The Management
Centre
Research Papers
EXPLORING THE PARADOX OF
UNIONISED WORKER
DISSATISFACTION
By
David Guest
& Neil Conway
Research Paper 022
Subject area: Human Resource Management and
Employment Relations
July 2003
Further information may be found at the Centre’s web site: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/pse/mancen
THE MANAGEMENT CENTRE
RESEARCH PAPERS
EXPLORING THE PARADOX OF
UNIONISED WORKER DISSATISFACTION
By
David Guest
& Neil Conway
Research Paper 022
Subject area: Human Resource Management and
Employment Relations
To request a paper please contact Mrs. Cherry Combes at the following address:
The Management Centre
King's College, University of London
Franklin-Wilkins Building
150 Stamford Street
London SE1 9NN
United Kingdom.
Tel/Fax: +44-(0)20-7848 4532
Email: [email protected]
Corresponding Author:
Professor David Guest
The Management Centre
King's College, University of London
Franklin-Wilkins Building
150 Stamford Street
London SE1 9NN
United Kingdom.
Tel/Fax: +44-(0)20-7848 4252
Email: [email protected]
2
EXPLORING THE PARADOX OF
UNIONISED WORKER DISSATISFACTION
By
David E Guest*
&
Neil Conway†
Abstract
This paper explores the apparent paradox that while unions exist to promote the interests and
well-being of their members, UK survey evidence consistently shows that union members
report lower levels of job satisfaction than non-union workers. A review and further analysis
of the evidence confirms that this difference persists after controlling for other factors such as
type of work. If union member dissatisfaction reflects a form of voice, then we might expect
to see resulting gains. An analysis of data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations
Survey indicates that any gains are modest. Evidence is presented to suggest that although
management has become less hostile to trade unions, a degree of anti-union sentiment
remains, sometimes leading to a muffling of the union voice, and this helps to account for
some of the union member dissatisfaction.
*
DAVID GUEST, (corresponding author), The Management Centre, School of Social Science & Public Policy,
King's College, University of London, Franklin-Wilkins Building, 150 Stamford Street, London SE1 9NN,
United Kingdom.
Tel/Fax: +44-(0)20-7848 4252, Email: [email protected]
†
Neil Conway, School of Management and Organizational Psychology, Birkbeck College, University of
London
3
Exploring the Paradox of Union Member Dissatisfaction
The paradox of unionized worker dissatisfaction is a simple and familiar one. The core role
of unions is to promote the interests and well-being of their members; yet union members are
consistently shown to be more dissatisfied than non-union workers both with the experience
of work and with their voice in the workplace. This difference persists, even after controlling
for a range of background factors. Does this mean that unions are failing their members?
Alternatively, is this dissatisfaction a sign of the success of unions in raising the political
consciousness and expectations of their members? This paper explores these issues in the
context of theories about why workers belong to trade unions and using a variety of
contemporary UK data sets that can shed light on the competing explanations. The evidence
can be interpreted to support both views of unions as failing and as succeeding for their
members, leading to a need for tighter theoretical specification. There is also evidence that
union effectiveness continues to be severely constrained by management’s capacity to muffle
the union voice.
Interest in the relationship between trade unions and job satisfaction can be traced to a wider
interest, particularly among labour economists, in the impact of unions on behaviour and
performance at work. Hirschman’s (1970) analysis highlighted the choice for dissatisfied
workers between exit and voice; in other words, dissatisfied workers could either leave the
organization or use channels such as the union to express their grievances and seek redress.
Freeman and Medoff (1984) took this analysis forward arguing explicitly that one of the main
functions of unions was to provide voice. In so doing unions would be associated with lower
labour turnover which would be to the benefit of the organization.
The early research suggested that while unions may reflect voice, use of voice did not result
in a reduction in dissatisfaction. A series of American studies (see, for example, Berger,
Ohlson and Boudreau, 1983; Hersch and Stone, 1990; Schwocau, 1987) have provided
support for this conclusion. However within-organization studies by Gordon and De Nisi
(1995) and Buttigieg and Iverson (1997) raise some questions about the generality of these
findings. The normal explanation, embedded in most of these studies, is that unions have a
role in raising the political awareness and the expectations of their members and this explains
why they remain dissatisfied. An alternative and less fully explored explanation is that the
voice goes unheard and therefore they remain dissatisfied. This explanation can deal less
4
easily with why workers then continue to belong to a union.
However before accepting the
politicization hypothesis, the alternative at least needs to be tested.
This paper starts by presenting evidence about job satisfaction and its association with trade
unions. In so doing, it goes further than an analysis of union membership to incorporate union
recognition and density as well as a measure of management attitudes towards unions.
Secondly it reviews theories about why workers join and remain with trade unions. Thirdly it
presents evidence about the consequences of union membership for workers and seeks
explanations for these consequences. Finally, the results are reviewed and some emphasis is
placed upon the role of management.
Evidence on the Satisfaction of Union and Non-Union Workers
Job satisfaction is a widely researched issue, partly because it is considered to be a central
concern to workers and partly because of the optimistic assumption that a satisfied worker
will be a productive worker. Despite occasional headlines about how job satisfaction has
collapsed and about the low levels of job satisfaction of British workers compared with those
from most other countries, all the evidence shows that a strong majority of workers report
satisfaction with their work (for a review see Guest and Conway, 1999b). Typical figures
show that on global measures between 65 and 80 per cent report satisfaction, up to 15 per
cent report dissatisfaction and the rest are neutral.
When specific facets of satisfaction are
explored, as was the case in the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) (Cully et al,
1999), the results depend on the issues covered. Therefore WERS, which examined
satisfaction with pay, achievement, respect and influence, showed a lower overall
satisfaction, based on the average score across the items, of 54 per cent with 19 per cent
dissatisfied. The evidence from sources such as the British Household Survey panel also
suggests that there has been a slight decline in satisfaction over the past ten years, more
particularly among those expressing strong satisfaction (Oswald and Gardner, 2000). Finally,
far from being the most dissatisfied, in any European league, the UK comes in the middle of
the job satisfaction table.
