D emocracy Watch
Democracy Watch
15
In this issue
politics with the
E Playing
enfranchisement of the wrongfully
disenfranchised ....... Page
corruption...
1
zero tolerance for
........ Page
4
E Continuing insensitivity to conflicts of interest ...... Page
8
E DCEs and power: the James
Dogbe Shopping Center?
...... Page
dictators: celebrating
E Coddling
Eyadema
....... Page
8
9
E Incumbency and the challenge of
internal party democracy
....... Page
1
IN THE ANNALS OF GOVERNANCE
ISSN: 0855-417X
E Revisiting
March 2004
A Quarterly Newsletter of the Ghana Center for Democratic Development
Volume 5, No. 1
March 2004
Vol. 5, No. 1
10
EDITORIAL TEAM
n Baffour Agyeman-Duah
n Audrey Gadzekpo
n E. Gyimah-Boadi
n H. Kwasi Prempeh
n Edem Selormey
n Kwesi Yankah
Democracy Watch is published with funding from
the German Technical Cooperation, GTZ.
Playing politics with
the enfranchisement
of the wrongfully
disenfranchised
An attempt by the Government to
secure quick passage of an
amendment to the Representation of
the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284)
met intense objection from a coalition
of opposition parties. The amendment
was for the purpose of extending the
right to vote to Ghanaians resident
abroad. The NPP government had
introduced the bill under a Certificate
of Urgency, thus placing it on
Parliament’s fast-track calendar and
process. However, loud protest from
both the parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition forced the
government to abandon its reliance on
a certificate of urgency and caused the
bill to be placed instead on
Parliament’s regular calendar. While
Opposition objection to the bill
focused immediately on the
government’s intention to “rush it
through Parliament,” public statements
by the opposition parties indicate that
they are even more forcefully opposed
to the substance of the bill.
Unfortunately, because of the
government’s choice of a legislative
strategy (namely, the certificate of
urgency) that called its motives into
question, the ensuing public debate did
not focus sufficiently on the substantive
disagreement.
The very idea that more than one
decade after the Constitution has been
in effect, the right to vote in our
Continued on next column E
democracy continues to rest on the
provisions of a decree promulgated in an
undemocratic era is indeed embarrassing
and makes a mockery of democracy itself.
PNDC Law 284 was necessary when it
was promulgated in 1992 because, at the
time, there was no Constitution and
Ghanaians had no legal right to vote. In
order to create the legal framework for
Ghanaians to vote in the referendum and
then general elections of that year, it was
necessary for the PNDC to grant eligible
Ghanaians the statutory right to vote.
Once the Constitution came into effect,
however, PNDC Law 284 should have
been repealed or else given way to the
constitutional provision dealing with the
franchise, because upon the coming into
effect of the Constitution the right to vote
was no longer just a statutory right, but a
right derived directly from the Constitution.
“The very idea that more than
one decade after the
Constitution has been in effect,
the right to vote in our
democracy continues to rest
on the provisions of a decree
promulgated in an
undemocratic era is indeed
embarrassing and makes a
mockery of democracy itself.”
Unfortunately, the Electoral Commission
has since 1993 been conducting the
business of registration and voting as if the
right of Ghanaians to vote and to be
registered to vote is statute-based, rather
than constitutionally rooted. Thus we
continue to live with the anomaly that the
most basic and foundational right in our
constitutional democracy is defined and
implemented by reference to a military
decree. But symbolism is not the only
Continued on page 2 E
2
Democracy Watch
Vol. 5, No. 1
problem with PNDCL 284. As a matter of substance,
PNDCL 284 is, in many respects, also at variance with the
self-enforcing provision of Article 42 of the 1992
Constitution, the provision of the constitution to which
Ghanaians owe their right to vote and to be registered to
vote in the Fourth Republic.
Article 42 grants the right to vote and to be registered to
vote in the most unconditional and unequivocal terms. It
states: “EVERY CITIZEN of Ghana of eighteen years of
age or above and of sound mind has the right to vote and is
entitled to be registered as a voter for the purposes of public
elections and referenda.” This provision of Article 42
specifies only three qualifications for a person to secure
the right to vote and to be registered to vote. These are
(1) citizenship (“every citizen”); (2) age (18 years and
above); and (3) mental capacity (must be of sound mind;
not medically insane).
Notably, Article 42 of the Constitution does not mention
residency as one of the qualifications for the right to vote
or to be registered to vote. Because Article 42 grants the
right to vote unconditionally to “every citizen” (18 and above
and of sound mind), the practice in past elections, based
presumably on PNDCL 284, whereby the right to vote
and to be registered to vote has been limited to Ghanaians
resident in Ghana (and to Ghanaian diplomatic personnel
abroad), represents an unconstitutional restriction on the
Article 42 rights of Ghanaians living abroad. That practice
effectively adds unto Article 42 a new qualification, to the
effect that a citizen must be “resident in Ghana or else be
on diplomatic or other official business abroad” before he
or she may be entitled to vote. This additional condition or
qualification is, of course, not found anywhere, expressly
or by implication, in the Constitution. And because Article
42 trumps the contrary provision in PNDCL 284, the latter
cannot stand. In fact, PNDCL goes even further to require
that a citizen be resident in Ghana for a minimum of six
months before he or she would be eligible to be registered
to vote. This, too, is patently unconstitutional, and the
Supreme Court said as much in its 1996 decision rendered
in Tehn-Addy v. Electoral Commission.
The controversy over the proposed amendment to PNDCL
284, however, had as much to do with the means as with
the ends. While in opposition, the NPP had promised, in
the course of the 2000 campaign and especially during fundraising tours abroad that, if elected, it would bring an end
to the disenfranchisement of Ghanaians in the diaspora.
One wonders why, after winning power, the NPP
government waited three full years to initiate legislation on
this matter, knowing well that this being an election year
any attempt to enfranchise a new class of voters (even if
the measure merely restores a right unconstitutionally
denied) is bound to provoke partisan reaction and call into
question the government’s motives. The NPP made matters
worse when it decided to proceed this last minute by means
Continued on next column E
March 2004
of a certificate of urgency, when whatever “urgency” it
perceived was caused by its own inertia and inexplicable
three-year delay.
The NPP government’s handling of this matter follows a
pattern of omissions and delays in dealing with certain
election-related matters. The list includes the Government’s
failure to fill in a timely fashion certain vacancies on the EC
as well as its failure to quickly rectify the anomaly of
commission members who had passed the retirement age
but continued to serve on the EC. To wait until an election
year to begin to deal with these outstanding matters is to
invite the accusation, trumpeted by the opposition, that the
Government is trying to use its incumbency to undermine
the integrity of the upcoming general elections.
The NPP’s attempt to pass the amendment to PNDCL
284 by means of a certificate of urgency also raises
questions about abuse of this fast-track legislative process.
