Copyright
by
Henry Lane Nevils
2013
The Dissertation Committee for Henry Lane Nevils certifies that this is the
approved version of the following dissertation:
The Actions of Institutional Leadership at Two Louisiana Community Colleges in
the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Committee:
Victor Saenz, Supervisor
Edwin Sharpe, Co-Supervisor
Juan Gonzalez
Lodis Rhodes
Rick Bateman
The Actions of Institutional Leadership at Two Louisiana Community Colleges in
the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
by
Henry Lane Nevils, B.A.; M.A.
Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
The University of Texas at Austin
December, 2013
Dedication
This work is dedicated to my late father, Thomas M. Nevils. I miss you everyday
but am grateful for all the good times. It is also dedicated to my mom, Betty Sonnier
Nevils and my sister, Kimberly Ann Nevils, who both taught me so much.
Acknowledgements
Conducting research for this dissertation was enjoyable because so many people
in my life were willing to help – I am forever grateful. I am particularly grateful to the
people I interviewed at Nunez Community College and SOWELA Technical
Community College. I hope, although I doubt, that this work does justice to your
experiences – I did my best.
v The Actions of Institutional Leadership at Two Louisiana Community
Colleges in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Henry Lane Nevils, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2013
Supervisor: Victor Saenz
Co-Supervisor: Edwin Sharpe
In August and September of 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the
Gulf Coast with damages estimated at $85 billion. Hurricane Katrina was so devastating
that the number of lives lost and injuries sustained is still being calculated. Hurricane
Rita, which made landfall in the southwestern part of Louisiana just a few weeks after
Katrina, did not cause as much damage as Katrina but was devastating nonetheless. In
both cases, two Louisiana community colleges, Nunez Community College and
SOWELA Technical Community College, were damaged to the point that many doubted
that either college would have a future. Both community colleges, however, continued
classes and are in operation today.
This study examines the actions of the institutional leadership at Nunez
Community College and SOWELA Technical Community College in the aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. A constructivist grounded theory approach was used to
conduct case studies on each college. A substantive theory emerged from the findings
explaining the resiliency of both institutions.
vi Table of Contents
List of Figures ...................................................................................................................xi
Chapter One .......................................................................................................................1
Introduction .....................................................................................................................1
Nunez Community College Profile.................................................................................1
SOWELA Technical Community College Profile ..........................................................2
Statement of the Problem ................................................................................................3
Purpose of the Study .......................................................................................................5
Research Questions .........................................................................................................6
Methodology ...................................................................................................................6
Significance of the Study ................................................................................................8
Definition of Terms.........................................................................................................8
Delimitations .................................................................................................................10
Limitations ....................................................................................................................10
Assumptions..................................................................................................................10
Literature Review..........................................................................................................11
Summary .......................................................................................................................11
Chapter Two.....................................................................................................................12
Introduction ...................................................................................................................12
Crisis Management........................................................................................................12
Planning.........................................................................................................................19
Leadership .....................................................................................................................25
Technology....................................................................................................................37
Effects of Katrina and Rita on Higher Education Institutions in Louisiana .................40
Resilience Literature .....................................................................................................48
Summary .......................................................................................................................51
Chapter Three: Methodology ...........................................................................................52
vii Introduction ...................................................................................................................52
Purpose of the Study .....................................................................................................52
Research Questions .......................................................................................................53
Research Design............................................................................................................53
Limitations to Qualitative Methods ..............................................................................56
Case Study Design ........................................................................................................59
Selection of Site and Participants..................................................................................60
Description of the Community Colleges.......................................................................60
Data Collection Instruments..........................................................................................61
Data Collection Process ................................................................................................64
Reliability and Validity .................................................................................................65
Data Analysis ................................................................................................................66
Summary .......................................................................................................................67
Chapter Four: Findings ....................................................................................................68
Introduction ...................................................................................................................68
Context ..........................................................................................................................71
Findings.........................................................................................................................74
Finding I: Lack of preparation .................................................................................74
Finding II: Improvised response prior to storm’s landfall .......................................76
Finding III: Improvised communication ..................................................................81
Finding IV: Improvised security and cleanup ..........................................................87
Finding V: An improvised alternate Site – Baton Rouge ........................................89
Finding VI: Improvised continuity...........................................................................92
Persistence............................................................................................................92
Online classes.......................................................................................................96
Dual enrollment....................................................................................................97
Nursing program ..................................................................................................98
Finding VII: Persistence and continuity led to outside help ..................................101
viii Money ................................................................................................................105
Volunteers ..........................................................................................................106
Finding VIII: Improvised repair and cleanup of facilities .....................................108
Cleanup ..............................................................................................................110
Finding IX: The college became an oasis for the community ...............................111
Finding X: Effective networking took place ..........................................................112
Finding XI: A strong sense of community was pervasive during the recovery .....114
Finding XII: Chancellor’s leadership was paramount to college’s survival ..........116
Conclusion...................................................................................................................119
Chapter Five: Findings...................................................................................................120
Introduction .................................................................................................................120
Context ........................................................................................................................123
Findings.......................................................................................................................126
Finding I: Lack of preparation ...............................................................................126
Finding II: Improvised communication .................................................................130
Finding III: Taking initiative while circumventing rules and regulations .............133
Finding IV: A primary concern for the chancellor was that the college’s staff was
paid and not furloughed .....................................................................................135
Finding V: Improvised alternate site saved employees from being furloughed ....136
Finding VI: Leadership decided to cancel most of the semester and refund student’s
tuition .................................................................................................................143
Finding VII: Improvised continuity of fall semester..............................................146
Finding VIII: Improvised campus ..........................................................................149
Finding IX: SOWELA’S persistence led to outside help.......................................154
Finding X: Effective networking took place ..........................................................156
Finding XI: A strong family culture existed among the SOWELA staff...............158
Conclusion...................................................................................................................162
Chapter Six: Discussion .................................................................................................163
ix Introduction .................................................................................................................163
Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................163
Research Questions .....................................................................................................166
Methodology ...............................................................................................................166
Discussion of Findings................................................................................................168
Findings for research question one ........................................................................168
Findings for research question two ........................................................................174
Findings for research question three. .....................................................................179
Similarities. ........................................................................................................179
Differences. ........................................................................................................182
Findings Related to the Literature...............................................................................184
Emerged Theory..........................................................................................................188
Theoretical Discussion ................................................................................................191
Discussion and Implications .......................................................................................192
Recommendations for Further Research .....................................................................194
Appendix A ....................................................................................................................196
Appendix B ....................................................................................................................197
Appendix C ....................................................................................................................198
Appendix D ....................................................................................................................201
Appendix E.....................................................................................................................202
Appendix F.....................................................................................................................203
References ......................................................................................................................206
x List of Figures
Figure 1 ........................................................................................................................189
Figure 2 ........................................................................................................................190
Figure 3 ........................................................................................................................192
xi Chapter One
Introduction
In August and September of 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the
Gulf Coast with damages estimated at $85 billion (National Hurricane Center, 2011).
Hurricane Katrina was so devastating that the number of lives lost and injuries sustained
is still being calculated (FEMA, 2011). Hurricane Rita, which made landfall in the
southwestern part of Louisiana just a few weeks after Katrina, did not cause as much
damage as Katrina but was devastating nonetheless. In both cases, two community
colleges, Nunez Community College and SOWELA Technical Community College,
were damaged to the point that many doubted that either college would have a future.
Despite the devastation experienced by the colleges, both were able to continue offering
limited classes in the fall of 2005 and open their doors for the 2006 spring semester.
Both colleges are operating today, and SOWELA is the third fastest growing community
college in the nation (Community College Week, 2011). This study investigates the
actions taken by the leadership of these two institutions in response to the two
hurricanes.
Nunez Community College Profile
Nunez Community College is located in St. Bernard Parish in the town of
Chalmette, east of New Orleans. The population of Chalmette is 16,008. Elaine P.
Nunez Community College is named after the late wife of the Honorable Samuel B.
Nunez, Jr., President of the Louisiana State Senate from 1982-1988 and 1990-1996, and
was the first public institution of higher learning in Louisiana to be named after a
1 woman. In recognition of Mrs. Nunez’s support of public education, the 1992 Louisiana
State Legislature passed Act 341, establishing Elaine P. Nunez Community College. The
Act merged Elaine P. Nunez Technical Institute and St. Bernard Parish Community
College to form a comprehensive community college offering both vocational and
technical programs, in addition to art and science programs. The new college was placed
under the governance of the Board of Trustees of State Colleges and Universities
effective July 1, 1992, and Dr. James A. Caillier, the president of the Board of Trustees,
acted as the first president of the college. Nunez Community College experienced a
dramatic beginning as Hurricane Andrew struck the New Orleans area on the day
registration for classes was scheduled to begin. However, with strong support from the
local community the College was able to open three days later. Finally, in the spring of
1993, the Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools
(SACS) accredited Nunez Community College to award associate degrees and
certificates. The current Chancellor of Nunez Community College is Dr. Tommy
Warner, and the enrollment is currently over 2200 (Nunez Community College, 2011).
SOWELA Technical Community College Profile
SOWELA is an acronym for Southwest Louisiana. The college is located in Lake
Charles, Louisiana, which has a population of 71,475. In 1938, the Louisiana legislature
established Southwest Louisiana Trade School, and in 1940 the first classes began. The
name was changed to SOWELA in 1962 “due to expansion of facilities, growth of the
student body, increased curricula, and the need for additional technical education”
(SOWELA Technical Community College, 2011, p. 3). In 2003, the Louisiana
2 Community and Technical College Board of Supervisors changed the status of
SOWELA Technical College to SOWELA Technical Community College. During
Hurricane Rita, Stanley Leger was the chancellor (SOWELA Technical Community
College, 2011).
Statement of the Problem
In the past 12 years several disasters have forced different sectors of society to
focus on the inevitability of such crises and how to plan and respond effectively to them.
There are many different types of crises and varied typologies have emerged in the
literature in the last decade. Smith and Riley (2012) developed perhaps the most widely
used crisis typologies that fall into five categories:
Short-term crisis: ones that are sudden in arrival and swift in conclusion.
Cathartic crisis: ones that are slow in build-up, reach a critical point and then can
be swiftly resolved.
Long-term crisis: ones that develop slowly and then bubble for a very long time
without any clear resolution.
One-off crisis: ones that are quite unique and would not be expected to recur.
Infectious crisis: ones that occur and are seemingly resolved quickly, but leave
behind other significant issues to be addressed, some of which may subsequently
develop into their own crisis. (Jacobsen, 2010, p. 3)
Organizations are often confronted with crises, and their ability to plan and respond to
crises is imperative to the organization’s survival and viability. Crises are often caused
by a disaster. Hoffman and Oliver-Smith (2002) defined disaster as “a process leading to
3 an event that involves a combination of a potentially destructive agent from the natural
or technological sphere and a population in a socially produced condition of
vulnerability” (p. 4).
Organizational crises pose several challenges for leaders. Seegar, Sellnow, and
Ulmer (2003) summarized the importance of leadership during a crisis:
Leaders inculcate and personify many of the organization’s values and set the
overall tone and direction of the organization. During a crisis, a leader often
becomes the organization’s public face, playing a critical role by providing
information and explaining the crisis to stakeholders and the larger public. Crisis
frequently requires that leaders respond to accusations of wrongdoing, justify and
explain choices, and offer personal assurances that problems will be corrected.
Leadership frequently frames the larger meaning of the crisis, which may be
necessary for followers to begin the initial sense-making process that ultimately
leads to coordinated, harm-reducing actions. In addition, the leader may establish
an overall tone for the crisis by remaining calm, personifying authority and
control, and reinforcing core values. Leadership, therefore, is one of the most
important and visible organizational roles in the aftermath of a crisis. (p. 238;
Jacobsen, 2010, p. 3)
Crisis management literature often focuses on the military and the private sector,
but all sectors of society are vulnerable:
Increasingly, crises are common parts of the social, psychological, political,
economic, and organizational landscape of modern life. They affect more people
4 than ever before, are more widely reported in the media, and have a wider impact
on increasingly interconnected, dynamic, and complex social-technical systems.
(Seegar et al, 2003, p. 3; Jacobsen, 2010, p. 3)
Higher education institutions sometimes face crises and the actions of institutional
leadership are often the primary driver in effectively responding to the crisis. Since each
crisis is unique, it behooves researchers to study the actions of leaders in different crisis
events. Although there is literature that focuses on crisis management on campuses,
there is little written on specific actions taken by campus leaders during a crisis,
especially one caused by a natural disaster.
Purpose of the Study
The research goal for this study was to examine the actions of institutional
leaders of Nunez Community College in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the
actions of institutional leaders of SOWELA Technical Community College in the
aftermath of Hurricane Rita. It was also the objective of this study to compare the
actions of the institutional leadership of the two community colleges in reaction to the
crisis wrought by the hurricanes.
By conducting a qualitative multiple case study using a constructivist grounded
theory approach, the researcher examined the challenges faced by institutional leaders of
two community colleges that experienced very similar crises, and their response to those
challenges. By comparing the actions of the leadership at the two community colleges,
themes emerged to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the responses so that lessons
were gleaned from their experiences in hopes that institutional leaders can better plan
5 and respond to similar crises. The study also adds to the literature on crisis management
and crisis leadership.
Research Questions
1. What were the actions of the institutional leadership of Nunez Community
College in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina?
2. What were the actions of the institutional leadership of SOWELA Technical
Community College in the aftermath of Hurricane Rita?
3. What were the similarities and differences in the actions of the institutional
leadership of the two colleges in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita?
Methodology
This study used a qualitative methodology. It was a multiple case study of two
community colleges. Qualitative methodologies are based on interpretivism, which
“grew out of the work of eighteenth century German philosopher Immanuel Kant and
was expanded by Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber, Edmund Husserl and others” (Glesne,
2011, p. 8). The ontological basis that accompanies interpretivist epistemology is one
that “portrays a world in which reality is socially constructed, complex, and ever
changing” (Glesne, 2011, p. 8). What is most important, then, is “how people interpret
and make meaning of some object, event, action, perception, etc.” (Glesne, 2011, p. 8).
A qualitative study, therefore, can assess “the perspectives of several members of the
same social group about some phenomena” and “can begin to say something about
cultural patterns of thought and action for that group” (Glesne, 2011, p. 8).
6 A multiple case study method best fits when the researcher “has little control
over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life
context” (Yin, 2003, p. 1). Case study research “allows investigators to retain the holistic
and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2003, p. 2). The case study
approach offers a means of understanding in depth a view of a particular setting, the
participants and/or a phenomenon. Marshall and Rossman (2011) described a case study
as “the most complex strategy, (which) may entail multiple methods – interviews,
observations, historical and document analysis, and even surveys,” a number of which
will be used during the research process (p. 94).
A systematic procedure was applied to the collection of data. The specific
methodology for collecting this data included the following:
•
Document and archival analysis
•
Semi-structured and in-depth interviews
Since this study focused on the actions of institutional leaders of Nunez
Community College and SOWELA Technical Community College in the aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and the researcher began with no a priori theoretical
orientation, grounded theory was most appropriate to use in the researcher’s approach.
In grounded theory the researcher “generates a general explanation (a theory) of a
process, action or interaction shaped by the views of a large number of participates”
(Creswell, 2007, p. 63). Grounded theory originated in sociology in the 1960s when
Barney Glaser and Asselm Strauss felt that a priori approaches were ill suited to their
7 research. Grounded theorists held that “theories should be ‘grounded’ in data from the
field, especially in the actions, interactions or processes of people” (Creswell, p. 63).
Significance of the Study
Organizations are always threatened by the possibility of a crisis and it behooves
leaders to study carefully the literature produced concerning actions taken by the
institutional leadership. In some cases, organizations are more vulnerable to certain
types of crises. Both Nunez Community College and SOWELA Technical Community
College are located in high frequency hurricane zones and there is a high probability that
they will be threatened again in the future. This study elucidated the actions of the
institutional leadership in these two community colleges in order to learn lessons from
the experiences responding specifically to the aftermath of a hurricane, as well as adding
to the literature concerning crisis leadership. Since the study used a constructivist
grounded theory approach, the goal as to form a substantive theory from the data
collected.
Definition of Terms
Crisis Management: The identification of threats to an organization and its
stakeholders, and the methods used by the organizations to deal with these threats.
Culture: Shared rules, beliefs, and attitudes, which shape our perception and
interpretation of live events.
Displaced: The loss of one’s primary dwelling due to a natural disaster.
Evacuee: An individual who is forced to leave an area due to a severe threat.
8 FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency): Leads and supports the
nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency system of preparedness, protection,
response, recovery, and mitigation (FEMA, 2011).
Infrastructure: The fundamental facilities and systems serving a nation, city, or
area, as transportation and communication systems, power plants, and schools.
Institutional Culture: The collective total of assumptions, beliefs, and values
which members of an organization share and express through their actions (Jones, 2008;
Farmer; 1990).
Institutional Leadership: The top administrators at the two colleges being
studied, especially the chancellors.
Leadership: The ability to lead, especially in an institution or community.
Organizational culture: Describes the psychology, attitudes, experiences, beliefs
and values (personal and cultural values) of an organization.
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A mental disorder resulting from exposure to an
extreme, traumatic stressor (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2012).
Resilience: The process of adapting well in the face of adversity, trauma,
tragedy, threats, or even significant sources of stress such as family and relationship
problems, serious health problems or workplace and financial stressors.
Response efficacy: Belief that recommended preparedness measures will mitigate
the personal impact of a disaster (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012.
Road home program: A Louisiana housing financial assistance program to help
homeowners with rebuilding lost residences.
9 Urban resilience: Cities that adapt well to adversity.
Delimitations
This study focused on the time period immediately before the hurricanes made
landfall, during the hurricanes, and the aftermath. The study did not focus on events after
normal classes resumed. Both colleges are still feeling the effects of the storms, but the
study primarily focused on the actions of the leadership in the aftermath of the
hurricanes.
Limitations
Since this is a multiple case study of two community colleges under unique
circumstances, the findings may not be representative of how other community colleges
would or should respond to such crises. Wide generalizations, therefore, may not be
possible. Other limitations included the time passed since the hurricanes struck the Gulf
Coast, which may have inhibited interviewees’ from giving accurate information. It may
have also been difficult for interviewees to remain objective while recounting events
since they were an integral part of the phenomena studied.
Assumptions
The researcher entered the study with assumptions that are based on prior
experience and knowledge working for the Louisiana Community College System as a
history instructor at SOWELA Technical Community College. The first assumption was
that institutional leaders were major players in managing the crisis brought about by the
2005 hurricanes. The second assumption was that the chancellors of the colleges, as well
10 as other personnel from the colleges and the community, were willing to share their
experiences during the time of the crisis with the researcher.
Literature Review
The literature review conducted for this study informs both the researcher and
the reader of current and relevant literature on crisis management, particularly on college
campuses, and leadership issues specific to colleges impacted by these two hurricanes.
The review augments the case that there needed to be more research focused on the
actions of leadership in response to crises.
Summary
This chapter provided an introduction, the background of the two Louisiana
community colleges that were the backdrop of the study, and the problem statement.
This chapter then discussed the purpose of the study, the methodology that was used and
the significance of the study. Chapter one concluded with the definition of terms,
delimitations, limitations, assumptions and a brief outline of the literature review. The
next chapter reviews the relevant literature that informed this study.
11 Chapter Two
Introduction
This literature review is divided into six parts: Crisis Management, Planning for
a Crisis, Leadership, Technology, Effects of Katrina and Rita on Higher Education
Institutions in Louisiana, and Resilience Literature. The purpose of the review is to give
the researcher and the reader a firm grounding in the current and relevant literature
concerning crisis management, leadership, and resiliency as well as show that there is a
need for more research on the actions of leaders during institutional/organizational
crises.
Crisis Management
Much of the literature on crisis management on school campuses focused on
school shootings. Archer (1992), for example, described the university and community
response to the murder of five students at the University of Florida in the fall of 1990
while the author was the Director of Counseling. According to Archer, early crisis
management efforts were successful for several reasons. First, a crisis management task
force was formed from both university officials and community members and met nearly
every day over the first few weeks of the tragedy. The Vice-President of Student Affairs,
who had been at the university for over 17 years and was well respected by the
community, met and worked closely with this group throughout the crisis.
Second, the campus had an effective student affairs and counseling operation,
and Gainesville had a well functioning community crisis center. Both worked well
together during the crisis since both had worked together in the past.
12 Third, although the president and the provost were new, they were involved in
the entire crisis management process from the very beginning. The president, whom
Archer described as an “extraordinary communicator” gave many interviews assuring
the public that law enforcement and the university were taking all the steps necessary to
alleviate the dangers and to provide help to those who needed it (p. 94).
Fourth, the campus already had a crisis team in place, which had previously dealt
with the aftermath of other tragedies. Finally, Archer stated that the student body
leadership, especially the student body president, was paramount in effectively
managing the crisis.
Archer (1992) concluded that although there was no elaborate plan in place to
deal with such a tragedy, they did have an “abundance of people who instinctively knew
what had to be done and who were willing to work together sometimes without regard
for their own safety or for their own needs” (p. 99). This enabled the university and the
community to effectively manage the crisis.
Sean Fanelli (1997), who served 15 years as president of Nassau Community
College (NCC) in New York, wrote about his perspective on managing a crisis. He
stated that a crisis can come in many forms and the most important attribute a president
can have is good communication skills. The author also stated that an open, agreeable
relationship with the board of trustees is indispensible in a crisis situation. Fanelli
advised that three things must be done so that a crisis does not become a disaster:
communicate, communicate, and communicate. If the crisis is predictable, it is important
to take advantage of every opportunity to communicate with the board and with the
13 community. In an unpredictable crisis, communication must occur while the crisis is
occurring. Because there is no possibility for pre-communication, it is important that the
president be particularly adept at communication, whether it is oral, written, or both. The
author concluded that a crisis, if handled properly, can have positive ramifications for
the college and can also improve the relationship between the president and the board.
Kenney (1997) provided the trustee’s perspective on crisis management at
community colleges and asserted that since crises have increased, crisis management
should be part of the strategic planning. Again, communication is the key in any crisis
management situation. Although communicating with the media is necessary,
communication within the college and between the administration and the board is very
important and allows for “an orderly response to crisis situations” (p. 75).
Kenney (1997) concluded that the means to effective crisis management is
“planning, preparation, and a strong working relationship between the board and the
president” (p. 79). The author also suggested that one work session per year be dedicated
to reviewing the crisis plan and for presidents and others to practice their communication
skills. Because both presidents and board members often change, it is also important that
a new president or a new board member learn the crisis management plan.
Stein et al. (2007) were prompted by the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina to
examine a network response to disaster in university settings. As the authors pointed out,
little attention has been given to the effect disasters have had on higher education
institutions. The authors argued that the organizational structure of many universities
inhibits collaboration, yet collaboration during a disaster is necessary.
14 The article also contended that a network response could facilitate collaboration.
It presented a case study of mental health and academic units at a mid-western university
to outline “specific methods used in conducting a network assessment of campus
organizations and academic units capable of providing mental health services” (p. 332).
The results of the research showed that units within the university were more likely to
collaborate with agencies outside the university than within the university. Stein et al.
contended that it is beneficial in the event of a disaster if the university leadership can
restructure the organization to facilitate networking and collaboration.
Patterson et al. (2010) focused on the role community has in disaster response.
The two definitions that the authors used for community can be traced to de Tocqueville.
One definition stated, “community is simply an aggregation of individual persons, that
is, a population” (p. 127). The other definition, however, was that “community is an
autonomous actor, with its own interests, preferences, resources, and capabilities” (p.
127). The authors focused on social resilience and how they are related to the idea of
“social capital, which stress the importance of social networks, reciprocity, and
interpersonal trust” (p. 127).
The theoretical models the authors used provide a framework for efficient
evacuation and disaster recovery. The most salient section of the article, however,
contains concrete examples of community roles in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
The Jewish Family Service (JFS) in Louisiana and Florida, for example, created
contingency plans for future hurricanes that include an Emergency Care Contact List for
the elderly.
15 The Vietnamese community was exemplary in their response to Hurricane
Katrina. The community leaders were effective at evacuating nearly everyone and stayed
behind during and after the storm to help those who did not leave. As the floodwaters
receded, the Vietnamese population returned and rebuilt their communities.
Although the article did not cover campus disasters, no campus is an island
separate from the community, and it would be impossible to conduct this study without
also focusing on the interactions that the colleges had with their communities.
In much of the literature, communication is a key point. In an article following
Hurricane Katrina, Garnett and Kouzmin (2007) described four conceptual lenses for
understanding crisis communication:
crisis communication as interpersonal influence
crisis communication as media relations
crisis communication as technology showcase
crisis communication as inter-organizational networking (p. 386)
The authors concluded that errors in communication contributed significantly to the
post-Katrina debacle.
Crisis communication as interpersonal influence is the “prototypical” method of
handling many crises today with a strict hierarchical structure that includes command
centers in which leaders and their subordinates direct the action. According to Garnett
and Kouzmin (2007), the strength of the interpersonal influence lens is proximity to the
crisis, but its weakness is the tendency toward “lack of overall perspective” and
16 groupthink (p. 386). The authors maintained that groupthink often results in “risk
negligence, recklessness and entrapment – combining as hubris” (p. 386).
Crisis communication as media relations emphasizes the function different
organizations play during a crisis. The authors took a markedly anti-neo-liberal view in
their argument that the media often plays an unnecessarily negative role in major crises
since the mass media is more concerned with profitability than disseminating
information to the public. The researchers stated, however, that the ability to disseminate
so much information to so many people is a major asset of this framework.
The crisis communication as technology showcase lens, focuses on the use of
technology during a crisis. Major advantages to this lens are the speed with which
information can be disseminated and the consistency of the information while major
disadvantages include technological failure, redundancy, and lack of perspective. The
authors argued that Katrina showcased many of the disadvantages of the technology
showcase lens because the loss of technology was a major part of the disaster: “Landline
and cellular telephone service was virtually nonexistent for days because of flooding,
power outages, and even theft of equipment” (p. 387).
Inter-organizational networking emphasizes the relationships between the people
and organizations that are involved in the crisis and how resources are to be allocated.
As one may expect, if the leadership is strong, then the interplay between the various
actors will be productive, but if there is weak leadership, then individuals as well as
organizations may not cooperate and find themselves in power struggles. The
researchers contended that Hurricane Katrina was a showcase for the weaknesses of the
17 inter-organizational networking lens, especially the dispute over jurisdiction between
Governor Blanco and the federal government.
Garnett and Kouzmin (2007) stated that an overemphasis on one lens over the
other would cause discord during and after a crisis. They also stated that some lenses
have received much more attention in scholarship. Media relations is often emphasized
because of the ability of the media to promote their own relevance, something the
authors have termed “media narcissism.” The article concluded that each lens alone
achieves a very limited perspective on crisis communication.
In a follow up article, Garnett and Kouzmin (2009) revisited their multiple case
modeling approach to examine crisis communication in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina and continue a critical analysis of communication following the disaster. One of
the concerns that the authors pointed out is that legislation has over-centralized
emergency response, granting most of the responsibility to the federal government,
which they argue will accentuate the difficulties that stem from hierarchical organization
structures. The authors also elaborated through a review of the literature the ineffectual
nature of the news media and concluded that the nature of the profit driven media has
created an impotent medium through which the communities or the nation attempt to
obtain accurate information.
Mayer, Moss, and Dale (2008) investigated how businesses in the southeast
Texas region prepared for Hurricane Rita. A quantitative methodology was used in
which the authors sent an e-mail survey to businesses in the region. The results showed
that 60% of businesses did not take the necessary precautions before the storm, but those
18 businesses also stated that they are now taking the precautions that are necessary when
there is a threat of a storm.
The authors identified several areas where planning for disasters is necessary and
can easily be used by college and university leaders in the event of such disasters.
First, leaders should be informed about what type of disasters may threaten their
organization. This helps reduce the impact that a disaster or a crisis will have. Second, it
is important to prioritize and to reduce the organization to the bare minimum. The leader
should be aware of what is necessary to keep that organization functioning. Third,
leaders should have a plan to replace equipment if it is destroyed and to find a temporary
location for the organization. Strong professional relationships with other organizations
can facilitate this. Fourth, it is important to save vital records at a back-up location.
Fifth, communication is key and it is vital to plan how leadership and staff will
communicate with each other. Mayer et al. (2008) also advised having emergency
contact information for everyone in the organization. The authors concluded that making
preparations and having a plan, though complex, can enhance an organization’s ability
to survive a disaster.
Planning
Primeaux and Breaux (2007) investigated the lessons organizations learned from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita from a human resources (HR) perspective. The authors
stated that it is impossible to plan for every contingency during a disaster, but it is
important to learn lessons from mistakes made. The researchers contended that there are
19 three phases of crisis management in which the human resources department should play
a role: planning, response, and recovery.
In preparing for a crisis or a disaster, a plan must be adopted. The plan should
include a strategy for immediate response and for the recovery: “As Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita have shown us, low morale, fear, physical relocation, or even death from a
crisis may result in the loss of workers, along with vital talent and organizational
knowledge” (p. 41). The responsibility of the human resources department is to
minimize these losses and ensure the “safety, health, and well being” of the staff (p. 41).
Developing a plan is just the beginning. Primeaux and Breaux maintained that
training and education are imperative for any plan to be effective. The HR department
should do its best to convince leaders that the plan should be tested before a disaster
strikes. One of the most important parts of any plan for a disaster is communication. The
authors stated, “One of the most important parts of CM [communication] is a continuous
line of communication” (p. 42). Every type of communication that is available should be
used during a disaster: corporate 800 numbers, email, websites, and text messaging. The
top priority for human resource managers should be communication with the staff. The
use of corporate 800 numbers can be useful for employees who need information. The
line of communication needs to be available on both ends. Another measure that worked
very effectively, possibly better than any other communication device during the
hurricanes, was the ham radio.
