The Great
Depression
U P DATED EDITION
EY E W I T N E S S H I S TO RY
The Great
Depression
U P DATED EDITION
David F. Burg
The Great Depression, Updated Edition
Copyright © 2005, 1996 by David F. Burg
Graphs copyright © 2005 by Infobase Publishing
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Burg, David F.
The Great Depression / by David F. Burg. — Updated ed.
p. cm —(Eyewitness history)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 0-8160-5709-5 (acid free paper)
1. United States—History—1933–1945—Juvenile literature. 2. United States—History—
1919–1933—Juvenile literature. 3. Depressions—1920—United States—Personal narratives—
Juvenile literature. 4. New Deal, 1933–1939—Personal narratives—Juvenile literature. I. Title.
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This book is printed on acid-free paper.
In memory of Laura Roth Johnson and Floris Johnson Burg
NOTE
ON
PHOTOS
Many of the illustrations and photographs used in this book are old, historical
images. The quality of the prints is not always up to modern standards, as in
some cases the originals are damaged.The content of the illustrations, however,
made their inclusion important despite problems in reproduction.
CONTENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Preface to the First Edition
Preface to the Updated Edition
Acknowledgments
Introduction
xi
xiii
xv
xvii
Prelude to Crisis: 1919–1928
Fateful Year on Wall Street: 1929
The Failure of Optimism: 1930–1933
The First New Deal: 1933–1934
The Second New Deal: 1935–1936
Storms Gather Abroad: 1937–1938
The Emerging War: 1939–1941
1
41
60
103
146
187
241
Appendix A: Documents
Appendix B: Biographies of Major Personalities
Appendix C: Graphs and Charts
Bibliography
Index
313
349
397
410
427
PREFACE TO THE
FIRST EDITION
Events of the present may be viewed as the past continuing to unfold. For
whether we like it or not, and whether for good or ill, we are all vitally connected to the past, involved in it through its enduring influences on our lives.
And if we doubt this statement, all we need to do is think about the personal
legacy of our parents and grandparents in our own lives. We may escape from
our ancestors, leave home forever and leave them to their deaths, but we only
fool ourselves if we think we are truly free of them.The past does not necessarily predetermine present and future events; but if we remain ignorant of the
past, then we cannot really understand the nature of our own lives now, and we
increase the risk of dooming ourselves to allowing the past to decide the continuing course of events. That is, in order to influence how the present and
future will develop, we must know the past—whether we speak of the collective human past or of our own personal lives. Surely that is reason enough to
study history. Surely that is more than reason enough to study the era of the
Great Depression, which has had such an enormous impact on subsequent
events worldwide and on the lives of people we know personally.
So what can we confidently know about the past? Any historic work probably should contain a warning to the reader. For despite protestations of objectivity, historians inevitably bring some bias to their accounts. Quantitative
analysis supposedly achieves objectivity; but interpretations of statistics depend
upon the thesis the analyst has begun with, the nature of the questionnaire or
other instrument used to gather data, and the formulas the analyst applies to
the data, not to mention the final “massaging” the analyst performs. A thesis
may prescribe outcomes by determining the questions asked; respondents
sometimes misinterpret questions, give misleading answers, or even lie; analysts
apply formulas that suit their own biases—we need only listen to how three
different economists, let us say, interpret the same set of economic data in order
to agree to the validity of this statement. If bias influences statistical analysis,
then it seems most unlikely it would not enter into narrative history.
For one thing, sources can be misleading, frequently on purpose. For
example, Herbert Hoover is known to have made numerous factual errors in
his Memoirs, so anyone who uses them should be wary; but how does one
know that in advance of reading them without knowledge of the subject and
of historic commentary? Inaccuracy, of course, is common in memoirs—recollections are often faulty or self-serving. In addition, the historian who interprets the sources cannot help bringing personal biases to the interpretation. If
the historian’s biases are clearcut, then fair enough. For example, no reader will
mistake that, in general, Robert S. McElvaine, in his highly readable The Great
xi
xii
The Great Depression
Depression, evidences some disdain for the Hoover administration and some
admiration for Roosevelt. Furthermore, concerning the historian’s bias, there is
an obvious problem involved in selecting materials and information. As the
great historian Charles A. Beard, not one to hide his own biases, once commented, “Writing any history is jut pulling a tomcat by its tail across a Brussels
carpet.” Only those tufts of wool that snag in the claws get used, but the vastness of the carpet and the intricacy of its design remain unpenetrated. And
there is still another problem. Regardless of how voluminous may be the writings, speeches, letters, memoirs, or recorded conversations any individual leaves
for the researcher to peruse, finally that individual’s ultimate motives and precepts remain elusive—sometimes they are purposely obscured, sometimes they
are not even known to the individual.You cannot, after all, get inside another
person’s mind. Eleanor Roosevelt once said of her husband, the president, that
she recognized he was a great man but that she did not really understand who
he was.
