Esteemed Delegates,
Welcome to &MUN V! My name is Mary Kate Adgie, and I am your director. I am incredibly
excited for this weekend, and I know that our committee—Ebola: The Sequel—will be a
challenging and interesting experience.
I’m a Senior at the College, double majoring in International Relations and Economics with a
focus on sub-Saharan Africa. I grew up pretty much everywhere since my dad is in the U.S.
military, including Germany, but I now claim El Paso, Texas as home. My model United Nations
experience began at the College of William & Mary, and I’ve staffed our middle school, high
school, and college conferences since I became a student. This is my first time directing &MUN,
and I highly look forward to seeing you all handle Ebola: The Sequel with regard to the complex
history of Western Africa and the issues affecting the international community.
I am particularly eager about this committee, as I am incredibly passionate about African affairs.
I have taken many courses on African issues, and this past summer I spent 9 weeks conducting
research in Tanzania regarding birth registration, digital financial services, the mobile phone
revolution, and women’s empowerment. I hope to have a career working in sub-Saharan Africa
or on the issues impacting the continent. Until then, though, I get to fake an African career by
participating in Model UN.
This weekend you must work together to stop the return of Ebola. Millions of lives are at stake,
in addition to the economic welfare and political stability of Western Africa. You must decide
how far you will go to protect the people of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. Their pasts will
haunt you or they will help you. While you decide how to best move forward—hopefully
together—you will call into question the efficiency of aid, the importance of international
organizations and non-governmental organizations, and whether the military and private
companies have a role to play. Delegates will make decisions amidst the growing panic of West
African citizens, and thus the committee will experience an accelerated timeline. It is important
to note that this is a crisis committee.
Delegates will most often use in-room parliamentary procedure to discuss the issue at hand.
Unless another motion is put forth, the committee will default to moderated caucuses with oneminute speaking time. Unmoderated caucuses are encouraged when appropriate. The committee
will receive periodic crisis updates, to which delegates should directly respond. Delegates should
respond to crisis updates, and Crisis will in turn respond to the actions of the delegates.
Delegates should seek to create and pass short, concise, actionable documents called directives in
response to crises. The passing of a directive requires a majority vote. In voting procedure,
abstentions are the absence of a vote and will not contribute towards the majority. If you have
any questions about the committee or &MUN as a whole, please feel free to email me at
[email protected].
See you in March!
Mary Kate Adgie
Hello Delegates!
It is my pleasure to welcome you to &MUN V! I am so excited to serve as the crisis
director of Ebola: The Sequel, 2016.
My name is Emily Kinney, and I am a Sophomore at the College. I am majoring in
Biology with a minor in Public Health, with a focus in epidemiology and disease surveillance. In
the world of Model UN, I have always been drawn to the health related committees, as one of my
biggest points of interest is medical infrastructure, and how governments respond to epidemics
and disease. So as you can see, this committee is incredibly exciting for me.
I have become pretty involved in William & Mary’s Model UN team, as I have staffed
every conference, and have just had the privilege of serving as Undersecretary General for
Specialized Agencies at William & Mary’s High School MUN Conference this fall. While I have
only competed in one collegiate conference, I am looking to become more involved in travelling
over the next year! In addition to the IR Club, I am involved with the Pi Beta Phi sorority and
Global Medical Brigades. I also work at the Williamsburg Campus Child Care Center, a daycare
sponsored by the College here.
I want this committee to be fast paced, competitive, and true to the diplomatic values that
William & Mary’s conferences uphold. As a crisis director, I am hoping that delegates use their
portfolio powers and creativity to shape the committee and flow of debate. Plans that are thought
out and influential will be received the best by me and my staff! In addition, Mary Kate and I
value the balance between committee-wide involvement and personal crisis plans. Crisis
committees don’t work unless delegates are looking to be equally involved in both!
If you have any questions at all, please feel free to email me at [email protected].
Whether it is a specific question about the committee, or if you just want to introduce yourself
and talk about how excited you are for this awesome conference, shoot me an email!