This is not the first time the NPP’s attempt to pass legislation
through a certificate of urgency has provoked intense
objection. It will be recalled that the bill to introduce a
national health insurance scheme was passed by means of
a certificate of urgency. In that instance, too, there was no
“urgency” other than the government’s own desire to rush
passage of the bill. Such misuse of the certificate of urgency
creates the unhealthy impression and sets a precedent that
numerical superiority in Parliament entitles a government
to fast-track any legislation and thereby truncate the
deliberative process at its pleasure. Recourse to a
certificate of urgency should be reserved properly for
emergencies brought on by unanticipated events that call
for an immediate legislative response. In such instances,
there would be a true national urgency justifying the use
of a certificate of urgency, not just a party emergency.
Parliament should use this opportunity to clarify or revise
the rules governing certificates of urgency to save that
legislative device from abuse.
While it is fair to object to the NPP’s attempt to pass its
proposed amendment to PNDL 284 by means of a certificate
of urgency in an election year, the substance of the amendment
itself has much to commend in its favor. As already noted,
PNDL 284 impermissibly deprives many Ghanaians, including
Ghanaians resident abroad, of their constitutional right to vote
and to be registered to vote. Opposition to the substance of
the proposed amendment is therefore misplaced.
“ To wait until an election year to begin to
deal with these outstanding matters is to
invite the accusation, trumpeted by the
opposition, that the Government is trying to
use its incumbency to
undermine the integrity of the upcoming
general elections”
Continued on page 3E
Democracy Watch
In an era when it is a commonplace to find growing numbers
of a country’s nationals residing and earning a living abroad,
it is short-sighted policy to deprive such citizens of their right
to vote in national elections merely because they happen to
reside abroad. Such disenfranchisement is especially
egregious when these citizens make important economic
contributions to the national economy through their remittances
and investments back home.
The policy rationale behind PNDCL 284’s
disenfranchisement of non-resident Ghanaians is indeed
difficult to fathom. One commonly heard argument is that
enfranchising Ghanaians who live abroad is tantamount to
granting them “representation without taxation.” This is,
of course, a bogus claim, since the right to vote is granted
to citizens, not taxpayers. Moreover, it is a well-known
fact that only a small minority of Ghanaians resident at
home pays income taxes. If indirect taxes such as custom
duties are included, then in fact Ghanaians abroad also
contribute substantially to national tax revenues. At any
rate, citizenship, not taxpayer status, is what Article 42
stipulates as the constitutional qualification for voting.
“The fact that a party might stand to gain
politically from a piece of legislation does not
make such legislation improper”
Opposition accusations that the NPP government is merely
seeking to extract partisan and electoral advantage by
enfranchising Ghanaians abroad evade the real issue. The
fact that a party might stand to gain politically from a piece
of legislation does not make such legislation improper. In
fact, it is natural in a democracy to expect that governing
parties would sponsor legislation from which they hope
to gain some electoral advantage as a side effect. As long
as the particular legislation is in the national interest, the
incidental fact of electoral benefit for the sponsoring party
is beside the point. Especially in the case at hand, where
the proposed legislation is intended to reverse a
constitutionally dubious policy, the prospects of partisan
advantage, one way or the other, are immaterial. After
all, what else but pure partisan advantage in favor of the
NDC explains why the outgoing PNDC decreed the
disenfranchisement of Ghanaians abroad on the eve of
the transition to multiparty democracy? The PNDC had
long harbored suspicions that influential sections of
Ghanaians living abroad, including many who had gone
into exile after the AFRC and PNDC coups, were
vehemently opposed to its rule. Thus, disenfranchising all
Ghanaians resident abroad may very well have been
motivated by a partisan desire to skew the electoral playing
field in favor of the PNDC’s successor party. In fact, this
hypothesis gains greater credibility when one tries to divine
the logic behind the additional rule in PNDC 284 that a
citizen otherwise qualified to register to vote must have
been resident in Ghana for the six months immediately
Continued on next columnE
Vol. 5, No. 1
March 2004
3
prior to the date of registration before he or she would be
registered as a voter. One effect of such a ridiculous rule is
to make it impracticable for Ghanaians abroad who desire to
return home to vote or register to vote to be able to do so.
“ the right to vote is granted to citizens,
not taxpayers”
There is no reason why the NPP government must keep in
place such an anti-democratic, indeed unconstitutional, policy.
It is entirely legitimate for the NPP to initiate legislation to deliver
on a campaign promise, as it did earlier in 2001 with the
legislation to decriminalize libel. In the latter case, the original
statute had already been pronounced as constitutional by the
Supreme Court. Even so, the new NPP government’s repeal
of that statutory provision was widely commended as a good
policy that served the national interest by helping to advance
the cause of media freedom. The proposed amendment to
PNDCL 284 is even wiser policy, as it will remove the disability
currently imposed on large numbers of Ghanaians who happen
to be earning a living outside the borders of the country. At
any rate, there is no reason why all political parties cannot
compete vigorously for the votes of Ghanaians in the diaspora,
the same way the parties compete for votes here at home. It
is indeed bad form for the opposition parties to oppose the
proposed amendment to PNDCL 284 largely on the spurious
claim that the proposed change in the status quo, even if in
consonance with the letter and spirit of article 42 of the
Constitution, will inure to the electoral advantage of the
incumbent party. That is not sufficient grounds to oppose
proposed legislation in a democracy.
Finally, the Electoral Commission’s own position in this whole
episode has been unimpressive. The EC has continued to
enforce PNDCL 284, even when that statute’s provisions run
contrary to the clear and self-enforcing language of Article 42
of the Constitution. The EC insists that it is bound to enforce
PNDCL 284 because it is still good law, as if to suggest that
Article 42 of the Constitution is not binding on the EC or that
the constitutional provision is inferior to PNDCL 284. If the
EC thinks the statute and the constitution are in conflict, why
disregard the Constitution’s superior commands and enforce
PNDCL 284 instead?
“ It is indeed bad form for the opposition parties
to oppose the proposed amendment
to PNDCL 284 largely on the spurious
claim that the proposed change ,even if in
consonance with article 42 of the Constitution,
will inure to the electoral advantage of the
incumbent party.”
When challenged about this matter, the EC’s typical
response has been to show complainants the way to the
Supreme Court. It is true that it is only the Supreme Court
that can settle authoritatively any constitutional dispute. But
that is not a license for public officers and institutions to act
Continued on page 4 E
Democracy Watch
4
Vol. 5, No. 1
in blatant disregard of the Constitution and thereby compel
complainants to go to court. The country’s scarce judicial
resources should not be wasted on avoidable litigation. One
reason why constitutional provisions like Article 42 are
written in plain and simple language is to avoid self-serving
interpretations and needless litigation. Moreover, nothing
stops the EC from obeying the self-executing Article 42
and thereby compel whoever thinks PNDC Law 284 should
prevail to be the one to take the matter to the courts instead.
