Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening Variable in Russian
Politics
Author(s): Robert G. Moser
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jan., 1999), pp. 147-165
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
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Independents and Party Formation
ElitePartisanship
as an Intervening
Variablein RussianPolitics
Robert G. Moser
No modem democracyhas existed without some type of political party.In fact, it is
scarcely imaginablehow democraticgovernancecould function in nation-stateswith
millions of inhabitantswithout political parties to frame electoral options, aggregate
and articulate social demands, and translate them into public policy.' Given their
centralityto moderndemocraticgovernance,political partiesand party systems have
received significant attentionfrom scholars interestedin democratictransitions.The
literatureon democratizationhas been engaged in an ongoing debatebetween structuralistsand transitionists.2In regardsto party developmentduring regime change,
structuralistshave focused on social prerequisitesfor the formationof a competitive
party system and social cleavages upon which political parties can build their constituencies.3The literatureon transitionshas tended to tie party formationto founding elections, emphasizing the importanceof the timing and sequence of elections,
the impactof electoral systems, and the favorableinfluence of elite pacts.4
Relativelylittle attentionhas been given to partybuilding. Political partiesare not
born as nationwide organizations with networks of local organizations stretching
across a state'sterritory.They typically startout as small, geographicallyconcentrated organizations or as cliques of governing elites in the capital. Only with time,
effort, and luck do parties expand their influence and organization,eventually contesting elections in all of a state's regions and at national, state, and local levels of
electoral competition.
This study addressesparty building in democratizationby examining the factors
affecting elite partisanshipin the Russian Federation.Russia is a particularlyinteresting case because its long history of CommunistParty rule has produceda strong
antipartysentimentamong elites and voters alike. The nascent Russian party system
is a fluid conglomerationof parties with little continuityfrom one election to another. With the partial exception of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation
(KPRF), even those parties that have shown some staying power lack the organizational form, coherentideological program,and reliable social constituencyof parties
in establisheddemocraciesand many democratizingstates. Russian voters display a
general lack of party identification. According to survey research, 78 percent of
Russian voters do not have a party identification, comparedwith 13 percent in the
United States and 8 percent in Great Britain.5The weakness of Russian parties has
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been particularlyapparentin the proliferationof independentparliamentarycandidates in the single memberdistricttier of Russia'smixed electoral system. (Half the
seats are elected by proportionalrepresentation[PR], and half by plurality in single
member districts.) More than half winning seats from single member districts officially ran as independentsin 1993, and 34 percent of winning candidates did not
affiliate with a partyin 1995.6
This examinationof Russianpartisanactivity is based on the 1993 and 1995 elections to the State Duma in 179 single memberdistrictsin fifty-seven Russianregions
(oblast and krai).7As a more demandingenvironmentfor party building, this half of
Russia's parliamentaryelectoral system presents a more accurateassessment of the
penetration of parties into Russian society. The PR contest automatically places
every registered party on the ballot in every region of the country regardless of
whether a party has a regional organizationor not. Relatively successful parties can
thus emerge quickly under PR by developing a national following around a single
charismaticindividual,as witnessed in the success of VladimirZhirinovsky'sLiberal
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) in the PR tier, particularlyin 1993.8 In single
memberdistrictssome measureof local organizationis requiredfor partiesto field a
local candidate.Races in single memberdistrictstend to be more parochial,contested by local elites on local issues and less influenced by the coattails of the national
leaders heading PR lists, as shown by the LDPR's equally surprisingfailure in this
tier of the election.9 In the single memberdistrictsparties are forced to adaptthemselves to local conditions, recruit local elites, or try to establish name recognition
and supportfor less well known local partyactivists.
The complexities of party affiliation in Russia should be noted. In Russia's single
member districts it is difficult to distinguish partisan and independentcandidates.
Not all candidateswho belonged to political partiesofficially registeredas members,
especially in 1993.10Some partisancandidateswho could independentlygather the
signaturesnecessary to appearon the ballot were officially designated as independents (nominatedby "votergroups")even though they conductedtheir campaignsas
members of a party and joined party parliamentaryfactions in the State Duma if
elected. Some candidatesintentionallyhid their ties to a party in fear that their party
affiliation would alienate potential supporters.1 Members of minor parties that did
not make it onto the PR ballot were often nominatedas independentsbut ran as partisans. Thus, relying solely on the official designationof candidates'partyaffiliation
provided in candidatelists tends to overestimatethe number of independentcandidates.12
To compensate for this overestimationof independent candidates several additional sources were used to identify partisancandidatesofficially nominatedas independents. In the 1993 elections Russia's Choice published a fuller list of candidates
it supportedin the single memberdistricts,includingsome who were officially nominated as independents.13Candidateson PR lists and in single member districtswere
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Robert G. Moser
comparedto find officially independentcandidateswho were on a party'sPR list.14
Finally,fuller personalbiographies,includingmore accurateinformationon partisan
affiliation, was availablefor winning candidates.15Therefore,a more expansivedefinition of elite partisanshipwas used in the study.Candidatesofficially designatedas
independents were considered partisan if they were supported by a party, also
appearedon a PR partylist, or won and had a partisanattachmentlisted in the longer
candidatebiographiesfound in the directoryof deputiesto the State Duma.
Elite partisanshipis treatedas an interveningvariablein Russian politics that is
affected by social and political developmentsand in turn influences mass and elite
political behavior. Urbanizationis used as the environmentalvariable influencing
elite partisanship. Elite partisan affiliation is expected to rise with urbanization.
Following the literatureon western party development, I hypothesize that Russian
political parties begin as urban phenomena and then gradually penetrate more
peripheralrural communities.Thus, during initial elections partisancandidateswill
cluster in urbandistricts. Occupationalstatus is the personal variableaffecting elite
partisanship.It is hypothesized that party formation is driven principally by those
removed from state power. Candidatesfrom state structuresare assumed already to
possess mobilizationalresources(name recognition,organization);they thereforeare
expected to have little need for parties and tend to resist partisanaffiliations. As an
independentvariable,elite partisanshipis expected to have a positive effect on voter
turnout. Partisan candidates are expected to present voters with more discernible
policy alternativesand thus sparkgreaterinterest.