The authors concluded that an organization’s resiliency can be optimized through
careful preparation and education and that for an organization, the “optimal time for
20 learning to occur [is] after the immediate crisis has passed, but before forgetfulness sets
in” (p. 46).
Many difficulties arise in planning and preparing for a crisis. McConnell and
Drennan (2006) explored the challenges that organizations face in converting the idea of
crisis preparation into an effective practice. The first difficulty is that a crisis or disaster
is a low probability event that demands significant resource allocations. It is a challenge
for these resources to be allocated for disaster preparation when resources for “front-line
services” often take priority (p. 59). The second difficulty is that no crisis is ever the
same. Often, any type of planning requires a certain order or coherence that never exists
in a crisis situation. The authors stated that crises are “neither amenable to being
packaged into neat scenarios, nor are institutional pre-crisis plans so easily constructed”
(p. 64). Third, planning for a crisis takes the cooperation of many different sectors of
society, and as McConnell and Drennan noted, “the modern world is characterized by
fragmentation across public, private and voluntary sectors” (p. 59). Fourth, training and
preparation of staff is costly and rarely reflects the realities an organization will face
when confronted with a real disaster.
The authors concluded that although crisis preparation is not a “mission
impossible,” leaders must be aware of its challenges and understand that during a time of
budget cuts and scarce resources, it is difficult to effectively prepare for a crisis – but it
can be done.
Boin and Lagadec (2000) contended that traditional training methods are not
enough to prepare organizations for a crisis. The researchers argued that organizations
21 must prepare for future crises by organizing “for resilience e.g., to facilitate a rapid,
flexible, innovative and effective response when a future crisis presents itself” (p. 188).
The authors offered several suggestions on how to do this.
The first step in preparing for a crisis is to ensure that top-level managers view
crisis management as a priority. The authors stated that executive leadership should
develop and foster a culture of communication and openness since communication and
flexibility is key to successfully managing the crisis.
The authors argued that several “organizational capabilities” must be developed
for organizations to develop resiliency. They include,
monitoring capability to detect weak and non-conventional signals;
emergency information systems, which can process relevant information to and
from central authorities;
alert and mobilization capability of crisis units, with support from all parts of the
organization;
capability to handle the technicalities of ‘first emergencies;’ actors must be
prepared to deal with uncertainty and complexity and be able to relate technical
matters to strategic issues;
capability for action in situations of decentralized crises: provide for an
organizational structure which allows the largest possible number of actors
access to the system’s response capacity. (p. 189)
Organizations must work continuously on their preparation efforts. They should
analyze past crises and responses and learn from them. Tests and simulation exercises
22 are also necessary. Managers must be trained properly, and when they are trained, it is
important to include and expand the range of people involved or who may be involved in
a crisis situation, even to those outside the organization. When training and preparing,
managers should be leery of elaborate plans that are overly ambitious. The authors
asserted, “It is necessary to introduce tests and resources progressively over time,
gradually and incessantly, involving increasingly numbers of actors” (p. 190). Boin and
Lagadec concluded by stating that any organization, if it wants to be resilient when
facing a crisis, must know its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Because every crisis is
unique, flexibility and adaptability alongside proper preparation are key to successful
management of a crisis.
Boin (2009) outlined the changing nature of crises and future crises. The author
maintained that the types of crises that organizations face are the same, but
consequences may be very different because of the nature of contemporary crises or
what the researcher terms “transboundary crisis.”
“Transboundary crisis” does not respect borders, and one crisis in a region or
country can affect a region or country on the other side of the world. The author used the
2008-2009 financial crisis as an example of a crisis that crossed geographic and
institutional boundaries. He pointed out that a “transboundary crisis” also jumps
“functional boundaries.” It can start with the financial system, for example, and move
into the industrial sector, or it can jump from the public to the private sector. Finally,
Boin (2009) stated that a “transboundary crisis” does not adhere to any traditional time
23 boundaries. Neither the beginning nor the end of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, for
example, can be pinpointed accurately.
The article also focused on the challenges that “transboundary crises” pose to
public leadership. Although such crises are rare, they are often the most difficult
challenge that leaders may face in their careers. Leaders find that during a crisis, the
normal bureaucratic organization that is in place will not suffice during unpredictable
events, yet, as Boin (2009) aptly asserted, leaders are held accountable.
There are five executive tasks that need to be completed in order to effectively
manage a crisis. The first task is for leaders to prepare in the face of indifference.
Preparation can occur in many different ways but leaders face several roadblocks.
Planning and preparing for a crisis, for example, is expensive and it is always difficult to
plan for events that are unique. Hurricanes in Louisiana and earthquakes in California,
for example, always have different consequences. Another major challenge for leaders is
that crisis preparation is always going to create political tension since it will inevitably
involve the allocation of resources.
The second task that leaders must learn to perform is “making sense of an
emerging and evolving crisis” (p. 371). One method researchers have found to alleviate
this problem, according to Boin (2009), is for leaders to develop a proactive culture of
finding problems in their organizations. According to researchers, these organizations
are capable of accurate and quick decision making during an unpredictable event (Boin,
2009; LaPorte, 1996; Roe & Schulman, 2008).
24 Third, leaders must learn to work with other agencies and institutions since this
capacity will be needed during a crisis. This is challenging considering the
“fragmentation of authority that is inherent to crises and disasters” (Boin, 2009, p. 373).
An effective response must be organic and cannot be dealt with as a static situation from
a centralized crisis center.
Fourth, leaders must communicate with the public and members within their
organization. Accurate information is important to ensure credibility, but public leaders,
warned Boin (2009), must be aware that they do not have a “monopoly on framing the
crisis” to the public and must consider the perspective of other actors and stakeholders
(p. 373). As is often the case, public perception of a crisis can hinder the decision
making process of leaders.
The fifth task of public leaders is to learn from mistakes. Mistakes are inevitable
since every crisis is different, but they can be an opportunity to influence policy in order
to be better prepared for the next crisis.
Boin (2009) certainly recognized the difficulties in preparing for crises. His
framing of modern crises as “transboundary crises” is important to understand if leaders
are to effectively respond to today’s disasters.
Leadership
Pierce and Pedersen (1997) explored what qualities a community college leader
needs in order to be successful. Although they did not specifically focus on crisis
leadership, their insight can help in determining what traits are often demonstrated
among effective community college leaders, especially during a time of change and
25 uncertainty. The authors argued that three attributes are needed for a community college
president to be effective: adaptability, role flexibility, and sound judgment.
The most effective community college presidents have adapted to changing
student demographics by establishing services such as day-care, small business centers,
and expansive developmental programs that have reached previously underserved
populations. Pierce and Pedersen (1997) argued that adaptability among effective
presidents can also be seen in their commitment to democratizing campus governance,
and that it is important for presidents continue to redefine their role in changing times.
Effective community college presidents also realize that role flexibility is very
important for the college. In the past, community colleges were independent entities that
did not have to work with other institutions. That is no longer the case, and presidents
should be aware that the function of their college must adapt to the changing needs of
the community and work closely with other agencies, organizations and businesses.
As for all effective leaders, sound judgment is extremely important. Sound
judgment, according to the authors, is a skill that comes in part by being able to listen to
different opinions and find commonality and mutual interest among discordant opinions.
The authors argued that community college presidents have done a superb job of
serving and adapting to the needs of their constituencies in a time of diminishing
resources. Their success has stemmed from their ability to adapt, their flexibility, and
their sound judgment.
Smith and Riley (2012) conducted a thorough review of relevant literature
concerning school leadership in times of crisis. The authors’ objective was to identify
26 leadership attributes that are needed for a school to survive a crisis. The paper identified
several key leadership attributes needed in crisis situations.
The first attribute Smith and Riley (2012) identified is “decisive decision
making” (p. 57). In times of crisis, it is difficult for leaders to make clear decisions
because of the lack of “relevant and timely knowledge of the situation” (p. 57). Intuition
and flexibility, the second attribute, is then needed. Since timely knowledge of a
situation is not always available, it is imperative that an effective crisis leader be able to
quickly weigh options and make quick decisions while assessing acceptable risks.
The third attribute Smith and Riley identified is “creativity and lateral thinking”
(p. 63). This attribute is difficult to find in most leaders since leaders are rarely hired for
“their established capacity for lateral thinking and effective decision making in the face
of ambiguity and uncertainty” (p. 63).
“Tenacity and optimism” is the fourth attribute that Smith and Riley found in
their review of the literature (p. 64). Again, this is often a challenge since “schools still
exhibit bureaucratic structures with hierarchical distribution of power and decisionmaking responsibility” (p. 64) Risk aversion, then, is often a priority over innovation.
The question of “Who is the leader?” is less important than “How is leadership best
distributed and coordinated to deal with?” the crisis (p. 64).
The fifth attribute identified was “procedural, intuitive and creative intelligence”
(p. 64). All three are different forms of what Lagadec (2009) termed “leadership
intelligence” (p. 76). Procedural intelligence is the understanding of what works best in a
crisis situation that stems from past experiences of similar crises. Intuitive intelligence is
27 the ability to deal effectively with a crisis that is different but not entirely new. Creative
intelligence refers to one’s capacity to effectively respond to an entirely new crisis.
Smith and Riley (2012) also found in the literature that the way one thinks is as
important as what one thinks. Gardner (2007), for example, stated that effective
educational leadership in the future “depends on ways of thinking rather than on ways of
doing” (p. 67). Gardner identified five ‘minds’ for the future: the disciplined mind, the
synthesizing mind, the creating mind, the respectful mind, and the ethical mind. The
disciplined mind is the “knowledge and skill developed over time on the basis of what
does or does not work in different contexts” (p. 67). The synthesizing mind is “the
ability to collect, collate, analyze, understand, and evaluate large volumes of complex
information” (p. 67). The creating mind is the “ability to develop new ideas and ways of
looking at issues, and to create opportunities out of crisis” (p. 67). The respectful mind is
the “ability to welcome differences among human beings in constructive and mutually
beneficial ways” (p. 67). The ethical mind is the “ability to move beyond self-interest
and to work unselfishly for the benefit of others” (p. 67).
Communication and media skills were the last attributes that Smith and Riley
(2012) discussed. The most important facet of these attributes is two-way
communication at all times. Furthermore, the media should be considered a positive
force in communication. It is important, says Smith and Riley (2012), that the media
“not be avoided,” and there can be “no economy of the truth” (p. 68).
Smith and Riley (2012) concluded by stating, “In the face of a crisis, it is critical
for school leaders to be decisive in their decision making, to provide clarity and
28 certainty, to engender hope, to rally effort, and to ensure open and credible
communication with everyone affected by the crisis” (p. 69).
Adrianna Kezar (1998) completed a comprehensive case study on a community
college and its use of participatory leadership. There were several questions that guided
the study:
How does positionality (gender, race, role as faculty, field of study) relate to
constructions of leadership?
How do conditions of power relate to constructions of leadership?
What contextual conditions relate to constructions of leadership? (p. 79)
Kezar (1998) focused on a community college because “these institutions
typically tend to have a diverse faculty, administration, and student body” (p. 79). The
author stated that community college faculty are usually more affected by “conditions of
power” than at other institutions of higher learning (p. 79). Structural diversity within
the staff, faculty, and student body was important to the study, and she chose a sample
institution that reflected this. The researcher conducted interviews, performed document
analysis and observations of various college activities over a 6-month period, and
examined the physical environment.
The college had approximately 20,000 students with more than 1,500 faculty
members. A new president had implemented a more participatory leadership structure by
forming leadership teams, reducing middle management by 30%, allowing decisions to
be made at lower levels and through collaboration between departments.
29 Kezar (1998) found that although these reforms had been in place for eight years,
the campus had not accepted the participatory model, and there was evidence that the
new model had not overcome a “singularly defined view of leadership” (p. 81).
Other problems identified were groupthink and miscommunication.
Kezar (1998) concluded that a pluralistic leadership model “insist[ing] on
respecting differences and perspectives” will help campuses avoid the groupthink and
miscommunication that the author found in her sample case (p. 82).
Devitt and Borodzic (2008) argued that much of the research on leadership
during a crisis focuses too much on the analytical and logical abilities of crisis leaders.
These skills include leaders’ ability to prioritize, delegate, manage a number of pressing
tasks, communicate effectively, and stay calm during a crisis. The authors argued that
these skills are important, but that qualitative abilities are just as important as technical
competencies. The authors conducted a qualitative study in which interviews were
performed to better understand attributes needed for effective crisis leadership. Four
major themes emerged: Task Skills, Interpersonal Skills, Personal Attributes and
Stakeholder Savvy (the authors use the acronym TIPS to describe these attributes).
These qualities, combined with the analytical and logical competencies mentioned
earlier, form what the authors call interwoven leadership, which they contend is needed
for effective crisis leadership.
King (2007) focused on a specific characteristic of a leader’s personality that
may inhibit efficacy: narcissism. King stated that decisions made by leaders pre-crisis,
during a crisis, and post-crisis can have a profound impact on the resiliency of the
30 organization and that leaders who are more concerned with their ego and public
perception instead of the health of the organization will have a detrimental effect on that
organization’s ability to recover after adversity.
Waugh and Steib (2006) argued that there is a natural temptation after a disaster
to make adjustments in government agencies that centralize authority. They used the
example of the conclusions the House Select Committee reached after Katrina. The
committee stated that the poor response to Katrina was due to mistakes made by the
command and control system and that a more centralized command and control system
would have been conducive to a more effective government response. The authors
argued, however, that an over-centralized command and control system accentuates the
problems that were inherent in the Katrina response, namely the lack of situational
awareness. Waugh and Steib (2006) stated that what makes effective crisis management
is counterintuitive – the traditional hierarchical centralized systems often breed a lack of
communication. A crisis situation “may be better handled by a style that is affiliative,
open, and democratic” (p. 136).
Murray and Kishur (2008) conducted several case studies of community colleges
throughout the United States to learn how presidents managed a potential crisis before it
became a real crisis. They concluded that in each situation the presidents took ownership
of the potential crisis instead of hoping that the problem resolved itself. First, each
president acquired as much information as possible about the situation and ensured that
it was accurate. Once the presidents realized that the situation could easily turn into a
crisis, they immediately took action and informed all those directly and indirectly
31 involved to control the possibility of misinformation spreading. The presidents, in
almost all the cases, expanded their advisors to people outside the community college
who might provide some expertise on the matter. The presidents who were most
satisfied with the results stated that they trusted and followed the collective advice of
everyone.
Akbar and Sims (2008) conducted a qualitative ethnographic study to analyze the
effect that Hurricane Katrina had on New Orleans’ Historically Black Colleges and
Universities’ (HBCU’s) teacher education programs. Akbar and Sims also examined the
impact that Katrina had on the relationship between HBCUs and the New Orleans public
schools. The New Orleans HBCUs are Dillard University, Southern University of New
Orleans (SUNO), and Xavier University. They are located in historically AfricanAmerican working class neighborhoods that were devastated by Katrina.
Akbar and Sims (2008) cited the 2007 Southern Education Foundations report
stating that between 45,000 and 54,000 New Orleans students dropped out of college for
at least one semester in the 2005-2006 year, and nearly 30,000 students dropped out for
the entire year. The report also showed that African-American students were
disproportionately affected by the storm. The damage that these institutions sustained is
almost unimaginable.
A total of 22 levee breeches from the London, 17th Street, and Industrial Canals
filled nearly 100 percent of each neighborhood and campus with 2 to 4 feet of
floodwater remaining for at least 3 weeks. In most places, the water stood more
than 5 to 7 feet. All of Xavier’s buildings, except for one, flooded with more than
32 4 foot of water. Dillard, located one fourth of a mile from the London Avenue
Canal levee breach, was completely submerged under 2 to 5 feet of water. The
chapel was the only building not to flood. In addition to flood damage, three of
Dillard’s dormitories were destroyed by fire. SUNO faired the worst of the three.
Its entire campus was flooded when the water from the Industrial Canal poured
onto its campus. The library and other buildings were damaged by more than 8
feet of water, which rendered most facilities inaccessible and unusable. The
catastrophic damage to these neighborhoods resulted in a void in electricity, gas,
and certifiable drinking water for approximately 3 months. Sanitation and
communication services, both digital and analog, were also nearly nonexistent.
The dismantled infrastructure forced each of the universities to temporarily close
their home campuses. (p. 451)
Despite the damage sustained to all three campuses, the leadership, faculty, staff
and students were determined to continue and to rebuild. From distant locations, the
leadership designed and put recovery plans into action. Communication was the key.
The Informational Technology (IT) personnel from each institution quickly and adeptly
established different means of communication so that the leadership, faculty, staff, and
students could reconnect. Through the technology that the IT personnel set up, the
faculty members were able to counsel displaced students. Colleges and universities in
Louisiana and Texas that were not as affected by Katrina or Rita accepted many of the
displaced students. The students who were at these colleges and universities were
contacted via e-mail to inform them that the colleges and universities were planning for
33 their return. In some cases, personnel from the college would drive to these host
institutions to meet with the students in person for counseling and encouragement.
Students and faculty took the initiative and created blogs to communicate, and each
university’s web site was backed up almost immediately following the storm.
Despite the unprecedented damage, Xavier students returned in January 2006. In
September 2006, students resumed classes at Dillard. SUNO had not yet accepted
students onto their campus when Akbar and Sims authored this article. SUNO did,
however, continue classes, albeit in Baton Rouge and on the web.
When students and faculty returned to their campuses, many lived and worked in
FEMA trailers, and the leadership found innovative ways to continue classes:
Because affordable housing in New Orleans was at a premium, Xavier’s
returning students were housed in dormitories, and displaced faculty and staff
took up residence in the convent or in a FEMA trailer village located on the east
campus. The south campus housed recovery workers in another FEMA village.
Dillard moved its campus operations to the New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel,
where students, faculty, and staff also lived. Classes were held at the New
Orleans World Trade Center and the Hilton. (p. 452)
Akbar and Sims (2008) concluded that Hurricane Katrina “should have destroyed each
university” (p. 461). Instead, each university has viewed their rebuilding as a renaissance
that has enabled them to restructure and renew their commitment to the needs of their
students.
34 Gardner et al. (2007) conducted a qualitative study interviewing 15 student
affairs administrators from five New Orleans institutions of higher learning in regard to
how Hurricane Katrina affected their work. The study found that institutional culture and
context played a very important role in the status of the institutions today. The public
institutions’ hierarchical structure often disenfranchised student affairs administrators
from much of the decision making process. While the private institutions had fewer
difficulties as a result of organizational structure, individuals were often overburdened
with multiple jobs. Many administrators at both the private and public institutions,
however, had already experienced these heavy workloads pre-Katrina due to budget
cuts; the storm only increased their work and responsibilities.
Cavanaugh et al. (2008) published a summary of sessions on disaster planning
and management that was hosted by the Society of Psychologists in Management
(SPIM). The session focused on the experiences John Cavanahugh, Ph.D. had with six
hurricanes as president of West Florida University. When Hurricane Ivan ravaged
Florida in 2004, 95% of the University of West Florida’s campus sustained some
damage. Dr. Cavanaugh et al. stated that, “It is not just the leader who creates a
successful recovery after a disaster, it is everyone” (p. 222). When faced with a disaster,
there is a “needs hierarchy” that must be followed (p. 222).
The first priority should always be people. All plans, decisions, and actions must
be based on keeping people safe. The key is using experiences to learn from past crises
and to consult with those who have gone through a similar crisis. Planning is next in the
“needs hierarchy” (p. 222). Planning is obviously important and “every key person in the
35 organization needs to know the key elements ... of the plan. It is better to prepare for the
worst-case scenario. Decisiveness is extremely important and it is vital that a crisis
leader be…decisive, clear, and consistent” (p. 223). Execution of the plan should begin
as quickly and as early as possible. Communication is key, as is creating a strong
command center where people know to go for information. The leader, however, must
be flexible in such fluid environments.
The authors also offered “considerations for leaders in a crisis” (p. 234). These
considerations are a list of qualities that the authors felt enable a leader to be effective in
leading an institution through a crisis.
Transparency is important since the fate of any organization is connected to the
fate of the individuals within that organization. Secrecy only adds to stress.
Transparency, however, reduces stress and increases “the likelihood that the personnel
will invest themselves fully in following the leadership, and increase the resilience of the
organization” (p. 234).
Predictability is a leadership quality that, during a crisis, can create a stronger
bond between management and staff, which will obviously be strained during a crisis.
The authors concluded “the inspirational value of leadership behavior in crisis is
enhanced by a progressive set of predictable actions that follow logically one upon the
other” (p. 234).
Tolerance is important from both leadership and personnel. During any crisis,
taking risks is necessary. It is important to understand that mistakes will be made and
having a “perfectionistic or punitive stance will predictably lead to risk aversion and
36 self-protection, which can prove disastrous and demoralizing for the organization” (p.
235).
The authors also stated, that during a crisis, leaders need to embrace
inclusiveness. The authors emphasized that inviting dissent and disagreement is
important in leaders’ decision making. They also insisted that everyone should be given
a voice in decision-making.
The last consideration for leaders is justice: “Leadership in a crisis are also
responsible for ensuring that people are treated in a fair and equitable manner” (p. 236).
Although the article is a summary of sessions conducted at the SPIM conference
and is based on personal experiences, it is helpful in giving the researcher a background
in lessons learned from leaders who experienced a similar phenomenon as the leaders
from Nunez and SOWELA.
Technology
In the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, technology played a central role
in enabling personnel from universities and colleges to communicate with each other
and, in some cases, allowed classes to resume nearly immediately. Mastrodicasa (2008)
studied the several New Orleans area universities during the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina and their response. Mastrodicasa (2008) found that communication via the
Internet, cell phones, and the LSU radio station was paramount in the ability of the
institutions to keep track of students, which allowed many students to continue their
studies in nearby universities that were less affected. After the storm, for example, LSU
“enrolled, registered, and housed visiting students, as well as cared for the mental
37 health” of the displaced students (p. 48). The staff worked tirelessly for weeks without
any time off. Other institutions around Louisiana and nearby states also offered
assistance by offering classes to the students.
At Tulane University, the assistant vice-president of student affairs contacted
Coca-Cola to help provide assistance. The Coca-Cola Company supplied phones and
created a call center at its Houston office with a toll-free number. Another assistant vice
president for student affairs recruited staff to work the phones to provide assistance to
students with questions. First year students were a particular challenge. Many were
moving in at the time the university was evacuating students. Student affairs staff
members were assigned 50 students and would call each one every two weeks to answer
questions or to check on their status.
Mastrodicasa pointed out that the storm created a sense of collaboration among
the American Council on Education and the National Association of College and
University Business Officers. They created a website, CampusRelief.org, “to serve as a
clearinghouse of information for students, faculty, staff, and institutions to assist in the
recovery and relocation process” (p. 49). This site was the first website to offer campusto-campus disaster assistance.
Colleges and universities around the country have learned from the 2005
hurricane experience. Shah and Gerrity (2006) stated that many have devised strategies
to resume operations as soon as possible following a disaster. These strategies include
working with other institutions, storing data, and using business applications to restore
38 payrolls as soon as possible. The authors also concluded that higher education
institutions no longer have an excuse for being unprepared following a disaster.
LaPrairie and Hinson (2007) addressed what schools can do when a crisis occurs
and infrastructure is destroyed. Although the authors focused on K-12 education, their
recommendations can be applied to higher education institutions. LaPrairie and Hinson
(2007) offered what is needed to establish and develop an online learning community
during a disaster.
The authors began by using Hurricane Katrina as an example of why school
systems should have a back-up plan to be able to continue classes in the event of such a
disaster. They also started with the caveat that the success of online education depends
on students having access to computers, which, according to the authors, is not always
the case, especially among low-income students.
In order to alleviate the issue with connectivity, a task force in Louisiana was
formed well before the 2005 hurricanes (1999). The task force,
ConnectEDOnlineLouisiana (CEOL) was made up of two state universities, the
Louisiana State Department of Education, two internet service providers, and one nonprofit organization” (p. 211). Although the task force was implemented to enhance
educational achievement by extending learning beyond the school day, the authors
maintain that the CEOL model can easily be replicated as a “viable prototype for
moving schools online in the event of a disaster” (p. 211).
The model the CEOL used comprised of developing the infrastructure, training
and support, and sustaining the model. Cable companies and a non-profit computer 39 recycling center played a crucial role in providing installation, modems, and computers
(the computers had to meet minimum specifications). Workshops were organized to
train teachers who then trained students. Sustainability was maintained through
continued workshops and giving teachers opportunities for feedback. Funding, of course,
is a major sustainability issue, and different options are currently being explored.
Although the authors focused on a program that was implemented before the
2005 hurricanes for K-12 institutions, the article offered insight into what is needed for
classes to continue if disaster strikes a campus.
Effects of Katrina and Rita on Higher Education Institutions in Louisiana
Collins et al. (2008) conducted case studies of Louisiana Technical College
Sullivan Campus located in Bogalusa, Louisiana; Pearl River Community College in
Poplarville, Mississippi; and the Louisiana Technical Community College System’s
technological infrastructure.
Due to Hurricane Katrina, the Louisiana Technical College Sullivan Campus
sustained significant damage. The campus suspended operations for over six weeks due
to building damage. Immediately following Katrina, the campus dean participated in
local recovery efforts, and the faculty and staff who were not displaced engaged in a
campus recovery plan that also involved city officials, strategic partners, businesses and
other members of the community. According to Collins et al. (2008), the institutional
culture in place prior to the hurricane facilitated campus recovery. One challenge,
however, was that prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Louisiana Community Technical
College System underwent a reorganization that centralized authority in Baton Rouge.
40 This, according to Collins et al., inhibited campus leaders from negotiating with local
businesses to help in reopening the campus since all negotiating had to go through Baton
Rouge. Following Katrina, the Sullivan campus conducted a formal review of its
Emergency Preparedness Plan to address post-disaster communication challenges.
The Campus leaders certainly became adept at working with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Louisiana Office of Risk Management
(LORM) and Facilities, Planning & Control of Louisiana. After the storm, the Sullivan
campus participated in a pilot program that included the imaging of records and the
storage of materials in Denver, Colorado so records could be easily retrieved if another
calamity like Katrina occurred.
Pearl River Community College (PRCC) served as the city shelter during
Hurricane Katrina. The storm hit the campus on August 29 and destroyed all
communications, power, and water. Twenty-seven of the 53 buildings had roof damage,
and every building had some damage. Immediately following the storm, the campus
police secured the campus and began work on maintaining generators. The college
contracted with private firms to clean up the campus and began working with local
officials toward recovery. The College served as a headquarters for local police and
firefighters as well as the army corps of engineers. In Northern Mississippi, community
college presidents organized volunteer work crews that began working on site within
three days of the disaster.
After the storm, PRCC president Dr. D. W. Lewis met with his team and
community leaders to discuss a plan of action. Dr. Lewis stated that nothing could have
41 prepared them for the damage they had sustained. Local autonomy facilitated Dr. Lewis’
decision making since he did not have to communicate with a central office like in
Louisiana. Dr. Lewis appointed the dean of business services to act as the liaison
between the college and FEMA. A certified public adjuster worked for PRCC and
estimated the damage to be between 30 and 40 million dollars but increased it in
response to rising construction costs.
Collins et al. (2008) described the institutional culture at PRCC as familial.
There was no division between administration, faculty, and staff, and after the storm,
“some PRCC employees suffered severe damage to their homes and property. Faculty
and staff helped their coworkers when possible and volunteered with the Red Cross or
other relief organizations to move their communities forward” (p. 192). PRCC used a
quote by Herbert Spencer following the storm to motivate the college, “The great aim of
education is not knowledge, but action.” Collins et al. pointed out that this quote
perfectly expressed the PRCC institutional culture. PRCC said they learned several
lessons from Katrina.
a) Build ways to locate faculty and staff.
b) Hire a specialist who can navigate the recovery process between insurance and
government funding packages (FEMA, grants from various agencies, etc.)
c) PRCC has chosen to serve as Shelter for Special Needs in the future, which
links it to additional state resources and priorities for power during
emergencies. (p. 193)
42 The third case study that Collins et al. conducted was on the Louisiana
Community Technical College System’s (LCTCS) technology recovery efforts after
Katrina, specifically in regards to LCTCS and Delgado Community College. Delgado
and Nunez Community College were affected the most by the hurricane. Within 24
hours, everything from these two college’s websites was redirected to the LCTCS
servers, which allowed for a “coordinated agency response to propagate information
through Yahoo news groups” (p. 194). It took two months before Delgado was able to
establish service. Delgado placed all Blackboard accounts in the LCTCS system and
made them available to key personnel and also found data center space in Shreveport at
the Health Science Center. A major challenge was recovering backup tapes for Delgado,
which were in a New Orleans storage facility. The owners could not be contacted, so the
state police escorted LCTCS IT personnel into New Orleans to retrieve the tapes.
Unfortunately, water damage destroyed the tapes. Once it was determined that the tapes
could not be restored, LCTCS IT personnel “went to Delgado and actually fork-lifted the
mainframes out of the facility and moved them to Baton Rouge to support the system”
(p. 195).
Another challenge was the shortage of fuel (diesel, gasoline, or natural gas)
needed to run generators in and around New Orleans. The generators only operated for a
few days until there was no power and no way to get the fuel to the generators. As a
result, it was impossible for the banks to process paychecks. This challenge was
exacerbated because Delgado used state chartered banks that maintained less
sophisticated storage backups. This meant that all data regarding personnel activities and
43 associated payroll records had been lost. LCTCS personnel used PeopleSoft and ISIS
HR records to organize and distribute the payroll: “This was a joint operation that was
taken from various locations and agencies around the state. Internally, this was
accomplished through the efforts of internal audit, finance, and other personnel in the
HR department, and it was all completed in a weekend” (p. 196).