In fact, between obedience to a PNDC Law and
enforcement of the self-executing Article 42, the Oath of
Office sworn by Commissioners of the EC upon assuming
office obligates the Commission to obey and enforce Article
42 over the conflicting statute, and thereby shift the burden
of a legal challenge unto those who would think that it is
the conflicting PNDC Law that must be enforced.
The Commission’s other claim that implementation of voting
by non-resident Ghanaians would be a logistical nightmare
is even more specious. If the proposed amendment is
passed, it would not make Ghana the first country whose
non-resident citizens vote in national elections. Many
countries with substantial non-resident populations, such
as Mexico, already provide that opportunity to their
nationals abroad. If the EC were committed to implementing
the dictates of the Constitution and of the proposed
legislation it would have no difficulty finding appropriate
models to adopt or adapt. The logistics excuse is particularly
odd, given that it is this same EC that proclaimed
vociferously that it had the capacity, even on short notice,
to handle the creation and administration of elections in 30
new constituencies. Yet, the EC would like us to believe
that it is incapable of developing a plan to enable Ghanaians
abroad to participate in national elections. ¦¦
March 2004
to obtain loan guarantees for a private company of which
he was a director, shareholder and company secretary.
The scandal and its handling provide the occasion, once
again, to re-examine the Kufuor administration’s selfproclaimed policy of “zero tolerance of corruption” and
to assess whether, on the basis of the record so far, such
a policy could be said to exist in fact.
“ ...the list of indiscretions and arguably
illegal acts committed by the Deputy
Minister reflects a troubling numbness or
indifference to conflicts of interest by our
public officials”
On the positive side, the Bamba scandal is illustrative of
the contribution that investigative journalism can make to
the search for good governance and probity and
accountability in our public life. It also shows the
phenomenal progress that Ghana has made in the area of
media freedom and independence, even as the government
continues to lag behind in its promise to enact a creditable
freedom of information law. Also, because such events
are a rarity in Ghanaian public life, the Minister Bamba’s
“resignation” in the wake of the Chronicle exposé is worthy
of note.
The whole affair, however, raises a number of worrisome
concerns. In the first place, the list of indiscretions and
arguably illegal acts committed by the Deputy Minister
reflects a troubling numbness or indifference to conflicts
of interest by our public officials. For example, the Deputy
Minister’s alleged directorship of a private company, if
true, would likely be in breach of articles 78 and 284 of
the Constitution.
Minister Bamba’s case indeed highlights the kind of ethical
vacuum that is created by the continuing absence of a credible
code of conduct for appointees of the executive branch.
While the existence of such a code would not necessarily
prevent incidents of ministerial indiscretion and malfeasance
from occurring, it would at least provide general guidance
and place ministers on notice as to what they may or may not
hana’s struggle to entrench probity and accountability do. The President promised precisely such a code of conduct
has made some limited progress, but has also met significant a while back. That promise has yet to be redeemed.
drawbacks. A number of developments in the first quarter
of 2004 highlight both the minimal progress and the evident The Bamba affair also points to weaknesses in the current
stagnation in the much-heralded policy of zero tolerance asset declaration regime. A comprehensive and credible asset
declaration regime would have required the Deputy Minister
for corruption.
to disclose the nature and extent of his interest in the private
company. Of course, under the current asset declaration
ALHAJI MOCTOR BAMBA’S WOES
Revisiting zero tolerance for
corruption: Bamba, Bagbin, and
CHRAJ in the crosshairs
G
The deputy Minister of State at the Presidency and Member
of Parliament for Wenchi East, the Honorable Alhaji Moctor
Bamba, resigned after a string of investigative reports by
the Chronicle revealed that he had used his office to facilitate
visa fraud. The report also accused him of being complicit
in the use of forged signatures of various Ministers of State
Continued on next columnE
“ ...the Bamba scandal is illustrative of the
contribution that investigative journalism can
make to the search for good governance and
probity and accountability in our public life”
Continued on page 5 E
Democracy Watch
statute even such a disclosure cannot be verified by the
media or civil society, as the statute denies a public right
of access to declarations made by the affected officials.
The fact that Minister Bamba was a Deputy Minister at
the Presidency also raises the question why his goings-on
escaped the notice of the President’s Office of
Accountability, an office that is supposed to raise the ethical
bar within the executive branch by taking both proactive
and remedial action to promote integrity and ethics in the
conduct of executive appointees. Not a word has been
heard from the Office of Accountability since it was
installed. Yet the allegations against the Deputy Minister
apparently surfaced as far back as July 2002. Some of
the allegations are so brazen that an Office of
Accountability that had its eyes wide open and its ears to
the ground would have become aware of the unfolding
scandal. One wonders whether the Office of Accountability
is indeed up and running and, if so, what exactly it has
been doing. That the Bamba scandal happened within
close proximity of the President and the Office of
Accountability appears to confirm the view that the
government lacks an effective in-house machinery and
policy for dealing with miscreant ministers and members
of the presidential office.
Indeed the Bamba affair gives cause to query what the
real job description is of a Minister or Deputy Minister
“at the Presidency,” especially when the President,
pursuant to the Office of the President Act, has the
assistance of a large number of staffers headed by the
Chief of Staff, as well as other special offices. So far,
there is no evidence that the removal of Deputy Minister
Bamba from his job at the Presidency has created a
vacuum or vacancy that is crying to be filled. Nor, for
that matter, has a replacement been named to take his
place or is one contemplated. If so, it is doubtful whether
there is or ever was a need for the position Deputy Minister
Bamba previously occupied. Had Deputy Minister
Bamba been assigned a meaningful job description and a
position of significant responsibility with clear reporting
lines, one that kept him occupied daily on important affairs
of state, it is unlikely he would have found the time to
pursue the kinds of activities that eventually brought him
down in disgrace.
Finally, the Presidency’s silence in the face of the scandal
as well as the “voluntary” manner of Deputy Minister
Bamba’s exit have done little to reassure a skeptical nation
of the President’s continuing commitment to a policy of
zero tolerance for corruption. Because Deputy Minister
Bamba was appointed by the President and, moreover,
served in the Presidency, it was reasonably expected, once
the scandal broke, that the President would act decisively
to fire the Deputy Minister and use the opportunity to
recommit himself and his government to his zero-tolerance
declaration. Instead, Deputy Minister Bamba was allowed
to “resign” without fanfare. Perhaps his announced
Continued on next column E
Vol. 5, No. 1
March 2004
5
“resignation” is simply an euphemism for “fired”. That may
well be the common understanding in other political cultures.
In Ghana, however, it is one thing, in the public mind, for an
official to be fired and quite another for him or her to resign.
By not firing Deputy Minister Bamba, the President missed
an opportunity to reaffirm his commitment to probity and
accountability within the executive branch at a time when
the public is growing increasingly doubtful of that
commitment.
“ Indeed the Bamba affair gives cause to
query what the real job description is of a
Minister or Deputy Minister “at the
Presidency,” especially when the President,
pursuant to the Office of the President Act,
has the assistance of a large number of
staffers headed by the Chief of Staff, as well
as other special offices.”
