The Editors and Board of Trustees of the Russian Review
Peasants on the Move: State Peasant Resettlement in Imperial Russia, 1805-1830s
Author(s): Willard Sunderland
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Russian Review, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Oct., 1993), pp. 472-485
Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of The Editors and Board of Trustees of the Russian Review
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State
Move:
Peasants on the
in
Peasant Resettlement
1805-1830s
Imperial Russia,
WILLARD SUNDERLAND
The renewed interest in Russian peasant studies in recent years has done much to
explore the complex dynamics of the peasant family and commune and the equally
complex relations between peasants and rural agents of power such as landlords,
bailiffs and state officials.1 One dimension of rural life that has not received much
recent attention, however, is peasant colonization. Although it has been over a century since V. O. Kliuchevskii identified the relentless process of "internal colonization" as the "basic fact" of Russian history, we still, in many respects, know very
little about how rural colonization occurred, how it affected peasant demographic
and social structures, and how it influenced peasant mentalite and culture. This holds
particularly true for colonization in the preemancipation period, which remains considerably understudied in comparison to the larger and better-documented peasant
migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2
State peasant resettlement in the early nineteenth century is one of the least
studied and potentially most interesting episodes in the history of peasant colonization. The Russian state prior to this period had supported peasant colonization in
a number of ways, either offering incentives to serfowners to relocate their serfs to
Researchfor this articlewas supportedthroughthe ResearchScholarsProgramof the American
Councilof Teachersof Russian(ACTR)andthe RussianandEast EuropeanInstitute(REEI) of Indiana
University.The articleoriginatedas a paperfor a seminarwith Ben Eklof and an earlierversionwas
presentedat the MidwestRussianHistoryColloquiumin April 1992. My thanksto Ben Eklof, David
Ransel, Toivo Raun and all the participantsin the colloquiumfor their adviceand assistance.
1 For recentoverviewsof this literaturesee B. Eklof, "Waysof Seeing: Recent Anglo-American
Studiesof the RussianPeasant,1861-1914,"JahrbicherfiirGeschichteOsteuropas,vol. 36, no. 1 (1988):
57-79; and D. L. Ransel, "RuralRussiaRedux,"PeasantStudies,vol. 18, no. 2 (1991): 117-29.
2 In contrastto the voluminous
period, there have been few
scholarshipon the postemancipation
generalstudies on peasantcolonizationunderserfdom.See Fr.-X. Coquin, La Siberie:Peuplementet
immigration paysanne au xixeme siecle (Paris, 1969); J. Pallot and D. J. B. Shaw, Landscape and Settle-
i pereseleniia
mentin RomanovRussia1613-1917(Oxford,1990);andM. M. Shulgin,"Zemleustroistva
v Rossii v XVIII i pervoi polovine XIX vv.," in Trudy Moskovskogo mezhevogo instituta po fakul'tetu
i pereseleniia,vol. 2, vyp. 1 (Moscow,1928). Kliuchevskii'sremarkcan be foundin his
zemleustroistva
Sochineniia v deviati tomakh (Moscow, 1987), 1:50.
The Russian Review, vol. 52, October 1993, pp. 472-485
Copyright1993The Ohio State UniversityPress
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WillardSunderland
473
the borderlands,encouragingthe resettlementof religious dissenters and odnodvortsyalong the state's frontiers,or taking a practicalview toward runawayserfs
whose presencein frontierareascouldbe turnedto the state'sadvantage.It was only
in the early 1800s, however,in responseto growingland shortagesin centralRussia
and the Ukraine, that the Russianstate took its firststeps towardestablishinga systematiccolonizationpolicythatwouldallowfor routineand legal peasantmovement
to the borderlands.This policy specificallytargeted the state peasant population.
Living on treasurylands and under the direct control of the state administration,
state peasants, the governmentbelieved, could easily be moved from their diminishing holdings in the center to more abundantlands in the empire's boundary
provinces.
From 1805, when officialresettlementbegan in earnest, to the Kiselev reform
in the 1830s,the Russiangovernmentembarkedon a wide-rangingrelocationof tens
of thousandsof Russianand Ukrainianstate-peasantfamilies. Fortunatelyfor historians,a richstoreof archivalmaterial,whichincludespeasantpetitions, ministerial
and gubernatorialcorrespondenceand officialreportsfrom the countryside,allows
us to begin analyzinghow this peasantmigrationand settlementtook place. My article, after brieflyoutliningthe backgroundand nature of the state's resettlement
policy,will attemptto examinethe socialmilieuof ruralcolonization,exploringsuch
questionsas how the peasantcommunityfunctionedin the resettlementprocess, how
peasantsorganizedtheirmovementin relationto authoritiesin the countryside,and
what problemsthe peasantsfaced in doing so.3
The firstinstancesof organizedstate peasant resettlementdate from the late eighteenth century,when the idea of organizingpeasantmovementarose in response to
the need for reinforcingthe state's militaryposition in the imperialperiphery,especially in the newlyconqueredand sparselysettled regionsof New Russia and the
North Caucasus.Beginningwith decreesin the 1760s,the state encouragedindividual state peasantcommunities,includinggroupsof odnodvortsy,retiredsoldiers,cossacks and Old Believers, to relocate to borderlandprovinces, where they would
receive land and tax privilegesin returnfor militaryservice.4Most of these early
resettlementswere random,extremelylimitedin scale and usuallytied to some sort
of militaryfunction.