Happy researching,
Emily Kinney
[email protected]
Ebola: The Sequel
On May 8th, 2016 a man from the town of Towah, Liberia, Samuel Dolo, travelled to the
capital Monrovia for the wedding of his cousin, Titus Dolo. According to Dolo’s sister, Ariana,
Samuel felt ill at the wedding and complained of experiencing muscle pain, a headache, and a
sore throat. Ariana dismissed the severity of the symptoms, and Samuel remained at the
wedding. However, a few hours later, Samuel experienced severe diarrhea, bloody vomiting, and
body rashes. Ariana then took Samuel to a hospital, but he did not respond to emergency
treatment and died hours after arrival. Test results confirmed that Samuel died of Ebola. The
hospital, concerned with the severity and hasty expression of Samuel’s symptoms, alerted the
Liberian government of the death. An investigation revealed that the source of Dolo’s Ebola was
likely consumption of monkey meat in Towah, a town on the border of Liberia and Guinea. The
Liberian government has called to order this committee to discuss the prevention of another
Ebola outbreak due to the travels of Samuel Dolo, now known as “Patient Zero.”
Liberia’s History
Liberia is one of the only African countries that was not colonized. Instead freed
American slaves founded Liberia as a republic in 1822.1 In 1980 Samuel Doe killed the thenpresident and established his authoritarian rule, which lasted until 1989 when Charles Taylor
ignited a civil war to take power.2 A 1997 election placed Charles Taylor as Liberia’s leader, but
in 2000 civil war erupted again.3 The war finally ended in 2003 and Liberia voted current
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf into power in 2005.4 After 14 years of fighting, Liberia struggled
greatly. There were few health facilities, thousands of displaced citizens, rampant food
1
“The World Factbook: Liberia,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/li.html
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
insecurity, and growing poverty.5 Liberia has made progress, though. In 1990 the GDP growth
rate was at an all-time low of -51.031% in 1990; it then climbed to -30.145% in 2003 and then
stood at 8.704% in 2013.6 Similarly in 1995 GDP per capita was $64.81 but in 2013 it was
$453.339. Still before the Ebola crisis, most families could not afford basic health services or a
single meal a day.7
Guinea’s History
Guinea gained its independence from France in 1958 only to spend decades under an
authoritarian rule.8 General Lansana Conte won the presidency in three separate fraudulent
elections, and after his death in 2008 Captain Moussa Dadis Camara led a coup and put himself
in power.9 His presidency caused political tension that lasted until his exile in 2009, after his
guards killed over 150 protesters.10 In 2010 Guinea held its first free and competitive democratic
presidency election.11 Guinea boasts the world’s largest reserves of bauxite and has significant
gold and diamond reserves (the three of which are Guinea’s greatest exports).12 Approximately
40% of GDP is the services sector.13 Guinea’s GDP growth rate has been relatively volatile for
5
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
6
“Liberia: GDP growth,” World Bank,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=LR&view=chart_.
7
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
8
“The World Factbook: Guinea,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/gv.html
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
the past 15 years, but it was on a decline from 2012-2014.14 Corruption, lack of transparency,
and crumbling infrastructure prevent Guinea from reaching its full potential.15
Sierra Leone’s History
The British used Sierra Leone as a trading post for timber, ivory, and slaves beginning in
the 1700s.16 Sierra Leone won its independence from Britain in 1961, but it did not quickly
achieve good governance.17 The country was plagued with a civil war from 1991-2002 that
displaced 2 million people and killed thousands.18 The national military replaced UN Security
Peacekeepers following the civil war and has helped maintain stability in Sierra Leone.19 The
mining sector plays a big role in the economy, especially iron-ore production, even though half
of the workforce engages in subsistence agriculture.20 Sierra Leone is particularly susceptible to
international prices due to its high exports of iron ore, rutile, and diamonds. In 2004 70% of the
population lived below the poverty line.21 The country has been trying to recover from its
damaging civil war and weak institutions.
The Science and History of Ebola
The first outbreaks of Ebola haemorrhagic fever (further referenced as EVD [Ebola virus
disease] or simply Ebola) occurred in 1976 in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.22 Ebola is a serious and often fatal disease that has no known cure. See Figure 1 for
information on the transmission, expression, symptoms, and treatment of EVD.
14
Ibid.
Ibid.
16
“The World Factbook: Sierra Leone,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/sl.html.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
“Ebola virus disease,” World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/.
15
Figure 1.