The muted in-house reaction to the Bamba scandal is typical
of the government’s attitude toward media exposés of
scandal or suspected corruption involving executive
appointees. The government has either remained silent in
the face of such allegations or else shifted the burden to the
press to come forth with actionable proof, instead of
independently investigating the allegations. Instead of
shrugging off such allegations, the government must at least
acknowledge that the growing perception of corruption
within its ranks cannot all be the makings of a mischievously
fertile journalistic mind, but rather that behind the perception
lies a real problem that demands to be addressed. The
government must balance its vigorous pursuit of post-regime
accountability with an equal concern for “incumbent regime”
accountability by taking steps to get to the bottom of a matter
especially in those instances where the telltale signs of
corruption or impropriety are too obvious to miss or where
the air is saturated with credible gossip or the pungent smell
of such wrongdoing. Government must back its catchy
slogan of “zero tolerance for corruption” with transparent
and credible measures that will give comfort and confidence
to the public that combating corruption is indeed a top priority
of the NPP administration.
Finally, insofar as Alhaji Bamba currently serves as a
Member of Parliament, Parliament too has a responsibility
to act to censor or discipline a member whose conduct
brings disrepute to the institution. Unfortunately, no such
action has been forthcoming from the people’s assembly.
BAGBIN IN THE CROSSHAIRS
Auditor General vs. Bagbin
The Auditor General has asked the Minority Leader of
Parliament, Mr. Alban Bagbin, to refund to the State certain
allegedly “unauthorized” expenditures made on behalf of
Mr. Bagbin by the Ghana Ports and Harbors Authority
Continued on page 6 E
6
Democracy Watch
Vol. 5, No. 1
(“GPHA”), a public commercial organization on whose
board Mr. Bagbin sat during the period his party held the
reins of government. The in-kind expenditures, involving
the use of certain vehicles of GPHA for purposes unrelated
to the organization’s official business, allegedly benefited
Bagbin’s 1996 and 2000 parliamentary election campaigns.
The Minority Leader has come back with a defiant
response. He concedes that he did in fact use the said
vehicles but insists that the use was authorized as part of
the normal perks for members of the Board of the GPHA.
The Minority Leader charges that the investigation by the
Auditor General is politically motivated and stems from
his filing of a complaint with CHRAJ alleging diversion of
public funds for the renovation of the President’s private
residence. Mr. Bagbin also alleges that the investigations
are in retaliation for his “principled” opposition to the
appointment of Mr. Dua Agyeman as Auditor General.
“That Mr. Bagbin, who is not unfamiliar
with how “the system” works, seems so
confident in his position suggests
that the practice of which he stands
accused is perhaps “standard
operating procedure” in the public services
and persists even to this day”
Before commenting on this dispute, a quick observation
about the appointment of an Auditor General. The fact
that we have, at last, a properly appointed Auditor General,
instead of one serving indefinitely in an acting capacity and
thus at the government’s pleasure, is indeed a positive
development. Since the Constitution contemplates
independence and security of tenure for the Auditor General
(similar to that enjoyed by judges of the superior courts),
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution is violated
whenever the government resorts to contract or at-will
acting appointments to fill that important position.
Unfortunately, such has been the practice until now. It is
hoped that future vacancies in the office will be filled
promptly and in accordance with the spirit of the
Constitution.
Regarding Mr. Bagbin’s dispute with the Auditor General,
it is important to note that the Minority Leader himself
admits that he used public resources for purposes unrelated
to the organizational interests of the entity concerned.
Despite this admission, Bagbin brushes off any implication
of wrongdoing, much less of illegality. That Mr. Bagbin,
who is not unfamiliar with how “the system” works, seems
so confident in his position suggests that the practice of
which he stands accused is perhaps “standard operating
procedure” in the public services and persists even to this
day. Hence, he sees nothing improper or exceptional in
his use of a public resource for personal political benefit.
March 2004
the Auditor General and the government to prove that his
admitted conduct is unlawful or even unusual. So far that
challenge has not been answered. The failure of the
government to call Mr. Bagbin’s bluff invites the suspicion that
the practice or conduct in question is indeed common and
continuing. This is, in fact, quite likely the case, as there is no
evidence of any positive change in corporate governance
practices in our public institutions and boardrooms since the
administration of the state changed hands in 2001. The failure
to take on Mr. Bagbin in this matter of using public resources
for private benefit is also an indication that the government
may well have decided to “let sleeping dogs lie,” out of a fear
that pressing the matter too hard might provoke the other side
to produce examples of identical practices under the current
administration. This perverse form of bi-partisan “peaceful
co-existence” can only come at a cost to good governance
and the national interest.
The dispute over Bagbin’s conduct should call attention to the
serious corporate governance deficits that exist in our state
enterprises and boardrooms. Whether or not Bagbin’s conduct
is in violation of any existing law, there is no doubt that it is
improper and a bad corporate governance practice.
Loosely defined, corporate governance means the internal and
external mechanisms that define and regulate the relationship
between the ownership and management of a corporate entity,
so as to ensure that the equity and other resources of such
entity are managed responsibly and in a sustainable manner.
However, far too often, the resources of our public
corporations and state institutions are used by the
organization’s insiders and the appointed custodians of such
resources in ways that can hardly be called responsible, and
for purposes having little to do with the entity’s business. In
fact, in many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) it is often
impossible to tell the difference between assets belonging to
the corporation and the private assets of its bosses. The
corporation’s assets are routinely used free of charge for all
kinds of personal purposes.
“The dispute over Bagbin’s conduct
should call attention to the serious corporate
governance deficits that exist in our state
enterprises and boardrooms. Whether or not
Bagbin’s conduct is in violation of any existing
law, there is no doubt that it is improper and a
bad corporate governance practice”
To buttress his position, Mr. Bagbin has in fact challenged
The abuse becomes institutionalized and thus difficult to
control when the “privilege” is extended to benefit the very
board whose members are supposed to oversee the
management of the corporation and ensure the prudent,
profitable, and sustainable use of scarce public resources.
No wonder boards of directors at our various SOEs have
not been able to prevent or check the perennial losses,
corruption, and wastage that have turned most of these
public investments into chronic liabilities.
Continued on next columnE
Continued on page 7E
Democracy Watch
The board of directors is supposed to be the body that
sets the tone for good corporate governance in an
organization. In the state-owned enterprise, board
members are essentially proxies of the public, appointed
to oversee the lawful and judicious use of the public’s
resources and the realization of the statutory mission for
which the organization has been established. When board
members join hands with the organization’s management
by turning the organization’s resources to their personal
use, what we have is a breakdown of the corporate
governance system. Board members should be reasonably
compensated for their service on the board. They should
not, however, be given perks that align their private interests
too closely—and corruptly—with the self-interest of the
corporate managers they are supposed to oversee. Such
collusion of interests undercuts the independence and
effectiveness of the board.