Communication was a major challenge for LCTCS. Disseminating information
to everyone was a priority. Both Nunez Community College and SOWELA Technical
Community College created their own websites, which resulted in some confusion and
did not propagate the kind of information that public relations desired. Public relations
eventually put links on the LCTCS website, but this strategy proved to be ineffective.
In 2005, before Hurricane Katrina struck, LCTCS had no plan for technology
recovery in the event of a disaster. Collins et al. (2008) referenced Kiernan (2005a) and
Pirani and Yanosky (2007) in summarizing the lessons learned:
Take inventory: Assess what computer systems and electronic repositories of
data are being utilized by your institution, and find out where they are located
and who is responsible for them.
Reduce risks: Find out what can be done to eliminate some or all of the
vulnerabilities of the computer system infrastructure, and determine what steps
can be taken to reduce the impact of those risks.
Set priorities: Decide what the most important business processes are at your
college that must be restored as quickly as possible.
44 Plan: devise a disaster plan that describes procedures, alternative facilities, and
the staff’s responsibilities in coping with possible disasters.
Test: Conduct regular, realistic tests of your disaster plan. Modify the plan based
on any deficiencies that arise during the exercises. (Collins et al., 2008, p. 200)
The state of Louisiana has not been kind to higher education. After Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita devastated Louisiana in 2005, the government cut post-secondary
education by 10-13%. This added to the $54 million that was lost due to the storms
(Fischer, 2006). The technical colleges and the burgeoning community colleges were
hardest hit, losing $17.3 million (Fischer, 2005). Watson et al. (2008) argued that the
crisis forced the higher education community in Louisiana to think of innovative ways to
provide quality education with little state funding. Watson, et al. (2008) conducted three
case studies on grant funding and how the technical and community colleges used the
revenue. They concluded that,
(a) Colleges could no longer passively wait for money to finance their
institutions, but they had to aggressively seek out new types of funding
streams or financial opportunities;
(b) Colleges had to be flexible in their delivery of the curriculum;
(c) Postsecondary institutions could no longer work in isolation but had to seek
out creative collaborations in leadership as well as subordinate roles;
(d) With additional grant funding, institutions had no other alternatives but to
change their behavior and be held, at times, to more intrusive accountability
standards. (p. 215)
45 Watson et al. (2008) concluded that higher education institutions will be forced to search
for alternative revenue streams and that although grants are a legitimate means to
funding, they come with conditions that may change the “landscape of higher education”
(p. 216).
Jones et al. (2008) chronicled the challenges in enrollment management that
higher education institutions in the New Orleans area faced post-Katrina. The Delgado
Community College (DCC) staff’s efforts to manage the post-Katrina enrollment
challenges are an excellent example of leadership at all levels. Delgado sustained over
$75 million in damage and only received $12,903,935 in federal dollars in 2006. The
priority for the leadership at DCC was to get the students back to the campus and
enrolled. Delgado enrollment pre-Katrina was over 17,000, and half that number was
expected to return after the storm.
Even when Delgado was without electricity, staff and faculty worked outside at
the City Park campus and enrolled students despite the inclement weather. Staff also
placed signs throughout the city and on their vehicles stating, “Come Home to Delgado.”
Faculty members answered phones at one of the campuses in 4-hour shifts, and
department heads searched for students in shelters. One department head “searched for
students in a Red Cross shelter located in Alabama and found three of Delgado’s
international students there,” which enabled the students to stay in the United States and
continue their studies (Jones et al., p. 178).
Temporary headquarters were set up in Baton Rouge, where updates on payroll
and events were communicated to Delgado employees. Jones et al. (2008) emphasized
46 that the Delgado Chancellor, Dr. Johnson, led by example and made himself available to
everyone during this time. A call center was established, and a temporary website was
created to facilitate communications. The researchers concluded that enrollment
personnel must always be flexible and innovative, especially during times of crisis. They
quoted Donald Schon’s Educating the Reflective Practitioner to emphasize their point:
In the varied topography of professional practice, there is a high, hard ground
overlooking a swamp. On the hard ground, manageable problems lend
themselves to solution through the application of research-based theory and
techniques. In the swampy lowlands, messy, confusing problems defy technical
solutions. As a president, I have spent most of my time in the swampy lowlands
where problems have many dimensions and clear answers are few. The only way
out of a swamp is to invent as you go. (1987, p. 246)
Jarrell et al. (2008) administered a survey to higher education administrators in
Mississippi and Louisiana technical and community colleges to determine the biggest
challenges facing communities post-Katrina. They found that personnel and affective
issues as well as workforce training were the most pressing. The authors concluded with
several proposed solutions to effectively manage future crises:
a) Detailed procedures should be put in place in the event of a crisis
b) Services must be adequate to support the procedures
c) All student data should be backed up
d) There should be alternate ways to contact students
47 e) Backup computer systems should be outsourced so information can be
accessed during a time of crisis. (p. 247)
The article cited Kiernan (2005), who emphasized “that restoring channels of
communication should be the top priority when disaster strikes” (p. 247). Jarrell et al.
(2008) stated that educators must be proactive in their crisis management plans. These
plans should start at the college and university level and then “filter up to the governing
and/or coordinating bodies” (p. 248).
Resilience Literature
Resiliency has been defined by many different disciplines (Norris et al., 2008).
Webster’s Dictionary (2012) defines resiliency as “the capability of a strained body to
recover its size and shape after deformation caused by compressive stress…an ability to
recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change” (p. 1003). Resiliency research
began among psychologists who were studying vulnerable children (Sutcliff & Vogus,
2003). Although this study focused on two organizations, it behooves anyone studying
organizational resilience to have an understanding of individual resilience since
organizations are made up of people, and leaders who guide organizations through a
crisis must have those qualities (Chabot, 2008). In the context of individuals, Braverman
defined resilience as “the phenomenon of successful development under high-risk
conditions” (2001, p. 1). He went on to state that resilience is made up of two parts: “(a)
exposure to significant stressors or risks, and (b) demonstration of competence and
successful adaptation” (p. 2).
48 Stumpfer (2001) defined resilience as a “goal-directed behavior of coping and
rebounding…of accompanying emotions and cognitions. It is a dynamic phenomenon,
influenced by both the internal characteristics of the individual, and various external life
contests, circumstances, and opportunities” (p. 5) (Chabot, p. 37). No one is an island,
however, and environment and community impacts one’s capacity to adapt during
difficult times. Hind (1996) stated that to fully understand the resilience of an individual,
it is important to consider the interaction between the individual and the environment”
(p. 19). It is important, therefore, to also look at resilient communities.
Norris et al. (2008) focused on community resiliency as it applies to disasters.
The authors used McFarlan and Norris’ definition of disaster as “a potentially traumatic
event that is collectively experienced, has an acute onset, and is time delimited; disasters
may be attributed to natural, technological or human causes” (p. 128). They do not
include in their definition of disaster “chronic environmental hazards, ongoing
community and political violence, war, and epidemics” (p. 128).
The authors then gave an extensive list of different definitions of resilience
applied to different areas such as ecology, cities and communities. A theme throughout
the definitions is that “resilience is better conceptualized as an ability or process than as
an outcome” and “second, resilience is better conceptualized as adaptability than as
stability” (p. 130). The authors defined resilience as: “a process linking a set of adaptive
capacities to a posture trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance” (p.
130).
49 Drawing mainly from Dohrewend’s (1978) model of psychosocial stress, the
authors created a model that has added and replaced some of the nomenclature used in
contemporary writings to introduce the concept of “stress resistance and resilience over
time” (p. 130).
In the author’s framework, resilience emerged from a number of adaptive
capacities and, within the community, a number of “networked adaptive capacities” (p.
135). The authors cited Goodman et al. (1998) to define community capacity:
the characteristics of communities influences their ability to identify, mobilize,
and address social and public health problems and the cultivation and use of
transferable knowledge, skills, systems, and resources that impact community
and individual level changes consistent with public health-related goals and
objectives. (Norris et al., 2008, p. 135)
The authors, in the context of resilience, focused on “adaptive capacities” when they are
“robust, redundant, or rapidly accessible and thus able to offset a new stressor, danger or
surprise” (p. 136). The authors offered another model that illustrates the set of
networked adaptive capacities. The four primary sets of networked capital that the
authors surmised from resilience literature are: “Economic, Development, Social
Capital, Information and Communication Competence” (p. 136).
The authors convincingly argued that resilience “leads to adaptation, not an
outcome, not stability” (p. 144). The authors also argued that resiliency is the result of
several adaptive capacities, which they define “as resources with dynamic attributes,
specifically robustness, redundancy, and rapidity” (p. 144).
50 The authors gave an excellent explanation of how the resilient dynamics work
within a community and end with several caveats to their findings. The definitions,
models, and use of past literature are excellent for anyone researching resiliency. The
authors, however, only gave one mention of institutional resiliency. The framework the
authors used, however, can be helpful in studying institutional resilience.
Organizational resilience theory is an emerging subset of resilience theory. Bell
(2002) stated that leadership is key for organizational resiliency. His five core principles
are leadership, culture, people, systems and settings. Bell stated:
Resiliency begins with enterprise leadership setting the priorities, allocating the
resources and making the commitments to establish organizational resilience
throughout the enterprise. Leadership achieves a balance between risk taking and
risk containment to ensure ongoing innovation, but in the context of prudent risk
minimization. (p. 1)
Summary
This chapter outlined key literature that guided the researcher in the study and
also revealed that the research is clear that every crisis is unique, and that flexibility,
communication, and strong leadership are key for organizations in order to withstand
and ultimately overcome adverse circumstances. A review of the literature also indicated
that there is very little research concerning the actions of institutional leadership of
Louisiana community colleges after the 2005 Hurricanes.
51 Chapter Three: Methodology
Introduction
Chapter two provided an overview of the current literature on leadership during a
crisis and on community and institutional resiliency. Chapter three outlines the design of
the study, which focuses on qualitatively describing how Nunez Community College
and SOWELA Technical Community College responded and survived Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
Chapter three begins with a reiteration of the purpose of the study and the
research questions and includes a description of the research design, data collection
procedures, and the data analysis process.
Purpose of the Study
The research goal for this study was to examine the actions of institutional
leaders of Nunez Community College in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the
actions of institutional leaders of SOWELA Technical Community College in the
aftermath of Hurricane Rita. It was also the objective of this study to compare the
actions of the institutional leadership of the two community colleges in reaction to the
crisis wrought by the hurricanes.
By conducting a qualitative multiple case study using a grounded theory
approach, the researcher examined the challenges faced by institutional leaders of two
community colleges that faced very similar crises, and their response to those
challenges. By comparing the actions of the leadership at the two community colleges,
themes emerged to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the responses so that lessons
52 can be gleaned from their experiences in hopes that institutional leaders can better plan
and respond to similar crises. The study also adds to the literature on crisis management
and crisis leadership.
Research Questions
1. What were the actions of the institutional leadership of Nunez Community
College in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina?
2. What were the actions of the institutional leadership of SOWELA Technical
Community College in the aftermath of Hurricane Rita?
3. What were the similarities and differences in the actions of the institutional
leadership of the two colleges in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and Rita.
Research Design
This study used a qualitative research approach. In order to answer the research
questions, it was important that the data collected reflect what each institution and the
individuals within the institution experienced. Bogdan and Biklen (1982) argued that in
qualitative research, “the data collected…is rich in description of people, places, and
conversation and not easily handled by statistical procedures” (p. 2). Denzin and Lincoln
(2000) defined qualitative research as:
[A] situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of
interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices
transform the world… At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive,
naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study
53 things in their natural setting, attempting to make sense of, or interpret,
phenomena in terms of meanings people bring to them. (p. 3)
Qualitative research is based on the belief that our reality is socially constructed.
Creswell (2007) stated:
Social constructivism is another worldview. In this worldview, individuals seek
understanding of the world in which they live and work. They develop subjective
meanings of their experiences – meanings directed toward certain objects or
things. These meanings are varied and multiple, leading the researcher to look
for complexity of views rather than narrow the meanings into a few categories or
ideas. The goal of the research, then, is to rely as much as possible on the
participants’ views of the situations. (p. 20)
The objective of qualitative research is to understand how people have
experienced the phenomena being studied (Glesne, 2006; Willis, 2007). This study
focused on the experiences of the staff at SOWELA Technical Community College and
Nunez Community College during the 2005 hurricanes and how they responded to their
respective crises, enabling the colleges to survive; therefore, the research design will be
a qualitative study.
Creswell (2007) provided several characteristics of qualitative research. What
follows is a brief explanation of how these characteristics emerged in the research:
“Natural setting – Qualitative researchers tend to collect data in the field at the
site where participants’ experience the issue or problem under study. They do not bring
individuals into a lab (a contrived situation), nor do they typically send out instruments
54 for individuals to complete” (p. 37). The research was conducted on site at both colleges
to better provide context for the perspectives offered by participants.
“Research as a key instrument” (p. 37). The researcher collected data through
interviews, documents and archives. Instruments developed by other individuals will not
be used.
Multiple sources of data - Qualitative researchers typically gather multiple forms
of data, such as interviews, observations, and documents, rather than rely on a
single data source. Then the researchers review all of the data and make sense of
them, organizing them into categories or themes that cut across all of the data
sources. (p. 38)
The researcher used interviews, documents, and archives to create an accurate picture of
the phenomena being studied.
Inductive data analysis – Qualitative researchers build their patterns, categories,
and themes from the ‘bottom up,’ by organizing the data into increasingly more
abstract units of information. This inductive process involves researchers
working back and forth between the themes and the database until they establish
a comprehensive set of themes. (p. 39)
Most data was collected from semi-structured interviews, allowing the themes to
surface organically.
“Participants’ meanings – In the entire qualitative research process, the
researchers keep a focus on learning the meaning that the participants hold about the
problem or issue, not the meaning that the researchers bring to the research or writers
55 from the literature” (p. 39). Although a comprehensive literature review was conducted
in chapter two, the findings of those researchers were not included or used as a basis
during the data collection.
Emergent design – The research process for qualitative researchers is emergent”
(p. 39). The researcher used semi-structured interviews with open ended
questions while interviewing as well as allowed participants to guide the
researcher to other participants, documents and archives that were used.
“Interpretive inquiry – Qualitative research is a form of inquiry in which
researchers make an interpretation of what they see, hear, and understand. (p. 39)
The researcher found themes in the data, but understood that he was interpreting an
interpretation of events. The reader will also interpret the research. Multiple meanings
emerged giving credence to the complexity of the phenomena.
“Qualitative researchers try to develop a complex picture of the problem or issue
under study. The ultimate goal of the researcher is to ensure the phenomena being
studied is understandable to the reader regardless of its complexity” (p. 39). Considering
the complexity of the phenomena being studied, a qualitative study is most appropriate.
Qualitative methods, however, have limits. These limitations include research bias,
generalizability, and reliability (Bogdan & Biklen, 1982).
Limitations to Qualitative Methods
Bogdan and Biklen (1982) asserted that qualitative research is often not
generalizable beyond the specific context that is being studied. Although the results of
this study may or may not be generalizable, it is not designed to find an archetype of
56 community college crisis management in the face of natural disasters. This study was
designed to provide insight into how two institutions responded to hurricanes that
destroyed their campuses. It may be helpful for both colleges, other community colleges
on the Gulf Coast, and other organizations.
Research bias is a concern for qualitative researchers. The job of the researcher is
to add to the current literature and understanding of a particular phenomenon. It is not
the job of the researcher to cherry pick data to fit a worldview. In the case study on
Nunez Community College, the researcher has never had any lasting affiliation with the
College and was only interested in conducting the case study.
This is not the situation, however, with SOWELA Technical Community
College. The researcher has been an employee of SOWELA for over five years as a
history instructor. It was important that the researcher be fully aware of potential bias.
As Glesne (2011) stated, “Previous experiences with settings or peoples can set up
expectations for certain types of interactions that will constrain effective data collection
(p. 41). Creswell (2007) also warned, “To study one’s own workplace, for example,
raises questions about whether good data can be collected when the act of data collection
may introduce a power imbalance between the researcher and the individuals being
studied” (p. 122).
There are, however, several advantages. The researcher enjoyed proximity and
access; any groundwork for rapport had already been established. Because the researcher
expected to continue working at SOWELA and within the Louisiana Community
Technical College System, the research may be useful in the future, especially when one
57 considers the frequency of hurricanes in the area. Since it took less time and fewer
resources to collect data, more time was spent on data analysis (Glesne, 2011, p. 41).
There was always the possibility that the presence of the researcher could
influence the data that participants offered in interviews. For example, participants may
have given a positive light to a situation because they thought that the researcher was
expecting to hear positive comments (Bogdan & Biklen, 1982). Since some data was
collected from staff members who were discussing actions taken by their superiors,
some interviewees may have been less than willing to be critical or negative for fear of
giving a less than positive image of their leaders and their institution. These are
important considerations, and the researcher was beholden to assuage such concerns that
the participants may have had.
Reliability is also a concern in qualitative research. Since qualitative research is
based on the interpretive tradition, and each participant interprets his or her own
experiences, some may argue that the findings cannot be replicated. Qualitative research,
however, is less concerned with replication and more interested in accurately capturing
complex phenomena (Boyden & Biklen, 1982).
The researcher understood and appreciated the concerns regarding qualitative
research and the possible bias that can occur, especially when researching one’s home
institution, but the researcher was committed to conducting the research with total
objectivity.
58 Case Study Design
In an effort to investigate how two Louisiana community colleges responded to
the 2005 hurricanes and how the institutions were able to survive the total destruction of
their campuses, the researcher utilized a multiple case study approach. Although there
are different kinds of case studies, there are similar definitions. According to Schramm
(1971), “The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study,
is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: Why they were taken, how they
were implemented, and with what result” (Yin, 2009, p. 17). Creswell (2007) defined
case study research as “a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a
bounded system (case) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving
multiple sources of information” (p. 73). Willis (2007) stated that case study research
focuses “on understanding the intricacies of a particular situation, setting, organization,
culture, or individual, but that local understanding may be related to prevailing theories
or models” (p. 243).
By using a multiple-case study approach, researchers ensure that the findings
will be more complete. As Yin (2009) stated, “The evidence from multiple cases is often
considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more
robust” (p. 53).
Since there is no a priori theoretical orientation that guided the study, grounded
theory was used in the researcher’s approach. Grounded theorists contend, “theories
should be ‘grounded’ in data from the field, especially in the actions, interactions or
process of people” (Creswell, p. 63).
59 Selection of Site and Participants
For the purposes of this study, the researcher chose two similar institutions:
Nunez Community College and SOWELA Technical Community College and their
leadership. The colleges and their leadership were used to study how the leadership
affected the resiliency of the two institutions in the face of a natural disaster.
Description of the Community Colleges
Nunez is located in St. Bernard Parish in the town of Chalmette, east of New
Orleans. Chalmette has a population of 16,008. Elaine P. Nunez Community College is
named after the late wife of the Honorable Samuel B. Nunez, Jr., President of the
Louisiana State Senate from 1982-1988 and 1990-1996, and was the first public
institution of higher learning in Louisiana to be named after a woman. In recognition of
Mrs. Nunez’s support of public education, the 1992 Louisiana State Legislature passed
Act 341, establishing Elaine P. Nunez Community College. The Act merged Elaine P.
Nunez Technical Institute and St. Bernard Parish Community College to form a
comprehensive community college, offering both vocational and technical programs and
art and science programs. The new college was placed under the management of the
Board of Trustees of State Colleges and Universities effective July 1, 1992, and Dr.
James A. Caillier, the president of the Board of Trustees, acted as the first president of
the college. Nunez Community College experienced a dramatic beginning as Hurricane
Andrew struck the New Orleans area on the day registration for classes was scheduled to
begin. With strong support from the local community, however, the college was able to
open three days later. Finally, in the spring of 1993, the Commission on Colleges of the
60 Southern Association of Colleges and Schools accredited Nunez Community College to
award associate degrees and certificates. The Chancellor of Nunez Community College
is Dr. Tommy Warner. The enrollment in the fall of 2011 was over 2400 (Nunez
Community College, 2011).
SOWELA is an acronym for Southwest Louisiana. The College is located in
Lake Charles, Louisiana, which has a population of 71,475. In 1938, the Louisiana
legislature established Southwest Louisiana Trade School, and in 1940 the first classes
began. The name was changed to SOWELA in 1962 “due to expansion of facilities,
growth of the student body, increased curricula, and the need for additional technical
education” (SOWELA Technical Community College, 2011). In 2003, the Louisiana
Community and Technical College Board of Supervisors changed the status of
SOWELA Technical College to SOWELA Technical Community College. During
Hurricane Rita, Stanley Leger was the Chancellor, and today, Dr. Neil Aspinwall fills
the position (SOWELA Technical Community College, 2012).
Data Collection Instruments
Data are rough “materials researchers collect from the world they are studying…
that form the basis of analysis” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1982, p. 73). In qualitative research,
and in particular, a case study, data can be derived from several places – interviews,
archival records, documentation, direct observations, participant observations and
physical artifacts (Yin, 2009).
The researcher used multiple data sources to ensure consistency and rigor. The
specific data sources included semi-structured interviews, in-depth interviews
61 documentation and archives. As Yin (2009) stated, “One of the most important sources
of case study information is the interview” (p. 89). Semi-structured interviews were
used. The researcher began with the same questions but remained flexible to allow the
interviewees to guide the questioning.
Semi-structured interviews allowed the interviewees to share their stories. These
narratives are very important to allow the researcher to illuminate the colleges’
responses to the hurricanes. As Dyson and Genish (1994) stated:
Stories help make sense of, evaluate, and integrate the tensions inherent in
experience; the past with the present, the fictional with the ‘real’, the official
with the unofficial, personal with the professional, the canonical with the
different and unexpected. Stories help us transform the present and shape the
future for our students and ourselves so that it will be richer or better than the
past. (p. 242-243)
Webster and Mertova (2007) stated that narrative “provides researchers with a
rich framework through which they investigate the ways a human experiences the world
depicted through their stories” (p. 4). Capturing the stories of participants allowed the
researcher to obtain a fuller picture of the phenomenon. Webster and Mertova also said
that the narrative offered by the interviewees can tap the social context or culture in
which this construction takes place. Just as a story unveils the complexities of
characters, relationships and settings, so too can complex problems be explored in this
way (p. 4).
62 In-depth interviews were also used when interviewing individuals who were the
major decision makers at the colleges during the crisis, such as the chancellors. While
using in-depth interviews, the researcher was able to ask about the interviewees’
opinions on the events.
In addition to interviews, documents and archives were used for data. Examples
of documents are:
letters, memoranda, e-mail correspondence, and other personal documents such
as diaries, calendars and notes;
agendas, announcements and minutes of meetings, and other written reports of
events;
administrative documents – proposals, progress reports and other internal
records;
formal studies or evaluations of the same “case” that you are studying; and
news clippings and articles appearing in the mass media or in community
newspapers. (Yin, 2009, p. 103)
For this study, the use of documents was used “to corroborate and augment evidence
from other sources” (Yin, 2009, p. 103). Examples of archival records include,
‘public use files’ such as the U.S. census and other statistical data made available
by federal, states, and local governments;
service records, such as those showing the number of clients served over a given
period of time;
organizational records, such as budget or personnel records;
63 maps and charts of the geographical characteristics of a place;
survey data, such as data previously collected about a sites’ employees, residents
or participants. (Yin, 2009, p. 107)
To gain a better understanding of the colleges before, during, and after the hurricanes, a
document and archival analysis included a review of the colleges’ website, strategic
plans, crisis management plans, faculty senate minutes, enrollment, retention and
graduation data, financial documents, newspapers, e-mail correspondence, and letters as
well as other documents that helped in the case study.
Data Collection Process
Before gathering data, the researcher requested approval from the University of
Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board (Appendix F).
The researcher began interviews with the chancellors of the colleges and other
high level administrators who were working at the colleges in the summer of 2005.
Faculty members were also interviewed as well as members of the community who were
not affiliated with the colleges but assisted the colleges during the response to the
hurricanes and during the aftermath. A snowballing technique was used to find
participants to interview.
Since the researcher was on site at SOWELA as an instructor, logistics were less
of a factor. At Nunez, however, the researcher worked with administrators to secure a
time and space for interviews to be conducted. Over thirty interviews were conducted,
but only twenty-one were used in the study.
64 Prior to beginning the study, the researcher conducted pilot interviews with
volunteers. This was helpful to ensure validity by allowing the researcher to examine the
questions and whether they were easily understood. It was also important to ensure that
the wording of the questions was appropriate, since word use can clarify but can be
confusing as well. Pilot interviews helped the researcher refine the interview and his
interview skills. Light, Singer, and Willette (1990) stated, “No design is ever so
complete that it cannot be improved by a prior, small scale exploratory study. Pilot
studies are almost always worth the time and effort” (p. 213). To expedite data analysis,
all interviews were transcribed within days of the interview.
Reliability and Validity
According to Bogdan and Biklen (1982), reliability is the “fit between what they
record as data and what actually occurs in the setting under study” (p. 44). Qualitative
research is less concerned with replication than with accuracy (1982). To ensure
accuracy, interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. “Member checking” was
used (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, p. 221). This is a process in which transcribed
interviews are given to the interviewees so that they can inform the researcher of their
accuracy.
Data triangulation was used to bolster validity. Data triangulation is the “act of
bringing more than one source of data to bear on a single point” (Marshall & Rossman,
2011, p. 252). As Yin (2009) stated, “With data triangulation, the potential problems of
construct validity also can be addressed because the multiple sources of evidence
essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon” (p. 116-117).
65 Data from semi-structured interviews, in-depth interviews, and document and
archival analysis was used to triangulate and corroborate the different sources to help
ensure data validity. The advantage of case-study research is that many different data
sources are used, increasing the validity of one’s findings (Yin, 2009, p. 114).
Data Analysis
Data analysis is the “process of systematically searching and arranging the
interview transcripts, field notes, and other materials that you accumulate to increase
your own understanding of them and to enable you to present what you have discovered
to others” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1982, p. 145). Merriam (1988) defined data analysis as
“the process of making sense out of one’s data” (p. 127).
The analysis was conducted in two parts: what Glesne (2011) called “early data
analysis” and “later data analysis” (p. 188; 194). Early data analysis “enables you to
focus and shape the study as it proceeds” (p. 188). Early data analysis consisted of
writing a field journal to record the researcher’s thoughts after interviews and reviewing
documents, building analytic files as data was collected and developing codes that were
used in the emergent themes.
Since the researcher used grounded theory as the approach to the research,
detailed procedures were used for analysis. It consisted of three phases of coding – open,
axial, and selective. Grounded theory calls for “developing categories of information
(open coding), interconnecting the categories (axial coding), building a ‘story’ that
connects the categories (selective coding), and ending with a discursive set of theoretical
propositions” (Cresswell, 2007, p. 160).
66 Summary
Chapter three outlined the design and implementation of the qualitative research
study, which focused on the actions of the institutional leadership of Nunez Community
College and SOWELA Technical Community College in the aftermath of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. Chapters four and five report findings of the study, and the final
chapter provides an analysis of those findings.
67 Chapter Four: Findings
Introduction
This chapter reports the findings for the first research question: What were the
actions of institutional leadership of Nunez Community College in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina?
The study used a qualitative methodology using both a case study and grounded
theory approach. Case study research “allows investigators to retain the holistic and
meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2003, p. 2). It also offers a means of
understanding in-depth a view of a particular setting, the participants and/or a
phenomenon.
Since the study focused on the actions of institutional leaders of Nunez
Community College in response to Hurricane Katrina and the researcher began with no a
priori theoretical orientation, grounded theory was most appropriate to use in the
researcher’s approach. In grounded theory the researcher “generates a general
explanation (a theory) of a process, action or interaction shaped by views of a large
number of participants” (Creswell, 2007, p. 63). This approach originated in sociology
in the 1960s when Barney Glaser and Asselm Strauss felt that a priori approaches were
ill-suited to their research.
Since the 1960s several different versions of grounded theory have emerged.
This study used a constructivist grounded theory method first described by Charmaz
(2000, 2008 2009) and later by Corbin and Strauss (2008), Clark (2003,2009), and
68 Morse et al. (2009). Constructivist grounded theory is less positivist than the original
Glaserian method and takes on a relativist and reflexive approach to the research
(Charmaz, 2009).
Most of the data came from semi-structured interviews. Other data were gathered
from a documentary made by a NCC faculty member, newspapers, e-mail
correspondence, documents, and archives. A snowballing technique was used to find
participants to interview. This was consistent with the unique grounded theory technique
of theoretical sampling. In grounded theory, data collection and analyses occur
simultaneously. Findings are analyzed and one’s theoretical sensitivity leads to more
data collection, which is then compared to emerging concepts “until no new themes,
categories, or relationships are discovered” (Fassinger, 2005, p. 157).
The following are brief descriptions of individuals interviewed.
Interviewee I: The Chancellor of Nunez Community College. He also served as
director of facilities at NCC from 1994 to 2000, at which point he was appointed
Chancellor. He was born and reared in the New Orleans area. Prior to becoming
Chancellor, he was a Louisiana state representative for District 104. He began his career
in education as a history teacher and football coach at the secondary level in St. Bernard
Parish.
Interviewee II: The Director of Human Resources at Nunez Community
College. She held the same position in 2005 when hurricane Katrina arrived.
69 Interviewee III: In August of 2005 she was the Director of Institutional
Effectiveness and Planning as well as the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools
(SACS) liaison. Today she is Vice Chancellor for Academic and Student Affairs.