The West Africa outbreak that began in March 2014 in Guinea was the largest Ebola
outbreak ever with approximately 28, 616 “suspected, probable, and confirmed” cases of Ebola,
of which 11,310 resulted in fatalities.23 Prior to the 2014 outbreak and since its 1976 discovery,
approximately 1,590 people had died from EVD.24 In March 2014 the World Health
Organization’s African Regional Office and Liberia’s Ministry of Health reported cases of Ebola
in Guinea and Liberia.25 In May the Ministry of Health of Sierra Leone also confirmed EVD
23
“2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa-Case Counts,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html.
24
“2014 West African Ebola outbreak: feature map,” World Health Organization,
http://www.who.int/features/ebola/storymap/en/.
25
Ibid.
cases.26 The WHO provided much support to the West African countries to stop the spread of
EVD, but Ebola cases continued to rise. On August 8 the WHO-Director General, Margaret
Chan, declared the EVD outbreak a “public health emergency of international concern.”27
Senegal announced a case of EVD in August, and a month later Ebola was reported in the United
States.28 Nigeria and Mali also experienced smaller outbreaks, which encouraged regional
coordination of Western Africa to end the EVD outbreak.29 Health officials continued to promote
safe strategies to prevent contagion and provide proper supplies, labs, and treatments. Two
vaccines are still undergoing clinical trials.30 The Western Africa Ebola outbreak was a complex
medical crisis that was unlike any other. It challenged the medical community and had a severe
impact on medical practices, public health campaigns, the economies, and even the culture of
Western Africa. Yet it was more than just a medical crisis--it was a development crisis that
affected the economic, social, and political sectors of Western Africa.31 Health and government
officials and citizens learned the best practices of combating of EVD that will—hopefully—
allow them to swiftly contain and eliminate a future Ebola outbreak.
A Public Health Crisis
Since there is still no approved vaccine for Ebola, during the 2014 EVD outbreak
government and health officials focused their efforts on stopping human-to-human transmission
of Ebola. The World Health Organization (WHO) approached this through five different
26
Ibid.
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
30
“Ebola vaccines, therapies, and diagnostics,” World Health Organization,
http://www.who.int/medicines/emp_ebola_q_as/en/.
31
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
27
avenues: “care to patients, contact monitoring, safe burials, laboratory support and social
mobilization.” Because patients and family members often mistook initial EVD symptoms for
symptoms of malaria or typhoid fever, laboratory diagnoses were important for confirming Ebola
cases.32 At -risk or infected people then sought treatment at Ebola treatment units (ETUs) and
community care centres (CCCs).33 ETUs provided isolation, supervision, and medical
treatment.34 Patients went to CCCs to receive basic medical care within the community at a place
separate from usual primary care health facilities.35 Health officials recommended treatment and
monitoring at ETUs and CCCs and not at home.36 Contact monitoring (or contact tracing) is
identifying everyone that came into contact with an Ebola-infected person and then monitoring
these people for 21 days in order to provide health assistance and limit further transmissions.37
Contact tracing typically involved isolation of these contacts, especially after they expressed
symptoms.38 Improving burial practices was also important, as bodies were still infectious.
Officials advised West Africans to pay respects to the person at least 1 meter away, not touch the
body, and have trained teams take care of the body and perform the burial.39
Public health campaigns focused on encouraging handwashing, avoiding contact with
bodily fluids of EVD patients, properly handling the bodies of EVD victims, and the importance
of seeking official treatment once someone falls ill.40 These efforts included using social media,
32
Ibid.
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
“Contact Tracing,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/whatis-contact-tracing.html.
38
Ibid.
39
“Allow for a Safe Burial when Someone Dies at Home,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/when-someone-dies-in-the-home.pdf.
40
“Reaching out to communities at-risk of Ebola in Liberia,” World Health Organization,
http://www.who.int/features/2014/risk-communities-ebola-liberia/photos/en/index4.html.
33
text message campaigns, radio announcements, and banners.41 The participation of community
and religious elders and leaders was also crucial for spreading the message of Ebola prevention
and treatment.42 Social mobilization teams travelled to meet with affected and at-risk
communities.43 One challenge throughout the 2014 Ebola outbreak was misconceptions and even
outright disbelief of Ebola.44 Some communities did not believe that Ebola existed. Citizens who
cited witchcraft or poisoning as the source of Ebola symptoms did not seek appropriate medical
treatment, thus inhibiting EVD prevention and treatment.45 Convincing people of the truth of
Ebola thus became an important task of preventing the spread of Ebola.