There is indeed an urgent need for major reform of the
system and practices of corporate governance in our public
organizations. This call has been made ad nauseam to no
effect. Not even the colossal losses and corporate
governance failures uncovered at SOEs like SSNIT,
GNPC, and Ghana Airways seem to have given the
government cause to review and reassess the current
dysfunctional corporate governance regime at our SOEs
and corporate boardrooms, and to put forth meaningful
and far-reaching reforms. The Auditor General may
continue to unearth improper practices, waste, and wrongful
expenditures at our state institutions and in our
boardrooms. But unless Government acts decisively to
push credible corporate governance reform, positive
change will continue to elude us in this area.
Bagbin vs. CHRAJ
In October 2001, the Minority Leader, acting in the name
of the opposition party in Parliament and on his own behalf,
petitioned the Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) to investigate certain
matters arising out of renovation works carried out at
President Kufuor’s private residence. The complaint
named as respondents the President, the Attorney General,
the Minister for Works and Housing, and the Chief of Staff.
The gravamen of Mr. Bagbin’s petition was that renovation
works at the President’s private residence had been carried
out with public funds and resources and that this amounted
to an illegal abuse of office. The petition further alleged
that, the decision to accept an offer by a private donor to
pay for the cost of the renovation in the wake of public
controversy over the funding of the renovation was also
improper and in violation of the rule against potential conflict
of interests contained in article 284 of the Constitution.
CHRAJ assumed jurisdiction over the petition. After a
protracted series of adjournments, CHRAJ finally set a
hearing date in the first quarter of 2004, only to dismiss
the case “for lack of prosecution,” rebuking the Minority
Continued on next column E
Vol. 5, No. 1
March 2004
7
Leader for filing the petition and then resorting to delaying
tactics and repeated requests for adjournment to prevent
the matter from proceeding on the merits. The action
taken by CHRAJ in dismissing this case is regrettable indeed.
“The nation would have been best served
had CHRAJ gone ahead with its
own investigation and issued a report of its
findings and conclusions. ... CHRAJ could
have used this case to define and clarify the
rule against conflict of interests and set
forth prophylactic guidelines on such
problem areas as acceptance of gifts
by public officers”
The issue here is not whether the grounds adduced by CHRAJ
for dismissing the petition are legally tenable or sufficient. What
is important is that CHRAJ had the option, once it asserted
proper jurisdiction over the matter, to carry out its own
independent investigation of the allegations. In fact, in a matter
such as this, where the allegation is directed at the President
by a leader of the opposition, an independent investigation by
CHRAJ, without the drama of a full-fledged public adversarial
hearing, may well be the better way to proceed, as that prevents
either party from using CHRAJ’s processes for needless
politics. By not taking this path and insisting instead on following
strictly a judicial model in this case, CHRAJ essentially
abdicated the important role it is expected to play in our national
integrity system. By ending the case on what many would see
as a legal technicality, CHRAJ squandered some of its
credibility and opened itself needlessly to charges that it was
afraid to investigate matters having to do with the President.
Of course the very fact that CHRAJ asserted jurisdiction over
the Minority Leader’s petition in the first place belies any such
accusation of cowardice. Yet, the perception is inescapable.
The nation would have been best served had CHRAJ gone
ahead with its own investigation and issued a report of its
findings and conclusions. In fact, CHRAJ could have used
this case to define and clarify the rule against conflict of interests
and set forth prophylactic guidelines on such problem areas
as acceptance of gifts by public officers.
As it stands, none of the parties or players in this matter has
been helped by the turn of events. CHRAJ certainly lost out,
because it has created an unfortunate perception of bias or
cowardice on its part. The President and the other named
respondents also lost out, because they were denied the
opportunity to answer the allegations and have the matter
resolved conclusively. The biggest loser in all this, however,
has been the nation. By refusing to proceed suo moto, CHRAJ
missed an opportunity to deepen constitutionalism and good
governance in the Fourth Republic as well as shore up its own
institutional independence and constitutional role as an anticorruption agency. But all is not lost - the Commission still
retains the legal wherewithal to determine the case on its merit,
and it is our hope that it has the institutional will to do so in the
interests of the nation at large.¦¦
8
Democracy Watch
Vol. 5, No. 1
DCEs and power: the James Dogbe
Shopping Center?
One reads with amused disbelief the story that the Hohoe
DCE had the effrontery to name a public edifice after
himself: the “James Dogbe Shopping Center.”
Upon reflection, however, the naming of the shopping
center is anything but funny. It is gratifying that the reaction
of the District Assembly was swift, albeit not severe enough,
and the offending inscription ordered to be removed. It
shows that on a certain level, local government is
progressing. Nonetheless there is still a long way to go.
In other democracies, the DCE’s actions would also have
been the epitaph on his political career.
“The incident highlights the re-emergence
of the specter of the power-hungry “bush
doctor” DCE, administering the district as
if it were a personal fiefdom”
Inscribing your name on an edifice implies ownership, and
when the property in question belongs to the state, an
argument could be made that the action amounts to
misappropriation of state property. The action of the DCE
points to a disconnection between the party executive and
its midlevel leadership. It appears DCEs have carved out
little kingdoms for themselves that enable them govern or
misgovern, without supervision by the central authority.
Indeed, the James Dogbe incident highlights the reemergence of the specter of the power-hungry “bush
doctor” DCE, administering the district as if it were a
personal fiefdom. This monster has bedeviled our politics
right from the days of independence when certain DCEs
(one recalls the notorious DC Kwame Kwakye) were
infamous not only for their political gaffes, but also for
questionable activities. It appears the office of DCE is a
breeding ground for petty tyrants. Recently, Parliament
indicted another DCE for inappropriately awarding a
contract for the renovation of his official residence. Other
actions by various DCEs have elicited public outcry,
resulting in “redeployment” of some.
The James Dogbe case also highlights an underlying
systemic fault in the Hohoe District Assembly, which could
well epitomize a national problem. Why did it take until
the unveiling ceremony for the act of naming the public
edifice after the DCE to come to the attention of the District
Assembly? Such lapses force us to question the structures
in place for supervising the implementation of public works
and projects. If indeed, as we are being asked to believe,
the Assembly only became aware of the DCE’s actions at
the inauguration, it underscores serious internal system
failures. Public works need supervision from start to finish,
Continued on next columnE
March 2004
and any district assembly that allows a DCE sole
supervisory power is unwittingly or intentionally abdicating
its authority. The DCE is rightly castigated for his poor
decision, but the District Assembly should also be blamed
for dereliction of duty.
This case may be viewed as evidence of a liberal or overlyliberal character in the Kufuor presidency which allows a
midlevel functionary such as a DCE to feel safe enough in
his position to have the gall to do what he did. Ironically,
the story might also epitomize the very essence of good
governance – power checking power. The District
Assembly called DCE Dogbe to order, albeit
belatedly.¦¦
Continuing insensitivity to conflicts
of interest - the case of the Volta
Region NADMO chief
The SFO is investigating the NPP Volta regional
chairman for actions undertaken in his role as the NADMO
regional coordinator. While the alleged malfeasance
relates to irregularity in the payment of the salaries of certain
NADMO staff, the issue for Democracy Watch is rather
the fact of his holding two conflicting positions.
