Playing Brussels right? Comparing Danish and Swedish strategies towards the
European Commission
Paper for the 2012 EGPA Conference, Bergen, Norway, PSG XIV: EU Administration and MultiLevel Governance.
WIP, Pls. do not cite without permission from the authors.
Caroline Howard Grøn, University of Copenhagen, [email protected] (corresponding author)
And Sofie Grønbek,1
“The smaller you are, the more right you’ve got to be”
John Riccardo, former chairman of Chrysler, cited in (Waltz, 1979:194)
Abstract
The European Union has been described a system of multilevel governance. The relationship
between civil servants, promoting national interests, and the European Commission, changes over
the life span of a dossier. It takes skills and understanding of the mechanisms at play to navigate
successfully in these muddy waters, not least for smaller EU member states who cannot to the same
extent rely on their influence in the Council of Ministers. This paper uncovers the tools at hand for
civil servants when trying to influence the formulation of new legislation in the Commission, and
asks if member states over time become better at play the game.
Through a comparative case study of Denmark and Sweden, members since 1973 and 1995, the
paper concludes that length of membership does not appear to be the most relevant explanatory
variable. Rather, the two countries behave in a rather similar manner in most aspects. There are few
exceptions however, and these seem more related to the national political culture than to EU
experiences.
1
The work was carried out while Sofie Grønbek was working at the University of Copenhagen as a research assistant.
1
Introduction: Small state lobbyists
The EU is a complex political system. When looking at the ways national governments, agencies
and EU institutions and bodies interact, the complexity is quite breathtaking (as e.g . done by
Egeberg and Trondal, 2009). The system has been named multi-level governance, and this seems
quite fitting (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996). The complexity does however not only rest in the
number of actors, interacting across levels, it is also due to the ways the roles of actors change over
the lifespan of a dossier. On the one hand, sovereignty generally rests with member states who act
as principals for EU institutions, but as Tallberg has pointed out, sometimes the tables change, and
the European Commission (Commission) and the European Court of Justice take on the role as
principal, or supervisor. In these instances, the member states acts as agents (Tallberg, 2003). The
interest here is not principal-agent theory and its extensions, but the observation that the power
relations between EU institutions and member states are shifting over time and between dossiers.
Tallberg is primarily interested in the powers held by EU institutions after a piece of legislation has
been decided upon, but the interactions going on before a piece of legislation is decided, is also
quite interesting for studying the relationship between EU institutions and member states.
To put their mark on EU legislation, Member states cannot solely rely on their voting powers in the
Council of Ministers (Council), especially not if they are small and have few votes.2 While bigger
member states can rely on their voting power, or even on their relative importance in the EU as
such, smaller member states needs to look beyond the Council to ensure their interests
(Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006:256; Wivel 2010:18). Among scholars of small state behavior the
possible gains from acting not only ‘as a state’ in pursuing own interest have gained increased
prominence. Referred to as a ‘smart state’ approach, scholars have discussed which tools small
states can take in, to improve their abilities to influence EU decision-making (Joenniemi, 1998;
Arter, 2000; Wivel, 2005; Grøn and Wivel, 2011). Here tools classically seen as belonging to states,
such as acting as an honest broker, or promoting mutually beneficial solutions to commonly
recognized problems, are suggested among strategies more akin to the activities usually taken up by
non-state lobby groups (Grøn and Wivel, 2011). This ‘lobby approach’ will be discussed further
2
What constitutes a small state is contested (Thorhallsson, 2006). Whereas Panke defines small states as states with a
below average number of votes in the Council (Panke, 2010b:786, note 2), Mourtizen and Wivel see smallness as
basically a relative phenomenon, and argues that small states are the weaker part in a power relation, which they are not
capable to change by themselves (Mourtizen and Wivel, 2005:4). In this context, the emphasis on relative weakness
lends itself well to line of argument pursued here: small member states, due to their smallness, need to play a game
beyond power politics and voting in the Council of Ministers.
2
below, and it will be argued, that it is quite useful in conceptualizing the ways states act to influence
a piece of legislation before it leaves the Commission.
