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2005
The U.S. Army's 2nd Ranger Battalion:
Beyond D-Day
Alissa Quistorff
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
THE U.S. ARMY’S 2ND RANGER BATTALION :
BEYOND D-DAY
By
ALISSA QUISTORFF
A Thesis submitted to the
Department of History
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
Degree Awarded:
Summer Semester, 2005
The members of the Committee approve the Thesis of Alissa Quistorff defended on April
20th, 2005.
Nathan Stoltzfus
Professor Directing Thesis
Jonathan Grant
Committee Member
Michael Creswell
Committee Member
The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee
members.
ii
Dedicated to my family especially Papa, who taught me to love history and
Inspired me.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
.................................................................................................
1. Introduction
Page v
..........................................................................................
Page 1
2. Chapter 1: Pointe du Hoc ..........................................................................
Page 9
3. Chapter 2: Hurtgen Forest .........................................................................
Page 28
4. Chapter 3: Brest and Rhine Crossing ..........................................................
Page 42
5. Conclusion
..........................................................................................
Page 56
APPENDIX
..........................................................................................
Page 63
BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................................................................
Page 66
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .........................................................................
Page 69
iv
ABSTRACT
This thesis is a micro-history of how the 2nd Ranger Battalion, during World War II
evolved their military doctrine. This work focuses on their training for Operation Overlord and
the ensuing battle. After the fight for Pointe du Hoc the Rangers had no stated doctrine to follow
for later missions. Given that, the Rangers were deployed in a variety of ways. By examining
the Brest campaign, the battles in the Hurtgen Forest, and the crossing of the Rhine River, the
Ranger doctrine slowly begins to emerge.
v
INTRODUCTION
Either we shall employ our strength, power, and conscience boldly
and righteously in defense of human dignity and freedom
or we shall waste these resources for peace and default
to the forces that breed new wars.
–General Omar Bradley
Memorial Day Address 1948
1
This study attempts to explain how and why the U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion’s military
doctrine and their strategic use evolved during the Second World War. Formed to capture Pointe
du Hoc as part of Operation Overlord, the 2nd Ranger Battalion’s training as an elite Army unit
focused on developing the skills necessary for their assault on the cliff. With the Army
designating them an elite fighting unit, they received additional training as a special operations
unit. After the Rangers were relieved from Pointe du Hoc after two days (D+2), they faced a
serious problem as a unit. They did not have a doctrine to dictate their operational use. The
lack of an established doctrine to use resulted in the slow evolution of a unique Ranger doctrine,
transforming the Rangers into a light-weight, mobile, special operations force known for going
in and quickly capturing its objective.
The four major campaigns that the Rangers participated in clearly demonstrate, with
their fighting style, how the Rangers established their doctrine after Pointe du Hoc. The assault
on Pointe du Hoc was the start of the Rangers’ doctrine, but their next major operation was the
Hurtgen Forest, had a direct effect on the Ranger’s doctrine.1 The difference stands out when
comparing the Brest campaign (18 August-28 September 1944), which was conducted before
Hurtgen Forest (14 November-10 December 1944), and the drive from the Roer River to the
Rhine River (22 February-7 March 1945). Both of these campaigns also had a small on Ranger
doctrine.
This study also examines a secondary issue. Were the Rangers deployed in operations
correctly? If Ranger doctrine dictated that they were only to be used as a frontal attack unit,
then deploying them as front-line soldiers would have been a misuse. However, the Rangers did
not have a doctrine to follow after Pointe du Hoc. They only had training that could guide a
commander’s decision as how to use the Rangers in combat. By examining why commanders
decided to use the Rangers in place of other units, it is clear that they were not tactically
misused. They were deployed where they were needed and could best use their skills. The
Rangers’ ability to accomplish any mission that the war called for became part of their doctrine,
along with their special skills in executing fast, frontal attacks on the battlefield. The ability to
1
In this study doctrine is defined as a written, tactical and the strategic purpose for the
Rangers.
2
be successful in the multiple roles they played in the war was not a tactical misuse of the
Rangers; instead, it resulted from their lack of doctrine. Examining how and why Ranger
doctrine evolved during the Second World War is very important to the overall study of special
operation forces. It allows historians to gain an understanding of the overall evolution of special
operation forces from 1941-1944.
The Second World War was the first time the American military leadership tried to use
special operation forces on a large scale. By conducting a micro-study of the 2nd Rangers, it is
clear that commanders did not always know what to do with the elite fighting forces. Given that
the Army was not always sure how to deploy the Rangers, they were often attached to different
units. This dispersal has led to the Rangers’ story becoming lost. Historians have downplayed
the Rangers’ history because they worked as attached units in multiple divisions, thus making it
difficult to distinguish between what the accomplishments of the and that of their attached
division. Historians wanting to study how special operation forces were used in the Second
World War found that the U.S. Army Airborne Divisions demonstrated the evolution of special
forces better. Therefore, the Rangers are often overshadowed by the history of the Airborne.
However, to truly understand how the Second World War shaped the use of special
operation forces and their deployment, one must consider both the Airborne and the Rangers.
The success of both the Rangers and Airborne during the Second World War led to the use of
both these forces today. If they had failed, the Airborne and the Rangers would not be a modern
military force still in use today. It is critical to understand how these units were formed and
tested on the battlefield. The Second World War was the crucible in which they evolved not
only their military doctrine, but also the future for special operations in the modern army.
Historians writing about the Rangers have faced three main issues regarding the current
literature. First, given that they had been trained and formed for only one kind of operation, their
role in Operation Overlord, what role did the Rangers play after Pointe du Hoc? With Operation
Overlord a success, the question not only for commanders but also historians was what to do
with the Rangers? Were they deployed correctly by those in command? If not, why or why not?
Second, did commanders deploy the Rangers appropriately, by taking into account their special
training? This study also examines if the Ranger doctrine was evolving or if it was static.
Finally, did the Rangers contribute to the overall victory for the Allies? If their role as a special
3
operation force helped to win victory for the Allies, in what capacity did they do so?
Current literature on the Rangers is very limited. It becomes even harder to find
secondary sources that deal strictly with the 2nd Ranger Battalion. There are, however, a few
historians who have made significant contributions to the field of Ranger history. Ronald Lane’s
Rudder’s Rangers is considered one of the cornerstones of Ranger history. This study of the 2nd
Ranger Battalion did not examine how and why the Rangers were deployed but focused on the
story of how Colonel James E. Rudder led the Rangers. Robert Black has completed the other
major work done on the Rangers exclusively during the Second World War. His examines all
the operations in which the Rangers participated in Rangers in World War II .2 He draws heavily
on the oral histories of the men and the after -action reports. Black combines both narrative and
a study of the larger picture of the Ranger’s role in World War II. These two books by Lane and
Black are the best studies examining how the Rangers were used in the conflict.
David Hogan Jr. has written two very detailed and critical studies of the Rangers. His
works differ from those mentioned above because he did not limit the books to just the Rangers
in the Second World War. His first book The Evolution of the Concept of the U.S. Army’s
Rangers 1942-1983, examined the Army’s concept of what operations Rangers could be
deployed in.3 This very detailed and well written book evaluates the lack of any strict concept of
the Rangers in the army. His second book, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, does
not just study the role of the Rangers, but includes all special operation units, including the
Rangers and Airborne forces.4 Hogan examines both theaters of World War II and what
contribution special operation forces made during the conflict. Both of the studies examine the
larger picture of the Ranger’s role in the Second World War. The second book, while it stays in
the time frame of World War II, includes the Rangers with all the special operation forces used
during the war.
2
Robert Black, Rangers in World War II. (New York: Ivy Book, 1992)
3
David Hogan Jr., The Evolution of the Concept of the U.S. Army’s Ranger, 1942-1983.
(North Carolina: Duke University Dissertation, 1986)
4
David Hogan Jr., U.S. Army’s Special Operations in World War II. (Washington D.C.:
Center of Military History, Department of the Army)
4
The history of the Rangers is often told by authors who have to include the Rangers along
with other units and their history. In histories that cover the entire European theater, such as
Stephan Ambrose’s Citizen Soldiers, the Rangers are mentioned only twice.5 He discusses them
during Operation Overlord and their involvement in the Hurtgen Forest. He does not discuss
them when they are attached to other units during the Brest campaign and the drive from the
Roer River to the Rhine. In order to know what the Rangers were doing, one would have to
know what units to which they were attached. General Omar Bradley does the same thing in his
book A Soldier’s Story.6 He hardly mentions the Rangers except in Operation Overlord. A few
other authors, such as Robert Sterling Rush, examine specific operations in which the Rangers
were involved. His book, Hell in Hurtgen Forest, studies the entire battle of the Hurtgen Forest
and within that study the Rangers.7 The other way authors include the Rangers in their studies is
in oral histories of the war. Patrick O’Donnell’s Beyond Valor, symbolizes those narrative books
that are very helpful in understanding what the soldiers went through in battle, but do not offer
any type of analysis of the role the Rangers played in the war.8 The above list is not
comprehensive; huge gaps in the literature remain.
The question of whether commanders correctly deployed the Rangers is one of the
questions that drives current research. Little research has explored why commanders decided to
use the Rangers and for what missions, in particular, how the high command decided to use the
Rangers. Another area that has been neglected is if the Ranger’s lack of doctrine had any effect
on the operations on which the Rangers were sent. In regards to Ranger doctrine during the
Second World War, scholars have not examined how and why their doctrine evolved the way it
5
Stephen Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the
Bulge to the Surrender of Germany June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945 ( New York: Simon and Schuster,
1997)
6
Omar Bradley, ( A Soldier’s Story. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951)
7
Robert Sterling Rush, Hell in Hurtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American
Infantry Regiment (Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 2001)
8
Patrick O’Donnell, Beyond Valor: World War II’s Ranger and Airborne Veterans
Reveal the Heart of Combat. (New York: The Free Press, 2001)
5
did. Historians who have examined the evolution of the Ranger doctrine have always extended
their study outside the period of the Second World War. There has also been a recent trend of
publishing oral histories of the Rangers. See Patrick O’Donnell’s book Beyond Valor.9
Although helpful in understanding what the soldiers experienced, the books do not tackle any of
the issues currently under study involving the Rangers
Two main assumptions appear in the work of historians who study the Rangers in Second
World War. The first has to do with the role the Rangers played in the war. Because the
Rangers lacked an established doctrine, many scholars assume that the Rangers were not
deployed in operations suited for them. This assumption is most clear when the Rangers are only
studied in isolation in major operations such as Operation Overlord and Castle Hill (in the battle
for the Hurtgen Forest). Historians tend not to study when the Rangers were deployed as regular
line infantry. If they do examine them in this role, historians such as David Hogan Jr. believe
that they were being deployed in operations that ill suited them. This thinking is based on the
fact that the Rangers were trained for special operations and were constantly used as regular
infantry.
The second assumption, which is more rare, is that the Rangers were unnecessary.
Writers such as Cornelius Ryan believe that they did not make any significant contribution in the
operations in which they were deployed. His book, The Longest Day June 6,1944, discusses the
Rangers on Pointe du Hoc and how the German Howitzer’s were moved from their former
emplacements.10 He believes that because they were moved where they could not be used to fire
down on the beaches, the Rangers did not need to ascend the cliff. However, this assumption
does not appear in more current studies. The present study of the Rangers examines the first
assumption in greater detail.
This study provides the first micro study of the Rangers. It chronicles the 2nd Ranger
Battalion from 1943 through 1945 only. It follows the 2nd Rangers from their training in the
9
Patrick O’Donnell, Beyond Valor: World War II’s Ranger and Airborne Veterans
Reveal the Heart of Combat. (New York: The Free Press, 2001)
10
Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day: June 6, 1944 (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1959)
6
United States to their crossing of the Rhine River. Second, it is also a micro study of how the
Ranger’s have evolved their doctrine. By studying the 2nd Battalion of the Rangers only, it
becomes easier to see the small changes in their doctrine. In the larger evaluation of special
forces, this study demonstrates that special operation forces were crucial to victory in the Second
World War. When the 2nd Battalion is mentioned in Ranger history, it is always combined in the
total effect or use of the Rangers. This study demonstrates the important role the 2nd Ranger
Battalion had in the overall development of the Ranger concept.
This micro history of one battalion in the Second World War should interest a number of
audiences. The larger audience for this work is scholars of modern American history. Given
that the Rangers are a U.S. Army unit, it helps to understand how Americans viewed the role of
special operation forces in the American military. Military historians will also find this study
useful in furthering their understanding of the development of special operation forces, in
particular the Rangers. This work also speaks to historians of the Second World War. With the
period of this work only covering the Second World War, it is important for those historians who
are interested in how military doctrine evolved during the conflict.
The majority of the collections used in this study are military documents, such as afteraction reports and daily battalion journals. In the oral histories the problems of bringing up
memories and glorifying one’s actions are a drawback to their use. However, they are needed to
humanize the Rangers and help the reader visualize what they experienced on the battlefield.
These collections are appropriate for the current study because they give the factual information
in great detail about what, where, and how the Rangers were performing during each operation
and on a daily basis. They are already established sources, they are not adding anything new to
the primary source base. Yet taken together as a whole, not as individual separate operations, a
picture emerges about the evolution of the Ranger doctrine.
