Long-term effects of the Spanish Inquisition

P31
Long-run effects of the Spanish Inquisition
Jordi Vidal-Robert
Department of Economics, University of Sydney
Robustness checks
Empirical strategy: Differences-in-differences
This paper
1. Analyzes if the Spanish Inquisition had long-lasting or permanent effects on Spanish
economic development
2. Explores possible channels of such persistence: trust, social polarization, cultural
channels
The Spanish Inquisition
The Spanish Inquisition lasted more than 300 years (1478-1834) and it carried out
more than 100,000 trials, Contreras and Henningsen (1984)
I First institution with de facto power over all Spanish territory
I Motivations of Inquisition trials
I
popgrowthi,t = βc + αt + γi,t Xi,t + δ inqi ∗ afteri,t + inqi + afteri,t + i,t
Table: Population and Inquisition: Municipal Level (Catalonia)
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
Accessibility
Neigh. trials
Dist. borders
Dist. rivers
Jewish settl
All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860
popgrowthi,t : average annual population growth at municipality i between t and t − 1
I inqi : treatment group dummy (i.e. municipalities affected by the Inquisition)
I afteri,t : dummy variable for the period after the first trial of the Inquisition takes place in
a municipality i; dummy for the period the first trial occurs in a neighbour municipality
I Xi,t : vector of time-invariant variables of each municipality interacted with the set of
year fixed effects
I
Inquisition x After
Inquisition
After
Observations
R-squared
Capital
Population 1378
Geography
County FE
Year FE
Historic access
Trials neighbour
Border distances
River distances
Jewish settlements
I
Is it comparable to other European institutions?
European Trial Intensity
Spanish Inquisition Intensity
.5.5
0
1
.5
1.5
1500
1600
1700
1800
Estonia
Finland
Geneva
Hungary
Norway
Venice
Intensity
year
(trials/thousand inhabitants)
.5.5
0
1
.5
1.5
1500
1600
1700
1800
Barcelona
Cordoba
Cuenca
Granada
Murcia
Valencia
Intensity
year
(trials/thousand inhabitants)
Cordoba
Estonia
Cuenca
Geneva
1
.5
0
Norway
Venice
Inquisition x After 0.078
(0.086)
Inquisition
0.036
(0.074)
After
0.124
(0.089)
-0.117*
(0.064)
0.065
(0.059)
0.032
(0.075)
-0.078
(0.072)
0.073
(0.062)
0.019
(0.078)
Observations
R-squared
22,343
0.180
4,732
0.129
10,238
0.115
Inq x After x Trials
Inquisition
After
1700
1500
1800
1600
1700
18001500
1600
1700
18001500
1600
1700
1800
year
Inquisition Trials Data (1478-1808)
Individual trial data (35,255 trials): Barcelona, Valencia, Murcia, Cuenca and Toledo
Offender’s name, year, charges, sentence and village
I Regions (CCAA, 5) and Provinces (14)
I 947 Catalan municipalities in 42 comarques (counties)
I
Impact of the Inquisition
(repressive trials)
Impact of the Inquisition
(crypto-moral trials)
Predicted impact of the Inquisition across time
Predicted Impact of the Inquisition (repressive trials)
Predicted impact of the Inquisition (crypto-moral trials)
-.6
Trial sources: Garcia Carcel (1976, 1980), Gracia Boix (1983), Vignau (1903),
Blazquez Miguel (1987, 1990), Perez Ramirez (1982), Garcia Ivars (1991) and
Contreras (1982)
Impact of the Inquisition
across time
.4
1600
Marginal effect of the Inquisition
-.2
0
.2
1800 1500
1
51
101
151
201
Years since the first trial of the Inquisition
251
301
Observations
R-squared
1
51
101
151
201
Years since the first repressive trial
251
301
Trials in 1515
1-5
6 - 10
6 - 10
11 - 50
11 - 50
51 - 100
51 - 100
1
51
101
151
201
Years since the first crypto-moral trial
251
301
Trials in 1553
101 - 740
101 - 911
Historical economic relevance
Distance to Roman roads (intersections),
maritime routes and ports, navigable rivers
I Accessibility index
1-5
6 - 10
51 - 100
0.069
(0.083)
0.028
(0.070)
0.026
(0.084)
0
-0.112*
(0.064)
0.063
(0.059)
0.006
(0.074)
0
22,343
0.188
4,732
0.131
22,343
0.189
4,732
0.131
22,343
0.210
4,732
0.157
22,343
0.218
4,732
0.161
22,343
0.221
4,732
0.164
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.044
(0.082)
-0.0015
(0.002)
0.056
(0.069)
0.039
(0.084)
-0.126**
(0.063)
-0.0004
(0.002)
0.079
(0.058)
0.020
(0.074)
0.055
(0.081)
0.0022
(0.004)
0.033
(0.066)
-0.177**
(0.077)
-0.130**
(0.062)
-0.0032
(0.003)
0.080
(0.055)
-0.127*
(0.067)
0.297***
(0.112)
-0.0057**
(0.002)
-0.078
(0.094)
-0.072
(0.050)
-0.016
(0.068)
0.0002
(0.003)
0.013
(0.059)
0.001
(0.036)
22,318
0.219
4,726
0.162
22,318
0.219
4,726
0.163
22,318
0.219
4,726
0.161
I
101 - 938
Persistence of inquisitorial mind:
political polarization, voting behaviour
Dep. variable:
Right party votes (%)1934
Existence of cultural center
All Trials Crypto-moral Repressive All Trials Crypto-moral Repressive
Number of Trials 0.048
(0.201)
Observations
R-squared
Migration
Population growth responds to trials elsewhere
I Control for number of trials in the neighbour
municipalities
Crypto-moral trials do not drive the effect
of the Inquisition; Repressive trials have a
negative effect on growth until the mid
19th century
