An Investigation into: to what extent were Deng Xiaoping’s
economic modernizations accompanied by democratic reforms?
Name
IB Candidate #:
IB 20th Century World History
HL
Ms. Makarczuk
Total Word Count: 1990
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Table of Contents
A. Plan of the Investigation … Page 3
B. Summary of Evidence … Page 4
C. Evaluation of Sources
D. Analysis
E. Conclusion
F. Bibliography
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Part A. Plan of Investigation
Considering the intersection between Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s economic and political
policies is important in understanding how China shifted away from Mao Zedong’s cultural
revolution during the late 1970s. Thus, the research will address the question, “To what extent
were Deng Xiaoping’s economic modernizations accompanied by democratic reforms?” The
investigation will evaluate primary sources from Deng’s rise to power, which explain his initial
goals, and from the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the peak of China’s repression. It will also
evaluate Chinese political advocates’ writings in order to gain understanding of China’s political
climate. Finally, this report will consider historians’ works to identify the long-term implications
of Deng’s reforms. As the purpose of this investigation is to analyze the connection between
Deng’s political and economic policies, less attention will be paid on China’s general lack of
democracy, and more on whether economic reforms made China slightly more democratic or
not.
Word Count: 148
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Part B. Summary of Evidence
Deng Xiaoping’s Rise to Power
The April Fifth Movement of 1976 occurred in Tiananmen Square. Citizens criticized the
Gang of Four and called for reform. Deng Xiaoping was punished and removed from
office because of his connection to the movement.1 Yet he later rose to power along a
pro-democracy wave as the Gang of Four declined, becoming the People’s Republic of
China’s undisputed leader. 2 Initially, Deng allowed for some freedoms so that people
could express pent-up resentment with Mao’s regime.3
Economic Modernizations
Once in power, Deng initiated his Four Modernizations, advancing China’s agriculture,
industry, technology, and defense.
4
Capitalistic reforms decreased government
interference, moved China away from state centralization, and gradually increased
individual economic freedom.5 Economic liberalization improved the Chinese people’s
welfare, more than doubled incomes in cities, and made technology like televisions and
telephones more accessible.6 Deng protected China’s new capitalist economy with harsh
punishments for actions that threatened it. For instance, China executed peasants for
reselling sales tax receipts, stealing cows, and more. Labor and human rights activists
were also imprisoned.7 Deng stated that economic modernizations were a prerequisite to
1
Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erik. "The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition Movements, Wall Poster
Campaigns, and Underground Journals." Asian Survey 21, no. 7 (July 1981): 747-74. JSTOR. Accessed February
23, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643619. Page 757.
2
Ibid. Page 758.
3
Link, P. "The Limits of Cultural Reform in Deng Xiaoping's China." Modern China 13, no. 2 (April 1987): 115-76.
JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/189151. Page 119
4
"Heaven on Earth: The Rise and Fall of Socialism Mao Zedong 1893-1976 Deng Xiaoping 1904-1997." PBS.
2005. http://www.pbs.org/heavenonearth/leaders_thinkers_zedong_xiaoping.html.
5
Tyler, Patrick E. "Deng Xiaoping: A Political Wizard Who Put China on the Capitalist Road." The New York
Times, February 20, 1997. http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0822.html.
6
Ibid.
7
"China's Arbitrary State. (Asia)." The Economist (US), March 23, 1996. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G118123807.html.
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political reforms, 8,9 and that the Chinese Communist Party had to continually deliver
economic growth in order to maintain legitimacy and avoid collapse like the Soviet
Union.10 Because of free market reforms, the Chinese government didn’t maintain the
same level of intrusion in individuals’ private lives as it had under Mao.11
1979 Crackdown on Democracy Movement
Economic reforms and the shift away from Mao’s Cultural Revolution engendered hope
for democracy, expressed through reformist Wei Jingsheng’s article, “The Fifth
Modernization: Democracy.” 12 From 1978-1979, the “Beijing Spring”, Chinese prodemocracy movement occurred, and protesters claimed that economic reforms were
insufficient without political rights. 13 Deng tolerated calls for democracy as he rose to
power, but cracked down on the movement in March, 1979, claiming it threatened to go
“too far” and undermine his authority and Four Modernizations.14 Deng labeled the pro-
“Western pundits who argue that international capitalism will drag behind it improvements in the government's
appreciation of human rights have yet to produce much evidence. On the contrary, the forces of incipient capitalism
8
Brodsgaard, "The Democracy Movement in China,” Page 773.
