Hegemony and
Foreign Policy
Analysis: The Case of
Canada as Middle
Power
MARK NEUFELD
ntroduction It has become commonplace in the discipline of international relations to observe that changing
conditions in the global order demand new analyses of
that order. The dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the lingering
global economic downturn are both touted as developments
requiring new appraisals and prognoses. Equally important,
this realization has its parallel at the (meta- )theoreticallevel;
it is increasingly accepted that the failure of students of
world politics to anticipate and account for the sea-changes
of the past few years cannot be divorced from a discussion
of the way in which world politics has been studied. Simply
put, what is required is not just new analysis, but new ways
of analyzing; not merely re-examination of global structures
and processes, but critical exploration of alternatives to the
dominant theoretical traditions and analytical frameworks
that have guided our thinking about world politics.!
It is the intent of this paper to pursue this theme with
regard to the analysis of Canadian foreign policy in the context of a changing global order. The alternative tradition
that will be the focus is one which is derivative of neoMarxist theories of the state - an approach to foreign policy
which Pratt has termed "dominant class theory."2 It will be
argued that the "dominant class theory" approach to the study
of Canadian foreign policy, as articulated by Pratt and others,
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Studies in Political Economy 48, Autumn 1995
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Studies in Political Economy
can be strengthened and enhanced through the integration
of Gramscian-inspired theorizing - in particular, the notion
of "hegemony." I will illustrate this point in terms of the
notion of Canada as a "middle power." Before moving to a
discussion of the relevance of the Gramscian notion of hegemony, and to its usefulness in conceptualizing discourse
around the notion of "middlepowermanship," however, I will
briefly examine recent developments in the theoretical mainstream which also take up the question of new ways of analyzing in relation to the notion of Canada as a "middle
power."
Relocating Canada as a Middle Power: Neorealist Directions In a review of scholarly literature on Canadian foreign
policy, Molot has argued that what distinguishes that literature is a preoccupation with Canada's "location" in the international system.J Typical has been the notion of Canada
as a "middle power" which informed traditional analyses of
Canada's place in the world in terms of diplomatic practice
and influence, and, more recently, with reference to Canada's
position within the global economy.f
With reference to the wider academic literature, Molot
identifies two liabilities attached to this approach. First, in
concentrating analysis on Canada's middle power status, and
the attendant "selfless" character of Canadian foreign policy,
this approach has "tended to ignore considerations of national interest in Canadian action, despite emphasis in the
larger international relations literature on precisely this issue."5 Furthermore, argues Molot, given the centrality of
the analysis of international regimes during the 1980s,
it is noteworthy that there has been no analysis of Canada's
behaviour in international and other institutions as what Lake
describes as a "system supporter," particulary given the liberal
internationalist tradition in Canadian scholarship .... Does the regime paradigm of analytical utility have a Canadian perspective,
or does it exemplify a theoretical preference at variance with
Canadian interests?6
In this regard, it is significant that recent works coming
out of the theoretical mainstream have attempted to address
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Foreign Policy
both these issues. Of particular note is Cooper, Higgot, and
Nossal's Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada
in a Changing World Order.l where an effort is made to
relate Canadian foreign policy initiatives during the 1980s
to the issue of "national interest." More importantly, the
authors frame the question of Canada as middle power not
in terms of its location, but rather in terms of an approach
to diplomacy, "geared to mitigating conflict and building
consensus and cooperation.t'f Drawing heavily upon the very
regime literature highlighted by Molot, they argue that middle power diplomacy
will fix on mediatory and consensus-building
activities, especially such activities as building reformist coalitions ... to bring
about change within existing regimes or creating "foundational
coalitions" to establish new regimes.?
It must be recognized that, in terms of the mainstream
study of Canadian foreign policy, Relocating Middle Powers
represents important progress. In emphasizing the centrality
of Canada's "national interest," this approach demonstrates
that power and interest cannot be ignored; as such, it provides an effective counter to the idealist-inspired
myth of
Canadian "exceptionalism"
in foreign policy practice. Furthermore, by drawing on the regime literature the approach
makes several important contributions. First, by integrating
the concept of international regimes-v it becomes possible
to take a more differentiated view of the international context
in which foreign policy is made and implemented.U
Secondly, the notion of regimes opens the door to the integration
of interpretive methodologies and explicitly normative concerns.F And finally, it allows for the conceptualization
of
greater autonomy for international actors - of particular
relevance when the object of foreign policy analysis is a
non-superpower.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the neorealist/regime-oriented
approach represented by Relocating Middle
Powers suffers from important liabilities as well. First, neorealism's neglect of the important role played by social forces
and societal structures in determining state action leads to an
exaggeration of the autonomy of the state bureaucracy in foreign
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Studies in Political Economy
policy making.U Furthermore, neorealism's focus on the
"national interest" lends legitimacy to policies in place, obscuring the degree to which state. policy may serve some
parts of the "nation" better than others. A parallel critique
can be directed at regime theory, where the clear predilection
to support the basic principles of the Liberal International
Economic Order (LIED) obscures the degree to which that
order serves the interests of some individuals and groups
better than others.