The Army formed in 1943 the 2nd Ranger Battalion to be trained as a special operations
unit for the assault on Pointe du Hoc during Operation Overlord. They were volunteers who had
to pass a harsh physical testing based on the selection process of the Airborne. However, after
their mission on Pointe do Hoc was completed, they were left without any clear concept by the
high command of what to do with this elite unit. Rangers established their doctrine through the
course of the Second World War. As the they were deployed where commanders believed they
7
could best be used, they established themselves as a light weight, fast moving, attack unit. They
were able to perform any role they were called on to perform. This ability to complete a variety
of operations also became a part of Ranger doctrine.
In order to examine this evolution of Ranger doctrine, this study divides the Rangers
deployment in the Second World War into three chapters. The first chapter examines the
training that formed the Rangers into a special operations unit. It then follows the Rangers
through their mission on Pointe du Hoc. The second chapter highlights the next major evolution
in the Ranger doctrine. This was the Battle for the Hurtgen Forest. This operation had two
stages. The first was how they had been used by previous commanders: as regular lines forces to
prevent the line from collapsing. Then they demonstrated that they could be used to take
objectives by frontal assault that other heavier weight forces could not. After this they were used
more for their training by attacking and capturing towns in rapid deployment.
In chapter three their demonstration of speed becomes clear by comparing the Brest
campaign, which proceeded the battle in the Hurtgen Forest and the drive from the Roer River to
the Rhine River. How they were used by commanders is different and is better suited for their
training. When taken together, it is easy to see that the Rangers during the Second World War
were able to take a military doctrine that was not formed and evolve their doctrine to become
one of the best special operations forces in the U.S. Army.
8
CHAPTER ONE
Rangers were volunteers, highly trained, superb physical condition
with very high esprit. We held when we should have been annihilated–we held
when it was impossible–we took objectives that units larger
and more heavily armed couldn’t–it was our training–leadership ‘Elan.’
–Kendall McClure, Captain
World War II Survey
U.S. Army Military History Institute
9
After the December 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States formed an
agreement with its old European allies to fight against the Axis powers. As quickly as U.S.
forces were mobilized and recruited, leading American military strategists realized that the
United States would need small action units to fight specialized missions. The Army Rangers
were just that kind of unit. They were to serve as highly trained, small action forces otherwise
known as Special Operation Forces.11 The Army Rangers were an all volunteer unit that received
the most rigorous training that the Army had developed. This training focused on preparing
them for the mission to capture Pointe du Hoc. Not all the men made it through the initial
physical selection; even more dropped out during the continued conditioning the men received.
The men who did survive the training developed a deep bond. This tight unit cohesion allowed
them to achieve their objectives despite the loss of leaders and adverse conditions. Later, the
same bond held them together against the two days of isolated attacks by the Germans.
When the first Ranger battalion was established in 1942 and sent overseas to the
Mediterranean, it quickly demonstrated how well the Rangers could preform on the battlefield.
The 2nd Battalion was formed in 1943, out of volunteers from other units. All possible new
recruits had to pass two weeks of rigorous physical testing, because they were all volunteers and
were an elite unit. physical testing. Ralph Goranson of Company C explains:
To get into the Rangers, you had to volunteer. At any time during training, you
could volunteer out, because of physical requirements, mental requirement, or just
the fact that you just didn’t fit. We had a high turnover at the beginning, but as
we got ready to leave in early September of ‘43, we had a pretty crew put together
in each of our Ranger companies.12
Why did men like Ralph Goranson join the Rangers? Many thought that if they were going to
11
The term Special Operation Forces has had many meanings. I will be using David
Hogan Jr.’s definition of Ranger commando, “...elite light infantry units, organized and trained
to conduct raids and long-range reconnaissance and to seize critical points on the battlefield.”
U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, 1992, 4.
12
Peter S. Kalikow World War II Oral History Archive: The Eisenhower Center for
American Studies, University of New Orleans, Ralph Goranson. Hereafter referred to as
Kalikow archive.
10
serve in the military, it might as well be the best. Captain William Acancy joined because he,
“...wanted to serve with well trained men and officers.”13 For some, the idea of working in a
small unit held greater appeal compared to the large divisions that were also forming at the time.
The desire for wanting to serve with the superior units arose from, “personal pride at being part
of elite unit.”14 James Eikner describes all these feelings well:
These units accepted only volunteers and men were selected for their mental and
physical stamina and their motivation to get the job done. Sometimes we were
called a suicide groups, but not at all we were simply spirited young people who
took the view that if you were going to be combat soldier you may as well be the
very best. Also we were anxious to get on with the war so as to bring things to a
close and get home to our loved ones as soon as possible.15
Once the soldiers made it through the first phase of the selection process, the training and
conditioning increased in order to make the men an elite fighting unit.16
The 2nd Battalion was formed in 1943 and was not deployed on their first mission until
June 6, 1944. During this time, they were in different camps training for Special Forces
missions. From 11 April– 5 July 1943, the Rangers were stationed in “Tent City” about one mile
north-east of Camp Forrest in Tennessee. During this period, they focused on developing
physical stamina. The men were required to complete a five mile march in one hour and a nine
mile march in two hours. The policy mandated that, “If a man fell out on a hike, he would be
considered physically unfit for Ranger service and would be transferred from the
13
U. S. Army Military History Institute: World War II Survey, William Acaney. [ World
War II Survey]
14
World War II Survey, Gerorge Kerchler.
15
Kalikow Archive, James Eikner.
16
The majority of the selection process took place during two weeks of individual combat
methods, which was based on the experience of soldiers in North Africa. The men were selected
based on the paratrooper requirements. U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black
Collect, box 1, Training record “Tent City”.
11
organization.”17 This policy would remain in force throughout training. The soldiers also started
their training in small unit actions. These activities included: scouting, patrolling, village
fighting, infiltration, bayonet, hand-to-hand, and “rugged” group games to help create unit
cohesion.
The weekly cycle of five- nine- and twenty five- mile speed marches also continued at
this time. The first week of May, the first cliff ascent was practiced by the Rangers. The cliff
was almost completely sheer the first 90 feet and required the use of free ropes perfect training
for the upcoming Pointe du Hoc mission. Instruction and field practice followed the physical
conditioning. This included: ambushing tanks, booby traps, demolition, blitz courses, sniping,
construction and passage of wire entanglements, stream crossings, toggle ropes, and
camouflage.18 This training was the first step in making the Rangers an elite fighting force.
Both the training and morale increased when Major James E. Rudder took command on 30 June
1943 because he implemented strict Army policy raising the standards at which they operated.
The Rangers were transferred back into the barracks at Camp Forrest.
From 6 July–28 August 1943, the Rangers continued with their physical conditioning and
small unit action training. Under the direction of Major Rudder, the training increased in rigor
and the unit exercises in difficulty. The turnover rate during this time was still very high, with
men replacing the ones who could not endure the training. This outcome was what Rudder
wanted: a high level of unit cohesion and comradery. On 29 August, the soldiers reported for
amphibious training at Fort Pierce, Florida. Designed as a fifteen -day course, the Rangers
completed it in only eight days. The day was divided into three sections: each started with a
lecture, roll call, and then concluded with a practical. There was the “swim and swat” when the
men stripped to their shorts for roll call and were allowed to be “eaten” by sand flies. Physical
conditioning on the beach was followed by the amphibious instruction that lasted well into the
17
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, Training record
“Tent City.”
18
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, Training record
“Reorganization.”
12
night.19 Then on 16 September, the Rangers reported at Fort Dix, New Jersey. They stayed
there until they left for Great Britain on 11 November 1944. During this time, they continued
with conditioning and small unit maneuvers. By the time they left for England the men were a
cohesive fighting unit. They did not realize, however, that their training in England would be
even more strenuous and demanding then what they had gone through. That was because they
were now training for their mission on Pointe du Hoc.
The Rangers arrived in England on December 1st, 1943 after the long trip over on the
Queen Mary. Owen Brown describes what was waiting for the men:
We arrived at Bude Cornwall on December 2, 1943. 500 rangers were greeted
with 500 pairs of boxing gloves and a few miles of rope for our training on the
cliffs of Cornwall. We climbed the cliffs along the Cornish coast and hike the
hills inland, just for conditioning.20
Bude, Cornwall is located on the West coast of England, just south of the Bristol Channel. The
men were divided into small groups and then sent off to find the private homes in which they
would stay. During their stay, they continued to work on their physical conditioning and small
unit actions (both day and night maneuvers.) The soldiers also trained to distinguish Allied
uniforms and weapons from those of the Axis. During this time, they also worked on cliff
climbing while a select number of the officers and NCO’s worked with the British
Commandos.21 One unusual part of their training in England required them to travel. The men
would be given a certain location in England and a date and time to be there. The men would
then have to figure out some way to get there on time. Prior to leaving, the men had been
receiving pay. The men could use any amount of money they wished to spend renting a vehicle,
or buying a bus or train pass. More often, the men would try to hitchhike across either in groups
19
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, Training record
“Amphibious Training.”
20
Kalikow Archive, Owen Brown.
21
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, Training record
“Private Billets.”
13
or individually.22 These exercises reinforced individual problem solving. Commanders like
Rudder knew that in the heat of battle Rangers would have to think for themselves to survive.
Finally, in May 1944, while the men were in lock down before the big invasion, they were given
their mission.
The objectives for Operation Overlord were top secret, thus the men were allowed to
know their mission in small groups. Jack Keating explains what happened to him:
...about 2-3 weeks before D-Day, if my recollection is correct, we were called in
not on an individual but on a very small unit basis and briefed. We were taken
into this room where they had a map or an overlay–it was like a mat that had the
beaches outlined, and we were shown exactly where we were going to land, what
our job was going to be, and for the first (probably) 4 or 5 days after D-Day, if
you survived.23
Owen Brown goes into even more detail about the type of information the Rangers received
about their mission:
We had miniature plaster layouts of the French coast, giving the location of
beaches, cliffs, and the German defenses. They showed us pillboxes, barbed wire,
mine fields, underwater obstacles. They even told us the composition of the
soldiers. There was supposed to be cadre of Germans with Polish, Russian, and
Hungarian men from captured countries working and fighting for the Germans24.
The exact mission of the 2nd Rangers was very detailed and was part of the much larger plan of
Operation Overlord. The capture of the guns atop Pointe du Hoc was vital to the landings on
Normandy.
By mid-1942, planning for an invasion of France’s coast had already begun. The
American and British military leaders had given the plan the name “Roundup”. As planning
proceeded, leaders in America and Britain disputed the best method to stop Hitler. Britain’s
22
Kalikow Archive, Owen Brown.
23
Kalikow Archive, Jack Keating.
24
Kalikow Archive, Owen Brown.
14
Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery favored
proceeding up the Italian peninsula and striking at the “soft underbelly” of Europe. They
planned to accomplish this goal by launching several series of attritional and diversionary
campaigns. American President Franklin Roosevelt and his military leaders, however, thought
that an early and decisive drive across France into Germany would win the war.25 This first step
for a campaign in France would have to be a cross-channel attack. Yet it was not until 1943 that
the Allies decided on the cross-channel attack. Operation Overlord was a compromise between
America and Britain. Russia, pushing for relief on the Eastern Front, and thought that an
invasion of France was also necessary. The three Allies decided that the best long term strategy
would be for the British to still strike at the “soft underbelly” of Europe with the campaigns in
Italy. These operations would cause Germany to divide its forces on the Eastern Front and along
the coast of France and Italy. America was given the go ahead to plan and execute Operation
Roundup, now renamed Operation Overlord.
To mount an invasion force that would be successful not only during the initial invasion,
but also gain a secure foothold on the continent was crucial. Planing for the cross-channel began
in 1943. It would be the largest amphibious attack in history, with involvement of all branches
of the military and forces from several countries. To head the allied coalition, President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill decided on General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Appointed
Supreme Allied Commander, he took over at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF) and began planning the invasion. The most obvious place to try and launch an
invasion force was at Pas de Calais. Unfortunately for the Allies, it was also obvious to Adolf
Hitler and his military leaders and was thus the most fortified position along the Atlantic Wall.
The next preferred landing area was on the Normandy coast. The proximity to the coast
of Britain allowed for troops to be deployed by the navy, bombings of the coast, and the strategic
port of Cherbourg, located only 100 miles away, to be used. The city of Caen, a major
communications center with highways and rail lines, was also nearby. The major advantage to
the Allies was that it was one of the least defended areas of the Atlantic Wall. According to
25
Richard Leighton, “Overlord Revisited: An Interpretation of American Strategy in the
European War, 1942-1944,” American Historical Review, vol. 68, no.4 (July 1963), 919-937.
15
Operation Order N.O. 3-44 of Assault Force “U” dated 15 May 1944 in the Enemy Order of
Battle and Capabilities, there were only four infantry divisions on the Cotentin Peninsula and
areas inland. Farther inland were one SS Panzer Division, two Panzer Divisions, one Panzer
Training Division, and one Infantry Division. The intelligence report goes on to state that of the
four infantry divisions, only one was of the field type, meaning completely mobile. That was the
352 Division; the others are the 3, 709, 243, and 716, which were known as limited deployment
divisions.26
After the location of the invasion was set, General Eisenhower began organizing his force
and assigning them missions. For the assault, Eisenhower planned on using the 21st Army Group
that was led by Field Marshall Montgomery. The 21st Army Group was then broken down into
the U.S. First Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley and the British Second Army,
commanded by Lt. Gen. Sir Miles Dempsey. The British Second Army consisted of the British
XXX Corps, which contained the Br. 50 Infantry Division and the British I Corps, which had the
Canadian Infantry Divisions and the Br. 3rd Infantry Division. The U.S. First Army consisted of
the U.S. VII Corps that formed the 4th Infantry Division and the U.S. V Corps that made up the
29th Infantry Division and the 1st Infantry Division.