9
Nathan, Andrew J. "The Tiananmen Papers." Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (January/February 2001): 2-48. JSTOR.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20050041.
Deng Xiaoping: I’ve said over and over that we need stability if we re going to develop. How can we progress if
things are in an utter mess? (Page 13.)
Deng Xiaoping: Some people say we allow only economic reform and not political reform, but that's not true. We do
allow political reform, but on one condition: that the Four Basic Principles are upheld. ... We can’t handle chaos
while we’re busy with construction. … That's why we have to insist on clearing the Square. (Page 33)
10
Tyler, "Deng Xiaoping: A Political Wizard Who Put China on the Capitalist Road."
The failed Soviet coup in August 1991 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Communist Party seemed to
convince Mr. Deng that the most powerful antidote to such a fate for Chinese Communism would be economic
growth. … Thus began a period in which the Communist Party's legitimacy arose from its ability to deliver
economic growth and rising incomes. ''In the end, convincing those who do not believe in socialism will depend on
our nation's development,'' Mr. Deng said in late 1991. ''If we can reach a comfortable standard of living by the end
of this century, then that will wake them up a bit. And in the next century when we, as a socialist country, join the
middle ranks of the developed nations, that will help to convince them. Most of these people will genuinely see that
they were mistaken.''
11
Shambaugh, David. "Editorial Introduction: Assessing Deng Xiaoping's Legacy." The China Quarterly, no. 136
(September 1993): 409-11. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/654095. Pages 410-411.
12
Jingsheng, Wei. "The Fifth Modernization: Democracy." In From Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600
Through the Twentieth Century, by Theodore De Bary and Richard Lufrano, 497-500. 2nd ed. Vol. 2. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2000.
13
Brodsgaard, "The Democracy Movement in China,” Pages 747-748
14
Ibid. Page 770
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democracy movement as pro-capitalist, pro-Taiwan, and anti-CCP. 15 In response, Wei
Jingsheng called Deng a dictator, but was sentenced to 15 years of prison.16
Tiananmen Square
In 1989, students called for democracy in Bejing’s Tiananmen Square. By May, these
protests had attracted international attention, and some escalated to hunger strikes. 17
Deng Xiaoping ordered a military crackdown on the protests on June 3-4, resulting in
nearly 300 deaths and 7000 injuries.18
After the Tiananmen Square massacre, Deng Xiaoping added more people to the Party’s
Central Committee such as Jiang Zemin, Li Ruihuan, and Song Ping. Democrat Yan Jiaqi
viewed this as mere “balancing” aimed at maintaining Deng’s legitimacy without
instituting major reforms. Jiaqi predicted that Deng would adopt the rhetoric of the
democracy movement while still maintaining a dictatorship.19
15
Ibid. Page 772
Ibid. Page 771
17
Nathan, "The Tiananmen Papers," Pages 3-8.
18
Shawki, Ahmed. "China: Deng's Legacy." International Socialist Review, no. 2 (Fall 1997).
http://www.isreview.org/issues/02/China_Part2.shtml.
19
Jiaqi, Yan. "China Is Hardly A Republic." World Affairs 152, no. 3, China's 1989 Upheaval (Winter 1989-90):
163-66. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672228.