In the present context, the key issue is the relative satisfaction of union and non-union
members. Table 1 presents the basic descriptive results for the four WERS items.
5
Table 1: Job Satisfaction Among Union
and Non-Union Members in the WERS Sample‡
Non-union Union
%
Amount of pay
Satisfied
Neutral
Dissatisfied
36.7
24.4
39.0
34.1
22.2
43.7
Sense of achievement
Satisfied
Neutral
Dissatisfied
65.3
21.0
12.7
59.6
22.2
18.3
Respect from management
and supervision
Satisfied
Neutral
Dissatisfied
62.7
19.4
17.9
51.9
21.8
26.3
Influence over the job
Satisfied
Neutral
Dissatisfied
62.3
25.2
12.5
53.3
27.1
19.5
The WERS results confirm that union members are consistently less satisfied than non-union
workers.
These differences are, as we might expect, statistically significant. Results from
the analysis of other samples shows a somewhat similar pattern. For example, if we look at
the evidence from one of the annual CIPD surveys, based on a representative sample of
workers, where a global question is used, we find that 42.6 per cent of non-union workers but
only 31.3 per cent of union members say they are very satisfied, 39.9 per cent compared with
40.4 per cent say they are “quite satisfied” while 17.4 per cent of non-union and 28.3 per cent
of union members say they are either “just about” or “not at all” satisfied. These differences
are statistically significant§.
The problem with these simple comparisons is that they fail to control for a number of
obvious factors such as occupation, income and gender. We need to take as many of these as
possible into account and see if the trade union factor remains significant. Table 2 shows the
results of regression analyses based on the WERS data covering just over 28,000 workers and
‡
There are just under 11,000 trade union members in the sample and about 17,000 who do not belong to a
union. Of these, about 5150 are ex-union members. The responses of these ex-union members tend to fall
between the two larger groups but to be closer on most issues to the other non-union workers. There is some
variation in the precise response rate across items.
6
two years of the survey of British workers conducted annually for the CIPD and which covers
2000 workers. In each case we used the same set of background variables to explore different
levels of job satisfaction. In the case of the WERS sample, the analysis is based on the
combined average of the four items; for the CIPD sample, it is based on responses to the
single item on overall satisfaction with the job which is referred to above.
Table 2. What Explains Variations in Job Satisfaction?**
n
Tenure
Permanent contract
Hours worked
Male
Education
Age
Blue-collar worker
White-collar worker
Service and sales worker
Earnings
Trade union member
CIPD
Surveys
2000
WERS
-.052*
.042
.003
-.104***
-.063*
.058
-.109***
-.058*
.042
.088**
-.105***
-.091***
.040***
-.060***
-.092***
-.034***
.090***
-.141***
-.102***
.013
.079***
-.121***
28147
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001
The results are remarkably similar for the two different samples. Both show clearly that even
after controlling for a range of background factors such as type of work, tenure, hours and
earnings, trade union members are more dissatisfied than non-members. Furthermore, union
membership is one of the items with the highest beta weight, exceeded, in both samples, only
by being a blue-collar worker. This suggests that the dissatisfaction may be something to do
with being a union member.
§
These figures for the CIPD survey are based on data collected in 1997. In the more recent surveys we have
asked about “work” rather than “job” satisfaction and with this change in wording the differences between
union and non-union workers become smaller.
**
In this and all subsequent regressions, we report standardised beta weights. With large samples, many of
these will be statistically significant but will explain very little of the variation in responses. With the large
WERS sample, any beta weight below about .060 will be likely to demonstrate only a marginal effect size.
7
One possibility is that the dissatisfaction among union members is a product of different
treatment of workers in settings where unions are recognized or where there is a high level of
union density.
We can explore this with the WERS data and the results for both job
satisfaction and the measure of ratings of employer-employee relations are shown in Table 3.
We have slightly extended the variables in the analysis. The key additional variables are a
measure of union recognition, a measure of union density, reflected in over 50 per cent of
workers at the establishment being members, and a measure of how workers’ perceived
management’s attitude to unions which was measured on a three point scale from being in
favour, being neutral or being opposed. In this context it is important to note that union
members consider management to be much more in favour of trade unions than nonunionists. 30.2 per cent of them believe that management in their workplace is in favour of
unions while 18.4 per cent say they are opposed. Among non-union workers, the figures are
9.3 per cent and 34.6 per cent respectively.
The remainder in both groups say that
management is neutral. We have also added in measures of the size of both organization and
establishment.
The results reveal that union membership continues to show a strong negative association
with job satisfaction and is also associated with a poorer assessment of relations between
managers and employees. Trade union recognition has an independent additional association
with lower satisfaction and a poorer assessment of employment relations. In this context,
recognition appears to be more important than trade union density††. Finally, where workers
believe that management is opposed to trade unions, ratings of job satisfaction and
employment relations are poorer. This results applies just as much to non-union as to union
members.
It appears that a perceived anti-union stance on the part of management, a
perception more likely to be held by non-union than by union members, may reflect a wider
set of policies and practices that in turn are associated with lower job satisfaction and poorer
employment relations. In other words, it will often be non-union workers in establishments
where management is opposed to trade unions who express lower satisfaction and poorer
employment relations.
††
We also explored the data using a union membership density of 75%+ but it made very little difference to the
results.