Eisenhower decided that on D-Day, all of these troops would land on the French coast
and establish a line of attack over sixty miles long. The assault plan called for the troops to head
straight southward towards the coast of Normandy with the Americans on the right flank and the
British and the Canadians on the left. The extreme right of the attack was Utah Beach and the
city of Quineville. The extreme left flank was Sword Beach by the mouth of the river Orne.27
Within this sixty-mile front, the beaches were divided into sections and given different code
names. The British sector contained from right to left Gold, Juno, and Sword. The U.S. sector
contained from right to left Utah and Omaha, with Pointe du Hoc located between the two
26
Sims Gautheir Collection: The Eisenhower Center for American Studies, University of
New Orleans, Intelligence plan. [Sims Gautheir Collection]
27
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1948), 243.
16
beachheads.28 It was this area of the U.S. sector that had intelligence worried while planing for
D-Day.
Pointe du Hoc is located 6,000 meters or 3.7 miles west of the city of Viervilla. To get to
the top of the cliff, a person must scale about thirty meters or 100 feet of almost a 90-degree
rocky surface.29 Once on top of the cliff, one encountered barbed wire, the observation post,
interlocking trenches/dugouts for firing positions for machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, artillery
shells that exploded in the face of a cliff climber. Moreover, the Germans had grenades and they
could drop them down onto the beach.30 It was on this cliff that the Germans had placed six 155mm Howitzer guns. Each gun had an estimated firing range of 25,000 yards. At this distance,
the guns could fire on landing positions at both Omaha and Utah. They could also hit Port-enBessin in the British sector to Taret de Ravenovill.31 For Eisenhower and his staff, one of their
most vital concerns was the observation post on top of Pointe du Hoc. The observation post was
a large concrete structure on the edge of the cliff. From the post, German soldiers could see the
beaches of Omaha and Utah perfectly. To enhance the power of the Howitzer guns and the
observation post, the Germans had equipped it with a radio and underground telephone
communication line that connected to headquarters.32 These guns caused General Eisenhower
to assign a special forces battalion to eliminate them during Operation Overlord.
The reason Eisenhower decided that a special forces team was needed to handle the guns
on Pointe du Hoc was:
If these guns were used against the beaches they would be firing parallel to the
shore, causing more destruction to the coastline. The Overlord planners felt that
28
Included in the invasion force were three U.S. airborne divisions and a British airborne
division. The total force landed in 24 hours would be 150,000.
29
David Chandler and James Collins Jr., The D-Day Encyclopedia (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1999), 451.
30
Robert Black, Rangers in World War II (New York: Ivy Books, 1992), 185.
31
Chandler, The D-Day Encyclopedia, 196.
32
Ibid, 411.
17
the Pointe du Hoc guns were ‘the most dangerous battery in France.’33
General Eisenhower ordered General Bradley tell Lieutenant Colonel Rudder that it would be his
Ranger battalions that would be given this daunting mission of scaling Pointe du Hoc. Bradley
later recalled having to tell Rudder his mission for Operation Overlord:
No soldier in my command has ever been wished a more difficult task than that
which befell the 34-year old commander of this Provisional Ranger Force.
Lieutenant Colonel James E. Rudder, a rancher from Brady, Texas, was to take a
force of 200 men, land on a shingled shelf under the face of a 100-foot cliff, scale
the cliff, and there destroy an enemy battery of coastal guns. ‘First time you
mentioned it,’ Rudder recalls, ‘I thought you were trying to scare me.’34
Indeed, Rudder was trusted with planning and executing a very critical mission for Operation
Overlord. With all the training the Rangers had completed within the last year both in the United
States and in Britain, Rudder knew his men could handle the mission assigned to them.
In order for the Rangers to be successful, Rudder divided what the men were to do into
very detailed objectives. First, the Rangers had to scale a one hundred foot cliff and proceed
inland to capture and disable the six 155-mm Howitzer guns. Second, they were to close the
Viervill-Grandcamp road from any advancing German reinforcements and protect their position
on Pointe du Hoc from any counter-attacks. Finally, the Rangers were ordered to attack the
emplacements at Pointe de la Percee.35 These general missions were then broken down into
three separate forces for the different objectives. Force A would be given the main mission of
capturing the guns on Pointe du Hoc. This force consisted of Companies D, E, and F of the 2nd
Ranger Battalion. Force B, was Company C of the 2nd Ranger Battalion and was to attack a
series of mortar emplacements on the cliff at Pointe-et-Raz-de-la-Percee. Force C was to wait
off shore for thirty minutes until they received an all clear signal from the Rangers on Pointe du
Hoc. If they did not receive that signal, they were to proceed to Omaha Beach, Dog Green sector
33
Ibid, 196.
34
Omar Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), 269.
35
Chandler, The D-Day Encyclopedia, 451.
18
with the 116th Infantry Regiment.36
From there each force was divided by their company objectives and then by their platoon
objective. Company E of Force A divided into three sections. The first section was supposed to
destroy the number three gun and its casemate. The second section was to set up a defense at the
main east-west road. Finally, the third sector had the mission of destroying the concrete
observation post. The rest of Force A was separated similarly. Company F was to take the left
flank, which had to neutralize the number one and number two gun positions and destroy the
anti-aircraft guns. Company D was to take the right flank and destroy the guns positioned
there.37 The reason for such detailed breakdown of the mission was to ensure that the Rangers
not only knew their job, but the job of the man above. This breakdown also ensured that during
the battle there would be no collapse of leadership and unit morale. Ranger training also gave
them the ability to successfully complete these demanding missions, but also had some special
equipment made to help them.
The most recognized of these weapons were the DUKWs, a type of tank that functioned
not only as a tank on land, but could also “swim.” For their landing on Pointe du Hoc, the
Rangers took four DUKWs. These four tanks were also equipped with extension ladders that
were provided by the London Fire Department. This way once the DUKWs landed on the beach,
they could extend/lay the ladders on the face of the cliff. Each ladder extended one hundred feet,
and on top of each ladder was a pair of Oerlikon machine guns.38 With the guns equipped on top
of the ladders, a Ranger could go up the ladder and lay down covering fire to help keep the
Germans from firing down on the men who were climbing up the cliff. To help the soldiers scale
the face of the cliff, the Rangers also had specially designed ropes.
The easiest and most preferred way by the Rangers was to use traditional climbing ropes.
For the landing, the ropes would be kept in wooden boxes located in pairs on the bow, amid
ship, and the stern. All the ropes were 3/4 inches wide. The favorite climbing rope was the plain
36
O’Donnell, Beyond Valor,124.
37
Ronald Lane, Rudder’s Rangers (Virginia: Ranger Associates, 1979), 117.
38
Black, Rangers in World War II, 189.
19
scaling ones. The Rangers also had “toggle ropes,” which had round pieces of wood throughout
the length of the rope to help the men climb faster and easier. They also landed with rope
ladders as well. All these ropes were fired through rockets to help them get to the top quicker.
The only drawback was that if the ropes became wet, then they would be too heavy to fire, thus
posing a serious problem during the landings. The other type of ladder that the Rangers were
given was a four-foot tubular steel ladders that weighted four pounds each. These ladders were
supposed to be assembled as the men climbed up. One other important part of the pre-invasion
preparation to help the Rangers succeed on D-Day was the bombing of the Normandy coast.
The guns on Pointe du Hoc were considered the most dangerous, because of this they
received the heaviest pre-invasion bombardment. Heavy bombers from the U.S. 8th Air Force
and the British Royal Air Force dropped bombs on Pointe du Hoc on April 15, April 25, May 22,
and June 4th. A directive titled Air Plan from Operation Order No. 3-44 states the bombing
missions to be conducted before D-Day:
General priority for the fire support program is given to the neutralization or
destruction of Forces. Batteries covering the sea approaches and the beaches are
regarded as primary targets for the heavy night and medium Oboe bombers...With
the exception of the batteries indicated below, which are specifically selected for
neutralization in the assault phase, attacks on batteries will be confined to those in
open emplacements or under construction, with a view to harassing rather than
destructive effect.39
During the course of this bombardment, it is estimated that the total amount of tonnage dropped
on Pointe du Hoc would be equal to more than 10 kilotons of high explosives, equivalent to the
bomb dropped on Hiroshima.40 While the bombing was sure to help the Rangers achieve their
mission, it would be the combination of their training, weapons, and their morale that would lead
to their success on June 6, 1944.
The vast navy armada that crossed the English Channel was breathtaking in its size. The
39
Sims Gauthier Collection, Air plan document.
40
Stephen Ambrose, D-Day: June 6, 1944 The Climatic Battle of World War II (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 406.
20
fleet totaled over 7,000 vessels. That included 138 warships that would later provide fire support
to the landing army. There were 221 escort vessels, 287 minesweepers, and 495 light coastal
craft that were protecting the advancing convoy. Over 4,000 landing ships, landing crafts, and
other amphibious vessels were needed to land the large infantry force for Operation Overlord.
To help carry the majority of the ground force, tanks, ammunition, and other supplies the troops
needed to land were 805 cargo ships.41 Amid all this equipment were the 250 Rangers of the 2nd
Battalion. They were loaded into their DUKW’s, LCA’s and LST’s around 0200-0300 on June
6th. Shortly afterwards, the gun boats opened fire on the Normandy coast to help soften the
Atlantic Wall. Former Ranger James Eikner describes what it was like to cross the channel that
morning:
Just about day break all hell broke out on the mainland there with the shelling
from the big ships and all it looked like a tremendous fourth of July and we were
all standing up admiring it really, a sight to see. But then low and behold geysers
of water began going up all around us and we thought we were being shelled but
we weren’t, these were short rockets that were being fired from rockets boats in
toward the land and somebody had the wrong range.42
To make matters worse, the rough waters were causing the waves to crash over the sides of the
boats. The problem arose due to the storm that had gone over the English Channel the day
before, developing rough seas. Many men were bailing out their boats with their helmets to try
and keep them afloat. The Rangers also began throwing over some of their much needed
supplies as well. Besides the waves making the trip across the channel dangerous, the rip
currents were causing many of the landing crafts to be pushed off course. Luckily, Lt. Col.
Rudder realized that the Rangers were heading in the wrong direction and persuaded the
coxswain drivers to turn and run parallel to the coast for four kilometers. This change in
direction caused the Rangers to be 35-minutes late to Pointe du Hoc. The time delay left the men
vulnerable to the Germans firing down on them. To help with covering fire while they landed
41
Williamson Murray and Allan Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World
War (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 240.
42
Kalikow Archive, James Eikner.
21
and scaled the cliff, Rudder called in fire from the USS Satterles and the HMS Talybont.43
Not only did the late-arriving Rangers receive fire from the Germans, they also
encountered another problem: the tide was starting to come in. With the water level increasing,
the DUKWs became useless, leaving the Rangers one weapon short. Their scaling ropes were
also having trouble getting to the top of the cliff. Having been stored on the sides of the landing
crafts, all the waves that crashed over the sides had made the ropes soaking wet. Frank South
describes another problem with the late landing:
As we got in, close to the cliffs, we were not in the planned positions, so that our
boats were crowded too closely together. The rockets with the grapnels attached
were fired, bringing up the climbing lines and ropes. Many fell short because
they were fired too soon, or because the ropes were wet and heavy. The grapnels
were designed to go to the top of the cliffs, dig in there, and then we would be
able to scale the cliffs, using either rope ladders, which some of them had, or
simply straight ropes, which most of us preferred.44
As the men were trying to assemble and scale the cliff, the Germans were firing down on them
with everything they had, including “potato mashers,” concussion grenades, and machine gun
fire. They were also trying to cut the ropes. Nonetheless, the Germans did not stop the Rangers
from quickly getting to work:
At the same time that this was happening, I felt a blast over to my left. The other
F Company boat was unable to get it’s rockets into position to fire them properly.
So, Tech Sergeant Cripps had taken the rockets off, I think two of them as I
remember, put them on the beach itself, and hand-fired them while standing only
three feet off. In the process of firing the first one, he was partially blinded, with
carbon particles embedded deeply in his face. Nevertheless, he went on, and
again, in almost direct line of fire from the machine gun, was able to get the
second one in position, fired it, again taking a terrible blast. It took extraordinary
43
Ambrose, D-Day, 406.
44
Kalikow Archive, Frank South.
22
courage, determination and self control.45
As men such as Tech. Sergeant Cripps got his men and himself up the cliff to the top of Pointe
du Hoc, the real mission began.
Now that the Rangers were up the cliff, they had to quickly find and disable the guns.
This task turned out to be harder than planned. The Air Force had dropped so many bombs on
the cliff that it created crater after crater. All the bombings before Operation Overlord also
caused another major shock for the Rangers. When they finally got to the gun positions on
Pointe du Hoc, the guns were not there:
We didn’t stop; we played it just like a football game, charging hard and low. We
went into the shell craters for protection, because there were snipers around and
machine guns firing at us, and we’d wait for a moment, and if the fire lifted, we
were out of that crater and into the next one. We ran as fast as we could over to
the gun positions-to take the one that we were assigned to. There were no guns in
the positions!46
Shortly after reaching the top of Pointe du Hoc, a small group of Rangers found the guns in an
apple orchard about 1,200 yards inland. The Rangers also found large quantities of ammunition
by the gun sites, though the guns had not been fired.47 After the heavy bombing that Pointe du
Hoc received, the Germans had moved them inland to protect them. Very quickly the men set to
work disabling the guns:
They were under the trees. There were three guns, and we didn’t have too much
trouble taking the guns, because they seemed like they were empty–no guards, no
troops around there. If there were, they must have taken off. So we put
phosphorus grenades in the breech and destroyed all the pile of ammunition. I’d
say within an hour, we had everything well taken in and destroyed there.48
45
Ibid.