When a partisan position (NPP regional chairman) and a
public or quasi-public one (NADMO Regional
Coordinator) reside in the same entity or person, it
obfuscates the sharp divide that exists between the two
discrete interests inherent in the different offices. NADMO
is the re-incarnation of the PNDC era’s National
Mobilization program, which was effectively an organ of
the PNDC. The NDC changed it to NADMO, but it still
remained colored by its party affiliations, for which the
NDC was castigated. The NPP does not seem to have
departed from this unhealthy practice.
It is more disquieting to observe that this conflict is actually
a microcosm of the apparent inability of the NPP party
apparatus to separate purely party interests from national
ones despite claims to the contrary. Sadly, whereas the
NPP began well and was able to separate party functions
from state ones, it seems to be regressing. It is becoming
disquietingly common these days to see various party
functionaries at state events (and not necessarily because
they have state portfolios), draped in party colors, and
being paraded to meet foreign dignitaries. If one turned
off the sound bites, one could be forgiven for thinking the
events were political rallies.
“It is more disquieting to observe that this conflict is
actually a microcosm of the apparent inability of the
NPP party apparatus to separate purely party interests
from national ones despite claims to the contrary
”
Continued on page 9E
Democracy Watch
This is wrong. Failure to appreciate the difference between
the State and the Party is a basic misunderstanding of the
democratic process. Mixing the two in a nascent
democracy such as ours sends a wrong message to the
opposition parties: that the ruling party alone represents
the nation. This becomes fodder for ill will and has the
potential to stymie attempts at reaching consensus on issues
critical to the nation. A whole section of politicians feel
marginalized. Further down the command structure, at the
level of an organization such as NADMO, the deleterious
effects of mixing national and party business leads to
negative net results. It also confuses the electorate and
adds to the culture of winner takes all.
Specifically, a Pavlovian conditioning surreptitiously takes
place: people associate the party with the benefits accruing
from NADMO. What they see is the NPP regional
chairman providing relief during a disaster. The beneficiaries
of state largesse attribute it not to the nation, but to the
party. Being seen as an NPP person is then perceived as a
necessary condition for receipt of relief when disaster
strikes. Consequently, critics of such behavior rightly see
it as the party commandeering the state apparatus to illicitly
garner goodwill.
“the deleterious effects of mixing national
and party business leads to
negative net results. It also
confuses the electorate and adds to the
culture of winner takes all”
Whereas the President and ministers cannot be, and indeed
should not be disassociated from their party affiliations,
the Party is NOT the State. Public office holders in the
execution of their public duty should only have one goal in
mind – serving the nation. Further down the chain of
command, midlevel and lower party functionaries such as
regional chairpersons or coordinators should not hold public
office concurrently.
Finally, when the function or activity at hand is a state one,
the only colors that should be on display are the red, gold,
green and black of our national flag!¦¦
Coddling dictators: celebrating
Eyadema
When Togo recently celebrated “National Liberation”
day, Ghana sent a high-powered delegation that included
the Minister for Defense, the Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs and the Chief of Defense Staff. The group was
augmented by a large military contingent, together with a
resplendent Ghana Armed Forces Band. This played into
the carefully orchestrated circus of Africa’s longest serving
strongman, General Gnassingbe Eyadema.
Continued on next column E
Vol. 5, No. 1
March 2004
9
Good neighborliness does require that we celebrate with
our friends across the border in their times of joy and
commiserate with them in their sorrows. And so, on
Independence Day, Republic Day and other such
celebrations, it is right to send relatively high-ranking officials
if the head of state cannot make the trip himself. Being
there with our neighbors shows that we share in the
sentiments they are celebrating.
“... for a government that would like to be seen as
setting the tone and standards for the progress of
democracy and good governance on the West
African littoral, sending such a high-powered
delegation to the celebration of Eyadema’s coup
sends worrying and conflicting signals”
“National Liberation” day, however, is the celebration of
the violent coup d’état that overthrew President Nicholas
Grunitzky and unleashed on the continent its current longest
serving head of state, General Eyadema. For a country
with a past such as ours, and for a government that would
like to be seen as setting the tone and standards for the
progress of democracy and good governance on the West
African littoral, sending such a high-powered delegation
to the celebration of Eyadema’s coup sends worrying and
conflicting signals.
The pomp and pageantry of the Ghanaian entourage sends
a message that sharply conflicts with the stated philosophies
of the NPP government. It affirms Eyadema’s coup d’état
and contradicts the NPP’s arguments that June 4th and
31st December should not be celebrated in Ghana because
of their undemocratic and violent foundations.
Laying out the red carpet for a coup-maker is not only a
slap in the face of Ghanaians, but also an insult to the
democracy-seeking people of Togo. With so many of our
neighbors caught in internecine strife, openly cozying up
to a person violently opposed to democracy undermines
and even squanders the general goodwill we have been
building among our neighbors.
“Laying out the red carpet for a
coup-maker is not only a slap in
the face of Ghanaians, but also an
insult to the democracy-seeking
people of Togo”
An argument might be made that with the Chairmanship of
ECOWAS comes the duty to be represented at state
functions of all member countries. Still, that is well achieved
by sending a minister to team up with the Ambassador in
Togo to present a carefully worded message on behalf of
the President. Good neighborliness does not mean careless
abandonment of the moral high ground in favor of personal
friendships. ¦¦
10
Democracy Watch
Vol. 5, No. 1
Incumbency and the challenge of
internal party democracy
Many, perhaps even most, Ghanaians regard our
political parties as “private clubs” whose “internal affairs”
may be left to a few executives at the national or local
level or to the party constitution to decide free from
external constraint or limitation. This view, though
widespread, is incorrect. The Constitution of the Fourth
Republic certainly does not regard political parties as
private entities. Political parties in Ghana have important
public and constitutional roles to play, as vehicles for
effectuating the “representation of the people.” It is for
this reason that the Constitution devotes several provisions
in the chapter on “The Representation of the People” to
the structure and organization of political parties.
Specifically, Article 55 of the Constitution prescribes
certain basic standards and requirements to which all
political parties must adhere. Notably, subsection 5 of
Article 55 states that “the internal organization of a
political party shall conform to democratic principles and
its actions and purposes shall not contravene or be
inconsistent with this Constitution or any other law.”
The logic of Article 55(5) is simple: because political
parties constitute the basic building blocks of our
democracy and the avenues through which our national
political leadership is recruited, it is vital for the
consolidation of our democracy that the parties themselves
nurture, develop, and adhere to democratic standards,
practices and habits. In short, Article 55(5) of the
Constitution regards our political parties as “the home”
of our democracy; so, like charity, democracy must begin
at home.