State-sponsoredresettlementsoon acquireda new dimension,however,as the
3 The principalsourcesfor thispaperweredrawnfromtwo ministerialfondy(f. 1285,Departament
gosudarstvennogokhoziaistvaMVD 1778-1835,op. 3, Po raznymprichinam;and f. 379, Departament
imushchestvMinisterstvafinansov,op. 1, Pervoeotdeleniepo upravleniiugosudarstgosudarstvennykh
vennamikrest'ianamii imushchestvami),both located in the Tsentral'nyigosudarstvennyiistoricheskii
arkhiv(TsGIA, now RGIA) in St. Petersburg.Unfortunately,due to an accidentat the archivein July
1991, a large and importantbody of materials(f. 1285, op. 1, 0 pereseleniiakhgosudarstvennykh
krest'ian)was unavailablefor use. As of March1992these documentswere still inaccessible.
4 V. M. Kabuzannotesthatmilitaryservitorsandpeasantswithmilitaryobligationsconstitutedover
half of the populationin most areasof New Russiain the late eighteenthcentury.See his ZaselenieNovorossii v XVIII-pervoi polovine XIX veka (Moscow, 1976), 108 passim. On the southern borderlands see
also E. I. Druzhinina,Severnoeprichernomor'ev 1775-1800gg. (Moscow,1959), 58-70; A. V. Fadeev,
Rossiia i kavkaz v pervoi tret'i XIX v. (Moscow, 1960), 32-39; and J. P. LeDonne, Ruling Russia: Politics
and Administration in the Age of Absolutism 1762-1796 (Princeton, 1984), 291-306.
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474
The RussianReview
centralgovernmentbeganto reactto a noticeabledeclinein the economiccondition
of the state peasantry,a situationlargelyattributableto provincialland shortages.
These shortageswere especiallyseverein areasof centralRussia and southwestern
Ukrainewheresizablepopulationgrowthin the late eighteenthcenturyhad reduced
manystate peasantholdingsto four desiatinaor less per male peasant,far below the
norm of fifteen desiatinaper male soul envisionedin the Land Surveyinstructions
of 1766.5By 1810, conditionssuch as those in the centralRussianprovincesof Tambov, Riazan' and Orel, where "manyvillages knew no more than two or three desiatinaper male soul,"hadbecomeincreasinglywidespread.6Realizingthat holdings
of this size made it nearly impossiblefor peasantsto supportthemselves or meet
theirobligations,the governmentlookedto organizedpeasantresettlementas a possible solution. In 1781 the governmentorderedgovernorsin provincesaffected by
land shortagesto assess the numberof state peasantsin their provinceswishingto
resettle. Those peasantswho agreedto relocatewere to be relievedfrom state taxes
for a periodof one-and-a-halfyears.7Furtherukazyfollowed over the next two decades as the governmentcontinuedto encourageresettlementfrom overpopulated
areas.8The state's policy,clearlyexpandingin the late eighteenthcentury,took on
greatersignificancein the early1800s,when peasantresettlementbecame a working
elementin the plansfor peasantreformthat appearedduringthe firstyearsof AlexanderI's reign.
Governmentactionin the particularareaof state peasantreformcan be traced
to the creationof the Ministryof InternalAffairs and the Ministryof Finance, the
two institutionsmost closely involvedin overseeingthe state peasantryin the early
nineteenth century.9V. P. Kochubei,the first ministerof internalaffairs, strongly
favoreda more activegovernmentrole in improvingthe plightof the state peasants.
Resettlement,in his view, was an importantmeans to this end. If carriedout efficiently,state-sponsoredresettlementheld out the double prospectof resolvingthe
land shortagesin the interiorand populatingthe borderlands.10
Furthermore,it was
clearto Kochubeiandothersthat some kindof actionwas necessaryin orderto stem
the tide of independentresettlementthat often broughtgreat hardshipto peasant
settlersand, of course, affectedthe collectionof state taxes."1With this intentionin
mind, the governmentissuedthe ukaz of 3 June 1805, establishingthe guidelinesfor
5 N. M. Druzhinin,Gosudarstvennye
krest'ianei reformaP. D. Kiseleva,vol. 1 (Moscowand Leningrad,1946), 89-90; S. P. Kavelin,"Istoricheskiiocherkpozemel'nogoustroistvagosudarstvennykh
krest'ian,"Trudyobshchestva
mezhevykhinzhenerov,vyp. 2 (Moscow,1912), 18.
6 F.-X.
Coquin,"Faimet migrationspaysannesau xixemesiecle,"Revued'histoiremoderneet contemporaine,vol. 2 (1964):129.
7 Polnoesobraniezakonovrossiiskoiimperii(PSZ), ser. 1, vol. 21, no. 15177,pp. 186-87.
8 N. Petrovich,"K istoriikrest'ianskogo
dvizheniia,"Arkhivistoriitrudav Rospereselencheskogo
sii, book 10 (1923):150.
9 Controloverstatepeasantaffairsat this time officiallyrestedwith the Departmentof State Properties (Departamentgosudarstvennykh
imushchestv),a divisionof the Ministryof Finance.See E. AmRusslandsvon Peterdem Grossenbis 1917 (Leiden, 1966),
burger,Geschichteder Beh5rdenorganisation
uchrezhdeniidorevoliutsionnoiRossii
244, 281; and N. P. Eroshkin, Ocherkiistoriigosudarstvennykh
(Moscow,1960), 205-6.
10TsGIA, f. 379, op. 1, d. 4, 1. 122.
11 Ibid., 11.25-25(b).
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WillardSunderland
475
a systematicresettlementpolicythat-at least on paper-were to governthe process
for the followingtwentyyears.
The 1805 decree concerned the resettlementof over three thousand "landstarved" (malozemel'nye)state peasantsfrom Smolenskprovince to New Russia.
These peasants,who lived on meagerholdingsof three-and-a-halfdesiatinaand had
sufferedthroughrepeatedharvestfailures,were in suchdesperatestraightsthat they
could "neitherpay their taxes nor even feed themselves."'2Faced with such grim
circumstances,the peasantshadappealedforpermissionto resettle. The government
approvedthe peasants'requestand devised a list of proceduresfor them to follow.