[I]n order to maintain his authority, the despot will attempt to achieve political stability by practicing a "balancing
act" among the various opposing political power forces. … The new people added to the party Central Committee
during the Fourth Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] Thirteenth Central Committee are
actually just the results of Deng Xiao ping's efforts to play a political balancing act. In order to restrict the expansion
of the Li-Yang alliance's circle of power, Deng Xiaoping adopted two measures. One was to elect Jiang Zemin, Li
Ruihuan, and Song Ping as standing members of the party Central Committee, and the other was to make Jiang
Zemin, who is not a member of the Li Yang alliance, party general secretary. Shi, Song Ping, etc., made at the
National Party Congress, to counter the steadily expanding power of the alliance between Li Peng, Yang Shangkun,
and Yao Yilin. … It is clear from the gathering of the Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP Thirteenth Central
Committee and Deng Xiaoping's own words that, in the wake of the great massacre and after the massive searches
and arrests, Deng Xiaoping will not only adopt all of the slogans shouted during the student and democracy
movements but will also find a scapegoat, and perform surgery on the dull witted, incapable Li Peng, in order to
establish moral appeal and legitimacy upon the foundation of power created by the use of armed military
suppression. (164-165)
16
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The Tiananmen Square Massacre created a precedent for using force to crush dissent, as
seen with the government’s reactions to the Chinese Democratic Party in 1998-99 and the
Falun Gong religious movement since 1999.20
Political Structure of China
Deng feared disorder, claiming that society wouldn’t cohere well under a multiparty
democratic system.21 He dismissed calls for democracy as Western meddling.22 Yan Jiaqi
called Deng Xiaoping’s government a dictatorship because his speeches showed that it
met the three key categories: concentrated power, untransferable power, and a lack of a
procedure for succession of leaders. 23 In contrast, the Chinese government celebrated
20
Nathan, "The Tiananmen Papers," Page 9.
Deng Xiaoping: ... This incident has been a wake-up call for all of us. We'll never keep the lid on if we relax on the
Four Basic Principles. ... Our use of martial law to deal with the turmoil was absolutely necessary. In the future,
whenever it might be necessary, we will use severe measures to stamp out the first signs of turmoil as soon as they
appear. (Page 43)
21
Tyler, "Deng Xiaoping: A Political Wizard Who Put China on the Capitalist Road."
“Mr. Deng's inherent fear of disorder and the violence it has wrought explains his deep opposition to political
pluralism. ''If all one billion of us undertake multiparty elections, we will certainly run into a full-scale civil war,'' he
told President Bush in February 1989. ''Taking precedence over all China's problems is stability.''”
22
Nathan, "The Tiananmen Papers."
Deng Xiaoping: The Western world, especially the United States, has thrown its entire propaganda machine into
agitation work and has given a lot of encouragement and assistance to the so-called democrats or opposition in
China, people who in fact are the scum of the Chinese nation. ... Some Western countries use things like "human
rights," or like saying the socialist system is irrational or illegal, to criticize us, but what they're really after is our
sovereignty. Those Western countries that play power politics have no right at all to talk about human rights! Look
how many people around the world they've robbed of human rights! And look how many Chinese people they've
hurt the human rights of since they invaded China during the Opium war!” (Page 32)
23
Jiaqi, "China Is Hardly A Republic."
“Contrary to a republic, what Deng Xiao ping has established in China under his rule is a typical dictatorship.
Dictatorship has three obvious characteristics. The first is the ultimate concentration of the highest power in the
hands of one single man. In his 9 June speech, Deng said that China could not implement "the independence of three
powers" but should "uphold a system of people's representatives congress." The recently convened Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress demonstrated again that this so-called standing organ of the highest
national power could not but obey the order of the dictator Deng Xiaoping. The second characteristic of a
dictatorship is that the highest power in the hands of that individual is untransferable. In his 24 June speech, Deng
Xiaoping unequivocally indicated that if the image and prestige of the third-generation leader cannot be established,
that is to say that if nobody in mainland China can both obey Deng's order and thoroughly hold power, Deng still
will absolutely not relinquish the highest power.1 The third characteristic is the lack of set procedure for the
succession of the highest power. After Deng Xiaoping had seized dictatorial power, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Zi yang,
respectively, became his chosen "heir apparent." However, Deng could not avoid the dilemma facing all dictators.
Once the successor even slightly disagrees with him, he will discard all procedure at all cost to change the
succession for the highest power. Deng Xiaoping is an emperor without the official name and a dictator worthy of
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Deng Xiaoping’s ability to grow China’s economy, open relations with the West, and
maintain a strong socialist state. China’s government claims that ethnically Chinese
people from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other oversees Chinese areas all supported Deng,
and that they all grieved his death.24 It claims that Deng’s modernizations provided the
groundwork for democratic advancements.25
Human Rights Record
Deng Xiaoping oversaw human rights abuses, such as the Tiananmen Square Massacre in
1989.