As a consequence, it must be recognized that the neorealist/regime-oriented approach to the study of foreign policy
is not a neutral one. In every case, the object of analysis
- i.e., the liberal-capitalist state, or the LIED - becomes
something to be accommodated and not challenged. In short,
despite its strengths, the neorealist/regime-oriented approach
to the study of Canadian foreign policy can be understood
as a form of "traditional theory," seeking to facilitate the
smooth working of existing social and political arrangements.H Accordingly, here the focus will be on the development of a more "critical" form of foreign policy analysis
- an approach that, instead of accepting the status quo,
seeks to challenge the "ideologically frozen relations of dependence"15 that sustain it.
The Dominant Class Model and Canadian Foreign Policy
Although marginalized within mainstream foreign policy
analysis, it is important to note that efforts to develop a
critical approach to the study of foreign policy have been
made. One of the most important is Cranford Pratt's exploration of the relevance of the "dominant class model." Following Pratt, the defining characteristics of the dominant
class model can best be understood in terms of an alternative
answer to the question "How can one best conceptualize
theoretically the interaction of government and society in
the making of Canadian foreign policy?" In contrast to neorealism's emphasis on the autonomy of the bureaucracy in
constructing policies in the "national interest," the dominant
class approach suggests that
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Neufeld/Canadian
Foreign Policy
the capital-owning class in any capitalist state is the dominant
class and that the policies of the state reflect and perpetuate
that dominance.l6
Accordingly, notes Pratt, dominant class theory approaches
the study of foreign policy by concentrating
on the widely pervasive bias in policy towards the interests of
the dominant class. Sometimes this bias operates through the
structural constraints identified by the structural theorists and
sometimes through the network of linkages identified by the
so-called instrumental theorists. Through the power which the
dominant class has to shape social attitudes and values, its influence extends far beyond those cases where structural determinant or direct class influence can be demonstrated. It can thus
claim to be a powerful theory even while abandoning any aspiration to reduce to class terms the whole range of internal
factors which influence policy formation.I?
The dominant class theory approach has a number of
strengths. First, dominant class theory, like neorealism, is
able to attribute a considerable degree of autonomy to the
state; unlike neorealism, however, which must be content
to affirm the universal pursuit of power, dominant class theory is able to identify the specific goals pursued by the state
apparatus: the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production. Secondly, dominant class theory acknowledges the
crucial legitimizing function of an accepted dominant ideology that "provides a rationale for the private and severely
unequal ownership of capital."18
At the same time, it must be conceded that the dominant
class approach suffers from some lacunae. First, the dominant class approach as articulated by Pratt is limited to being
a theory of "foreign policy," thus leaving largely unanswered
the question of how its emphasis on class society at the
domestic level relates to the larger global context. Secondly,
to the degree that dominant class theory is derivative of
structuralist Marxist theories of the state, it is prone to the
same weaknesses as structuralist Marxism itself, the most
serious of which is the over-emphasis on determining structures, and the corresponding neglect of human agency.
Accordingly, this paper will seek to build upon the strengths
of dominant class theory by means of Gramscian-inspired
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Studies in Political Economy
theorizing at two specific levels. To begin, I will draw upon
the Gramscian approach to the study of world order to sketch
out the global politico-economic setting of Canadian foreign
policy. This is necessary for two reasons. First, a focus on
the global setting makes clearer how the emphasis on class
society at the domestic level relates to the larger global context. Secondly, attentiveness to the material context of Canadian foreign policy is vital if the discursively-oriented
analysis which follows is not to descend into linguistic idealism.I?
Consistent with the Gramscian emphasis on the importance of ideas, I will analyze the public discourse surrounding Canadian foreign policy at the domestic level. Specifically, I will focus on the regulative ideal of "middle power."
It is important to stress that no fixed meaning is attached
to this term. "Middle power" (and the attendant notion of
" middlepowermanship")
will be approached as an "essentially contested concept," whose definitional content in any
given context is a product of efforts by societal agents to
define key terms in public discourse in a way consistent
with the political project they support. In certain contexts,
those articulating a vision corresponding to the interests of
the dominant class (e.g. government leaders, mainstream intellectuals) may enjoy a relatively free hand in defining key
terms. In others, the understanding of key terms in public
discourse may be hotly contested by oppositional forces
within society as part of the larger effort to give voice to
political aspirations directly contradictory to the interests of
societal elites. Accordingly, while the particular definitional
content of the notion of "middle power/middlepowermanship" must be seen in relation to its material context, it
should not be seen as merely the "effect" of that context;
rather, its politico-normative content is the product of creative social agents in pursuit of concrete political projects.
Conceptualizing
the Global Context of Canadian Foreign
Policy It is necessary to distinguish the Gramscian notion
of hegemony from that of (neo )realism. In the neorealist
framework, states are understood to be the principal actors
in the international realm. Given a context of "anarchy" 12
Neufeld/Canadian
Foreign Policy
that is, an absence of a central authority with a monopoly
on the legitimate use of force - states compete with one
another in an ongoing struggle for power. The distribution
of capabilities (power) across the units (states) is the key
variable in explaining outcomes in the international system.
