Using Situational Crisis Communication Theory to Interrogate a PWIs Response to a Campus
Racial Crisis
A thesis submitted to the
Graduate School
of the University of Cincinnati
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in the Department of Communication
of the College of Arts and Sciences
Branden D. Elmore
B.A. Fayetteville State University
May 2014
Committee Chair: Ronald L. Jackson II, Ph.D.
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ABSTRACT
This study examines how a university’s leadership at a predominantly White institution
(PWI) responds to campus racial crisis, and how that response is framed to support
organizational systems and norms while resisting structural change. On July 19, 2015, Sam
Dubose, a Black male, was murdered by a White University of Cincinnati (UC) police officer at
point-blank range. Dubose’s death has left many Black students, faculty and staff questioning
university leadership and their responses. This study attempts to understand the responses
from UC leadership and the broader campus community in regard to the shooting. Themes
were then generated through analyzing administrative leadership’s responses. This was all done
by conducting a critical discourse analysis using available public discourse. Using situational
crisis communication theory, the study serves as an analysis of the strategic communication
enacted by university administrative leadership in response to campus racial crises. It was
revealed that in addition to rethinking the institution’s crisis prevention plan to include key
elements of community engagement, administrative responses should also seek to restore
“peacefulness and calmness” and consider adding “reengineering” and “recruitment” as
response strategies that can be enacted in lieu of already proposed SCCT strategies.
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iii
Acknowledgments
This thesis is dedicated to my Aunt Kathy. I had no idea how I would make it through
graduate school without you, but like always you were forever there. Many thanks to my
wonderful department, cohort, and the great institution of University of Cincinnati. I am so
grateful to have had such a strong network of support around me. Special thanks to Ms. Niki,
Dr. Aus, Dr. Boys, Dr. Zoller, Dr. Ban, and Depoe- your mentorship is greatly appreciated. Most
importantly I want to thank my wonderful committee members: Dr. Bates and Dr. Banjo, I am
so thankful to have you two on my team! To Dr. Jackson, your instruction and influence can
never be repaid and I will forever be trying to give back with my scholarship. I hope to inspire
others as you have me! I cannot forget my amazing students and my family in RED- for if it was
not for you my passion to explore such issues within our Higher Education institutions would
have no meaning. Lastly, a special dedication to the late Samuel Dubose, your story changed my
life forever and together I hope we can bring change to the minds and hearts of others.
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Table of Contents
Abstract
Page ii
Acknowledgements
Page iv
Table of Contents
Page v
List of Tables
Page vi
Chapter 1 (Introduction)
Page 1
Chapter 2 (Literature Review)
Page 11
Chapter 3 (Methods and Methodology)
Page 30
Chapter 4 (Analysis)
Page 36
Chapter 5 (Conclusion)
Page 66
References
Page 81
Appendix
Page 86
v
List of Tables
Table 4.1
Page 37
Table 4.2
Page 67
Table 4.3
Page 75
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The realm of Higher Education (Higher Ed) has successfully created a system of
academia that prepares a promising future for the many young individuals who take advantage
of its opportunities and has even managed to stay afloat as one of the World’s most strategic
business enterprises disguised as a non-competitive entity. Yet with good comes bad and if
there is one thing that Higher Ed has not succeeded at it is the ability to address campus racial
crises. Throughout the scope of this study, more than 50 institutions across the nation (majority
of which who are considered predominantly White) witnessed students of color in protest
demanding change on their college campuses (thedemands.org). Be sure that the wake of these
demands are not by mistake and the uproar that took place over the 6 months of this study
from July- December 2015 is indicative that there is a void within the structure of response
throughout Higher Ed. This void becomes evident when one tries to locate a handbook for
addressing campus racial crises. To fill this void the demands of those once silenced must be
heard and the world of Higher Ed must begin to consider this issue exactly what it is, a crisis.
Famous poet and scholar Nikki Giovanni lent her expertise to the world of academe by
visiting as an instructor of creative writing at Virginia Tech. While there, she wrote about her
experiences in a White space and offered a lesson to Black students at predominantly White
institutions (PWI) in her book Racism 101 (1994). The book discusses the concept of “Campus
Racism” and Giovanni suggests to Black students that, “Your job is not to educate White
people; it is to obtain an education” (p. 111). So whose job is it to educate Whites about
racism? If it is not the job of the students who have been classified as non-White or as people
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of color, then who can we hold responsible for racism on college campuses? At first, one might
assume the University. However, this seems unfair, as there is a system that influences the
institution itself. A system that is ran by key players at the institution. The key players within a
university have the best chance at affecting diversity and inclusion education on a college
campus. Those key players tend to be university administrative leaders as they are the most
responsible for establishing campus culture. The values and vision of the leaders directly
influence everything from budget to classroom instruction and through their decision-making
they choose what is vital to the overall campus climate, especially within respect to the twin
registers of diversity and inclusion.
