University of Trento
School of International Studies and
Department of Humanities
European foreign policy in times of crisis: the
Euro-Arab dialogue
- Ilaria Pagano -
Going Global. The History of EC/EU External Relations. A Jean Monnet Module
on the History of European Integration (Professor Sara Lorenzini)
Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
Table of contents
1. Introduction
3
2. The oil crisis and the inception of the Euro-Arab dialogue
3
3. Institutional structure, aims and achievements of the Euro-Arab dialogue
6
4. The Euro-Arab dialogue: EC foreign policy considerations
8
4.1 The European Political Cooperation
9
4.2 The Commission
10
4.3 US influence on the development of the Euro-Arab dialogue
12
Conclusion
14
Bibliography
16
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
1. Introduction
1973 marked a pivotal breaking point for the development of the European
Community's foreign relations: the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, and the
subsequent imposition of an oil embargo on Western countries, represented a
remarkable challenge to the newly-founded European Political Cooperation (EPC)
and to the European Community (EC) as a whole. This complex international
situation required EC Member states to elaborate a coherent and structured foreign
policy response towards oil-producing countries: failure to do so would have
damaged the EC's international standing and put its oil supplies at risk. In this
context, notwithstanding internal divergences and initial US oppositions, the EC
was finally able to develop an independent diplomatic response to the crisis,
which finally culminated in the creation of the Euro-Arab dialogue: its aim was to
establish a long-term cooperation between the EC and the Arab League on a wide
range of issues, i.e. industry, agriculture, infrastructure, finance and culture.
Although the dialogue did not finally encompass energy and political issues and
although it substantially lost significance after the approval of the Camp David
Accords in 1978, it still represented a remarkable effort on the part of the EC to
establish independent diplomatic relations with the Arab countries, providing
them with a possible alternative to the traditional US-USSR Cold War duality.
The present work will be organised as follows: the first part will briefly
outline the process of creation of the Euro-Arab dialogue, together with its
institutional setting and functions; the second part will specifically analyse the
structure, the characteristics and the achievements of EC foreign policy within the
framework of the dialogue: by means of primary sources we will investigate and
evaluate the effectiveness of the interplay of two EC institutions, namely the
Commission and the European Political Cooperation, in the elaboration of a
common foreign policy towards the Arab countries. Finally, some reflections will
be made on the influence exercised by the United States on the development (and
on the setback) of this independent European initiative.
2. The oil crisis and the inception of the Euro-Arab dialogue
The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 constituted the first real test for the
cohesion of EC's foreign policy since the creation of the European Political
Cooperation in 1970. A common foreign policy response to the oil crisis was very
3
Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
hard to agree upon, though, especially because the oil embargo imposed by the
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Export Countries (OAPEC) had hit EC Member
states differently: an immediate 25% cutback on oil supplies, plus further 5%
monthly cuts, applied as a general rule to EC countries; at the same time, no
embargo had been imposed on France and Great Britain, while the Netherlands
suffered a total embargo1. Notwithstanding the different application of the
embargo, the fear of being marginalised at global level and, more concretely, of
seeing oil supplies vanish contributed to overcoming internal divergences and
culminated in the elaboration of common energy and political responses to the oil
crisis. With regard to energy, action was taken jointly with the United States
within the framework of the Washington Conference in February 1974: US and
EC Finance and Foreign ministers, together with the Presidents of the Council and
of the European Commission, agreed to preserve internationally stable energy
relationships between oil-consuming and oil-producing countries by enacting a
stricter control on the delicate balance between oil supply and demand; in
addition, the delegations committed themselves to developing additional energy
sources with the aim of limiting the traditional dependence on oil supplies2. The
Washington Conference finally led to the foundation of the International Energy
Agency, whose main task was to respond to disruptions in the oil supplies as well
as serving as an information source about the international oil market. As to the
political response to the crisis, a common and totally independent European stance
was agreed at intergovernmental level with the Brussels Declaration (November
1973), which – for the first time – expressed a common position on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict by officially recognising the rights of the Palestinian people3.
Reference to this issue was revolutionary if compared with previous positions
taken by EC Member states and therefore constituted a meaningful political
statement.