I Jewish settlements are positively
associated with growth until the mid 19th
century
I
Levels of Trust and Attitudes towards Scientific
Advances: Regional and province levels
Inquisition, political and cultural outcomes
0
11 - 50
-0.131**
(0.063)
0.071
(0.058)
0.011
(0.074)
0.0000
(0.000)
Attitudes towards Scientific Advances
I Libraries and cultural centres (Ateneus Populars)
in 19th century Catalonia
I
0
0.055
(0.081)
0.058
(0.069)
0.033
(0.083)
0.0004***
(0.000)
I
I
I
1-5
-0.126**
(0.063)
0.067
(0.058)
0.003
(0.075)
0.0000
(0.000)
Trust: Institutions, people
I Knowledge, culture, technological
improvements
Roman roads and accessibility
0
0.038
(0.082)
0.075
(0.070)
0.043
(0.087)
0.0005***
(0.000)
I
Alternative explanations: factors that explain inquisitorial activity and growth
Trials in 1497
-0.117*
(0.064)
0.064
(0.059)
0.037
(0.075)
0.0000
(0.000)
Channels of persistence
-.4
1700
.2
1600
Marginal effect of the Inquisition
-.4
-.2
0
1800 1500
-.6
1700
0.081
(0.083)
0.026
(0.071)
0.154*
(0.090)
0.0005***
(0.000)
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
All trials
Repressive trials
Crypto-moral trials
All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860 All years Before 1860
Inquisition x After
.2
1600
year
I
Dependent variable: Annual Population Growth (in %)
All years Before 1860 Before 1930
Marginal effect of the Inquisition
-.4
-.2
0
1500
I
Table: Population growth and Inquisition
0
.5
Hungary
1.5
Valencia
1
1.5
Finland
1
Intensity (trials/thousand inhabitants)
1
.5
0
Murcia
1.5
Granada
0
Intensity (trials/thousand inhabitants)
1.5
Barcelona
.5
I
Negative significant effect of the
Inquisition on population growth after a
municipality has experienced an
inquisitorial trial until the first half of the
19th century.
I The Inquisition lead to a 0.11% lower
annual population growth (Average
annual population growth is 0.3 approx.)
I Controls include County FE, Year FE,
Initial population, and geography variables
(Altitude and ruggedness). Standard
errors clustered at the town level. . Years:
1497 to 1991.
I
-0.116*
(0.064)
0.064
(0.059)
0.038
(0.075)
Trials (neighbours)
The Spanish Inquisition and Population growth
Religion persecution at early stages of the Inquisition (crypto-moral trials)
I Repression/social control of ideologies that differed from the official political establishment
0.087
(0.084)
0.027
(0.072)
0.168*
(0.088)
868
0.092
0.110
(0.380)
-0.003
(0.424)
-0.017***
(0.005)
-0.037***
(0.009)
-0.007
(0.006)
868
0.130
868
0.092
308
0.352
308
0.389
308
0.314
Regional level
Province level
Dependent variable
Trials (in 1,000) Observations Trials (in 1,000) Observations
Mistrust on Government
-0.024***
969
0.006
1,348
(0.009)
(0.104)
Mistrust on Parliament
-0.017*
957
0.210**
2,138
(0.009)
(0.088)
Mistrust on Justice System
0.006
425
-0.232**
1,472
(0.012)
(0.104)
Mistrust on Friends
0.029
546
(0.024)
Mistrust on People
0.024
551
0.0003
9,184
(0.018)
(0.006)
Scientific Advances
-0.015***
929
-0.014**
9,184
(0.006)
(0.007)
Dependent variable is the answer to the question regarding Mistrust levels. For example Mistrust level of government goes from 1-5 where 1 represents the highest level of
trust and 5 the highest mistrust level of government. Scientific advances is a dummy
that is 0 if the respondent thinks scientific advances will harm in some way economic
development. Control variables include year of the survey dummy, age, age square,
dummy variables for educational attainment, size of the town where the respondent is
living and socio-economic status. Standard errors in parentheses.
I
Trials in 1717
Trials in 1787
Trials in 1857
I
Jewish settlements
Rivers network
Other economic drivers
I Municipalities affected by the Inquisition are linked to lower population growth afterwards. Villages that suffered at least one
Distance to France
I Distance to main rivers - location for electric and
textile industries
I Jewish historical settlements
trial of the Inquisition grew at 0.11 percent lower rate than those that were not exposed to trials. The significance of this effect
smoothly vanishes after 1860.
I Results show significant negative associations between trials of the Inquisition and attitudes towards new technologies or the
spread of culture. In particular, I show that people that living in areas with more intense levels of inquisitorial activity are more
likely to think that new technologies will harm them (4 percent more likely with a difference of 1,000 trials).
I Municipalities that experienced trials of the Inquisition were less likely to have a cultural center between 1860 and 1930.
I These results suggest that the effect of the Inquisition on economic performance would have been achieved through reduced
entrepreneurship
I
0
1-5
6 - 10
11 - 50
51 - 100
101 - 1502
0
0
1-5
1-5
6 - 10
6 - 10
11 - 50
51 - 100
101 - 1682
Discussion
Jewish settlements in Catalunya
Jewish site
Jewish Quarter
11 - 50
51 - 100
101 - 1694
Jordi Vidal-Robert, Department of Economics (University of Sydney) - [email protected]