46
Kalikow Archive, Leonard Lomell.
47
Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 270.
48
Kalikow Archive, Salva Maimone.
23
Once they destroyed the guns, the Rangers’ next mission was to close off the roads leading to the
beach. This move would prevent the Germans sending in reinforcements. Of course, this meant
the Rangers would be facing the counter-attacking Germans.
The German counter-attack came from the 716th Infantry Regiment, commanded by
General Wilhelm Richters. The regiment had been stationed in Normandy since May 1941.
Allied intelligence did not consider the 716th a top line fighting force, however. There were two
main reasons for this. First, the men in the regiment were considered too old to be effective in
combat. The second was that by 1944 they had many non-Germans in their ranks.49 The
Germans also sent in the 914th Infantry Regiment to help the 716th.50 Throughout the day the
Rangers fought against these units, at times being almost pushed back to the cliff, before surging
forward again. Finally, around 2100 hours, a few of the Ranger reinforcements from the 5th
Ranger Battalion made their way to Pointe du Hoc. This is what was waiting for them:
Then we formed up in a straight line where D Company, E Company, and F
Company were in a straight line, and it didn’t get dark till 12:00, and that’s when
trouble really started. They started attacking, and we were shooting at the enemy
tracers. Every time we’d shoot, and every time we would fire, they’d come back
with another fire. They could see the bullet tracers, ammunition, and somehow,
they’d know where to shoot. They had lots of motor shells going in the position
where they thought we were, but we weren’t in there. We took about another 25
or 30 yards in front of their position, and the mortar shell was going over us.51
As D-Day came to a close, the fighting continued. Very quickly the Rangers realized that they
had a major problem developing if they did not get relieved soon. They were running out of
supplies.
Many of the landing crafts had to throw supplies overboard to keep the boats afloat, this
caused a serious supply shortage by D+2. Lt. Col. Rudder tried to get two LCVPs to bring them
49
Black, Rangers in World War II, 185.
50
Chandler, The D-Day Encyclopedia, 451.
51
Kalikow Archive, Salva Maimone.
24
supplies and evacuate the most seriously wounded. Due to heavy fire, the LCVPs retrieved only
some of the wounded and were not able to drop off the much needed ammunition, food, and
medical supplies. The only high point of the day came when the Rangers re-established
communication with the naval ships.52 Rudder was finally able to call in the heavy guns to try
and repulse some of the attacking Germans. The Rangers did not have ammunition for their own
guns, so they began using the guns and ammunition of the dead Germans around them. While
this worked to keep them alive during the night and morning of D+2, when the men were about
to be relieved, it caused trouble for the Rangers:
...then finally on D+2 when we were being relieved, our Rangers were using
German machine guns and there’s a distinctive sound between an American
machine gun and a German machine gun. So, when the 5th Rangers in the 116th
Infantry were advancing up the road towards us from Omaha Beach, and they
heard these German machine guns, they thought, ‘Well, those aren’t Rangers up
there. That isn’t Col. Rudder and his Rangers, those are German because they’re
firing the German machine gun’. So, they opened up on us with mortars and even
a couple of tanks fired on us and killed four men and wounded about six.53
When the Rangers were finally relieved it was on June 8th or D+2. Jack Keating was a Ranger
from another unit, who came to relieve the men on Pointe du Hoc. He was amazed that the
Rangers had been able to hold out that long. Even more amazing was what he saw on the top of
the Pointe:
We went out to the cliffs and Pointe du Hoc, and when we got a look of what they
had been going through for 3 days, it was a seesaw battle. They’d push inland,
and then get pushed back, almost into the sea again off the cliffs, and it was touch
and go for the 3 days. Our colonel, Colonel Rudder, Colonel James E. Rudder
from Texas, one of the greatest men that ever lived, military, and he was hit twice
52
Chandler, The D-Day Encyclopedia, 218-219.
53
Kalikow Archive, Louis Lisko.
25
on D-Day and refused to be evacuated.54
In the first two days on Pointe du Hoc, the 2nd Rangers of Companies D, E, and F suffered 77
killed in action, 152 wounded and 70 missing in action. Frank South states it in a more realistic
way, “Of the 250 men who had landed on the Pointe, there were less than 95 who could still bear
arms.”55
After the battle for the Normandy coast, the Rangers began the task of evaluating their
performance during the battle. Two main outcomes stood out for the commanders. First, the
Rangers had been able to seize critical points on a battlefield quickly and efficiently despite
heavy resistance. The second was that after they achieved their objectives they continued to hold
the ground against heavy German counter-attacks. These outcomes were critical for the future of
the Rangers. The battalion had been trained and conditioned for the Pointe du Hoc mission.
After that there was no standing military doctrine for them to follow. Unlike the paratroopers,
who had a strict military doctrine to plan for the next operations, the Rangers did not have such a
doctrine. The high command did not know what to do with these elite, highly-trained men. The
future of the Rangers and their military doctrine would continue to evolve during the course of
the war.
54
Kalikow Archive, Jack Keating.
55
Kalikow Archive, Frank South.
26
CHAPTER TWO
The Rangers specialty is overnight combat, and they only can create
from the battlefield instant tactic and strategy for themselves
at multiple sites, as well as for military units in destress.
In essence the Rangers became the worlds fore-most
authority on creating, sustaining, and projecting
combat morale on demand!”
–The Ranger Collection
U.S. Army Military History Institute
27
Although the Rangers’ mission at Pointe du Hoc brought them recognition and honor, the
fighting in the Hurtgen Forest offered them their deadliest test. It is easy to see why historians
have focused on Pointe du Hoc. The imposing cliff they scaled and the fierce fighting that
ensued under Lt. Rudder enveloped American soldiers in an idealized image. It was in the
forest, however, that the true valor of the Rangers shone. There during the cold, harsh winter the
Rangers really began their process of changing from a battalion with no stated purpose to a
defined force. According to Sid Salomon, “After the invasion, there was no need for a 2nd
Ranger Battalion. We were used as an infantry company, attached to maybe ten different
divisions. The people in command did not know what the Rangers were.”56 When the Rangers
were originally sent in during November, they were used as line troops. In December, the
opportunity to demonstrate and evolve their fighting techniques occurred at Castle Hill. The
fighting in the Hurtgen Forest changed the Ranger concept dramatically.
After receiving additional training and replacements, the Rangers had finally reached
their full fighting strength. By this time, the battle for the Hurtgen Forest had started. By
November 1944, the Allied Front was bogged down by bitter winter weather and supply lines
that were stretched too far. Eisenhower decided to launch one more big campaign before the
winter really set in. He commanded General Hodges of V Corps to lead the big push through the
forest to the Roer River for the eventual Rhine River crossing. The attack was to begin on 2
November with the 112 Infantry of the 28 Division leading the way. The windy, snowy weather
would make allied air support next to impossible.57 These conditions would make an already
difficult mission that much worse.
To complicate the mission, the Germans had just arrived in the area to conduct a map
exercise led by Field Marshall Walther Modell. After hearing of the attack, he personally took
command of the German forces. Before the scheduled exercise, the German 89th Division would
be relieved by the German 272nd Volks Grenadier Division. The American attack, however,
56
Geraold Astor, The Bloody Forest: Battle for the Huertgen September 1944-January
1945 (California: Presidio Press Incorporated, 2000), 305.
57
U.S. Army Military History Institute: JoAnna McDonald Collection box 1, After Action
Report.
28
persuaded Modell to rescind the relief order to double his fighting strength. He would later
during the course of the campaign also send in SS divisions.58 These forces clearly gave the
Germans the upper hand during the attack. Very quickly, the 112th Division got bogged down
and was decimated. Brig. General “Dutch” Cota, who was commanding the 28th, sent in the
110th to try and help the 112th, plus two combat engineer battalions. Finally, Cota called in the
Rangers on 14 November to relieve the 112th in the Germeter/Vossenach area.59
Why did General Cota decide to call in an elite fighting force for regular line support?
Two main reasons lay behind his thinking. The first is that the Rangers were close by
conducting training and conditioning exercises. On 3 November, they were stationed at Neudrof
Belgium, attached to the 5th Armored Division. They were briefed on the situation and were
placed on alert to be sent to Vossenach. Thus, when the situation became desperate on 14
November, they were quickly moved by truck to the area and marched the rest of the way to
Germeter and Vossenach. There they were attached to the 28th Division.60 It was not uncommon
for the Rangers to be used where lines were collapsing. Other commanders had used the
Rangers for this purpose with great success. Their success in using the Rangers leads us to the
second reason why General Cota sent them into Germeter/Vossenach.
While the assault on Pointe du Hoc demonstrated the Rangers’ skills at achieving
specialized objectives, it also demonstrated their ability to save lines that were collapsing. To go
from a highly specialized unit, to filling in holes in a line shows that not only did the Rangers
lack any specific operational standard like paratroopers; it also shows that commanders did not
know how to deploy the Rangers after Pointe du Hoc.61 The Rangers took this in stride,
knowing that their ability to hold a line resulted from their training and leadership. After all
Rangers were an, “elite light infantry units, organized and trained to conduct raids and long58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black 1940s-1990s Collection box 1, Unit
History.
61
By this time the 101st and the 82nd Airborne Divisions had been deployed on their own
mission in conjunction with the British in Operation Market-Garden.
29
range reconnaissance and to seize critical points on the battlefield.”62
Unlike most battalions, all the men in a Ranger company were trained to do the job of the
man above him. This flexibility ensured that there was never any breakdown in command in
critical times. Giving them an advantage over regular infantry, “It came down to the point that
well-trained and disciplined Rangers knew what had to be done and did it. When officers in the
various Ranger companies became casualties, leadership at the company and/or platoon level did
not suffer...”63 How the Rangers preformed during the Germeter/Vossenach crisis clearly
demonstrates how well they worked as an unit.
When the Rangers were sent into the Germeter/Vossenach area on 14 November, 1944,
they were not only going in facing fierce German resistance, but also harsh weather conditions.
The biting cold was made worse by the falling rain and snow. During the day it turned the clay
based soil into heavy, slippery mud. At night the mud and pooling water froze. The overcast
skies prohibited air support for the allies. As the Rangers marched into the area, they saw the
frozen equipment left by the quickly retreating 110th. Within nine hours from the time they were
notified of their movement to Germeter/Vossenach, they had taken up their positions in the
forest. Even though the Rangers were under the same heavy shelling and mortar fire from the
Germans, they did not suffer the high casualties rates of the 112th. The reason for the low
casualties were because they had been trained to stay deep in their foxholes during the night
surrounding the city they were defending. During the day, when they could be seen, they stayed
in the city, sending patrols to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy and capture German
soldiers.64
The night was the worst time for the Rangers. The Germans would take their turn
patrolling the American lines raiding for soldiers. German artillery would rain down shells that
broke the huge pine trees, creating additional falling debris. Men were afraid to leave the
62
David Hogan Jr., U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, 4.
63
Sidney Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion Germeter-Vossenach-HurtgenBergstein-Hill400 Germany, 14 Nov.-10 Dec. 1944 (Doylestown: Birchwood Books, 1991), 71.
64
Charles Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest: The Untold Story of a disastrous
Campaign (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), 149.
30
foxholes, which made their situation even worse. One historian describes the horrible conditions
the Rangers endured:
American soldiers lived in foxholes half full of water that froze during the night.
Because of problems sending blankets and sleeping bags forward, many nights
soldiers slept shivering in raincoats and whatever else they could find, without
blankets or sleeping bags. There were no fires at night, so soldiers sat and
shivered waiting for the sun to come up and warm them. Clothes remained wet,
and the dampness bred hypothermia and trenchfoot.65
For many soldiers, harsh conditions in the field drive them further from their leaders and their
unit, as individual survival becomes the number one concern for many. While Rangers did not
believe that this type of line protection was what they were best suited for, it brought the men
even closer together.
Finally, on the night of 19 November, the Rangers were relieved and placed in an
assembly area, once again reattached to a different division. This time it was the 8th Infantry
Division. Back in the assembly area the Rangers that were not casualties agreed that:
Vossenach was definitely not Ranger work. Rangers attacked, killed, and with
drew to wait for another job. The Ranger theory was to hit hard-hit hard and fast
and then get out. Here at Vossenach the 2nd Battalion felt like the [man] in the
carnival who has to stick his head through a hole and let people try to hit him with
baseballs.66
Even if many of the Rangers thought that they had been misused in the forest, that is not the
case. Their training allowed them to go in and do the job of holding the ground that others could
not. The Ranges’ were still lacking an official military doctrine allowing them to be used for
that purpose.67 They had proven successful on Pointe du Hoc in holding the line during heavy
counter-attacks. This situation was the same. In a matter of days, the evolution of Ranger
65
Robert Sterling Rush, Hell in Hurtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American
Infantry Regiment (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 22.
66
Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest,149.
67
Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operation In World War II, 136,
31
doctrine would take another turn. A chance to prove themselves in a similar objective of taking
ground that infantry forces could not, but this time the stakes were high just like at Pointe du
Hoc.