8
Table 3:
Factors Associated with Satisfaction and Positive Ratings of Employment
Relations
Job
Satisfaction
Employment
Relations
Tenure
Temporary contract
Fixed-term contract
Hours
Male
Educational qualifications
Occupation – professional
Occupation – white collar
Occupation – blue collar
Occupation – sales
Occupation – other
Earnings
Trade union member
Union recognition
Trade union density 50%+
Management not in favour of trade unions
Organization size – large organization
Size of establishment
-.063*
.024*
.016
-.156*
-.106*
-.085*
-.090*
-.106*
-.113*
.041*
-.041*
.251*
-.118*
-.060*
-.023
-.232*
-.050*
-.029*
-.105*
.006
.014
-.084*
-.053*
-.048*
-.055*
-.061*
-.134*
.015
-.053*
.074*
-.120*
-.090*
-.024
-.282*
-.034*
-.087*
Adj. R2
.128
.160
* p=<0.001
In summary, these results suggest that trade unions, whether reflected in individual
membership or in union recognition at the workplace, are associated with lower levels of job
satisfaction and a poorer assessment of employment relations. In addition, a perceived antiunion stance on the part of management, which may be a proxy for a wider range of policies
and practices, also has a strong negative association with satisfaction and with ratings of the
state of employment relations.
9
Explanations for Differences in Satisfaction
Possible explanations for the lower satisfaction among union-members can be found in theory
about why workers belong to trade unions and theory of management behaviour in
employment relations. While there is extensive theory about union joining (Guest and Dewe,
1988, Gallie, 1996), there is rather less on membership maintenance and on why people leave
unions. There are four potentially complementary explanations for joining, and in some cases
maintaining membership of a trade union. The first is that workers join unions because of
dissatisfaction with management. In other words, dissatisfaction is treated as the independent
or causal variable in the analysis. However more complex mechanisms are required to explain
why voice is preferred to exit (Hirschman, 1970) and why membership would be maintained
once the source of dissatisfaction had been removed or once union pressure has failed to deal
with the issues. At this point, the explanation is likely to become subsumed within the other
models presented below so this dissatisfaction model will not be pursued further.
A second explanation, and the one that is most strongly supported in the literature, is that
workers join unions primarily for instrumental reasons. In other words, they will gain by
being members of a union. Traditionally, the strongest claim has been the union wage mark
up but unions can promote a wide range of workers’ interests and the theory simply states
that, given the opportunity, workers will join and remain members of a trade union as long as
they perceive that they gain from doing so. A slightly more elaborate version would be that
the benefits of membership outweigh the costs. This rational model implies that membership
will only be maintained if workers are satisfied that the union is delivering benefits that
outweigh the costs of membership. On the assumption that we are not dealing with new
union members‡‡, according to this model membership should be associated with evidence of
objective benefits and subjective satisfaction.
A third explanation for union membership, which can be seen in some respects as a variant of
the instrumental model, is that the union provides a protective or security role. This is also
sometimes described as a social insurance role. While the collective protection of the union is
‡‡
This appears to be a valid assumption in the UK. According to the evidence from WERS, there has been no
acceleration in union member drop-out but there has been a marked failure to recruit new members either in
greenfield sites or among young workers. An analysis reported by Coats (2001) suggests that in 2001 only 18
per cent of employee aged 18-29 belonged to a trade union in the UK compared with 43 per cent in 1983.
Furthermore, he notes that employment growth is likely to be strongest in areas where unions are weakest.
10
the key, the concern is often less with collective redundancies than with cases where
individuals are selected out for harsh treatment either by the organization or individual
managers. The security model – what we might call a negative instrumentality – offers
ambiguous predictions about general satisfaction. It may not remove the root cause of
dissatisfaction or insecurity but may affect its consequences. In this context, the union in
effect serves as a monitor of management practice, ensuring fairness and delivery of
obligations and commitments. We might therefore expect to see higher levels of fairness and
this in turn might be linked to higher satisfaction. In the public sector, for example, where
workers are traditionally more reluctant to leave, this may be one of the important functions
of a union. We might also expect to see the union playing a role in limiting redundancy and
therefore ensuring higher levels of job security.
The final explanation for union membership is based on a notion of collective solidarity. In
the past, this may have been class or craft-based but increasingly, in so far as it can be
sustained, it appears to be linked to some form of professional or occupational identity.
Although there is little support for traditional class-related concepts of solidarity as a basis for
union membership, there is some evidence, for example in the list presented by Kelly (1998)
of unions that grew in membership in the 1980s and 1990s, to support a view that
professional or occupational solidarity now affects union joining. Kelly has incorporated
elements of the solidarity model into his mobilization theory to highlight the process whereby
the union promotes a sense of identity that is distinct from the employer, raising awareness of
“them and us” and thereby aligning union membership with dissatisfaction both with the
employer, the experience of work and the scope to represent views through collective voice.
This analysis might explain how higher expectations are created and how failure to meet
these might be reflected in lower job satisfaction and more negative assessments of
employment relations. On the other hand, if this approach is to be successful, it should be
reflected in superior outcomes – unless a sense of solidarity based on dissatisfaction with
frustrated expectations is an end in itself, something which the model does not seriously
suggest. In other words, within this perspective, the success of trade unions should be
reflected in the superior outcomes of mobilization.
Each of the models suggests that workers join unions in the expectation of benefits of some
sort.
By implication, unions will retain membership as long as they can sustain the
11
expectation of future benefits. This raises the question of whether, despite or perhaps partly
because of the higher levels of dissatisfaction among union members, union membership and
union recognition are associated with superior outcomes. Both the WERS and CIPD data sets
provide an opportunity to explore some of these outcomes. The next section presents the
results of this analysis.
Are There Benefits to Union Membership?
There are a number of instrumental benefits that might be expected to derive from union
membership and/or the presence of a recognised trade union in the workplace. These are
essentially a function of trade union bargaining power. Firstly, there has been longstanding
interest in the impact of unions on wages and in particular in the notion of a union mark-up,
so we might expect union members to report higher pay, after controlling for other factors.