Lane (2002) posits the most important environmental factor on college campuses is the
racial climate. It is the responsibility of the University, and more so its leaders, to produce
scholars that are well-rounded individuals who will contribute to society in a positive way. As
noted within the University of Missouri’s mission statement, “Scholarship and teaching are daily
driven by a commitment to public service — the obligation to produce and disseminate
knowledge that will improve the quality of life in the state, the nation and the world” (2015). It
is safe to say that we trust in our educational institutions to provide a climate that is inclusive
and fostering to all walks of life.
However, what is prominent throughout society does not isolate itself outside of our
educational spaces. Considering that we spend most of our childhood and adolescent lives
inside of the classroom before entering a college community what we bring with us is just as
important as what we are experiencing throughout those 4-6 years of working towards a
college degree. Our experience with racism helps to mold our understanding of it and this
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affects how we deal with it. Not one person will experience racism in the same way and
although we have attempted to define the term, we have failed to do so because its
interpretation is particular to the individual. This next section will provide a better
understanding of racism and how it is exemplified on college campuses.
Racism
Racism is a societal issue that plagues our places of learning and development. The
definition of racism has been argued for many years. For this study I rely on the work of Audre
Lorde (1992) who defines racism as “the belief in the inherent superiority of one race over all
others and thereby the right to dominance” (p. 496). Students are most directly affected by acts
of racism in dealing with racist comments, feelings of disconnect, and unequal access to
opportunities (Lane 2002). The biggest challenge faced by Black students at predominantly
White institutions (PWIs) connects most closely with the environmental factor: racial climate.
Racism is not contained to one space and has serious implications in regards to student success.
Overt or covert, racism may not always be received the same way. Benton (2004) reminds us
that one of the obstacles faced by Black students at PWIs is the ignorance about Black culture,
not only incubated in the majority student population, but also witnessed throughout
administration and staff. This has been an issue throughout traditional educational pedagogy
for some time, but now more than ever as we have begun to see crises manifesting in spaces
that are pegged as being progressive, sociocultural learning and developmental environments. I
argue that it is the responsibility of those who hold power and influence, such as administrative
leaders to create an inclusive racial climate. This is important so that when crises spawn due to
racial inequalities, they may respond using the best practices. So what happens when you have
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administrative leaders who lack the same situational experiences, background and
understanding responding to these incidents? The answer can be dangerous, as again, issues
around diversity and inclusion are not isolated to one institution. In fact, the majority of PWIs
have yet to create an effective plan for diversity and reach inclusive excellence.
Examples of Campus Racism
The consequences of not having an effective plan for reaching inclusive excellence
presents challenges not just for the students, but for administrative leadership as well. This is
best exemplified when Black students at the University of Missouri caused uproar calling out
the racist history of the University and asked for the resignation of the then President, Timothy
Wolfe. The University would like us to believe that this was a definite crisis, one that they had
under control, but for the students and the rest of the world, this was an example of an
extremely racially charged crisis that questioned the morals of the individual in control. The
impetus of this crisis was carried out by the feelings that the Black community of University of
Missouri had felt for a long time which were consequences of racial inequities that were
present over a period of time. In an open letter addressed to the University Of Missouri System
Board Of Curators, student protestors discussed their anger for the lack of responses in regards
to racial inequities and bigger societal issues such as the death of Black male, Mike Brown, a
Missouri native. The letter produced by the Executive cabinet of the undergraduate student
government, highlighted the fact that Timothy Wolfe “the leader” of the “community” had
failed to listen and respond to the needs of students of color (Son and Madhani, 2015). This
event gained media attention as players from the school’s football team decided to join the
protests and sit-out of upcoming sporting events. This helped to move the needle as Timothy
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Wolfe decided to step down on November, 9 2015, just a few months after students enacted
hunger strikes and walkouts.
One of the most important pieces to take from this example is the University’s response.
Students first expected a response from administration in regards to Mike Brown’s death in
Ferguson, Missouri and were taken aback when there was no light given to the situation. For
something that affected an integral part of the campus community to be left out of the
administration’s response (or lack of) is one cause for later boycotts that erupted. Second,
ignoring the concerns of students of color and their experiences with campus climate helped to
excel the protests and provided a platform for other students to stand in solidarity. Most
importantly, after the crisis erupted, the response from Tim Wolfe and the University
reinforced that these concerns were in fact overlooked and valid, leaving the campus
community expecting a plan for action that would “fix” the issues around diversity and
inclusion.