Due to the nature of the transmission of Ebola, healthcare workers were at high risk of
infection. Health care workers include doctors, nurses, midwives, drivers, cleaners, and burial
teams, and they were 21 to 32 times more likely to contract EVD than the general
population.46Health care workers were encouraged to practice basic hygienic practices, such as
frequently washing hands, using safe injection practices, and disposing of medical equipment
properly.47 In addition, health workers were to wear personal protective equipment (PPE), such
as gloves, face masks, goggles, boots, and gowns or coveralls.48 Health care workers were also at
greater risk of heat-related illnesses because of the PPE.49 In Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea,
8.07%, 6.85%, and 1.45%, respectively, of the countries’ doctors, nurses, and midwives died
41
Ibid.
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
“Health worker Ebola infections in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone,” World Health Organization,
http://www.who.int/hrh/documents/21may2015_web_final.pdf.
47
“Ebola virus disease,” World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/.
48
“For General Healthcare Settings in West Africa: Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Recommended for Low
Resource Settings,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/international/recommended-ppe.html.
49
“Interim Guidance for Healthcare Workers Providing Care in West African Countries Affected by the Ebola
Outbreak: Limiting Heat Burden While Wearing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),” Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/limiting-heat-burden.html.
42
from Ebola.50 The increasing infections of health workers caused people to believe that health
centers were the source of Ebola and should thus be avoided, exacerbating the epidemic and
preventing people from seeking medical attention for non-Ebola illnesses.51 Reports even
emerged of people attacking health workers who were trying to conduct contact tracing or spray
chlorine to kill traces of Ebola.52
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea had struggling health systems even before the outbreak,
but Ebola quickly drained the countries’ health workers, drugs, and facilities. Liberia, for
example, had only 2.8 healthcare workers per 10,000 people and 51 medical doctors in the entire
country (which boasts a population of 4.29 million).53 Guinea and Sierra Leone were similarly
limited. Liberia had the greatest number of hospital beds per 1,000 people of the three countries-0.3 hospital beds.54 The 2014 EVD outbreak was not limited to just one region and severely
impacted urban and rural areas.55 However, rural areas were less likely to have access to clean
water, health facilities, and health workers.56 On the other hand, those living in slums in the
urban areas were particularly vulnerable to infection.57 In addition, it is estimated that the
decreased availability for non-Ebola related health services caused an additional 10,600 deaths
due to malaria, HIV, and tuberculosis.58
50
David K. Evans, et. al. “Healthcare worker mortality and the legacy of Ebola epidemic,” The Lancet,
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(15)00065-0/fulltext?rss=yes.
51
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
“Package and approaches in areas of intense transmission of Ebola virus,” World Health Organization,
http://who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/response-approaches/en/.
56
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
57
Ibid.
58
“Cost of the Ebola Epidemic,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/impact-ebola-economy.pdf.
The Ebola epidemic was a one-of-a-kind crisis for which Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Guinea were unprepared. Many international organizations thus attempted to provide aid during
this plight. The Mano River Union and the Economic Community of West African States worked
together to realize that Western Africa needed international assistance.59 The African Union
created initiatives to contain the disease and provided health personnel to affected countries.60
Other African countries independently provided support, such as Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.61 The WHO and international community pledged over
$2.89 billion to the relief effort, but distribution of the money was slow.62 United Nations
agencies and international non-government organizations (such as Medicins sans
Frontiers/Doctors without Borders) provided on-the-ground assistance during the crisis.
Approximately 60% of the donations came from bilateral Western donors.63 All this assistance
had a flaw, though, that could be described as “coordination failure” among donors and
organizations.64 Help (and money) was slow to reach the countries, and at times activities would
be implemented that were no longer necessary given the changing situation.65
An Economic Hit
The Ebola outbreak was costly—the efforts to end the epidemic cost over $3.6 billion.66
The U.S.A. donated $2,369 billion; the World Bank donated $140 million; and the United
59
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
60
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
66
“Cost of the Ebola Epidemic,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/impact-ebola-economy.pdf.