The procedureswere necessary,the ukaz noted, because of the long recordof peasant relocationsthat had failed due to a lack of "necessarysupervision. .. and provisioning." Out of a total of fifty thousand peasants previously dispatched for
resettlementto the North Caucasus,no more than fifteen thousandhad arrivedat
their destination, althoughthe decree does not indicate what happened to these
settlers.13
Accordingto the decree, state peasantswere requiredto send a partyof scouts
(khodoki)to the areaof resettlementonce theirrequestfor relocationwas approved.
These scouts would choose the new lands and village sites in conjunctionwith the
local authorities.In cases of long-distanceresettlement,an advance party was to
build lodgingsand preparethe fieldsfor the main partyof settlers. These preparations would take place over the winter,with the rest of the settlers followingin the
springand travelingin groupsof no morethanthirtyfamiliesso as to avoidproblems
of quarteringandprovisioningduringthe journey.As a furthermeasureagainstproblems or disturbances,local officialsor soldierswere to escort the peasants as they
moved "fromcity to city"and "fromone uezd to another."These local officialswere
also requiredto providethe settlers with money for food and other necessities en
route. On arrival,the peasantswere to receive allotmentsof fifteen desiatinaper
male soul, five years' relief from paymentof taxes, and fifteen additionalyears of
eligibilityfor governmentloans. In orderto ensurean unbrokenflowof state revenue,
the settlers' tax obligationsduringthe exemptionperiod were to be passed on to
those peasantsstayingbehind (that is, to the communes),an arrangementthat the
governmentviewed as appropriatepaymentfor the lands vacatedby the departing
settlers.'4
The level of state assistanceoffered to potential settlers in the 1805 decree
markeda considerableimprovementover previouslegislation.The five-yearrelease
from dues was especiallyimportant.Settlerspriorto 1805had been grantedmerely
a one-and-a-halfyear exemption.Duringthis shortperiod, they were barelyable to
constructtheir homes, set up their farms and adjustto their new climate and surroundings.Kochubei,who arguedstronglyfor the five-yearexemption, noted that
one-and-a-halfyears was simply not enough time for the peasants to provide adequatelyfor themselves,let alone meet their obligationsto the state.15The minister,
12
13
14
PSZ, ser. 1, vol. 40, no. 21779(a),p. 41.
Ibid., 43.
Ibid., 43-44.
15 TsGIA, f.
379, op. 1, d. 4, 11.117-18(b).
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The RussianReview
476
however,stoppedshortof sayingthat the generousfive-yearprivilegeshouldbe extendedto all settlers.Althoughthe 1805decreeeventuallybecamethe precedentfor
all state-sponsoredresettlement,it is clear that the governmentdid not originally
intendfor the ukaz to applyacrossthe board.Fearingthat "simplepeople" (prostye
liudi) might misinterpretthe decree as officialendorsementfor independentresettlement, the governmentdecidednot to publishit.16
Insteadof makingthe decreepublic,the governmentdevisedan administrative
systemintendedto ensurecompletecontrolover the resettlementprocess. In early
1806the Ministryof InternalAffairsrequestedgovernorsin twenty-twocentraland
southwesternprovincesto informit of all petitionsfor resettlementinvolvinggroups
of five or more families.The ministrywould then approveor reject these requests.
In reservingthe rightof finalapproval,the governmenthoped to retainenoughcontrol over resettlement"to restrictit or abolishit altogether"if it no longer seemed
to serve the state's best interests.17Centralizedcontrolwas one of the guidingprinciples of the government'sdesign. Even thoughprovincialgovernorsand treasuries
were expectedto communicatewith each otheron mattersconcerningthe departure
and arrivalof peasant settlers, the centralministriesin St. Petersburgwere to be
kept abreastof all developments.
With its long enumerationof detailed procedures,the 1805 decree certainly
reflectsthe spiritof tutelageandmartialregimentationthatpermeatedmost Russian
governmentprojectsin the late eighteenthand early nineteenthcenturies. As one
historianhas noted, the state approachedthe managementof peasantresettlement
with the same concernfor minutiaeand exactnessthat it might have shown in organizingan armyregiment.18There were, of course, practicalreasonsfor tryingto
exert this control. One of the state's most importantconcernswas to ensure that
resettlementdid not interferewith the fulfillmentof the peasantry'sfinancialand
militaryobligations.We have alreadyseen how responsibilityfor peasanttaxes during the exemptionperiod was convenientlypassed on to the settlers' former communes. What is more, the peasantsreceived no reprievefrom militaryobligations
as the governmentinsisted that settlers continueto rendertheir requiredshare of
militaryrecruits,even duringthe difficultinitial period of their resettlement.The
government'ssteadfastnesson this point appearsto have developedin response to
fears that an energeticresettlementpolicy mightlead to a reductionin recruitment
levels. In a letter to Ministerof FinanceA. I. Vasilievin 1807, Kochubeimade it
clear that local authoritieswere not to allow peasantsto departfor resettlementif
their recruitmentquotashad not been met.19
Despite suchattemptsat control,the governmentnonethelessencounteredconsiderableproblemsin organizingthe resettlementprocess. In 1806 it had to extend
specialpowersto governorsin provincesthatwereoverwhelmedwithincomingpeasant settlers,and six yearslaterit was actuallyforcedto halt resettlementtemporarily
to all provincesexcept New Russia due to outstandingproblemswith the imperial
16
17
18
19
Ibid., 11.119, 8.
Ibid., 11.26, 123(b).
Coquin, La Siberie, 50.
TsGIA, f. 379, op. 1, d. 4,11. 122(b)-123.