Interviewee IV: He was the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs in August of
2005. He is now retired.
Interviewee V: In August of 2005 he was an assistant professor of history. Soon
after the storm he became Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs, as well as holding other
administrative positions. Currently he is a professor of history and department chair of
Humanities and Social Sciences.
Interviewee VI: She was an assistant professor for early childhood and teaching
at the time Hurricane Katrina made landfall. She is from Violet, a small community
about five miles from Chalmette. Today she is the Dean of Academic Affairs.
Interviewee VII: He had been Director of Facilities at NCC for eight years prior
to the storm. Before that he was a carpenter instructor. He is originally from Chalmette
and was reared just a short distance from the campus.
Interviewee VIII: She was the Executive Director of Institutional Advancement
at the time Hurricane Katrina made landfall. She still holds that title and has worked at
NCC for 16 years.
Interviewee IX: She was the Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs and is
currently retired.
70 Interviewee X: At the time of Hurricane Katrina, he was a faculty member and
taught American, World, and Louisiana history. Today he is a full professor. He was
born in New Orleans and currently lives a few blocks form the NCC campus.
Context
Although South Louisiana is known for its strong French heritage, it was a
Spanish colony for much of her formative years (The famous French Quarter, for
example, consists almost entirely of Spanish architecture). Spain administered Louisiana
from 1762 to 1802, and it was during this period that St. Bernard Parish was created.
Many St. Bernard residents are Islenos, descendants of colonists from the Canary
Islands, who settled in Louisiana between 1778 and 1783. The people in St. Bernard
Parish take pride in having a tight-knit community. As one participant said, “if you
marry a person from this area you stay with them and their mom forever.” Another
interviewee from New Orleans stated that because he married a girl from St. Bernard, he
had to move there. St. Bernard Parish was also the battlefield where the Battle of New
Orleans was fought in 1815.
Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a category three hurricane near BurasTriumph, Louisiana on Monday, August 29, 2005. Once the storm had passed, many
people thought that New Orleans and the Gulf Coast had been spared. There was
damage but not to the degree that would occur once the levees failed. The New York
Times on Tuesday, August 30 stated:
Hurricane Katrina pounded the Gulf Coast with devastating force at daybreak
Monday, sparing New Orleans the catastrophic hit that had been feared but
71 inundating parts of the city and heaping damage on neighboring Mississippi
where it tossed boats, ripped away scores of roof tops and left many of the major
coastal roadways impassable. (para. 1)
The Executive Director of Institutional Advancement, who had evacuated to Alabama,
stated that once the storm passed, they thought they had avoided a major catastrophe:
Well, the hurricane had hit Sunday night, you know, Sunday early morning and
everybody thought everything was ok. Then the news started talking about
flooding, water is coming in, levees are breaking, that type of thing.
Although the storm had passed, the storm surge and the failure of the levee system
would eventually create the disaster everyone feared.
As the storm surge traveled across Lake Borgne and up the Mississippi River
Gulf Outlet (MRGO), it overtopped the levee along the northern edge of the
urbanized area of St. Bernard Parish, and broke through the levee on the
Industrial Canal in New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward. Water from both levee
breaks flooded most of the parish inside the levees to depths of up to 14 feet.
(http://www.louisianaspeaksparishplans.org/IndParishHomepage_BaselineWhat
Happened.cfm?EntID=13)
The Director of Facilities, who had stayed at the college, recounted his experience as he
watched the result of the levee failure.
And all of a sudden, I said ol’ (man) here it comes and the water was coming
across Parish Road and it went down the streets and it was feeling up the streets
72 and it started coming across the lawn – and that was kind of the beginning of the
end.
St. Bernard Parish, like much of New Orleans, is below sea level, making it
particularly vulnerable if, in the case of Katrina, the levees that protect it do not hold.
Hurricane Katrina caused the largest displacement of people due to a natural disaster in
United States history and the majority of those displaced were from the Nunez
Community College’s service area (St. Bernard Parish, Plaquemines Parish, Lower
Ninth Ward, and New Orleans East). Most of the faculty and staff lived in this service
area as well. Nunez Community College was the only higher education institution in the
state where 100% of the population was affected by Hurricane Katrina (Jones, 2010).
All of St. Bernard Parish was flooded. It is important to note that the levee break
was the cause of the flooding, not the rain from Hurricane Katrina. Many of the
respondents emphasized this during interviews since they expected that the levee would
work. If the levee had held, the original response of the college to the hurricane would
have been sufficient. If the flooding had not been enough, the people of St. Bernard
Parish had to also contend with a major oil spill caused by the flooding and, three weeks
later, more flooding caused by Hurricane Rita. The response of the leadership at Nunez
Community College to this unprecedented disaster was almost entirely improvised in the
wake of institutional failures at many levels. These improvised actions, however, were
effective and the college continued to serve its population even during the fall semester
after Hurricane Katrina and has continued to increase its enrollment every semester
since 2005.
73 Findings
Finding I: Lack of preparation. The year 2005 was the most active hurricane
season on record. On August 24, the once tropical storm became Hurricane Katrina and
moved towards South Florida. The next day the category one hurricane made landfall in
South Florida then entered the Gulf of Mexico. The warm waters of the Gulf
strengthened Katrina to a category five with 175 mile per hour winds as it moved toward
New Orleans.
As the storm approached, the college was conducting registration for the fall
semester. The Human Resource Director explained:
Actually, we didn’t have a well-developed crisis management plan. It happened
in the middle of registration. So our Chancellor, our Chief Financial Officer, and
our Facilities Director…met people in the parking lot and sent people home -said we’re shutting down. We’re closing down, but there wasn’t time to get the
word out. It was on the television, of course. We put it on the marquee. We did
as much as we could to notify people that we were shutting down for that day
until the storm had passed. But just in case the people missed it, we had people
out (in the parking lot) sending people home…at that time, we didn’t even have –
I mean, we had – we had a list of phone numbers, but we didn’t have any kind of
organized method of who notifies who.
The Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs stated:
Well, it kind of caught us by surprise as it did a lot of people because we all
thought it was going to go ahead and make that turn north and hit the panhandle
74 of Florida. And it was the Friday afternoon right before Katrina. Dr. Warner and
I had a meeting with a local employee of parish government that was trying to
get back into school and wanted to meet with both of us because there were some
issues. Well, this person was late for the meeting and I had his cell phone number
and the Chancellor and I talked about 25 minutes past the meeting time and I
finally got this guy to answer on his cell phone. Well, in a whispered voice he
told me we’re having an emergency management meeting for the parish right
now. I can’t leave. I said why, what’s happening? He said put on the TV.
The Director of Institutional Advancement and Student Affairs stated:
That Friday we heard the storm was in Florida and it would probably come into
the Gulf. Whenever a storm comes into the Gulf we would start to put into
practice our evacuation plans or make sure that we had our emergency numbers
for people or make sure that, we were so silly; we covered our computers with
black garbage bags so that if rain came in they wouldn’t get soaked with water,
and so we did that, we picked up some things. We just tried to make sure
everything was secure, or as secure as we could. There are many times we’ve
had to evacuate this area for hurricanes, so it was almost a routine drill. This is
what we have to do. So we were sort of in that phase. Because we were
expecting, we were up for SACS reaccreditation and a SACS visit in the fall…so
I was concerned we would lose some data, so I packed up some things that I
thought I’ll bring with me. That way if we lost it some kind of way we would
still have the backup for SACS.
75 Many members of the faculty, staff, and administration did not believe the storm
was a major cause for concern. One faculty member recalls her experience as the storm
approached:
The Chancellor walked in the morning and made sure they were picking stuff up
and just getting ready to go and contacting students. So you know, I was on the
second floor, just made sure everything was closed and put away, grabbed my
purse and went home, and started packing up the car there. Brought a computer
with us, a laptop, just to check-in later, not that we’d done a lot of that at that
point. But that was what we did. It wasn’t going to be a big deal, maybe three
days closed…like every other time.
Finding II: Improvised response prior to storm’s landfall. Although there
was not a strong crisis management plan for the college, the Chancellor and others led
an improvised response to the hurricanes imminent landfall. Although most people from
the college and community evacuated, the Chancellor and 20 other individuals stayed at
the college. Many of the decisions that staff members of the college and members of the
community made were informed by past experiences. Serendipity also played a role in
saving important documents for the future of the college.
The Chancellor discussed his first course of action:
Well, the first course of action we took was basically making sure that it was
headed this way. And once we got the final notice that we should evacuate and
that happened also in the City of New Orleans. We are about seven miles out of
downtown New Orleans. So the first thing we had to do was let our faculty and
76 staff know that they should evacuate and move out of he area and protect
themselves against the storm. Actually it was only about, I would say it was only
about 30 or 40 hours before the storm was going to hit because nobody really had
told us that you had to vacate and we saw it was coming. But a lot of times these
storms turn. But this one we figured was too big. So the Saturday morning before
the storm hit us on a Sunday evening, I did dismiss all of the teachers and staff
and made sure that they – not only vacated the building and tie things down that
had to be tied down, put machine and equipment up on the tables and desks and
cover them in case we had something come blowing in from the windows and all
of that.
The Chancellor stated that his priority was the safety of his faculty, staff, and students.
The most important thing was to get them off of the campus and out of the
community and area so that they wouldn’t be affected by the storm to any
disastrous problems that might happen at their homes or in the community.
The Director of Facilities had lived in Chalmette for over 60 years and had experienced
Hurricane Betsy in 1965, which had a similar path to Hurricane Katrina. His experiences
from past Hurricanes informed his actions.
When the storm was coming, I actually had a little inside scoop because my son
worked for the Department of Coastal Erosion at the time. My son called us up
and said, ‘dad, this is the one. This is the storm that we’ve always been afraid
of.’ He said, ‘y’all have to get out of there. I said, well, that’s not going to
happen. We’re going to stay over at Nunez. Your mother and I are going to stay
77 over there. Your brother is coming over there. Your sister is coming over there…
I lived three blocks away. So back when Betsy – when Betsy came around, you
know, I was a young kid. This house I’m in, it had a foot of water. The school,
the property that it’s built on now – the slabs – are three foot above what was
Betsy’s flood stage. So I felt over there was going to be ok. Here we still might
get a three or four feet of water, thinking maybe less because we had better flood
protection than we did for Betsy… So as the Director of Facilities though, I said,
I’m going to stay at Nunez and my wife was very instrumental in this too
because she was like, she wanted to stay around the house.
Other members of the community decided to stay and ride the storm out as well. As the
Chancellor explained the evacuation order was late and many people had stayed during
past evacuation orders and storms.
Of course that (the evacuation order) was still a little bit late because you had all
of the highways starting to get backed up and loaded up and so forth. Some
people in the community decided to stay because they had been through these
storms and they would say well, we been though this. We went through a pretty
tough storm with Betsy. We also had some other storms other than this one, and
they stayed… It (the highway) was creeping along. Some of them didn’t want to
get caught up in that.
Most of the community, however, evacuated and most of Nunez’s employees left as
well.
78 The Chancellor explained why he decided to stay at the college:
I stayed because I wanted to make sure. I battened down everything in the
college and also to be here in case we had any wind damage or water damage if
there was anything that I could do, and also to keep – to maintain the custody of
the college and to be careful that we didn’t have any looters that might have been
around because of the storm… As chancellor I felt it was my obligations, my
duty. I did try to get everybody else out, every person on campus or every person
that was here.
The Chancellor failed in getting everyone out. As mentioned earlier the Director of
Facilities stayed as well as a faculty member and his family. There were 21 people who
decided to wait the storm out inside Nunez’s main facility. A faculty member stated:
So when the hurricane hit in August of 2005, I stayed on campus for the entire
hurricane with the Chancellor and 20 other people.
The Director of Facilities explained:
So I’m going to stay at Nunez. If something happens and we lose electricity, ok,
we want to be there to make sure nobody gets into the place, nobody steals
things, things like that.
He goes on to explain other reasons they stayed and did not evacuate:
So, you know, we decided we were going to stay over there. (It’s a much)
stronger building than my house. If we had anything like a tornado or something,
we would be much safer over there. The same thing with all the people that were
79 staying with us. They didn’t want to stay in their own homes but they wanted to
stay close to home but they didn’t have ways to get out. Like I said, I had my
sister, my mother, you know, my niece… We had food forever. We had
generators. We had all kind of things. We were ready to be able to stay there for
a little while… We brought them (generators) up on the second floor… We were
not thinking it’s going to flood but it might.
The Chancellor also wanted to be there if the college would be needed for a shelter.
I wanted to be there in case some kind of way we had some sort of mass group
coming in, you know, to avoid the flood or to get out of the flood or to get out of
the storm – and we had a couple of them on the way.
Luck played a role in the college saving important data that would later be used to
contact faculty, staff, and students as well as information needed to transfer students to
other higher education institutions. The Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs explained:
The computer system at Nunez, we would back it up at the end of every week.
The Friday of the storm, the tech person backed the system up, went to the bank
to put it in the vault, the bank was already closed, it had shut down and
evacuated. He put the tape in his car, and evacuated with it. So when we got back
together, he had it. Had he put it in the vault it would have been lost. We had
data on Nunez on everything up to the Friday before the storm, which was very,
very luck that it happened that way. So we had a current database of students, of
contacts for students, for faculty.
80 The IT guys, and it was just sheer luck that we had that capability. But I also, we
brought everything back on line, it gave us fiscal records, it gave us just a
current, up to the day database of everything at Nunez up to that point in time.
This was huge. Transcripts, because we lost all the paper transcripts, that
building went under water. So all the paper records of Nunez were lost but we
had this one tape, and it was just part of the salvation of everything. But other
things sort of happened, things like the Gates Foundation gave us all laptops.
Faculty, what we tried to do, and a lot of it, the faculty really stepped up, as we
contacted faculty in this little house, and it was get on phones, get on the internet,
try to track students, and faculty members X, if you’re comfortable trying to
transfer your course to an online format, you can reach bodies. And if you sit
here and say I want to take a shot at converting what I did to an online course,
have at it.
Finding III: Improvised communication. Once the levees broke and St.
Bernard Parish flooded, communication was impossible for several days for the
Chancellor and others who stayed at the college. Through improvised means such as
texting and an ad hoc website created by staff who had evacuated, communication was
established.
The Chancellor explained:
Unfortunately we were not able to communicate. When that storm hit all of the
wind and the power and everything else, all of our cell phones went out and our
81 regular parish phones really, they were out even earlier than that. When those
towers were blown down and so forth, we had no communication with the
outside world.
Once the levees broke staff who had evacuated began trying to communicate with each
other. Interviewee III stated:
The telephones aren’t working, all you can do is text. I had never texted at that
time. So we started texting some people from school. Actually one of the people
from school, the Registrar – she texted me, ‘how are you, where are you…have
you heard from anybody else? We kept getting this beeping on my phone, and
my children said, mom you’ve got a text. So I looked and said well how do I text
back, so they showed me how to text back. Then we started going online. And
the Executive Director for Institutional Advancement (EDIA) had set up, she was
in a hotel in Alabama, and she had set up a web page for us.
The Executive Director of Institutional Advancement explained:
So we finally got a hotel room and the first thing we did was turn on CNN,
and… I could see that the water was up to the eaves on the porch of the Circle
Food Store in downtown New Orleans. And I knew that everything had to be
under water at that point and it was just a devastating thing to see that. So you
know, then I was like well, I knew that the Chancellor was at Nunez, and I – we
started hearing things on the news about, you know, nobody has any word out of
St. Bernard. We don’t know if anybody survived down there, that type of thing.
Slidell was devastated. It’s ruined. The whole town is gone, things like that. This
82 is what we were hearing. So I didn’t know if I had a home. I certainly didn’t
think I had work to go back to.
But I was worried about those that had stayed, so I contacted the Coast Guard. I
contacted the National Guard. I contacted everybody saying there are people
down in Chalmette at the college. Nobody can get out of Chalmette. Nobody can
get into Chalmette. And I said ok, when you can, you need to go to Nunez
Community College and this is what you have to do.
And then my next thought was I started going on nola.com and some of the other
websites that had chat boards and I thought I wish we could have something like
this for the Nunez survivors. I need to see if we can get in touch with students, in
touch with each other and that type of thing. So having done the website at
Nunez, I knew I couldn’t do anything there because that server was most likely
underwater. I started looking at what was available and cheap – I didn’t know if I
had a job after this -- So I found something called web.com and I thought – it
was 13 a month or something like that. I said what the heck. I can spend 13
dollars. And so I thought that would be kind of cute. We were the Pelicans. It
could be the Pelican web. So I setup a website and set it up so people could get
out any announcements if there was something to get out. And so I started
working on that. And I really did it both so that we could communicate and also
something to keep me from going nuts because I didn’t know what was
happening.
83 With the help of the IT coordinator, who had evacuated to Arkansas, the website
enabled faculty, staff, administrators, and students to start communicating with
each other.
And it did become a way for all of us to communicate. Students were able to find
us and that type of thing…people were able to say things like, you know, I’m in
Indiana, here’s my e-mail address and things like that.
Texting continued to play a role in communication even after the website was
created. The EDIA was still concerned about the staff that stayed behind at Nunez.
Despite her lack of experience texting, (texting was not something many of the staff was
familiar with) it became one of the principal ways in which the staff began
communicating.
It was our first way to be able to communicate because again telephones weren’t
working. Most of us at the leadership level at Nunez were not people who texted
at that time. We kind of knew about it. And, of course, as old as most of us were,
that was something, you know, that we had really gotten into. One of my first
contacts was with our workforce administrator. He sent me a text and said, ‘are
you ok?’ I had to figure out how to answer him because I had never texted
before. And once I discovered oh, you can text and it actually goes through. It
might not get there when you text but hours later when it has a chance, it pushes
through. So that was a breakthrough.
84 I remember sending a text to the Chancellor that said, ‘I know you don’t know
how to do this, but if you just hit send or reply. That’s what it is, just hit reply
and then hit send, a blank screen, I’ll know you’re alive.
The Chancellor followed directions to the relief of EDIA and family members
who had contacted her to inquire about the Chancellor’s condition or if anyone had
heard from him.
His daughters had gotten in touch with me through someone else…asking if I
had heard from him and that type of thing. So it was a relief to them too because
I was able to say they’re alive. I don’t know what kind of shape they’re in or
anything like that but they are alive. That was a relief to them as well.
The EDIA continued to do her best to communicate and locate everyone through
the website she created. The Chancellor and others who stayed at the college were a
constant concern for her.
It was funny because I had sent so many messages to the Coast Guard and
everybody that I could think of to send it to when – I can’t remember if it was the
Coast Guard or the National Guard actually finally went in, the Chancellor
refused to leave because he didn’t want to leave the school. So they told him you
have to come with us and all of that kind of thing the first time and he wouldn’t.
So then they sent people back (to the college) later and made him come, but it
was funny because as soon as they made that first contact, someone sent me an email and said ok, we found them. They’re ok. So please stop emailing us. I had
sent so many e-mails to so many different people and they were like this lady is
85 going to drive us insane. Just as a side note, my mother told me she was going to
have me committed because I was going crazy. She was like you need to be
committed. You’re insane and I was. I was getting an hour of sleep. I was
working, looking on the Internet to see who I could find, where they were, trying
to get in touch with everybody that I could. And I guess that’s the only thing that,
you know, but I think it’s the only thing that kept me sane was being able to
contact people and know that people were ok.
The facilities director, who had stayed at the college, reiterated the difficulties with
communication:
It took us a while to realize that the only thing that we had that really worked
cellphone wise was texts. Only the younger people knew what text was. We
didn’t know what text was, but they did. So if you sent a text message,
eventually it got out to where – if you were trying to call somebody, you only got
out every once in a while. So we were able to get out. Of course we got out
things that were, you know – I mean, so many things that came back to us that
weren’t true. You know, like, we would get things over the radio saying that
there were people coming in from New Orleans and they were looting and raping
and things that were not happening. (We had) a police radio that we listened to.
This garbage was coming over the police radio. So it was making us scared. We
stayed up, watching 24-hour watch, all of us. None of us had a gun. I had
actually made some Molotov cocktails. I had like a half dozen of bottles of
gasoline that I had rigged up. I felt like I was – I would throw them down into the
86 stairwells. If somebody tried to come in, I would throw them down into the
stairwells.
Finding IV: Improvised security and cleanup. In the meantime the Chancellor
and others were still at the college doing their best to protect what was not destroyed by
the flooding, as well as initiating clean up. The Chancellor stated:
As I said, the first floor was inundated to about six or seven feet, and maybe a
little bit higher. So we were on the second floor. And so we tried to maintain all
of our – all of the equipment and computers and everything that we had on the
second and third floor. We did have some water on the third floor in one of the
corners of our building where the storm tore the roof up pretty good and we had
water in the classroom too and down the hall but it wasn’t really that serious.
We’re talking with two or three inches of water on the third floor, and which we
were able to mop up and make sure it didn’t sit there too long. (We also) made
sure that our bathroom facilities were convenient to us because I knew that was
going to be a problem since we had that same problem back in Betsy when we
were in our homes and we didn’t have water, sewerage and all of that sort of
stuff. So we had to watch that and take care of that. So we set up the bathrooms.
We had them on the second and third floor, and fortunately, we had – with the
few people we had, we had bathrooms taken care of. We also captured a lot of
the fresh water from the storm where we had a leak in the roof and we put some
wastepaper baskets and that caught a lot of the water which allowed us to use
that for sanitary purposes that we could flush the toilets with.
87 The Facilities Director stated that some people would come by in boats. Since he knew
most of them from the neighborhood, he would wade through the water and negotiate
with them. Most of them, he said, would give them food and water.
And everyone that we talked to that came by, I mean, when somebody would
come by, I would actually go and walk the water this deep (chest level). I would
back out there and meet with them. And every one of them, everyone of them
had guns and they were looters. And they had food. Every one of them gave me
food or water. I would go out there and meet them. I didn’t really know them by
name but I knew them from the neighborhood. I have been here my whole life. I
mean 60 years between here and three blocks away.
In some cases staff and family members would give the food and supplies to people
coming by the school. The Chancellor recalls:
We did keep some of them out – some of the looters out. We think they were
looters coming by at night. We were shining light to let them know, but we had
some come by…they wanted to say they were hungry and so forth. We didn’t
allow them in the building. We gave them a sandwich and told them we couldn’t
let them in the building so they took off. But they would have got in this building
and they would have ransacked it. They would have taken a lot of out computers
and so forth.
The Chancellor had also brought his boat to the college before the storm and
used it to travel around the parish to assess the damage and help those in need.
88 And then we just kind of lived, you know, seven days up here as a small
community or society like. And we, you know, we tried to determine what was
happening out in the world and so forth. We did use my boat to go around the
parish because it was there so we just untied it. We actually went around the
parish to see what happened and (assess the damage)…that was an eye opening
experience.
Finding V: An improvised alternate Site – Baton Rouge. Eventually, with the
help of the Coast Guard and the National Guard, everyone who had stayed at Nunez
Community College was able to leave. Most went to Baton Rouge where they met with
staff that had evacuated before the storm and made their way there. The staff that had
already been there was busy reaching out to students and staff. One staff member
(interviewee II) explained:
So it was like, ok, what are we going to do? In order for us to continue to get
paid we had to report somewhere. So they set up a little room for us on the Baton
Rouge campus, Baton Rouge Community College campus and we started
reporting there. They said just report here every day and help with the call
center… Our faculty were spread from New York to California. Everywhere,
literally we had people everywhere. And we just started getting in touch with
people as we could. Some people we were never able to get in touch with, still
don’t know where they are or what happened to them.
89 The Chancellor recounted:
We went to Baton Rouge and were able to contact the systems office, our
systems office, Louisiana Community Technical College System office, and they
provided us with a building right next to their office where our community
college and two other community colleges were housed, you know, at least our
administration so we could try to get back and find out what was going to happen
to us.
Basically what we did was we pretty much moved to – I was fortunate enough to
have one of my daughters live in Baton Rouge. She also helped with some of the
rest of the family out because they all matriculated to Baton Rouge. And so was
able to get back to her and we lived with her for a few days ‘till we got – actually
we lived with her three or four days and then my son-in-law was able to get us a
rented house. And so I was – except for trying to find some clothes and all that,
which my daughter did find some that people actually, put out in their lawns in
big bags for the Katrina victims. And I found some pants and shirts, so forth.
And actually wore that for about three or four days. And after that, I was able to
go to a Dillard’s store to get me some sort of a semblance of pants and an outfit
and coat.
So with that we actually worked in the office that was setup for us in Baton
Rouge. And when I say I worked, what I was trying to do is make sure I found
out where everybody was, trying to get in touch with them. That was very
90 difficult. We tried to make sure the leadership part of it was ok. Let’s find out
where we are before we can go anyplace else. What staff do we know is around
where we can contact them, what happened to them, most important thing was
to take care of them first and see if everything was ok. And then we could get
back to school as soon as we possibly could.
They set up an office in Baton Rouge and it was very crowded. It was just like,
you know, we had – actually we had one big room. It was an open area and we
had a small office area. That was it. That was what we operated from. And I had
with me, I had the Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs. We had a couple of
other people who were there with us that helped us, a couple of teachers and they
worked with us. So we set up shop and tried to find where everybody was.
And by that time, it was about a week or two – it was about two weeks after the
storm when we started getting a little indication of what was happening. We let
them know where we were. And they put it out to where they could get in touch
with us and so forth and they started to get in touch with us.
Nunez Community College’s leadership worked from Baton Rouge until January of the
following year. They did, however, make frequent trips back to the Chalmette and the
college. The Chancellor recalled,
We started setting up shop in Baton Rouge somewhere around the 10th of
September, and we were in Baton Rouge through January 5th, 6th, or 7th.
91 Finding VI: Improvised continuity. Despite skepticism that there even was a
future for St. Bernard Parish or the college, leaders, and especially the Chancellor,
pressed forward to continue with at least some instruction during the fall and started
planning for the spring semester. Dogged persistence, online classes, dual enrollment
and the maintenance of the nursing program facilitated by strong networking allowed for
continuity.
Persistence. The Director of Institutional Effectiveness and Planning recalls how
the Chancellor, as soon as he arrived in Baton Rouge, worked on saving the fall
Semester and organizing for the spring semester.
So he (the Chancellor) came there, he came to Baton Rouge, and started trying to
put together a January semester, right off the bat. There was never in our minds,
the Chancellor felt that if we stopped a beat, if we stopped, there might not be a
Nunez. So we just started gathering students. We would get together and say, ok,
we need to get something together this semester to show we’re open this
semester. It doesn’t matter how many students we have, it doesn’t matter
anything… So we’re trying to get stuff going for the fall.
I remember calling a meeting and saying, ‘ok, Doc wants us to put together a
schedule for the spring’ and people around the table were like, ‘you gotta tell the
man he is crazy. And I said I am not gonna tell my boss he’s crazy. And they
said, ‘there’s a curfew, so there won’t be night classes. There’s no one living
down there, so we don’t even know if we can go back. One agency said the
92 benzene was so high because we had the oil leak, so people shouldn’t return, and
it was hazardous to our health to return. It was difficult getting FEMA trailers in
and getting places to stay. There were so many unknowns. And I remember
looking at them and saying let’s humor the man, he’s been through enough. Let’s
put a schedule together. Let’s put it online. Let’s see if we can do a limited
schedule for the spring. And you what, if it works, great, and if it doesn’t work,
at least we can tell Doc we tried. But we can’t tell him we didn’t try.
She went on to say:
We would get together and say, ok, we need to get something together this
semester (the fall) to show we’re open this semester. It doesn’t matter how many
students we have, it doesn’t matter anything. We did get stuff going for the fall.
There were online classes taught. We got in touch with our nursing students and
our nursing faculty. They met in Slidell at a Community Coffee House, that’s
where they met. The teachers got them their clinicals. That class graduated on
time. So that class continued. Our EMT instructor held class at her house uptown
that wasn’t flooded. She got them moving and going. And we had about three or
four online courses we had here that we kept going. So we did not shut down for
the fall semester at all. We were still operating… that was very important to us.
Then we started trying to call all the department chairs together and meeting with
them and telling them, ok, let’s get a schedule, we’re going to be back in
January. Now, you have to understand how ridiculous that sounded. It was just a
disaster zone. Almost every single home in St. Bernard Parish was flooded,
93 almost every single business. We didn’t have sewage, much less electricity or
anything else.
The Chancellor explained that his most pressing concern was continuing to do
the work of the college. When he was able to return from Baton Rouge to the college
several weeks later he worked to get things moving forward. The logistics of driving
back and forth from Baton Rouge proved to be difficult since they were unable to stay at
the college for long periods of time.
We came back and prepared. When can I get back, when can I start this, I was
hoping that if nothing else I was trying to get back in the fall of 2006. I went to
the parish administration building to talk to the president of the parish and asked
him if could give us some help or if he could just lend us some of his machinery
so we could move some of that furniture, tables and desks, chairs seats from the
auditorium, something that could help us take care of the big stuff. He did send
over some volunteers, and he did have some machinery where we could really do
some things.
Some of our first volunteers, I think were from Canada. And we had some other
volunteers, I don’t know if it was from New York or it was from out of state.
Anyway I think it was – it might have been Kentucky or Tennessee, I don’t
know. But they came in and they help us too. And basically what they helped us
do is get rid of all of the debris so we could at least walk down the hallway and
down the campus and get through all of that.
94 We had a lot on the sidewalks – three feet high. We shoveled it and got it moved
off to the – we didn’t have any grass left. Anyway, the volunteers helped us with
a whole lot.
It was a five or six-hour day for us because we had to come from Baton Rouge.