26
His “Strike Hard” Policy encouraged harsh punishments with limited due
process. For instance, China executed at least 4,367 people in 1996.27 Since 1989, many
Western Nations censured China for its human rights abuses, however, by the mid-90s,
some countries stopped these censures (e.g. France stopped in 1997, but executions and
denials of due process continued).28
Word Count: 670
the title. The absolute power of Deng Xiaoping suffers no divisions or impedances, and there can be no telling who
his successor will be. The "People's Republic" simply follows his every command.” (163-164)
24
"History." Chinese Government's Official Web Portal. 2005. Accessed February 24, 2014.
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/06/content_24233.htm.
25
Ibid.
26
Nathan, Andrew J. "The Tiananmen Papers." Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (January/February 2001): 2-48.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20050041. Pages 3-8.
27
Shawki, "China: Deng's Legacy."
28
"Perfidious Marianne: China." The Economist (US), April 5, 1997. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G119274135.html.
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Part C. Evaluation of Sources
Source A29
China Is Hardly A Republic is a 1989 writing from Yan Jiaqi. He used to advise senior CCP
officials, but is now democratic reform advocate living in exile in France. His work aims at
exposing Deng Xiaoping’s regime as a dictatorship in spite of titles like the “People’s Republic”
of China, which Yan believes is a necessary first step to political change in China. As Yan was
once a political advisor in China who has direct experience with the government, this source has
value because it’s based on information that outside, foreign sources couldn’t access. Western
powers did not have full knowledge of the extent of China’s repressive policies, and the Chinese
government also tried to cover up information about the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Yan’s
source provides insider knowledge that is rare because of Chinese censorship. However, as
someone previously affiliated with Chinese politics and a democracy advocate, Yan writes with a
political motive, limiting his work. He has an incentive to distort facts to make Deng appear as
unjust as possible, as he wants to motivate Chinese citizens to oppose Deng and push for
democratic reform.
Source B30
Editorial Introduction: Assessing Deng Xiaoping's Legacy was written by David Shambaugh, a
Professor at George Washington University specializing in Chinese government. It’s from a
1993 issue of China Quarterly aimed at providing a better understanding of Deng Xiaoping’s
role in Chinese history. This source is valuable because, unlike Chinese sources, it isn’t subject
to Communist censorship, and thus doesn’t have to artificially praise Deng. Additionally, this
source better analyzes long-term effects because it’s from twenty-five years after Deng’s Four
29
30
Jiaqi, "China Is Hardly A Republic."
Shambaugh, "Editorial Introduction: Assessing Deng Xiaoping's Legacy."
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Modernizations. For instance, Shambaugh notes that while Deng refused to implement direct
democratic reforms, his free market reforms rolled back government interference that ultimately
made China more free.31 A primary source from the late 1970s would only be able to consider
Deng’s intentional refusal to implement democracy, not the unintentional, democratic impacts of
his reforms. However, Shambaugh’s Western perspective limits his work. By comparing Deng to
free marketers like Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Regan, 32 Shambaugh
risks overgeneralizing Deng’s policies and forcing Western culture into his analysis. While
Deng, Regan, and Thatcher were all free marketers, the democratic UK and US were
fundamentally distinct from the autocratic China with incidents like the Tiananmen Massacre.
Shambaugh’s cultural perspective is thus predisposed to praise economic liberalization, ignoring
China’s underlying repression.
Word Count: 396
31
Ibid. Page 410.
“Deng Xiaoping inherited from Mao Zedong a stagnant economy, alienated society and paralysed polity. He will
bequeath to his successors a robust economy and rejuvenated society, but antiquated political system. China's
political system is antiquated partly for reasons common to Leninist party-states, but also because of Deng's
steadfast refusal to create meaningful channels of political participation for China's citizenry. … Deng believed, like
other Chinese reformers before him, that a strong state which monopolized political power was essential to
economic development. … Yet, at the same time as Deng rebuilt the party-state from its fractured condition of the
Cultural Revolution, he also sowed the seeds of its potential demise. His economic reform programme and the
autonomy from state control that he created for Chinese from many walks of life inexorably decreased the Party's
previous hegemony. In the wake of Tiananmen Deng and the Chinese leadership sought to refurbish the instruments
of Orwellian state power- subjecting the society to considerable coercion, propaganda and economic austerity- only
to realize that these instruments had dulled as a result of the 1980s reforms.”