Accordingly, in neorealist terms international orders may
be understood as hegemonic or non-hegemonic. They are
hegemonic to the degree that a preponderance of power on
the part of one state (the hegemon) allows it to dominate
other states, thereby serving as a rough approximation of a
central authority. Hegemonic international orders in this
sense have been seen as the necessary precondition for a
liberal international economy embodying the norms of openness and nondiscrimination.P"
In contrast, the Gramscian notion of hegemony assumes
a capitalist world economy in which relations between
classes is a key explanatory variable.U The role and activities of social structures, from firms to states to international
organizations, are understood in terms of class relations. As
in the case of neorealism, hegemony can be applied to an
analysis of the international realm. In this case, however,
hegemony is understood to involve not dominance of one
state by another, but rather the institution and maintenance
of a world order which serves the interests of the dominant
class of the dominant state while at the same time it serves
the interests of the dominant classes of other states as well.22
As such, a hegemonic order is characterized by the fact
that the dominant power presents that order as consistent
with the common interest. As Cox notes, in a hegemonic
world order
A leading nation's conception of the world becomes universalized to the point where its own leaders stand by the universalized
principles when they conflict with particularist domestic interests.23
Thus, in contrast to the neorealist approach, the Gramscian notion of hegemony allows us to conceptualize not
two but three distinct categories
of world order: i) a
hegemonic world order, defined by a duly recognized leader
whose actions are understood to serve the "common interest"
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Studies in Political Economy
(i.e., those of the dominant social classes at home as well
as associated elements in other states); ii) a non-hegemonic
order in which a single state dominates other actors in pursuit
of its own "national" interests; and iii) a non-hegemonic
order in which power is sufficiently diffused so that no single
state dominates all others.
The Gramscian-derived notion of hegemony is not limited
to the level of the international order, however. In terms of
core states, at least, hegemony at the international level has
its parallel in hegemony at the domestic level, where dominant classes make real concessions (always within limits)
to subordinate classes to achieve broad societal consent for
their leadership.
A hegemonic world order, then, implies relations of hegemony in the international/interstate
realm coupled with
hegemonic relations at the level of civil society in core states.
Such an order, moreover, has important consequences in
terms of the understanding of the behavioral norms and institutions established to regulate the world order, whether
it be a question of inter-state conflict or forces of civil society acting across borders. Significantly, these norms and
institutions are not identified with the narrow interests of
specific states or social classes, but rather take on a semblance of universality and, therewith, an aura of legitimacy. 24
In terms of the post-war period, one can speak of a
hegemonic world order extending from the end of the Second
World War to the mid-1960s. In this period, the United States
established a world order built around norms and institutions
that Ruggie has termed the "compromise of embedded liberalism" - i.e., a Keynesian welfare state combined with
a liberal(izing) international economic order - all stabilized
under the overarching structure of the cold war.
By the end of the 1960s, however, the bases for a stable
American-led hegemony were beginning to erode. The expectation of continuing economic growth and rises in productivity, which had been central to the stability of the
hegemonic order as the means of moderating both interand intra-state conflict, proved more and more questionable.
Indeed, the very components of the "compromise of embedded liberalism" came increasingly into conflict one with
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Neufeld/Canadian Foreign Policy
another.F' Finally, the rise of East-West detente robbed the
Soviet threat of much of its mobilizing efficacy.
As a consequence, hegemony began to dissolve not only
at the international level, but also in domestic terms. In the
United States, for example, hegemony began to unravel as
the legitimacy of the American state and the order it represented came to be seen as open to question, a process clearly
visible in the growing public opposition to US government
policy in South-East Asia, as well as the increasingly vocal
civil rights movement.P
Given the centrality of the leading state in the maintenance of any hegemonic order, the nature of the foreign
policy of that state is a good indicator of the robustness of
hegemony. As Cox notes,
The evidence of the decline of hegemony is to be sought less
in loss of power than in a tendency towards unilateralism in
furtherance of specific interests.27
In point of fact, by the 1980s the change in the nature
of the global order was clearly visible in the shift in US
foreign policy. Specifically, the Reagan administration's
response to the undermining of American moral superiority
and universalism
took the form of "nationalist assertiveness," most clearly evident in the abandonment of multi-lateral consultative leadership, typifying hegemony, in favour
of an unrepentant unilateralism - a trend which, arguably,
remains very much present in US foreign policy into the
present. Thus, the US remains dominant in the system at
present. However, it must be remembered that, in contrast
with neorealist notions of hegemony, in Gramscian terms
US dominance is a sign of a non-hegemonic
world order
qualitatively different from the hegemonic pax-Americana
which preceded it.
Canada as a Middle Power: The History of a Concept
The early successes of Canada as a middle power were attributable
to our skill in producing sound ideas for the general rather than
just the Canadian interest. This is the way to be listened to.
John Holmes28
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Studies in Political Economy
It was in the context of the American-led hegemonic order
that the character of post-war Canadian foreign policy first
took shape. Given Canada's status as a core state, the Canadian capitalist class enjoyed clear benefits in its association with American-led efforts toward liberalization in trade
and investment regimes. Domestically, of course, concessions were extended to subaltern classes - in the form of
the welfare state - to provide a stable basis for capitalist
class hegemony within Canadian society.