We had to get clearance to come into the community because the police were
checking for looters and anybody else. You couldn’t get in the parish. To get in
and out you had to have a card, which you we were able to get because of being
the community college and we did get a permission of entrance card to come into
the community. So we looked at the damage of what we had to do and so forth
and so on. I was able to get in touch with the state facility planner and met with
him about three or four weeks after the storm. And they really came on board. I
mean, and surveyed the damage and actually had somebody – they just took
meticulous notes and all of that as to how bad it was damaged, et cetera et cetera.
That took them days to do that. They did it. You got to understand that
everything was flooded. It was in disarray. I mean schoolrooms looked like, you
know, you had chairs hanging up on the ceiling. So they (state facilities director
and staff) came in and said well, we don’t know what we are going to do and so
forth. And my thoughts to them was, how do I get us back. How do I bring us
back? How do I bring us back to the community, not only for us, but also for the
community?
95 What we did is we came in, we drove in, four or five times a week from Baton
Rouge, looking at what we had to get done here, and then some of our people did
come to help us out, one was my electrician and another one my police – one of
my security people, my policeman came by who incidentally died later on, had a
heart attack after we finally got back in and all. He had a heart attack. But he
came by. We had a couple of teachers that came by, administrators.
Online classes. Online classes proved to be an important part of the college’s
continuity, despite the Chancellor’s preference for face-to-face instruction. Interviewee
II explained,
The chancellor doesn’t believe in online classes. He believes person to person. I
mean, he is a person type person and so he doesn’t really believe in those. So we
had to convince him that we had to do some online in order to stay open. So he
acquiesced…
One of the history faculty members explained:
I, with my family, actually went to Georgia, and that was for the online classes,
which was one of the ways we could keep things going even for the semester. I
taught myself to do the online administration and actually set up the initial online
classes… I had not taught online classes before, but I taught a distance learning
class. So I actually just got out the software and tried to figure it out from
Georgia. And then if I remember correctly I tried to recruit a few other
people…who were able to do some semblance of an online class. So that first
96 semester we were actually able to (teach some classes) – the semester of the
hurricane, which hit right at the beginning.
Dual enrollment. Dual enrollment was also extremely important in order to
continue the work of the college.
The Dean of Academic Affairs recalled:
We had a group of faculty on the Northshore to do all the work to get classes
running in high school, in Slidell High School up there. So they were able to start
folks on the ground. So having just those things. Having some sort of way to
have our institution continue (was important).
A faculty member stated:
We pushed that (dual enrollment) greatly. To this day maybe a third of our
students are dual enrollment, a third of the entire student body. We had, I want to
say, 30 high schools at some point, by promoting the dual enrollment through a
lot of the neighboring parishes, seven or eight of the neighboring parishes. We
actively did the online and the dual enrollment parts to kind of bring Nunez
through, to try to get it to survive, and we were very conscious that that’s why
we were doing it.
It included the college classes being offered to high school students (these are
classes that high school students take in their schools by credentialed high school
teachers) as well as we would send our professor, Nunez professors, to teach the
high school classes. Working in close cooperation with the teachers as well. I
97 taught several dual enrollment classes as a professor in Plaquemine’s Parish and
St. Tammany Parish, and we did it in St. Bernard Parish as well. I was over dual
enrollment for a while, so we would monitor those, we’d send people out to
different high schools, to view the teachers and all that. So dual enrollment was
probably the key part.
Interviewee IV stated,
We had worked hard to bring high school dual enrollment onto the campus prior
to the storm and we’d made some gains on it but it hadn’t blossomed the way we
thought it would. After the storm we saw it as a source of numbers.
Nursing program. The continuation of the nursing program was a success story.
Through persistence, creativity, hard work, and networking, nursing students were able
to graduate on schedule.
The Chancellor explained:
We were trying to get back the nurses and they were all across the lake, all kind
of different places. So we pulled them together in about the middle of January. It
was about the 12th or something like that. We made a call to all of them. We said
we’ll meet you across the lake at CC’s Coffee House. They had a room for us, a
small room we got, so we had 22 nurses who had worked for – had gone through
all but one-third of their nursing classes.
So we did finally get in touch with them. The nursing staff kept their books –
they had their numbers. We got in touch with a lot of them. Some were in Baton
98 Rouge. Some were in middle Louisiana. Some were in South Louisiana, so forth.
Got in touch with them and said we set up a meeting at CCs Coffee House in
Slidell. And darn if 21 of them didn’t come. We were able to get 21 of them.
And we offered them their last semester starting, I think it was a week after that.
Yeah, I think it was a week or two after that if they would come in. Wherever
they were. And we had two hospitals across the Lake that agree to work with us
especially with their clinicals. That was the important ones. The hospital said
they will work with you and so forth. They were all prime. They were in their
clinicals anyway when the storm hit so that worked out real well anyway.
The nursing staff – the teaching staff said they could do it (establish clinicals at
hospitals) and so the nursing staff said they – they approached me and I said yes,
we want to do it. We want to finish up their last semester is what it amounted to.
That was in the spring. That was from actually – that happened actually from
January, middle of January somewhere, all of the way to March. It was almost to
April. And then we had their cap and pin. The teaching nurses worked with them,
you know. We had three or four teaching nurses that were still available. And
they worked with them. And 22 of them were not only capped and pinned – 22 of
them met the certification, met the state certification and all of them became
LPNs.
99 The V.P. for Academic Affairs stated:
There’s a story about the nursing program. I remember that cohort group had
maybe 23 or 24 students in it doing practicum and we were able to get in touch,
there was one student who could not make it back, and the big hospital in Slidell,
it’s just an example o networking and being able to reach out to people, Dr.
Cherry, who didn’t work for Nunez but was affiliated with us through the Work
Force Investment Board, his church over there, it was a Baptist Church, had a
dormitory, and some classrooms that they gutted out and cleaned up, and we
were able to put that entire nursing cohort back together minus one student. They
were all working in the hospital over there. Tremendously the hospital needed
nurses, I mean these were not nurses yet, but better than nobody. We were able
to hold that group together. They all graduated, they all passed their boards. The
first meeting we had with them was in the coffee shop next to Hobby Lobby, it
was CC’s or something like that, but they let us use a back room.
The Director of Institutional Effectiveness and Planning stated:
We got in touch with our nursing students and our nursing faculty. They met in
Slidell at a Community Coffee House, that’s where they met. The teachers got
them their clinicals. That class graduated on time. So that class continued. Our
EMT instructor held class at her house uptown that wasn’t flooded. She got them
moving and going. And we had about three or four online courses we had here
100 that we kept going. So we did not shut down for the fall semester at all. We did
have something going on.
A faculty member stated:
That was probably the biggest success story, I think, the third semester nursing
class, we have an LPN, licensed practical nurse program, who were a group of
about 22 students, who just needed to complete their practical part and a few
others. So I can remember they would meet in a coffee house in Slidell
occasionally, and get some of that done as well as practical experiences around
the State, were arranged by the nursing professors. So they actually stuck with it
and graduated, did very well.
I can remember on student lived out of her car for some of the time, because her
family had evacuated to Texas…so she lived out of her car to do some of the
clinical stuff to be able to graduate.
Finding VII: Persistence and continuity led to outside help. Because the
college continued with classes and staff persisted in their work, outside entities took
notice and help began to arrive in the form of money and volunteers. Continuity was
also instrumental in convincing officials in Baton Rouge that Nunez Community College
was worth saving.
The Chancellor explained:
In the long run, I had nothing to lose. But to say we took a shot at it. We not only
took a shot at it, but we made it happen and that was the important thing. And I
101 really think that helped save the school. The fact that we didn’t sit back and say
woe is me, woe is us. What are we going to do so forth and so on, you know.
That’s the worse thing that you got to get off of… Somebody has got to have ‘we
can do it; it was a positive attitude. We are going to get it done. I was amazed
that our president of our system and our board, they were behind us because they
had empathy for us. Because they said if you can do it, get it done. We’re not
going to – y’all have gone through hell and so forth. We don’t want to stand in
your way, but you know, it’s doubtful. So we kept moving ahead and one thing
begot another thing.
The Director of Institutional Effectiveness stated:
He fought for the school. The President of the system was so worried about him
during the storm. He thought he had lost one of his Chancellors, and after he
found out he survived, he was just going to let him go off and do whatever he
wanted. The President was told to close us down, from what I understand, and he
said if you can survive, survive, go to it. So if he hadn’t have been stubborn
about us coming back and surviving, we wouldn’t be here.
The Chancellor was dogged in his insistence that the school continue its
operation despite the skepticism of officials in Baton Rouge. He explained:
Then I did talk to the Commissioner of Education for the whole state who was –
who admitted to me when I went to see him, look, I know you have a tough time
– what we’re going to do is try to get you back in about a year. When I talked to
102 him, I said no, Commissioner, I came back here to make sure where we were,
where we are going. Because I got some people out there. You know, we’ve
started back to school. We can do it. We can make it, so forth and so on. He was
like well, he was very forthright. He’s a great commissioner. He said we are
looking at it, and basically what we want to do is, you know, let y’all sit out for a
semester or a year and then try to bring y’all back and get y’all back in real good
shape thereafter.
My thought there was to him Mr. Commissioner, you know we lost our homes,
we lost our clothes, we lost our cars, we lost some friends, we lost a lot of other
things, you know. Don’t tell me these people these people have to lose their jobs
and I have to go back and tell them that. I will make it. He said well, I tell you
what. We will see how you do. See what you can do. How you can bring it back,
so forth and so on. And I enough, I guess, time – I guess friendship with them
and all that. They said well, we will give you a shot at that. See what you can do
and we will see what will happen after that.
So when we came back that semester and we reported that we had 300 or 400
students, and some of those were dual enrollment students but we reported that
and that’s what we had. We did have about 300 students here. So we did get
back. We were at – before that we were at 2,500 or 2,600 students. So we had
that semester. And we came back in the fall of 2006, I guess it was. We came
back in the fall and we had some kind of enrollment up to about 6 – 700 people.
103 In spring we did about the same and the following year, we came back and we
reached about 1000 people. But they were coming to the college, you know, to
finish their degrees.
The Dean of Academic Affairs stated:
We never came to a full stop and I think that’s really important that we never
came to a full stop. There was always something going on and teaching going on.
There was always some point we had classes. We were instructing students. We
were continuing our goal.
She later went on to say:
It’s important not coming to a full stop. It’s really important because people are
so distracted, so distracted trying to put their lives back together and just holding
on by their fingernails. That once it stops and you lose sight of it and there’s
nothing going on, I don’t know that it’s possible to get it started running again.
So keep it moving however you can.
The Executive Director of Institutional Advancement stated:
The chancellor was instrumental in the whole thing because he never gave up
hope, not for one second. And yet when you have someone who is that strong of
a leader and I say that all the time because in the past the Chancellor was accused
of not having enough vision or whatever, stuck in his ways or this kind of thing,
you have to be a true visionary to be able to see yourself coming out of
something like that and to see an institution and an area because we had to -- we
104 had to have belief that the folks of Chalmette would come back, that the folks in
St. Bernard would come back, the folks in New Orleans would come back.
And so there had to be that trust and belief in our community as well as ourselves
and our institution and he had that. He had that. He also had the connections still
from having been in the legislature to get some of this accomplished.
Money. Because the college was continuing its operation despite all odds against
it, people took notice and the school was given one million dollars from the Bush and
Clinton fund. The Chancellor stated:
So in any catastrophe where you try to pick yourself up with your bootstraps and
dust your pants off and say let’s go back out there. You can say – you can have
vision. You can have determination. You know, you can have patience, and you
can have – you can reach for things that aren’t reachable but you are still going
to try to reach for them and that’s going to get you so far. Sometimes you do get
them and we did.
Clinton came, ok. He came with President Bush, daddy Bush, George Bush, he
came and they gave – and their foundation gave us $750,000. That $750,000
saved us because we didn’t have that in our budget. We didn’t have that kind of
money. So they saved us and we wrote them for another $250,000 and they gave
us that.
Then our visits and our trips to Washington, talked to the Secretary of Education
and coming down here and understanding us and said – I think because we did
105 fight or we did come up and they did try to pick us up, they said we are going to
try to help these people. They came through and said we are going to give those a
million dollars that helped us to pay for salaries and everything… It was for all
the universities and colleges. Tulane got a check, University of New Orleans got
a check, Delgado got a check, Nunez got a check. A couple of other private
colleges got a check and all of that. But the fact that we were there, that helped
us.
Volunteers. Outside help also came in the form of volunteers and other higher
education institutions.
The Chancellor recalls:
Some of our first volunteers, I think were from Canada. And we had some other
volunteers, I don’t know if they were from New York or from another state.
Anyway, I think it was – it might have been Kentucky or Tennessee, I don’t
know. But they came in and they helped us too. And basically what they helped
us do is get rid of all the debris so we could at least walk down the hallway and
down the campus and get through all of that. We had a lot on the sidewalks three
feet high, two and a half, three feet high. We shoveled it and got it moved off to
the – we didn’t have any grass left. Anyway, long story short, the volunteers
helped us with a whole lot.
He went on to say:
People were starting to come back to clean up their houses and all of that. We
had a lot of volunteers that came back – Samaritan’s Purse came here with
106 hundreds of people. They came and they did a tremendous job for us. As far as
bringing in people from all over the country, and they helped clean up houses,
and mucking houses if you can understand that. The mud and the slurry and so
forth was two and three feet high, and they had to shovel it out, and tear out the
sheetrock and all of that. That was a very difficult time, very difficult thing for
them.
The Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs stated,
Another big factor that helped a lot was that students jumped into school
elsewhere. The whole country responded. I mean schools that you wouldn’t
imagine students would go to and, could I get into college in California, and
many, many schools across the country accepted the students. Tuition free, and
were glad to help, and we could actually issue a current transfer.
The work of volunteers still conjures a lot of emotion among Nunez faculty and staff.
One faculty member stated:
I remember one day going to school and I was driving. They had some college
kids outside gutting a house. And there was one girl, a beautiful little blonde with
paper suit, her yellow gloves, and her respirator. She had a respirator pulled
down off her neck, and she had her goggles up on the top of her head. She was a
precious child. So I pulled up and I said Honey, this is spring break. Wouldn’t
you rather be on a beach in Florida. And she just looked at me. She said, there’s
no place in the world I’d rather be than where I am right now. It’s makes me cry
almost saying it right now.
107 Finding VIII: Improvised repair and cleanup of facilities. An advantage
Nunez Community College had was that it was also a technical college, which meant
that many of the employees had the skill sets needed to rebuild and repair an institution’s
facilities. The Chancellor discussed the importance to have an electrician on staff.
So we did have our electrician. He was a Master electrician – he taught here. He
was one of our teachers. But he was across the lake and he didn’t get affected
that much by the storm so he could come by and work with us.
He lived across Lake Pontchartrain. He lived in Slidell, which was about a 35 to
40 minute ride from us, not too bad. Actually that is another thing to get to
Slidell to our throughways and so forth, he actually had to travel on top of the
median where it wasn’t too wet because all of the cement and the concrete was
still inundated with two and three feet of water. So that was a challenge, but
anyway he came back and he was working on that (the electricity).
The Chancellor discussed their work with Louisiana Entergy (a major electric company
in Louisiana).
They (Entergy) were right across the highway from us. So that was a lucky thing
we had. They used our parking lot incidentally for all of their equipment.
The leadership at Entergy and Nunez cooperated with each other. The Chancellor
explained:
They were right with us. They said, see if you can help us put this up and so
forth. So it took them all that long for them to get all of the wires and everything
108 out of the highways and to our school I mean, they had to take care of the
infrastructure there too. So they helped us out. Because they were right across the
street, we’ll try to get you (electricity) – and so they (Entergy) worked at it with
us and we worked at it and our electrician worked at it.
One of the most important events that took place was the restoration of electricity. The
Chancellor:
Well we had – we had an electrical engineer from Entergy, that’s the electrical
company in South Louisiana. And they had another one, I don’t think he was an
engineer, but he was really savvy with electricity for the company. And the
engineer, the electrical engineer said no, I don’t think it’s going to work so forth
and so on. And our electrician said, I think it will work. So anyway what they
did, they were about to abandon it because the electrical engineer he was
doubtful. So he called somebody else up and said, ‘I don’t think this is going to
work.’ And the other guy said, ‘ I don’t know how, I don’t know why, but we’ve
had it done before.” He said, ‘you out to try it. I think it might work. They threw
the switch, lights came on, and we had electricity.
Once we had electricity, that gave us a lot of availability to do a lot of other
things. So that was a hallelujah day. I will never forget that, you know. That was
four months or whatever after the storm. So we had electricity. Then that said to
us, well we have offices on the second and third floor. We can have classrooms.
We don’t need that many because we don’t have that many students coming back
109 right now. They’ll be coming back later. So we were able to get the message out
to the faculty that we knew was around. And so we would like to, you know,
come in, it looks like we’re going to start to get back into school.
Cleanup. Everyone worked on the cleanup and recovery of the campus
regardless of position. Interviewee II explained:
Doc (the Chancellor) was able to get a crew here (to the college). Mud around
my house from the swamp was about two feet, three feet deep. In some places it
was more. It took us a long time to get the mud, the sludge, I guess sludge is
what it’s called, out of the elevator shaft. Doc – I remember him telling me one
night to call these people, tell them that we’re meeting at the campus on this date,
bring your boots and your shovels and we’re just gonna clean up the place. I said
do you want me to call any women, you only have men on here. He said no, you
all don’t need to be down there doing that, I need you doing other things. Y’all
get the classes together, I’ll have the men doing this. And I used to call him
sexist because of that. And I said Doc, if you need us down there, and he said
y’all don’t need to be down there. So anyway, they were coming down here, they
were trying to get the place dried out first, which was a major task, just trying to
get everything dried out and getting everything done. If you were in property and
facilities, you were expected to come here and help.
110 Finding IX: The college became an oasis for the community. Once classes
began in the spring the college became a kind of oasis for people returning to the
community. The Chancellor explained:
Also it was still very dark in the community at 5 or 6 – the community did not
have any lights. They were just starting to get lights on the streets and all that. So
we were probably the only place – I guess, we were – I call this an oasis, you
know, in the community. Because people couldn’t come to classes during the
day. They’d come at night. And the beauty of the thing at night is, they’d come
to class and, you know, we had classes from like 5:30 to like 7:00. And we had a
class – we had two classes I think from 7:00 to 8:30.
And invariably I had to come up, you know. I had to come back, some up to the
second and third floor, we’d just walk up the stairs. I’d come in and I’d say look
it’s 10:15. We’ve got to close up because we got to come back tomorrow. And
they were just talking to the teachers in the hall. They just had somebody to
communicate with and go through their woes. We had to move out. We lost
everything. We lost all of our automobiles. We lost all of our cars.
The Dean of Academic Affairs stated:
So I drove over by myself, my three and half hour drive from Jackson, and I
came in and walked up the stairs and by the time we got to the second floor, the
building just seemed normal. Everything was on my desk where I left it. My
pictures of my kids were still there. It still smelled like a normal building which
111 was pretty incredible at the time around here. And it was nice to just walk into
that office and just sit and be quiet in someplace that was still there because my
parent’s house was gone, my house was gone, my husband’s mother’s house was
gone, my grocery store that I shopped at was gone, my children’s school. So it
was the one normal place that I had found that was still there after the storm and
it was nice.
The Vice chancellor of Academic Affairs stated:
As the campus sort of became an icon, there was slowly, particular once the
lights went on, there was electricity there, there were lights on at night, and it just
became sort of an icon, and if the campus can crawl back, then the rest of the
community can do it also.
Finding X: Effective networking took place. A major them that emerged from
the data was the amount of networking that occurred from the leadership. The chancellor
had been a former legislator, which gave him access to people in the state government.
Other leaders at the college had lived in the area their entire life, increasing their
networking capacity. The Director of Human Resources explained:
He (the Chancellor) is a former legislator. So he called in some of those favors
that he had banked over the years, you know, and just asked, and asked for help
when he needed to ask for help. He has been here forever. He has a real
community of friends and associates in St. Bernard. Everybody was in the same
boat. Everybody pulled together.
112 The Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs stated that he felt networking was key to the
colleges’ survival:
I think as it became obvious that Nunez was fighting for its life, gradually, at
some point the call was made that said shut it down, as it became evident that the
core at Nunez was going to try to not let that happen, the Board, a lot of the local
politicians just got being that movement, and I guess networking would be a
keyword. Reaching out, picking up support of every sort, not just monetary, but
equipment, supplies, the power, the willingness, I don’t know if it was Entergy,
whoever the grid supplier was, to get our connection to the grid back up and
running besides what was on campus but the feeders coming onto the campus,
and be able to sell that idea…the bookstore, just getting textbooks for the next
semester. I think they came in and just basically gave us books.
A faculty member explained:
He (the chancellor) had a lot of political connections, so he used those… He had
been here for some time, and very actively involved in higher education in the
legislature. Of course he had been the facilities director at Nunez. He resigned
his post as representative once he became the Chancellor.
The faculty member went on to say that the NCC’s relationship with surrounding high
schools enabled them to continue classes.
We were able to have classes that next semester, the spring semester, on the
campus – a few. And I taught some of those. We had to arrange other classrooms
in addition to the online, we met in Slidell at Slidell High School. The loaned us
113 some of their high school classrooms and we had college classes there. Slidell
High School also loaned the culinary, I guess the cafeteria facilities… Several
others did too – we have a little adjunct campus over there. When Chalmette
High School got up and going I think we had some classes there as well, they
lent us some space.
Finding XI: A strong sense of community was pervasive during the
recovery. Interviewee II:
There’s a saying in this area that if you marry a person from this area you stay
with them and their mom forever. The women here don’t leave their moms too
easily. You grew up in an area where everyone knew your history or at least you
felt like everyone knew your history or at least you felt like everyone knew your
history, because you’re always running into people. My kids were always so
aggravated because no matter where my husband or I went we would see people
that we hadn’t seen in a while and we would stop and talk. We could be at the
grocery, going to a movie, or at the ballpark, no matter what we were doing we
would always run into someone and our kids would get frustrated if they wanted
to go do something because we would stay and talk and catch up. I think that was
the hardest thing for me, to be in Baton Rouge where suddenly they had this
influx of many, many people, and I could be in an entire Wal-Mart superstore
and no one knew me. That is a weird feeling, to be in a crowded church that is so
full that people are standing like it’s an Easter Sunday when it isn’t an Easter
114 Sunday and I didn’t know another person in there and no else knew me. That was
a strange feeling.
Another interviewee who was a lifelong resident of the area stated:
St. Bernard Paris has always been a closed community here. It takes a while for
you to be a native. You come here for 10 years and they’ll finally let you know
that you’re in. Family is really strong here. People don’t move away from their
homes too much. The community is really tightly bonded. You know everybody,
and you know their mama.
Being part of a community like that, that’s so much identity tied up in this
community, and the people who are here that’s harder to break. Especially such a
– such a, you know, such a sudden complete loss of community. I think that just
the culture in the parish brings people back. It brought us back because people
wanted this to happen again. They wanted the community to come back. Our ties
are really strong around here.
So I think that’s important and it’s always been sort of that structure in the
college. We know each other. We know each other’s kids and it’s gotten so much
stronger since the storm.
The H.R. director stated:
We believe in this college and we believe that we serve a real purpose, and the
people who currently are in leadership positions in the college were in leadership
positions in the college before the storm. So there’s not been a lot of turnover. So
115 this is not a school were people come and go, come and go. They build their lives
around this college because we honestly feel like St. Bernard needs us. I do think
that if had – if we had felt as a collective group, if we had felt that this
community didn’t need us, I don’t think we would have worked as hard to make
it come back…but St. Bernard’s strength and St. Bernard’s weakness is that St.
Bernard closes in on itself…we often isolate ourselves and that’ s not necessarily
a good thing. And now we’re finding out had we made more noise, probably
things would have been on a faster track. But like I said St. Bernard’s strength is
that we pull together and protect ourselves. And we feel that way about the
school. We feel that we have to be here for our community.
Finding XII: Chancellor’s leadership was paramount to college’s survival.
The Human Resource Director stated:
Without our chancellor, this school would not be here. He was determined we
were going to come back. He was determined we were going to find a way to
make it happen and he did. He got people in here and himself in shrimp boots
with a shovel and they cleared out enough of this campus that we could – that
they could offer classes…from the janitor all of the way, pretty much staff in
general.
But he was not asking anything of any – of any of us that he wasn’t willing to do,
so if he asked – if he needed somebody to come in and drive a bulldozer, shovel
things out, he was going to be on that bulldozer for some period of time himself.
116 Physically and mentally, he – he really provided true leadership in this
throughout the whole process.
One of the faculty members stated:
I really think it was primarily the will of the chancellor and other people at
Nunez to make sure that it survived. The State, some of the State organizations
in charge had already had plans, official plans that might have led to some type
of merger between Delgado and Nunez and there was even a new name that had
been proposed, the Community College of New Orleans, in those early days.
Because I think most people thought that it would not go through. Some of the
State facility organizations had demanded that Nunez not fix up some of the
things. Those were just ignored and instead the Chancellor and the facilities crew
and professors and everything really gutted the buildings and everything
ourselves without any outside help. Later on we got some volunteers and
everything but not much from the State. So it really just made it to where there
really wasn’t a choice anymore, just block any actions to prevent it. And the
Chancellor, obviously he had a lot of political connections, so he used those.
Another faculty member stated:
We had the Chancellor as the center. I mean, he was the rallying point. We knew
he was there and we knew he was in a place, sort of a safe place. We knew he
was fighting for the school and we knew things were happening. He was sort of –
he was sort of a rallying point for folks because he would communicate with us.
117 We knew that he was – he was fighting for the school. And we knew he wanted
the institution to continue.
The facilities director stated:
The Chancellor had to have the kahunas to say, you know, we’re going to get this
place back together. Because you got to – if you don’t fight that fight, and I’m
going to say who was at SOWELA. He had the same fight. He had to fight with
them to get himself back together. It wasn’t bad as we, we probably were closer
to the chopping block than he was. But I mean Delgado too. They were just as
scared as we were as far as. They could do away with us. Why would you need
community colleges, you know. I mean, especially, you know, with all of the
colleges having problems anyway. I mean, shoot do away with the community
colleges and put them in the colleges.
Another interviewee stated:
A reason the college did not close, if I had to put my finger on one person it
would be the chancellor, for not heeding the will of the powers that be to close
the doors, he would have to be credited with that.
The Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs stated:
I truly believe and I know a lot of people that if it would have been anyone else
but our Chancellor who was willing to do things independently and being a
former legislature and still having some clout in the legislature, he was able to do
that. Nobody else would have. If I had been Chancellor or (someone else), I
don’t know anybody else in Nunez’s immediate community that had they been
118 Chancellor, they would have been in a position to buck the system and kind of go
independently toward rebuilding the college.
Conclusion
This chapter presented the findings for research question one: What were the
actions of the institutional leadership of Nunez Community College in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina?
The findings from the data analysis were: (1) Lack of Preparation: (2)
Improvised response to storm’s landfall; (3) Improvised communication; (4) Improvised
security and cleanup; (5) An improvised alternated site; (6) Improvised continuity; (7)
Persistence and continuity; (8) Improvised repair and cleanup of facilities; (9) The
College became an oasis for the community; (10) Effective networking took place; (11)
A strong sense of community was pervasive during the recover; and (12) the
chancellor’s leadership was paramount to the college’s survival.
119 Chapter Five: Findings
Introduction
This chapter reports the findings for the second research question: What were the
actions of institutional leadership of SOWELA Technical Community College in the
aftermath of Hurricane Rita? The study used a qualitative methodology using both a case
study and grounded theory approach. Case study research “allows investigators to retain
the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2003, p. 2). It also
offers a means of understanding in-depth a view of a particular setting, the participants
and/or a phenomenon.
Since the study focused on the actions of institutional leaders of SOWELA
Technical Community College in response to Hurricane Rita and the researcher began
with no a priori theoretical orientation, grounded theory was most appropriate to use in
the researcher’s approach. In grounded theory the researcher “generates a general
explanation (a theory) of a process, action or interaction shaped by views of a large
number of participants” (Creswell, 2007, p. 63). This approach originated in sociology
in the 1960s when Barney Glaser and Asselm Strauss felt that a priori approaches were
ill-suited to their research.
Since the 1960s several different versions of grounded theory have emerged.
This study used a constructivist grounded theory method first described by Charmaz
(2000, 2006, 2009) and later by Corbin (2008), Clark (2003, 2005, 2009), Morse et al.
(2009) and Stein (2009). Constructivist grounded theory is less positivist than the
120 original Glaserian method and takes on a relativist and reflexive approach to the research
(Charmaz, 2009).
Most of the data came from semi-structured interviews. Other data were gathered
from institutional data at SOWELA. Since this study was done in conjunction with
Nunez Community College, it was important for the researcher to code the data
simultaneously so that one would not influence the other and objectivity would not be
compromised. A snowballing technique was used to find participants to interview. This
was consistent with the unique grounded theory technique of theoretical sampling. In
grounded theory data collection and analyses occur concurrently. Findings are analyzed
and one’s theoretical sensitivity leads to more data collection, which is then compared to
emerging concepts “until no new themes, categories, or relationships are discovered”
(Fassinger, 2005, p. 157).
The following are brief descriptions of individuals interviewed.
Interviewee I: The Chancellor of SOWELA Technical Community College. He
is from Kinder, Louisiana, a small farming community about 30 miles northeast of Lake
Charles, Louisiana. He began his career as an English teacher at the secondary level and
also owned and operated the newspaper of his hometown. He eventually was hired at
SOWELA as an assistant director and then Chancellor. He worked in that capacity for
17 years.
Interviewee II: In September of 2005 he was the Vice Chancellor of Workforce
Development and also worked as the Facilities Director. He was first hired at SOWELA
in 1981 as an instructor. He is now retired.