32
Ibid Pages 410-411.
“At the same time, it must be recognized that (unlike Mao) Deng Xiaoping trusted in the entrepreneurial spirit in
Chinese culture, and did much to remove state strictures from people's lives. In this sense he shares a legacy with
free-marketeers Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Getting the government “off the backs” of average Chinese,
in order to free their essential commercial instincts, will be one of Deng's most enduring legacies. He rolled back
much of the intrusive apparatus that had intimidated a vast nation and provided the stimulus for the realization of the
Napoleonic prophecy of the awakened Chinese giant. In doing so, however, he unleashed powerful centrifugal
forces in society that are progressively undermining Leninist rule and Communist Party control.” (Pages 410-411.)
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Part D. Analysis
As Deng Xiaoping emerged as the People’s Republic of China’s predominant leader,
Chinese citizens expected that democracy would accompany his economic reforms—the Four
Modernizations. Deng guaranteed freedoms as he rose to power, like decreasing interference in
the economy and allowing more free expression than Mao had. However, these reforms were
minor, and Deng was committed to denying democracy in order to implement his economic
reforms. Thus, rather than promoting democracy, Deng Xiaoping’s economic modernizations
fundamentally solidified political repression.
Deng initially provided democratic reforms. In 1976, he was arrested for being a part of
the April 5th Movement in Tiananmen Square, a pro-democracy protest against the Gang of
Four. 33 But he used the popular sentiment behind these protests to outmaneuver his political
opponents and gain control of the PRC.34 To appeal to the pro-reform fervor of the late 1970s,
Deng granted citizens limited cultural freedom, like letting writers express discontent with
Mao.35
Yet these reforms were a mere ploy to ensure that Deng could gain control of China. He
was a shrewd politician; discontent with Mao helped Deng win over pro-democracy reformists
like Wei Jingsheing. But once Deng consolidated power, he no longer had any use for the
democrats.36 Rather, they constrained his ability to autocratically modernize China’s economy,
leading Deng to criticize them as going “too far.” He cracked down on the 1979 Beijing Spring
33
Brodsgaard, "The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition Movements, Wall Poster Campaigns,
and Underground Journals." Page 757.
34
Ibid.
35
Link, "The Limits of Cultural Reform in Deng Xiaoping's China." Page 119
36
Brodsgaard, "The Democracy Movement in China,” Pages 747-748
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democracy movement, arresting all dissidents.37 After getting a glimpse of democracy, China
remained repressed.
Historian David Shambaugh argued that by liberalizing China’s economy, the
government lost the apparatus necessary to interfere in citizens’ lives, creating the foundations
for eventual democracy. 38 Yet while free market societies like the United States often have
strong democracies, that logic fails when applied to China.
The evidence for Shambaugh’s claim is weak: China had experienced the “centrifugal
forces” of the free market for eleven years before the Tiananmen Square Massacre, but that
failed to stop the government’s harsh crackdown on protestors. Free market liberalization
reduced government intrusion in economics, not politics.
Deng used modernization as an excuse to delay political reform, proving the opposite of
Shambaugh’s argument. The Tiananmen Papers cited Deng Xiaoping’s exact words prior to the
Tiananmen Square massacre, which indicated that he believed economic modernization would be
impossible with the political instability he associated with free expression and multiparty
elections. 39 Under this “stability precludes development” logic, Deng Xiaoping became more
repressive in order to ensure economic growth, as he harshly punished crimes that threatened the
capitalist system, like reselling sales tax receipts and stealing cows.40
Economic growth thus became a means for silencing dissent. To prevent China from
collapsing as the Soviet Union had, Deng attempted to placate the people with economic
37
Ibid. Page 770
Shambaugh, "Editorial Introduction: Assessing Deng Xiaoping's Legacy." Pages 410-411.
39
Nathan, "The Tiananmen Papers."
Deng Xiaoping: I’ve said over and over that we need stability if we re going to develop. How can we progress if
things are in an utter mess? (Page 13.)
Deng Xiaoping: Some people say we allow only economic reform and not political reform, but that's not true. We do
allow political reform, but on one condition: that the Four Basic Principles are upheld. ... We can’t handle chaos
while we’re busy with construction. … That's why we have to insist on clearing the Square. (Page 33)
40
"China's Arbitrary State. (Asia)." The Economist (US), March 23, 1996. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G118123807.html.