It was also in this context that the regulative ideal of
Canada acting in the world as a "middle power" first came
into prominence. To begin, it is important to note that as a
regulative ideal guiding state action, middlepowermanship
was nested in a complex of assumptions about the global
order shared by Canada's politico-economic elite. Pratt identifies the following two assumptions as key:
i) the most serious threat to international peace and global human
welfare was international communism and the strength of the
United States was the primary bulwark against its spread;
ii) the international economic order and its major institutions
operate to the substantial advance of all participants therein,
that consequently no significant injustices or indefensible inequalities were due to the international economic relationships.29
It was these assumptions which provided "the underlying
unity to such seemingly disparate policies as Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Treat Organization, its close
military and defence productions links with the United
States, its expanding aid programme, its active role in
peacekeeping, and its effective participation in international
institutions ... "30
Upon the foundation of these assumptions, then, the notion of "middle power" was erected. As a regulative ideal,
"middle power" must be understood in terms of both levels
of the global order. In terms of the international level, middlepowermanship
directed the Canadian state to playa
prominent role in multilateral fora, particulary in terms of
international organizations associated with the North Atlantic community, and the Bretton Woods and UN systems. In
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Neufeld/Canadian Foreign Policy
this way, the notion of "middle power" oriented the Canadian
state to a role supportive of the hegemonic global order in
two critical senses: i) by fulfilling an important role of facilitator and mediator, Canada helped to defuse potential conflicts which, if not addressed, might have undermined the
stability of the global order.U and ii) by showing itself willing to sacrifice short-term national interests for the greater
good, Canada helped to reinforce the notion that the global
order was in fact not a narrowly "American" order, but one
which truly represented the "common interest."32
In terms of the construction of hegemony at the domestic
level the notion of "middle power" played an important function as well. First, in its stability-reinforcing role of facilitator at the international level noted above, the Canadian
state helped to create an environment conducive to economic
growth. It was upon this growth that the compromise of the
liberal welfare state - the cornerstone of hegemony within
core states like Canada - depended. Secondly, the image
of "middle power," with its attendant emphasis on Canada
as a responsible member of the international community,
was crucial in creating a domestic consensus in support of
extensive involvement in the maintenance of the international order. As Holmes has noted, in the immediate post-war
context the notion of "middle power" served the important
function of "encouraging a wallflower people to get responsibly involved in keeping the peace and unleashing the world
economy .i:" 33 Finally, in representing Canada's selfless activism in the international realm as the natural expression
of Canadian society as a whole, middlepowermanship reinforced the notion that the social order within Canada's borders was an essentially just one, and deserving of widespread
public support.
It is clear, then, that in its original formulation, the regulative ideal of "middle power" was framed in terms of dominant class interests and in tune with a hegemonic global
order. Nor is it surprising, given such an understanding of
the origins of this formulation, that in a context of declining
hegemony (both internationally as well as within core states)
already discernible during the 1960s, this definition of middle
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power would progressively lose its value both as a guide
for action and as a source of legitimacy.
An episode which demonstrates clearly the change that
declining American hegemony had for the regulative ideal
of "middlepowermanship" is the Johnson administration's
hostile reaction to Pearson's suggestion. made in his 1965
speech at Temple University. that the United States suspend
its bombing of North Vietnam. The most cursory reading of
the text of Pearson's speech will confirm the degree to which
the speech reflected an uncritical acceptance of the US adminstration's view of the conflict - i.e.• that "the US intervened to help South Vietnam defend itself against aggression...•" that "its motives were honourable. neither mean nor
imperialistic ..." that "its sacrifices have been great and ...
were not made to advance any selfish American interest."34
The implicit criticism of US policy can only be described
as gentle. while Pearson's justification for the suggestion
- that a temporary suspension of bombing might induce
the North Vietnamese leaders to make significant concessions while allowing them to save face - was hardly radicaP5
Most importantly. however. criticism of US policy was
consistent with the notion of "middle power" situated within
a context of pax-Americana. and with Canada's efforts in
support of Western interests in Indochina during the 1950s.
which "enabled us to differ from the United States without
opposing the interests of the United States as we saw
them."36In this case. however. American hegemony was sufficiently threatened (both domestically and internationally)
that the Johnson administration felt no more willing to extend concessions to associated elements in an allied state
than it did to the North Vietnamese themselves. The generosity of spirit which marks a hegemon's relations with its
allies during a stable hegemony had given way to a closeminded siege mentality reflective of hegemony in decline.
The consequence for Canadian foreign policy was profound.
As Holmes notes. "Among the casualties [of the Vietnam
war] has been the Canadian belief in its role as a middle
power."37
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Accordingly, as the 1960s came to an end, a growing
dissatisfaction with the regulative ideal of "middle power"
could be discerned within government circles. And since that
time, efforts to find an alternative formulation, which would
both safeguard dominant class interests as well as achieve
public acceptance, have been a regular feature of Canadian
political discourse.
The first such effort was made by the newly-elected
Trudeau government, which initiated a review of foreign policy, the result of which was a series of papers, collectively
entitled Foreign Policy for Canadians.38 There is no question that this report was designed to revise the terms in
which foreign policy was understood.