According to Nuttall, the separation of the first EC's energy and political
responses contributed to undermining the overall cohesion of EC policies towards
1
S. J. Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 94.
"Final communiqué of the Washington Conference", 13 February 1974, available online
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/final_communique_of_the_washington_conference_13_february_1
974-en-96e19fad-6aba-4b79-a791-34624e94acf9.html (last access: 27/09/2015).
3
Among its groundbreaking principles counted: the end to Israel's territorial occupation since 1967;
respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of every state in the area;
recognition of the legitimate rights of Palestinians for a just and lasting peace (see S. J. Nuttall,
European Political Co-operation, p. 95).
2
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
oil-producing countries, possibly mining their effectiveness: "[...] the fact that
energy policy, on which the Community in the end followed the American line,
and dialogue with the Arabs, on which the Nine followed the French line, were
handled in two separate forums, made for a weak and aimless overall European
policy"4. Nonetheless, the new conciling attitude adopted by the Europeans with
the Brussels Declaration paved the way for closer relations with the Arabs which
finally culminated in the creation of the Euro-Arab dialogue.
The first proposals for a closer and long-term Euro-Arab cooperation were
put forward from both sides: the Arabs, making unexpectedly their appearence at
the Copenhagen Summit of EC Heads of State and Government in December
19735, manifested their desire to cement the newly-found Euro-Arab friendship
and advocated for strengthened economic, cultural and technical ties 6. On the
European side, the French were particularly eager to start a political dialogue with
the Arabs. On one side, this was due to their colonial legacy and to the desire of
exercising a permanent influence over their former colonies7; on the other side,
their eagerness stemmed from the critical international situation – which, as
previously mentioned, saw the EC at risk of being marginalised at global level and
being cut off energy sources. This difficult situation culminated in the presentation
of a plan by the French Foreign minister Jobert, which involved a closer
partnership between the EC and the Arab League in the fields of energy,
technology and economics. The plan was approved, although in a watered-down
version, within the framework of the European Political Cooperation – i.e. in a
fully intergovernmental fashion – on 7 February 19748. Community institutions
had been excluded from the very first negotiations: EC Member states, in fact, had
preferred to keep such a sensitive action under strict control, unwilling to
4
Ibid., p. 97.
A delegation of Arab Foreign Ministers unexpectedly attended the EC Summit on 14-15 December
1973. According to some allegations, French officials had orchestrated the Arab visit: nonetheless,
some archival documents seem to contradict this assumption, ascribing the initiative esclusively to
the Arab representatives (see A. Gfeller, "A European voice in the Arab world: France, the
superpowers and the Middle East, 1970-74", Cold War History, Vol. 11, Issue 4 (2011), p. 665).
6
Ibid., p. 666.
7
A. Gfeller speaks of an "Europeanisation of French policies towards the Arab states": at that time
the French constantly tried to upload their foreign policy preferences to EC level in order to
advocate for them on a wider and potentially more influent arena. According to the author, this
strategy was the result of a pre-conceived plan, which nonetheless materialised over time (A.
Gfeller, A European voice in the Arab world, p. 665).
8
Ibid., p. 666.
5
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
empower the Community with foreign policy competences9.
3. Institutional structure, aims and achievements of the Euro-Arab dialogue
The Euro-Arab dialogue was officially launched at ministerial level in Paris
in June 1974 after wearying negotiations on its institutional setting and contents.
The institutional structure finally reflected the complexity of European equilibria:
the Euro-Arab dialogue was to function on an Euro-Arab General Commission
composed of diplomats from the twenty states of the Arab League and the nine EC
member states – the latest assisted by a delegation of the Commission, which,
after never-ending struggles, finally managed to have a role in the development of
the dialogue. The EC delegation, in turn, was to be assisted by a so-called Group
of Coordination, composed of the Political Committee10 of the EPC and of the
COREPER: the first was to deal with intergovernmental issues, while the second
advised on Community competences11.
