EDAM Foreign Policy and Security
Paper Series 2017/3
Operation
Euphrates Shield:
Lessons Learned
April, 2017
Can Kasapoglu
Defense Analyst, EDAM
Doruk Ergun
Research Fellow, EDAM
Sinan Ulgen
Executive Chairman, EDAM
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OPERATION EUPHRATES SHIELD:
Lessons Learned
Turkish authorities declared that Operation Euphrates Shield was successfully completed on March 29th
2017. In the operations that lasted over seven months,
Turkey accomplished two of its main objectives,
diminishing the ISIL threat emanating from beyond
its borders, and preventing PKK-affiliated PYD from
establishing a fait accompli corridor by bridging all
territories under its de facto control. Yet, the Turkish
operations have also had their costs, including the 71
Turkish military personnel that lost their lives. This
infographic analysis assesses the military and political lessons learned for Turkey during its first major
extraterritorial military operation since the 1990s’
cross-border counterterrorism incursions into Northern Iraq.
MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED
Geography Matters:
Military Geopolitics During OES
Despite the age of next generation warfare and advanced technology, Operation Euphrates Shield
once more proved that geography is one of the most
important determinants of fighting wars, both in
the past, today, and tomorrow. Especially during the
key February Offensive to destroy ISIL’s first line of
defense in al-Bab, capturing the strategic high-ground
of Aqil Mountain remained the primary goal for Turkish forces. Following the fall of Aqil Mountain after
a successful push, taking control of the Silos area in
the southwest came into the picture as the remaining
tactical objective. The Silos were offering critical positions for sniper operations and they were watching
the southern entrance of the town from above. The
southern gates of al-Bab was the attack direction of
the Syrian Baathist forces’ advance.
In the broader scale, the Euphrates Shield was also
about geography. It needed to secure 20-25km tactical depth, which was the rocket range of ISIL’s war of
attrition through BM-21 Grad variants. Later on, alBab, in some 30km deeper hostile territory, remained
the absolute objective as ISIL’s stronghold in the west
of Euphrates.
In sum, the al-Bab offensive proved that a successful
military power should read the geography well at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and act accordingly. Especially, Turkish operational command’s brave
insistence on capturing Aqil Mountain and the Silos
area, as well as Ankara’s strategic decision to deny the
necessary rocket range to ISIL, were the main geographic factors of Operation Euphrates Shield.
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Al-Bab, Aqil Mountain and the Silos Area
Al-Bab
Aqil Mountain
The Silos Area
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Subterranean Warfare is the Most
Dangerous Game in the Town
Starting from the initial incursion into Jarablus, the
Euphrates Shield forces had to deal with ISIL’s subterranean warfare activities. The terrorist organization’s
tunnel network in al-Bab was the most complex one.
Subterranean warfare is one of the oldest concepts in
military history, and has been used since the Akkadian and the Roman times. In the Middle East, many
groups, ranging from Lebanese Hezbollah to Hamas
use tunnel networks for gaining tactical surprise and
maintaining logistics. Before Operation Euphrates
Shield, Turkish security forces overcame PKK terrorist
organization’s tunnel network during its urban terror
campaign. Yet, confronting the subterranean warfare
threat in hostile territory was a more difficult task.
ISIL operated both rural tunnels – mostly in Jarablus
– as well as ‘door-to-door’ tunnels – mostly in al Bab –
that posed grave threats to the Euphrates Shield forces.
Probably, Operation Euphrates Shield was the most
significant subterranean warfare test for contemporary
Turkish military capabilities.
Thus, an effective lessons-learned assessment would
be vital in advancing the doctrinal and conceptual
perspective for future operations.
Tunnels In Rural Areas
Door-to-Door Subterranean Warfare Complex in al-Bab
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It is all about Hybrid Warfare and
Urban Operations
Importance of Indigenous Land-Based
Fire-Support Elements
The turning point of the Euphrates Shield was
the Turkish forces’ adaptability capabilities in two
relatively new concepts for recent combat history of
Turkish Armed Forces. The first one is hybrid warfare,
which could be briefly depicted as the blurring merger
between unconventional and conventional military
capabilities.
As a result of the disagreements between Turkey and
the US-led anti-ISIL coalition, the Turkish forces
could not receive enough close air support (CAS)
from the coalition forces, especially when the Euphrates Shield reached beyond 20km and headed to al-Bab.