While the whole range of EU institutions are of course included when a member state, be it big or
small, considers where to try to promote its interests, the Commission is of a special interest,
especially for smaller member states. The Commission has traditionally been considered the ally of
small states due to its role as the defender of the common good (Cf. Geurts, 1998; Antola and
Lehtimäki, 2001: 28-29; Bunse, Magnette and Nicolaïdis, 2005: 12-15). Furthermore while the
legislative powers and the overall influence of the Commission in the EU might have been
declining for the last two decades or so (Kurpas, Grøn and Kaczynski, 2008:3), it is still a
tremendously important institution. The Commission holds the right of initiative and in an EU 27
changing proposals, once they have been put down in writing, is increasingly difficult (Bouwen,
2009:25). Not least because small states generally observe the consensus norms in Council
negotiations more seriously than do larger countries (Antola and Lehtimäki 2001:72; Mattila 2004;
Heisenberg 2005:77, Thohallsson and Wivel 2006:661; Naurin 2011). This means that mostly,
when first a draft has left the Commission for the Council and European Parliament (Parliament), it
will be too late for smaller state to change the wording of it. The ways member states can influence
decision-making beyond traditional routes via Council meetings hence becomes more and more
important.
The Brussels game is a complex one, both formally and informally. Panke shows in her study of
small member states, that a certain amount of learning takes place. Over time member states
become better at defending and furthering their interests in Brussels (Panke, 2010a: 203). Within
the framework of member states aiming at influencing the Commission, this proposition is tested.
The paper raises two questions:
How do two smaller member states go about influencing formulation of new legislation the
European Commission?
And does length of membership matter when strategies for influencing formulation of new
legislation in the European Commission are selected?
Denmark and Sweden will be the two case countries in this study, which will approximate a most
similar case study (Gerring, 2007:131ff). They differ on the length of membership, which will be
the key independent variable in this study. Denmark joined the then EC in 1973 whereas Sweden
3
joined together with Finland and Austria in 1995. The argument tested here will hence be that
Denmark has had almost 20 years more to learn to play the Brussels game than the Swedes. In
1998, a study found that the Danes were generally more successful in promoting their interests in
Brussels compared to the Swedes, and that the length of membership was pointed out as the
explanatory variable (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen, 2004:38). It is however interesting to see,
if this difference still exists.
The countries chosen also have a number of similarities.
Both countries are relatively small. In this context it translates into 7 votes in the Council for
Denmark, and 10 for Sweden. This also indicates that Sweden is slightly bigger than Denmark, 9.4
mil. inhabitants compared with 5.5 mil. in Denmark.
The two countries share their cultural background being Scandinavian, protestant and with a long
democratic tradition. While Danes and Swedes anecdotally will point to many differences, looking
at it more widely, they are quite alike (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen, 2004:74).
Both countries have well functioning civil services, as e.g. illustrated by the World Bank
Governance Indicators, 2010. In relation to Government Effectiveness, Denmark had a rank score
of 99.04 and Sweden of 98,56.3 Similarly, both countries do well in Transparency Internationals
Corruption Perception Index being placed respectively as number 2 (Denmark) and number 4
(Sweden) in the 2011 ranking.4 This is also true for their work on EU dossiers. In a study by Panke,
they are both evaluated as developing timely positions of a high quality in EU negotiations (Panke,
2010b:780-781).
Their organization differs however in a certain respect, and there can hence be said to be a potential
flaw in the most similar design. When working with natural units it can be practically impossible to
find a perfect most similar case study. At least when it comes to small EU member states it is hard
to imagine a better fit. The study will continue with a view to the potential flaws coming out of this
variance. Denmark has a traditional ministerial system, where ministers are responsible for each
their part of the government, sometimes named monism (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen,
2004:75). Ministries are divided into a ministry and agencies which are also under the auspices of
3
The score indicates the place of the country compared to other countries in the survey on a scale from 0 – 100, where
100 indicates the best ranking in the world, see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp , visited July 4,
2012.
4
See http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/, visited July 4, 2012.
4
the minister (Christensen, Christiansen and Ibsen, 2006:81). In contrast, Sweden operates a cabinet
system, named a dualistic system (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen, 2004:75). Here, ministers
answer collectively for the decisions of government and an extensive coordination between
ministries take place. As opposed to the Danish system, a strong division between ministries and
agencies can be found. Whereas ministries are expected to be political, agencies are expected to be
driven by a technocratic rational (Statskontoret, 2000:6ff), to the point, where it is acceptable for an
agency to publicly criticize the minister of their area, if they find decisions to be lacking
(Statskontoret, 2000:43).
In EU matters, the two countries are also quite alike. They often stand out in surveys as two of the
best performing countries, when it comes to implementation of EU legislation (Bursens, 2002:178).