121 Interviewee III: She was the Department Head of Information Technology at
the time Hurricane Rita made landfall. She is currently the Dean of Instruction and
Student Success and has worked at SOWELA Technical Community College for over
28 years.
Interviewee IV: She was a faculty member and Institutional Research Director
in September of 2005. She is currently the Director of the Center for Excellence in
Institutional Technology.
Interviewee V: In the fall of 2005 she was the Department Head of General
Studies and a math instructor. Today she is still an instructor of math and assists both the
General Education Department Head and the Dean of Instruction in administrative
duties.
Interviewee VI: In the fall of 2005 she was the Department Chair for the
accounting and office systems programs. Today she holds the same position and teaches
classes.
Interviewee VII: In 2005 he was the Executive Vice Chancellor of SOWELA
Technical Community College. He worked at SOWELA in some capacity for 40 years
until he retired.
Interviewee VIII: She was the Department Head of Criminal Justice and
instructor of Criminal Justice. She currently holds the same positions.
Interviewee IX: He is currently the Coordinator of Workforce Development,
and was the assistant to the Vice Chancellor of Workforce Development.
122 Interviewee X: She was an instructor of English in the fall of 2005, and is
currently retired.
Interviewee XI: He was the Chief Executive Officer of Stine Lumber Company
and works in that capacity today.
Context
It is impossible to view Hurricane Rita separately from Hurricane Katrina. Many
people from Louisiana refer to the two hurricanes together as Karita. Lake Charles,
Louisiana, where SOWELA is located, had an influx of over 20,000 Katrina evacuees
from the New Orleans area. Most were housed in the Lake Charles Civic Center where
SOWELA students in the culinary department prepared three meals a day for their
fellow Louisianans until a few days before Hurricane Rita made landfall. The people in
the area still take pride in the work they did for the Katrina evacuees. One interviewee
stated,
The Lake Charles community – southwest Louisiana – is some of the most
resilient people – some of the most genuine people – some of the most caring
people of anywhere you will ever be. When our friends and neighbors from
southeast Louisiana were displaced because of the Katrina catastrophe, a lot of
the poor and indigent ended up in our Lake Charles civic center. All of the other
shelters had been destroyed in the New Orleans area and it was contaminated and
they couldn’t go back. We had about 20,000 people from the New Orleans area
that were temporarily housed in those facilities. Each day, they received three
meals a day, seven days a week, and our culinary instructor and all the culinary
123 students, as well as members of the community, staffed the kitchen of the Lake
Charles civic center and prepared a meal three times a day for them.
When Hurricane Rita approached and the evacuation order was given, the
Katrina evacuees were once again evacuated by buses to other areas of the country.
Residents in southwest Louisiana who evacuated had difficulty finding hotel rooms
because so many were still occupied by residents of southeast Louisiana due to Katrina.
The SOWELA Chancellor and his wife, for example, could not find a vacant hotel room
until they reached northern Tennessee. The Chancellor explained,
We left Kinder on Thursday morning going north and I thought we would make
it to Alexandria and get a hotel room there and wait it out and see what would
happen. As we began moving north and got to Alexandria, no hotel rooms. We
went on in to Mississippi – none – we couldn’t find hotel rooms anywhere. The
New Orleans area had been hit earlier by Katrina and so people were evacuating
there as well. They didn’t want to go through at that time the same thing again.
By that, the New Orleans area and the North Shore of Covington – those people
there had begun to move north as well. We got in to Mississippi by Naches and
that area – still no rooms. We really began to get concerned. We called Memphis
– one of the hotels over there – it may have been a Hilton – I’m not sure – they
said they were full but they had a hotel in another part of Tennessee that still had
some rooms available if we wanted to drive that far. We went – we had them
reserve two rooms for us and went through Memphis – never even slowed down
124 – and went on up further north into Tennessee – I can’t recall the name of the
town right now – we got a hotel room and we stayed there.
On September 24, 2005, Hurricane Rita reached landfall at Sabine Pass, Texas
with sustained winds of 120 mph. The storm surge inundated the low lying areas in
southwest Louisiana and caused even more flooding as far east as the New Orleans area.
The hurricane caused over 12 billion dollars of damage and over 100 fatalities.
SOWELA sustained 10 million dollars of damage and the staff was dispersed to all parts
of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee as well as other
areas. Most of the students who had registered for the 2005 fall semester evacuated as
well and had the same difficulty finding places to stay because of the evacuees from
hurricane Katrina. SOWELA is located on the former Chennault Air Force Base so it has
large, flat, open spaces south of campus, which makes the facilities vulnerable to
tornadoes during Hurricanes. It was tornadoes that caused most of the damage to the
facilities at SOWELA. Although news reports stated the magnitude of the damage that
SOWELA had sustained, almost all of the interviewees stated how shocked they were
when they saw the destruction first hand. Despite the destruction wrought by Rita,
SOWELA has continued to grow and expand its services nearly every year since 2005.
125 Findings
Finding I: Lack of preparation. Although SOWELA did make some
preparations for the storm, no one expected the damage to be as extensive as it was. The
preparations that were made proved to be inadequate.
While we were concerned about Hurricane Rita, it just didn’t look like it would
hit our area. But then it made a turn and began moving from south Texas to
southwest Louisiana, and we decided – I think it was on a Wednesday – we
decided that we would close the school, give everybody a chance to arrange their
departures if they wanted to leave the area if the hurricane continued in its
current course towards southwest Louisiana. We fully expected that we would be
out of school Wednesday and Thursday and we would be back in session on
Friday.
The Vice Chancellor of Workforce Development stated,
When Hurricane Rita came in September 2005, no one expected the storm to be
as devastating as it was. No one expected that it would come in here until about
30 hours before it got here. It became a reality to all of us that we were looking at
a killer storm was coming into the Lake Charles area. It didn’t give us time other
than to get everybody out. That was the order of the day – to evacuate. When we
left school on Wednesday afternoon, prior to the hurricane coming to town on
Friday, the evacuation order came from the civil orders for everyone to leave
Lake Charles and that is what everyone did. We didn’t go back to the school –
126 we didn’t have time to batten down the hatches – we just go out. There was some
work done on Wednesday but not anything to save anything.
One of the faculty members explained why she was not that concerned about the
approaching storm:
I think because I’ve lived here in Louisiana all my life and I’m used to
hurricanes, I didn’t really anticipate anything like this happening. In fact, I was
five years old when Audrey hit – I was in Cameron at the time. I lived through
that and I was comparing that experience to what might happened if we were
even hit by Rita. I didn’t expect devastation or anything because I wasn’t in the
hit areas during Aubrey. We really didn’t even anticipate leaving until my
neighbors convinced us that we needed to leave.
The Department Head of General Studies stated:
I don’t know where the hurricane was when we were told that we needed to start
our procedures and that includes things like – we had learned some of these from
Katrina. We learned that you don’t just lock things in a file cabinet when you
leave. We learned to put duck tape around all the seams to keep the water out
because schools in New Orleans lost things that were even in file cabinets. We
learned some things from them. We set in our protocols and basically, we had the
process of protecting all of our equipment and then maintenance had to clear the
yards and all of that stuff.
127 Pick up trashcans that might blow away and things like that – or if we had
construction materials hanging out, pick that stuff up - anything that could
become flying debris. I know a lot of people in their homes will tape their
windows up and that type stuff when a hurricane is coming, but I don’t recall us
doing anything like that. It was primarily clear the ground for the campus that
could become flying objects, and then as instructors, we made sure that the
computers in our offices or in our classrooms were wrapped in giant garbage
bags – kind of pick things up off the floor in case water comes in and settles on
the floor and all. We had to – we cleared our desktops off of anything of value,
student records and stuff like that. All of that was taped in the file cabinets or in
our desk drawers, which were also taped. It was primarily cover your electronic
equipment and water tight all the students’ records and everything. That was
what my preparation was for the storm. Course at the time it was coming, we
knew it was going to be a big one, but we had no idea we would get the direct
hit. If I recall right, we did our preparations maybe on a Friday afternoon or on a
Thursday and the storm didn’t hit until Saturday. We left – we didn’t know how
big it was going to be at the time.
The Department Head of Information Technology explained:
I don’t think any of us really, really, truly believed that the hurricane was going
to be as bad as it was, especially those of us who had been around for such a long
time. We had kind of been through the evacuation and then we would come back
and, you know, things are really not that bad. But we went through the motions
128 of securing things here, covering computers, things of that nature, typically what
we do when we prepare for a storm, trying to ensure that our technology doesn’t
get harmed as much as possible, taking computers if they’re sitting on the floors,
moving them onto tables and covering them up. That was pretty much the extent
of our preparation.
Another interviewee stated:
Before the hurricane, I don’t think any of us had experienced devastation like we
were about to see and we were just going through the normal motions of trying to
cover the computers, protect the equipment as much as we could. Little did we
know, it probably wasn’t that much devastation to the actual computers as it was
to the buildings. That was the greatest disaster part of it.
The workforce coordinator was frank in his assessment of the institution’s lack of
preparation.
From my perspective we didn’t do enough. You know, the last hurricane we had
was Audrey that had come through that was serious, which was a whole other
generation. So the idea that a hurricane could come through and could cause that
much damage, that was a TV show. That wasn’t reality.
We took some of the computers and set them on chairs in case a pipe burst or
something. We didn’t – I mean, we didn’t board up the windows like we should
have. We didn’t think it was going to be that bad.
129 Finding II: Improvised communication. The chancellor stated that the first
course of action was to communicate with his staff and the authorities that were in the
Lake Charles area after the storm.
Of course, my faculty and staff were scattered all over. People had gone in all
different kinds of directions. We maintained contact with each other through cell
phones and there were still people in Lake Charles – mostly civil defense and
law enforcement, Red Cross, and support organizations that were allowed to stay
in the Lake Charles area. I was able to communicate with some of those people
to get a preliminary assessment of the damages. Almost immediately, you know,
people I talked to said SOWELA is really damaged very, very severely.
Buildings collapsed – roofs ripped off – air conditioners off the roof onto the
campus – glass windows shattered – rain, wind going into the buildings. They
said it was a major disaster. This was just heart breaking. Except for the fact that
there was no loss of life or injury because people had evacuated – other than that,
it was a very bad situation.
The Department Head of Information Technology explained the situation with
communication when the storm made landfall:
Once the hurricane actually hit, most of our communications was done via email. So we were hoping that most people had either cell phones or someway of
getting e-mails. And so our administration, there was – the level administration, I
wasn’t in administration at the time. So I can’t really tell you what they did and
how they did it.
130 But for being on the receiving end, I can tell you that our communication from
our administration pretty much came via e-mail or cell phone calls and messages
and things of that nature. So that’s how they kept us informed of what was going
on and what we were to do as much as we could broadcast over television
stations and things of that nature.
The General Studies Department Head explained:
A lot of communications were through email. Where we were staying, we didn’t
have internet access. We had to go to another location in town – my husband’s
sister’s other house to get online. That is how people were communicating. Some
people had set up – I’m not techie enough – they had set up blogs or something –
even the local news media had set up sites and links on their sites where you
could go and try to find someone, or is anybody going to this neighborhood –
could you tell me if my property is okay. All of the news was being shared pretty
much by email. That was the communication, and cell phones. Talking on cell
phones – that was new to me – we had only gotten cell phones the week before
Hurricane Rita so I was still trying to figure out how to dial numbers on my cell
phone. People were sending me text messages and I don’t answer text message
or anything – that was all new technology at the time. Email was the main way
for communicating with people.
The Institutional Research Director stated:
There was something with some kind of a temporary website that the IT people
put together so we could communicate and see things being posted, get some e 131 mails from everybody. There wasn’t a lot of that in the beginning because
everywhere most of us went, there was still no electricity. And – but we got
enough information. We did have phone numbers. We were able to contact some
people by phone, cell phones and we were able to keep in contact. So we got
word when there were some meetings.
A few weeks after the storm the leadership called a meeting of administrators,
faculty, and staff that could attend.
The chancellor explained:
We were really restricted from even going on to the campus for another – I don’t
remember the number of days but we met the administrative staff – we met at –
once we were allowed to go back into Lake Charles, we met at the Chennault
Airport Authority Building. By that time, our faculty and staff had started to
come back to Lake Charles.
Interviewee VI said:
I can remember the first time we were able to come back to the campus and we
had a general meeting. The director, and all of the faculty, the adjunct faculty
came.
The Department Head of Criminal Justice recalled:
I think it might have been two weeks after the hurricane. We reported here in the
airplane hanger. The chancellor and other administrators and everyone, all the
adjunct faculty and staff reported who could. I think they told us what their plans
were and they fed us that day.
132 Finding III: Taking initiative while circumventing rules and regulations.
After the leadership and staff began returning to the Lake Charles area they began
making assessments of the damage that took place on campus. Eventually several
administrators and staff members took the initiative to save equipment and data that
eventually made a positive impact in the continuity of the college. One Interviewee
explained:
When we first got here, we had to sneak around some barricades and kind of, for
lack of better sense, we probably just broke the law, but we needed to get in to
see what was left.
Another staff member stated,
One of our IT employees had taken one of our servers with him when he
evacuated to make sure that we had equipment to put things on. And officially
we are not supposed to put things on. And officially we are not supposed to do
that. Officially we are not supposed to do that. Officially the state would say, oh,
God, you moved equipment without, you know, but I don’t care. At that point,
you just do what you had to do.
They told us we could not come in at all for anything. But we went and took
equipment out of our offices. We took whatever equipment we could salvage
from our office areas, you know, like servers and stuff like that. We started doing
reconnaissance. We were actually breaking the law because the buildings were
seized by the State, but me and a co-worker used to run over to the computer
133 building because we had three lab set up over there. We went and took
computers when we weren’t supposed to be in there any more. Matter of fact,
one of the times our Vice Chancellor of Workforce Development who was also
in charge of facilities and he was walking through the building with one of the
state guys, and he caught us coming down the main hall. We just said, ‘wow,
we’re not supposed to be down here.’ We turned around and left until they turned
the corner and then we ran and got what we had to get. But it was a time of –
there was no danger in the building. I mean, it wasn’t like it was going to cave in.
Another Interviewee stated:
They were concerned about all of the danger you had with all of the mold and
everything that was in those buildings. We couldn’t even go in. We just
happened – I’m going to say it, but it was almost – on some people’s part, they
probably would say it was illegal for us to get in there and do it, but we were so
desperate. Right at first even though they said, well, we don’t know – don’t go in
those buildings unless you really have to, something like that. We had to hurry
up and get in there so we could get a few desks and chairs and computers and get
some stuff so we could bring to Stine before they really locked down the doors
and say no more.
134 Finding IV: A primary concern for the chancellor was that the college’s
staff was paid and not furloughed. One of the primary concerns for the chancellor was
how everyone was going to be paid. He was able to communicate with his human
resources director, who had evacuated to north Louisiana, through the internet and cell
phone. The chancellor explained:
The campus was still off limits and the administrative staff got together and we
began trying to think of some kind of plans for the immediate future, which did
not include going back on the campus. We communicated with our different
staffs, and we had – one of our HR directors had evacuated to north Louisiana to
the Shreveport area – our payroll – that was one of our concerns – how were our
people going to be paid. What are they going to do? We communicated by cell
phones and computers with her – she was at one of the technical schools in north
Louisiana and we managed to send in our records and everything. She – we were
being paid centrally from Baton Rouge office and we were able to set up a
system where she could turn in data and everything and where people were, and
we were able to get everyone paid on time that way.
Another Interviewee stated:
The chancellor started getting word that we were all going to be laid off because
our campus was gone. I think they did the same thing to Nunez and Delgado. So
that’s when they started trying to find a place for us to meet at least be working
and they got the Stine building.
135 The Executive Vice Chancellor of SOWELA recalled:
Rita did tremendous damage for us. So we wanted to keep our staff. That’s why
we set up the way we did. They had some assignments, and we had a few
students, and we were trying to justify keeping our staff on.
Finding V: Improvised alternate site saved employees from being
furloughed. The chancellor stated:
We felt the need, as soon as possible, to bring everybody back together because
there were some places in Lake Charles that were not as severely damaged as
SOWELA – we got an offer from this Stine Family of Lake Charles who owned
large – they owned lumber yards. That is a more simplistic term because it is
more like a Home Depot operation. They had huge facilities and they had just
moved out of one of their facilities on Country Club Road and we contacted
them to see if they maybe they would allow us – our faculty and staff – to
congregate and meet, and begin doing some things that we could in order to
prepare for the time that we could return to campus, and they said certainly. We
contacted everyone and we moved everything that we could get that could help
us into this lumber company facility. We began reporting to that facility every
day, at the same time that we would have at SOWELA. We turned in our time
sheets, worked in-service, worked on projects, and contacted students letting
them know that if they had any questions, we were centrally located at that
facility.
136 The Chief Executive Officer of the Stine Lumber Company told this story:
We had moved out of our old building, which had been on Country Club Road. It
has a 30,000 square foot showroom with six to eight acres of warehouse space.
FEMA was looking at it because they were mobilizing a team to come down.
They had a team come down to look at our site and other sites to put a team
down here to handle claims and what not. FEMA was talking with us and we
were working on that while we were trying to serve customers. We had an
amazing number of people calling us asking us to rent the space because it was a
secure building and it was a 30,000 squared foot building with heat and airconditioning. Nothing was damaged on the building – if it was – it was minor –
So we had a lot of opportunities. We spent most of our time talking with FEMA
and they chose another building. So the result of that we had an opportunity to
think of all the other offers that were coming to us about renting it. We were very
busy serving customers so we didn’t spend a lot of time with it and all of a
sudden I read in the newspaper about SOWELA closing down and not having a
place to go. I knew the Vice Chancellor of Workforce Development from the
many years of working with him in the community and I called him and asked if
he was looking for a place to put your campus for few months – we are not
looking for rent. If you want to take it let me know quickly because we have
others that may want it that are willing to pay, but I am willing to loan you the
building if you can give me a timeframe. I thought I read in the paper that you
137 only needed the building until January 1. If you could use it, I’d be willing to
loan the building – of course I say I, but all my brothers too. His response was,
‘No everything is in such disarray I don’t think we can do it. I don’t know if we
can get things organized, I don’t know how your building would be of help, but I
surely appreciate your offer.’ I said, ‘O.K., well look, I just wanted to make that
offer.’ We hung-up and not ten minutes later he called back and said, ‘Is that
building still available?’ I answered yes and he said, ‘I’ve been talking to our
staff around here and we are trying to hold our team together and make certain
that we will be ready for January 1. I need some place where we can keep things
going… Let me talk to our team again, but will you hold it for us.’ I said, ‘yes, I
called you because we wanted to help.’ He asked, ‘can I see it’ and I walked him
through the building and he said ‘we will take it’ and the rest is history. The
SOWELA staff mobilized very quickly. I was amazed at how fast they set up in
that building. It was all over the news that SOWELA had moved to the former
Stine location because we had been there for over 20 years. The parking lot was
full of students and people doing whatever SOWELA was doing.
The Vice Chancellor of workforce development explained:
One of the things that we were able to do – one of the most gratuitous parts of
our assistance was that while we were scrapping every day, hoping, hoping,
hoping we could get enough campus put back together and it became a reality
that we would, the leadership in Baton Rouge – we didn’t know at the time – but
the leadership in Baton Rouge was building us a coffin to bury us. We weren’t
138 going to put up with that – we didn’t know they were doing it but one of the local
business leaders called one day and said “I’ve got my old store open on the other
side of town. It’s okay – can you use that?” I said, “I don’t know – let me get
back to you.” That is because we had been up 20 hours a day – about 30 minutes
later it hit me what he had asked me. I called back and said yes – we could use
that. What we were able to do is call in all our faculty and bring them all back
over to that far away place and get them set up there and have them sit there and
work.
A faculty member stated:
Someone called and told me that the Stine family had given us their old store as a
meeting place. Once they did that, we started going there regularly every day.
We were doing whatever business we could do.
I was able to get my classes back up because I’d - once we got the internet set up
there, they did have to run the lines under it and get set up out there, but once
they did that, I was able to contact my students and continue with my classes,
especially my online class. The face-to-face classes – some of those people
actually I was able to do through the online class as well. There were some
classes that continued – I believe some instructors went to other schools and had
their students meet with them –
Most of my stuff I did online once we were able to get the facilities at the Stine
store set up.
139 The Department Head of General Education recalled:
We got pushed into having to take some immediate action on things when the
state – I mean when you start looking at our higher education system across the
state, they were up a creek when it comes to looking into insurance and finances
and because they had been hit a double whammy two months in a row. Not just
community colleges but 4-year schools had been hit by Katrina and then by Rita,
and all this stuff. They were in a financial bind on, I think I’m correct when I say
that they didn’t have enough state insurance to cover all the damages – it was
obvious. They needed to get the schools back up, opened and running. I think it
was the LTCTS issuing an edict out to everyone who had been damaged by
hurricanes and saying that you needed to be open for business by a certain date
or you needed to start looking at laying off your personnel – you were going to
have to take severe cuts. The first ones were going to be in personnel because
without students and classes, you don’t need personnel. We were looking at a
deadline suddenly put in front of us and it was a deadline that came fast for us
because the schools in New Orleans had been affected by Katrina, they had a
whole month longer that they could have been working in trying to get things
going. But both sets of schools in New Orleans and Lake Charles got hit with the
same deadline. We didn’t have a lot of time where we could figure out how we
were going to keep our schools open – how we were going to lay off a bunch of
employees who now needed jobs because they had lost so much in the storm. We
140 were three days or less from having to lay off a bunch of employees when a local
businessman who, just prior to Rita, moved his business from one location to
another, and the old location was empty. He offered it to SOWELA. We didn’t
know if we were going to be able to hold classes there or not, but we were able to
move into his old facility and faculty were able to go to work every day – you
might think what were they doing if they didn’t have any students. We did not
have to close our doors because we could show that faculty was working on
different projects and doing things even though we didn’t have students and
courses going on. It was through that effort – it really surprised the state – they
were already wiping SOWELA off their map – I think they thought we were not
going to come back from this one. It surprised them that we kept the school open
and that we did open for classes in the spring.
Another interviewee remembered:
Our administration tried to contact different businesses in the area and asked for
support, and I think the top administration was very instrumental in speaking to
the Stine folks from Stine Lumber Company because they had opened up a new
store and so their old facility was just sitting there and it wasn’t being used. The
Stine family agreed to let us go there. And so we probably started reporting to
work out of this Stine building for – I don’t know how long we actually operated
out there. But I would guess or venture to say maybe about a month or so.
141 The Department Chair for Accounting and Office Systems described some of the work
they did while at the center.
We were able to go to the Stine Center and at that time it was an empty building
that the Stine Company offered us to use. It was a building supply company. It
was just a big open building. They had built a new building so this was on
Country Club road and it was unoccupied and it was offered to the school for us
to use. So we managed to get some computers from the school to set up there.
We got a network going back. I remember us taking – we couldn’t make – we
didn’t have phones for a couple of weeks when we first got to the Stine Center
but we took time – we would actually report there.
(When electricity was back) we called students to tell them we were going to
have a spring semester. There would be a registration. And we called them and
got them ready to come back at registration. We actually held our registration in
that Stine building.
The Executive Vice Chancellor of SOWELA explained:
By going to the Stine building and the approach that we took by continuing –
continuing the educational process as much as we could, we could show that we
were actually preparing for the next semester, and teachers were getting in
contact with some of their students and telling them, you know, we’ll give you
your tuition back, and we do plan to be – the spring semester by that time we’re
going to have facilities, and we plan to be open and ready to go in the spring
142 semester. So be prepared. So what we had to do then is we had to start working
on finding facilities to really have something going on in the spring semester.
Finding VI: Leadership decided to cancel most of the semester and refund
student’s tuition. The Chancellor made the decision to cancel most of the semester
(there were some classes that continued) and to refund tuition to the students. He
explained:
We were able to go back and pick up some of our computers and things like that
– we moved them out to the Stine facility. The faculty and staff just did a
tremendous job of contacting those students that had been in their programs.
They told them we were here – we’ve had a major disaster on our campus but we
will resume our operation and if you have questions, let us know and come by to
see us – our fall semester had been totally interrupted. Their major question was
when will they be able to go back to school – will we be able to go back to
classes during this semester? We couldn’t answer that question immediately. We
were able to make an assessment to the extent that based on the risk of molds –
some of the classrooms had been damaged – there was no way we could continue
that fall semester. What we did was cancel the remainder of the fall semester. We
refunded all of the tuition students had paid and informed them that we expected
to resume our classes for the spring semester. That is what we did.
There was never any question but that was the right thing to do. They were very
appreciative also. They had paid their tuition to get through the fall semester –
143 not only did they lose that semester but they did not need to lose the money as
well. We had our accounting system set up at Stine’s so we knew who had paid,
how much they had paid, the number of classes they had paid, and some refunds,
they came by and picked up – some – because the students had scattered as well
– they were all over. We managed to refund everyone that we knew of – no one
went away empty handed – they contacted us and we verified that they had paid
their tuition.
The Vice Chancellor of Workforce development also explained:
We were not able to keep the fall semester up and running – we were able to –
for seniors students in the process of technology area and senior students in the
litigation area were able to use the campus. The aviation folks were able to use
the campus in ABC school over in Westlake for the process technology students.
We were able to finish those two classes for senior students for the fall where
those people could graduate on time. But the other 1500 students, maybe 1600
students, we just had to refund them their tuition. We made a conscious effort or
a conscious decision as an administration that even though the semester was
about half over, we felt that we could not fulfill our obligation to our students
and we did not want to penalize them so we refunded them their tuition, and
made them 100% whole.
The Department Head of General Education stated,
The students were reassured that they would be refunded their money. This is
going to make me cry. That was the chancellor’s decision and he knew the
144 students needed that money or they would never get back in school again. You
asked how we got them there – those students who showed up at the time we met
in the hanger with them, they were communicating with the television stations
cause they were up and running. We tried to get messages out through media that
was available and through email. Of course, we knew our students scattered all
over. The media wasn’t going to reach them but we did have email for a lot of
students. We asked students to communicate with other students they knew.
The Coordinator of Workforce Development explained that this decision was important
to show the community and students that their best interests were being considered in
the decisions made by the institution’s leadership.
I don’t know the exact number but I know we – the fall semester we rebated –
they had already paid tuition, so we rebated that money. And that – doing that
was – I mean, that was a vote of confidence for the students. We proved to the
students that we had their best interest at heart. We didn’t – I guess legally we
could have done some, you know, make-shift classes here and there and yonder
and just kept the money. But when the Chancellor decided to refund that money,
it made a real statement about the spirit of the institution. So when it opened
back up in the spring. I don’t remember the number, but it seemed like we had a
very good enrollment.
145 Finding VII: Improvised continuity of fall semester. Although most of the
classes were cancelled and students were refunded their tuition, some face-to-face
classes were converted to online classes, and the online classes that had already existed
continued. Some technical classes were also taught off campus in nearby Westlake,
Louisiana.
One interviewee stated:
Some (students) withdrew and some actually stayed enrolled. Even the students
that originally enrolled in online classes were given the same option do you want
to continue or would you rather sit out his semester and wait for the next
semester.
The Institutional Researcher Director stated:
We were able to keep 400 online. We transferred a lot of classes online. At that
point we had – the online classes that were going on, of course just kept going.
They had no effect other than a lot of students didn’t have Internet access
anymore because they were going, you know, but they found it. Once they got to
where they were going, if they had Internet access, they could get back on and do
their class work.
The Executive Vice Chancellor recalled:
We even had some departments like process technology, they even had some
students that they had farmed out to industry and things like that. Some of the
other areas did the same thing in other departments. We still had a slight
enrollment.
146 The Vice Chancellor of Workforce Development stated:
We were not able to keep the fall semester up and running – we were able to –
for seniors students in the process of technology area and senior students in the
litigation area were able to use the campus. The aviation folks were able to use
the campus in ABC school over in West Lake for the process technology
students. We were able to finish those two classes for senior students for the fall
where those people could graduate on time.
A faculty member stated:
Actually, I was able to get my classes back up because I’d - once we got the
internet set up there, they did have to run the lines under it and get set up out
there, but once they did that, I was able to contact my students and continue with
my classes, especially my online class. The face-to-face classes – some of those
people actually I was able to do through the online class as well. There were
some classes that continued.
The Department Head of General Education stated:
We had several programs that were able to keep some or all of their courses
going. Probably, the one I’m most familiar with was the Process Technology
Department. They immediately – their department chair and faculty immediately
got with a training center on the other side of the lake – ABC Learning Center.
It was some American Builders and Contractors or something – it’s a private
training school – maybe it was a union training school – I’m not sure but it was a
147 facility that offered process quality training similar to what we were doing in our
process department. The department chair got with the folks at this training
center and we were able to move the process tech classes to that new location.
Now, not 100% of the students returned but a huge number of them did. At that
time, I was teaching a math class for process technology students and so even
though I was teaching math and not process technology, I went to the new
location and continued teaching the classes. Now we had to lengthen the time of
the classes – what had been a 50 minute class three days a week – those got
extended and we were going every day to make up for lost time. Through that
effort we were able to keep the process technology program going really strong.