On the same basis, we might also expect unions to promote equal opportunities, including
equal pay, better working conditions including family-friendly practices and greater access to
training and we might expect this to be reported by members. From a slightly different
perspective we might expect to see a relationship between union membership and more
particularly union recognition and greater consultation both over personal issues and
workplace issues and we might expect to find unions associated with greater worker influence
over decisions about their work. These aspects of voice, reflected in greater direct and
representative participation should in turn be associated with a greater sense of fairness of
treatment. With respect to the security or protection role, we would expect to see greater job
security and access to a union representative who has the potential to provide protection. We
can explore most of these issues within the WERS data set. The exception, the question of
fairness, can be explored using the CIPD surveys.
Unions’ association with pay, training and family-friendly practices
The relationship between trade unions and pay has been a focus of study over a number of
years. The general impression from a range of often unpublished studies is that the union
mark up, the gain in pay associated with union membership, declined during the last two
decades of the twentieth century. This and related issues have been closely examined by
Millward, Forth and Bryson (2001) in an analysis of the panel data and other evidence from
the sequence of WIRS/WERS surveys. The analysis is complicated because the measure of
12
pay in WERS is based on responses to a set of bands and it will therefore be difficult to pick
up subtle differences. It is also based on average earnings including overtime and this may
offer further distortion. If we look at the extremes, in 1998 46.9 per cent of non-union
members but only 21.4 per cent of union members earn less than £180.00 per week while
24.9 per cent of non-union and 41.6 per cent of union members earn more than £430 per
week. These differences look dramatic but fail to take account of hours worked.
The analysis summarized in Table 4 explores the relation between key union variables and
average pay. In Table 4 and in subsequent regressions, while we have included the various
background variables in the analysis, they are not shown in the table. Instead we focus on the
union-related variables and at the same time compare the public and private sectors since
unions have a much stronger public sector presence. For union density we take an arbitrary
cut-off of 50 per cent. The results show that after controlling for other factors there is a small
positive association between union membership and pay and between union density and pay.
Union recognition has no association with pay. The association with union membership is
stronger in the public sector while the association with union density is stronger in the private
sector.
Millward, Forth and Bryson (2001) have undertaken an analysis that provides more subtle
distinctions on both pay and union density and they find little consistent evidence of the
union mark up§§. Furthermore, the advantage that remains may soon disappear since workers
in the main bargaining unit in the multi-union plants reported smaller pay increases in 1998.
As Millward, Forth and Bryson conclude:
“This is consonant with the long-term decline in influence that British unions have
experienced in the 1980 and 1990s. It suggests that any pay premium for unionized
employees will become confined to a smaller and smaller portion of those covered by
collective bargaining. Indeed, it may gradually disappear in the future, unless the
causes of union weakness are addressed” (op cit p.34)
§§
In their analysis, private sector employees covered by collective bargaining receive a non-significant extra 3
per cent pay. When density of membership falls between 70 and 99 per cent, then the pay difference rises to 9
per cent. But in the same workplaces there is a 16 per cent advantage for non-union members. Surprisingly,
however if 100 per cent of employees are covered by collective bargaining, there is no wage advantage.
13
Table 4: Regression Analysis on Instrumental Benefits of Union Membership
n=
Average pay
Trade union member
Union recognition
Union density 50%+
Management hostile to unions
Adj R2
Training days
Trade union member
Union recognition
Union density 50%+
Management hostile to unions
Adj R2
Family-friendly practices
Trade union member
Union recognition
Union density 50%+
Management hostile to unions
Adj R2
Private
Sector
19,363
Public
Sector
8,859
Total
.028*
-.002
.089*
-.017
.672
.058*
.019
-.020
-.010
.716
.042*
.004
.039*
-.012
.680
.028
-.017
.011
-.073*
.123
.057*
-.011
.010
-.040*
.192
.062*
.013
.014
-.070*
.164
.010
.041*
-.065*
-.065*
.112
-.047*
.045*
-.053*
-.093*
.184
.000
.072*
-.074*
-.085*
.151
28,222
* = p<.001
Turning to the second potential advantage of union membership, access to training, the core
question on training asks about number of days of training provided by the employer in the
past 12 months. This is again based on bands such as “5 to less than 10 days” and is therefore
subject to similar distortion to the data for pay. The results show that union members receive
more training. Among non-union members, 43.7 had no training provided by their employer
in the past 12 months compared with 35.8 per cent of union members. A serious amount of
training, reflected in five or more days in the past year, was reported by 15.5 per cent of nonunion members and 21.1 per cent of union members. After controlling for other factors, the
apparent extra training enjoyed by union members in the private sector has disappeared
although it persists in the public sector. Union density and recognition have no significant
association with number of training days while management opposition to unions is
associated with less training.
14
The third area of potential advantage to union members is access to family-friendly practices.
In WERS, these are covered in a question asking “If you personally needed any of these
arrangements, would they be available at this workplace?” The list includes flexible working
hours, job sharing, parental leave, working from home and help with child care. Union
members reported more job sharing (available to 19.8 per cent compared with 13.3 per cent
of non-unionists), more scope for parental leave (31.5 per cent compared with 24.4 per cent
of non-unionists) and more provision of a workplace nursery or help with the cost of child
care (5.4 per cent compared with 3.1 per cent of non-unionists).
However non-union
members had more scope to work flexible hours (34.2 per cent compared with 30.0 per cent
of union members) and more opportunity to work at or from home (10.4 per cent compared
with 7.2 per cent of union members). In the analysis in Table 4 we counted the number of
items under the broad heading of family-friendly practices about which there was a positive
response.
The results for the combined count of family-friendly practices produce somewhat
contradictory results. In both public and private sectors, union recognition is associated with
more reported practices but a union density above 50 per cent is associated with fewer
practices. Individual union membership is not associated with more practices; indeed in the
public sector it is associated with fewer. On a more consistent note, where management is
reported as hostile to unions, there are fewer family-friendly practices in place.