The contents of the dialogue were very much debated, since the most
relevant policy issues had been excluded from the very beginning: energy policies
had already been dicussed at the Washington Conference in agreement with the
US – which implicitly excluded them from any form of independent cooperation
with the Arab states; sensitive political issues, such as the question of peace in the
Middle East, Israel's retreat from the occupied territories and the rights of
9
Notwithstanding the opposition of EC Member states, the Commission had attempted to submit its
own proposals for a closer Euro-Arab cooperation, which mainly rested on the expansion of two
cooperation plans already in place at Community level: the first, called Global Mediterranean
Approach, envisaged an individually-based cooperation between the Commission and a number of
Arab states (i.e. Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt). It involved a preferential
commercial regime and a closer cooperation at economic, industrial, technological and financial
level, each of them based on each country's real needs; the second, called Plan Deniau, targeted
Middle East countries and built on two pillars: the first provided help to the Palestinian refugees in
the field of nutrition, health and teaching, while the second, although underdeveloped, was strictly
aimed at creating a financial and technical cooperation with the states in the region ("Relations de la
C.E.E. avec les pays du bassin méditerraéen et du Moyen Orient", 23 January 1974, in Historical
Archives of the European Union (hereinafter HAEU), Accession Klaus Meyer (hereinafter KM) 39).
Notwithstanding the presence of two plans currently run by the Commission, the Nine preferred to
start a third one, which was originally intended to rest on the intergovernmental framework of the
EPC. All the existing plans had to run parallel to each other, the only difference being the nature of
the collaboration: while the Commission dealt with each state individually, the Euro-Arab dialogue
was meant to create a direct cooperation with the Arab League as a whole. This fragmented structure
clearly contributed to creating a confusing EC foreign policy framework, undermining again its
overall effectiveness.
10
The Political Committee was the hub of the EPC: it prepared Ministers' discussions, directed the
work of the Working groups, and frequently took decisions on its own responsibility (Simon J.
Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, p. 16).
11
É. Nöel, Note à l'attention de Monsieur le President Ortoli "Organisation interne en vue du
dialogue euro-arabe", 13 September 1974, in HAEU, KM 39.
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
Palestinian people, had been also kept out from the framework of the dialogue by
a decision of the Near East Working commission of the EPC12: taking a clear-cut
position on these issues, in fact, would not only have threatened the internal
cohesion of EC states – some traditionally more pro-Israeli, others Arab-oriented
– but it would also have triggered harsh US reactions. What started as a political
exercise on the part of Arab and French Foreign ministers ended to be an empty
box, possibly deprived of the most relevant policy issues. What could still be
object of cooperation, though, were economic issues, whose definition required
the policy expertise of the Commission – which, as previously mentioned, was
finally included in the institutional structure of the Euro-Arab dialogue. The
Group of Coordination of the Nine officially broke down the content of the
partership into five categories: agriculture, industrialisation, infrastructure,
financial, cultural and technical co-operation, each of which was to be dealt with
by a specific Working Committee13.
Negotiations between European and Arab delegations have been wearying
throughout the development of the dialogue and mainly regarded the institutional
structure and the contents of cooperation. The sources of dispute were many and
stemmed from both sides: on the EC side intense discussions were stimulated by
the issue of financing, which finally led to an overall lack of enthusiasm towards
the project. Cooperation was gradually relegated to the industrial sector rather
than to governmental organisations. On the Arab side major problems originated
both from their different relations with the EC and from their internal divergences.
As to the first aspect, the Euro-Arab dialogue clearly resented the presence of
alternative fora of cooperation: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia were first-group
associates of the EC; Somalia, Sudan and Mauretania were ACP countries within
the Lomè framework; Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon were Mediterranean
associates14. The plurality of memberships to different cooperation arenas
contributed to fragmenting the scope of the partership and to weakening its policy
outcomes. As to their internal differences, Arab countries espressed both moderate
12
K. Meyer, Vermerk für Herrn Präsident Ortoli, Sir Christopher Soames, Vizepräsident und Herrn
Cheysson "Sitzung des Unterausschusses 'Naher Osten' im Rahmen der Politischen Zusammenarbeit
am 10.5.1974 in Bonn", 13 May 1974, in HAEU, KM 39.
13
Note "Organisation of the practical work of the dialogue: British views", 28 November 1974, in
HAEU, KM 39.
14
D. Allen, "Political Cooperation and the Euro-Arab dialogue", in D. Allen, R. Rummel, W.
Wessels, European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign policy for Western Europe, London,
Butterworth Scientific, 2013, p. 74.
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
and radical positions and their economies were remarkably diverse: eleven out of
the twenty members of the League were non-oil-producers, which created serious
problems for the drafting of common contents for the Euro-Arab dialogue.