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Willard Sunderland
477
land survey.20Furthermore, despite the growing scope of the government's policy,
resettlements from any one area often remained too small to significantly reduce local
land shortages.21 Overall, the situation in the countryside proved hard for the government to handle, for it had neither the power to control peasant movement nor
the means to provide for it in adequate fashion. At the heart of the government's
dilemma lay the simple fact that in organizing resettlement it was attempting to bring
order and routine to a process that operated largely according to its own dynamic,
one related most of all to the difficult social and economic conditions of life in the
countryside.
Although precise figures are not available, a variety of sources show clearly that the
government's resettlement policy affected thousands of state peasant settlers in the
early nineteenth century. Most of the movement at this time was directed from central
and southwestern provinces to areas in the south and southeast. For example, during
the short period from 1805 to 1810 over twelve thousand state peasants ("revision
souls," that is, adult males) were resettled in New Russia from Poltava, Chernigov,
Kursk and other Ukrainian provinces. These resettlements led to the establishment
of at least twenty-five new state peasant villages.22In addition, state peasants moved
in considerable numbers to the North Caucasus and, on a somewhat lesser scale, to
the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia.23
In most cases, the obvious factor leading state peasants to resettle was simple
economic misery. Judging from files in the Ministry of Finance, peasants nearly always cited land shortages, poor harvests and their own generally impoverished condition as reasons for seeking resettlement. The case of the state peasants from three
villages in Suratskii povet, Chernigov province, is typical. In their petition for resettlement, 402 revision souls complained of "insufficient and poor-quality land" and
"failed harvests over the course of eight consecutive years" that left them "with no
hope of providing for their families . . . or paying their arrears in the foreseeable
future."24Other peasants from Gzhatskii uezd, Smolensk province, pleaded for resettlement due to "devastations" experienced during the war of 1812.25Judging from
available documents, it seems that it was generally the poorest peasants in the village
20
PSZ, ser. 1, vol. 29, no. 22367, pp. 878-80, and ser. 1, vol. 32, no. 25150, p. 364.
Petrovich, "K istorii," 154.
22 This information was
drawn from annual gubernatorial reports for the New Russian provinces.
The total figure of 12,218 revision souls comprises state peasants from a number of subcategories including
odnodvortsy and cossacks. TsGIA, f. 1281, op. 11, d. 165 (Khersonskaia guberniia 1805-1810 gg.), d.
184 (Ekaterinoslavskaia guberniia 1805-1810 gg.), d. 131 (Tavricheskaia guberniia 1805-1810 gg). Information on the village settlements is provided in A. Skal'kovskii, Khronologicheskoe obozrenie istorii
novorossiiskogo kraia, part 2, 1796-1823 (Odessa, 1838), 121.
23 On resettlement in these areas see L. N. Iurovskii, Saratovskie votchiny. Statistiko-ekonomicheskie
ocherki i materialy iz istorii krupnogo zemlevladeniia i krepostnogo khoziaistva v kontse XVIII i v nachale
XIX stoletiia (Saratov, 1923), 20-26; Istoriia Sibiri, vol. 2, Sibir v sostave feodal'noi Rossii (Leningrad,
1968), 167-71; V M. Kabuzan, "Zaselenie i osvoenie Severnogo Kavkaza (Stavropol'ia i Chernomorii)
v I-i polovine XIX v. (1815-1858 gg.)," Istoriia geograficheskikh znanii i istoricheskaia geografiia. Etnografiia, vyp. 4 (Moscow, 1970), 14-16; and Iu. M. Tarasov, Russkaia krest'ianskaia kolonizatsiia iuzhnogo
Urala: vtoraia polovina XVIII-pervaia polovina XIX v. (Moscow, 1984), 81-125.
24
TsGIA, f. 379, op. 1, d. 479, 11.2-2(b), 14-15, 17.
25
Ibid., d. 150, 1. 1.
21
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The Russian Review
478
who petitioned for resettlement. As one historian has noted, these peasants often
opted to resettle because they had the least to lose.26 The actual profile of peasant
settlers, however, must have included some wealthier peasants who were prepared
to take advantage of the state's incentives for resettlement and still others who, for
one reason or another, were forced to relocate by their communes. Though peasant
petitions overwhelmingly emphasized the economic "push" factors in their requests
to resettle, other "pull" factors such as utopian expectations of a land of freedom
and abundance on the frontier also motivated peasants to relocate. One tsarist official
noted that rumors about the good life in "faraway lands," in combination with poor
economic conditions, often created a mood for resettlement among state-peasant
communities.27
In choosing their place of destination, peasants demonstrated that they were
well aware of the dangers and uncertainties of the resettlement process. In most
instances they preferred resettlement over a limited distance, often within their native province if possible. Such resettlements held obvious advantages from the peasants' perspective: by relocating close to home, settlers avoided the risks of a long
journey, established themselves in a familiar environment and climate, and retained
the option of easily returning to their original villages if and when the need arose.
Other peasants, such as those from Khar'kov uezd, Slobodskaia-Ukraina province,
resettled over long distances but were able to reduce the difficulties of the process
by moving to areas already settled by their former villagers and relatives.28 Most
peasant settlers, however, did not have this option. In taking their families and possessions on the road, all that they could hope for was assistance from their communes
and from the state's local officials.
As the basic instrument of authority in the peasant community, the commune
understandably played an important role in the resettlement process. It granted permission for its members to petition the government for resettlement and, in some
cases, actually oversaw the selection of families.29But perhaps the commune's most
important function lay in providing departing settlers with some form of material
assistance. The decree of 1805 stipulated that the commune provide this support,
but it did not establish a set amount, requiring instead that local officials determine
26
Coquin,"Faim,"135.
krest'ianv Sibir'v nachale
Petrovich,"Pereseleniegosudarstvennykh
19 veka,"Arkhivistoriitrudav Rossii,book 12 (1924):116. Forstatepeasants(muchlike runawayserfs),
there appearsto havebeen some truthto expectationsof a betterlife in the empire'soutlyingprovinces.