The Origins of Political Parties and Their Nationalization
Why do politicians seeking election join together in political parties?Why and how
do political parties spreadto dominatethe nominationprocess in establisheddemocracies? Scholars studying these phenomena have tended to focus on the collective
goods providedby parties to candidatesto explain party origins and environmental
factors,particularlyurbanization,when examiningpartynationalization.
Scholars studying American political parties have argued that politicians create
partiesto serve their goals, primarilyelection to office. Partiesare endogenousinstitutions that emerge as instrumentsto overcome collective action problems.'6They
are useful (indeed necessary in most cases) for office seekers because they provide
certainresources. In the legislaturethe need to produce minimal winning majorities
to realize policy goals produces incentives to form parties-in-government.While
majority coalitions can form around individual issues without parties, a consistent
voting equilibriumis unlikely.Partiesproducea "structure-induced
equilibrium"that
allows partisan members to form long-term coalitions that reduce uncertaintyand
allow individual legislators to achieve their objectives more often." As long as the
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costs of joining a political party are lower than these benefits, party affiliation is a
rationalchoice for individuallegislators.'s
In elections ambitious politicians are also likely to form parties to furthertheir
interests.Especially the minorityout of power forms partiesto achieve majoritystatus throughelectoral success. Partiesprovideresourcesto overcome collective action
problems for voters and candidates as well. They help voters become sufficiently
informed to choose between competing candidates by providing a great deal of
informationinexpensively.Partylabels convey a lot abouta candidate'sgeneral ideological profile and major policy positions. Once establishedamong a sizable voting
constituency,the "brandname effect" of party labels can be a valuable resource for
candidatesby providinginstantcredibilityand reputation.19Winninga majorparty's
nominationalone ensures the votes of the party'scommitted supporters.Moreover,
parties provide economies of scale for individual candidates in mobilizing voter
turnout.Whether a campaign is conducted by the party organizationor individual
candidates,getting out the vote for one candidateof a partyoften helps its other candidatesas well, especially when elections to more than one office take place simultaneously. Once at the polls, voters are likely to vote on all offices up for election
whether they have an interest in them or not, with partisan voters likely to cast a
straightticket for candidatesof their preferredparty.20
It follows from this rationalchoice, new institutionalistapproachthat politicians
join political parties when they serve the ends of winning office and enacting policy
in the legislature.As Aldrich argues,"politiciansturnto theirpolitical party-that is,
use its powers, resources, and institutional forms-when they believe doing so
increases their prospects for winning desired outcomes, and they turn from it if it
does not. 21 While not guaranteeingthe existence of political parties, this theory
sees a strong tendency towardparty formationas long as competitive elections are
the main avenue to political powerand policy is determinedby majoritycoalitions in
elected legislatures.Of course, conditionscan preventparties from forming.Another
institutionmay provide the resources of parties, or transactioncosts of party formation may be so high as to make party formationirrationalfor individualcandidates.
Candidatesmay have preferences,such as strong ideological or policy preferences,
that counteror outweigh winning elections and make it difficult to join a particular
political party.But the ability of parties to overcome the collective action problems
faced by ambitiouspoliticiansmakes partyformationpossible if not probable.
The most prominentenvironmentalfactoraffecting partybuilding is urbanization.
As Samuel Huntingtonhas noted: "Politicalparties are modern organizations;they
are the creation of new men in urban environments.The party leaders are usually
drawn from the Western-educatedintelligentsia with upper- and middle-class backgrounds. 22 Stein Rokkan, in his study of the expansion of partisan activity in
Norway, providedempirical evidence of a significant difference in partisanactivity
in urbanand rural localities. Rural areas were slower to adopt a PR party-list elec150
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Robert G. Moser
toral system and lagged behind urbanareas in the penetrationof nationalparties into
local contests.23
Tarrowfound that the rural Frenchpopulationwas as active, if not more active,
than its counterpart in the cities. However, rural French voters and politicians
neglected partisanlabels and were even hostile towardnationalpolitical parties.This
combinationof high political participationand antipartisanidentificationchallenges
other comparativestudies that found a positive correlationbetween partisanidentification and political participation.24Tarrowattributedthis rural antipartisanshipto
the uneven extension of suffrage to rural areas, the egalitarian social structureof
rural areas which worked against identification along functional (class) cleavages,
and the personal characterof ruralpolitics which ran counterto the confrontational
natureof partypolitics.25
In early Americanparty development interpartycompetitivenessvaried substantially among states dependingon their level of socioeconomic developmentand cultural differentiation.During the period of two party competitionbetween Federalists
and Republicans (1795-1820) the New England and Mid Atlantic states tended to
have far more two party competition than the rural South, which was solidly
Republican. Social differentiation,based both on economic competition and ethnic
diversity,was the major stimulantfor party development.26Over time the existence
or absence of interpartycompetitioncontinuedto be relatedto the level of social differentiationand development.27
Urbanization and Patterns of Russian Party Activity
The Russian Federationprovides an excellent test case to see if similar environmental factors have influenced the distributionof partisanactivity during its initial period of party formation.Can incipient interpartycompetitionbe found at greaterlevels in urbanareasthan in ruralregions?
Elite partisanactivity is measured in three ways: the percent of candidatesrunning underpartisanlabels, the percent of winning candidateswith a partisanaffiliation, and the percent of polarized districts(districtswith at least one candidatefrom
a reformistand antireformistelectoral bloc).28Table 1 shows the aggregate level of
partisanactivity and success by the size of the largestcity in the electoral districtfor
the 1993 and 1995 elections. Two patternsstand out. First, partisanshipamong candidates has increased from 1993 and 1995 in all categories (percentage of candidates, winners, and polarized districts). In particular,the significant increase in the
percentageof polarized districts from 1993 to 1995 shows that, as the party system
expanded with the proliferation of parties in 1995, voters were presented with a
choice between candidates from reformist and antireformistparties in nearly every
district.However,these dataprovidelittle supportfor the hypothesis that parties and
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Table 1 Level of Elite Partisanshipby Size of LargestCity in District
Sizeof Largest Average%of
City in District
%(#) of
%(#) of
districtswith
partisan
winners
polarized
districtsa
57.2
65.8(25)
63.2(24)
56.4
74.2 (30)
58.5 (24)
60.2
71.6(24)
64.7 (22)
55.3
74.4 (32)
53.5 (23)
61.7
78.3 (18)
91.3 (21)
candidateswith
partylabel in
district
1993
0-100,000.