The slowliness of bargaining, together with EC and Arab League's internal
and external divergences, clarly impacted on the actual achievements of the
dialogue: since the year of its inception to 1978, when the process substantially
came to a halt due to the approval of the Camp David Accords, very few projects
had been actually realised: among them a telecommunication network, mainly
designed by the European Space Agency (ESA), the improvement of the transport
network of the Arab states, a plan for the development of Darfur, some measures
for the promotion of trade, the realisation of a technology institute for the training
of researchers and a common project for the exploitation of solar energy15.
4. The Euro-Arab dialogue: EC foreign policy considerations
After having pointed to the inception, the institutional structure, the contents
and the achievements of the Euro-Arab dialogue, we will now turn to an in-depth
analysis of EC foreign policy within this framework. Foreign policy in general
terms has always constituted a sensitive area for EC member states due to its
problematic political implications: disagreements on foreign policy issues were
frequent among the members of the European Community and they often tended
to undermine their overall cohesion, together with their policy effectiveness. A
solution to this problem was elaborated in 1970 with the creation of the European
Political Cooperation (EPC), an European intergovernmental institution which
aimed at coordinating foreign policy actions of EC member states. Every decision
within this framework was taken by unanimous agreement of the EC Foreign
ministers, thereby ensuring that any policy outcome would be accepted under the
consent of each and every Member state16.
The EPC played a pivotal role in the development of the Euro-Arab
dialogue, thereby confirming its importance in coordinating EC Member states'
positions. Nonetheless, other actors need to be taken into account in order to
provide an all-encompassing picture of EC foreign policy at the time of the EuroArab dialogue, namely the European Commission and the United States: the first
15
G. Bonvicini, La politica estera dell'Europa. Autonomia o indipendenza?, Istituto Affari
Internazionali, Bologna, il Mulino, 1980, pp. 9-10.
16
S. J. Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, p. 12.
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
played a very significant propositional role throughout the development of the
dialogue, essentially filling it with contents of cooperation; the second exercised a
strong influence on the EC by actually shaping from outside the contents and the
outcomes of the dialogue.
The following section will briefly analyse the interplay of these three actors,
identifying their influence on the Euro-Arab project. The analysis will be mainly
carried out on the basis of primary sources, namely the ones stemming from the
archival documents of Klaus Meyer, at that time Deputy Secretary-General of the
Commission. Meyer was directly involved in the process of definition of the
Euro-Arab dialogue: his institutional role secured him a very relevant position
both within the Commission and in conjunction with the EPC, which makes his
documents extremely relevant for the purpose of this research17.
4.1 The European Political Cooperation
The EPC greatly contributed to the institutionalisation and development of
the Euro-Arab dialogue by mediating among the diverging positions of EC
Member states, which stemmed mainly from the unequal application of the oil
embargo and from the contrasting stances on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As
previously mentioned, the inception of the Euro-Arab dialogue took place within a
fully intergovernmental framework with the approval by the same EPC of the
French Foreign minister's proposal for an Euro-Arab partnership. The EPC was
also responsible of framing the contours of the dialogue: it unanimously identified
its addressee, i.e. the Arab League, thereby rejecting the Commission's proposal to
create an inividually-based cooperation with the Arab countries18; it developed the
institutional structure of the dialogue, finally ensuring a permanent representation
of the European Commission19; lastly, it defined the political borders within which
the dialogue could take place, thereby excluding the most sensitive political
17
Meyer was the director of a permanent task force instituted by the Commission with the aim of
coordinating the works within the framework of the Euro-Arab dialogue. This group ensured close
relations between the President of the Commission and the Commissioners, and between the
President of the Commission, the COREPER and the EPC (Émile Noël, Note à l'attention de
Monsieur le President Ortoli "Organisation interne en vue du dialogue euro-arabe", 13 September
1974, in HAEU, KM 39).
18
K. Meyer, Note à l'attention de Monsieur le President Ortoli et de Monsieur Cheysson "Réunion
ministérielle de la coopération politique le 14 fevrier a Bonn – Coopération avec les pays arabes", 12
February 1974, in HAEU, KM 39.
19
K. Meyer, Note a l'attention de Monsieur Cheysson, 29 May 1974, in HAEU, KM 39.
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
issues, which mainly regarded the Israeli-Palestinian conflict20.