Kingdom and Germany donated $364 million and $163 million, respectively.67 The Ebola
outbreak also led to cruel repercussions on the already fragile economies and the livelihoods of
the people of these Western African countries. According to the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea together lost approximately $2.2 billion in
GDP in 2015 due to Ebola, “threatening not only macroeconomic stability but also food security,
human capital development, and private sector growth.”68 Since the outbreak, life has returned
somewhat to normal and the economies are attempting to recover. Liberia’s economy is slowly
recovering, while Guinea has stagnated and Sierra Leone has entered a recession.69 Sierra Leone
alone is estimated to have lost $1.4 billion in GDP.70
The three most-affected countries had slow growing economies pre-Ebola, but real GDP
growth decreased following the epidemic. In 2013 the GDP growth rate was 2.3%, 8.7%, and
20.7% for Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, respectively.71 In 2015 the GDP growth rates
dropped to 0.1%, 0.0%, and -20.6%.72 Guinea and Liberia’s GDP per capita dipped slightly
following the crisis. In 2013 Guinea and Liberia’s GDP per capita was $521.5 and $431.3,
respectively, and in 2015 it was $531.3 and $455.9.73 Sierra Leone, however, suffered the
67
Ibid.
Ibid.
69
“Update on the economic impact of the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic on Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea,” World
Bank Group, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/480751468266708176/Update-on-the-economic-impact-ofthe-2014-2015-Ebola-epidemic-on-Liberia-Sierra-Leone-and-Guinea.
70
Ibid.
71
“World Databank: World Development Indicators,” World Bank,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&country=.
72
Ibid.
73
“World Databank: World Development Indicators,” World Bank,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.CD&country=
68
greatest change. In 2013 GDP per capita was $796.3 and in 2015 it was $653.1.74 The countries
also experienced growing deficits due to increased expenditures and decreased revenues.75
The workforces of these countries were particularly hard hit, as some could not work due
to quarantining those who had come into contact with infected people (or even entire
communities) and the high rate of infection among the labor force.76 The “most active” age
group (15-44 years) was the labor force, which constituted 57% of Ebola cases.77 Sierra Leone
lost 50% of its private workforce during the crisis.78
The closing of borders and restrictions of the movement of goods, services, and people
impacted the Western African economies. Government officials closed international borders and
halted flights, limiting imports and exports.79 Most Liberians, Guineans, and Sierra Leoneans are
employed in the services and agriculture sectors, which contracted because of the crisis.80 The
non-iron ore sector produced 80% of Sierra Leone’s GDP and employed 98% of the population,
but only grew by 1% following Ebola.81 Smaller harvests caused food scarcity to become a
legitimate concern as people employed in the informal and agriculture sectors lost their incomes,
74
Ibid.
“Update on the economic impact of the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic on Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea,” World
Bank Group, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/480751468266708176/Update-on-the-economic-impact-ofthe-2014-2015-Ebola-epidemic-on-Liberia-Sierra-Leone-and-Guinea.
76
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
77
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
78
“Cost of the Ebola Epidemic,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/impact-ebola-economy.pdf.
79
Richard Hamilton, “Ebola crisis: The economic impact,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/business28865434.
80
“Update on the economic impact of the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic on Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea,” World
Bank Group, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/480751468266708176/Update-on-the-economic-impact-ofthe-2014-2015-Ebola-epidemic-on-Liberia-Sierra-Leone-and-Guinea.
81
Ibid.
75
entire towns were quarantined, and trade and food production slowed.82 Food prices rose. In
Liberia a bag of rice increased from $28 to $35.83 Even after the Ebola crisis slowed, the services
and agriculture sectors were slow to regain the pre-EVD momentum, particularly in rural areas.84
During the crisis inflation rose and local currencies depreciated.85
Foreigners quickly took note of the unfolding crisis. Many foreign investors slowed
production in affected countries and even removed staff from the countries.86 The already fragile
economies of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea depended on the output from foreign investors
in their mining sectors, and many feared that the lack of output could significantly damage the
economies.87 For example, iron ore production in Sierra Leone slowed during the epidemic.88 As
a result, the growth output was expected to fall from 20% to 5.5%.89 The tourism industry also
contracted, not just in affected countries but also in neighboring nations. The Gambia saw a 65%
decline in tourism receipts, and the tourist industry accounted for 16% of its GDP.90 Guinea and
Liberia began a slow economic recovery following the outbreak, but Sierra Leone continued to
struggle. All countries, however, needed significant development assistance to be close to
returning to their pre-Ebola trajectories.91
82
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
83
Kingsley Ighobor, “Ebola threatens economic gains in affected countries,” United Nations: Africa Renewal,”
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2014/ebola-threatens-economic-gains-affected-countries.