(n=38)
101-250,000
(n=41)
251-500,000
5
(n=34)
501-2,000,000
(n=43)
Moscow and
St Petersburg
(n=23)
1995
0-100,000
(n=37)
63.7
86.8(33)
71.1(27)
101-250,000
62.1
74.4 (32)
76.7 (33)
61.1
77.2(27)
82.9(29)
501-2,000,000
(n=-41)
62.6
85.4(35)
97.6(40)
Moscow and
St. Petersburg
58.2
87.0 (20)
100.0 (23)
(n=43)
251-500,000
(n-35)
(n-23)
blocs were more visible in urbanthan in ruralareas. Neither the proportionof party
candidatesin a districtnor the proportionof partisanwinners increasedconsistently
with the degree of urbanization.
The two measuresof partisanship,percentageof partisancandidatesand percentage of partisanwinners,providesome contradictorypatterns.The most ruraldistricts
(with populationcentersunder 100,000) had a relativelyhigh level of partisanactivity but not necessarily partisan success, while the middle levels of urbanization
showed a random pattern of partisan activity. In 1993 districts with cities of
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Robert G. Moser
101,000-250,000 had lower levels of party activity but a greaterproportionof partisan winners. The next level, districts with cities of 251,000-500,000, showed the
opposite tendency, greaterparty activity but fewer winners belonging to a party.In
districts with cities of 501,000 to 2,000,000, party activity dropped to its lowest
level, but partycandidates'success was relativelyhigh. Not surprisingly,the political
centers of Moscow and St. Petersburgtended to have higher levels of partisanactivity and success.
In 1995 the percentageof partisancandidatesshowed a relatively even distribution across all districts.Success of partycandidatescontinuedto show an ambiguous
relationshipwith urbanization.Rural districts returneda great number of partisan
winners, as did Moscow and St. Petersburg,while districts in the middle ranges of
urbanization showed a lower level of partisan success, particularly in small and
medium cities.
The final measure of partisan activity, polarization, showed a similarly erratic
relationshipwith urbanizationin 1993 but increasedin 1995. If one views the crucial
test of a competitive party system as the presentationof alternativepolitical programs to the electorate ratherthan the mere presence or success of partisancandidates, then it could be arguedthat urbanizationwas positively correlatedwith partisan competitionin 1995.
What accounts for this erratic relationshipbetween party activity and urbanization? Why were parties less visible in more urbanareas and more prominentin relatively rural areas? One reason for the patternof partisanactivity was the combination of a well-establishedruralparty and a handfulof reformistparties concentrated
in more urbanareas. In both 1993 and 1995 the AgrarianPartyof Russia (APR) was
a powerfulforce in ruralsingle memberdistrictsbut trailedoff rapidlyin more urban
areas.The Agrarianswon 24 and 21 percentof the seats in ruraldistrictsin 1993 and
1995, respectively.These seats accounted for roughly half of the seats won by the
AgrarianParty in these elections. The number of AgrarianParty seats droppedby
nearly half in the next category of urbanization(101,000 to 250,000) and quickly
dissipatedas urbanizationincreased.
Conversely, a spate of reformist parties led by the government party (Russia's
Choice in 1993 and Our Home Is Russia in 1995) was less active and successful in
ruraland small town districtsbut picked up steam as the cities grew largerand dominated in the political centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Reformist parties
accounted for 37.3 and 34.1 percent of the seats in large city districts (501,000 to
2,000,000) in 1993 and 1995, respectively.The percentagedroppedby nearlyhalf in
districts with medium cities and even more at lower levels of urbanization. The
CommunistParty was the only party capable of producing an even distributionof
winning candidates in rural as well as urban districts (except Moscow and St.
Petersburg)in both 1993 and 1995. This patternleft a gap in partisanactivity in districts with small and medium cities, where supportfor the AgrarianParty declined
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but the reformistpartieshad not yet expandedtheir activities.
The type of candidatesis anotherfactorthatmay help explain lower rates of partisanship. The strongest local candidates, for example, well-known members of local
power structuressuch as oblast, city, and rayon administrations,tended to run in districts of the political center.29As will be shown below, this group of local and regional elites tended to have a higher proportion of independents than other groups.
Consequently,the lower numberof partisanwinners in large cities may be due to the
stiff competitionthey faced frompowerfullocal notables runningas independents.
In 1993 significantly more members of the regional executive branch (18.6 percent) won in urbandistrictswith cities over 100,000 than in ruraldistricts(13.1 percent). Districts with large cities (501,000 to 2,000,000) had one of the highest percentages of winning candidates(19.2 percent) from the regional or local executive
branch.Small city districts(101,000 to 250,000) had a slightly higher percentageof
regional executive elites (21.9 percent), which may help account for the relatively
low partisanactivity in this type of district. In districts with medium cities, which
had relatively high partisanactivity, only 14.6 percent of winners came out of the
regional executivebranch.30
In 1995 the proportionof winners from regionaland local executive brancheswas
much smaller due to the influence of incumbentsfrom 1993, but the patternamong
differenttypes of districtsremainedthe same.31Rural districtstended to have lower
percentagesof deputies from regional executive branches(2.6 percent), while urban
districts had more (6.1 percent). Once again, districts with small cities (101,000 to
250,000) and large cities (501,000 to 2,000,000) had the highest percentageof winners from the regional executive elite, 8.0 and 7.5 percent, respectively. Districts
with medium cities elected regional executives at a rate similar to ruraldistricts(2.9
percent).