Taken together, these results for pay, training and family-friendly practices point to very
modest benefits for union members. If we look just at the private sector, the associations are
particularly weak and no clear pattern emerges. Union density seems more important for pay
and union recognition for family-friendly practices. We should also bear in mind that some
of the measures are rather crude and that the size effects are invariably very small. In
summary, there appear to be some marginal, inconsistent and probably declining benefits
associated with trade union membership and a significant trade union presence in the
workplace. This could be interpreted as indicating weak support for an instrumental model.
The one consistent finding across both sectors is that where management is hostile towards
trade unions, then there is likely to be less training provision and fewer family-friendly
practices in place. Since we have shown that these are not directly linked to the presence of a
15
union, this suggests that management hostility to unions may be reflecting some deeper
underlying antipathy towards investment in workers and worker welfare in general.
The other factor we should bear in mind is that despite some possible marginal benefits to pay
of union membership, on the basis of the evidence from the worker responses in WERS,
union members remain more dissatisfied with pay. This may reflect expectations. On the
other hand, Bryson and McKay (1997) reporting on the British Social Attitudes Survey,
found that union recognition was associated with being less likely to report that pay was “on
the low side” but more likely to believe that the gap between the lowest and the highest pay is
“too big”. This could be interpreted as evidence of some sort of politicization where a union
is present.
Unions’ association with employee voice and scope for participation
Three sets of questions in WERS address aspects of employee voice. The first asked whether
workers had discussed a set of personal issues with their supervisor during the past 12
months. The items presented cover how you are getting on with your job, promotion chances,
training needs and pay. The second set asked how often “you and others working here are
asked for your views on any of the following” and then listed future plans for the workplace,
staffing issues including redundancy, changes to working practices, pay issues and health and
safety at work. A four-point scale ranged from frequently through sometimes and hardly ever
to never. Table 5 shows the average response across the items.
The third set of items are
concerned with job autonomy and asked about amount of influence over the range of tasks
you do, the pace at which you work and how you do your work. Responses were sought on a
four-point scale from a lot through some and a little to none. Table 5 shows the average
response across each of the three sets of questions.
The descriptive results appear to show little consistent difference between union and nonunion workers. Once again the results must be considered in the context of other variables in
a regression analysis that controls for a range of background factors. The results for the
union-related variables are shown in Table 6. For each of the three aspects of voice we have
averaged the scores of the various items.
16
Table 5: Unions and worker voice
Non-union
Worker
%
Voice on personal issues
% who have discussed with their supervisor or
manager in the past 12 months
How they are getting on with the job
Chances of promotion
Training needs
Pay
Union
Member
%
58.3
20.2
44.4
33.7
57.5
19.3
50.7
19.4
49.1
28.6
59.9
28.3
60.6
49.7
33.8
62.6
26.0
68.3
Voice on workplace issues
% saying they and others are asked for views
“frequently” or “sometimes” about
Future plans for the workplace
Staffing issues including redundancy
Changes to workplace practices
Pay issues
Health and safety at work
Job autonomy
% saying they have “a lot” or “some”
influence over
The range of tasks you do in your job
The pace at which you work
How you do your work
66.1
72.6
83.9
62.9
66.8
82.2
Judgements about what constitutes “a lot” or “a little” autonomy or “frequent” consultation
are inevitably partly subjective and it is possible that trade union membership and a union
presence raise expectations. Whatever the reason, after controlling for other variables, union
membership is consistently associated with reports of lower voice and autonomy. The same
tends to hold true, albeit to different degrees, for union recognition and union density.
Management hostility to unions is consistently more strongly associated with lower levels of
voice and autonomy. In summary, union factors are associated with slightly less voice and
autonomy. This is contrary to what we might expect and may result from a combination of
high expectations and the influence of management. Bryson and McKay (1997) report
similar findings from the British Social Attitudes Survey and suggest that it reflects
expectations rather than real differences in voice.
17
Table 6: Regression analysis of factors associated with employee voice
Private
sector
Voice on personal issues
Trade union member
Union recognition
Union density 50%+
Management hostile to unions
Adj R2
Public
sector
Total
-.003
-.040*
-.086*
-.041*
-.043*
-.023
-.064*
-.020
-.044*
-.062*
-.080*
-.064*
.198
.130
.169
Voice on workplace issues
Trade union membership
Union recognition
Union density 50%+
Management hostile to unions
Adj R2
-.009
-.047*
-.024
-.048*
-.036*
-.019
-.049*
.010
-.004
-.184* -.199*
-.196*
.124
.098
.117
Workplace autonomy
Trade union membership
Union recognition
Union density 50%+
Management hostile to unions
Adj R2
-.083*
-.009
-.072*
-.086*
-.110*
-.014
-.033*
-.030*
-.058*
-.091* -.116*
-.101*
.116
.061
.091
* = p<0.001
Even if union voice fails to result in significant substantive benefits, we might expect it to
lead to procedural advantages. Yet evidence from the CIPD surveys, presented elsewhere
(Guest and Conway, 1999a) shows that union members report significantly lower levels of
fairness of treatment with respect to a range of issues than non–union workers and this
difference persists after a range of control measures are introduced.
Union membership and employment security
The third reason for union membership listed in the earlier section emphasizes the role of the
trade union as a source of protection. The obvious aspect of this is job security. A related
issue that we are able to explore through WERS is the extent to which workers have contact
with, and presumably therefore access to a workers’ representative should they need
“protection” or representation. On the single item question “Do you agree or disagree that
your job is secure in this workplace?”, 63.7 per cent of non-unionists agreed that it was
secure compared with 54.0 per cent of union members while 15.6 of non-union workers and
18
25.2 per cent of union members disagreed, implying a degree of insecurity. These differences
are statistically significant suggesting that union members feel more insecure. However
union members may work in more vulnerable sectors and this needs to be taken into account
in the context of a regression analysis controlling for background factors such as sector.
On the second issue, 66.3 per cent of union members and 16.4 per cent of non-union workers
said they had frequent or occasional contact with a union or workers’ representative about
workplace matters. 21.4 per cent of union members and 26.4 per cent of non-union members
said they never have any contact with a representative while 8.7 per cent of union members
and 55.5 per cent of non-union workers do not know any workers’ representative.