Falker et al shows that both countries can be considered prime implementers in comparison with
other EU countries (Falkner et al, 2005:331). The size of the Permanent Representations of the two
countries differs though. According to their web-sites, Denmark has app. 78 employed on their
Representation while Sweden has app. 125. 5
Policy wise, the two countries share some of the difficulties in their EU membership. They both
have opt-outs, Denmark on several issues, Sweden on the Euro. These opt-outs are the result of lost
EU referenda in both countries, which reflects a common skepticism towards the EU (Pedersen and
Olsen, 2008:40). Sweden lost a Euro referendum in 2003, whereas Denmark held its last
referendum on its opt-outs, the Euro opt-out, in 2000. Finally, they share what one could describe as
rather extremist views on both internal market and agriculture, being very liberal on both policy
areas.
The paper compares Danish and Swedish strategies towards obtaining influence on the
Commission. The comparison builds on primarily two types of data. I 2010, 32 interviews were
carried out with Danish and Swedish civil servants, placed in Brussels, Copenhagen and Stockholm,
as well as a few Danes placed in the Commission. Interviews were carried out as semi-structured.
Interviews were taped, transcribed and structurally coded to ensure the reliability of conclusions
drawn based on the material.
Interviewees were chosen with a view to covering a wide array of policy areas; including both areas
where the two countries have opt- outs (Justice and Home Affairs, the Euro) as well as areas where
5
See http://eu.um.dk/en/ and http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2250 , visited July 5 2012.
5
cooperation is strong (Internal Market, Environment, Agriculture) and areas where cooperation is
more nascent (Health, Migration).
Interviews were carried out both at the Permanent Representations in Brussels as well as with
representatives from ministries in the capitals. While it might have been relevant as well, no
interviews were carried out among civil servants in agencies at the national level due to resource
constraints. Rather, it seemed more fruitful to interview more widely at two levels than spread
interviews more thinly.
These interviews, together with the relevant literature formed the basis for doing a questionnaire to
all attaches6 at the Danish and Swedish Permanent Representations in Brussels. The questionnaire
had a response rate at 30% among Danish attaches and 33 % among Swedish. All in all, the survey
has an n of 38. While the size of n of course limits the range of the conclusions it still seems a
reasonable response rate. Due to the limited sample size, only quite simple statistical tools will be
used. We return to this below.
What to do, when lobbying?
This section will develop the notion of a lobbying strategy towards the Commission. The aim is
twofold. First, the categories developed help form a framework for conceptualizing what is actually
being done by the two states in relation to the Commission. Secondly, the framework will also work
as a yardstick to evaluate what kind of learning is going on. If Pankes proposition is right, one
would expect Denmark being more of a ‘smart state’ than Sweden, simply because the Danish civil
service has had so much more time to understand how to work the system properly.
Recent literature on small states, especially within the EU, have focused on how small states can act
smart to enhance their influence. This literature points out three main focus points for small states;
prioritization, working for the common good and acting as an honest broker (Wivel, 2010). These
focus points can help small member states punch above their weight.
Three strategies have been developed within this framework. Small states can act as lobbyists, as
self-interested mediators or as norm entrepeneurs (Grøn and Wivel, 2011). While the latter two
primarily deal with what goes on in the Council, the first is more related to activities in relation to
Commission and Parliament, and we will return to this strategy more extensively below. A self6
Attaches are civil servants at desk officer level at a Permanent Representation typically coming from the ministry in
the capital to work in Brussels for a shorter or longer period.
6
interested mediator uses the smallness of the country to convince other states that it can act as a gobetween, between bigger member states. In the role as broker, a certain room for own preferences
appear. The role as norm entrepreneur focuses on issues where a member state can work as a
benchmark for a certain normative development, which is generally shared. This is most relevant in
areas where the open method of coordination renders the Commission looking for member states
which can work as benchmarks, but also in other areas, smaller member states have a track record
of setting the standards, as illustrated by Finnish influence on EU policy on Northern European
security (Arter, 2000) or the Danish and Swedish influence on EU enlargement (Friis, 1998). Being
a norm entrepreneur can hence also be relevant in the context of the Commission, and this plays
into the lobby strategy, as will be clear below.
The lobby strategy basically proposes an increased focus on actively playing into the processes
which goes on inside the Commission and Parliament, when a proposal passes through these
institutions. While Parliament will be left out for now, it is not to say, that many of the same
strategies proposed in relation to the Commission might not also yield a return there. Here, focus
will however be limited to the Commission.