One of the main tasks of the EPC was the entertainment of diplomatic
relations and the elaboration of solutions to international bilateral controversies:
its main achievement throughout the development of the Euro-Arab partnership
was the inclusion of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the dialogue
in 1975, an issue that had brought negotiations to a halt both due to EC's internal
divergences and to Arab pressures, which made the membership of the OLP a precondition for the start of the dialogue. The so-called Dublin compromise,
elaborated by the Irish Presidency of the EPC, gave a twofold solution to this
stalemate: firstly, it allowed European and Arab Working Groups to meet despite
the ongoing political controversies and start elaborating projects; secondly, it
provided a long-term solution by convincing the Arabs to organise the meetings of
the General Committee on the basis of Arab and European delegations rather than
on state delegations. This gimmick made it possible for EC member states to
bypass the controversial international recognition of the OLP and, at the same
time, to allow its inclusion in the dialogue21, thereby satisfying the Arab claims
and maintaining the pace of Euro-Arab negotiations22.
4.2 The Commission
The original draft for a Euro-Arab cooperation did not confer the
Commission any relevant authority: EC Member states, in fact, preferred to keep
this sensitive matter outside of the Community framework, willing to rely
exclusively on intergovernmental structures. Nonetheless, as long as cooperation
acquired a strictly economic character – due to the progressive exclusion of
energy and political issues, the Commission started to play a very important role
in the project, which was finally recognised within the institutional structure of
the dialogue. While the EPC created the framework within which the dialogue had
20
K. Meyer, Vermerk für Herrn Präsident Ortoli, Sir Christopher Soames, Vizepräsident und Herrn
Cheysson "Sitzung des Unterausschusses 'Naher Osten' im Rahmen der Politischen Zusammenarbeit
am 10.5.1974 in Bonn", 13 May 1974, in HAEU, KM 39.
21
G. Bonvicini., La politica estera dell'Europa, p. 124.
22
The first appearence of OLP representatives is recorded at the Cairo meeting of Arab and
European delegations on 10-14 June 1975: two members of the OLP took part in the negotiations,
one of them – professor at the Cairo University – intervened in the discussions on cultural affairs,
technology and science, speaking on behalf of the Arab delegation. Meyer expressed a positive
comment on their conduct: "Ces participants envoyé par l'OLP ont prie grand soin de se montrer
constructif, ouverts et tout à fait aptes à jouer leur rôle dans des enceintes internationales comme
cette première réunion euro-arabe" (K. Meyer, Note à l'attention de Mm. les Membres de la
Commission, 16 June 1975, HAEU, SI (75) 473, KM 40).
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
to take place, the Commission filled the partnership with contents by acting as a
negotiator representing the whole European Community vis-à-vis the Arab League
in its areas of competence23. The Community, in the end, assumed a very
significant propositional role by elaborating structured projects of cooperation.
One of them, containing an all-encompassing description of the whole Euro-Arab
partnership, will be briefly summarised below: its precise and pragmatic character
will provide a sense of the importance of the Commission's policy expertise in the
development of the Euro-Arab dialogue.
Document de travail des services de la Commission "Dialogue Euro-Arabe", 28
January 1975, HAEU, SEC (75) 415, KM 40.
The idea of the Commission for an Euro-Arab dialogue set the EC and the
Arab League on an equal footing and stressed the obligation for each of them of
respecting the other's sovereignty and independence. The dialogue should have
aimed at creating economic interdependence between European and Arab states,
so as to ensure the economic and social well-being of the respective populations.
Cooperation should have taken place in different fields: economic development,
industry, agriculture and nutrition, training and development aid. For each of
them, the Commission formulated concrete proposals, which will be briefly
outlined in the following lines:
- economic development between the two partners had to be harmonised:
overproduction and imbalances between the two markets had to be targeted in
order to prevent market shocks and to ensure the well-being of the Arab
population;
- cooperation at industrial level should have addressed different sectors. The
petrochemical industry was obviosuly given special attention with the proposal of
the creation of in loco oil-refining structures and related industries. Nonetheless,
additional industrial sectors should have been expanded: electronic and processing
industry, for example, should have been developed with EC help with the aim of
both differentiating the Arab industrial landscape and of creating new jobs,
23
"Le dialogue euro-arabe est une action combinée Communauté/coopération politique à laquelle
l'une et l'autre participent en partenaires egaux. En raison de la nature des deux organisations
intéressées, la coopération politique s'occuperait plutôt du timing général, des problemes politiques
spécifiques à traiter et du cadre diplomatique et politique, tandis que la Communauté s'occuperait de
la substance et du contenu du dialogue" (La Communauté et la Commission dans le dialogue euroarabe et les procédures ultérieures, 8 July 1974, in HAEU, KM 39).