A
surprisingly large 3.2 per cent of union members and 0.8 per cent of non-union workers said
they were representatives. A related question asked who would ideally represent you in
dealing with managers if you want to make a complaint or if management wants to discipline
you. In making a complaint, 44.1 per cent of union members and 10.1 per cent of non-union
workers would prefer a union representative. A majority of both would prefer to speak for
themselves. In the context of discipline, 70.7 per cent of union members and 13.8 per cent of
union-union workers say they would prefer to be represented by a union. All this suggests
that for a majority of union members, the union is perceived to play a potentially useful
protective role. Nevertheless, despite the objective evidence from WERS of fewer sanctions
and dismissals where a union is recognized (Cully et al, 1999), union members still feel less
secure in their jobs.
As usual, it is necessary to separate out the role of trade union membership from the influence
of union recognition and density and a range of other background factors. The results of the
relevant regressions are shown in Table 7. Once again we have analysed them for both the
public and private sectors.
19
Table 7: Regressions for unions and security
Private
sector
Public
sector
Total
Job Security
Trade union membership
Union recognition
Union density 50%+
Management hostile to union
Adj R2
-.080*
-.069*
-.057*
-.139*
.081
-.066*
-.023
.064*
-.113*
.082
-.074*
-.079*
-.001
-.132*
.075
Contact with a Worker Representative
Trade union membership
Union recognition
Union density 50%+
Management hostile to unions
Adj R2
.331*
.037*
.104*
-.079*
.299
.268*
.035*
.048*
-.040*
.171
.327*
.048*
.078*
-.069*
.259
* = p<0.001
The results confirm that unions are associated with lower job security, more particularly in
the private sector, a result also reported by Bryson and MacKay (1997). Once again size
effects are generally small. Union density appears to show the opposite association in the
public and private sectors. Since there is some evidence that unions are associated with fewer
dismissals, it is possible again that this reflects the consciousness-raising role of trade unions
in the workplace. On the other hand, it may reflect a realistic assessment of what is actually
happening.
Millward, Forth and Bryson (2001) have investigated this possibility by
examining employment patterns in unionized and non-union settings. Using the panel data in
WERS, they were able to show that in private industry the presence of a recognized trade
union was associated with an increased chance of closure in the manufacturing sector. This
association was not present in the service sector***.
Their analysis shows that unions were
associated with slower labour growth in the 1980s and that this trend continued in the 1990s.
Between 1990 and 1998, labour in non-union plants in the private sector grew by an average
of 1.4 per cent per annum while in unionized workplaces it declined, on average, by 1.8 per
cent per annum. The downward influence of unions was stronger in the service than in the
manufacturing sector. The influence of a union presence existed irrespective of levels of
***
More specifically, it was where manual workers alone were represented that the chances of closure were
markedly increased – by 19 per cent compared with non-union plants. Where representation was more broadly
based, there was little difference between union and non-union plants.
20
investment in plant and machinery. In general higher levels of union density were associated
with lower growth. The only good news for unions from the Millward, Forth and Bryson
analysis is that where unions bargained over employment issues as well as wages then the
decline was much lower, indeed close to the non-union sector. It should be borne in mind
that their analysis controls for a range of background factors and it is likely that smaller
workplaces may exhibit faster growth than larger ones; but the union role remains after these
factors have been taken into account. They would appear to provide a basis for the lower
levels of job security reported by union members compared with their non-union
counterparts.
The analysis of contact with a workers’ representative shows a strong association in the
expected direction. A union presence but more particularly union membership is associated
with greater contact.
Drawing together the findings on instrumental benefits, voice and protection, we can see that
union membership, recognition and density have a mixed impact on the range of outcomes
and perceptions. There is some evidence that a union presence has a very modest positive
effect on the more specific outcomes such as pay and family friendly practices. But any
effect is very small and some of the measures are weak. There is stronger evidence in the
WERS data that the union effect is associated with a lower perception of scope for voice and
with lower job security. It is possible that unions raise expectations and awareness leading to
poorer perceptions of the operation of voice and to feelings of lower job security. Yet any
gains resulting from raised expectations and awareness are very limited. Job satisfaction
remains lower and, as the analysis by Millward, Forth and Bryson confirms, there is some
objective basis for higher job insecurity among union members since the presence of a
recognized trade union is associated with a decline in the size of the workforce†††.
One of the consistent findings is that where workers perceive that managers are hostile to the
presence of a trade union, they (the workers) are less positive in their responses. This effect
may extend to workplaces where unions are not recognised. However an explanation that
must be explored is that a union presence affects the attitude and behaviour of management,
†††
This does seem to be partly a function of a union presence since recognition and density slightly lower
worker perceptions of job security, even among non-union
21
leading in various direct and indirect ways to worker dissatisfaction. In other words, the
explanation for union member dissatisfaction lies in the management response to a union
presence. The workers’ perceptions of the nature and consequences of management hostility
to a union requires independent corroboration. The second possibility is that dissatisfaction
arises from unions doing a poor job in the sense that whether or not they raise expectations,
they fail to deliver either benefits or voice. In the next section we examine these alternative
explanations.
Why are the Unions not More Effective?
We can look first at the part played by the unions themselves. The evidence presented in the
previous section is consistent with the hypothesis of consciousness raising.
Union
membership and a recognized union presence help to create a demand for instrumental
outcomes and for increased voice as well as a greater awareness of potential job insecurity.
These concerns are at best only partly met and the result is dissatisfaction with outcomes,
lowered perceptions of levels of influence over the job and involvement in personal and
workplace consultation and lower job security. If this is the case, we might expect to see
rather low levels of satisfaction with the unions. Although we cannot address this issue
through the survey of workers in WERS, there is independent evidence.