The prime focus of the lobbying strategy is on the Commission as the institution holding the right of
initiative.7 Hence the focus is on the interactions which go on before a proposal leaves the
Commission. Early interest representation is a common mantra (Mazey and Richardson 2006:249;
Spence 2006:147; Eising 2007:387; Bouwen 2009:20), and as argued above has not become any
less relevant for small member states in an enlarged EU. The Commission does not cease to be an
important player once proposals has moved beyond the College of Commissioner; the role played
by the Commission in Council negotiations should not be underestimated, according to interviews.
But the Commission is first and foremost the institution in which proposals for new legislation is
being drafted.
Influencing the Commission is a different game from e.g. negotiating in the Council. The primary
currency is knowledge, which will help the Commission draft legislation and make it passable
(Bouwen, 2002; Grøn and Wivel, 2011). The Commission is no big administration and hence it is
very much depending on input from external sources to write up legislation. This goes both for
technical input which ensures that legislation actually will have the intended effect, as well as
7
The other main task of the Commission, defending the Treaties, of course also causes the member states to occupy
themselves with the actions of the Commission. Here, however, the focus will be on the drafting of new legislation
rather than the policing of existing legislation.
7
surveillance of the political environment in the EU, to ensure a piece of legislation is passable in
Parliament and Council (Mazey and Richardson 2006:249; Spence 2006:147; Eising 2007:387;
Bouwen 2009:20).
It is hence worth taking a closer look at the type of arguments, the two states use and the effect they
are expected to have. Basically, extending Bouwens typology, five types of arguments can be
presented (Bouwen, 2002). Proposition can be of a technical nature, they can be directed at the
European interest, they can reflect national interest, they can be aimed at creating a compromise in
Council or they can be part of a ‘qui pro quo’ deal-making between member states and the
Commission. In terms of the questionnaire, the types of argumentation are presented below:
Your proposition will improve the technical quality/solve practical problems with the legislation
Your proposition is in the interest of the EU as a whole and should be acceptable to all
Your proposition will make the legislation more acceptable to you as a member state
Your proposition will create a compromise between divergent interests in the Council
You need a personal favour/make a deal (quid pro quo)
In order to be able to deliver the right arguments, member states officials need to know, what is
going on inside the Commission. This can of course partly be done by surveying the Commission
work program, but quite a few things go on which are not reported here. In order to be able to know
when and where to lobby, insights as to what is going on inside the Commission are needed. This
can be done through informal contacts either with Commission officials in the particular DG or with
contacts with acquaintances in other parts of the Commission who can share inside information.
Here, desk officers of own nationality as well as seconded national experts (SNE’s) can be useful
(on SNE’s see e.g. Trondal, 2008, Trondal, Van den Berg and Suvarierol, 2008).
The question of the importance of nationality in the Commission is generally hotly debated. Hooghe
showed in her 2007 study of socialization among Commission officials, that nationality is the prime
socializing force (Hooghe, 2007), and Page has pointed to the problems raised by the multinational
character of the Commission for its internal organization (Page, 1997:41). As opposed to this, the
importance of nationality in policy making vis a vis other interests have been questioned in the
literature. Trondal (2008) points to the importance of the defending a particular dossier, and
Georgakakis (2010) points to the particular EU social capital which career civil servants in the
8
Commission accumulates. Similarly, Suvarieol (2008) shows that nationality does not explain
network formation in the Commission. No clear conclusions on the importance of nationality in the
Commission can hence be reached from looking at the literature. Here, it will be examined among
other strategies for surveying the Commission agenda.
When this is done, arguments can be served through different channels at different levels in the
Commission. Approaching relevant desk officers early in the process is generally recommendable,
but the final stages of decision-making in the College of Commissioners can also be addressed
(Greenwood 2007:32-33; Bouwen 2009:25-26).
We now turn to the analysis of Denmark and Sweden. We will take a closer look at the type of
arguments used, their surveillance of the Commission agenda and their channels of entry for
seeking influence.
Comparing Danish and Swedish Strategies: Learning by doing?
As written above, the analysis draws on a survey among attaches and interviews with civil servants;
both in the capitals and at the Permanent Representations. The two types of material will be
combined, but with a view to the fact that the survey was only distributed among attaches.
Interviewees will not been cited, rather descriptions are build on statements which have been made
by several interviewees as visible through coding. Differences between Danish and Swedish
officials as well as between officials placed in different institutional settings will be emphasized.
We start out by the type of arguments used in dealing with the Commission.
Improving legislation?