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
thereby satisfying the needs of the population and breaking their dependency on
oil resources;
- agriculture in the Arab countries should have been further extended: European
experts should have provided training to locals and helped boosting production on
Arab soil, both by transferring knowledge and technology;
- finally, the project of the Commission foresaw an enhancing of banks and
financial institutions for development aid.
All these ideas were not to be applied indiscriminately to each and every
country given their different economies and needs: nonetheless, cooperation in
sectors like agriculture and transport could have been extended to everyone, while
petrochemical, steel and textile industrial cooperation could have targeted only
some of them.
This project clearly mirrors the Commission's traditional committment to
development aid: the attention for the local population and the adjustment of
objectives according to the country of cooperation are two of the fundamental
characteristics of the Commission's development aid footprint. We now know that
most of these projects have never been implemented: nonetheless, the pivotal role
acquired by the Commission within the structure of the dialogue has to be
strongly emphasized. The Commission, in fact, was extremely active in
elaborating contents of cooperation and finally enjoyed an equal standing with the
intergovernmental
EPC.
This
special
scheme
of
internal
cooperation
(Commission/EPC) on foreign policy issues emerged precisely in occasion of the
Euro-Arab dialogue and rendered its institutional nature quite peculiar and
innovative.
Notwithstanding the importance of the interplay between the EPC and the
Commission for the development of the Euro-Arab partnership, a very important
factor is still necessary to be considered in order to fully understand the forces at
play within its framework, namely the influence exercised on it by the United
States.
4.3 US influence on the development of the Euro-Arab dialogue
When dealing with EC foreign relations during the 1970s we cannot
overlook the influence that the US had on them. The Euro-Arab dialogue clearly
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
resented this influence, especially in the phase of its inception and of its fall.
The project for an Euro-Arab cooperation was unexpectedly revealed to
Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State, almost one year after his proclamation of
the "Year of Europe": by means of this political initiative, launched with the
intention of placing Europe again at the top of US agenda, Kissinger advocated
the drafting of a new "Atlantic Charter" aimed at strengthening US-EC economic,
defensive and diplomatic relations24. In this context, the European announcement
of the creation of an independent Euro-Arab partnership was considered a serious
blow on US-EC relations: the US felt betrayed and resented the lack of
consultation on such a sensitive matter. Concerns were expressed about the
influence that radical Arab countries could have exercised on moderate ones
within the common framework of the dialogue, thereby threatening US ongoing
peace negotiations in the Middle East25. Historical records highlight an additional
reason for US opposition to the Euro-Arab project, this time based on energy
grounds: in 1974 the US was negotiating an agreement with Saudi Arabia – also
member of the Euro-Arab dialogue – on the delivery of oil supplies which would
have ensured its energetic survival until the end of the decade. An independent
Euro-Arab partnership, possibily dealing with energy issues, would have been
likely to endanger US negotiations. Nonetheless, according to Klaus Meyer, US
objections would have ended soon: "Dès que l'approvisionement américain sera
assuré par un tel accord, les Américains se désintéresseront du dialogue euroarabe et laisseront les Européens jouer leur jeu"26. Meyer was partially right:
coeval documents do not suggest a direct influence of the US on the dialogue
during the following years. Nonetheless, this apparently soft stance depended
quite certainly on the final exclusion of energy and political issues from the
framework of the dialogue, which rendered this cooperation arena almost
harmless to US interests in the Middle East27. Another reason for ceased US
oppositions may lie in the signature by EC Foreign ministers of the Gymnich
agreement (1974), which formally provided the EPC with the option of consulting
24
S. J. Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, p. 85.
K. Meyer, Aufzeichnung für Ministerkonferenz "Dialogue Euro-Arabe", 7 June 1974, in HAEU,
KM 39.