Unfortunately, Article 55 does not appear to have had
much of an impact or influence on the way political parties
in the Fourth Republic, particularly incumbents, conduct
their internal affairs. In fact, were one to subject the
constitutions and practices of each one of our political
parties to scrutiny, chances are that one would find several
provisions of the various party constitutions and several
operational practices of these parties that bear no
resemblance to basic “democratic principles.”
“Article 55(5) of the Constitution regards
our political parties as “the home” of our
democracy; so, like charity, democracy
must begin at home”
Incumbent political parties have had an especially difficult
time trying to square their internal practices with
democratic principles when it comes to the thorny issue
of selecting parliamentary candidates. The basic
Continued on next column E
March 2004
democratic principle governing the selection of party
candidates is that such candidates should be chosen by
each party through open and competitive voting by rankand-file party members at the constituency level. It is widely
believed that one of the reasons why the NDC lost its
parliamentary majority in the last elections was that it failed
to adhere to this basic democratic principle, as
parliamentary candidates were imposed on a number of
constituencies by party bosses at the national level. Now
the ruling NPP appears to be caught in the same bind in
which rival predecessor once placed itself.
In spite of denials from the Party itself, stories persist in the
media of attempts by the NPP national leadership to foist
candidates, especially incumbent MPs, on certain
constituencies. Various local primaries have been
postponed and litigation has been threatened or even
initiated in a few cases, thus fuelling suspicions of top-down
manipulation of the process of selecting parliamentary
candidates. The official line remains that no candidate will
be forced on any constituency, and that all candidacies
remain open for contestation even where an incumbent NPP
MP holds the seat. Be that as it may, whether the party is
unofficially trying to return incumbents, or this is simply
mischief-making by certain self-interested individuals or
groups within the party, the mere perception that such
imposition is taking place does not bode well for a party
that has often sought to distinguish itself from its rivals by
proclaiming superior fidelity to democratic principles.
“When the comfort of incumbency causes
a political party to forget or retreat from its
founding democratic principles, it risks
creating an embittered or
demoralized electorate...”
At the very least, the ongoing brouhaha within the NPP
and some constituency chapters of the party over
parliamentary candidacies suggests disaffection among
sections of the party rank-and-file over the integrity of the
selection process. That the NPP should follow along this
path, after similar tendencies within the then ruling NDC
exacted a heavy toll on that party’s electoral fortunes in
2000, is illustrative of how especially vulnerable an
incumbent party is to the “iron law of oligarchy”—the idea
that political parties, even those that mouth democratic
rhetoric, tend towards oligarchy. This oligarchic tendency
is further aggravated by entrenched patronage and
incumbency, which ensures that the ruling elites within the
party remain secure and irremovable in their positions.
In 2000 the NDC prominently displayed this oligarchic
tendency to its detriment. It was highlighted, for instance,
by Rawlings’ unilateral anointing of John Evans Atta Mills
as the party’s flag bearer, even before other potential
candidates had had the opportunity to express or announce
their interest. There were also a number of disputed local
Continued on page 11E
Democracy Watch
Vol. 5, No. 1
March 2004
11
primaries. These democratic deficits in the candidate
selection process led to defections, both at the local and
the national party level, and is said to have demoralized a
number of the party faithful on Election Day. In fact, as is
widely known, the formation of the National Reform Party
by a breakaway faction of the NDC was precipitated by
the way the party’s presidential flag bearer appeared to
have been foisted on the party by Rawlings’ fiat. The rise
of the Reform Party is cited as a contributory factor in the
NDC’s defeat in the last elections.
This drift of the party from its founding democratic principles
into oligarchy is most clearly highlighted by the decision of
the party delegates not to give ordinary members of the
party the right to decide who will contest the elections from
their constituencies. It is not surprising that the delegates
would take such an anti-democratic step; after all, they are
themselves un-elected people, thus when they constitute
themselves into a de facto electoral college, giving power
back to the rank and file hardly seems the natural thing for
them to do.
“Being democratic, ...is not something
Yet another recent action of the NPP that departs from the
basic democratic principle of equal access is the decision
of the national executive to require payment of 11 million
cedis before one would be eligible to contest the candidacy
of a constituency currently held by an NPP incumbent,
whereas the “fee” to contest a constituency where there is
no NPP incumbent has been set at a substantially lower
amount. By imposing such a high price tag on the right of
a party member to contest the local primary against an
incumbent NPP MP, the party has signaled its preference
for “incumbent protection” over free and open competition.
The measure also effectively prices large numbers of
otherwise interested party members out of the market for
fresh parliamentary candidates, leaving only those with
independent means or deep-pocketed sponsors to mount
a contest. This stiff entry barrier shields incumbent NPP
MPs from having to contest re-election as party candidates
on the basis of their record in office, thereby denying the
party constituents at the local level an important avenue for
holding incumbent MPs accountable for their performance
in office.
that is optional or simply
convenient for political parties in the Fourth
Republic. Rather, the requirement that
parties adhere to “democratic principles”
is a constitutional imperative
that is binding on all political parties by the
terms of Article 55.”
Since 2001, the challenge has fallen on the NPP to maintain
its much-vaunted claim to being the Democratic Party. This
claim can only be credible if the party’s internal practices,
constitution and conduct can withstand closer democratic
scrutiny. Segments of the public, candidates, party officials
and voters alike, perceive being elected as the ruling party’s
parliamentary candidate (what with incumbency and all)
as tantamount to getting elected to Parliament. Nearsighted though this is, the view has increased interest in
running for political office on the NPP ticket and
concomitantly focused attention on the Party’s selection
system.
As the current structure stands, before one actually can
get a place on the party’s ticket, one has to be vetted by a
committee and subsequently chosen by constituency
delegates. Given that the delegates are not themselves
accountable to the local electorate, but rather are selected
from above, the top hierarchy of the party effectively selects
a number of people who then select who gets to run on the
party’s ticket. Under such an arrangement, the opportunity
and temptation for top-down imposition of candidates on
the local electorate are wide open.
There is nothing wrong, of course, with “vetting” candidates
to ensure they are actually party members, have paid their
dues and so on. But after this essentially procedural
qualification has been satisfied, the most democratic thing
to do to lend legitimacy to the selection process is to leave
it to the party rank and file to determine who they would
like to represent them as the party’s nominee. There are
signs that the NPP may be retreating from this basic
democratic precept and even from the spirit, if not the letter,
of its own constitution.
Continued on next columnE
When the comfort of incumbency causes a political party
to forget or retreat from its founding democratic principles,
it risks creating an embittered or demoralized electorate
that, in the long run, could cost it dearly at the polls. It
does indeed appear that the NPP too is succumbing to the
incumbency influenza that was the bane of its rivals. The
sooner it returned to its original principles, the better it would
be for its long-term fortunes as a political party.
Being democratic, however, is not something that is optional
or simply convenient for political parties in the Fourth
Republic. Rather, the requirement that parties adhere to
“democratic principles” is a constitutional imperative that
is binding on all political parties by the terms of Article 55.