The earlier one gets in, the greater room for change or agenda setting in EU decision-making. An
old truth, also duly observed by the interviewed civil servants. Until proposals reach the College of
Commissioners, the Commission is primarily influenced by input which can improve the quality of
legislation. The Commission can also be interested in information on possible compromises in the
Council to ensure, that proposals can actually pass. Finally, the Commission is also interested in
detecting if individual member states are very strongly opposed to a certain proposal, in order for
the Commission to accommodate potential resistance in the Council. Generally however, if member
states are successful at feeding technical information into the system, this is the most efficient
strategy. Not least for a small member state with limited capacity for ‘being difficult’ in Council.
9
Information can take different forms ranging from input over a cup of coffee, non-papers to
formulating actual pieces of legislation. In line with the norm entrepreneur strategy above, both
countries report that their status as leaders on e.g. environment can benefit them when they present
technical information.
But providing input of course also have a cost. Something which both member states officials point
to time and again. In both countries, with few sectoral differences, it is underlined that their early
interest representation could be improved and that the quality of their input could be heightened.
The main reason why this is not done is cost. It is costly in manpower to have the agency back in
the capital draft a non-paper for the Commission, especially because it can be very difficult to
foresee the actual return on the investment. While the scope for change is large, it is difficult to
foresee the final outcome after negotiations internally in the Commission, in Parliament and in
Council. A huge number of other actors get involved along the way, and they all try to influence
any given dossier. Furthermore, the timeframe is often so long, that it can be difficult to prioritize in
day to day work. Basically, both countries report a lack of focus on the long haul, like lobbying
pieces of legislation which will be realized in perhaps five years, compared to the day to day battles
regarding EU issues in Parliament. Both countries have EU coordination mechanisms which
involves national parliaments but to a different extent (Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000, Pedersen
and Olsen, 2008:36-38). In Denmark, minority governments typically need to ensure back up in
parliament, when mandates for EU negotiations are given. Across the board among Danish officials,
it is reported that a lot of resources goes into preparing ministers, who are not always as
knowledgable about EU affairs as one might have hoped, being an EU interested civil servant.
These resources can hence not be used for preparing lobby efforts at an earlier stage directed at
Brussels. Basically, the focus of the ministries is directed mostly towards keeping the Minister out
of trouble in the European Affairs Committee rather than what is going on in Brussels. In Sweden,
Parliament also plays a role, but here resources are mostly used to ensure coordination internally in
government due to the cabinet system.
There are hence many reasons, why it can be difficult for both countries to prioritize the drafting of
technical papers, even if it is commonly recognized to be an efficient strategy.
In the quantitative survey, a similar picture arises.
10
Figure 1. Type of propositions presented 8
Generally, the two countries do not differ significantly9 in their chosen strategies. They primarily
present propositions as to what will make a proposal more acceptable to their member state, hence
not acting very smart. In second and third place, come propositions which will improve the
technical quality and propositions which are in the interest of the EU as a whole. These two types of
arguments are both more in line with acting smart.
On might suspect that the difference between what we would expect smart states to do and actual
behavior is due to a flaw in the theory. This though seems not to be the case when looking at the
arguments which are evaluated as successful by the respondents.
8
The respondent have been asked to choose an answer to the stated question form a balanced ordinal scale (options
stated as ”Never”, ”Rarely”, ”Some of the times”, ”Most of the times” and ”Every time”). For an easy overview of data
results, these answers has been assigned numerical values ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (every time) so that average
scores (reported in the graphs) could be calculated and allow for comparison.
9
Whether there are statistically significant differences between the averages of the two countries is determined by
calculating confidence intervals for each average, thereby taking into consideration the standard deviation and sample
size for each group. A significant difference requires that the confidence intervals do not overlap. Confidence levels are
set at 90 %.
11
Figure 2. Success of propositions
Once again, the experiences of the two countries’ attaches are remarkably alike. They evaluate
technical propositions, propositions promoting EU interest, and propositions generating
compromise in Council as almost equally successful. But comparing what is actually done with the
type of propositions considered likely to be successful, there appears to be quite a gap when it
comes to the use of propositions which will make proposals more acceptable for a specific member
state. Here, it seems that the most used type of proposition is evaluated as significantly less
successful than alternative propositions, leaving the personal favors out.
These responses fall very well in line with the impression gained from qualitative interviews; the
attaches have a good felling as to what is most efficient, but quite often these types of propositions
are too costly to pursue. Rather, it is less costly to go to the Commission and present the national
12
position which should be developed under any circumstances and which does not necessarily take
as many resources to develop as a more technical type of input.10
Knowing when to move
But for propositions to have an impact, the timing of their delivery has to be right. When asked in
the survey, it appears that most contacts between attaches and the Commission are done with the
purpose of obtaining information rather than influencing the agenda, as reflected in figure 3 below.