Another thing that we were able to do in the general studies program is that we
had a number of instructors who had been trained and teaching online classes –
that was an option that we gave to a number of the students who had been in face
to face classes that if they wanted to switch to an online class, we would do that
for them, and they would continue. I don’t remember how many – maybe a
dozen or so online classes that were created as a result of students who wanted to
keep going with their education that semester but they couldn’t attend face to
face. We were able to keep a lot of students active during the fall semester. One
of the things that faculty did to earn their pay while we were there – faculty
brought in their own computers, their own printers – they used their own cell
phones to contact students. The equipment that was in a lot of the buildings could
not be brought out because of the mold issues so faculty members brought in
148 their own personal stuff. They had it at home and brought it with them to the
building we were working in and some folks came in and set up some electrical
cords to keep all that money and we accessed our class rosters and student
records, and every faculty member that had a phone was calling students and
telling them at that time that classes would be open again in the spring – they had
not lost their fall tuition – told them we wanted them to be there, told them what
day to come and where to come to sign up for classes so they could be ready and
be able to start in the spring. Of course, we also contacted a lot of those students
to tell them about which classes would be available online.
Finding VIII: Improvised campus. The Vice Chancellor of Workforce
Development also worked as the facilities director for SOWELA. His work in procuring
buildings so that SOWELA could hold classes in the spring was paramount. The
following is his story.
The truth of the matter was where we had eight buildings that were damaged. We
were able to get five of the eight cleaned up where we could have classes, which
was okay. The two small ones in the heart of the campus – the two main
buildings – were not able to be cleaned up in time and they were put on a slow
track. I mean a slow track for the company so what we did, we re-negotiated with
the folks at FEMA to put together a temporary campus. They came in – their
representative came into the education ring and he designed a beautiful modular
campus that could go out – we had about 28 acres of concrete for our parking lot
– it was an old air base. He designed this beautiful modular campus that we
149 could have. He said “I’ll get the corps of engineers over here and they will put
this together, and by January, you’ll be up and running.” We were excited. This
was October. Now in November, they were going to go down to New Orleans
and go to Southern University of New Orleans, and they were going to put a
campus in for the Southern University of New Orleans. In December, they are
going to start on your campus. Sounds good. We’re all for that. November
comes, November goes. December comes – December 1 I’m standing out in the
parking lot waiting for the corps of engineers to roll in with my modular campus.
I called my friend at FEMA and said, “I thought we were going to get started
today on putting my modular campus together.” Well, we are negotiating with
the corps so we’ll get back to you. We had phone calls every day. On the 6th of
December, I said, “well, we are going to open from a month from today. We
really haven’t scratched an inch here and we’re going into the holidays – do you
think we are going to be able to do this?” They said, “Do you have a plan B?” I
said “No but by sundown I’ll have a plan B.” I got on the phone and started
calling modular building places and got hold of the engineers that were doing our
industrial hygienist – they had a civil engineer on their payroll and they got him
to do the modular. Based on low bid for the modular, we found a company over
in Texas and when they called back on the 7th, I said, “the corps of engineers
hasn’t even started on Southern University and it will be March before we come
to see you.” I said that wasn’t going to work. So then I called FEMA. I said
“look – we are going to be back in business in January and this is what I need
150 you to nod your head up and down – that is all you need to do. We’ll take care of
the rest. “So, I said what you want to do. “We’ll put up a modular campus – you
all are supposed to take care of it.” I said, yeah we can do that – it’s covered
under the same letters A though G. A is the highest part (hospitals, saving stuff)
and B is immediate need. D is where you start rebuilding temporary structures. I
told them we’ve got to have it – let us go forward. He said go ahead – here are
the bids – here is an engineering design – will you approve this and have the
office of risk management approve it? It was self-insured. What they do, they
cover the first $25 billion dollars in catastrophic property loss and anything over
that they have underwriters that cover the rest. Well, Katrina had hit and wiped
out there $25 billion they had in their risk management and they never thought
they would have two catastrophic events in one year so they are sitting there in
Lake Charles with Rita and the side thing about it is, that while we had a lot of
damage, the state portion of it was over bid about $25 billion so they weren’t
going to be able to reach out and get any help. They had spent all their $25
billion. It was pretty fun there for a while on who was going to pay the bill but
that wasn’t going to be my pocket. We did get the approval from the right folks –
they delivered on the 22nd of December, and they rolled in every day – they had
to shut it down on Christmas. They had hooked trucks – they were sitting in
truck stops over in Texas but they couldn’t move on Christmas day. Every day,
except Christmas Day, we rolled trailers in there and we had electrical and
plumbing contractors out there to bring in power, sewer and water to those
151 trailers and we set up a temporary campus and had to rob Peter to pay Paul to get
the transformers to run the electricity. We opened the campus on the 13th of
January – we didn’t have power in the buildings. On the 14th we had power and
we started having classes in the spring – SOWELA came back to life.
The Chancellor stated:
We knew that most of the buildings that we had would not be – we couldn’t
occupy. We began negotiating to have temporary buildings moved onto the
campus so that we would be ready for that spring semester. It was done in a
really tight time frame but we were able to get those modular buildings delivered
and set up and able to move some of our equipment back into those modular
buildings that had been into the other areas that we could not occupy like the
administration building - you couldn’t occupy it but certain areas were cleared
enough for us to go in and get our instructional materials, computers and things
like that, and move them over into the modular. We did that and we were able to
resume our classes for the spring semester. The one program that we were not
able to bring back on campus because – the administration building was more
heavily damaged than anything else – and of course the other programs that were
housed in that building – Office of Occupations, Drafting and Design, Basic
Studies – we were able to operate those programs in the modular buildings but
we had a really good large culinary occupations program, and they operated the
culinary program in the cafeteria in the administration building. We weren’t able
152 to bring them back for that spring semester but we negotiated with the City of
Lake Charles who had kitchen facilities at the Lake Charles Civic Center to
house that program at the civic center. Actually, the culinary program on a
voluntary basis had set up a basic operation at the Lake Charles Civic Center to
help feed the displaced people around southwest Louisiana and this whole area
as a service to those people who didn’t have homes. There were many of them,
and a lot of them were housed in the Lake Charles Civic Center. Our culinary
operation was already pretty well established over there in that they had been
cooking and serving meals for the people who were displaced.
We found a company in Houston that said they could provide us with the
buildings and set them up for us on campus. They would hook up the electricity
and everything for us so that they would be ready to go whenever we needed
them. We had – there is a state office – of course we had to go through that state
office and they, along with our facility people, negotiated with this company to
deliver these modular buildings and place them and set them up on campus,
ready for us to use. They were delivered by truck from Houston.
Several members of the administration, faculty and staff worked to make the portable
buildings usable for all the students. The Institutional Research Director stated:
The Vice Chancellor of Workforce Development and the assistant director of
workforce development as well as a faculty member and a security guard built
153 were building ramps to get into the new portable buildings. They put the
buildings out there but they didn’t put any kind of stairs or anything to them.
The Workforce Development Director explained:
We had a blank parking lot one day. A week later, we had a complete campus set
up just in what used to be the old airfield. So that was quite an undertaking in
itself. Like I said we built those ramps, which was kind of cool. It was kind of
cool being able to do that.
Finding IX: SOWELA’S persistence led to outside help. The Chancellor
explained that outside help in the form of monetary donations was a major factor in
allowing SOWELA to remain viable and continue its mission. He explained:
When we were in the Stine Center – we began to get financial contributions from
people who would just come in and say they wanted to contribute. One guy came
in and we had an administrative area and a student services area – all of that in
this one big, huge room. We had temporary folding tables. This guy comes in
and wanted to talk to me. He told me I know the good that SOWELA does and I
want to help. He said the best way I can help, I don’t know what your needs are,
but the best way I can help is to make a donation. So I said that would help. We
do need some supplies and things like that. He said okay. He pulled out his
checkbook and I was sitting across the table from him, and he started writing the
check. He gave it to me and I looked at it, and I was just staggered - $50,000.00.
I said, Oh my gosh! He said that’s fine. That’s what I want to do. He said the
154 only thing is to never reveal my name. I don’t want any publicity on this – I
don’t want any credit – I don’t want any of that but I want to help. I’ve never let
anyone know.
We got a $300,000 donation from the Bush family. Bush – former President
George Walker Herbert Bush and Bill Clinton, who really became pretty good
buddies, you know, even though they ran against each other for president – they
formed a non-profit agency to help areas that were hit by natural disasters and
they were able to solicit a lot of money for that purpose with the understanding
that they would use that money by making contributions to areas and agencies
that had been hit by earth quakes, or hurricanes, or tornados, floods – everything.
The big – Katrina was the big one. No one in southwest Louisiana believes
Katrina was a little one. Katrina got most of the publicity. When it came to the
educational – talking about the University of New Orleans, Tulane, SOWELA –
the administrative staff of all those institutions had formed an organization to
meet on a regular basis and make continuous assessments of situations of what
can we do – can we communicate with the Secretary of Education – they would
try to organize some kind of effort where everyone would be working together to
overcome the disaster. That organization was housed at the University of New
Orleans. They had been meeting since Katrina. When Hurricane Rita hit
southwest Louisiana, Dave Hebert and I were contacted by the people from UNO
who represented all the other institutions to see if we wanted to join in with them
155 since we were the two institutions outside of that New Orleans area that were
most severely impacted by Hurricane Rita. We said yes, we did. So we began
meeting with them. At some point – I don’t know who generated the effort on the
part of Presidents Bush and Clinton, but they apparently were contacted and were
given an assessment of the damages that these institutions in this area had
experienced. They agreed to make a donation to all of the different schools. One
day I was sitting in my office and Hebert said, can you come to Glen Oak. Their
campus was very badly damaged – buildings closed and everything. He said do
you think you could find time to come to UNO – we are going to – Presidents
Bush and Clinton are going to be here and they are going to be handing out
checks to different institutions. I said you’d better believe I’ll be there. Hebert
and I went over there and I think SOWELA was $300,000 or $350,000 – all of us
were there in the room, and Presidents Clinton and Bush came through and
shook hands with everyone and chatted a little bit. They said the contributions
for our institutions had been approved by their board and that we could expect to
receive a check.
Finding X: Effective networking took place. Throughout the recovery efforts
effective networking took place. This networking was the result of longstanding
relationships that the leadership and staff of SOWELA had developed over the years.
The Institutional Research Director explained that she and her husband (who also
worked at SOWELA) used their networking capacity to be able to get back into the city:
156 And luckily one of the people on the bus, the head of the Shrine worked for the
Attorney General’s Office. So he called and then I called a friend of mine at the
Sheriff’s Department and my husband called a friend that he had at the Marshal’s
office, and we said look, we got to at least get off because all of our cars are over
here. So they let the bus off. They didn’t even stop us. I guess when they had
gotten word, they knew it was us so they let us off.
The Department Head of Criminal Justice stated:
Most of getting stuff to go was our leadership just knowing people and
contacting people. I mean by – by our guys getting out there and making
contacts. Our administrators calling in favors probably is what happened.
Because if we wouldn’t have had a center to meet at, it would have been the end
for a lot of people. But just good politics is what I’m trying to say. Networking,
making connections and people valuing SOWELA in the community like the
Stine family at that time that wanted to help. Our Chancellor and our Vice
Chancellor of Academic Affairs, I have to give them credit because I think
they’re the ones that went out and hit the pavement and made phone calls.
The CEO of Stine Lumber Company explained why the company decided to
provide assistance to SOWELA.
That assistance probably would not have happened if I had not had a good
relationship with the Vice Chancellor of Workforce Development that we
developed over the years and if I had not had such an incredible respect for the
man.
157 Finding XI: A strong family culture existed among the SOWELA staff. One
faculty member stated:
I think the biggest factor was the sense of family that SOWELA has. They have
been around since 1938 and many of the people who work there still have that
sense of culture and sense of history that SOWELA has always had. I never
worked any place where people are so giving and so – it’s like one big family. I
think it was like, we are a family and there is no way that we are going to give up
this.
Because I think most of the people who work at SOWELA know why they work
there. They are there for the students – we see our students probably throughout
their careers more than other colleges and other places of education do because
we follow them. They come back and re-enforce their education even as adults.
There is closeness – the whole thing has cohesion to it that I don’t think major
universities have. They don’t see their students in that way. It’s the attitude more
than anything else. We are there for the students, and the students like us and we
like them. It’s a sense of family.
Another Interviewee stated:
I think Lake Charles as a community, and SOWELA as a family knew if we
were going to do anything, we were going to have to do it on our own. There was
no way to get help over here when the help was going in other directions. It took
the initiative of the faculty and the staff – all of them saying we are going to
158 make this work. I think it was their attitude – it was the primary reason – a lot of
them had to put their personal hardships on hold – they couldn’t build their own
houses right now but they could certainly come to work and help build where
they were working. One Interviewee said,
When you come to a job on a day-to-day basis, and you know you greet people
hey, hey, how are you today, things like that. Then you don’t really understand
what it really means until something like this hits. It was really kind of
overwhelming to see when people returned back from (being evacuated) how
happy and excited everybody was to really see everybody again.
This family culture that was pervasive at SOWELA often resulted in a lack of protocol.
One interviewee stated:
The leadership was – it wasn’t where you couldn’t talk. I could go talk to
anybody on campus. I could go to the chancellor anytime I needed to. I could go
to a student worker and talk to them if I needed to. If I had a problem, I talked to
the person that I had a problem with. I didn’t have to go to my boss to go to my
boss to go their bosses to go down to them.
The Department Head of Criminal Justice explained the culture of the institution before
the storm:
I could go to my boss and if I didn’t like what he said, I could go straight to the
chancellor. The chancellor would walk the halls and talk to you. And at faculty
meetings, we would know who people were.
159 This family culture facilitated a flattening of the college’s organization during the
recovery, which is common during a crisis. Leadership, faculty, and staff did not hesitate
to do work that was outside their job description during the recovery. The Vice
Chancellor of Workforce Development recalled:
We had nurses out there that were rollers – they were sanding and painting the
ramps. They were proud of the work they did. We don’t just have time to clean
your classroom so the faculty did it and didn’t mind. They totally understood that
if they didn’t do it themselves, it just wouldn’t get done because we were running
out of time.
Another Interviewee stated,
It took everybody working together. And I don’t think – I don’t think that I can
say there wasn’t anybody who didn’t pitch in and wasn’t willing to help one
department helping another as well as the individual faculty within the
department.
The workforce coordinator stated:
I brought my tractor. A couple of days later the Vice Chancellor of Academics
brought his. He had a front-end loader with a backhoe. That was something. He
would take the front-end of that backhoe and he just tore stuff. He done more
damage with that thing. I love him, but he was something on that backhoe. He
had his rig there. I had my equipment there. So we got all of the rubbish cleared
out where we could kind of get around. The road cleared out where we could get
160 in with trucks and that kind of thing. Then we got on the roof. My supervisor and
I put tarps on the roof so if it rained, it wouldn’t destroy or do more damage.
Another interviewee stated,
We all pulled together as a team. And even people that may not have been titled
as an administrator if there was something that needed to be done, everybody
rolled up their sleeves and got it done. I know there were days that probably our
Vice Chancellor of Academics and our Vice Chancellor of Workforce
Development, I know that there were times that they were up on the roof with a
nail and hammer putting the plastic stuff over there so we would not continue to
get rain pouring in. So whatever people needed to do, they did.
The lack of protocol and flat organizational culture sometimes caused problems during
the recovery since leadership and staff would take initiative in areas that were outside
their expertise. The Director of Institutional Research described such a situation.
The V.C. of Workforce Development handled putting the network attachments
to the computer to those portable buildings. That should not have been him. That
should have been my area, at least converse with me so I could tell him which
building would be the best one to put it at. Where would the best run be, that
kind of thing. So we weren’t asked about any of our knowledge at that point. He
just did it, which kind of led to some problems later, but we made our way
through it.
161 Conclusion
This chapter presented the findings for the second research question: What were
the actions of institutional leadership of SOWELA Technical Community College in the
aftermath of Hurricane Rita?
The findings from the data analysis were: (1) Lack of Preparation; (2)
Improvised communication; (3) Taking initiative while circumventing rules and
regulations; (4) A primary concern for the chancellor was that the staff was paid and not
furloughed; (5) Improvised alternate site saved employees from being furloughed; (6)
Leadership decided to cancel most of the semester and refund student’s tuition; (7)
Improvised continuity of fall semester; (8) Improvised campus; (9) SOWELA’s
persistence led to outside help; (10) Effective networking took place; (11) A strong
family culture existed among the SOWELA staff.
162 Chapter Six: Discussion
Introduction
In August and September of 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita made landfall
and devastated the Gulf Coast with damages estimated at $118.5 billion (National
Hurricane Center, 2011). Hurricane Katrina was so devastating that the number of lives
lost and injuries sustained is still being calculated (FEMA, 2011). Hurricane Rita, which
made landfall along the border of Louisiana and Texas just a few weeks after Katrina,
did not cause as much damage as Katrina but was devastating nonetheless. In both cases,
two community colleges, Nunez Community College and SOWELA Technical
Community College, were damaged to the point that the future of the colleges was in
doubt. Both colleges, however, are operating today, and SOWELA is the third fastest
growing community college in the nation (Community College Weekly, 2011). This
study investigated the actions taken by the leadership of these two institutions in
response to the two hurricanes.
This chapter provides the statement of the problem, the research questions, and
methods. The chapter continues with a synopsis of the findings, the findings related to
the literature, the emerged theory, a theoretical discussion, a general discussion,
implications, and concludes with recommendations for future research.
Statement of the Problem
In the past 12 years several disasters have forced different sectors of society to
focus on the inevitability of such crises and how to plan and respond effectively to them.
163 There are obviously different types of crises and varied typologies have emerged in the
literature in the last decade. Smith and Riley (2012) developed perhaps the most widely
used crisis typologies that fall into five categories:
Short-term crisis: ones that are sudden in arrival and swift in conclusion.
Cathartic crisis: ones that are slow in build-up, reach a critical point, and then
can be swiftly resolved.
Long-term crisis: ones that develop slowly and then bubble for a very long time
without any clear resolution.
One-off crisis: ones that are quite unique and would not be expected to recur.
Infectious crisis: ones that occur and are seemingly resolved quickly, but leave
behind other issues to be addressed, some of which may subsequently develop into their
own crisis.
Organizations are often confronted with crises and their ability to plan and
respond is imperative to the organization’s survival and viability. Crises are often caused
by a disaster. Hoffman and Oliver-Smith (1999) defined disaster as “a process leading to
an event that involves a combination of a potentially destructive agent from the natural
or technological sphere and a population in a socially produced condition of
vulnerability” (p. 4).
Organizational crises pose several challenges for leaders. Seegar, Sellnow, and
Ulmer (2003) summarized the importance of leadership during a crisis:
Leaders inculcate and personify many of the organization’s values and set the
overall tone and direction of the organization. During a crisis, a leader often
164 becomes the organization’s public face, playing a critical role by providing
information and explaining the crisis to stakeholders and the larger public. Crisis
frequently requires that leaders respond to accusations of wrongdoing, justify and
explain choices, and offer personal assurances that problems will be corrected.
Leadership frequently frames the larger meaning of the crisis, which may be
necessary for followers to begin the initial sense-making process that ultimately
leads to coordinated, harm-reducing actions. In addition, the leader may establish
an overall tone for the crisis by remaining calm, personifying authority and
control, and reinforcing core values. Leadership, therefore, is one of the most
important and visible organizational roles in the aftermath of a crisis. (p. 238;
Jacobsen, 2010, p. 3)
Crisis management literature often focuses on the military and the private sector,
but all sectors of society are vulnerable:
Increasingly, crises are common parts of the social, psychological, political,
economic, and organizational landscape of modern life. They affect more people
than ever before, are more widely reported in the media, and have a wider impact
on increasingly interconnected, dynamic, and complex social-technical systems.
(Seegar et al, 2003, p. 3; Jacobsen, 2010, p. 3)
Higher education institutions sometimes face crises and the actions of
institutional leadership are often the primary driver in effectively responding to the
crisis. Since each crisis is unique, it behooves researchers to study the actions of leaders
in different crisis events. Although there is literature that focuses on crisis management
165 on campuses, there is little written on specific actions taken by campus leaders during a
crisis, especially one caused by a natural disaster.
Research Questions
1. What were the actions of the institutional leadership of Nunez Community
College in response to Hurricane Katrina?
2. What were the actions of the institutional leadership of SOWELA Technical
Community College in the aftermath of Hurricane Rita?
3. What were the similarities and differences in the actions of the institutional
leadership of the two colleges in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?
Methodology
This study used a qualitative methodology. It was a multiple case study of two
community colleges. Qualitative methodologies are based on interpretivism, which
“grew out of the work of eighteenth century German philosopher Immanuel Kant and
was expanded by Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber, Edmund Husserl and others” (Glesne,
2011, p. 8). The ontological basis that accompanies interpretivist epistemology is one
that “portrays a world in which reality is socially constructed, complex, and ever
changing” (p. 8). What is most important, then, is “how people interpret and make
meaning of some object, event, action, perception, etc.” (p. 8). A qualitative study,
therefore, can assess “the perspectives of several members of the same social group
about some phenomena” and “can begin to say something about cultural patterns of
thought and action for that group” (p. 8).
166 A multiple case study method best fits when the researcher “has little control
over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life
context” (Yin, 2003, p. 1). Case study research “allows investigators to retain the holistic
and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (p. 2). The case study approach offers
a means of understanding in depth a view of a particular setting, the participants and/or a
phenomenon. Marshall and Rossman (2011) described a case study as “the most
complex strategy, (which) may entail multiple methods – interviews, observations,
historical and document analysis, and even surveys,” a number of which have been used
during the research process (p. 94).
A systematic procedure was applied to the collection of data. The specific
methodology for collecting this data will include the following:
Document and archival analysis
Semi-structured and in-depth interviews
Since this study focused on the actions of institutional leaders of Nunez
Community College and SOWELA Technical Community College in the aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and the researcher began with no a priori theoretical
orientation, grounded theory was most appropriate to use in the researcher’s approach.
In grounded theory the researcher “generates a general explanation (a theory) of a
process, action or interaction shaped by the views of a large number of participants”
(Creswell, 2007, p. 63). Grounded theory originated in sociology in the 1960s when
Barney Glaser and Asselm Strauss felt that a priori approaches were ill-suited to their
167 research. Grounded theorists hold that “theories should be ‘grounded’ in data from the
field, especially in the actions, interactions or process of people” (Creswell, p. 63).
Since the 1960s several different versions of grounded theory have emerged.
This study used a constructivist grounded theory method first described by Charmaz
(2000, 2009) and later by Corbin (2008), Clark (2003, 2009), Morse et al. (2009) and
Stein (2009). Constructivist grounded theory is less positivist than the original Glaserian
method and takes on a relativist and reflexive approach to the research (Charmaz, 2009).
Discussion of Findings
Using several coding procedures consistent with a grounded theory approach,
several themes emerged from the data. A synopsis of these findings is presented in this
section.
Findings for research question one. The first research question for this study
was, “What were the actions of the institutional leadership of Nunez Community
College in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina?”
The findings from the data analysis were 1) Lack of Preparation; 2) Improvised
response to storm’s landfall; 3) Improvised communication; 4) Improvised security and
cleanup; 5) An improvised alternated site; 6) Improvised continuity; 7) Persistence and
continuity; 8) Improvised repair and cleanup of facilities; 9) The college became an
oasis for the community; 10) Effective networking took place; 11) A strong sense of
community was pervasive during the recovery; and 12) The chancellor’s leadership was
paramount to the college’s survival.
168 Nunez Community College did not prepare adequately for Hurricane Katrina. To
be fair, and many interviewees expressed this, the hurricane’s winds and rain did not
cause the catastrophe that ensued – the break in the levee system did. Nonetheless, most
of the administrators, faculty, and staff fully expected to return to have a normal fall
semester once the storm passed. Many interviewees stated that this attitude resulted from
many previous evacuation orders that proved to be false alarms.
Because there was no serious crisis management plan in the event of a
catastrophic event, many of the preparations were improvised. The chancellor’s first
priority was to ensure the safety of his staff and students. He encouraged the evacuation
of all employees as well as residents in the community. The chancellor, however, along
with 20 other individuals, decided to stay at the college. Several interviewees stated that
they felt that they were safer at the college than staying at home or evacuating. Some
stated that they wanted to stay in order to assist the chancellor since they knew that he
would not evacuate. The chancellor and others also said that they wanted to protect the
college from the possibility of looters and also have the college prepared if a shelter was
needed for the residents of the parish and surrounding areas.
Hurricane Katrina passed and many people thought that New Orleans and its
hinterland escaped a calamity. The storm surge that was produced by Hurricane Katrina
while it was a Category 5 storm in the Gulf, however, proved too much for the levee
system that protected St. Bernard Parish. Nearly 100% of the structures in the parish
were flooded. The chancellor and those that had elected to stay at the college found
themselves in a precarious situation since the first floor was inundated. They had enough
169 food to last over a week, however, and they did set up generators as well. Where the
leadership and staff lacked in preparation, they made up through their improvising
abilities.
Once St. Bernard Parish was flooded, communication was impossible for several
days. Through improvised means such as texting and an ad hoc website created by staff
who had evacuated, communication was established. Several interviewees recalled how
it was their first time to use text messaging. It was texting, however, that served as the
means with which the chancellor was able to communicate to a staff member that he and
the others at the college were safe. The website proved to be vital in establishing
communication between faculty, staff, administrators, and students. It was through this
website that staff began communicating with students and informing them of the
school’s future plans.
It was several days after the flooding that the individuals who had stayed at the
college were able to leave. While there, they immediately began improvised cleanup and
security. The chancellor recalled that the first floor had at least six feet of water so they
began securing and protecting equipment on the second and third floors. He was also
concerned about the bathroom facilities and made sure that the toilets were functional.
The facilities director stated that they had heard rumors about looting through a police
radio, so he concocted Molotov cocktails in the event that they would have to confront
any intruders. Most of the people who came by the school by boat, however, were
simply neighbors who had elected to ride out the storm. The chancellor and others stated
170 they were happy they stayed at the college since there were some incidents of looting in
the parish. They felt that by staying, the school was protected.
Eventually, with the help of the Coast Guard and the National Guard, everyone
who had stayed at the college was able to leave. Most went to Baton Rouge, where they
met with staff that had evacuated before the storm. Louisiana Community Technical
College System (LCTCS) is situated in Baton Rouge, so it was a logical place to
congregate. The staff that had already been in Baton Rouge had taken initiative and were
already reaching out to students and fellow Nunez colleagues. The Baton Rouge site was
extremely important because LCTCS provided Nunez with a building where staff could
work. Several members of the Nunez staff were fortunate to have family who lived in
Baton Rouge, and since it was spared from the brunt of both Katrina and Rita, Baton
Rouge was the perfect place for people to stay and work. Many members of Nunez’s
staff, however, began making the long trek back and forth between Chalmette, where
Nunez is located, and Baton Rouge. They were not the only ones. The roads were
usually extremely congested and it would take several hours to drive back and forth.
Nunez Community College’s leadership worked from Baton Rouge until January of
2006.
Despite skepticism Nunez would have a future, the staff, and especially the
chancellor, pressed forward to continue with at least some instruction and started
planning for the spring. Dogged persistence, online classes, dual enrollment, and the
maintenance of the nursing program facilitated by strong networking allowed for
continuity.
171 This improvised continuity was key to eventually acquiring outside help in the
form of money and volunteers. Continuity was also instrumental in convincing officials
in Baton Rouge that Nunez was worth saving since there were discussions among state
officials that it might have been in the best interest of everyone if Nunez closed until the
following year. The chancellor expressed his concerns in several interviews that if
Nunez had closed it would never reopen. The chancellor, therefore, was resolute in his
insistence that the school remain open. Because classes had continued, albeit online and
off campus, donations began to come in. The most important donation came from the
Bush and Clinton fund. The Bush and Clinton fund contributed nearly a million dollars
for the restoration of Nunez Community College. It is doubtful that this money would
have ever made it to Nunez if it had not been in operation. Volunteers from around the
United States and world began to flood the area to help. One interviewee became very
emotional when he recounted the work of the volunteers.
An advantage Nunez Community College had in its recovery was that it was also
a technical college. Many of the employees had the skill set to repair the damaged
facilities. The moment the chancellor recalled as most important was when they were
able to get the electricity working. It was four months to the day after Hurricane Katrina
made landfall. The electrician at Nunez was instrumental in making this happen. The
chancellor often recalled this story when discussing some of the most important actions
taken by the leadership. He stated that once they had electricity, he knew that they would
survive and continue serving students in the area. One of the most difficult aspects of the
recovery was the cleanup. Through example, the chancellor led the charge donning his
172 rubber boots and cleaning out the mud that had accumulated on the first floor. All the
interviewees stated that nearly everyone worked on the cleanup regardless of position.
The main building at Nunez Community College was one of the first in St.
Bernard Parish to have electricity. Once the spring semester began, classes were held at
the main facility. Many interviewees stated how the campus became an oasis for people
returning to the community as well as for employees. Many of the students and staff
would stay at the college long after classes were over to talk. Employees, many of whom
had lost their homes and most of their possessions, stated that the college was the only
place where they felt normal. The chancellor and others said that the college had a
cathartic effect on people in the community.
Effective networking, a strong sense of community during the recovery, and the
chancellor’s leadership were major themes that emerged in the findings. The chancellor
had been a former legislator, which gave him access to people in state government. The
chancellor had also been involved in education in the area his entire life and was well
known and respected by people in the St. Bernard and New Orleans area. This facilitated
many of the improvised responses the leadership was engaged in during the crisis. Other
individuals at the college had lived in the area their entire lives. The residents of St.
Bernard Parish rarely leave to live somewhere else. One interviewee stated that she
knew people in Chalmette that had never left the parish until Hurricane Katrina arrived.
This strong sense of community was pervasive throughout the recovery and facilitated
an effective response. Part of community is identity and many interviewees stated how
proud they were to be from the area. This sense of identity was one of the factors that
173 motivated the leadership to work hard to save Nunez. Many interviewees explained that
if Nunez did not survive or even if it became part of the Delgado system in nearby New
Orleans, many of the students in their service area would not attend since the college is
so connected with the identity of the community. Every interviewee except the
chancellor stated that it was through the chancellor’s leadership that the college
survived. Even interviewees who admitted that they would often disagree with the
chancellor about administrative policies before the storm stated that if it had not been for
him there would no longer be a Nunez Community College.