Occupational Status and Partisanship of Russian Elites
The personal characteristicsof candidates can also affect their decisions to adopt
party labels. In environments where parties do not fully control the nomination
process, the social status of candidates,their name recognition, and their ability to
mobilize resources may be crucial factors in determining whether candidates run
under a party label or as independents.Studies show that party formationis usually
drivenby those outside of political and economic power structures.Politiciansout of
power are disadvantagedin terms of name recognition, resources, and control over
state resourcesfor patronage.To compensate,they are more likely to form cohesive,
organizationallysound parties than politicians already in power.32Studies of early
party formationin the late Soviet era suggest a similarpattern.33
According to this logic, one would expect those in or close to power to shun party
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labels and run as independentsand partisancandidatesto be furtherremoved from
state power. Moreover,one would expect to find variance among parties and electoral blocs. Naturally, the parties arising out of state structures, the "parties of
power,"Russia's Choice and Our Home Is Russia, would be expected to have more
candidates coming from state structures.Table 2 shows the occupational status of
victorious independent and partisan candidates in oblasts and krais for 1993 and
1995. Severalimportantpatternsemerge.
Table 2 OccupationalStatus of Winning Partisanand IndependentCandidatesin
1993 and 1995
Occupational
Backround
%(#)of
%(#)of
%(#)of
independentsindependentspartisans
in 1993
in 1993
in 1995
(n=129)
(a=50)
(n=33)
%(#) of
partisans
in 1995
(n=147)
151.7(76)
National Elite
16.0(8)
33.3 (11)
20.9(27)
Executive
Branch
1 2.0(1) 4
0 (0)
2.3(3)
0(0)
18.6(24)
0(0)
n/a
47.6(70)
2.7(4)
1.4(2)
Congressof People's
Deputies
14.0(7)
State Duma
n/a
FederationCouncil
n/a
3.0(1)
n/a
20.0(10)
12.1(4)
14.0(18)
RegionallLocal
Executive
12.0 (6)
3.0(1)
5.4 (7)
2.0 (3)
Executive
Administration
8.0(4)
9.1 (3)
8.6(11)
0.7(1)
Regional
Legislature
4.0 (2)
3.0(1)
4.7 (6)
8.9 (13)
RegionalLegislature
2.0(1)
3.0(1)
LocalLAgislature
0(0)
3.9(5)
0.8 (1)
7.5(11)
2.0(1)
Regional
Executive
T30.3 (10)
I
2.7(4)
1.4 (2)
24.0(12)
33.3 (11)
24.1 (31)
14.3 (21)
EnterpriseDirector
2.0(1)
21.2(7)
4.7(6)
6.8(10)
Collective Farm
4.0 (2)
0 (0)
6.2 (8)
3.4 (5)
18.0(9)
12.1(4)
13.2(17)
4.1 (6)
36.0 (18)
18.2 (6)
36.5 (47)
22.4 (33)
Intelligentsia
36.0(18)
36.0(6)
31.8(41)
20.4(30)
Other
0(0)
0 (0)
4.7 (6)
2.0 (3)
Economic
Elite
Manager
Enuepneur
Intelligentsia
J
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The interrelationshipbetween state power and elite partisanshipis complex. It is
contingentupon the branchand level of governmentof the candidate'spowerbase. If
all officeholders from executive and legislative organs at both the national and
regional levels are combined in one category, those close to state power comprise
equal proportionsof partisancandidatesand independentsin 1993 (40 percent). In
1995 candidatesfrom state structureswere a significantly higherproportionof partisan candidates(63.3 percent) than independents(48.4 percent) because of the electoralprowessof partisanincumbentsfrom the 1993 State Duma.
However, a closer examinationof different types of elites from the state sector
shows a great difference in the propensityof elites from differentlevels and branches of governmentto adoptpartisanlabels. National elites were more likely to be partisan than local elites, particularlyin 1995 when a large group of incumbentsfrom
the State Duma defended their seats. This finding suggests a certain penetrationof
party organizationsin national state, particularlylegislative, structures,not only in
the State Duma but also in the Congress of People's Deputies before it. Regional
elites have been less apt to be coopted by political parties,which tend to be Moscowcentricin their composition.34
There was also a significant difference between elites from regional and local
executive branchesand from regional and local legislatures.Candidatescoming out
of oblast and local executive administrationstended to shun party labels at a much
higher level than candidates from the legislative branch. In both 1993 and 1995
regional executive elites made up a much greater proportionof independentsthan
partisanwinners, while regional legislators made up equal proportionsof independents and partisans in 1993 and a higher share of partisans than independents in
1995. This difference may be due to the fact that regional executive elites were further removedfrom the electoratethan the popularlyelected local legislatures.Before
1996 most oblast heads of administrationwere appointedby PresidentYeltsin;they
then appointedregional and local administrations.There was no popularparticipation in the selection process. Now that President Yeltsin has allowed the popular
election of regional and local executives, a process of party formation may take
place within this class of regional elites. Challengersin gubernatorialelections who
lack electoral resources may turn to parties (of either national or regional orientation) to gain election at the local level, which may force incumbentsless in need of
party organizationsto do the same. This increased partisanshipmay then extend to
the nationallevel as the political careersof these elites progress.35
Other categories of candidates (economic elites and intelligentsia) had similar
shares of independentand partisandeputies in 1993.36In 1995 there was a dramatic
shift away from these types of candidatestowardthe state sector due to incumbency,
especially among partisan candidates. Thus, by the second election independents
were drawinga much greatershare of their successful candidatesfrom the economic
elite than partiesbecause these candidateswere the other class of citizens that might
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Table 3 OccupationalBackgroundof Deputies from Selected Parties
Party
%(#)
from
%(#) from %(#) from
Regional
Regional
%(#)
from
%(#) from
Intelligentsia
National Executive Legislative Economic andother
Elite
Elite
Elite
Elite
1993
RC
31.7(13)
19.5(8)
4.9(2)
14.6(6)
29.3(12)
YAB
28.6 (2)
0 (0)
28.6 (2)
0 (0)
42.9(3)
62.5(10)
25.0(4)
31.6(6)
26.3(5)
CU
12.5(2)
0(0)
0 (0)
APR
21.1 (4)
10.5(2)
10.5(2)
KPRF
13.3(2)
13.3(2)
73.3(11)
0 (0)
0(0)
0 (0)
0(0)
LDPR
0 (0)
20.0(1)
80.0(4)
15.2(27)
4.5 (8)
24.2 (43)
36.5 (65)
0(0)
14.3(1)
0 (0)
20.0(3)
6.7 (1)
33.3 (5)
11.1(1)
33.3 (3)
All
19.7(35)
Deputies
1995
NDR
YAB
57.1 (4)
40.0(6)
28.6 (2)
0(0)
(0)
PP
APR
55.6(5)
66.7 (10)
0(0)
6.7 (1)
0 (0)
26.7(4)
0(0)
KPRF
33.9(19)
1.8(1)
12.5(7)
19.6(11)
32.1 (18)
All
48.6(87)
Deputies
4.5(8)
7.3 (13)
17.9(32)
21.8 (39)
already possess the resources (particularlymoney) that parties provide. The shift