Figure 3. Purpose of contact11
10
It should be kept in mind that in Pankes survey of small member states some states have a difficulty in even coming
up with national positions (Panke, 2010a). It is hence an indication of the relatively smooth functioning of the EU
coordination mechanisms in the two countries, that national positions are relatively readily at hand.
11
Respondents have been asked to choose a number on a numerical scale from 0 to 10, where 10 represents 100 % of
their cases. A score of 7 can thus be interpreted as meaning that attachés make contact on 70 % of their dossiers on
average.
13
Again the two countries appear to use similar strategies. Information gathering is important for both
of them, and several avenues are pursued by the civil servants interviewed.
The Commission work program is an obvious place to start, as well as official hearings on white
and green books. 12 Practices in relation to answering hearings differ between policy areas, but it
seems that the Commission work program is studied across the board.
Secondly, information flows from expert groups conveyed under the Commission can be very
important. Here, we spot some of the differences between the two countries. For both countries
ensuring that information flows from experts situated in agencies in the capital through the Ministry
and on to the Permanent Representations can pose quite a challenge. But the very independent
Swedish agencies, which typically do not see themselves as a part of a political system to promote
Swedish interests, can complicate matters even further. The problem of insulation of civil servants
working with EU affairs is generally acknowledged (Tallberg et al, 2010:69ff). The Danish
government works in some areas deliberately to ensure this flow of information, between levels of
government. But communication flows between agencies, ministries and representation constitutes
a challenge in both countries and can potentially hinder important information on timing, and more
generally on what is going on inside in the Commission, from flowing into the Permanent
Representations which need it to time their lobbying efforts.
Thirdly, attaches find discussions with Commission officials within their area quite useful. When
focusing on obtaining information on what is going on, especially informal chats on the borders of
meetings in Council working groups are seen as important. Direct informal contacts are also used,
but not as extensively.
As figure 4 illustrates, the contact patters does not differ significantly between the two countries,
only the contact to the Cabinet of the responsible Commissioner differs significantly, which we will
return to below. The quantitative survey substantiates the impression gained from interviews, that
especially the Commission representative at Council meetings is an important contact point.
12
See e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/index_en.htm. For an example of a hearing, see
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/audiovisual_en.htm , both visited 12.07.2012.
14
Figure 4. Points of contact13
Contacts at Council meetings are convenient. While interviewees across the board point out that
informal meetings with Commission officials at different levels are very useful for establishing
relations which can be used for obtaining information and providing input for legislation, this is not
something which goes on, on a daily basis, as figure 5 shows. Once again, the Danes and Swedes
behave in a quite similar manner.
13
Scores calculated as explained in footnote 7, related to figure 1.
15
Figure 5. Informal meeting activities
For the bigger part, it is something which goes on 1-3 times a month with another big group doing it
less than monthly. Again, resources are probably a viable explanation. Attaches are already at
Council working group meetings, whereas lunches have to be set up. It might be more convenient
doing your networking at coffee breaks in Justus Lipsus.
Another prominent entry point, illustrated in figure 4, is the Commission unit which is working on a
particular proposal. We return to the question of contacts once the member state has gained an
impression on what is going on below.
Another way of obtaining information is through own nationals in the Commission, be it
functionnairs or SNE’s.
As figure 4 above illustrates, this strategy is not the most used among the attaches surveyed. The
qualitative data sheds light on this. First and foremost, the number of SNE’s as well as functionnairs
of Danish and Swedish decent is limited. According to Commission statistics, 392 Danes and 528
16
Swedes are employed in the Commission, amounting respectively to 1.6 % and 2.2 % of all
employees (Commission, 2012). Contacting someone with the same nationality is generally viewed
as easier than contacting someone from a different country, but the person in question needs to be
placed in a position in the Commission where relevant information is accessible. In very few
instances, the desk officer drafting will be either Swedish or Danish. In more instances, someone in
the Commission can be identified, who works in areas related to the area of interest. Both countries
produces lists of own nationals in the Commission with phone numbers and a brief description of
area of responsibility. Here, the strategy is to call up and ask if the Commission official can help in
identifying someone else to call, or give a brief account of what is going on. Finally, own nationals
placed strategically in the hierarchy can be more helpful in providing such an overview. But again,
in very few cases, the Danes or Swedes are so lucky as to actually have own nationals in the right
place, when needed.