26
Klaus Meyer, Note à l'attention de M. Cheysson "Objections américaines contre le dialogue euroarabe", 29 May 1974, in HAEU, KM 39.
27
It must be recalled that this decision had been taken by the EPC precisely to avoid harsh US
reactions. Even though the US did not seem to exercise any strong direct influence on the following
developments of the dialogue, it certainly controlled its contents from the very beginning, thereby
ascertaining the absence of any sensitive matter of cooperation.
25
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"allied or friendly countries" on the elaboration of common foreign policy
positions. This agreement finally ensured the US to be consulted on any
controversial foreign policy decision, also within the framework of the Euro-Arab
dialogue28.
The setback of the Euro-Arab partnership was also conditioned, although
not directly, by US actions: the Camp David Accords of 1978 finally ensured
peace in the Middle East, thereby restoring US supremacy in the area and once
again marginalising the Europeans in the international arena. The dialogue
officially lasted until 1989 and further suffered the influence of critical
international events29 without producing very significant policies after its setback
on 1978.
5. Conclusion
The Euro-Arab dialogue represented the first attempt of the EC to undertake
an independent diplomatic initiative towards the Arab countries. This (re)action
was clearly triggered by the urgency of finding a common response to the oil
crisis, which had put EC's international standing and oil supplies at stake. With
time, though, the original project of cooperation started to lose its innovative
premises: the gradual exclusion of energy and political issues from the contents of
the dialogue, mainly due to the influent opposition of the US, possibly deprived it
of the most relevant matters of cooperation. The restrictions imposed on the
contents of the partnership, the internal and external divergences on the part of
both the EC and the Arab League and the existence of alternative fora of
cooperation negatively impacted on the final outcomes of the dialogue.
Despite the apparent absence of significant results, the Euro-Arab initiative
can still be praised. At its very beginning this EC diplomatic exercise genuinely
tried to constitute a viable alternative for the Arab countries to the US-USSR
duality and aimed at creating a really independent diplomatic forum for a fruitful
Euro-Arab cooperation. The Euro-Arab dialogue also contributed to the creation
28
S. J. Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, p. 91.
Khader numbers a wide range of issues that gradually contributed to the weakening of the EuroArab dialogue. Among them the assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister Anouar Al-Sadate
(1981), Egypt's isolation from the Arab regional system, the internal Arab divisions during the first
Iraq-Iran War (1980-1989), the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982), the first oil price slump (1982)
and internal European concerns – i.e. the Single Market Treaty (1985), the second and the third
enlargement (B. Khader, The European Union and the Arab World: from the Rome Treaty to the
«Arab Spring», Malta, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, 2013, p. 8).
29
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
of a solid institutional structure for the elaboration of sound foreign policies: the
interplay between the EPC – exercising its diplomatic competences and mediation
skills – and the Commission – equipped in turn with valuable policy expertise –
contributed to creating a reasonably effective decision-making process together
with sound projects of cooperation, some of which have been actually realised.
On the whole, the Euro-Arab dialogue represents a meaningful attempt on
the part of EC Member states to coordinate common foreign policy responses and
to elaborate their related contents. This initiative, which started back in the 1970s,
can be especially praised also considering the present difficulties of the (now)
European Union in agreeing on coordinated and coherent foreign policy stances
on the most problematic international issues.
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Ilaria Pagano - European foreign policy in times of crisis: the Euro-Arab dialogue
Bibliography
Primary sources
Historical Archives of the European Union Accession Klaus Meyer Accession.
Final communiqué of the Washington Conference, 13 February 1974,
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/final_communique_of_the_washington_conference_13_fe
bruary_1974-en96e19fad-6aba-4b79-a791-34624e94acf9.html
(last
access:
27/09/2015).
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David Allen, "Political Cooperation and the Euro-Arab dialogue", in D. Allen, R.
Rummel, W. Wessels, European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign
policy for Western Europe, London, Butterworth Scientific, 2013.
Gianni Bonvicini, La politica estera dell'Europa. Autonomia o indipendenza?,
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Bologna, Società editrice il Mulino, 1980.
Aurélie E. Gfeller, "A European voice in the Arab world: France, the superpowers
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Bichara Khader, The European Union and the Arab World: from the Rome Treaty
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Simon J. Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
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