Although Nunez Community College was not prepared for the catastrophe that
occurred and there were systemic institutional failures at the local, state, and federal
level in preparing and responding to Hurricane Katrina, the ability to execute an
effective improvised response facilitated by strong leadership, effective networking, a
strong sense of identity and community allowed the college to overcome institutional
failures and remain viable in its service to the people in the St. Bernard Parish service
area.
Findings for research question two. The second research question for this
study was, “What were the actions of the institutional leadership of SOWELA Technical
Community College in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina?”
The findings from the data analysis were 1) Lack of Preparation; 2) Improvised
communication; 3) Taking initiative while circumventing rules and regulations; 4) A
primary concern for the chancellor was that the staff was paid and not furloughed; 5)
Improvised alternate site saved employees from being furloughed; 6) Leadership
174 decided to cancel most of the semester and refund student’s tuition; 7) Improvised
continuity of fall semester; 8) Improvised campus; 9) SOWELA’s persistence led to
outside help; 10) Effective networking took place; and, 11) A strong family culture
existed among the SOWELA staff.
Although the leadership at SOWELA had seen the devastation that was wrought
by Hurricane Katrina a few weeks before, their institutional preparation for Hurricane
Rita was still inadequate. All interviewees concurred with this. Most interviewees stated
that although Hurricane Katrina gave them ample warning of what could happen; few
took the storm as seriously as they should have. Hurricane Katrina did inform their
decision to evacuate, but most thought they would be back in a few days to start the
semester. Most of the damage that occurred was due to tornadoes caused by the
hurricane, rendering nearly every building on campus unusable.
Once the storm passed, members of SOWELA’s staff began to trickle back into
the Lake Charles area. Many had to evacuate to other states since hotels were full with
Katrina evacuees. After the leadership did a quick triage of the buildings, the chancellor
stated that his first priority was to communicate with his staff. The use of cell phones
and especially text messaging became a primary mode of communication among the
staff. The Information Technology (IT) personnel created a temporary website that
informed staff and students and also allowed them to communicate.
A few weeks after the storm, the leadership held a meeting that included
administrators, faculty, staff, and students. The meeting took place at the Airport
Authority Building since access to the campus was restricted. The chancellor
175 communicated with everyone explaining the situation and a meal was served to the
attendees.
Although the state had restricted access to the campus, leadership often took
initiative while circumventing rules and regulations. No interviewee was shy about
admitting this and even took some pride in telling stories of how they hid from state
officials and sneaked on and off campus in order to save data, equipment, or other items
they felt were necessary for the continuity of the college. Through this action, equipment
and data, such as financial aid records, were saved.
Almost every interviewee indicated that the state was on the verge of furloughing
the employees of SOWELA. No documentation was found to support this claim, but the
leadership interviewed from SOWELA all concurred. The chancellor’s primary concern
after Hurricane Rita was that his employees were not furloughed. An improvised
alternate site, however, put those fears to rest. Stine Lumber Company donated a
building that they had used for years since they had just moved a few months prior to
another location. Once this building was acquired by SOWELA, employees began
reporting to work there every day. At the Stine building, administration, staff, and
faculty contacted students, transferred face-to-face classes to online, advised students,
etc. Much to the satisfaction of the leadership, everyone was paid and paid on time.
Although there was an alternate site to do administrative work and plan for the
future, much of the semester had passed without holding classes and the chancellor and
other leaders decided to cancel most of the semester and refund the students’ tuition.
176 This, many felt, was important to show the community and the students that SOWELA
prioritized the interests of the students.
The entire semester was not cancelled and an improvised fall semester allowed
for continuity through online classes and off campus teaching that occurred in a private
sector facility. The classes that had already been online stayed online and some classes
that had been face-to-face were converted to online if the faculty member was familiar
with online instruction (online instruction was new for many community colleges in
Louisiana in 2005).
Once the decision was made to cancel most of the semester and refund students’
tuition while maintaining some continuity in the fall, the leadership began planning for
the spring semester. It was obvious that several of the buildings would not be ready
because of mold remediation and repairs, so the Vice Chancellor of Workforce
Development, who also managed facilities, started working toward procuring temporary
buildings so that classes could be held in the spring of 2006. Through tenacity and
networking he was able to get enough temporary buildings (these were trailers with
restrooms) to hold classes in the spring. The buildings needed stairs and ramps, so
several members of the staff, including a math instructor and a security guard, built the
wooden stairs as well as the ramps to make the buildings wheelchair accessible.
Everyone involved in building the stairs and ramps stated that their carpentry skills
improved with each one built, and it was obvious which ones were built first and which
ones were built last.
177 SOWELA’s persistence led to outside help. The chancellor became emotional
discussing the tremendous support SOWELA received from the community and outside
groups in the form of monetary contributions. The chancellor recalled how one
community member, who wished to remain anonymous, wrote the chancellor a $50,000
check, and the Bush/Clinton fund gave SOWELA $300,000. These contributions were
vital in allowing SOWELA to continue its mission of serving the students of southwest
Louisiana.
In every instance that leadership progressed towards recovery, effective
networking took place. Whether it was getting access to enter Lake Charles after
evacuating, or procuring a temporary site for staff to work, or negotiating to acquire
buildings for an improvised campus, the relationships that the leadership had fostered
over decades was paramount to the success of the recovery.
A consistent theme that emerged was that every interviewee discussed the family
atmosphere that SOWELA had before and after the storm. This facilitated the recovery
in most cases since a flat organizational culture encouraged initiative, which made it
easier for administration to focus on the broad issues like pay, facilities, and decisions
regarding tuition. At times, this flat organizational culture created problems when
individuals took initiative in an area where they had no expertise.
Although SOWELA Technical Community College was not prepared for the
devastation wrought by Hurricane Rita, strong leadership, networking, a strong culture
of family in the college, and a capacity to improvise allowed SOWELA to not only
remain viable but to continue its mission of service to the people of southwest Louisiana
178 almost uninterrupted. The spring 2006 enrollment was one of the largest enrollments in
SOWELA history and the school has continued to grow.
Findings for research question three. The third research question for this study
was “What were the similarities and differences in the actions of the institutional
leadership of the two colleges in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?”
Similarities. In both case studies, the findings showed that neither community
college, Nunez Community College or SOWELA Technical Community College were
adequately prepared for the storm. Neither had a serious crisis or disaster management
plan and interviewees from both colleges stated that they fully expected to have a
regular fall semester. The one outlier among the interviewees was a faculty member at
Nunez who had, just prior to the storm, purchased a house in central Mississippi where
he and his family could evacuate in the event of a storm like Katrina.
In both cases most of the preparations for the storm were largely improvised, as
was the recovery. Communication is vital in any crisis, and the ability of the personnel
to improvise communication was effective. Cell phones in 2005 were not as common as
today, especially among many of the older staff members. The use of cell phones,
however, especially text messaging, proved to be extremely valuable in each case. It was
through a text, for example, that the Nunez chancellor was able to inform others that he
was alive, which was not apparent while he and 20 others were on the second floor of
Nunez’s main facility while the entire parish was inundated. Ad hoc websites made by
personnel at both colleges also provided an important means of communicating with
other staff members as well as locating and informing students.
179 For both Nunez and SOWELA, it was paramount that an alternate site was found
and used since the facilities at both campuses were unusable following the storm. It was
particularly trying for the personnel at Nunez because many, after having lost nearly
everything, had to drive to Baton Rouge to work, a trip that normally takes nearly two
hours. The SOWELA personnel were fortunate to have a site donated by the Stine
family. In both cases everyone worked to create an improvised administration site so
that plans could be made and put into action.
Interviewees at Nunez Community College often spoke about strong community
ties that bound everyone together in St. Bernard Parish. They felt that this identity
motivated them to work toward making Nunez a viable community college again. One
interviewee, who was born in St. Bernard Parish, stated that although the town she and
her family have moved to was less than 30 miles away, it would never really be home.
This was indicative of many of the interviewees from Nunez Community College. A
similar theme emerged among the SOWELA interviewees. Nearly everyone commented
on the family atmosphere and culture that was pervasive among the leadership and
personnel at SOWELA. The strong attachment to place and to each other found at both
colleges facilitated the effective improvised actions of the leadership. This family
culture created a flat organizational structure, and personnel throughout the organization,
not just the administration, displayed leadership through the crisis.
Strong community ties and a flat organizational culture did have its
disadvantages. Several interviewees from Nunez stated that the strong community that
existed, and still exists in the St. Bernard Parish is the college’s biggest strength and
180 biggest weakness. The strength of community was apparent in the college’s response
after the storm. Throughout the years before the storm, however, it fostered a certain
provincialism that created a less than open atmosphere. One Nunez interviewee stated
that they have worked to become more open since the storm. SOWELA’s lack of
protocol often led to inefficiencies before and after the storm. Interviewees stated
personnel would often take initiative and begin to work in areas where they had little
experience, which created more problems. For example, one interviewee stated that the
Vice Chancellor of Academics at SOWELA brought his personal backhoe and began
operating it to help in the cleanup and did additional damage to the campus.
At both Nunez and SOWELA effective networking took place. Nunez’s
chancellor had been involved in both education and politics for his entire career and the
relationships he had fostered over that time proved to be extremely valuable during the
recovery. Many interviewees stated that had anyone else been the chancellor, Nunez
would not have survived since his networking capacity played such a vital role in
convincing the right people that Nunez was worth saving. One interviewee, who
admitted she and the chancellor had had a tenuous working relationship at times, was
adamant that Nunez would not have continued had it not been for the chancellor’s
networking. SOWELA’s leadership had a similar networking capacity. It was their
networking that secured an alternate administrative site, procured temporary buildings to
be used as classrooms, and also attained sizeable contributions from individuals and
businesses in the Lake Charles area. There were numerous other examples of networking
that took place by administrators, faculty, and staff that facilitated the recovery.
181 Personnel from both colleges took the initiative to help in the recovery.
Personnel from Nunez who had evacuated automatically began contacting each other
and students without any directive. Many also went to Baton Rouge to the systems office
without a directive and began contacting students and personnel. SOWELA staff took
the same type of initiative, sometimes even circumventing rules and regulations to do so.
Both colleges taught classes during the fall semester and provided off campus
sites for students to finish their studies. At Nunez the continuity of the nursing program
was one of the biggest success stories. Nearly all the nurses graduated on time and
passed the state board exams. Some online classes were taught for Nunez students as
well. At SOWELA, although much of the semester was cancelled, some online classes
continued and process technology students studied off campus earning their degrees on
time.
Differences. Some of the differences between the actions of Nunez and
SOWELA’s leadership resulted from the difference in the nature of the crisis. It is
important to note that Nunez Community College sustained over 30 million dollars of
damage while SOWELA sustained 10 million dollars in damage. St. Bernard Parish was
completely flooded. Nearly every structure in the parish had been inundated to the point
of being completely unusable. The majority of the infrastructure in St. Bernard Parish
was also destroyed rendering many roads impassable. The chancellor told a story about
an individual who commuted on the median to get to work since the roads were so
damaged. SOWELA, as terrible as the situation was, still had an infrastructure
surrounding the campus and a community to work within. As a result, the interaction of
182 the institutions with their communities was very different. Nunez, for example, became a
kind of oasis for the community. It had the first buildings in the area to acquire
electricity and many people viewed the campus as the one refuge of normalcy. The
location of Nunez in Chalmette also played a role in it being an oasis since it is centered
on a main road that goes through the town. Nunez as an oasis motivated the leadership to
press forward since they felt that their survival was intricately intertwined with the
survival of the community. SOWELA, however, was more dependent upon the
community in which it served. Lake Charles is a small city with a population of nearly
80,000 and although it sustained substantial damage from Hurricane Rita, it paled in
comparison to Chalmette and the rest of St. Bernard Parish. In Lake Charles, it was the
community that bolstered and supported SOWELA. It was Nunez, however, that
bolstered and supported the Chalmette and St. Bernard community.
In addition, the two schools differed in their approach to academics. At
SOWELA there was not a strong push for students to continue their studies in the fall.
Students were given a choice to take online classes or be reimbursed for their tuition.
Most chose to be reimbursed and most of the semester was cancelled. At Nunez, the fear
of being entirely closed down for a year motivated leadership to encourage students to
enroll in classes and continue with studies to show that the college was still viable. The
semester was never officially cancelled. Since Hurricane Katrina occurred before the
semester was fully underway, what to do with students’ tuition was never as much of an
issue as with SOWELA. This encouragement, stated one interviewee, may have been a
disservice to the students since they had to confront so many difficult personal issues
183 resulting from the storm that their scholastic focus was jeopardized resulting in poor
academic performance. One interviewee expressed concern that this poor performance
may have had a detrimental effect on the students’ academic careers affecting their
ability to attain future financial aid. In some cases, the interviewee stated, students may
have had to pay money back to the government, a fact that still concerns her today.
The actions of the leadership at both colleges had similarities and differences.
Despite the different location, different leadership, and different crisis, there were
remarkably more similarities than differences.
Findings Related to the Literature
The findings were consistent with much of the literature. In both case studies
communication was vital. As Fanelli (1997) stated, communication is paramount to an
effective crisis response before, during, and after an event. Kenney (1997) reiterated the
importance of communication and stated that it was key to any crisis situation.
Stein et al. (2007) argued that the organizational structure at many universities
inhibits effective response to crises. They argued that a strict adherence to protocol
could create isolation within units of the institution making it more difficult for different
sectors to work efficiently together. This study concurs with their findings. The lack of
protocol at Nunez and SOWELA facilitated, in most cases, the recovery and encouraged
individual initiative and collaboration.
The findings of this study also reified the theoretical models put forth by
Patterson et al. (2010) concerning the importance of community in disaster response.
The article used both the Vietnamese and Jewish communities in the New Orleans area
184 as examples of effective community response in the face of Hurricane Katrina. At both
Nunez and SOWELA the community response was also exemplary and instrumental in
the recovery.
Garnett and Kouzmin’s (2009) research showed that an over centralized
emergency response that grants most of the responsibility to the federal government will
create more difficulties that stem from a hyper-hierarchical organizational structure. The
findings concur with their conclusions. Many of the interviewees at both colleges stated
that they took the initiative because they simply could not wait on the government to
respond effectively.
Findings from both case studies showed that Nunez and SOWELA were not
adequately prepared. Primeaux and Breaux (2007) investigated lessons organizations
learned from Hurricane Katrina and concluded that planning for disasters that are most
probable is of utmost importance. The authors stated that an adequate plan is extremely
important, but that personnel must be trained to adequately execute that plan. Again
communication is paramount before, during, and after a crisis. Although the improvised
response at Nunez and SOWELA proved to be effective, greater vigilance in planning
and preparation could have created a smoother recovery. The authors concluded that an
organization’s resiliency could be optimized through careful preparation.
McConnell and Drenman (2006) addressed the difficulty in planning and
preparation, especially in the context of today’s state divestment in education. Both
Nunez and SOWELA operated and still operate on very limited funding. McConnell and
Drenman stated that in light of the difficulties, an organization foster a culture that is
185 conducive to crisis management. At Nunez and SOWELA the culture of the institution
was crucial in their effective response.
Boin (2009) reiterated the difficulty in planning and preparation. One particular
poignant conclusion Boin made is that leaders must combat indifference among
personnel. In areas, such as south Louisiana, where hurricane evacuation orders become
a part of life in late summer, it is easy to become lackadaisical. It is imperative that
leaders recognize this and foster a culture of urgency among the staff and be guarded
against becoming lax themselves.
At Nunez and SOWELA strong leadership played an absolute crucial role in the
effective response that ensued in the aftermath of the storms. Much of the literature on
leadership concurred with the findings of this study. Pierce and Pedersen (1997) argued
that adaptability and flexibility is crucial for effective community college leadership.
The Nunez and SOWELA leadership in 2005, although long established, showed a
tremendous amount of adaptability and flexibility, especially during the recovery
process. In Smith and Riley’s (2012) review of relevant literature concerning school
leadership, decisive decision making, intuition and flexibility, creativity and lateral
thinking, tenacity and optimism, and creative intelligence were all emergent themes. The
findings of this study concurred with these themes. The leadership consistently
displayed these qualities during the recovery.
Devitt and Borodzic (2008) argued that much of the research on leadership
during a crisis focuses too much on the analytical and logical abilities of crisis leaders.
Devitt and Borodzic’s findings were consistent with the findings of this study. The
186 authors stated that skills such as the ability of leadership to prioritize, delegate, manage a
number of pressing tasks, communicate effectively, and stay calm during a crisis was
more important than analytical and logical abilities of leadership. Again the leadership at
Nunez and SOWELA displayed an incredible capacity for these attributes.
At Nunez and SOWELA the selfless actions of the leadership was also apparent.
This corresponds to King (2007) who stated that one of the major inhibitors of effective
crisis management is the narcissistic tendency of leadership. Interviewees stated that the
leadership of their institutions displayed nothing that resembled narcissistic behavior.
Akbar and Sims’ (2008) study showed remarkably similar findings as this study.
The organization’s leadership, faculty, staff, and students in New Orleans’ HBCU
institutions showed extraordinary resiliency in recovering from Hurricane Katrina
through strong leadership, initiative, networking, and effective improvised response.
These institutions remained viable and are serving their students today.
Technology played an important role in the recovery of both Nunez and
SOWELA. The literature that focused on technology was consistent with the findings of
this study. For example Mastrodicasa (2008) showed that communication via the
Internet, and cell phones at several New Orleans’ universities was crucial in their ability
to communicate with students after Hurricane Katrina. The same was true for both
Nunez and SOWELA. Cell phones and ad hoc websites were central to leaderships’
ability to communicate. Tulane University in New Orleans, according to Mastrodicasa’s
findings, reached out to the Coca-Cola Company and was supplied with phones and the
company created a call center at its Houston office with a toll-free number. This was
187 consistent with the findings in this study that showed SOWELA’s relationship with the
Stine family in Lake Charles was integral in SOWELA’S continuity. Mastrodicasa also
pointed out that a website increased communication capacity. This was also found to be
essential in the case of Nunez and SOWELA. LaPrairie and Hinson (2007) showed the
importance of online education during a crisis, which was also found to be important for
Nunez and SOWELA after the storm.
In research conducted regarding other higher education institutions in Louisiana
and their response to Hurricane Katrina, similar findings emerged. Technology proved to
be crucial, communication was often improvised, and a familial culture within the
colleges facilitated effective actions after the storm.
The findings of this study showed that community played a huge role in the
effective response of Nunez and SOWELA and were consistent with themes that
emerged in the resilience literature. Much of the resilience literature focused on what
Dowrewend (1978) called “networked adaptive capacity” (p. 135). Both Nunez and
SOWELA, and their communities, displayed a number of networked adaptive capacities
months and, in the case of Nunez and the St. Bernard community, years after the storms.
The findings of this study are consistent with current literature concerning
institutional and community response to crises.
Emerged Theory
The goal of any grounded theory study is “to produce innovative theory that is
‘grounded’ in data collection from participants on the basis of the complexities of their
lived experiences (Fassinger, 2005, p. 157; Barnett, 2010). This study used a
188 constructivist grounded theory methodology, which is, like classic grounded theory, a
non-linear process. Charmaz (2008) explained this through a seven step process: 1)
collecting rich data; 2) coding data; 3) memo-writing throughout the study; 4) theoretical
sampling, saturation, and sorting; 5) reassuring what theory means; 6) writing the draft;
and, 7) reflecting on the process. This approach is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1.
There are two types of theories that are found in grounded theories: substantive
and formal. A substantive theory is “a theoretical interpretation or explanation of a
delimited problem in a particular area” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 189) of study. A formal
theory is
a theoretical rendering of a generic issue or process that cuts across several
substantive areas of study. The concepts in a formal theory are abstract and
general and the theory specifies the links between these concepts. Theories that
189 deal with identity formation or loss, the construction of culture, or the
development of ideologies can help us understand behavior in diverse areas…
(Charmaz, 2006, p, 187)
A substantive theory emerged from this study and was applied to both case
studies. Although Nunez Community College and SOWELA Technical Community
College were not prepared for the catastrophe that occurred, and there were systemic
institutional failures in preparing for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the ability to execute
an effective improvised response facilitated by strong leadership, effective networking, a
strong sense of identity and community, a familial culture, emotional investment, and
individual and group initiative enabled the colleges to overcome institutional failures
allowing for the colleges’ survival and ultimate continuity (Figure 2).
Figure 2.
190 Theoretical Discussion
The substantive theory that emerged from the data instructs us on certain
capacities that allows for an effective response to crises despite institutional failures.
Many of these capacities are consistent with the characteristics that are derived from
what Ferdinand Tonnies called Gemeinschaft in his 1887 work Gemeinschaft und
Gesellschaft (usually translated as Community and Society). Tonnies differentiated two
different social units. Gemeinschaft (often translated as community) is a traditional
social unit characterized by a kind of organic solidarity. Other characteristics of
Gemeinschaft include common mores, group interests over self-interests, strong personal
relationships, strong familial characteristics (whether real or cultural), and a collective
sense of loyalty. Gesellschaft (often translated as society, civil society or association) is
a social unit that is characterized by a contrived solidarity. Characteristics also include a
lack of shared mores, rational self-interest, and earned positions. In a Gesellschaft,
relationships are rationally constructed in the interest of efficiency or other
considerations that make an institution or organization more effective. The findings of
this study confirmed that the leadership of both institutions and the communities in
which they are housed showed strong characteristics of Gemeinschaft. It is easy to
romanticize Gemeinshcaft, but it is also important to recognize that strong and effective
Gesellschaft capacities such as efficiency, professionalism, merit based positions, and
adherence to protocol are extremely valuable during a crisis. It is incumbent upon
institutional leadership to foster the organic capacities that community can provide while
191 cultivating efficient institutions. The stronger both Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are,
the greater the capacity to optimize effective responses to crises (see Figure 3).
Figure 3.
Discussion and Implications
Although Nunez Community College and SOWELA Technical Community
College were not prepared for the disaster that ensued after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
in August and September of 2005, the actions of the leadership of both institutions in the
aftermath of the storms were effective. Both schools continued teaching classes in the
fall of 2005 and opened their doors to students in January of 2006 for the spring
semester (see Appendices D and E). This was a remarkable accomplishment considering
the 40 million dollars of combined damage the schools sustained. When one considers
192 that nearly every person involved in the recovery had his or her own personal life in total
disarray as a result of the storms, it becomes even more remarkable. Almost every
interviewee became very emotional during the interview process. This was just another
example of the strong vested interests that the personnel had in their institutions and
community.
The ability to have an effective response was facilitated by the capacity of the
personnel at both institutions to improvise. This ability to effectively improvise in the
middle of the crisis and its aftermath was augmented by strong leadership, a familial
culture within the institutions, strong connections to the community, and the leadership’s
networking capacity that was fostered through decades of community interaction. The
leadership during these crises was not limited to just the administration. In some
situations faculty, staff members–including custodial staff, and even members of the
community that were not part of the institution became part of the leadership. When a
crisis occurs, institutional leadership must understand that the organizational structure
flattens and flexibility is important to allow for positive organic improvised responses to
take place, especially in older and entrenched communities.
In several ways, the findings of this study raise one of the key modern dilemmas:
How does society maintain a strong sense of community and identity, maintain positive
aspects of provincialism, foster robust familial ties (whether they are real or part of the
work culture within an organization), and yet embrace inclusivity in an increasingly
global society as well as accept and augment members of society that have been and
often continue to be politically and economically disenfranchised? Educational leaders,
193 whether they have been part of an institution and community for a long time, or whether
they are mobile in their careers, should recognize and cultivate a balance between
traditional cultures and communities with ever-changing modern institutions.
Recommendations for Further Research
This qualitative research study joined the body of literature regarding higher
education institutions and their responses to natural disasters as well as other crises.
Natural disasters and other crises are becoming increasingly prominent and it is vital to
continue researching these phenomena, especially when one considers the variety of
crises that may occur. Even if the natural disaster is the same, the effect of the natural
disaster will be different depending on location, institution, and leadership along with
many other variables. As communities become increasingly dependent upon institutions,
it is crucial to study how institutions function in the wake of a crisis.
Research should be conducted on the networking capacity of career mobile
institutional leadership. Institutional leaders, who have not had the opportunity to
develop strong relationships within the community where their institutions are housed,
may find it difficult to use networking to respond to a crisis in the same way as leaders
who have been in the area for years. Further research should be conducted on effective
yet flexible crisis management plans and which ones are most effective and why. Other
research should include the resilience of faculty and staff during a crisis, the effects of
crises on organizational structures, the ability of individuals to function in a work
environment while their personal lives are in disarray, and the ability of students to
function in a similar situation. Such research can not only increase our understanding of
194 how institutional leaders should best respond to crises, but also clarify our institutional
mission within a community and the world.
195 Appendix A
Interview Questions for the Chancellors
1. When did you become Chancellor of your college? 2. What was your first course of action when you heard about the hurricane threat?
3. Was there a crisis management plan? If so what did it say? How helpful was it?
4. How were you able to take care of your personal needs and the college’s needs?
5. What was your biggest concern as the hurricane approached?
6. Tell me about your experience during the hurricane. Where were you?
7. Were you able to maintain communication with the college’s staff? If so how?
8. Where did most of the staff go during the hurricane?
9. What course of action did you take once the hurricane had passed?
10. Once the hurricane passed, what was your most pressing concern for the college?
11. What do you think was the most important decision you made concerning the
college after the hurricane passed?
12. What kind of help did the staff at the college give you during this crisis?
13. What kind of help did people in the community give you during the crisis?
14. What factors do you think were most important in the resilience of the college?
15. What advice would you give other chancellors/presidents if they were confronted
with a similar crisis?
196 Appendix B
Interview Questions for Faculty/Staff
1. What is your position at the college? What was your position when the hurricane hit
this area in 2005?
2. Did you evacuate? Where?
3. Was there a crisis management plan? If so was it helpful?
4. How were you able to take care of your professional responsibilities and your
personal needs during this time?
5. What was your biggest concern as the hurricanes approached?
6. Tell me about your experience during the hurricane. Where were you?
7. Were you able to maintain communication with your colleagues?
8. Where did most of the staff go during the hurricane?
9. What was the first thing you did once the hurricane passed the area in terms of your
job at the college?
10. Once the hurricane passed what was your most pressing concern for the college.
11. What do you think was the most important decision made by the leadership
concerning the college after the hurricane?
12. What kind of help did the staff give to the chancellors in the aftermath of the
hurricane?
13. Did people from the community help the college in the aftermath of the hurricane?
14. What factors do you think enabled the college to remain viable?
15. What factors do you think were most important in the resilience of the college? 197 Appendix C
Consent for Participation in Research
My name is Lane Nevils and I am a doctoral candidate at the University of
Texas/Austin and I am conducting a study for my dissertation and I am asking you to
participate.
The purpose of this form is to provide you information that may affect your
decision as to whether or not to participate in this research study. Read the information
below and ask me any questions you might have before deciding whether or not to take
part. If you decide to be involved in this study, this form will be used to record your
consent.
You have been asked to participate in a research study about the actions of
institutional leadership of two community colleges in the aftermath of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. The purpose of this study is to ascertain the actions of institutional
leadership of Nunez Community College in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the
actions of institutional leadership of SOWELA Technical Community College in the
aftermath of Hurricane Rita and to find the similarities and differences of the actions of
the institutional leadership of the two Colleges in the aftermath of the hurricanes.
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to: • Meet me at a time
and place of your convenience • Answer interview questions
This study will use interviews that will last 30 minutes to an hour and will
include approximately 30 study participants. All interviews will be audio recorded.
There are no foreseeable risks to participating in this study.
198 You will receive no direct benefit from participating in this study; however, the
study and your participation will add to the literature that exists concerning community
college crisis management and will add to existing knowledge of how gulf coast
institutions (especially higher education institutions) can respond to future hurricanes
and other crises.
Your participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate at all or, if you
start the study, you may withdraw at any time. Withdrawal or refusing to participate will
not affect your relationship with The University of Texas at Austin (University) in
anyway.
If you would like to participate you will receive a copy of this form attached to
an email invitation to participate in the study.
You will not receive any type of payment participating in this study.
This study is anonymous and confidential. Your name will not be used unless
otherwise directed by you.
If you choose to participate in this study, you will be recorded. Any audio
recordings will be stored securely and only the research team will have access to the
recordings. Recordings will be kept until the research is completed and then erased. The
data resulting from your participation may be used for future research or be made
available to other researchers for research purposes not detailed within this consent
form.
Prior, during or after your participation you can contact the researcher Lane
Nevils at 337 501 3502 or send an email to [email protected]. This study has been
199 reviewed and approved by The University Institutional Review Board and the study
number is 2012-10-0138.
For questions about your rights or any dissatisfaction with any part of this study,
you can contact, anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board by phone at
(512) 471-8871 or email at [email protected].
Thank you very much,
Lane Nevils
200 Appendix D
Nunez Community College
201 Appendix E
SOWELA Technical Community College
Enrollment growth by semester
3500 Fall 2005 Spring 2006 Summer 2006 3000 Fall 2006 Spring 2007 2500 Summer 2007 Fall 2007 Spring 2008 2000 Summer 2008 Fall 2008 Spring 2009 1500 Summer 2009 Fall 2009 Spring 2010 1000 Summer 2010 Fall 2010 Spring 2011 500 Summer 2011 Fall 2011 Spring 2012 0 Summer 2012 Fall 2012 Spring 2013 202 Appendix F
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