So the absolute truth about the past events cannot be known, but we can at
least approximate the truth closely enough to make knowledge of the past
both amply reliable and highly useful for understanding the present. That’s
what I have hoped to achieve for readers in this book. The central format of
the book—brief narrative overviews, chronologies and excerpts from sources—
lends itself, I believe, admirably to such an achievement by allowing the reader
to step into the era at any point. This format, along with the photographs,
biographies, texts of sources, and bibliography, also allows readers plenty of
scope for coming to their own understanding of the Great Depression.
Readers of this book are not told, “Here is exactly what happened and this is
how you should interpret it.”We read usually on our own, privately, in silence,
and the end result is of our own making. Reading a history is like reading a
novel—it finally means whatever it means to you personally. Just so, readers of
this book are left free to draw their own conclusions. But then, having said
that, I think I must add one final warning: Even I might be biased. Make your
own judgments.
PREFACE TO THE
UPDATED EDITION
For this edition I have provided significant new material to both the narrative
and the Eyewitness Testimony sections of every chapter as well as the biographies, and I have expanded the bibliography with scores of additional sources,
including many published since the original edition of this book appeared.
More than two dozen new photographs and charts have been added. And a
modest update of the introduction also provides some reflection on the legacies
of the New Deal informed by more recent scholarship.
To the narrative sections I have added extended commentary on the longterm effects emanating from the Treaties of Paris and Versailles that ended
World War I; commentary on Gertrude Ederle’s conquest of the English
Channel and curious fads of the 1920s; a lengthy insertion on the possible
causes of the Great Crash; a focus on the early achievements of Robert
Hutchins Goddard; an overview of the tax rebellions of the early 1930s; material on the youths of America joining the ranks of the hoboes; expanded treatment of the experiences of African Americans and women during the
depression years; a segment on the popularity of comic strips and comic books;
a discussion of horse racing and the career of Seabiscuit; insights into the
Roosevelts and the movie industry; and a sidelight on the development of
major art collections by American entrepreneurs. The Eyewitness Testimony
sections now contain new text reflecting the views of Eleanor Roosevelt;
Irving Fisher and other prominent economists; reminiscing hoboes; Franklin D.
Roosevelt in his fireside chats; and many other commentators. I sincerely hope
that readers will find all of this new material both interesting and valuable.
xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It is impossible to thank all of those whose work I have depended on in writing this book, so I would like to offer a blanket expression of appreciation to
scores of historians who have published books and articles on the depression
era. I would also like to thank, once again, the staff of the University of
Kentucky M. I. King Library, whose resources have always proven a splendid
benefit; I wish in particular to thank Thomas M. House for his help in the
library’s Photographic Archives, Special Collections. My thanks also go to the
staff of the Library of Congress, most especially Michael Cooper of the library’s
Photoduplication Service. And, as always, I wish to thank my wife, Helen
Rendlesham Burg, for her patience and support.
xv
INTRODUCTION
FROM THE FIRST EDITION
Some events have had such profound and enduring impact on subsequent history that they emerge from the past as pivotal events, forming a definable break
between what came before and what followed. The Great Depression of the
1930s stands out as such an event. Lasting for a decade, the depression and the
enormous social, economic, and political changes it wrought altered the course
of the entire remaining 20th century in ways that no one could have anticipated even as the 1920s were ending.
During the 1920s, American politicians and the general populace as well
may have been especially myopic about foreseeing the likelihood of the coming depression—let alone its enduring effects. P reoccupied with that decade’s
economic surge, t h ey appear in re t rospect to have enthusiastically embraced
the faith that the historic cycle of economic boom and bust had finally been
ove rcome and that the new prosperity would last forever. Some knew better,
of course. Among them, American farmers and bl a c k s , who mostly endure d
the prosperous decade of the twenties, we re struggling to survive. Others
suddenly began to sense their faith’s possible fragility when the Great Crash
of the New York stock market occurred in the fall of 1929. Although economic decline did not begin precisely at that moment, the crash was a wa rning of things to come.