What is most notable about Foreign Policy for Canadians
was the explicit rejection of the essence of "middlepowermanship." "Public disenchantment" [read, "elite dissatisfaction"] with Canada's foreign policy, stated the report, was
directly attributable to "an over-emphasis on role and influence" [read "middlepowermanship"] resulting in an "obscuring [of] policy objectives and actual interests."39 It was "misleading," argued the report, "to base foreign policy on an
assumption that Canada can be cast as the 'helpful fixer' in
international affairs," a role which "no longer corresponds
with international realities ..."
There is no natural, immutable or permanent role for Canada
in today's world, no constant weight of influence. Roles and
influence may result from pursuing certain policy objectives '"
but they should not be made the aims of policy. To be liked
and to be regarded as good fellows are not ends in themselves;
they are a reflection of but not a substitute for policy.40
It can be argued that the effort to redefine the regulative
ideal for Canada's foreign policy away from the image of
selfless internationalism to an explicitly self-focused pursuit
of "national aims and interests in the international environment" was a logical response to a changing international
environment marked by a hegemonic order in decline. The
erosion of hegemonic pax-Americana allowed increasingly
little scope for a middle power foreign policy characterized,
at least in part, by a stance of "loyal opposition.vt!
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Studies in Political Economy
Significantly, the break with "middlepowermanship" promoted by Foreign Policy for Canadians met with considerable resistance in many parts of the attentive public. In some
quarters this resistance was motivated by a continuing allegiance to the traditional notion of "middle power," and the
attendant "selfless" character of Canadian foreign policy. For
others, however, the rejection of the alternative promoted
by Foreign Policy for Canadians was grounded in a deeperlevel dissatisfaction with the basic assumptions common
both to the notion of a self-interested foreign policy as well
as to the traditional practice of "middlepowermanship."
Indeed, it was public questioning of the traditional assumptions about the international order by emerging oppositional social groupings which led, outside of official circles, not to an abandonment, but to a substantive redefinition
of the notion of "middle power." Pratt has referred to this
social grouping, which arose in the context of declining hegemony, and remains active into the present context, as the
"counter-consensus.t'<s
What distinguished the members of
the counter-consensus was their rejection of the principal
assumptions informing elite discourse about the global order,
voicing criticism, in explicitly ethical terms, of both the militarism associated with the cold war as well as the workings
of the international economy which they saw as systematically disadvantageous to the Third World.
Indeed, radicalization and expansion of the social base
of the "counter-consensus" through the 1970s and 1980s,
most recently in the context of anti-free trade struggles, led
to increased emphasis on the links between disarmament,
economic development and wealth re-distribution, environmental policy, and democratization at the global level with
radical change at the domestic level. In this respect the
"counter-consensus" can be understood as forming part of
an emerging "counter-hegemonic bloc."
Of particular importance for the discussion here is the
fact that the counter-discourse of the "counter-consensus"
gave new life to the regulative ideal of Canada as a "middle
power." Significantly, the links of the earlier notion of "middle power" to support for an American-led hegemonic order
were severed. Rather, "middle power" was recast to signify
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Neufeld/Canadian Foreign Policy
the influence enjoyed by a country like Canada, and the
potential such influence offers to effect radical progressive
change in terms of disarmament, economic development and
wealth re-distribution, environmental policy, and democratization of the foreign policy-making process:
The outline of a global community, in which the planet's resources could be managed by institutions practising fairness and
stewardship, is coming into view .... People who sense the power
and creativity of our time now demand a safer, saner world in
which governments, using the levers in hand, generate the production of the goods of life, not the weapons of death.
As this constitutes an enormous challenge to Canada, this land
so blessed in space, resources, technology, ability and reputation
throughout the world. The rise of middle-power influence with
the end of superpower enmity provides Canada with an unprecedented opportunity to work for the development of global security structures.O
It is not hard to appreciate how this oppositional understanding of "middle power," were it to achieve widespread
acceptance, could pose a serious threat to dominant class
interests at both the domestic and international level. Accordingly, it is not surprising to observe that the regulative
ideal of "middlepowermanship" - if not the term itself44
- resurfaced in the reviews of foreign policy conducted by
the Mulroney government beginning in the latter half of the
1980s. What is equally noteworthy, however, is that the definitional content of the revived notion of "middle power"
in official discourse differed significantly, not only from that
of the counter-consensus, but also from the traditional notion
of "middle power" associated with the heyday of pax-Americana. No longer was the notion of "middle power" designed
to motivate "a wallflower people" to active participation in
the management of a hegemonic global order. Rather, now
"middlepowermanship" was defined in a way consistent with
Holmes' observation, made in the 1980s, that if there was
still a point in seeing Canada as a middle power, it was "to
discipline ourselves":
... we still need guidelines to cling to and knowing one's strength
remains a sound principle. If we are now more discriminating
and calculating in our estimates of our own as well as others'
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powers, so much the better. Scepticism about spreading our good
offices too wide may have induced a sense of proportion about
the number of rescue missions, crusades, or moral interventions
a country of twenty-five million can conduct at one time.