Similarly, in October of 2015, Black students and concerned campus members of
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) demanded a response from campus administration
when word got out that numerous students of White Greek-lettered organizations threw a
“Kanye-Western party” promoting Blackface and racial-slurring. The University has a history of
racial tensions that are best remembered when the school’s bookstore sold shirts that read
“Still Filthy” in conjunction with images of Mexican symbols printed on them (Kingkade, 2015).
The administrative leadership of the University have made numerous public apologies,
however, no major disciplinary action has been enacted upon any student to date.
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Crises as such are not special to college administrators and their campuses. Desert Vista
High School in Arizona made headlines when a few of the members of the 2016 graduating
class decided to turn picture day into a full on racial slur. While posing for yearbook photos 6
female students stood arm in arm with big smiles on their faces as their individual shirts side by
side read the racial slur “NIGGER”. Superintendents and local board members quickly made
comments letting the community know they were aware and handling the issue. The high
school’s Principal, Dr. Christine Barela, expressed how she planned to address the “obvious
needs for sensitivity training” (Blakinger, 2016). Interestingly enough, each student involved
had either committed or applied to colleges in hopes of continuing education and now college
Presidents have the task of rethinking their anticipated acceptance. Accepting these students
with notice of their behavior may establish unwanted attention to the Universities involved as
well.
These overt examples of racial crises in higher education are a series of events that
made headlines much like the national conversation that took place in a recent Supreme Court
hearing about race-based admissions to the University of Texas. Justice Antonin Scalia caught
fire for a comment he made which resurfaced the argument of affirmative action stating that
African- Americans benefited more from “having them go to a less-advanced school, a slower
track school where they do well” (Abdullah, 2015). The University of Texas and their responses
have been targets for both sides of the argument and have helped reshape a climate where
they had been accused of denying a White female admission due to affirmative action laws.
One can only imagine how campus administration felt when this conversation reached a
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national level. Their overall success throughout higher education is determined and measured
by their ability to act as managers and a crisis can make or break that perception.
Significance
Each of the earlier mentioned examples of responses from campus leadership evolved
from acts of physical and/or psychological violence aimed at a racial group. There are many
types of crisis at a university but this study is principally concerned with campus racial crises.
This investigation examines an individual institution’s response to a racial crisis.
Most recently, in July of 2015 Samuel Dubose, a Black male was shot in the head by a
University of Cincinnati (UC) police officer after being stopped off campus for not displaying a
front license plate. Officer Ray Tensing who shot Mr. Dubose has been placed on leave without
pay, while the two officers who helped to express an invalid account of what happened were
allowed to come back to work just under two months after the shooting. Led by the UC’s
President Santa Ono and often involving other university leaders the University’s administrative
efforts were enacted through email, social media, forums and many other platforms to provide
sincerity and regrets for the loss of life. Continuous efforts have been made and the University
of Cincinnati (UC) has invested in a top to bottom review of UCPD and their relations with the
Black community. UC Administration positioned criminal justice professor, Robin Engel, as VP of
Safety and Reform in hopes to update and coordinate police training.
The Situation
The initial responses by UC administrative leadership are just examples of what is being
done on campus. Student activist groups have continuously called out the efforts made by
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campus administration and considered shortcoming an “absence of public positioning”
(theirate8.com). There have also been several attempts to promote diversity and inclusion and
a sense of urgency in creating a model for reform that can be used widely and implemented
throughout. Events such as healing conversations, discussion panels, social media statements
and such are other examples of responses that have been utilized since the death of Sam
Dubose. These efforts have been shared and exercised by the campus community as a whole
and while there are many attempts to stand in solidarity with the Black community in and
around UC, the responses to this racial crisis have shown to not be a solution of comfort for the
community they are meant for. This crisis has awakened the social justice factor within those
who advocate for an inclusive atmosphere at the University of Cincinnati. Administrative
leaders have been forced to respond to the inconsistencies that have been highlighted by those
who continue to raise conscious on campus. Interrogating the response tactics that have been
employed by campus administration allowed for me to provide suggestions that may help to
enhance crisis communication response strategies, as well as set a platform for understanding
other racially charged campus crises. The current crisis at the University of Cincinnati serves as
a catalyst for using communication theory to begin addressing the issue of campus racial crises.