The collapse of prosperity that followed in the early thirties took an
enormous toll. Millions of American workers lost their jobs, with no hope of
finding other work that could maintain their livelihoods. Fo l l owing the loss
of work ensued lost savings, lost homes, lost security, lost pride, and lost hope
for many who had never before experienced such extreme deprivation.
Investors went bankrupt, banks failed, factories closed, corporations
foundered, farmers lost their farms, sharecroppers lost everything. Politicians
initially displayed confidence but offered no solutions. The majority of
Americans who remained employed evidenced their compassion and caring
through communal efforts to re l i eve the hunger and homelessness of the less
fortunate. But private as well as state relief efforts have their limits, of course;
and as the depression persisted through 1932, the demand for remedial action
by the federal government grew.The hesitancy of President Herbert Hoover’s
administration to respond cost him reelection and swept Franklin Delano
Roosevelt into the pre s i d e n c y.
Roosevelt’s inauguration in March 1933 marked the beginning of an
unprecedented political transformation. The federal government would now
xvii
xviii
The Great Depression
assume varied roles that it had never before been expected to perform.
Although lacking a defined vision of a comprehensive, long-term plan for
change or of the potential outcomes his policies might effect, Roosevelt asserted the willingness to act, to experiment, and to improvise in hopes of overcoming the depression. His New Deal generated a vast array of economic and
social programs that largely endure to this day and have influenced the life of
every American alive during the past 70 years. These programs encouraged
labor unionization; instituted regulation of banking and investment; promoted
soil and forest conservation; funded massive public works projects; provided
oversight for interstate commerce, communications, and transportation; established a process for subsidizing and controlling agricultural production; and,
perhaps most important of all, created a social insurance system whose keystone is Social Security. The New Deal changed forever American social, economic, and political realities. Ironically, however, the bold experiment failed to
end the Great Depression.
In Europe and Asia the depression provided the context for the burgeoning
of extreme militaristic and nationalistic movements in Germany and Japan that
culminated in World War II, with its eruption of terrible destruction, horror,
and inhumanity.That war forced the United States to become not only a major
participant in world events but also the primary defender of democratic and
capitalistic systems in the cold war hostility with the Soviet Union (USSR)
that followed.That protector and policeman role persisted until the hegemony
of communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe began to unravel rapidly following the destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989. But many remnants of the
Great Depression endured through these cataclysmic events. As economic
cycles of growth and recession have continued, for example, governments
throughout the world have combatted the downturns with policies that were
initiated during the depression years.
In the United States, opponents of the New Deal legacy have continuously
battled against some federal and state programs it created—such as regulations
of commerce and relief payments—and others spawned in later years through
its ongoing momentum. Even now conservative candidates for the presidency
and the Congress campaign as advocates of dismantling or drastically revamping these programs, while liberal candidates ardently defend them and propose
their expansion. Both opponents and proponents thereby acknowledge that the
New Deal’s influence still pervades current U.S. social and economic systems.
Thus the ghost of the New Deal haunted the Capitol during the 1994
failed struggle to create a national health insurance system, a program the
Social Security Act of 1935 had overlooked. And as the debate over passage of
a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution proceeded in early 1995,
opponents invoked the presumed sanctity of Social Security—expressing their
fear its funding might be imperiled by the amendment—as ample reason to
vote against it. Major conflict has focused on revising the “welfare system,”
whose initial programs emerged during the New Deal, and on scrapping funding for the arts, a New Deal innovation that was phased out before World War
II and reemerged in altered form in the 1960s and 1970s. In just such ways,
and others probably more significant and pervasive, perhaps beneficial or perhaps detrimental, the legacy of the Great Depression endures. And the events of
70 years past continue to unfold into the future.
Introduction
FOR THE UPDATED EDITION
The overview presented in the original introduction still applies, as may be
affirmed, for example, by the continuing debate over the future of the Social
Security system. The administration of George W. Bush appears intent upon
promoting revision of that system to allow wage earners who so desire to
invest a certain percentage of their incomes that would be subject to the Social
Security tax in private investments rather than having it subsumed into the
Social Security fund. The impact such a change, if translated into law, would
have on the Social Security system and on the retirement prospects for the socalled baby boomers generation remains to be seen.