The CAS and ISTAR support were critical to overcome highly time-sensitive, pop-up ISIL targets.
Since the Second Lebanon War, hybrid warfare has
been dominating the Middle Eastern conflicts. Especially, flow of black and gray arms market into the
region enabled non-state groups to capture gamechanger tactical weapons such as anti-tank guided
missiles (ATGM), man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADS), guided-rockets, and even anti-ship
cruise missiles. At the initial phases of Operation
Euphrates Shield, the majority of fallen Turkish troops
lost their lives due to the ATGM fire. Later on, suicide
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs)
had become the primary cause for casualties. Ankara
preferred not to use its formidable rotary-wing platforms intensively due to the MANPADS threat.
In the absence of enough CAS assistance, especially
under unfavorable weather conditions with limited ISTAR capability available, Turkish indigenous
land-based fire-support elements, predominantly the
155mm-class howitzers and the 122mm-class multiple
launch rocket systems (MLRS), took over the mission.
For instance, during the February 7 offensive, which
untied the knot of Aqil Mountain, more than 72% of
ISIL targets were hit by land-based fire-support elements.
The abovementioned picture became even more complicated when the Euphrates Shield reached its absolute urban warfare phase. Al-Bab had to be cleared
from IEDs, unexploded ordnance, as well as remaining terrorist elements that were trying to disguise
within the local population.
In sum, helicopter survivability in contested airspaces,
armor survivability against hybrid threats, capabilities
for real-time targeting network / intelligence-surveillance-target acquisition-reconnaissance (ISTAR) / using smart munitions to overcome SVBIED threats will
be the main topics of Turkey’s lessons-learned process.
In the light of the lessons-learned from recent operations, Turkish defense industry now has the historic
responsibility of building on its initial success in
artillery and MLRS systems. Further advancements
are needed especially in guided munitions and more
efficient battle networks segments.
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Use of Indigenous Armed Drone
Bayraktar-TB2
Proxy Groups are a Liability As Much As
an Asset:
Bayraktar TB-2 drone made its combat debut against
PKK terrorist elements in September 2016. The indigenous armed drone was also used in the Euphrates
Shield, albeit the F-16s dominated the skies.
Operation Euphrates Shield has been conducted by a
coalition of rebel groups united under the Free Syrian
Army (FSA) banner. Though Turkmen forces reportedly performed well in the battlefield, the discipline
and combat capabilities of the entire FSA components
were not at desirable levels. This necessitated Ankara
to alter its force generation strategy in favor of committing more ground troops and military assets to
push the operation further, increasing the casualties
and costs it endured. Likewise, in the past, Turkey had
come under fire from the West over its support for rebel groups with alleged extremist affiliations after the
emergence of its partnership with Saudi Arabia and
Qatar. When planning the Euphrates Shield, Ankara
was more diligent with incorporating only ‘moderate at Western standards’ indigenous elements to the
operation.
It was an important step for Turkish defense industry
in receiving lessons-learned for further armed-drone
operations. Furthermore, Bayraktar – TB2 has gained
an important prestige by taking place in Operation
Euphrates Shield shortly after its debut.
Realism is Still Key in the Middle East:
POLITICAL LESSONS LEARNED
Boots on the Ground Translate into a
Seat at the Table:
Operation Euphrates Shield came at a time when
Ankara’s core national security interests surrounding
Syria were increasingly coming at stake, and when the
country was gradually being sidelined in determining
the future of Syria. Boots on the ground has translated
into a seat at the table, securing Turkey a position
in the Astana process. Moreover, the understanding
reached between Ankara and Moscow has helped
Turkey play a constructive role, such as assisting the
evacuation of besieged rebel-held areas to prevent
further humanitarian costs.
Turkey once again saw that its allies and partners
will prioritize their short-medium term interests over
Turkey’s long-term concerns regardless of how sensible
they are. In many ways, Washington’s continued support to the PYD resembles its decision to cooperate
with the Iraqi Kurds against Turkish objections in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the latter case, Washington’s
priority was the deposition of Saddam Hussein, in
the former, diminishing the ISIL threat. The Turkish
position has been weakened in both cases by the lack
of tangible alternatives to address the immediate needs
of Turkey’s allies, which resulted in its concerns about
the permanence of the Assad regime, and PYD’s rising
prominence, to fall on deaf ears.