27 The officialis cited in N.
See D. Moon, Russian Peasants and Tsarist Legislation on the Eve of Reform: Interaction between Peasants
and Officialdom,1825-1855(London,1992),23-33. On the powerof utopianlegendsandtheireffect on
the Russian peasantry see K. V Chistov, Russkie narodnye sotsial'no-utopicheskie legendy XVII-XIX vv.
(Moscow,1967).
28 TsGIA, f. 379, op. 1, d. 459,1. 17 passim.Between1821and 1828,severalhundredpeasantsand
voennyeobyvatelifrom these Ukrainianvillagesfollowedtheir relativesto Saratovprovince,takingup
residencein the originalsettlementsor establishingnew ones nearby.Linksof kinshipand zemliain this
instanceappearto have been importantmechanismsfor supportingresettlement.
29
Familyselection,usuallyby meansof castinglots, occurredin cases when resettlementwas requiredby the state (TsGIA,f. 379, op. 1, d. 187,11.55, 68[b]). On instancesof forcedresettlement,such
as those that occurredduringthe establishmentof militarycoloniesin the 1810sand 1820s, see N. Petrovich,"Prinuditel'noepereseleniebobyletskikhkrest'ian,"Arkhiv istoriitrudav Rossii, book 11-12
(1924): 149-63.
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WillardSunderland
479
the appropriatelevel of assistanceon a case-by-casebasis.30Unfortunately,official
documentationin most instancesdoes not reveal the extent of communalsupport
offered to peasant settlers, except to say that it was generallysufficient. One can
assumethat the assistancecame in money or in kind, or that it sometimesinvolved
more elaboratearrangements,such as in the case of the state peasantsfrom Kletino
village, Meshchovskiiuezd, Kaluga province. Upon leaving for settlement in the
Saratovarea, these 224 peasantsagreedwith theircommunethat they wouldreceive
ten rublesfor each settler as well as rightsto usage or rentalover their formerpersonal plots for three years followingtheir departure.31Regardlessof the arrangements that settlers made with their communes, however, the basic unit in the
resettlement process remained the individualpeasant family, a fact that correspondedboth to the dictatesof peasantlife as well as to the stipulationsof the state's
resettlementpolicy. The act of permanentresettlement,unlike temporarymigrant
work, revolved around marriedcouples, and sometimes whole households, who
would move togetherto the borderlandregions.
The role of local administrationin the resettlementof state peasants was absolutelyessential. In additionto ensuringthat settlersreceived appropriatesupport
from their communes,local officialswere also expected to arrangefor travel assistance (posobie, kormovyeden'gi), escort teams and quarteringfor peasantson the
road. Given the dismal reputationof Russia's provincialadministration,it is not
surprisingto learnthat local officialsoften failed to carryout these responsibilities.32
Supportfor travelexpensesvariedfrom case to case: in some instancesit was generous; in many others it came in small amountsand only on request.33Sometimes
provincialtreasuries,insteadof providingoutrightsupport,issuedloans to cover the
costs of travel.34As for escortingand monitoringduties, little informationexists in
the state archives.One can only wonderwhetherstate escorts abided by gubernatorialinstructionsnot to controlthe peasantsor "restrictin anywaytheirfreedom."35
In additionto providingor servingas escorts, local officialshad anotherimportantpolicefunction:to preventstatepeasantsfromundertakingresettlementwithout
officialpermission.As noted above, independentresettlementwas a persistentproblem, one that contributedto the government'sdecisionto draftthe 1805legislation.
The creation of an official resettlementpolicy, however,did not really affect this
phenomenon.Giventhe long delaysinherentin the petitioningprocessas well as the
ever-presentpossibilitythat resettlementcould be denied, the lure of independent
30
PSZ, ser. 1, vol. 40, no. 21779(a), p. 44.
31
TsGIA, f. 379, op. 1, d. 77,1. 15(b).
32
The venal, inefficientand often brutalcharacterof Russianlocal officialdomin the nineteenth
centuryis well known.For an overviewof local officialsand theirworkwith the state peasantrysee G.
Bolotenko, "Administrationof the State Peasantsin Russiabefore the Reformsof 1838" (Ph.D. diss.
Universityof Toronto,1979), 121-92.
33 In a directivefrom
1806, Kochubeiinstructedthe vice-governorof Kurskprovinceto provide
peasantswith travel assistance"only if one of them, out of extreme poverty,chooses to request it"
(TsGIA, f. 379, op. 1, d. 4, 1. 70).
34 Ibid., d. 479,11.28-31.
35These instructions,from the governorof Tobolsk,are quotedin Petrovich,"Pereseleniegosudarstvennykhkrest'ian,"112.
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resettlement remained strong.36The case of state-peasant settlers from the village
of Baturovka, Suratskii povet, Chernigov province, provides a typical example.
These peasants (four families in all) were found "traveling on thirteen oxen, with
their wives, young children, stock animals ... in a word, with all of their belongings
in tow." When asked what they were doing, the peasants responded that they had
left their homes because of harvest failure and were heading for resettlement to
"lands on the Black Sea." Having no papers, they were promptly carted off to the
police, forced to return to their village, and presumably punished for what the local
zemskii komissar called "vagabondage in the guise of resettlement."37 On this occasion at least, state officials were successful in turning back illegal peasant settlers.