Deserving of mention here is recent scholarship arguing that the New
Deal, while widely viewed as having secured the primacy of traditional
American political liberalism and the various reform programs its adherents
had supported for many decades, actually subverted traditional liberalism in
favor of a collectivist-oriented liberalism (in other words, socialist or marxist), a
collectivist image of government, and the aggrandizement of power in the
presidency.This is not entirely a new argument but actually a revival of objections presented during the New Deal era by both conservative opponents and
disaffected liberals such as Senator Hiram Johnson, who at the time expressed
grave concerns that the New Deal, perhaps especially during the years 1935 to
1938, was propelling the nation toward socialism and dictatorship. It should be
pointed out, of course, that such concerns emerged within a background context of ascendant fascism and Stalinism in Europe and elsewhere.
This argument as currently stated is ably expressed by Gary Dean Best
in his The Retreat from Libera l i s m (2002). Best points out that traditional liberals sustained their faith in capitalism and its ability to reverse the depre ssion through rev ived and increased industrial pro d u c t i o n , while the new
c o l l e c t ivist liberals—Felix Frankfurter prominent among them, Best say s —
embraced the view that capitalism was either mori bund or dangerous (the
latter evidenced by fascism in Italy and Germ a ny) or both and there f o re
needed to be replaced by a collectivist system. The collectivist liberals had
been persuaded by the advocacy of Harold J. Laski, well-known British
Labour Party official and marxist, says Best. He quotes Rexford Tugwell as
stating that these new liberals perc e ived Congre s s ’s sole purpose to be transferring “wide emergency powers” to the White House. “Thus,” observes
Best, “the Congress elected by the people was not re g a rded as a partner in
government, nor even as part of a system of checks and balances, but as a
rubber stamp on policies formulated without public debate by the White
House junta.” Best adds, “The subsidization of America under the New Deal
for the sake of the leader’s political fortunes obscured the loss of liberty that
was taking place under it.” To the extent that the collectivist liberal agenda
succeeded, the New Deal failed totally in its efforts to remedy the depre ssion, in Best’s judgment. Whether Best’s view has validity will likely be
re s o l ved by the debate that is certain to develop over future ye a rs. What can
be said with certitude for now at least is that the collectivist liberal agenda
Best outlines foundered upon congressional and judicial opposition and
finally upon the pressing need for re n ewed dependence on America’s capitalist production system to confront the challenges of wa r. In short, events
xix
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The Great Depression
beyond the collectivist liberals’ influence or the president’s control determined the outcome. Nevertheless, the issues of governmental checks and
balances, the magnitude of presidential power, and rival visions of what the
nation’s government should be and do merit continuing argument—as they
have since the administration of George Washington.
1
Prelude to Crisis
1919–1928
THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
Although historians frequently cite 1929, the year of the Great Stock Market
Crash, as the beginning of the Great Depression, they generally agree that the
origins of the depression trace to the decade that preceded it and even to the
cataclysm of World War I that predicated major events of the twenties and
thirties. Certainly for the United States, World War I and its immediate aftermath, including the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, set the stage for subsequent trauma: the foundering of Woodrow Wilson’s presidency, postwar
disillusionment over the Allies’ aims, American isolationism, the Red Scare, race
riots, Prohibition, the emergence of the mob.
So the era of the Great Depression cannot be fully understood without
first garnering at least some modest knowledge of the decade that preceded it.
The Treaty of Versailles, finally signed on June 28, 1919, after months of haggling, is a good starting point. This controversial settlement partitioned the
Austro-Hungarian Empire into autonomous states; awarded the Danzig
(Gdańsk) corridor to Poland, dividing Prussia into separated areas; ceded Germany’s Saar coal mines to France; mandated Allied occupation of the
Rhineland for 15 years; granted the Allies the right to try Kaiser Wilhelm II for
war crimes; awarded German colonies in Africa to the Allies; and imposed a
monumental reparations bill on Germany—among other onerous stipulations.
The only concession that President Woodrow Wilson had won at the Paris
Peace Conference in his quest for a “just and honorable peace” based on his
Fourteen Points was the creation of the League of Nations (a precursor to the
United Nations). The harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Great Britain’s
prime minister David Lloyd George observed at the time, predestinated a German hunger for revenge and set the stage for a larger war within 25 years.