Our moral majority may want the government to pass judgement
on every misbehaviour in the world, and no doubt they will feel
better if we do so, but it is the surest way to undermine the
beneficent role of the middle power.45
In this regard, it is striking that beginning with the 1985
review of Canadian foreign policy, Competitiveness and Security, through the report of the Special Joint Committee
on Canada's International Relations (Independence and Internationalism),
the response of the government of Canada
to the report of the Special Joint Committee (Canada's International Relations), and to the Defence White Paper of
1988-89, concessions to the "counter-consensus"
that Canada must work in multi-lateral fora in the interests of peace
and justice46 were consistently twinned with observations
about the limits to Canada's power and influence, and about
the restrictions the international environment places on Canada's latitude of action. Accordingly, and notwithstanding
the fact that "our values dictate that we help the poor, the
hungry and the politically abused,"47 Canadians were admonished to discipline their expectations, and accept the simple and unavoidable truth: "We do not have the resources
to do all we would like in international affairs."48 In short,
the "limitationist" conception of "middle power" was a call
to abandon exactly the kind of progressive activism entailed
by the definition of "middle power" proffered by the counterconsensus (even while paying it lip service), in favour of
an orientation more in keeping with existing power and privilege in Canadian society and in the global order.
Conclusion The limitationist notion of "middle power" was
an elite attempt to succeed - as the image of Canada as a
self-interested,
utility maximizer had not - in garnering
widespread public support for government foreign policy initiatives while retaining sufficient flexibility to work in the
service of dominant class interests. Accordingly, the limitationist
notion of "middle power," which first achieved prominence
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in the Mulroney years, has also become a regular feature
of official discourse since the election of the Chretien government in 1993.49 The Liberal government statement, Canada in the World, for example, repeats the pattern established
in the 1980s by twinning affirmations of "exceptionalism"
in Canada's foreign policy record
Canada's history as a non-colonizing power, champion of constructive multilateralism and effective international mediator, underpins an important and distinctive role among nations as they
seek to build a new and better order ....
with thinly veiled admonishments
progressive action in the future:
to limit expectations
of
While Canadians strongly support an active foreign policy, they
also have a realistic view about the challenges ahead and the
constraints - especially financial constraints - that we face....
[Accordingly] We will not do everything we have done in the
past, nor shall we do things as we have done before.50
In a similar vein, renewed enthusiasm in policy circles
for peacekeeping, often represented as the quintessential expression of the Canadian tradition of "middlepowermanship,"51 can be seen as a strategy to appeal to public sentiment while dampening expectations for progressive action.
Specifically, a focus on peacekeeping i) appeals to public
sentiments which support a progressive role for Canada in
the international realm, while ii) serving as a justification
for high levels of military spending, thereby deflecting calls
for a "peace dividend." In terms of the international order,
middle power as peacekeeper
makes Canadian military
forces available to serve the larger agenda of "global riot
control" increasingly important in a non-hegemonic
world
order marked by US dominance. 52
At the same time, it is far from certain that these efforts
will be successful. For while government pronouncements
in favour of peacekeeping and multilateralism may be more
effective in garnering public support than the notion of a
self-interested foreign policy in the national interest associated with Foreign Policy for Canadians, it is doubtful
whether such a limited conception of middle power will, in
23
Studies in Political Economy
the long run, satisfy the demands of the counter-consensus.
Nor is it at all clear in what sense even a limitationist notion
of "middle power" can serve as an effective guide for policy-making in a post-hegemonic world order marked by i)
American unilateralism, ii) the lack of a unifying external
threat (absent the Soviet menace), and iii) increasing economic insecurity derivative of an unregulated global economy. Accordingly, it would seem more likely that the issue
of Canada's behaviour on the world stage will remain
strongly contested, and a potential flash-point within the
larger debate surrounding the proper role of the Canadian
state in an era of globalization.
Ironically, recent events would suggest that political leaders are finding even the limitationist notion of "middle
power" too prone to incite expectations of progressive policy
initiatives. It is noteworthy that, despite the call for the promotion of Canadian values such as human rights in Canada
in the World, more recent statements have sought to distance
government policy from that orientation by down-playing
the importance of human rights records indeterrnining Canada's trade relations.53 Ultimately, political leaders may be
tempted to distance themselves from even the limitationist
notion of "middle power" to ensure sufficient latitude for
the defence of dominant class interests, much as they have
broken with the basic tenets of the welfare state. What is
not clear is how public acceptance of the former can be
achieved any more easily than the latter.
Finally, although too cursory an overview to be more than
suggestive, the exploration of Canada and middlepowermanship effected here lends support to the argument that Gramseian theorizing - and in particular, the notion of hegemony
- is a valuable adjunct to the dominant class approach to
foreign policy analysis, To begin, it is compatible with and, indeed, reinforces - dominant class theory's inherently
critical orientation. Additionally, it provides a means of relating the global context to foreign policy-making, as well
as a space for agency in terms of the construction of meaning
through discourse. As such, the Gramseian approach is a
viable alternative to realist-oriented theorizing, and deserves
24
Neufeld/Canadian Foreign Policy
serious consideration in the search for analytical frameworks
adequate to the contemporary world order.