In contrast to the Baturovka peasants who attempted to relocate without official
permission, many other peasants actually secured the right to resettle by making it
impossible for the government to refuse, ignore or delay the approval of their petitions. In 1806, for example, peasants from several villages in Penza province, expecting to resettle to the Caucasus in the summer, "sold their homes and all other
property, and refrained from sowing their fields." As a result, they had no means of
supporting themselves and thus had to be released for resettlement at the earliest
possible juncture.38In another case, 1,987 state peasants from Orel province received
permission to leave their communes and immediately began preparing for departure
by selling all of their belongings. Given the possibility of disturbances if their resettlement were postponed, the Orel governor found himself "obliged" to let them go.39
By disposing of their property and surrendering their land to their communes, the
peasants basically forced the government to respond, thereby accelerating the resettlement process and throwing a wrench into the state's deliberate, slow-moving
and overly centralized system. Though provincial authorities sometimes succeeded
in keeping peasants from leaving too quickly, one gets the sense from official documents that peasant action-not state policy-generally set the schedule for relocations in the countryside.
Considering the difficulties inherent in the resettlement process, arranging for
departure was probably the least of the settlers' worries. Much more worrisome was
the prospect of moving to new lands and establishing a new life in an unfamiliar and
potentially inhospitable environment. The journey itself was the first challenge. Judging from available accounts, long-distance resettlement in the early nineteenth century brought considerable hardships. Most state-peasant settlers in this period
traveled by cart or by foot for weeks and even months at a time, moving in small
groups of five, ten or fifteen families, and quartering when possible in villages along
the way. In cases of resettlement over extremely long distances, death and desertion
on the road were common.40And even when settlers reached their destination, dif36
State peasants who left for resettlement without official permission received none of the privileges
or even the tentative assistance accorded to legal settlers. Despite this fact, independent resettlement was
widespread. Many state peasants reacted to the state's resettlement policy by simply setting out on their
own. See Druzhinin, Gosudarstvennye krest'iane 1:92-93.
37 TsGIA, f. 379, op. 1, d. 479, 11.19-20.
38 Ibid., d. 4, 11.30-31.
39 Ibid., 11.34-37.
40
Coquin, La Siberie, 51.
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481
ficultiesin adjustingto the rigorsof a new environmentas well as in dealing with
significantshortcomingsin the state's resettlementpolicy often meant that their situation did not noticeablyimprove.
Land was a constantsource of concern.Despite a seeming abundanceof land
in the outlying provincesof the empire, the distributionof state land to peasant
settlers proceeded slowly and, periodically,stopped altogether.Due to inadequate
surveys,provincialauthoritiessimplydid not knowthe quantityof land availablefor
distributionto peasantsettlers.Thisexplainswhythe governmenttemporarilyhalted
resettlementin 1812in all provincesexceptthe New Russianterritory.Yet even New
Russiacame to experienceproblemsin this regard.The enormousinfluxof settlers
to the territoryled to the establishmentin 1818 of provincialcommittees designed
to oversee the distributionof new allotments.Justone year later,however,the committees cited enormousdifficultiesin theirworkdue to the fact that "the exact quantity of state lands" in the territoryremainedunknown.41The incompletecount of
state lands caused confusion and delays in the resettlementprocess all across the
empire.42It was not unheardof for peasantsettlersto be denied the land chosen for
them by their scouts or agents(poverennye).One groupof settlersin Tavridaprovince, for example, complainedthat they had been given "lands without access to
water"in lieu of the better-qualitysites that they had originallyselected. Despite
the peasants'petitions, local authoritiesrefused to allow the settlers to relocate to
the lands they desired.43
Peasantsoften lived in poor conditionsin their new settlements. Settlers from
Suratskiipovet, Chernigovprovince,found conditionsin Tavridaso disastrousthat
some of them petitionedfor permissionto returnto their originalvillages. A provincial clerk or "fixer"(striapchii),sent to investigatethe situation, found the settlers' homes permeatedwith "a foul humidsmell,"wells that were "cavingin" for
"lack of wood supports,"and grossly inadequatesupplies, including"a mere five
days'supplyof fuel" and "no cattle feed or grain."Althoughthe settlers requested
loans for timber,oxen, cows, plows and harnesses,only a fractionof the funding,as
well as some grain,wasprovided.The state thusalleviatedthe settlers'dire situation
but hardlyprovidedthe meansnecessaryfor a successfulstartto resettlement.44
This
case typifiesthe situationthat often prevailedin the countryside.Despite isolated
effortsto intercedeon behalfof peasantsettlers,provincialtreasuriessimplydid not
have the means to assist the peasants.Lack of coordinationbetween provincialorgans furthercomplicatedmatters. Governorsand treasuriesin the provinceswere
supposed to cooperate in handlingresettlementissues, yet this cooperationoften
broke down, as can be seen in the cases of numeroussettlers who, due to miscommunicationbetween the provinces,were registeredfor taxes both in their original
villages as well as in their new settlements.45
In additionto a generallack of officialsupport,sicknessesresultingfrom life in
41
42
43
44
45
TsGIA, f. 379, op. 1, d. 187,11.96-98.
Istoriia Sibiri, 170.
TsGIA, f. 379, op. 1, d. 479,1. 140.
Ibid., 11.79(b)-83(b).
krest'iane1:94.