Whether the Treaty of Versailles directly fomented the advent of World
War II in Europe—and prevailing historical judgment argues that it did not—
the treaty’s terms, perceived by the Germans to be a “dictated peace” (Diktat),
most certainly provided the catalyst for resurgent German nationalism and the
political destabilization of the Weimar Republic during the 1920s. The treaty’s
stipulations bred the widespread view among Germans that their generals and
politicians had betrayed them—that they had been “stabbed in the back” and
1
2 The Great Depression
forced to accept a dishonorable peace settlement that violated Wilson’s Fourteen Points, even though they had never actually been defeated. As peoples’
actions and responses derive from their perceptions of reality, from what they
believe to be true but more than likely is not, so for the Germans the prevailing view of the Diktat provided a compelling dogma that generated desires for
exoneration, remediation, and vengeance. Adolf Hitler and other extremists
would exploit these perceptions and desires aggressively.The Weimar Republic,
plagued as well by severe economic turmoil and inflation resulting largely from
the financial burdens imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, foundered as a consequence. Furthermore, in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Asia, and Africa,
the Peace of Paris and its related developments established conditions and mandates—including arbitrary boundaries for new nations in the Balkans, creation
of Iraq under British control, denial of promised Arab independence, recognition of the Zionist movement’s claims for inhabiting areas of Palestine, and
other circumstances—whose repercussions continue to trouble the world to
the present time.
Ironically, the one concession Wilson achieved, the League of Nations,
proved to be his undoing. On July 10, the president personally delivered the
Treaty of Versailles (264 pages in length) to the U.S. Senate; the treaty would
have to be approved by a two-thirds vote. The Senate rejected the treaty in
November and again in March 1920 on a second consideration. The major
reservation to the treaty motivating his Senate opponents was recognition of
and membership in the League of Nations.
Wilson, his health destroyed by his strenuous effort to secure ratification
(he had traversed more than 8,000 miles in a single month of speech-making)
and his stature reduced by the vitriolic comments of Senate opponents such as
Henry Cabot Lodge and William E. Borah, was a broken man, unable to fulfill
his duties after suffering a stroke.
PROHIBITION, RACISM, LABOR UNREST
Coincident with the struggle over the treaty came the onset of Prohibition.
The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution secured ratification by the
requisite number of states in January 1919. In October 1919, Congress passed
the Volstead Act, enabling legislation for enforcement of Prohibition to begin
in January 1920. The act defined an “intoxicating” beverage as one containing
more than 0.5 percent alcohol and resulted in creation of the bootlegging
industry to satisfy Americans’ desire for stronger stuff. Gangster “Scarface” Al
Capone moved from New York to Chicago to be in the right place to take best
advantage of the boot-legging opportunities presented. Within a few years he
had 700 hoodlums and the suburb of Cicero under his complete control.
Chicago was also the scene of one of the worst race riots of the century.
Demobilized African-American troops, believing their contribution to the
fighting had earned them a better stake in America, found a new spokesman
for militancy in Marcus Garvey when they returned home from Europe and
World War I. But whites had little desire to make concessions, and race riots
broke out all over the nation in the summer of 1919. In the Chicago riot,
which lasted 13 days, 38 people died and more than 500 were injured, mostly
blacks. Partly in reaction to the riots but also reflecting a rising intolerance of
Prelude to Crisis 3
immigrants, Jews, and Catholics, the Ku Klux Klan experienced a rebirth in the
early twenties, gaining enormous political clout not only in the southern states
but also in some states of the Midwest and even the Pacific Coast.Through the
efforts of Edward Y. Clarke of the Southern Publicity Association and Imperial
Wizard Hiram W. Evans, the Klan attained some 4.5 million members by the
end of 1924.
The social and political tensions that racial animosity exposed were made
worse by labor unrest in the fall of 1919 in the midst of a postwar depression
that threw hundreds of thousands out of work while the cost of living spiraled
upward. In September the Boston police went on strike, demanding higher
wages and better working conditions. Subsequent riots and looting resulted in
the intervention of the Massachusetts militia.The police capitulated and agreed
to return to duty; but the police commissioner, supported by Governor Calvin
Coolidge, dismissed them all and hired a new force. Also in September,
300,000 steelworkers, some belonging to the American Federation of Labor
(AFL), began a nationwide strike to secure a shorter workweek—in some mills
the workers toiled seven days a week, 12 hours each day.Violence followed in
Members of the Ku Klux Klan
parading down Pennsylvania Avenue,
Washington, D.C., 1926 (Library
of Congress)