away from the intelligentsia seems to have followed an opposite trend.The number
of doctors, lawyers, academics, and other membersof the intelligentsiaamong independent and partisanwinners declined sharply from 1993 to 1995, but this type of
candidateis finding success much more as a partisanthan as an independent,probably due to the lack of electoral resources that flow from this stratumof the population. Membersof the intelligentsiaare truly outsiderswho need partiesto gain political power.As will be seen, this type of candidatehas found the greatest success as
part of the CommunistParty,which boasts the closest thing to party identification
among a solid constituencyin Russianpolitics.
Table3 shows the occupationalstatusof winning candidatesfor selected partiesin
1993 and 1995.37Partiesvarieddramaticallyin the proportionof theirwinning candidates from the political elite, economic elite, and intelligentsia.As parties explicitly
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January 1999
built aroundthe state apparatus,Russia's Choice and Our Home Is Russia had the
highest proportionsof winners from state structuresboth nationallyand regionally.In
Russia'sChoice 56.1 percentof winners came from nationaland regional state structures, compared to 39.4 percent for all deputies. Similarly, in 1995 Our Home Is
Russiahad a largershareof winnerswho had positions in the state (85.7 percent)than
the average(60.4 percent).These parties also managedto do the best job in coopting
regional executive elites which have been the most resistant to partisan affiliation.
Russia's Choice matchedindependentsin the proportionof regional executives winning seats, while Our Home Is Russia had a greaterproportionof winners from this
governmentalstratumthan independents.However,neitherof the governmentparties
was able to turnthis success in recruitingregionalpolitical elites into a decisive number of single memberdistrictseats.38In particular,the failureof Our Home Is Russia
to capitalizeon its monopoly of regionalpolitical elites shows the limits of electoral
strategybased primarilyon personalitiesoverpolicy.
Despite the existence of self-proclaimed governmentparties in 1993 and 1995,
oppositionpartiesfromboth sides of the spectrumcould not be describedas comprising
only "outsider"groupsremovedfrom politicalpower.All political partiesthat found a
reasonableamountof success in the single memberdistrictshad a significantcontingent
of winnerscoming from nationaland regionalgovernment.The AgrarianParty,in particular,managed to attracta significant contingent from national and regional state
structuresto complementits dominancewithin state-runagriculture.Moreover,contraryto the Yablokobloc's self-constructedimage as a groupof new politiciansoutside
the establishment,a large proportionof its successful candidatescame from local and
nationalpowerstructures,particularlyregionaland local legislatures.
The Communist Party was the most successful party of "outsiders."Although
only recently divorced from power, the CommunistParty did not have many wellknown local notablesrunningunderits banner.Rather,the KPRFwon seats based on
local organizationand a well-establishedconstituencyloyal to its ideological opposition to marketreforms, as seen in the high proportionof CommunistParty winners
from the intelligentsia,which has the fewest independentsources of electoral capital,
particularlyin 1993 but also in the party'sresurgencein 1995. The otherparty with a
majorityof candidatesremovedfrom state powerwas VladimirZhirinovsky'sLiberal
DemocraticParty.However,this party'spoor showing in the single member districts
shows the varying degrees to which a party can help its candidateswin, depending
on whetheror not it has strong ties to a well-defined social constituency.Unlike the
Communists,who can rely on the pensioner vote, the LDPR is a charismaticparty
with a much less well defined social constituencydedicatedmore to the leaderthan
to his party or platform.While this personalizedfollowing has allowed the LDPR to
performwell in the PR election, Zhirinovsky'scoattails did not extend to the single
memberdistrictraces, which were more concentratedon the personalcharacteristics
of the local candidates.
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Robert G. Moser
Besides the generallyweak developmentof social ties between most Russianparties and their social constituencies,institutionalfactors workedagainst the influence
of party identification in the single member district elections of 1993. In 1993 ballots did not have candidates'party affiliation listed next to their names, so voters
unfamiliarwith the candidatescould not vote based on parties. In 1995, when party
affiliation was includedon the ballot for single memberdistricts,party identification
became a much more powerful factor because voters were given the information
necessary to cast a party-linevote with their two ballots in the PR and single member districtcontests.39
The Effect of Elite Partisanship on Voter Turnout
Elite partisanshipand party competitivenesscan also be viewed as an independent
variable affecting mass participation and policy outputs. Survey research in the
United States and elsewhere has shown that voters with a strongparty identification
are more likely to participatein elections than voters with no party loyalties.40Stein
Rokkanarguedthat voter participationwas closely linked to urbanizationand party
penetration. He argued that in rural areas lacking the presence of national party
organs, regional elites had the power and motivationto dampen local mobilization
and keep voter turnoutlow.41 Similarly,V O. Key showed that a lack of effective partisan choice and competition tended to dampen voter participation,particularlyof
the lower socioeconomic classes. He arguedthat with more intense partisancompetition at least one party was forced to make appeals for the votes of the have-notsand
thus bring them into the political system.42
If these hypotheses hold in Russia, one would expect a positive correlation
between the presence of political parties and voter turnout.To test this hypothesis,
ordinaryleast-squaresmultiple regression was used to examine the influence of the
level of partisanship(percentageof partisancandidatesper district),party polarization (existence of at least one candidatefrom a reformistand an antireformistpolitical party), and urbanization(size of largest city in district aggregated into the five
categories defined above) on voter turnout.43Urbanization was used as a control
variablebecause it has been found to be the decisive environmentalfactor influencing voter turnout, consistently having an inverse relationshipwith turnout;that is,
contraryto most comparativeexperience Russian voter participationruns higher in
ruraldistricts than in urbandistricts.44Table 4 shows the results of multiple regression for both 1993 and 1995.