84
“Update on the economic impact of the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic on Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea,” World
Bank Group, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/480751468266708176/Update-on-the-economic-impact-ofthe-2014-2015-Ebola-epidemic-on-Liberia-Sierra-Leone-and-Guinea.
85
Richard Hamilton, “Ebola crisis: The economic impact,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/business28865434.
86
Kingsley Ighobor, “Ebola threatens economic gains in affected countries,” United Nations: Africa Renewal,”
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2014/ebola-threatens-economic-gains-affected-countries.
87
Ibid.
88
Ibid.
89
Ibid.
90
Ibid.
91
“Update on the economic impact of the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic on Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea,” World
Bank Group, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/480751468266708176/Update-on-the-economic-impact-ofthe-2014-2015-Ebola-epidemic-on-Liberia-Sierra-Leone-and-Guinea.
An Adversary to Political and Social Stability
Fear, misconceptions, and blatant resistance allowed Ebola to spread and hindered efforts
to contain the disease. People were fearful to seek medical attention and engage in contact
tracing.92 This fear also stemmed from political concerns and community instability. Some West
Africans thought that Ebola was just a myth that the government created to receive internationals
funds that would go straight to government officials’ pockets.93 Feelings of frustrations and a
lack of confidence in the government’s capability also started to emerge, which was particularly
unfavorable given the countries’ already fragile political and social environments, given past
coups and wars.94 Further fear had eroded the trust between and within communities and
weakened the usual willingness to care for family and community members.95
Religious and cultural practices contributed to infection rates. Many groups in Western
Africa bury the dead with their ancestors, which at times meant travelling long distances with
infected bodies to burial sites.96 Ancestors resting in another country also increased the risk of a
cross-national spread of Ebola. Another practice that showed respect for the dead involved
washing and redressing the bodies.97 This was risky, as corpses were still infectious and could
transmit Ebola if touched. In addition, people would very rarely consider cremation an option.98
People were reluctant to abandon these cultural and religious practices, and health and
government officials who encouraged people to avoid these practices had to be careful not to be
92
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
93
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
94
Ibid.
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
insensitive.99 Ambulances and burial teams were to handle all bodies of Ebola victims, but often
they were overwhelmed and could not respond quickly enough, irritating families.100 Burial
teams were to also burn the clothes, bedding, and mattresses of the dead.101 To health workers it
was clear that these practices infected others. In Guinea, for example, practices involving care
for the dead caused approximately 60% of all infections.102 Yet West Africans were still
resistant.
Ebola had a greater impact on women than men. At the beginning of 2015, 51% of
infections were women.103 Caregiving and burial practices more often were the responsibilities
of women, exposing them to more Ebola-infected patients for longer periods of time.104 Due to
the redistribution of health resources toward Ebola efforts and fear of health facilities, many
pregnancies also occurred unattended or at home.105 For example, in August 2014 in Liberia the
number of births that at least one health professional attended dropped from 52% to 38%.106 The
economic impact of Ebola hit women particularly hard. Approximately 90% of women in
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea were employed in the informal and agricultural sectors.107 The
EVD crisis closed borders and limited trade, preventing most women from engaging in their
livelihoods.108 In addition, many microfinance institutions and women’s loans groups stopped
lending due to the uncertainty Ebola caused, increasing this economic “reversal” of women.109
99
Ibid.
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
“Socio-Economic Impact of Ebola Virus Disease in West African Countries: A call for national and regional
containment, recovery, and prevention,” United Nations Development Group,
http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ebola-west-africa.pdf.
106
Ibid.
107
Ibid.
108
Ibid.
109
Ibid.