Druzhinin,Gosudarstvennye
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an unfamiliarenvironmentalso contributedto settlers'misfortunes.In the firsteight
yearsfollowingtheirresettlementto Tavrida,a communityof 428 peasantsoriginally
from Melitopol'skiiuezd, Malorossiiaprovince, lost 126 membersdue to "differences in climate,"a commoneuphemismfor unknowndiseases.46Settlersalso sometimes experiencedproblemswith their new neighbors.In the Crimea,for example,
lands given to state peasantswere not clearlyseparatedfrom nearbypasturesused
by Tatarherders.As a result, Tatarsheep and cattle often grazedon peasantfields
and trampledtheirplots, givingrise to frequentland disputes.47Othersettlersfound
themselvesat the mercyof neighboringnoblelandowners.In the case of the peasants
from Suratskiipovet, a local landownerowned the only well close to the peasants'
settlementand frequentlychargedthem for its use, forcingthem to performlabor
serviceswithoutpay.48
Given the hardshipsinvolvedin resettlement,it is not surprisingthat peasants
sometimesabandonedtheir new homes and returnedto their formervillages. This
phenomenon,unanticipatedby the state's resettlementpolicy, caused considerable
problemsfor both the peasantsand the provincialauthorities.Take, for example,
the three hundred-plusodnodvortsyfrom Orel provincewho had resettled to new
landsin the Caucasusin the early 1810s.In 1815these peasantspetitionedto return
to theirold villagesin Orel, complainingthat officialsin the Caucasusdid not furnish
them with "suitableland" or providethem with the lumber needed to build their
new homes. The peasantsreceivedpermissionto leave, but on returninghome discoveredthat their formervillageswouldnot take them back. The peasantswho had
stayedbehindinsistedthatthey couldnot affordto reintegratethe returningpeasants
into theirvillages,citing"a lackof landand, moreover,protestingthat they had paid
[the settlers'] taxes, rendered their obligations . . . and provided them with twenty-
five rublesassistanceper soul in resettlingto the Caucasus."In resolvingthe issue,
the Orel treasuryallowedthe returningsettlersto repossesstheir formerallotments
except those that had been built upon.49
Peasantsreturningto their formerhomes were often in such a poor state that
they requiredimmediateassistancefromlocal officials.In 1815the governorof Smolensk provincerequestedcompensationfrom the Ministryof Financefor assistance
renderedto 205 state peasantswho had just returnedfrom attemptedresettlement
in New Russia.These peasantshad exhaustedtheirresourceson the returntrip and
"possessedneitherhomes, stock animals,tools, nor even seeds for sowingtheirwinter fields."The governoraskedfor over twenty-fivethousandrublesin assistancefor
the peasants,absolutionfrom debtsincurredduringthe year of theirfailed resettlement, and release from taxes for the comingtwo years.50This benevolentconcern,
however,did not applyto state peasantsettlerswho attemptedto returnhome withTsGIA, f. 1285,op. 3, d. 132,1. 2(b).
S. A. Sekirinskii,"K voprosuo zaseleniiKrymav kontseXVIII veka,"Izvestiiakrymskogopedagogicheskogoinstitutaim. M. V Frunze,vol. 23 (1956):81.
48
TsGIA, f. 379, op. 1, d. 479,1. 143.
49 Ibid., 11.13-15(b).
50Ibid., d. 151, 11.2-3(b), 5.
46
47
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WillardSunderland
483
out officialpermission.In such cases, peasantswere forced to go back to their settlements, compoundingthe hardshipsthat had led them to leave in the firstplace.5'
Althoughresettlementin the earlynineteenthcenturywasfraughtwith difficulty
for peasants,fromthe government'sperspectiveorganizedresettlementwas serving
a clearpurpose.Despite shortcomings,the state'spolicyprovideda legal framework
for controllingpeasantmobilityand directingit to the borderlandareas for colonization and development.Whilethe policydid not preventindependentmovementor
flight, it did provide some incentive for peasants to resettle accordingto the law.
Despite instancesof failed resettlement,the greatmajorityof legal peasantsettlers,
judgingfrom the lack of complaintsin the state archives,must have overcome the
dangersof the resettlementprocessand adjusted,at least somewhatsuccessfully,to
life on their new lands.
Throughoutthe earlynineteenthcentury,the Russiangovernmentremainedstrongly
committedto its resettlementpolicy, a fact that reflecteda growingattachmentto
resettlementas part of a largerdesign for reformingthe state peasantry.Action in
this domainwas intense, especiallyin the 1820s, when committeescreated by Tsar
Nicholas I discussedseveralreformproposals.Two projects in particular,those of
PrinceA. Kurakinand M. M. Speranskii,gave prominentplace to the resettlement
idea.
In 1828, Kurakin,a wealthylandownerandold courtprotege, submitteda project to the powerful6th of DecemberCommitteein whichhe proposed, amongother
things, the forcedresettlementof hundredsof thousandsof peasantsfrom overpopulatedto underpopulatedprovinces.Althoughthe committeerejectedmost aspects
of the proposal,it endorsedthe idea of resettlementas a meansof resolvingthe land
crisis and laying the basis for a new system of individualland tenure on state domains.52This theme was also energeticallypursuedby Speranskii,a memberof the
committeewho had workedclosely with the resettlementsystem in his capacityas
governor-generalof Siberia.Accordingto Speranskii'splan, Russianagriculturewas
graduallyto reformitself alongthe lines of the Englishmodel. At the same time that
the repartitionalcommunewasslowlyabolishedin core agriculturalareas, a program
of massive resettlementwould transferpeasantsto outlyingprovinces,where they
would receive "surveyedand apportionedlands ... on the basis of single-familynot communal-tenure."53
In additionto entertainingthese vast designs, the governmentin the 1820s and
early 1830s also introduceda numberof smallerand more manageablecorrectives
to its existing resettlement policy. Responding to the problems of long-distance
resettlement,an 1824decree requiredthat provincialauthoritiesfirstattemptto resettle needy peasantson availablelandswithintheir home provincesbefore permitting them to departfor more distant areas. In this way, the governmentmoved to
reduce its own expenses as well as wardoff some of the hardshipsfaced by peasant
51 Ibid., d.
479, 11.139-139(b).
krest'iane1:179.
Druzhinin,Gosudarstvennye
views on resettlementduringhis work in Siberiasee M.
53 Ibid., 183. For details on Speranskii's
Raeff, Siberiaand the Reformsof 1822 (Seattle, 1956), 58-59; and Coquin, La Siberie,69-73.