So far, political parties in the Fourth Republic appear to
have read that provision out of the Constitution, preferring
to do things their own way, as if they were private clubs
operating, by and large, without external constitutional
restraint. As Ghana strives to consolidate the democratic
achievements of the first decade of the Fourth Republic, it
behoves our political parties, especially ruling parties, to
heed the commands and spirit of Article 55 and practise
true internal democracy, as that is how they too can
contribute meaningfully to the nurturing and growth of a
democratic culture in our society and national life.¦¦
Democracy Watch
12
Vol. 5, No. 1
CDD-GHANA DEMOCRACY
PROGRAMS FOR THE 3rd AND 4th
QUARTER OF 2004
February-March
The Center, in collaboration with the
Overseas Development Institute (ODI),
began a study on “Drivers of Change”, an
exercise to adopt a more historicallyinformed, less technocratic approach to
aid policy, focusing on the way change
happens, and how economic, social and
political factors interact over the long term.
The study included a series of meetings
involving CDD and ODI consultants and
select members of civil society and the
private sector. The project was
commissioned by the DfID.
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
February 6-9
In collaboration with the Ministry for
Parliamentary Affairs, the Center
organized a two-day workshop for the
parliamentary leadership, chairmen and
ranking members of committees of
Parliament, committee clerks and senior
officials from the Ministry of Finance to
review the 2004 Budget. A total of eightytwo (82) people participated. The
resource persons were: Dr. Augustine F.
Gockel, Prof. Cletus Dordunoo, Mr. Vitus
Azeem, Mr. William Ahadzie, Dr. Nii Moi
Thompson and Dr. Sulley Gariba. The
workshop was sponsored by the USAID.
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
February 27-29
The Center collaborated with the Police
Administration to organize a sub-regional
Continued on next columnE
March 2004
workshop on “Democratic Policing in West
Africa” for one hundred (100) Police
Officers drawn from Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone and the Gambia. The workshop
was the last in the series of activities under
the Ford Foundation sponsored project on
democratic policing in Ghana and West
Africa. The workshop discussed the
findings of the Center’s recent study on a
comparative analysis of policing in the subregion and recommended strategies for
improving policing as well as entrenching
issues of democratizing policing in the
sub-region. The resource persons were:
Dr. Kwesi Aning, Senior Fellow, African
Security Dialogue Research, Chief Supt.
Daniel Avorga, and Mrs. Gifty Botwe,
DCOP, all from the Ghana Police Service.
Nana Owusu Nsiah, the Inspector General
of Police, gave the keynote address. Hon.
Thomas Broni, Deputy Minister for the
Interior, delivered the opening address.
The workshop was chaired by Hon. Mrs.
Emma Mitchell, Member of the Council of
State.
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
March
The Center began a project on political
party financing in Ghana. The project,
which is a pilot project on African Political
Party Finance Initiate, is being conducted
in three other African Countries (Kenya,
Senegal and South Africa). It seeks to
raise and expand the profile of political
party financing through an enhanced civil
society and non-state actor participation
and advocacy. The project has two main
components, research and civil society
advocacy. The National Democratic
Institute (NDI), a Washington based
organization, is financing the project.
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Continued on page 13E
Democracy Watch
March 19
As part of the continuous public education
and sensitization on the national
reconciliation exercise, the CDD/Civil
Society
Coalition
on
National
Reconciliation collaborated with a group
of students from the School of Performing
Arts, University of Ghana to use theater
development to educate market women
on the ongoing national reconciliation
exercise. The exercise took place at
Makola market for traders in and around
the 31st December Makola market. The
resource persons included Rev. Dr.
Ayetey Nyampong, Counsellor at the NRC.
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
March 22
The Center collaborated with the Ghana
Office of the World Bank to organize the
fifth edition of the Development Dialogue
Series at GIMPA, Accra. The dialogue
was on the theme: “Decentralizing the
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy:
Deepening the Involvement of Poor
People in Problem Definition and
Solution”. The Guest of Honor was the
President of the World Bank Group, Mr.
James Wolfensen. Other speakers
included Mr. Kofi Gbedemah, Ms. Augusta
Sena Gabianu, Dr. Audrey Gadzekpo,
Hon. Osafo Marfo, Minister of Finance and
Hon. Kwadwo Adjei-Darko, Minister of
Local
Government
and
Rural
Development. Dr. Sulley Gariba, Director
of the Institute of Policy Alternatives,
chaired and moderated the session. Dr.
Baffour Agyeman-Duah, Associate
Executive Director of CDD gave the
welcome remarks. ¦¦
Vol. 5, No. 1
March 2004
13
CDD-GHANA UPCOMING
ELECTION 2004 PROGRAMS
Pre-election Monitoring: With partial
funding from OSIWA and FNF, the Center
will train and deploy civil society observers in
all the regions to monitor and report on the
conduct of the political parties and their
candidates, electoral administration as well
as instances of “abuse of incumbency” by
the ruling party from June to December 2004.
Election Day Observation: With partial
funding from FNF, CDD will revive the
Coalition of Domestic Election Observers
(CODEO) formed in 2000, train and deploy
observers on election-day.
Presidential Debate: This is another CDDFNF project. The Center in collaboration with
the Ghana Journalists’ Association and other
partners to provide a platform for a
Presidential debate.
Parliamentary Candidates’ Forums: This
project is also being partially funded by
OSIWA. The project is aimed at creating a
platform for Parliamentary candidates to
engage the electorate in a structured format
for effective communication and to improve
the policy content of their campaign. The
forums will be held in twenty specially selected
constituencies. ¦¦
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
“A disciplined
society is one in
which the rule
of law is not a mere
slogan”
E. Gyimah-Boadi
Democracy Watch
14
Vol. 5, No. 1
March 2004
The Ghana Center for Democratic Development
(CDD-Ghana)
14 Airport West Residential Area
P.O. Box 404, Legon
Accra-GHANA
Phone: 233-21 776142/ 763029/ 784293 - 4
Fax: 233 21 763028
e-mail: [email protected]
Website:www.cddghana.org
CDD-Ghana Publications
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
Briefing Paper Vol. 1 Nos 1- 4
Briefing Paper Vol. 2 Nos 1- 4
Briefing Paper Vol. 3 Nos 1- 4
Briefing Paper Vol. 4 Nos 1- 4
Briefing Paper Vol. 5 Nos 1- 4
Critical Perspectives Nos 1- 16
Research Papers Nos.1- 12
Conference Proceedings
The Ghana Center for Democratic Development, CDD-Ghana is
an independent, nonpartisan and nonprofit organization based in
Accra, Ghana. It is dedicated to the promotion of democracy,
good governance and the development of a liberal economic
environment in Ghana in particular and in Africa in general. In so
doing, CDD-Ghana seeks to foster the ideals of society and
government based on the rule of law and integrity in public
administration.
Democracy Watch
Vol. 5, No. 1
March 2004
15
16
Democracy Watch
Vol. 5, No. 1
March 2004