SNE’s are an alternative route. SNE’s can be strategically placed where one would expect to need
them. Placing SNE’s is however both cumbersome and expensive and not very common. While the
Commission pays allowances to SNE’s while they stay in the Commission, the member state still
upholds the regular salary of the employee. In times of austerity it can be difficult to prioritize
sending someone to Brussels when the manpower could be used in the capital or at the Permanent
Representation. And then the Commission needs to agree taking the person on. Mostly, it is difficult
for member states placing SNE’s very strategically, because the Commission has to ask for them.
Both functionnaires and SNE’s are officially supposed to be primarily loyal to the Commission
(Artciel 6, Commission 2008) and these loyalties are interpreted quite differently between
Commission officials. Especially the Danes report that some Danish functionnaires have no wish
what so ever to cooperate with the Danish Permanent Representation. They would prefer to be left
alone all together. Finally, both inside the Commission and among attaches there seems to be the
impression that other countries are ‘better’ or at least ‘more active’ in using own nationals. If this
holds true is beyond the scope of this study.
All in all, contacting officials of own nationality is generally considered an efficient strategy, but
being a small country it is seldom a really viable approach.
The two states generally use the same mechanisms to obtain information on the Commission
agenda. Both countries are relatively smart; they work actively to obtain information through a
17
range of different channels, but both countries also face resource constraints. Here, a relevant
perspective might be the relative size of the Permanent Representations of the two countries. While
the size of the Permanent Representation is no absolute measure of the recourses used in EU related
work,14 it is still quite interesting, that Sweden has almost 50 people more employed than the
Danes.
Promotion of interests
Once what is going on is identified, actual promotion of interests can take place. As discussed
above, arguments take on different character. Here, we shall take a closer look at the different
channels for seeking influence.
As was obvious in figure 4 above, the responsible desk officer is a very popular entry point for
attaches. It is generally pointed out, that contacts with the Commission should be taken at a level,
which matches the level of the one taking contact, in terms of hierarchy. This means that attaches
will contact desk officers and Heads of Unit whereas e.g. the Ambassador can contact Director
Generals or Heads of Cabinet and the Minister will be used for contacting the Commissioner. The
desk officer or his or her Head of Unit are popular also because influencing them means influencing
a proposal early on. The further up the Commission hierarchy, the more difficult it becomes to
ensure major changes.
In the few instances where it is actually possible to contact someone of same nationality, this is a
popular route. Here, the quantitative data shows an interesting indication of differences between the
two countries, as well as a difference between contacting own nationals and other Commission
officials. For the Swedish respondents, it is clear that they consider propositions regarding Swedish
interest much more successful with Swedish officials than with other officials. This tendency does
not hold true for Denmark, and one hence see a difference between the two countries.
14
The balance between placing people in Brussels and in the capital can vary from country to country depending on
national priorities and the analysis as to where their work will be most valuable.
18
Figure 6. Importance of nationality15
While the Swedes seem to experience considerably enhanced success, when presenting precisely
the member state argument to officials of their own nationality, the Danes rate the effect of
nationality on this particular argument to be practically on the same level as with the other types of
arguments. It is then generally considered somewhat more effective presenting proposals to
someone of the same nationality, thus suggesting that nationality can make a difference in how
receptive officials are to arguments in general, although the reasons for this are not fully uncovered
by the survey.
What furthermore seems interesting is the fact that in the qualitative study the Danes generally
report that they are ‘too nice’ and playing ‘too much by the rules’ compared to other countries.
Here, Sweden may be one of the countries which uses own nationals in the Commission more
15
These scores are to be interpreted as measures of how much more effective the arguments are, when presented to
someone of the same nationality rather than just any official. The scale consist of the options “Not at all”, “To some
extent” and “Very much” which was then assigned scores of 0, 2 or 4. An average score of 0 would mean there is no
positive effect of nationality, while scores significantly above 0 suggests the existence of such an effect.
19
actively. The Danish impression that more could be done in order to take advantage of Danes in the
Commission seems to be validated.