Timing is of the Essence:
When Turkey offered to support coalition operations
through its own assets, and later with FSA proxies,
this was perceived to be too little too late. The opinion among Western strategic community that Turkey
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was not doing enough to counter the ISIL threat had
already set in, and military operations against ISIL
were progressing with the presence of PYD/YPG on
the ground. Moreover, Turkish initial requests of assistance, that were not perceived to be very tangible,
always came with conditionality, most notably on
the future of the Assad regime, as well as against the
changing realities in Syria after the Russian intervention. On the other hand, launching the Euphrates
Shield following the rapprochement with Russia
reflected the efficient practice of timing on Turkey’s
scorecard.
Military Means Need to be
Complemented with Diplomacy:
Operation Euphrates Shield proved to have its limits,
after both Russia and the United States signaled that
they would not welcome a further advance into Manbij. The Turkish operation that came to be dependent
on continued cooperation with Russia, was halted following an agreement between PYD, Moscow and the
Baathist regime, in which Russian and regime forces
set up a buffer zone between Operation Euphrates
Shield forces and the PKK-affiliated PYD/YPG held
territories. US troops were also stationed in the area
to serve as a blockade for Turkish-backed operations,
a clear indication that Ankara had failed to convince
both its traditional ally, and its newfound partner for
a broader military campaign.
Diplomatic Maneuverability is a
Component of National Security:
Neither Turkey’s traditional Western alliance, nor its
newfound alliance of convenience with Saudi Arabia
and Qatar, provided Turkey with the results it pursued
in Syria. It was only through its partnership with Moscow that Turkey was able discard the risk of Russian
air defenses and initiate the Euphrates Shield safely.
Still, the Turkish operations had been significantly related with the continuation of this understanding with
Moscow, as Ankara lacked unilateral leverage the Russian leadership, and did not have any external counterbalances. As such, the scope of Operation Euphrates
Shield was effectively set by Russia’s decision to side
with the PYD.
The Early Bird Gets the Worm:
While the Syrian civil war came as a surprise to most,
the tremendous shortcoming of the international system to address it was even more shocking. In this environment, actors that rapidly anticipated the failure
of the international system gained advantage. Against
its fundamental transgressions of international norms,
and crossing numerous ‘red-lines’, the Baathist regime
has clung to power and faced no penalty despite its
war crimes. Iran used its Quds Forces and proxy paramilitary organizations to expand its influence in both
Iraq and Syria. Russia militarily intervened, changing
the rules for everyone that had a stake in the Syrian
civil war. In this environment, by Ankara’s inability to
assess the situation accurately and take the initiative
weakened its position at the outset of the civil war.
In fact, the Euphrates Shield was a response to the
unfavorable momentum, and a comeback for Turkey.
A further shift may be in the making with the new US
administration, and those that assess the alteration
accurately and act swiftly will be able to capitalize on
them.
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Vacuums are Rapidly Filled:
A lack of concerted Western action, and especially the
virtual absence of Washington, opened up space for
regional actors to position themselves. While Iran has
benefited significantly from this, Russia won the main
prize by ensuring its permanence in Syria, breaking its
isolation, returning back to the Mediterranean, and
positioning itself as a political and military actor operating at the Middle East as an alternative to the US.
These regional actors are now using their leverage as a
diplomatic advantage to press the West on other issues.
Domestic Issues Play a Role in
Influence/Power Projection:
Turkey’s calculations over Syria, and its ability to
collaborate with the U.S. and Russia, should always
be assessed by taking its threat perceptions surrounding the PKK terrorism into account. Furthermore, as
evidenced by the political and violent ramifications
in Turkey during ISIL advances on PYD/YPG in
2014, developments surrounding the PYD issue had
domestic security implications for the country. After
its peace process collapsed, Ankara’s ability to follow a
pragmatic approach to PYD naturally faltered. Thus,
the Turkish decision to initiate Operation Euphrates
Shield was to prevent the establishment of a PKKaffiliated PYD/YPG corridor beyond its borders, as
much as it was to counter the ISIL threat.
EDAM Foreign Policy and Security
Paper Series 2017/3
April, 2017
Operation
Euphrates Shield:
Lessons Learned
Can Kasapoglu
Defense Analyst, EDAM
Doruk Ergun
Research Fellow, EDAM
Sinan Ulgen
Executive Chairman, EDAM