Notes
I would like to thank Leo Panitch, Fred Judson. Harriet Friedman. and.
especially. Tony Porter for their comments on earlier drafts. as well as the
Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial
support. An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the conference
"Canada and the World." held in May. 1993. at the Centre for International
and Strategic Studies. York University.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
For a discussion of this theme in relation to theorizing about world
politics more generally. see Mark Neufeld. The Restructuring of International Relations Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press. 1995).
Cranford Pratt. "Dominant class theory and Canadian foreign policy:
the case of the counter-consensus."
International Journal 39 (Winter
1983-4). pp. 99-135.
Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We. Should We. or Can We Sit?
A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature." International Journal of Canadian Studies 1-2 (Spring-Fall 1990). pp. 77-96.
As a counter-position
within the mainstream literature. see the literature on Canada as a principal power. in particular. David Dewitt
and John Kirton. Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: John Wiley
& Sons. 1983).
Molot. "Where Do We ...••. p. 80.
Ibid., pp. 86-87.
(Vancouver: UBC Press. 1993). See also A. Clair Cutler and Mark
W. Zacher (eds.), Canadian Foreign Policy and International Economic Regimes (Vancouver: UBC Press. 1992).
Cooper et al., Relocating Middle Powers. p. 174
Ibid .• p. 174.
The classic definition is that of Krasner. where regimes are defined
as "implicit or explicit principles. norms. rules. and decision-making
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given
area of international
relations."
Stephen D. Krasner. "Structural
Causes and Regime Consequences:
Regimes as Intervening Variables,': in S. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca. N.¥.: Cornell University Press. 1983). p. 2.
For example. by distinguishing between economic and strategic contexts.
On this point. see Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie,
"International
Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the
State," International Organization 40/4 (1986). pp. 753-75.
Critiques of the propensity of neorealist theorizing to reify the state.
and thereby underplay (if not negate completely) the role of social
forces are. of course. standard within critical theorizing about world
politics. One of the best remains Richard Ashley. "The Poverty of
Neorealism,'
in Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics
25
Studies in Political Economy
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
26
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300. For a
parallel critique which targets Kirton and Dewitt's neorealist re-conceptualization of Canadian foreign policy, see Pratt, "Dominant Class
Theory," pp. 108-115.
On the distinction between "traditional" and "critical" theory, see
Max Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," in Horkheimer,
Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Continuum, 1989), pp.
188-243.
Jiirgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J.
Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 197\), p. 310.
Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory," p. 104.
Ibid., p. 116.
Ibid., p. 105.
In this I follow Fredric Jameson in affirming that while history "is
inaccessible to us except in textual form," history is nonetheless "not
a text, nor a narrative, master or otherwise." Rather, "history is what
hurts," and "its alienating necessities will not forget us, however
much we might prefer to ignore them." See Jameson, The Political
Unconscious (New York: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 35,
102.
The most developed formulation of this position is that of "hegemonic
stability theory." See Robert Keohane, International Institutions and
State Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), esp. chapter four. See
also David Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" International Studies Quarterly 37/4 (December 1993), pp. 459-89.
The pioneer in this regard is, of course, Robert Cox. For a good
overview of the relevance of Gramscian theorizing for the study of
world politics, see Stephen Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993).
One of the outcomes of such a global order is the internationalization
of what were, originally, domestic forces. As Cox notes, such an
order "would most likely give prominence to opportunities for the
forces of civil society to operate on the world scale (or on the scale
of the sphere within which hegemony prevails). See R. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," in
Gill, Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations,
p. 61. General agreement between representatives of the dominant
classes of core states on politico-economic arrangements and strategies is often achieved by means of a semi-formal, institutionalized
bargaining process located within Northern-controlled international
organizations. In this regard, one can also speak of an internationalization of the dominant classes of core states not only in material
terms, but also in terms of class consciousness. See Stephen Gill,
American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Robert Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order,"
International Journal 44 (1989), p. 829.
As Cox has noted: "The rules and practices and ideologies of a
hegemonic order conform to the interests of the dominant power
while having the appearance of a universal natural order of things
Neufeld/Canadian Foreign Policy
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
which gives at least a certain measure of satisfaction and security
to lesser powers." "Middlepowermanship," p. 825.
As Cox notes, the crisis of hegemony "became apparent at the level
of the world economy in the conjunction of oil shocks, disarray in
the international monetary system, the international transmission of
inflation, and the downturn in growth in the advanced capitalist countries that also had consequential negative effects for Third World
trading partners." See "Middlepowermanship...," p. 829.
Ibid., pp. 829-31.
Ibid., p. 829.
John Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle," International Journal 39
(Spring 1984). Reprinted in J. L. Granatstein (ed.), Towards a New
World: Readings in the History of Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto:
Copp Clark Pitman, 1992), p. 100.
See Cranford Pratt, "Dominant class theory," pp. 120-121. To these
two assumptions, shared by leading decision-makers both north and
south of the 49th parallel, can be added a third, more distinctly Canadian notion, deriving from Canada's status as a non-superpower,
namely that the national interest is best served by "an orderly and
predictable world environment that embod[ies] some limits to the
ambition and the reach of dominant powers." See Robert Cox, "Middlepowermanship,' p. 824.
Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory," p. 121. For a discussion of the seamier side of Canadian diplomacy in the service of Pax Americana, see
Noam Chomksy, "The Drift Towards Global War," Studies in Political
Economy 17 (Summer 1985), pp. 5-31.
It will be remembered that the Pearsonian innovation of "peacekeeping" was prompted by the desire to regulate a conflict between core
states during the Suez crisis. Specifically, the Canadian peacekeeping
contribution allowed for a resolution of the potentially destabilizing
rift between France and Great Britain, on the one hand, and the United
States on the other. In short, it can be argued that from the beginning
the principal function of peacekeeping has been to contribute to the
maintenance of order and stability within the hegemonic sphere - a
goal very much in keeping with the "national interest" of a non-superpower.
It can be argued that Canada's political leadership was not always
completely consistent in this regard. One of the corollaries of middlepowermanship was the principle of functionalism, according to
which countries, such as Canada, should be allotted a seat at the
table in international organizations to the degree to which they contributed. This principle, while achieving some success in deterring
the great powers from appropriating all decision-making power to
themselves, clearly contradicted liberal international principles of
global governance (i.e., the formal equality of all states) by arguing,
in effect, that there should be a further differentiation between secondary and lesser powers. The cost of advocating a principle of global
governance which hardly lent itself to the claim of representing the
"common interest" was that at the first meeting of the UN General
Assembly, Australia, and not Canada, won a seat on the Security
Council. See Tom Keating, Canada and World Order (Toronto:
McClelland & Steward, 1993), chapter one.
27
Studies in Political Economy
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
28
Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle," p. 90.
Mike: The Memoirs of Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 3 (Toronto: Toronto
University Press, 1975), p. 138.
Indeed, it is very much in keeping with classical realism's scepticism
about solving political problems with military means, and its emphasis
on the need to find diplomatic solutions to political conflicts. See
Gordon Craig and Alexander George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990), esp. part II.
John Holmes, "Canada and the Vietnam War," in J. L Granatstein
and R. D. Cuff (eds.), War and Society in North America (Toronto:
Thomas Nelson, 1971), p. 190.
John Holmes, "Canada and the Vietnam War," p. 191.
(Ottawa: Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1970).
Foreign Policy for Canadians, p. 8.
Ibid., p. 8.
See Mark Neufeld and Sandra Whitworth,
"lmag(in)ing
Canadian
Foreign Policy," in Glen Williams and Wallace Clement (eds.), Building on the New Canadian Policy Economy (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
Press, forthcoming).
Pratt defines the "counter-consensus"
as "internationally
minded public interest groups," which exist in substantial number, and which
have traditionally
been "peripheral to decision-making
in Canadian
public life." Within this group, Pratt includes church-related
organizations like Project Ploughshares,
the Canadian Council for International Co-operation,
Oxfam, the Canadian Catholic Organization for
Development
and peace, Ten Days for world Development,
the Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, the taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, as well as secular
organizations
such as disarmament, peace, or Third World solidarity
groups. One should also include organized labour, as well as extraparliamentary
opposition groups such as the National Action Committee.
Transformation Moment: A Canadian Vision of Common Security,
The Report of the Citizen's Inquiry into Peace and Security (CoPublished by Project Ploughshares and the Canadian Peace Alliance:
March 1992), p. 6, emphasis added.
As Cooper et al. note, in December 1991, Barbara McDougall, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, described Canada's foreign policy in middle power terms without, however, employing the
term itself. See Relocating Middle Powers, p. 184, note 37.
Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle," p. 102.
Now re-furbished
with the new title of "constructive
internationalism."
Competitiveness and Security, p. 43.
Joe Clark, "Foreword,"
Competitiveness and Security.
Interestingly, under the Liberals, the term "middle power" itself has
been resurrected.
In early November, 1993, for example, the new
Foreign Affairs Minister, Andre Ouellet, promised a foreign policy
review with explicit reference to the tradition of "middlepowermanship": "It's clear Canada's foreign policy must be reviewed in the
context of the end of the Cold War ... It also has to be reviewed in
Neufeld/Canadian Foreign Policy
50.
51.
52.
53.
the context of Canada's capacity, as a middle power, to play an important role at the United Nations ... " The Toronto Star Friday, November 5, 1993, emphasis added.
Canada in the World (1995), p. 8,9.
A recent discussion of Canadian peacekeeping
under the rubric of
"middlepowerrnanship"
is to be found in Meeting New Challenges:
Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping, Report of
the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (February 1993).
For a critical look at the use of the image of Canada as peacekeeper,
see Stephen Dale, "Guns N' Poses," This Magazine 26/7 (1993), pp.
11-16.
See Michael T. Klare, "The Pentagon's
New Paradigm,"
in Micah
Sifry and Christopher Cerf (eds.), The Gulf War Reader (New York:
Random House, 1991), pp. 466-76.
In this regard, note Foreign Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet's insistence that "to try to be a Boy Scout on your own, to impose your
own rules on others when indeed nobody else is following it is absolutely counterproductive
and does not lead to any successful future." The Globe and Mail Tuesday, May 16, 1995, p. A 11.
29