One of the main problems for the allies advancing in the forest was the accurate and
heavy artillery shelling by the Germans. The attacks were made possible because the Germans
held the high ground at Bergstein. German forces were able to call in direct hits from the top of
Castle Hill, also known as Hill 400. Castle Hill was the main observation post and firing
position of the German forces. The height of the hill allowed them to view all U.S. movements
and enabled them to use their massive artillery directly on the American troops.68 Given that the
Germans could use the hill for accurate and deadly fire power, the Americans had tried
numerous times throughout the Hurtgen campaign to seize Castle Hill.
At first, regular infantry and armored units tried to capture Castle Hill. One such unit
was the 5th Armored Division, which was supposed to take the hill. They assaulted the hill with
3,000 men, tanks, and armored vehicles. They could not take the hill in a course of over a week
and finally had to be withdrawn due to heavy casualties.69 Yet commanders General Gerow
“Wild Bill” Weaver and General Hodges did not think of the Rangers at first. Even though they
had successfully attacked Pointe du Hoc, the missing doctrine of the Rangers caused different
generals to view how they could be deployed differently. A serious misconception on the part of
the generals was that Rangers were light forces. These generals thought that they should not be
used as shock troops or attack forces because they did not have the necessary “weight” behind
them to conduct successful frontal assaults.70 This thinking proved to be false. It would become
even more so after their frontal assault on Castle Hill. Finally, on December 6th, Gen. Weaver
decided to send the Rangers up against Castle Hill.
When the Rangers got official word that they would be attacking Castle Hill, they
immediately began to develop an attack plan and send out reconnaissance patrols. For the
68
Astor, The Bloody Forest, 301.
69
Ibid, 305.
70
U.S. Army Military History Institute: The Merle T. Cole Collection box 1, “Evolution
of the U.S. Army Ranger Concept.”
32
attack, Rudder decided to send D, E, and F Companies up the hill. Company A was to dig in at
the bottom of the hill along with Company B. Company C was to set up a roadblock between
the hill and the church nearby. They were also to leave a platoon in reserve in town to man the
81mm guns. After it was decided what companies would be going up the hill, they sent out
patrols. Unfortunately for the Rangers, the weather had created very hazardous conditions. Dog
Company sent out a patrol to Bergstein consisting of one officer and five men. They were to
look for the easiest way to attack to the hill, also looking for pillboxes, bunkers, observation
posts, and enemy strength. After all the pre-attack planing had been completed, the men set off
for their areas. They were tired and wet, and to make matters worse, the enemy was sending
down mortars.71 That evening they were to march into Bergstein:
It was a miserable march, a column of troops on either side of the road, plodding
through the cold mud that oozed around the shoes of the men. Artillery rounds
burst near by, artillery flashes temporally lit up the horizon, and not knowing who
they were soon to face created a lot of consternation in the minds of the men.72
To make the day even worse for the Rangers, they were just about to get some disheartening
news. According to official battalion records of 7 December 1944, Colonel Rudder turned over
his battalion to Major Williams.73 Rudder broke the news right before the men were to attack the
hill. While the news was personally devastating, it shows just how committed Rangers were to
each other and the mission, that they did not falter in completing their next coming mission.
The attack on Castle Hill started at 0830. Just before they launched the attack, a veteran
of Pointe du Hoc was overheard saying, “Here we go with the old king-of-the-hill game.”74 He
was right on the mark. The Rangers once again proved just how effective they were in achieving
critical points on the battlefield. By 0835 Company F had reached the top of the hill and were
71
Sidney Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 62.
72
Ibid, 16.
73
Colonel Rudder assumed command of the 109th Regiment of the 28th Division. Taken
from the Robert Black Collection box 1. Training record “Tent City.”
74
Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 38.
33
digging in. By 0903 Companies D, E, and F were all in their defensive positions.75 In a matter
of thirty five minutes, the Rangers had once again reached the top of the hill, a feat that more
than 3,000 regular infantry soldiers could not accomplish.
For the Rangers, this outcome was not a surprise. As “light” weight troops, many
commanders could not understand how they achieved their objective so fast. In order to
understand why they were able to achieve such critical objects quickly, it is necessary to not only
examine the tactics they used, but how closely bonded the men were that they could take over
anyone’s job if need be.
The initial plan to attack the Castle Hill was simple. The companies would get into
position under the cover of darkness to prevent the Germans from seeing their movement. They
were also going to attack without pre-artillery bombardment. During the war this tactic was
almost unheard of. Most units liked to “soften” the enemy before trying a frontal assault. The
Rangers did not want the bombardment because it would have tipped off the Germans that they
were coming. Once the go signal was given, Companies D, E, and F were to fire from their clips
at the German positions, who would be forced to take cover, then they were to just reload and
keep charging until the hill was taken.76 Sidney Saloman describes the attack on the hill:
Heavy small arms and machine gun fire was directed on the rushing Rangers.
Casualties on both sides now began to mount, but still the charge continued. The
Rangers would not and could not be stopped. They were determined at all costs
to take Castle Hill 400 and hold it unit relieved...The enemy continued to offer
stiff resistance. Ultimately, the fast unceasing and determined forward
momentum of the assaulting D Company Rangers stunned the German
defenders...77
This kind of attack was suited for the Rangers, who took very little with them, allowing them to
use their speed and agility effectively. Also their ability to advance despite massive casualties
75
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection 1940s-1990s box 1, Unit
History.
76
Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, 156-157.
77
Solman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 38-39.
34
was a tribute to their leadership. Moreover, every man knew how to do the job of the men above
them. For example, on the advance up the hill before they even reached the base of the hill, both
the D Company commander and his runner became casualties. The undaunted Rangers
continued advancing, comfortable in knowing that once at the top they would be replaced by the
men under them.78 In total, however, Company D suffered only four casualties.79 Their speed
and agility had overwhelmed the enemy. When the men reached the top of the hill, they got to
work.
When the men reached the top of the hill, they eliminated the remnants of the German
resistence, and began to dig in. One of the Rangers describes just what his captain did:
Captain Massney stumbles into a German pillbox with a swift kick from his boot, he
smashes the door open. A grenade flies in. A muffled crunch. A cloud of thick black
acrid smoke foams out. Next moment a dozen terrified, black-faced Germans come
stumbling out, screaming for mercy.80
They knew that they would need to have defensive positions for the counter-attacks along the
crest of the hill right away. There was a slight problem the remaining Rangers had to quickly
overcome. The top of Castle Hill was too hard to dig into. The top, after only a few inches of
soil, was covered with rock and large heavy tree roots. The best protection they found was under
fallen trees from the previous American shelling or the shell holes.81 To make matters worse, the
heavy artillery shelling by the Germans began a half-hour after their seizing the top of the hill.
The Germans first tried retaking the hill in an aggressive attack often times involving
hand-to-hand combat, but these attacks were beaten off. Then the Germans immediately began
shelling the hill. If the Rangers had not been a close fighting unit, the extreme shelling would
have driven even the most capable infantry from their positions. But they held together, even
when they were exposed in the open. A Ranger historian describes what they experienced:
78
Astor, The Bloody Forest, 302.
79
Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, 158.
80
Ibid, 157-158.
81
Astor, The Bloody Forest, 303.
35
A dozen shells are hitting the hill from three directions every time you draw a
breath. The hill is in convulsions and seems to be bursting a part at its rocky
seams. Trees, limbs, and rocks are mixed with the dirt and the flying steel
fragments. The stench of cordite is everywhere.82
Such heavy bombing produced several Ranger casualties. They radioed down to headquarters
back in Bergstein at 1242 that D Company was down to 17 men and F Company was down to 15
men fighting on the hill. The artillery bombardment and fighting continued to get worse and by
1314 they had in total 42 men of fighting strength. They requested air support, but the Germans
still kept attacking. Finally, at 1735 the hilltop was silent, but was now down to 25 fighting
men.83 Yet it was not quiet for long. With the Germans still trying to shell the hilltop, and the
wounded getting evacuated, the night was one of the longest in Ranger history.
Around 2140, the rest of E Company was sent up the hill to not only provide much
needed reinforcements, but also bring down some of the wounded who were unable to walk
down. It was a deadly game for the Rangers on top of the hill to be moving around. They
needed to reinforce their defensive positions for the next day’s counter-attacks, and help get the
wounded on litters to be brought back down. The problem was that the Germans were
continuing to shell the hill, and send up flares to see what they were doing. For the Rangers left
on the hill, the night of 7 December was worse than any nightmare:
That was the longest night we ever spent: fifteen hours of weird, black nightmare;
of flares streaming their hellish glow on the tortured hillside; of mortar shells
crumping in a few yards away, beating the breath from our lungs, leaving us
gasping and dazed; fifteen tense hours of tense straining to detect the approach of
the Hun, who did not come often, for to move on the hill that night meant death,
swift and violent.84
For those men who survived the night, it coincided with a new resolution: to ensure that not only
82
Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, 159.
83
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection box 1, Unit History.
84
Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, 172.
36
would the Germans not retake Castle Hill, but to survive.
The long day began at dawn when allied air forces hit German positions. This air attack
brought much needed relief for the Rangers, because the counter-attacks had started early at
0730. After the Rangers repulsed this attack, one platoon of E Company was sent up again to
help with defending the hill. The situation continued to worsen. By mid-day the Germans were
launching continuous attacks on three sides of the hill.85 Ranger Sidney Soloman describes just
how hard the continuous fighting was:
Each time a German combat patrol assaulted the top of the hill, they were
successfully driven down the hill by the D Company Rangers. But then once
again, the horrible and devastating artillery and mortar barrages would resume on
the Ranger positions while the Germans reorganized for another counterattack.86
This fighting continued all day on December 8. Not only did the Rangers high intensity training
and conditioning allow them to keep the Germans from retaking Castle Hill, but most
importantly, the Ranger spirit kept them going when all seemed lost. Even German General
Modell admired the cohesive fighting unit of the Rangers. General Modell, Chief of the German
General Staff, was so desperate to gain the high ground of Castle Hill that he started offering
seven day furloughs and the Iron Cross to each man in the unit that was successful in retaking
the hill. Fortunately for the Americans, the Rangers held their ground against all the units
Modell sent against the Rangers. One of the units that failed was an elite paratrooper unit that
was stationed just to the north of Bergstein.87 Despite the best efforts of the Germans, they could
not dislodge the Rangers from Castle Hill. Finally, word came at 2310 that they would be
relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Infantry. All the Rangers were relieved by 2338 on
December 8, with Company C moving out last.88
Once the Rangers were relieved, they were once again attached to the 28th Infantry
85
Ibid,173.
86
Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 41.
87
Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 72.
88
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection box 1, Unit History.
37
Division and headed into a resting area. When they returned, the total number of casualties was
truly devastating. During the battle for Castle Hill alone, there were twenty three killed, four
missing in action, and one hundred and six wounded in action.89 This may not seem like a large
number, but they had already experienced casualties during their Germeter/Vossenach campaign
and the Ranger battalion is at full fighting strength with 250 men. Yet these losses were not
nearly as high as those of the men who had attempted to take Castle Hill before the Rangers. In
less than a hour, the Rangers accomplished what three infantry divisions and one armored
division had been unable to do. Not only did the Rangers complete their mission of taking
Castle Hill, they also stopped the allied line in the Germeter/Vossenach area from collapsing.90
Once again, they performed the jobs that the regular infantry could not complete. Their
objectives were all accomplished while being at the front line less than a week during a fourweek period.
The reason why the Rangers executed both missions successfully can be attributed to two
main reasons. The first is that their military doctrine had not yet been established. After Pointe
du Hoc, there were no clear missions that only Rangers could perform, unlike a paratrooper unit.
With the Rangers lacking a defined doctrine, commanders used them where their regular
infantry forces could not complete the objective. Rangers were used, much to their dislike, as
line forces at first. There they perfected their ability to hold the ground at all costs. From there,
as the battle for the Hurtgen Forest demonstrates, they began to take more high stakes objectives.
This is only a slight shift in doctrine, because they are still going in only after regular infantry
could not take the objective. However, this shift shows that they were not just light weight
troops that could only be used to reinforce weak areas on the line. Like paratroopers, they could
go in, seize their objective and hold it until they were relieved by reinforcements.91
The second reason the Rangers were successful over the regular infantry has to do with
89
Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 68.
90
Ibid, 71.
91
The airborne doctrine had them being dropped in behind enemy lines and achieving
critical objective for the incoming infantry. Up to this point they had been successful in doing
this. The operations were active were Operation Overlord and Operation Market-Garden.
38
their ability to cope under such heavy enemy engagement. While their training gave them the
skills to defend themselves against such forces as the German paratroopers, it was their unit
morale that got them through. When they had to endure such hellish nights and suffer the loss of
so many in their battalion, the Rangers believed that no matter what, you had to keep going.
They kept fighting, not for the commanders who had ordered the attack, but to the men who were
hurt or dead. With every campaign the Rangers’ ability to hold together and achieve the
objective that other infantry forces could not, only strengthened this bond. So when the order
came after only six days to move out, there was no hesitation.
After the Hurtgen Forest campaign, they were attached to the 78th Infantry and sent to the
Simmerath Village for the next attack against the Germans. They stayed in this area training and
conditioning until January 2nd 1945.92 For the Rangers, the experience of Hurtgen Forest was
not only was a turning point in the concept of how the Rangers could be deployed on the
battlefield, but also a personal experience they would never forget. The Rangers, however, were
not done doing line support. While the men had demonstrated their ability to achieve critical
objectives, their doctrine had not permanently changed to reflect that.
92
Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, 201-202.
39
CHAPTER THREE
The Ranger leadership is also unique, it is traditional
that they give the standing order ‘Follow Me.’ Those who
follow are hard-charging and unforgiven, the ultimate
objective is to make use of the enemies arsenal to hasten
their own demise.