52
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settlers. In additionto listinga numberof new procedures,the decree reducedthe
tax-exemptionperiod for settlersfrom five to three years and-for the firsttime in
such universalterms-absolved settlers from their militaryobligationsfor a threeyearperiod.54The addendato the 1824ukaz, whichappearedin 1831, reiteratedthe
steps to be taken in providingsettlers with monetaryassistanceand good-quality
land, specifyingthe amountof aid in differentinstancesand stressingthe need for
greaterintercessionby local authorities,particularlyin the Caucasusandin the provinces of Saratovand Orenburg,where resettlementwas occurringon the greatest
scale.55
Judgingfrom the ukazy,it is clear that the governmentcontinuedto see great
advantagesto organizedstate peasantresettlementin the 1820sand 1830s. Despite
smallchanges,the governmentessentiallyretainedthe systemof land disbursement,
materialincentivesand centralizedcontrolthat the decree of 1805had codified.Under the Ministryof State Domains, founded in 1837, this system was further entrenched, serving as the workingbasis for a massive resettlement program that
touched over 160,000 revisionsouls between 1838 and 1856.56Thoughthe Kiselev
era lies beyondthe scope of this essay,it is worthnotingthat the problemsplaguing
state peasantresettlementin the firstdecadesof the nineteenthcenturypersistedin
the 1840sand 1850s.The physicalhardshipsof geographyand climate,as well as the
negligenceand inefficiencyof state officialdom,continuedto make resettlementa
potentiallydisastrousventurefor peasantsettlers. Furthermore,the great difficulty
thatthe state experiencedin controllingthe migrationprocesswas a constantfeature
of resettlementpolicy both before and afterthe emancipation.57
Most historianswho have writtenon state peasant resettlementin the early ninecriticalof the government'spolicy,pointing
teenthcenturyhavebeen understandably
out that the official resettlementsystem was cumbersome,overly centralizedand
insensitiveto the needs of peasantsettlers. Yet the government'spolicy represents
only one side of the issue. To understandthe full workingsof the resettlemententerprisewe must look beyond this official dimension. Once we do, we discover a
different,muchmoredynamicworldin whichstatepolicyinteractedwith timetables,
arrangementsand initiativesestablishedby the peasantsettlersthemselves.Peasant
settlersoften took the initiativein organizingtheir own departure,forcingstate officialsto respond.Followingresettlement,the settlersgenerallyhadless controlover
theirsituation.Theywere dependenton the cooperationof local officialsin receiving
54 PSZ, ser. 1, vol. 39, no. 29848, pp. 227-32. In a special instance, a five-year release from draft
obligations (1809-1813) was extended to a group of Smolensk settlers in New Russia. See A. V. Florovskii,
"Neskol'ko faktov iz istorii russkoi kolonizatsii Novorossii v nachale XIX v.," Zapiski odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei, vol. 33 (1919): 39.
55 PSZ, ser. 2, vol. 6, no. 4311, pp. 113-15.
56 Most resettlement at this time proceeded, as before, from overpopulated provinces in the center
and southwest to areas on the periphery. Relocations within a given province, however, were also intensified. See N. M. Druzhinin, Gosudarstvennye krest'iane i reforma P D. Kiseleva, vol. 2 (Moscow and
Leningrad, 1958), 189-95.
57 D. W. Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlementfrom
Emancipation to the First World War(Princeton, 1957), 80-81.
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485
the landsand materialassistancethey needed for establishingtheir new settlements.
Nonetheless,peasantinitiativecan still be seen, especiallyin instancesof failed resettlement, when conditionsbecame so unbearablethat settlers chose to return to
theirformerhomes,withor withoutofficialpermission.Throughoutthe resettlement
process, the familyand the communeplayedcrucialroles. Muchas in other spheres
of peasantlife, these two institutionsprovidedthe basicframeworkand supportfor
the acts of departureand relocation.
As for the policy itself, it seems reasonableto conclude that state-sponsored
resettlementfailed as an attemptto furtherstate-peasantreform.The resettlement
programin the early nineteenthcenturyenjoyed neitherthe scale nor the resources
to broadlyimprovethe economicconditionsof the empire'sstate-peasantpopulation.
The policydid succeed, however,in openinga limitedspacefor legal mobility,which
the state consistentlyattemptedto direct to the borderlandprovinces.While there
was no coherentplan for imperialdevelopmentin the earlynineteenthcentury,Russian statesmenwere certainlyawareof the vast and underexploitedpotentialof the
empire'sboundaryregions, and they viewed resettlementas a mechanismfor developingthis potential.As such, it was partof a largerimperialtendencyin the borderlandsbest describedby the Russianterm osvoenie, the process of incorporating
and literallymakinga territoryinto one's own.58The pawnsin the empire-building
process, in this case, were legal peasant settlers, counted, registered and locked
within a systemof state taxes and obligationsthat would make them, and the borderlandsthat they moved to, productive.
It is difficultto judge the successof state-directedresettlementas an imperialist
policy in the early nineteenthcentury.The scale of organizedresettlementduring
this period was certainlynot large enough to produce the impact that it later had
underKiselevor in the postemancipationera, whenmassiveRussiansettlementtook
place in Siberiaand newly conqueredTurkestan.Nonetheless,the early nineteenth
centurysaw considerablelegal peasantmovement.Tens of thousandsof Russianand
Ukrainianpeasantssuccessfullyovercamethe rigorsof resettlement,adaptedto their
new surroundings,and establisheda coexistencewith neighboringnon-Russianpeoples, thus furtheringthe processof osvoeniein the empire'sboundaryprovinces.
58 Colonization and
other imperial strategies are discussed in A. Kappeler, "Historische Voraussetzungen des Nationalitatenproblems im russischen Vielvolkerreich," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 8
(1982): 159-83.
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