The findings from this analysis suggest that parties played a role in bolstering
voter turnoutin both 1993 and 1995, albeit in differentways. In 1993 the degree of
partisanship(percentageof candidatesper district) was not significantly related to
voter turnout after controlling for urbanization.However, party polarizationhad a
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January 1999
Table 4 Multiple Regression of Urbanization, Partisanship, and Polarization on
VoterTurnout
1993
Variable
Beta
B
Urbanization
-0.35
Partisanship
Polarization
.0426
1.536
Constant
.5817
i
-.5205**
.3079
.0467**
Multiple R = .5857
R2 = .3431
AdjustedR2 = .3318
StandardError= .0554
1995
Variable
B
Beta
Urbanization
-1.176
-.341O*
Partisanship
.0630
.1789*
Polarization
Constant
-.7491
64.750
-.0514
Multiple R = .4096
R2= .1678
AdjustedR2 = .1534
StandardError= 4.762
**Significant at the .001 level.
*Significant at the .01 level.
positive, statistically significant influence on voter turnout.This finding suggests
that the existence of candidatesfrom ideologically opposed camps may have encouraged voterparticipationby giving voters cleareroptions. Moreover,faced with strictly opposed competition,candidatesfrom both camps may have increasedtheir mobilization efforts. Finally, opposing constituencies committed for and against reform
might have been more compelled to vote if both their own candidateand a candidate
diametricallyopposed to their views were competing for the same seat.
In 1995 the relationshipbetween partypolarizationand voter turnoutdisappears.
But in this election the degree of partisanshiphas a positive, statisticallysignificant
influence on voter turnout.Partyproliferationmay explain both changes from 1993.
With the dramaticincrease in parties, the starkbipolar competition between propo160
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Robert G. Moser
nents and opponentsof reformwas clouded by smaller parties occupying ideological
space between the two extremes. Party polarization was now commonplace and
accomplished,not by a handful of parties comprising each opposing camp, but by
many parties overpopulatingeach point along the political spectrum.While the proliferationof parties may have diluted the bipolarnatureof Russian electoral competition, it may also have increasedvoter turnoutby offering alternativesto voters disenchanted with the major parties on both ends of the ideological spectrum. For
example, nationalistvoters who had only Zhirinovsky'sLDPR to turn to in 1993 had
many alternativesin 1995, some headed by equally charismaticpoliticians such as
retiredGeneralAlexanderLebed.
Conclusions
This study suggests that despite their many weaknesses Russianparties have played
an importantrole in elections and the postcommunisttransitionto democracy.Elite
partisanaffiliation has increasedsignificantly between Russia's first and second parliamentaryelections. Partisandeputies, whetherovertly nominatedor covertly party
members,made up over 75 percentof the 1995 State Duma. Voterparticipationwas
positively relatedto elite partisanshipin one form or anotherin Russia'sinitial elections.
Party affiliation among Russian elites is a function more of individualcharacteristics than of environmentalfactors.Contraryto the comparativeliterature,elite partisanship was not positively related to urbanization.The existence of a strong rural
party and a numberof urban-basedreformistpartiesmade for a rathereven distribution of partisancandidatesbetween the most ruraland most urbandistricts and left
gaps of partisancompetitionin districtswith mid-sized cities and towns. Elite partisanship seems to depend most on whethercandidatespossess their own independent
source of electoral capital: name recognition and organizationaland financial support. Because of the combination of personalized single member district plurality
elections and the predominanceof patron-clientrelations,these resourceswere most
likely to emanatefrom state power,particularlyregional executive branches.Indeed,
these local executives were even better poised than political elites to contest elections in single memberdistrictsbecause they did not have the baggage of being part
of the Moscow establishment.Since they alreadypossessed the public goods provided by a party,the costs of party affiliation outweighedthe benefits, and a large contingent of competitiveindependentcandidatesemerged.
Kitschelthas arguedthatprogrammaticpartiesare unlikely to emerge in Russia.45
Parties will not be inconsequential, but a different type of more clientelistic or
charismaticparty will emerge. Over the long term, whetherthese parties will dominate electoral politics or will continue to compete with a large contingent of well161
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January 1999
known regional political elites running as independentsdepends more on rules and
elite actions and decisions than on deep social structuresand cleavages.
Rules governing electoral competition have a profound effect on the status of
political parties.The introductionof a partisanballot for single memberdistrictelections has greatly increased the ability of parties with substantivesocial constituencies, primarilythe CommunistParty,to win seats based on partyidentificationrather
than simply the personal characteristics of their candidates. This ballot should
encourageelites to join partiesbecause they can now offer tangiblereputationalbenefits. Particularlyencouragedshould be elites removed from state power who have
few other avenues to challenge entrenchedregional establishments.Moreover,the
direct election of regional and local executives should introduceparty competitionto
this level of governmentand graduallyerode the nonpartisanshipof regional executive elites.