–The Ranger Collection
U.S. Army Military History Institute
40
If Pointe du Hoc was the reason for the creation of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, and Hurtgen
Forest was the turning point for Ranger doctrine, then the Brest campaign and the Rhine River
crossing illustrate why the fighting in the Hurtgen was that turning point. When the Rangers
completed their objective of destroying the guns at Pointe du Hoc, and then held the ground in
complete isolation for two days against harsh counter-attacks, it proved that despite the Rangers
being a light weight force, they could achieve and hold critical objectives during battle. In the
months that followed, they had no major objectives until September when they were used by the
29th Infantry for the Brest campaign. This campaign demonstrated just how well the Rangers
could be used with regular line infantry. With the Rangers’ help, they were able to quickly
achieve their objectives. This success led to their use in the Hurtgen Forest where they
demonstrated just the type of warfare they were designed to do, which was to swiftly seize and
hold areas of the battlefield until regular infantry could relieve them. After Castle Hill, however,
this led commanders to try and use them in a very different ways. The Rangers could operate so
fast as a light weight force, that they were attached to the 102nd Cavalry Squadron. They trained
with them for months leading up to the Rhine River crossing. From there the Rangers and the
102nd Cavalry were let loose to quickly seize important towns and road crossings for the Allied
advance. By comparing the Brest campaign against the dramatically different campaign for the
Rhine, it is easy to see that a Ranger doctrine was beginning to emerge.
The mission at Pointe du Hoc was completed when they were relieved on D+2. Their
next major mission would not begin until 18 August 1944. Between June 8th and the beginning
of the Brest campaign, the Rangers were used in a variety of ways. The variety was caused by
two main reasons. The first was that the casualties suffered at Pointe du Hoc forced the Rangers
to seek replacements, without which they would be severely under strength. They also needed to
get the surviving men re-supplied, equipped, and rested. Until that time, the battalion could not
operate. The second reason was that the commanders did not know what to do with the new
special operations force. The Rangers were like the airborne divisions in the fact that they were
both elite highly trained forces for one kind of mission. For the airborne, it was to drop behind
enemy lines, seize key objectives, and hold them until the regular infantry could relieve them.
For the 2nd Battalion of the Rangers, they had been trained as light forces that could scale and
seize Pointe du Hoc. After that, they had no stated doctrine to help determine what their next
41
mission or objective should be. Thus until they could use their ability as a quick light weight
force, the Ranges would remain in support positions. They spent many days training and
conditioning their new replacements. They were also used to set up defensive positions to not
only protect the rear areas, but also guard against German prisoners escaping.93 By mid-August,
the allies were ready to breakout of the hedgrows and unleash their best weapon against the
Germans, their mobility. To help them quickly take critical cities and roads, VIII Corps wanted
the help of the Rangers.
By using the Rangers, they hoped to increase their speed of advance when attacking
enemy forces. For the Rangers, they officially began the Brest campaign on 18 August. They
were given three missions. First, they were to secure the 29th Division’s right flank. The 29th
was the main attacking element. Commanders knew that they would have to keep their flanks
protected or face possible envelopment. Second, they were to attack and capture the Lochrist C
Graf Spee Battery. The third was to mop up any resistance in the Le Conquet Peninsula.94 To
help the Rangers and the 29th Infantry Division accomplish their missions, the Rangers were
attached to the 29th for command purposes. They were also split into two separate fighting
forces. Companies A and C were under the command of Captain Arnold. Companies B, D, E,
and F were under the command of Captain Slater.95 The mission would be the first time that the
Rangers were separated into two different fighting forces. Yet despite their division, they still
were able to successfully achieve all three missions during the Brest campaign.
Before examining how and why the Rangers were successful during the campaign, it is
necessary to remember how critical their lack of military doctrine was during a campaign.
Commanders such as Lt. Rudder knew that an elite fighting force could not just sit around after
the invasion of Pointe du Hoc until it was decided what to do with them. Training, conditioning,
93
Harold Gunther and James Shalala, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United
States Army (Plzen, Czechoslovakia: Vsetisk, 1945), 16.
94
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, declassified
“secret” document on missions.
95
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 2, declassified
“secret” document on missions.
42
and guard duty for such an highly trained force undermined their morale. When they were
attached to the 29th Infantry for the Brest campaign, the men were ready to prove their worth as a
fighting unit. At the same time, the Rangers were preparing for regular infantry duty, the
airborne forces were preparing and fighting in Operation Market-Garden. The difference
between the two special operation forces is that one had an established doctrine and one did not.
Since the airborne had a clear doctrine, they could be used in operations that continually
demonstrated their strengths. The Rangers did not have this advantage. Instead, they
continually evolved their role during the war. Even though their roles varied, it did not mean
that they were misused tactically, however. Many commanders like General Hodges tried to use
the Rangers wherever possible. They recognized that they were an elite force and were not used
in everyday operations. The Rangers then were called in for operations that either regular
infantry would have trouble executing as fast as the Rangers or when the infantry failed to
capture critical areas on the battlefield. In the Brest campaign they were used for their ability to
achieve different objectives with low casualty rates. This ability is easy to see when the
campaign is broken down and examined by each of the different objectives.
The first objective of securing the right flank of the 29th Division was the longest running
of the three objectives. For the Rangers, the mission official began on 18 August, but the
fighting began on 22 August. At that time, they were in corps reserve waiting for their orders to
move out. By 23 August, both Ranger forces were in supporting position just south of St.
Renan.96 The Rangers’ ability to move swiftly won them the mission of securing the flank from
the enemy who would be moving from the Le Conquet area to Brest. The best way would be to
cut the Brest-Le Conquet Road. The Rangers completed the mission despite heavy enemy fire
and with no casualties to the Rangers thanks to their speed.97 During this time, not only were the
Rangers quickly advancing through the Le Conquet area in support of the right flank, but they
were also capturing cities and prisoners. Force Arnold (Companies A and C) on 28th August
were able to encircle an enemy garrison. The Rangers accomplished this with the help of fog.
96
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, The Brest
Campaign, Unit/Narrative History.
97
Ibid.
43
By the time the Germans knew that they were coming, the Rangers were advancing so fast that
the Germans only had enough time to raise the white flag of surrender. This action resulted in
ninety-four prisoners being taken without the loss of a single Ranger.98
Throughout the campaign, the Rangers’ speed allowed them to not only capture many
prisoners, but also areas that the infantry were having trouble advancing on. One such area was
Hill 63. The hill had been attacked previously, but the attacks were repelled due to heavy enemy
fire. It would take the Rangers twice to take the hill. The Rangers were able to swiftly surround
and seize the hill with a combination of a fast frontal attack and help from artillery fired on the
hill.99 This ground was critical because its high elevation allowed the Germans to see advancing
allied troops. The first advance was on 1 September, but by 5 September the hill was secure.100
During the attack, the other Ranger force was still advancing on towns and eliminating enemy
resistance to keep the right flank secure. On the night of 7 September, the 116th Infantry tied in
on the left and the 5th Ranger Battalion meet them on the right. This move finally secured the
right flank of the 29th Division. The first of the three Ranger objectives during the Brest
campaign was complete.101 Their next objective was to seize the Lochrist (or the Graf Spee)
Battery.
The Lochrist Battery presented a serious threat to the flank and to the advance of the
allies. Located in the Le Conquet Peninsula, it would cause heavy casualties and slow the
advance if not taken. In the battery were four 280-mm guns, numerous 88-mm and 20-mm dual
purpose anti-aircraft guns and manned by over 800 enemy soldiers.102 It was up to the Rangers
to capture this critical battery. Lt. Rudder decided that because the allies did not know with
certainty the location of the battery, each company would be assigned a certain zone to cover.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
Gunther, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army ,30.
101
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black, box 1, The Brest Campaign,
Unit/Narrative History.
102
Ibid.
44
The attack would take place on 9 September, with a jump off time of 0830. Once again, because
the Rangers were a light weight force, they were able to execute the mission with the speed
necessary to make the mission successful. By 1212, the battery had surrendered to the
approaching Rangers. They would have captured the battery sooner, but were slowed by
difficult terrain and a large number of prisoners. The Rangers had advanced so fast through their
zones of coverage that the enemy did not have time to mount any attacks. Instead, they
surrendered in numbers large enough to have to set up holding cages.103 With the capture of the
Lochrist Battery, the Rangers had in one morning completed their second mission.
In the
process they had captured 1,800 prisoners of war.104 Their final mission was to conduct patrols
of the area to make sure that the area was clear of all enemy resistance.
The final mission of the Rangers was classified as “mopping up” the Le Conquet
Peninsula. With the large Lochrist Battery under allied control, the mission was going to be
easier to complete. They started clearing the area of enemy resistance on 10 September. The
Rangers once again used their speed to overrun enemy areas. Most of the time the Rangers
encountered little resistence because they overran enemy positions so fast. As a result, there
were a high number of prisoners captured.105 They continued the mop up mission until 18
September. At that point the Rangers had successfully completed all three of their missions
during the Brest campaign. The men then decamped to the Crozon Peninsula to help the 8th
Division in capturing the Crozon Garrison.106 With the completion of the Brest campaign on 20
September, the Ninth Army had taken 28,000 prisoners of war. They killed 4,000 Germans,
while the allies had only suffered around 2,900 casualties.107 These large numbers were gained
with the help of the 2nd Ranger Battalion.
103
Ibid.
104
Gunther, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army, 31.
105
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, The Brest
Campaign, Unit/Narrative History.
106
Gunther, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army, 31.
107
U.S. Army Military History Institute: James Moor, box 3, “Quest of Brest” unit
narrative.
45
After the Brest campaign the next major operation would not be until the fighting in the
Hurtgen Forest. Between September and their deployment in the forest, the Rangers focused on
training and conditioning. The men who had lived through Pointe du Hoc and now the Brest
campaign were a closely knit unit. For them, Pointe du Hoc had been the climax. The Brest
campaign was nothing more than keeping busy. It is clear that the Rangers were lacking
doctrine that would give the unit direction in the kind of missions assigned to them. Instead,
they used their ability as a highly mobile fighting unit to seize towns and capture prisoners. This
was needed at the time by the allies, however. During the allied breakout after their landings in
Normandy, speed was vital. The Rangers provided the speed and the skills they needed at the
time. It is true that the airborne, the other elite unit in Europe, were planning for operations
designed just for their ability. They also had the doctrine that supported such operational
planning. The Rangers did not. For the Rangers, the Hurtgen Forest was a turning point in their
doctrine during the Second World War. After demonstrating not only their ability to seize
critical objectives quickly, but also their fighting spirit, a change in their operations occurred. It
was most noticeable during their operations from the Roer River to the Rhine.
The campaign from the Roer River to the Rhine took place from 22 February 1945
through 26 March 1945. This campaign is very important in the evolution of the Rangers. After
the Hurtgen Forest, the Rangers were sent to the rear for much needed rest and replacements.
During January they received their replacements and by February they were conducting patrols
around the Schwammanuel Dam.108 These patrols were conducted to help get the new Rangers
used to going out and working together to keep the Rangers unit cohesion. The Rangers’ ability
to work well together was about to be put to the test. At this time they were attached to the 9th
U.S. Army and had resumed training in the Kalterberberg area.109 On 22 February, the Rangers
were attached to the 102nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Group for some unique training.110
108
Gunther, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army, 18.
109
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert W. Black Collection 1940's-1990's, box
1, Unit History.
110
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black, box 3, Declassified
Interviews/Narrative “From the Roer to the Rhine.”
46
There were two reasons for the attachment to the cavalry. The first was that Colonel
Cyrus Dolph III who commanded the 102nd requested infantry support. Major General Clarence
Huebner who commanded V Corps decided to give Col. Dolph III the Rangers.111 To Colonel
Huebner, the Rangers were the most adequate force available. The second reason why the
Rangers were attached to the cavalry was because they were trained for fast advances. The
Rangers’ training and their swift frontal attack on Castle Hill demonstrated their ability to work
with a mobile cavalry unit. This ability to work closely and quickly made it a natural attachment
to a cavalry unit were speed and communication skills were paramount in order for operations to
be a success. Combined training began in Bedenborn Germany on 23 February 1945.112
The Rangers and the cavalry trained from 23 February until 3 March. This was not a
long period of training when considering that the two units had never worked as a combined
unit. The Rangers were designed and deployed as light weight infantry where their speed and
mobility came from their training and unit cohesion. Until Castle Hill they had been used mostly
on flanking maneuvers and seizing critical objectives that other infantry could not capture. After
they demonstrated that they could operate in frontal attacks with the speed they had used in
earlier operations, their military doctrine evolved to allow them to be used in different capacities.
By combining the heavy fire power of a cavalry unit and the speed of the Rangers, commanders
hoped that they would be able to swiftly capture and eliminate enemy forces. Accordingly, they
started unit problems that focused mostly on coordinating the Rangers movement and firing with
the cavalry’s attack.113
The exercises focused on finding out the best way to combine the light weapons of the
Rangers and the heavy weapons of a cavalry unit. The Rangers soon discovered that the cavalry
provided good overhead fire, thereby covering their advance. Once the Rangers were in
position, they could open up on the enemy at close range. This kind of advance demonstrated
111
Ibid.
112
Gunther, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army, 18.
113
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black, box 3, Declassified
Interviews/Narrative “From the Roer to the Rhine.”
47
the benefits of combining light and heavy automatic weapons.114 After the Rangers and cavalry
worked out the best way to attack in conjunction with each other, they had to find a way to move
the Rangers with the tanks.