Preview of Conceptual Framework
This study uses situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) as a conceptual
framework. This theory is new to the field of crisis communication, showing up in the literature
only a few short years ago by Coombs (2007). The theory helps organizations to minimize their
reputational threat, which can be detrimental to the organization’s reputation if no action is
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taken. This concept provides a catalyst for studying the responses of University administrative
leadership. The theory provides 4 types of strategies for response: deny, diminish, rebuild and
reinforce. These will be the responses categories that I will systematically examine with the
present study by attending to UC’s administrative responses to the crisis.
Preview of Method and Methodology
In order to analyze the discourse, this study employs usage of the critical discourse
analysis process to assist with defining themes that are presented in the responses. I will
conduct a critical discourse analysis on collected pieces of discourse from three different
avenues: 1) The University President’s Twitter page 2) Emails sent to the campus community
from the Office of the President and Public Safety 3) Archives found on the Safety and Reform
website. Once the discourse is mapped in a timeline from the date of the incident (July 19,
2015) to December 31, 2015, I will then begin to code the information in regards response
strategies outlined in SCCT. This will all then be recounted by my advisor to ensure that the
discourses can be replicated and placed in categories redundantly. This method is backed by an
iterative process that allows for the researcher to go back and forth from relevant literature
and their findings to present contextual information.
Research Questions
The following questions help to guide the research study: 1) To what extent does UC
administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis reflect situational crisis
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communication (SCCT) strategy of denying the racial crisis? 2) To what extent does UC
administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis reflect situational crisis
communication (SCCT) strategy of diminishing the racial crisis? 3) To what extent does UC
administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis reflect situational crisis
communication (SCCT) strategy of rebuilding during the racial crisis? 4) To what extent does UC
administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis reflect situational crisis
communication (SCCT) strategy of reinforcing during the racial crisis?
Overview
In the proceeding chapters I will attempt to reveal the phenomena of campus racial
crises and bring forth new information that positions SCCT as a theory for addressing this issue
in higher education. Throughout Chapter 2 I will explore relevant literature around the theory
and provide a brief understanding of its usage. This chapter will also provide examples of crisis
handling on college campuses and will include a discussion about campus racial tensions and
how they are exemplified within the specificities of UC. Chapter 3 will provide the structure for
the method and methodological approach of the study. This will help the reader to understand
the process and approach to data collection and analysis. Within this chapter the reader will
gain an understanding of why certain discourses were chosen and why others were left out of
the scope of the research. Chapter 4 will then provide the results from the data analysis that
will be followed with points of interpretation. Finally, Chapter 5 will seek to provide conclusions
to the study and offer implications that may be used as suggestions in handling campus racial
crises.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter will provide an understanding to the definition of a crisis and outline the
components of a racially charged crisis. I will then set the foundation for crisis communication
theory, situational crisis communication theory (SCCT). Following this foundation I will overview
the topics of crisis handling and campus racial tensions by providing examples. The chapter will
conclude with a discussion of how this all relates to the study by providing a backdrop of UC’s
campus racial tensions and how this has been influenced by the racial tensions prominent in
the surrounding city of Cincinnati.
Defining Crisis
A crisis is defined as a sudden and unexpected event that threatens to disrupt an
organization’s operations and poses both a financial and reputational threat (Coombs 2007, p
164). Another detailed definition posited by Seeger et al (1998) considers a crisis to be “a
specific, unexpected and non-routine organizationally based event or series of events which
creates high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high
priority goals” (p. 233). Both definitions highlight the threat that is presented to an organization
dealing with crises. This is important, especially in crises that are considered to be racially
charged. Fisher Liu (2010) defines racially charged crises by these four tenets: a) are sparked by
accusations of discrimination and/or systemic biases against racial minorities; b) at least initially
escalate in intensity through close national and/or international media scrutiny; c) cannot be
ignored by the individuals and/or organizations held responsible for the crisis; and d)
jeopardizes the positive reputation of an organization and/or individual (p. 336). The next
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section will briefly discuss how the field of Communication has previously understood and
responded to crises.
Crisis Communication
Throughout communication practice there have been three main strategies used to
respond to crises: framing, agenda-setting, and priming. These strategies carry a heavy
influence in the world of public relations and have been reapplied through many different
works adding to the ambiguity of their usage through mass-media communication, politics, and
sociology to name a few. Understanding the ways in which organizations utilize these concepts
as strategies to respond to crises by influencing or preying on public opinion requires an
introduction to each of their core foundations.