38
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benefits. He created a system in which the Chinese overlooked oppression; so long as they had
money and jobs, they had to be quiet and content.41
Every year after the Tiananmen Square massacre, Western nations censured China for its
human rights abuses. But by the mid-’90s, some countries, like France, halted their criticism in
order to maintain profitable trade relations, despite China’s continued denials of due process and
other rights.42 China’s economic growth thus motivated countries to disregard its human rights
abuses.
In his work, Yan Jiaqi accounts for the undemocratic system that Deng’s reforms created.
Citing Deng’s speeches, he illustrates that power was concentrated and untransferable in the
Chinese government. 43 His evidence is stronger than Shambaugh’s: while Shambaugh only
makes abstract analytical claims about capitalism and freedom, Yan points to specific structures
in China, like the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, to show how the free
market kept citizens subservient to Deng.44
Rather than decreasing government interference, Deng’s economic reforms created an
insatiable need for economic growth, causing him to sidestep democratic reforms and silence
internal and international critics.
Word Count: 628
41
Tyler, "Deng Xiaoping: A Political Wizard Who Put China on the Capitalist Road."
"Perfidious Marianne: China." The Economist (US), April 5, 1997. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G119274135.html.
43
Jiaqi, "China Is Hardly A Republic." Pages 163-164.
44
Ibid.
42
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Part E. Conclusion
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, like allowing writers more freedom, were superficial at best, and were
quickly reversed. He only tolerated the democracy movement of the late 1970s because it helped
him rise to power after the Gang of Four, and cracked down on the movement once they
conflicted with his interests. Rather than creating a liberalized environment as historians like
David Shambaugh have argued, his economic reforms were used to justify continued political
repression, as seen through Deng’s justification for a military crackdown on the Tiananmen
Square protests. By modernizing the economy in order to maintain the quality of life of the
Chinese and avoid the fate of the Soviet Union, economic growth became a means of silencing
dissent merely by providing money instead of democracy. Regardless of short-term increases in
political rights, economic modernizations ultimately failed to promote democracy, as they
solidified the legitimacy of an undemocratic regime.
Word Count: 148
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Part F. Bibliography
Bibliography
Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erik. "The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition Movements,
Wall Poster Campaigns, and Underground Journals." Asian Survey 21, no. 7 (July 1981): 747-74.
JSTOR. Accessed February 23, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643619.
"China's Arbitrary State. (Asia)." The Economist (US), March 23, 1996.
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-18123807.html.
"Heaven on Earth: The Rise and Fall of Socialism Mao Zedong 1893-1976 Deng Xiaoping 1904-1997."
PBS. 2005. http://www.pbs.org/heavenonearth/leaders_thinkers_zedong_xiaoping.html.
"History." Chinese Government's Official Web Portal. 2005. Accessed February 24, 2014.
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/06/content_24233.htm.
Jiaqi, Yan. "China Is Hardly A Republic." World Affairs 152, no. 3, China's 1989 Upheaval (Winter
1989-90): 163-66. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672228.
Jingsheng, Wei, and Richard Lufrano. "The Fifth Modernization: Democracy." In From Sources of
Chinese Tradition: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century, by Theodore De Bary, 497-500.
2nd ed. Vol. 2. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
Link, P. "The Limits of Cultural Reform in Deng Xiaoping's China." Modern China 13, no. 2 (April
1987): 115-76. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/189151
Nathan, Andrew J. "The Tiananmen Papers." Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (January/February 2001): 2-48.
JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20050041.
"Perfidious Marianne: China." The Economist (US), April 5, 1997. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G119274135.html.
Shambaugh, David. "Editorial Introduction: Assessing Deng Xiaoping's Legacy." The China Quarterly,
no. 136 (September 1993): 409-11. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/654095
Shawki, Ahmed. "China: Deng's Legacy." International Socialist Review, no. 2 (Fall 1997).
http://www.isreview.org/issues/02/China_Part2.shtml.
Tyler, Patrick E. "Deng Xiaoping: A Political Wizard Who Put China on the Capitalist Road." The New
York Times, February 20, 1997.
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0822.html.
15