After experimenting with different ways of transporting the Rangers, a loading method
was finally established. One platoon would be distributed among the leading elements of the
cavalry.115 The formation allowed for the Rangers to have the covering fire as they advanced
with the tanks. Once they reached small pockets of resistence the Rangers could then rush the
area with their speed. In support of this lead column was a second platoon held in an assembly
area in reserve. The two platoons provided a cohesive, ground-fighting unit if the situation
demanded.116 The men continued training until 1 March 1945 when they were called in to
relieve elements of the 309th Infantry area in the Ruhrberg area.117 It was here that the Rangers
and the 102nd Cavalry were ordered across the Roer River.
Upon their arrival at Ruhrbeg, Major General Huebner of V Corps called a meeting with
the commander of the 102nd Cavalry Colonel Saunders and Ranger commander Major
Williams.118 This meeting was to decide how and when the two forces would cross the Roer
River. The crossing of the Roer was needed to help the Allies capture critical towns and enemy
forces in Germany. The mobility, speed and low casualties at which the combined force
operated would allow the enemy no time to conduct a retreat or counter-attacks. The
commanders decided that two patrols would cross early in the evening. They were to continue
up to the high ground beyond the river which was north-east of Ruherberg. If they met little or
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
116
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, Declassified
“Secret” document Roer River.
117
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 3, Declassified
Interviews/Narrative “From the Roer to the Rhine.”
118
Ibid.
48
no resistence, then the full company would be sent across.119
On the evening of 1 March, one patrol from each of Company D and E 120 were sent
across the Roer. They took approximately one hour to wade across. Their progress was slow
because of the extreme caution they were taking. They did not know what awaited them on the
other side. After crossing, they met one enemy outpost who fled immediately and two houses
with civilians in them. At 0140 they sent word back to headquarters that it was a “go” to cross.
As the rest of the company crossed the river, the two patrols continued forward to the high
ground and established a defensive position. The men were lucky, though. The German 272nd
Infantry Division had been in the area until the 28 February. If they had faced the estimated 240
men in the division, they would not have been able to cross the Roer and conduct the raids that
the allies needed to achieve total victory in Germany.
One of the first actions that the Rangers had to accomplish was to conduct patrols of the
surrounding area. In order for them to operate with the cavalry, they needed to find and locate
mines. The Germans had laid under the snow antipersonnel and concrete mines and then had
laid out detours that were also heavily mined. Captain Arnold says, “...some artist could have
made a good picture of the two [soldiers] lifting their legs carefully and setting them down very
slowly as they picked a path through the mine field.”121 The mine field slowed the Rangers and
the cavalry in their advance since all the roads to the west were not cleared of the mines. When
the engineers finished clearing the roads in their immediate area alone they found over fifty
mines.122 Once the Rangers cleared the area, they returned to the 102nd Cavalry Group and
began their advance to the Rhine River.
Before the Rangers and the cavalry set out for the race to the Rhine, they had laid out
formations and tactics that took advantage of each of the unit’s strengths. With the help of the
119
Ibid.
120
Each patrol consisted of one officer and fourteen men.
121
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 3, Declassified
Interviews/Narrative “From the Roer to the Rhine.”
122
Ibid.
49
cavalry, the Rangers, who were light weight forces, could move even faster. They also sustained
fewer casualties and could pack a heavier hit with the cavalry’s fire power. The operations that
the men would be involved in were the capturing of towns and eliminating enemy resistance. To
help organize the attack, they were broken down into two attack squads. Companies A, B and C
of the Rangers were attached to the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squad, while Companies D, E,
and F were attached to the 102nd Cavalry.123 During the campaign, the commanders had a
system set up to allow them to figure out just where they would be attacking the next day. Major
Williams would call in the squad commanders and would discuss what towns would be captured
the next day and what the new boundaries would be. Once it was established where they would
be attacking, they would decide if it would be the 38th or the 102nd squad in the frontal position
and the other would go in abreast. Once this was decided, Ranger Captains Slater and Arnold
were informed of the plan and would proceed to inform the Rangers.124
When the attack started, the Rangers would be taken by trucks to the town and the
cavalry would locate the enemy and pin them to the ground with their heavy fire power. Then
the Rangers’ with their speed on the ground would enable them to rapidly execute a flanking
maneuver and take the objective. This worked well for the Rangers ,who were already known
for their speed. When combined with covering fire the cavalry provided for them, they could
seize their objectives faster and with fewer casualties.
A good example of the attack style they used is the capture of Kommern. They entered
the city at approximately 2000 and started a house-to-house search. One platoon took one side
of the street another platoon the other side. When they met heavy resistence outside of town
they called in the cavalry which were stationed a little outside of the town. The Rangers
normally moved so quickly that the artillery was hardly used. Also communication between the
men and their support units would have been difficult, but the Rangers had been trained to act
independently and knew what the other man was doing.125 After that the rest of the company
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.
125
Ibid.
50
would enter the town and begin planing for tomorrow’s attack. This kind of attack worked so
fast and efficiently that the speed of the Ranger’s advance was truly overwhelming.
The Rangers also advanced rapidly because all of the roads headed east were intact. This
was a surprise for the advance force. They expected the Germans to try to slow their advance.
The Germans, though, seemed to have been surprised by the advancing Rangers. The Rangers
believed that once they crossed the Roer and started their advance that the Germans had one idea
in mind: getting east of the Rhine.126 The Germans knew from experience that the allies,
particularly the Rangers were very quick and lethal in their advance. Accordingly, there was not
much delaying action by the Germans. They left practically no delaying force or road blocks.
For the Rangers, one of the main problems was getting the supplies they needed up to them fast
enough.127 Since the Rangers were moving so swiftly, the commanders decided to break up the
advance to keep the men rested. They noticed that the men were becoming tired with how fast
they were capturing towns. By 6 March, they had captured at least four towns and were still
continuing their advance at that speed. It was decided that the task forces would take turns
capturing towns. In essence, they started operating on a leap-frog schedule. For example, Task
Force A which contained Companies A, B, and C of the Rangers and the 38th Cavalry would take
one town one day while the other task force stayed in their previous positions until they were
given the all clear signal.128 By 24 March, they had advanced far enough that they received
notice that they were to cross the Rhine.
The crossing of the Rhine was a huge moment for the allies and the Rangers. The
Rangers were not the first to cross, but ever since they landed at Pointe du Hoc, they had been
fighting their way to the river. There was much anticipation in trying to cross, especially since
they were still attached to the cavalry units. They continued to work together since they were
able to advance and capture critical towns so rapidly. On 26 March Task Force Slater,
Companies D, E, and F with the 102nd Cavalry were to depart from Mayschuss and cross the
126
Ibid.
127
Ibid.
128
Ibid.
51
Rhine via the Treadway bridge. They then were to proceed to the Neuweid area.129 According
to the after action report about the crossing, “The grim specter of the Rhine crossing had haunted
the Ranger mind for many months; actually, the crossing was amazingly easy, proving that V-E
Day could not be far off.”130 After the rest of the company crossed the Rhine on 27 March 1945,
the campaign from the Roer to the Rhine had ended. For the Rangers, however, they had once
again evolved their military doctrine during this vital advance for the allies.
After the landings on Pointe du Hoc, the Rangers had no established military doctrine to
follow for further operations. The lack of military doctrine caused commanders to try and use
the Rangers in different kinds of operations to find out what operations would be the best suited
for their ability. The Brest campaign and the drive from the Roer River to the Rhine
demonstrates this point. During the Brest campaign, the Rangers were used mostly as flank
security. In providing the security the drive required, they also seized critical towns, the
Lochrist Battery and mop- up missions. While these missions were not part of the major
attacking force, they did provide much needed support and protection. The Rangers were
assigned missions that in the current situation were appropriate. The Brest campaign did
develop the Rangers’ doctrine further, though. By demonstrating speed and how well they
communicated as a unit, they were able to advance faster than other regular infantry units.
Achieving objectives quickly and with low casualty rates caused their doctrine to develop as a
light weight infantry force. With this development the Rangers were called into the Hurtgen
Forest. In the forest the Rangers demonstrated that just because they were a fast moving light
weight infantry did not mean that they could not achieve critical points on the battlefield. They
also demonstrated that they could successfully attack an objective with a swift and aggressive
frontal attack. As a result, they were trained and deployed together with the 102nd and 38th
Cavalry Squad.
This turn was an important one in Ranger doctrine. They went from operating
independently as a light weight special operation force to working in conjunction with heavier
129
U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1,Declassified
“secret” document Rehabilitation.
130
Ibid.
52
fire power. The switch worked well for the Rangers. They could further enhance their speed
with the use of vehicles and tanks. The cavalry also made it easier for the Rangers to assault and
capture towns by providing overhead fire as they advanced. The operations during the Roer
River to the Rhine River demonstrates that the Rangers could also work as a mobile heavy
fighting force. It also demonstrates that the Rangers were constantly evolving their doctrine to
provide a fighting force for whatever the war effort needed.
53
CONCLUSION
Sometimes we were called suicide groups, but not at all
we were simply spirited young people who took
the view that if you were going to be combat soldier you may
as well be the very best. Also we were anxious to get on with the war
so as to bring things to a close and get home to our loved ones
as soon as possible.
–James Eikner
54
For the Rangers during the Second World War, the fighting did not end with the German
surrender. Instead, they were once again deployed on 10 May 1945 to Pilsen, Czechoslovakia.131
For a few of the men it had been a long tough two years from their initial organization in 1943
to May 1945. The men had been through the toughest training the Army had devised to become
an elite fighting unit. The original men of the 2nd Ranger Battalion had been trained for one
purpose only: scaling Pointe du Hoc. From there the Rangers had no established doctrine for
them to follow. This lack of doctrine after D-Day led to their evolution as a fighting force.
Throughout the war, the Ranger’s military doctrine would be changing. Each of the campaigns
that the Rangers were used in led to their development as a light weight, highly mobile, elite
fighting force for the Army. It was the Rangers’ performance during the Second World War that
led the Army to continue their training and use of special operation forces.
The 2nd Ranger Battalion was formed in April 1943 after the success of the 5th Ranger
Battalion in Africa and the Mediterranean. The battalion was created out of volunteers who had
to pass the physical standards that were required by the paratroopers. After that the men who
made it through faced constant physical training and conditioning. The Rangers were training as
a light weight, mobile unit that also had training in amphibious and scaling assaults. The reason
behind this wide range of training is that they were formed for the assault on Pointe du Hoc
during Operation Overlord. They had to land on a narrow strip of beach after crossing the
English Channel and then scale a ninety-foot vertical cliff. Then the men had to disable the 150mm Howitzer guns and set up roadblocks to stop the Germans from sending reinforcements
down to the beachheads. After their mission was complete on D+2, the Rangers and
commanders faced a dilemma. What to do with the highly trained, elite Rangers?
The Rangers posed a problem for commanders. Because they were created for one
mission, their doctrine did not reflect any lasting commitment to Ranger operations during the
war.132 Given this, the Rangers had a slow evolution in their military doctrine that emerged out
131
Harold Gunther and James Shalala, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United
States Army (Czechoslovakia: Vsetisk, 1945), 20.
132
David Hogan Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army
Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 233.
55
of the various roles that the Rangers played. The Army consistently issued the Rangers
objectives that regular infantry were not ready to seize or could not take because of their
training.133 During the Brest campaign, they were given three objectives that at first glance
would not seem to fit with the Ranger training. However, this thinking is false because it is the
type of mission fit for the evolving Ranger doctrine. The Rangers were to secure the flank of the
28th Division, capture a deadly battery and then wipe out resistence that the forward divisions
could not eliminate. These objectives carved out just what the Rangers were capable of and
became the basis for the evolution of their doctrine.
The Rangers were able to use their training to move swiftly and capture not only key
towns but also eliminate strong pockets of enemy resistence. The Rangers were able to
accomplish this because of their ability to move fast and efficiently. Even though they were used
as line infantry, they were given objectives that allowed the military doctrine to expand.
Before the Brest campaign they had not been able to prove their ability as a highly
mobile and fast moving fighting force. During the Brest operation, they moved so quickly that
the number of prisoners that they seized actually slowed down their progress. The Rangers also
proved their ability to work as attached units. By having to coordinate their movements with
other units in the 28th Division, they had to not only operate independently to achieve their
objectives, but also work together to get the necessary support in supplies and fire power for
their advance. From that time forward, the Rangers were consistently attached to different units
who needed their superior fighting ability. By proving how well they worked as an attached
unit, it became part of their doctrine. As Ranger Robert Gillespie states, “We were attached
where needed. Mostly a tough position that had to be held.”134 This evolution of the Ranger
doctrine still had to be put to the test.
The Rangers were first brought into the Hurtgen Forest to fill in an area of the line that
was collapsing. Had the line collapsed, the Germans would have been able to rush through their
forces and cause a serious set back to the advance of the allies. When the 112th Infantry was
133
Hogan Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers
from Dieppe to Grenada, 233.
134
World War II Survey, U.S. Army Military History Institute. Robert Gillespie 9081.
56
pulled out and replaced by the Rangers, General Cota knew he was sending in a superior fighting
force that would be able to hold the critical ground. The Rangers easily handled this mission
because they had already fought as an isolated unit on Pointe du Hoc.
Then came a turning point for the Rangers: their mission to capture Hill 400 (Castle Hill).