Finally,rules governingparliamentaryfactions (Russia'snascent party-in-government) have produced contradictoryincentives for party development. On the one
hand,the ease with which deputies runningas independentscan form their own parliamentaryfactions with equal status of party-basedfactions removes incentives to
join parties in the electoral arena because elites are allowed to reap the benefits of
being membersof a party-in-governmentwithout being a memberof a party-in-theelectorate. Such arrangementsmay produce an equilibriumthat allows incumbents
to run continually as independents and simply form parliamentaryfactions after
elections to enhance their influence over policymaking and achieve desired legislative outcomes. On the otherhand,by forcing nonpartisandeputies to join parliamentary factions if they want a voice in policymaking,these rules may graduallyinitiate
a process of party formationamong independentsin the legislaturethat may laterbe
extendedto the electoralrealm following Duverger'smodel of internallycreatedparties.46
NOTES
1. See E. E. Schattschneider,Party Government(New York:Rinehart,1942), p. 1.
2. See HerbertKitschelt, "Political Regime Change: Structureand Process-DrivenExplanations?,"
AmericanPolitical Science Review,86 (1992), 1028-34.
3. See Seymour MartinLipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy:Economic Developmentand
Political Legitimacy,"American Political Science Review, 53 (March 1959), 69-105; Robert A. Dahl,
Polyarchy:Participationand Opposition (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1971); BarringtonMoore,
The Social Origins of Dictatorshipand Democracy(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Gregory M. Luebbert,
Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in
Interwar Europe (New York:Oxford University Press, 1991); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber
Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992); Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter
Alignments (New York:The Free Press, 1965); HerbertKitschelt, "The Formationof Party Systems in
162
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Robert G. Moser
East Central Europe,"Politics and Society, 20 (1992), 7-50; Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield,
"Identifyingthe Bases of PartyCompetitionin EasternEurope,"British Journal of Political Science, 23
(1993), 521-48.
4. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitionsfrom
Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Michael McFaul, PostCommunistPolitics: Democratic Prospects in Russia and Eastern Europe (Washington,D.C.: Center for
Strategic and InternationalStudies, 1993); Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin
America,"ComparativePolitics, 23 (1990), 1-21; Minxin Pei, FromReformto Revolution:TheDemise of
Communismin Chinaand the Soviet Union (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1994).
5. Steven White, RichardRose, and Ian McAllister,How Russia Votes(New York:ChathamHouse,
1997), p. 135.
6. See LauraBelin and Robert W Orttung,The Russian ParliamentaryElections of 1995 (Armonk:
M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 20; RobertG. Moser, "The Impactof the Electoral System on Post-Communist
Party Development:A Comparisonof the 1993 and 1995 Russian ParliamentaryElections,"paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco,August 29,
1996, p. 30.
7. Non-Russian regions (republicsand autonomousokrugs) were excluded from this study because
they presentan additionalcleavage, ethnicity,that is not currentlysalient in the nationalparty system in
Russia and makes comparisons of partisan activity in Russian and non-Russian regions problematic.
Major parties in Russia have had a distinctively Russian characterand have tended to be less active in
non-Russian regions. See Robert G. Moser, "The Impact of the Electoral System on Post-Communist
PartyDevelopment:The Case of the 1993 Russian ParliamentaryElections,"ElectoralStudies, 14 (1995),
385. Even though political partiesincreasedtheir activity in non-Russianregions from 1993 to 1995, their
activity appearedto be most gearedtowardRussian-speakingvoters in urbandistricts.See John Ishiyama,
"The Russian Proto-partiesand the National Republics,"Communistand Post-CommunistStudies, 29
(1996), 395-411.
8. The LDPR finished a surprisingfirst in the PR contest in 1993 with nearly 23 percent of the vote
and a respectablesecond in the 1995 PR race with 11 percentof the vote.
9. The LDPR won five seats in single memberdistrictraces in 1993 and only one in 1995.
10. There are similar difficulties in ascribingpartisanaffiliation to legislatorsin early Americanhistory. See Aldrich, p. 82; and KennethC. Martis, The Historical Atlas of the Political Parties in the United
States Congress: 1789-1989 (New York:Macmillan,1989).
11. See Timothy Colton and Jerry Hough, eds., GrowingPains: Russian Democracyand the Election
of 1993 (Washington,D.C.:The Brookings Institution,forthcoming).
12. Official lists of candidates in single member districts appeared in Rossiiskaya gazeta, Nov. 30,
1993, Sept. 6-Oct. 17, 1995.
13. Argumentyi]jaktv,49 (1993).
14. This comparisonof PR and single memberdistrictcandidateswas made for all thirteenparties in
1993 and eleven majorparties in 1995: CommunistPartyof the Russian Federation,Liberal Democratic
Party of Russia, Our Home Is Russia, Yabloko, Agrarian Party of Russia, Congress of Russian
Communities, Party of Self-Government, Women of Russia, Forward,Russia!, Democratic Russia's
Choice, Communists-WorkingRussia-Forthe Soviet Union, and Powerto the People. Lists of PR candidates were publishedin Rossiiskayagazeta, Nov. 30, 1993, Sept. 6-Oct. 17, 1995.
15. See Federal'noe Sobranie: Spravochnik(Moscow: Panorama,1994); Federal'noe Sobranie: Sovet
Federatsiiand GosudarstvennayaDuma Spravochnik(Moscow: Panorama,1996).
16. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winningof Office (Ann Arbor: University of
MichiganPress, 1991).
17. See KennethA. Shepsle, "InstitutionalEquilibriumand EquilibriumInstitutions,"in Herbert E
Weisberg,ed., Political Science: TheScience of Politics (New York:Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 51-81.
163
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18. Aldrich argues that transactioncosts in forming partiesare far less than in forming new majorities
for each new issue area over the long term providinganotherincentive for party building in the legislature. John H. Aldrich, WhyParties? TheOrigin and Transformationof Political Parties in America (Ann
Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress, 1995), p. 35.