The surveys conducted by or for the trade unions of their membership consistently show low
levels of member satisfaction. Margaret Prosser, reporting on a survey for the T&GWU
indicated that only about 20 per cent of the members reported satisfaction with the services
provided‡‡‡.
This concern among union members about the services provided must be
separated from national surveys showing that in the country at large unions have become
more popular. The issue can be put in some perspective with the data from one of the annual
CIPD surveys (Guest, Conway, Briner and Dickmann 1996). This asked about loyalty to and
trust in unions. It was based on a sample of 1000 workers selected at random of whom 396
were union members. The key results are shown in Tables 8 and 9 below.
‡‡‡
She was citing evidence from a survey conducted by Warwick University in a presentation to the ACAS
Northern conference, Harrogate, June 14, 2001.
22
Table 8: Levels of Loyalty to the Union and Employer
%
Loyalty to:
A lot of loyalty
Some loyalty
Only a little loyalty
No loyalty at all
Don’t know/did not answer
Union Employer Supervisor Fellow
workers
20
38 (41)
48 (51) 73 (70)
37
41 (39)
34 (32) 23 (25)
28
16 (14)
10 (10)
3 (3)
12
5 (6)
6 (5)
1 (2)
1
0 (0)
2 (2)
0 (0)
The results are percentages based on the 396 union members in the sample. Figures in
brackets show the responses for the full sample of 1000 workers. Non-union members were
not asked about loyalty to a union.
The results in Table 8 show that union members display more loyalty to their employer than
to their union and, more predictably, much more loyalty to fellow workers and their
immediate supervisor. We should perhaps not be too surprised by these figures since the
employer is a source of a greater range of potential returns than the union. However part of
the problem for unions is reflected in the figure of 40 per cent of union members who show
only a little or no loyalty to the union. More generally, it is worth noting that 47 per cent
display dual loyalty to both union and employer while 32 per cent of union members display
loyalty to the employer alone compared with only 11 per cent who display loyalty to the
union alone. A small group of 9 per cent display loyalty to neither.
The question addressed the issue of trust in the union and the employer. The specific
question asked about trust in the union/employer to keep their promises. The results are
shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Trust in Unions and Employer
%
Trust in:
Trust them a lot
Trust them somewhat
Trust them only a little
Don’t trust them at all
Don’t know
23
Union
14 (10)
41 (32)
32 (26)
12 (18)
1 (14)
Employer
23 (28)
46 (44)
18 (17)
12 (10)
1 (1)
The table shows the responses for the 396 union members with the responses for the full
sample of 1000, including the 396 in brackets.
It is again important to be aware of limitations in this evidence. The question asked about
unions in general and the response may be different with respect to your own union.
However the results imply that as with loyalty, even union members are ready to place greater
trust in their employer than in the unions and 44 per cent of union members trust the unions
only a little or not at all. Despite limitations of such data, the evidence from internal union
surveys and these more general external surveys shows that the unions are not perceived to be
doing a very good job and certainly not enough to gain the commitment and trust of many of
their members let alone non-members. It is therefore plausible to conclude that part of the
dissatisfaction of union members lies in the failure of unions to meet member expectations.
Of course a union presence may bring advantages in other ways. For example, there is some
evidence that a trade union presence is associated with the use of a greater number of human
resource practices. In so far as these practices are consistently associated with greater worker
satisfaction, this is a positive step (Guest, 2001). Furthermore, there is some evidence that in
greenfield sites, the decision to recognise a trade union, often in the context of some sort of
single union agreement, leads management to consider more seriously its whole range of
employment relations practices and as a result to take human resource management and
partnership-related issues seriously. But there is also evidence that human resource practices
may be used to obviate any felt need for a union presence or may help to ensure that the
union withers on the vine. Furthermore, there is consistent evidence that the application of
more human resource practices is associated with higher levels of worker satisfaction but
that, for a given number of practices, a union presence tends to reduce overall satisfaction
(Guest and Conway, 1999a).
An alternative explanation for the dissatisfaction among union members is that a union
presence alters management attitudes and behaviour.
The earlier analysis consistently
revealed that where management was considered by workers to be hostile to unions, poorer
outcomes were reported. Even though perceptions of management hostility were greater
among non-union workers, negative outcomes were still more likely to be reported by union
members than non-unionists. There is considerable evidence within WERS and elsewhere to
24
support a view that management does its best to muffle the union voice or allows it to be
heard only under conditions set by management. To support this analysis we will draw upon
two sets of data.
The first is the evidence in WERS about the extent to which voice
mechanisms operate.
The second is a recent survey of the employer’s side of “the
psychological contract” which explores the influence of a union presence on the “deal” that
management offers.
The data from WERS make for depressing reading for trade unions. The relevant data are
summarized in Guest (2000) and presented fully in Cully at al. (1999). They suggest, on the
basis of management reports, that there are union members in at least 53 per cent of the
workplaces surveyed but that union recognition exists in only 45 per cent. In 30 per cent of
private sector workplaces where there are union members, management does not recognize
unions for bargaining purposes. In the public sector, the figure is only 3 per cent. WERS
shows that 60 per cent of workplaces have no workers’ representatives including 25 per cent
where unions are recognized. Non-union worker representatives are present in 11 per cent of
workplaces without any union members rising to 19 per cent where there are union members
but no union recognition, suggesting that these representatives may be used partly to avoid
recognition. Legislation may be beginning to alter this pattern of recognition a little.
As already noted, even where unions are present their voice is limited. The WERS study
offered a list of nine standard issues that might be expected to be covered in negotiation and
consultation. In half the workplaces where unions were recognized there was no bargaining
with union representatives over any of these issues. Furthermore, management was likely to
consult on a wider range of issues with non-union representatives than with union
representatives. Some of these results might be explained by negotiation and consultation
taking place at a higher level in the organization.
And non-union representatives may
represent trusted senior groups of workers. But even if such factors explain some of the
differences, there seems little doubt that traditional union-led industrial relations has been
severely constrained in most UK workplaces, even where there is some sort of union presence
and more especially in the private sector.