100
Approximately one-fifth of Ebola patients were children.110 Over 16,600 children lost one
or both parents because of EVD.111 Extended family members would typically care for orphans,
but in some instances the fear of Ebola was so great that families were reluctant to take in
orphans.112 Schools in the three countries closed in June 2014 and remained closed until 2015.113
A total of 1,848 learning hours were lost.114 There is a possibility that the school closures could
have made children more susceptible to abuse, particularly young girls.115 There was also a 30%
reduction in child vaccinations.116
Lessons Learned and Points to Consider
The 2014 Ebola crisis ended and the efforts of the Western African states and the
international community proved to be successful, yet there were many barriers to eradicating
Ebola, and the epidemic left many negative consequences behind. The Ebola crisis had a lot of
actors trying to help frightened, struggling people. Some organizations directed more resources
to Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea, while others left the countries. Whose job was it to provide
assistance? Did the aid actually help? Did the governments do enough? Coordination--regionally
and internationally--was a major struggle, and it could have cost thousands of lives as people
waited on funds and supplies to arrive and activities and people arrived too late. How could
coordination have been better? Or did the countries and organizations do the best that was
possible in this type of crisis? The future of these nations is unknown. The economies are
struggling to recover, and as poverty and food scarcity rise, people could turn to criminality or
political violence against their governments. The progress made for increasing the welfare and
110
Ibid.
Ibid.
112
Ibid.
113
Ibid.
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
116
“Cost of the Ebola Epidemic,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/impact-ebola-economy.pdf.
111
equality of women has been somewhat reversed and the future is unclear after so many children
lost parents, homes, and schooling. Could the governments have done more to protect their
economies, women, and children during the crisis? Or was it simply too much? And with this
retrospective view, if Ebola were to strike again, could the world do better?
Positions
1. President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf -- head political leader of Liberia; appoints
cabinet heads
2. Liberia’s Minister of Commerce & Industry, Axel M. Addy -- encourages private sector
growth
3. Liberia’s Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Bernice Dahn -- strives to effectively
and efficiently bring health services to all Liberians
4. Liberia’s Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Boima Kamara -- oversees
economic development, spending, and financial resources of Libera
5. President of Sierra Leone, Ernest Bai Koroma -- head political leader of Sierra Leone;
appoints cabinet heads
6. Sierra Leone’s Minister of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children’s Affairs, Dr. Sylvia
Blyden -- assists in achieving welfare for women and children and addressing disparities
in welfare in all sectors
7. Sierra Leone’s Minister of Health and Sanitation, Dr. Abu Bakar Fofanah -- bringing
accessible, affordable, and equitable health services to Sierra Leoneans
8. Sierra Leone’s Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Dr. Kaifala Marah -implements sound economic policies and oversees distribution of public resources;
encourages economic growth
9. President of Guinea, Alpha Condé -- head political leader of Guinea; appoints cabinet
heads
10. Guinea, Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Remy Lamah -- bringing health services
to Guineans
11. Guinea’s Minister of Economy and Finance, Malado Kaba -- oversees spending,
development, and Guinea’s financial resources
12. Guinea’s Minister of Social Action and Promotion of Women and Children, Camara
Sanaba Kaba -- aids improving welfare of women and welfare
13. International President of Medicins san Frontiers, Dr. Joanne Liu -- provides medical
care, one of the few organizations to remain in affected countries following the outbreak
14. USAID Mission Director of Liberia, Anthony Chan -- oversees distribution of all
development aid and the coinciding activities from U.S.A. in Liberia
15. President of the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Commission,
HE Marcel de Souza -- leads ECOWAS in its promotion of trade, economic integration,
self-sufficiency, and peacekeeping
16. Director General of World Health Organization, Dr. Margaret Chan -- head of WHO;
oversees WHO activities and spending
17. Representative of United Nations Mission for Emergency Ebola Response (UNMEER),
Peter Graaf -- represents the UN body created to address the 2014 Ebola outbreak;
communicates with other UN bodies/agencies on UN activities
18. President and CEO of International Rescue Committee, David Miliband -- oversees
global relief operations resulting from conflict, war, and/or disaster
19. Vice President for Africa, the World Bank, Makhtar Diop -- supervises World Bank’s
financial commitment to combatting African issues, such as food insecurity, energy
provision and usage, economic opportunities for Africa’s youth, and emergency
situations