This juncture was crucial for their doctrine because they not only had to capture a critical area
of the battlefield, but they also had to use all their training and work with area artillery to capture
the hill. The swift frontal assault the Rangers made against the hill was the only successful
operation that captured the hill. Previous units including a calvary unit, had failed to take the
hill. In contrast, the Rangers used their speed, unit cohesion, and morale to overcome the far
superior enemy. By demonstrating their ability to execute a swift and successful frontal assault,
they evolved their doctrine from just going in and holding critical ground, but also taking it.
While they had done this on Pointe du Hoc, they had been trained especially for that
mission. The battle for Castle Hill was not an operation for which the Rangers had trained.
Instead, they demonstrated that their training as a elite force allowed them to fulfill multiple
roles in battle. The last evolution in doctrine that the Rangers underwent was their campaign
from the Roer River to the Rhine River. This situation was unique for the Rangers. For the first
time, they were to work in conjunction with another unit, a calvary unit. This attachment turned
out to be a great “marriage” for the Rangers. They were able to combine their speed with a force
that could not only keep pace with them, but also provided much needed overhead fire power for
their advance. The two forces worked well together and advanced quickly, capturing critical
towns and eliminating all areas of enemy resistence. Their advance was so quick that not only
did they have a hard time staying supplied, but most Germans fled to the east knowing that they
had no defensive lines on which to fall back. Thanks to three different types of missions they
were given, the Rangers went from a unit with no stated doctrine after their first mission, to
being able to evolve into the type of fighting force the Allies needed to help win the war.
The Rangers were able to evolve their doctrine during the war to fulfill the different roles
commanders needed in order to win because of three reasons. The first was their training.
While training in America for Operation Overlord, they also spent time preparing for all types of
small unit problems as well. This training encouraged the men to think and solve different kinds
of problems that develop during battle. They also continued to train and condition after the
57
landing on Pointe du Hoc. After every major operation in which the Rangers participated in they
were taken to rest areas and allowed to train their replacements. This move helped to keep the
Rangers on the edge during the operations to which they were assigned to.
The second was the leadership in the Rangers. During training, all the men had to learn
the jobs of their leaders. This allowed casualties to take place at the command level without the
battle collapsing due to inadequate leadership. The leaders also led by example. They were out
there with their men leading not only by command, but more importantly, by example. Herbert
Appel, a private during the war with the Rangers, describes what made the Ranger leadership
outstanding: “Our leaders led, sharing foxholes, exposing themselves to enemy fire...In a Ranger
Battalion everyone was capable of stepping into leadership roles as needed.”135 Training
allowed men to step forward into leadership positions, but what kept the men together was their
unit cohesion.
The last reason the Rangers were able to perform the various roles called for during the
course of the war was how close they were to each other. Being an elite unit, the men had to
endure harsh training conditions to earn the right to become a Ranger. Once in their unit, the
men would fight together in some of the most desperate conditions of the war. Fighting as an
isolated unit twice brought the men together and created high unit morale. Also, their ability to
quickly go in and take objectives that other regular infantry could not take created in the men a
sense of real pride at being a Ranger. This “elan” got them through the tough times.
In the battles for Nazi occupied Europe, American special forces played critical roles
during major operations against the Germans. In Operation Overlord, the Rangers destroyed the
guns and held the ground at Pointe du Hoc. In the same operation, the U.S. 101st and 82nd
Airborne Divisions were to drop behind enemy lines and held off enemy resistence until relived
by the landing infantry on D-Day. These two separate forces made the landings on the beaches
of Normandy to be a success.
After Operation Overlord, the Airborne and the Rangers went in separate directions.
While the Airborne played a critical role in holding the lines during Operation Market-Garden,
the Rangers were demonstrating their speed and mobility during the Brest campaign. Then the
135
World War II Survey, U.S. Army Military History Institute. Herbert Appel 9099.
58
Rangers not only held collapsing lines during the battle for the Hurtgen Forest, they also
captured the high ground after numerous attempts had been made by regular infantry. The
Airborne in December during the Battle of the Bulge held the key city of Bastogne. During the
spring offensive both forces proceeded to capture key cities along the route to Berlin. Despite
the fact that the Rangers and Airborne were small forces compared to a division, they were given
objectives that if not accomplished successfully could have led to the failure of the operations.
The roles they played were secondary, but their involvement in major operations were significant
and lead to the final victory for the allies.136 They also lead the way for a more prominent role
for special forces in the U.S. military after the war.
The U.S. Army 2nd Ranger Battalion during the Second World War paved the way, along
with the U.S. Airborne forces, in creating a permeant place for special operation forces after
1945. When the war ended, the large majority of Airborne men were discharged from the Army.
The Airborne, however, did not completely disband and continued to train and revise their
military doctrine after the war. For the Rangers, it was different. They were completely
disbanded after their assignment in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia. Once, it was decided that they were
not needed as a special operations unit because the military had the Airborne. Despite this
decision, when the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the Army quickly reformed the Rangers
based on the doctrine that had evolved during World War II. To this day, the Army Rangers are
still deployed as a special operations unit. Throughout World War II, they proved that the
Rangers could and would accomplish any objective given to them. Whether it was simply
holding a line that was collapsing or capturing critical objectives on the battlefield that regular
infantry had failed to capture, the Rangers proved that they were an elite fighting force.
On the 40th anniversary of D-Day, President Ronald Reagan’s speech on Pointe du Hoc
drew worldwide attention to the Rangers. He spoke about the dangerous and critical mission the
Rangers had completed on 6 June, 1944. While the Rangers were all honored and felt privileged
to receive such accolades from the President, the mission on Pointe du Hoc was only the
beginning for 2nd Ranger Battalion. They fought hard during the war creating the image of the
136
David Hogan Jr. U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington D.C.:
Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1992), 133.
59
tough, no nonsense soldier who could and would successfully achieve any mission given to
them. Ralph Goranosn describes just how and why the Rangers evolved into the elite fighting
force they are today: “We went through many hardships together, and we formed many enduring
friendships...It is hard to explain, but the highlight of my military career, was the frightening
work, training and privations that we went through, to create a fighting force equal to none.”137
137
Peter S. Kalikow World War II Oral History Archive: The Eisenhower Center for
American Studies, University of New Orleans, Ralph Goranson.
60
APPENDIX:
Research Summary
In order to better understand the primary documents and the collections from which they
came, I have listed the two archives I used and the major collections I cite. This system should
allow the reader to better understand the not only the citations I have used, but also the
conclusions I have drawn from the documents.
Primary sources come from two archives. The first one was the Eisenhower Center for
American Studies, which is in conjunction with the University of New Orleans and the National
D-Day Museum. The second was the United States Army Military History Institute. From the
Eisenhower Center for American Studies, I have used two collections. One was the Sims
Gautheir Collection.138 This collection contains declassified documents during the planning
stages of Operation Overlord. They contain information about believed enemy capabilities, prebombardments by the air force, naval documents regarding preparations for Operation Overlord
and casualty reports after D-Day. These are useful in examining how much planning went into
the operation and how critical the planers considered Pointe du Hoc.
The second collection is from The Eisenhower Center for American Studies’s oral history
collection. This collection is labeled the Peter S. Kalikow World War II Oral History Archive.139
This collection was started the historian Stephen Ambrose. It contains letters, interviews, and
submitted accounts of the men who were involved in Operation Overlord. The collection
contains accounts by men in all the different branches of the military. In this study, however, I
used only those from the 2nd Ranger Battalion. These are the only two collections I used from
138
When citing this source it will be as follows: Sims Gautheir Collection: The
Eisenhower Center for American Studies, University of New Orleans. Then what kind of
document it was.
139
In the study this collection will be cited as follows: Peter S. Kalikow World War II
Oral History Archive: The Eisenhower Center for American Studies, University of New Orleans.
It will then be followed by the name of the person. In shortened citations it will be labeled:
Kalikow Archive and then the name.
61
the Eisenhower Center for American Studies. The rest of my primary sources come from the
U.S. Army Military History Institute.
The second archive used was the U.S. Army Military History Institute. While all the
collections contain information about the 2nd Rangers, each collection needs to be singled out in
order to better understand how I used them in support of my thesis. At the Military History
Institute, the collections are named after the person who donated the sources or the author. They
are not collections that are the testimonies of the people who they are named after. In the Ranger
Collection I used a paper written by Peter Deeb titled, “Why Rangers.”140 It also contained
newspaper clippings and other stories about the U.S. Army Rangers from World War II through
the present. I also use two collections donated by Colonel Robert Black. One is the Robert W.
Black Collection 1940s–1990s. It is one box that contains reports, journals, and diaries, rosters,
and unit histories.141 In this collection I use Ivar Jone’s S-2 journal. It chronicles the action hour
by hour of the battalion. The other collection I use of Colonel Black’s is the Robert Black
Collection,142 the institute’s largest collection of primary sources dealing with the 2nd Ranger
Battalion. This collection includes: after action reports, operation objectives issued by
headquarters, declassified “secret” documents, detailed narratives of operation actions, and
detailed training reports, newspaper clippings and declassified official accounts/interviews
conducted on the field about different operations. The JoAnna McDonald collection was also
used.143 This collection contains books about the Rangers and a variety of after action reports.
The same is true of the James Moor Collection, but contains more items that deal with specific
operations.144
140
This is cited as: U.S. Army Military History Institute: The Ranger Collection. This
was followed by the box number and the document.
141
Cited as: U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert W. Black Collection 1940'–
1990's.
142
This collection is cited as: U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black
Collection. The box number follows along with what kind of document it is.
143
This is cited as: U.S. Army Military History Institute: JoAnna McDonald Collection.
144
Cited: U.S. Army Military History Institute: James Moor Collection followed by the
62
The next collection contains a useful narrative history of the Twelfth Field Artillery
Battalion, which the Rangers were attached. This collection is the Burton A. Smead
Collection.145 The next two collections are either books that are hard to find or extracts of
books. These are the Merle T. Cole and the Ella Bieroth papers.146 I also use two unit histories.
One is the 2nd Ranger Battalion, Company E from 1943-1945. The other is the 2nd U.S. Ranger
Infantry Battalion Germeter-Vossenach-Hurtgen-Bergstein-Hill400 Germany, 14 November-10
December 1944. Not only does this account give excellent detail about the Rangers in the
Hurtgen Forest, but also provides maps of the area that are used. The other collection that I use
for maps is the Louis Lisko Collection. The last collection I used from the Military History
Institute are their World War II Veterans Collection.147 They were questionnaires completed by
any veteran of the U.S. Army at any time and any division. Considering this study focuses on
the 2nd Ranger Battalion, these sources are very appropriate in their use.
box number.
145
The citation follows the previous outline.
146
Citation follows the outline of: U.S. Army Military History Institute, the collection
name and what kind of document it was.
147
These are cited as: World War II Survey, U.S. Army Military History Institute.
Followed by their name and the collection number.
63
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
U.S. Army Military History Institute
The Merle T. Cole Collection
Ella Bieroth Papers
JoAnna McDonald Collection
James E. Moore Collection
Robert W. Black Collection 1940's–1990's
Robert Black Collection
Burton A. Smead Collection
Unit History 609-2 Ranger 1945
Unit History 609-2 Ranger 1991
The Ranger Collection
World War II Veterans Collection, Rangers
The Eisenhower Center for American Studies
Sims Gauthier Collection
Peter S. Kalikow World War II Oral History Archive
Brown, Owen
Eikner, James W.
Goranson, Ralph
Keating, Jack
Lisko, Louis
Lomell, Leonard
Maimone, Salva
South, Frank
Secondary Sources
Ambrose, Stephen. The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D.
Eisenhower: New York: Doubleday and Company, Incorperated, 1969.
Ambrose, Stephen. D-Day: June 6, 1944: The Climatic Battle of World War II. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1994.
Ambrose, Stephen. Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge
to the Surrender of Germany June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1997.
Ambrose, Stephen. The Victors: Eisenhower and his Boys: The Men of World War II. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1998.
Astor, Gerald. The Bloody Forest: Battle for the Huertgen September 1949-January 1945.
California: Presidio Press, Incorporated, 2000.
Black, Robert. Rangers in World War II. New York: Ivy Books, 1992.
Bradley, Omar. A Soldier’s Story. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951.
64
Cottman, Edward. “The Duality of the American Military Tradition: A Commentary.” The
Journal of Military History, 64 Number 4(2000), 967-980.
Chandler, David and James Collins, Jr. The D-Day Encyclopedia. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1994.
Hogan, David Jr. The Evolution of the Concept of the U.S. Army’s Rangers, 1942-1983. Duke
University, 1986.
Hogan, David Jr. U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II. Washington D.C.: Center of
Military History, Department of the Army, 1992.
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Chapter Pages Quotes
Introduction
Robert Black Collection
Chapter One
World War II Veterans Collection, Rangers
Chapter Two
The Ranger Collection
Chapter Three
The Ranger Collection
Conclusion
Peter S. Kalikow World War II Oral History Archive
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
I was born in Great Falls, Montana in April 1981 and moved at the age of five to Minneapolis,
Minnesota. I graduated from Cooper High School in 1999 and moved down to Tampa, Florida
right afterwards. While an undergraduate at Eckerd College, I decided to major in history with a
minor in psychology. As a senior there I was the only person selected to do a thesis in my
department. My undergraduate thesis examined the role the Rangers played during Operation
Overlord. When I graduated from Eckerd College in 2003, I took some time off to figure out
what graduate school to attend. I enrolled at Florida State University in January 2004 and almost
immediately began my research for my Masters thesis. During my college years I have focused
on teaching history to school-aged children.
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