19. Ibid.p. 89.
20. Ibid.pp. 48-50.
21. Ibid.p. 24.
22. Samuel Huntington,Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1968), p. 440.
23. Urbanareas were almost all fully politicized a few decades following the introductionof the written ballot for local elections in 1896, but not until the end of WorldWarII did almost 90 percentof rural
communes have at least one nationalparty list. As late as 1963 only aroundhalf of ruralareas were fully
dominated by national parties. Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties (New York: David McKay,
1970), pp. 191-96.
24. See Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Whyand How People Get Involved in Politics (Glencoe: The
Free Press, 1959), p. 300.
25. Sidney Tarrow, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Political Involvement: The Case of France,"
AmericanPolitical Science Review,61 (1971), 354-56.
26. Paul Goodman,"TheFirstAmericanPartySystem,"in William Nisbet Chambersand WalterDean
Burnham,eds., TheAmericanPartySystems(New York:Oxford UniversityPress, 1967), pp. 65-72.
27. Robert E. Dawson, "Social Development, Party Competition, and Policy," in Chambers and
Burnham,eds., pp. 222-26.
28. Polarized districts are districts with at least one candidate from both reformist and opposition
blocs. In 1993 reformist blocs included Russia's Choice, Yabloko, Party of Russian Unity and Accord
(PRES), and Russian Movementof Democratic Reform;opposition blocs included the CommunistParty
of the Russian Federation(KPRF), Agrarian Party of Russia (APR), and Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia (LDPR). In 1995 reformist blocs included Our Home Is Russia, Yabloko, Democratic Russia's
Choice, Common Cause, Party of Economic Freedom, Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenkobloc, Party of SelfGovernment,PRES, and Transformationof the Fatherland;opposition blocs included KPRF,LDPR,APR,
Powerto the People, Derzhava,Communists-WorkingRussia-Forthe Soviet Union, National Republican
Partyof Russia, and Congressof RussianCommunities(KRO).
29. Membersof regional executive branchesincludedheads of administration,deputy heads of administration,and high-rankingmembersof regionaladministrationssuch as departmentchairs at the regional
(oblast) and local (city or rayon) levels. Members of regional and local legislatures were intentionally
excluded because they tendedto be more partisanthanthis group of regionalelites.
30. For information on the occupational status of the winning candidates to the State Duma, see
Federal'noe Sobranie:Spravochnik(Moscow: Panorama,1994).
31. Much of this differenceis due to the fact that membersof the regional elite who won in 1993 were
coded as incumbentsin the State Duma and thus membersof the nationalelite in 1995.
32. For Americanexamples see RichardHofstadter,TheIdea ofa Party System (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1970); and Richard P. McCormick, "Political Development and the Second Party
System,"in Chambersand Burnham,eds., pp. 96-97.
33. Members of newly emerging electoral blocs such as Democratic Russia and nationalist-patriotic
blocs tended to draw candidates from outside the CPSU upper hierarchy,while the CPSU hierarchy
remainedrelativelyunorganizedand ill-preparedfor competitive elections. On occupationalbackgrounds
of deputies elected in late Soviet-eraelections see TimothyColton, "The Politics of Democratization:The
Moscow Election of 1990," Soviet Economy, 6 (1990), 311-21; and Regina Smyth, "Ideological vs.
Regional Cleavages: Do the Radicals Control the RSFSR Parliament?,"Journal of Soviet Nationalities
(Fall 1990), 135-36.
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34. See M. Steven Fish, "The Advent of Multipartismin Russia, 1993-1995," Post-SovietAffairs, 11
(1995), 353-59.
35. However,despite the emergenceof pro- and antigovernmentcoalitions in nominatingand supporting candidates in gubernatorialelections, political parties played a relatively limited role in initial elections for governor in Russia's regions. See Steven L. Solnick, "GubernatorialElections in Russia,
1996-1997," Post-SovietAffairs, 14 (1998), 63-68.
36. The intelligentsia includes all professionals--doctors, lawyers,journalists, economists, engineers,
academics, artists, and teachers. Also included in this category are activists of political parties, social
movements,and tradeunions. Otherrefersto workers,students,pensioners,and unemployed.
37. Party abbreviations are RC, Russia's Choice; YAB, Yabloko; CU, Civic Union; APR, Agrarian
Partyof Russia; KPRF,CommunistPartyof the Russian Federation;LDPR, LiberalDemocratic Partyof
Russia;NDR, Our Home Is Russia;PP,Powerto the People.
38. Russia's Choice used a strong showing in the single member districttier to win the most seats in
the 1993 election and form the largestfaction in the State Duma. However,its gains paled in comparison
to the numberof independentswinning seats in the single memberdistricts.
39. Thus, there was a significantly higher correlationbetween the PR and single memberdistrictvote
for majorpartiesin 1995 comparedto 1993. In 1993 only Russia'sChoice, LDPR, and the AgrarianParty
had statisticallysignificant correlationsbetween the two tiers. Yablokoand the KPRF did not. In 1995 all
five majorparties (Our Home Is Russia, KPRF,LDPR,Yabloko,and the AgrarianParty)had statistically
significant correlationsbetweentheir PR and single memberdistrictvote, double the level found in 1993.
40. Lane, p. 300; Rokkan,p. 355.
41. Rokkan,p. 261.
42. V O. Key,Jr.,SouthernPolitics in State and Nation (New York:Vintage Books, 1949).
43. All datawere aggregatedat the districtlevel.
44. Ralph Clem and Peter Craumer,"A Rayon Level Analysis of the Russian ParliamentaryElection
and ConstitutionalPlebiscite of December 1993,"Post-Soviet Geography,36 (1995), 459-75; and Ralph
S. Clem and PeterR. Craumer,"RegionalPatternsof VoterTurnoutin Russian Elections, 1993-1996," in
Stephen White, MatthewWyman,and Sarah Oates, eds., Elections and Votersin PostcommunistRussia
(Cheltenham:EdwardElgar,forthcoming),pp. 40-67.
45. Herbert Kitschelt, "Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies," Party
Politics, 1 (1995), 457.
46. Maurice Duverger,Political Parties.:Their Organizationand Activity in the Modern State (New
York:John Wiley and Sons, 1954), pp. xxiv-xxx.
165
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