Once a proposal has left the DG drafting it, it continues into interservice consultation (Kurpas, Grøn
and Kaczynski 2008:40-41). Here, possibilities for influencing a proposal are generally considered
meager. These possibilities return, at least to some extent (Egeberg, 2006), when the proposal hits
the tables of cabinets, typically 72 hours before meetings in College. Both the Cabinet of the
responsible Commissioner or the Cabinet of the member state can be targeted. There are however
several obstacles to depending on this phase. First and foremost, it is very short. 72 hours is very
little, if the attaches are not already prepared on the content of a given proposal. Especially, if
expertise from the capital is needed in order to form a position. Secondly, the scope for changes is
small. A former Danish Commissioner pointed out in an interview that only once in her period, had
she pushed national interest in this phase to the extent that an item was taken of the Commission
agenda. And having proposals postponed is the most small member states can hope for. In relation
to the member states own Cabinet, it is the general impression that personal relations between
members of Cabinet and attaches are really important. The personal interests of the Commissioner
is however also key. Former Danish Commissioner Poul Nielson was generally reported to take
little interest in matters beyond his own portfolio which was seen as hampering Danish interests.
While Commissioners may not be able to remove things from the agenda, they still hold the
opportunity in College to report how a given proposal will be received ‘in the country, I know best’.
The impact of this should however not be overestimated, and what is generally going on at this
stage is putting out fires rather than framing legislation.
The Swedes generally seem more willing to push a political agenda than do the Danes. The Swedes
approaches the Cabinet of the responsible Commissioner more often, and as figure 8 shows, the
Swedes are more willing to send their ambassador into the field. While the difference looks large, it
is due to the limited sample size not statistically significant.16 It has been included because the
tendency was also reported in the qualitative data.
Ambassadors are used for gaining access higher up in the hierarchy and to show to the Commission
that a certain member state has quite strong feelings on a particular topic.
16
Confidence intervals overlap, the Danish interval ranges from 1.6 to 3.3 (Std. dev. 2.4) whereas the Swedish range
from 3.0 to 4.4 (std. dev. 2.1). Standard deviations are hence relatively high and intervals are overlapping, even if the
overlap is relatively small.
20
Figure 8. Use of Ambassador
The Danes generally view their political capital as limited due to their country size. In the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic capital is viewed as something one needs to save for a few special
occasions. In this, they are very much in line with the traditional pragmatism of Danish foreign
policy and Danish political culture more generally (Breitenbauch and Wivel, 2004:421). The
Swedes are more inclined to be principally opposed to policy. This is also quite well in line with
analyses of Swedish identity, pointing to the perception of the Swedish way of doing things as
superior to most other European countries (e.g. Trägård, 2002:131-132). An example could be the
Common Agriculture Policy which both Sweden and Denmark oppose and would prefer
dismantled. Here, the Swedes do not enter into negotiations, according to interviews, whereas the
Danes try to get as much out of it as possible, since there is no opportunity to close it down. While
this is primarily taking place in Council negotiations, the Swedes have also been willing to push the
Commission, especially on Justice and Home Affairs, threatening the Commission to move into
enhanced cooperation on specific areas, if the Commission would not propose legislation. The
Danes are extremely vary of enhanced cooperation because of the Danish opt-out, but beyond this,
21
the Danes generally approach the Commission in a more respectful way, and with a self perception
as a small state.
In terms of learning, the Swedes do not seem to play by the rules laid down by smart state theory
with regard to this particular aspect. But it seems that at least in some instances, the Swedes have
been rather successful in their more confrontatory strategies.
Conclusion: Learning by doing, or business as usual…
The paper basically asked, what Sweden and Denmark do to influence the Commission and if the
Danes were ‘smarter’ at influencing the Commission than the Swedes, due to their longer
membership of the EU.
First of all, the paper must conclude that the two countries go about influencing the Commission in
a quite similar manner. Both countries aim at early interest representation but both countries face
resource constraints and political priorities. The routes into the Commission are plural, and centrally
to any lobbying effort stands indentifying, what is actually going on.
There are however some differences. One relates to the structure of the civil services and another
perhaps to the self understanding or political culture in the two countries. Sweden struggles a bit
more to ensure the flow of information from agencies all the way to the Permanent Representation
in Brussels due to their sharp separation of agencies and ministries and the understanding that
agencies are of a technical nature.
Sweden is also less willing to behave as a traditional small state. Sweden is not as reluctant as the
Danes to spend political capital on promoting their views in Brussels. The Danes typically behave
in a pragmatic manner where the Swedes can appear more principled. If this more principled line
serves the Swedes is difficult to say. The smart state theory would propose that for a small member
state it would be wiser to enter into the process more low key and through informal channels.
What seems interesting however, is that the patterns indicated here basically detaches the behavior
of the states from their EU experiences. Rather, they reproduce their national political culture in the
way they deal with the EU system. That is not to say no adjustments are made, but where the two
countries differ, it primarily depends on the traditions in the two countries own political structures.
22
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