Further evidence on management attitudes comes from a survey of just over 1300 senior
managers with responsibility for aspects of employment relations and human resource
25
management (Guest and Conway, 2001). This was concerned primarily with management of
the employment relationship, defined in terms of the psychological contract. Since the
respondents were often from large organizations, 61 per cent (92% in the public sector and
45% in the private sector) reported that unions were recognised. Union density was reported
at 50 per cent or above in half of those organisations where unions were recognised. The
survey reports the perceptions of senior managers and may therefore shed some light on their
behaviour with respect to trade unions. At the same time, it should be noted that while it was
concerned with aspects of employment relations, it did not explicitly address attitudes
towards unions. The evidence shows that a union presence, reflected in recognition, after
controlling for all other background factors, is associated with lower management trust in
employees and a perception that workers are less cooperative, less committed, less motivated,
less likely to engage in citizenship behaviour and innovation, lower estimates of employee
performance and a lower willingness to believe that the organization is obliged to go out of
its way to look after its workers. On the positive side, a union presence is associated with
lower labour turnover and a higher level of employee involvement in organizational
decisions. A union presence has no effect on management judgements about the state of
employment relations. Taken together, these results suggest that while managers may tolerate
a union presence and do not believe it has a significant impact on union-management
relations, in areas which matter more to management, such as organizational commitment and
performance, the union presence is associated with poorer outcomes. We should therefore
not be surprised if management is eager to restrict the union voice where possible.
The results reported by Guest and Conway are very much in line with the analyses of the
1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey reported by Metcalf and Fernie (1995) and
Machin and Stewart (1996) who found that the presence of a recognized union was associated
with lower management estimates of productivity, change in productivity, financial
performance and industrial relations climate. However Addison and Belfield (2001) report a
rather different picture based on the 1998 WERS. A recognized trade union is associated
with a positive change in productivity, no significant impact on comparative productivity,
financial performance or industrial relations climate and, as in 1990, a strong association with
declining numbers in employment. Unions are also associated with lower labour turnover but
higher absence. Since most of these measures are based on management estimates, they
imply that management attitudes towards unions are becoming less hostile. However these
26
results should be seen in the context of the earlier strong results from WERS on the worker
reactions associated with perceived management hostility to unions.
There are, of course, a number of ways in which a union voice can be channeled by
management and thereby potentially restricted. One is to seek to incorporate unions by
engaging them in some sort of partnership. While there are strong arguments in favour of
partnership, evidence from the study of some of the long-established organizations in this
field suggest that while there may be gains for workers and their representatives from
partnership, particularly in those limited cases where it was based on high trust, the balance
of advantage appears to lie more with management (Guest and Peccei, 2001). From a union
perspective, there is a choice of strategy, often dichotomized as moderation/cooperation
versus militancy/confrontation. Bacon and Blyton (2002) have explored perceptions of union
representatives about the relative advantages of each in an attempt to test some of Kelly’s
arguments in favour of a more militant stance. They report some benefits associated with
militancy, but not necessarily the kind of militancy that entails mobilizing member
dissatisfaction. Indeed, the approach to collective bargaining appeared to be more important
for some issues than member mobilization.
Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that unions may raise expectations but are unable to
meet them. Meanwhile, although management hostility to unions may have reduced, a union
presence is often associated by managers with a range of poorer outcomes, providing a
rationale for a range of policies and practices which they might hope will lead to unions
withering on the vine. All this appears to support the view that managers remain very much
in the driving seat in employment relations and restrict the scope of union activity. By doing
so they may reduce any union impact on performance; but at the same time their actions are
likely to contribute to union member job dissatisfaction. A side-effect of an explicit antiunion stance is that it is associated with other patterns of management behaviour that result in
greater dissatisfaction even among non-union members.
27
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has presented survey evidence to show that union membership and a union
presence, defined in terms of both union recognition and union density, is associated with
higher levels of dissatisfaction among workers without any clear evidence of compensating
gains. The quality of some of the questions and the necessary interpretation of the findings
leaves the analysis open to considerable debate. Yet the evidence across surveys is consistent
and cumulative. The results may not be universally welcomed it is possible to criticize the
surveys, but it is important to acknowledge the evidence and consider whether we should be
concerned about higher levels of dissatisfaction associated with trade unionism.
Much has been made in considering the evidence of the role of trade unions in raising
expectations and awareness among members through some sort of mobilization process
(Kelly, 1998). Yet we have no clear evidence from the surveys to explain the process
whereby both membership and recognition shape the perceptions of workers leading them to
report lower voice and lower job security. Indeed, the fact that there is an effect, albeit small
and generally negative is a testament to the continuing union influence. Future research
might more explicitly test the effects of union consciousness raising in this context rather
than relying on inference.
There is little doubt that management often retains a degree of hostility to unions. Linking
this back to the models of reasons for joining and belonging to a trade union, the results
suggest that while people may join trade unions for instrumental reasons, there are very
limited instrumental returns either in terms of specific outcomes or greater voice. The second
explanation – that unions provide a form of security – has some support from data on
dismissals and redundancies, but union members report a lower sense of job security and
analysis of employment trends suggests this has some basis in actual labour force reductions.
The final explanation, in terms of union solidarity, is not fully tested with the data although
the relatively low levels of loyalty to, and trust in unions suggests that this is a weak
explanation.
There is continuing concern in the UK about the quality of management of employment
relations, reflected for example in the low uptake of the sort of human resource practices
associated with higher levels of worker satisfaction. These and other sources of evidence
28
support the case for a trade union presence in workplaces. The evidence presented here
suggests that unions may be succeeding in raising expectations but they are failing to meet
them, leading to member dissatisfaction. It also suggests that management is making a
significant contribution to this by restricting the role of unions in the workplace. Indeed, in
seeking to understand the apparent paradox of union member dissatisfaction, the active role
of management requires a central place.
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