Framing
The concept of framing was first introduced by Bateson (1972) and later discussed by
Goffman (1974). Through their scholarship we understand framing to shape the interpretation
of speech content and the relationship between communicators (Bateson, 1972) and to
produce meanings and organize our experiences (Goffman, 1974). Fairhurst (2005) more
appropriately considered framing among organizational leadership by suggesting that managers
are powerless in regards to controlling turbulence in their environments, yet are powerful in
controlling the context in which that turbulence can be seen. This strategy is a staple within the
crisis communication process and can help to create a perceived understanding among both
internal and external audiences if employed correctly.
Agenda-Setting
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Similar to the influence of framing, agenda-setting theory is understood to have an
effect on public perception. The concept of agenda-setting became popularized by McCoombs
and Shaw (1972) when they completed a study on 100 Chapel Hill, North Carolina residents to
find correlation between what the public felt was the greatest political issue of the 1968
Presidential Election and what was reported most in the media. The study positioned the
theory to be a valid determinant of public opinion. Since then agenda-setting theory has been
formally understood in three different ways as it is either determined by the: public, media, or
policy (Rogers and Dearing, 1988). With all of these agenda types in mind, crisis communication
relies on the fact that they all work in tandem. For instance, in mass communication it is
understood that public and media agenda’s influence policy maker’s agendas which in turn
affects the structure of public opinion. Understanding the agenda-setting type is important in
crisis communication because as suggested by Iyengar and Simon (1993) individuals often refer
to events in the news to confirm social and political issues. This confirmation may lend to their
perception of the crisis.
Priming
The concept of priming is merely an extension of agenda-setting. While the focus of this
theory is more so on politicians and the effect of media exposure to certain domains, it still
carries an influence towards public opinion or perceived understanding. Iyengar and Kinder
(1987) suggest that the more attention media pays to a domain or issue the more primed the
public is to it, causing public opinion to be distracted from what the essential issue may be. This
can also be used as a strategy within crisis communication to ensure that the public is following
one perception whether it has validity or not. The theories of framing, agenda-setting, and
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priming are the basics of communicating a response and dominating public opinion. Their
ambiguity has positioned them to being considered cross-disciplinary approaches. Although
there has been much work done using these theories the overall goal of the current study is not
to determine the congruency of the public and UC’s administrative understanding of the crisis,
but rather to investigate the responses in which administrative leadership enacted.
Situational Crisis Communication Theory
Throughout crisis communication research we have started to see a shift in techniques
and practices as the crises that empower this type of research have begun to evolve as well.
Situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) is a relatively new theory cultivated by crisis
communication theorist Timothy Coombs (2006). The theory, unlike many crisis response
theories, offers a conceptual link between crisis response strategies and the crisis situation’s
characteristics, which enables practitioners to more effectively manage crisis responses. This is
an important part of crisis communication, because if there is no action taken, the amount of
damage a crisis could do to the organization’s reputation may be detrimental. This theory helps
to minimize the reputational threat presented to the organization (Coombs 2007). Coombs
(2007) uses the term ‘organization’ instead of corporation because SCCT is applicable to a
variety of organizational forms (p. 164). The reputation of an organization can make or break
relationships with valued stakeholders. It is also a driving force in decision-making processes
that stem from the organization. SCCT also suggests a two-step process for determining the
reputational threat of a crisis (Fisher Liu, 2010). The first suggestion is to determine what type
of crisis is presented. There are three types of clusters that SCCT characterizes crises: victim,
accidental and preventable. The victim cluster presents a low level responsibility from the crisis
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manager and involves natural disasters, rumors, workplace violence, and malevolence. In this
type of crisis the organization is also the victim. The accidental cluster also presents a low level
responsibility and involves challenges, technical accidents and recalls. In this type of crisis the
organization’s actions that led to the incident were unintentional. The cluster that presents a
high level of responsibility is considered to be preventable. This type of crisis involves human
error accidents, human error product recalls, and organizational misdeeds. In this type of crisis
organizations knowingly place people at risk, enacted inappropriately, or violated a
law/regulation (Coombs 2006, 2007; Fisher Liu, 2010).
The second suggestive step in this process is to determine how much the “intensifiers”
play into the crisis threat. Intensifiers are best exemplified through looking at the organization’s
crisis history and relationship history (Coombs, 2006). Coombs and Holladay (2001) consider
crisis history as determining if there have been similar crises within the organization’s past. In
turn, the relationship history refers to the past relationships enacted by the organization and its
stakeholders. This is an important part of the process as it assists in understanding how
stakeholders will react to the crisis. These two factors have “direct and indirect effects on the
reputational threat posed by the crisis” (Coombs 2007, p. 167).
When an organization is presented with a crisis, the type of threat it is in addition to the
crisis and relationship history will help determine the best response strategies that may help
diffuse or redirect the situation. SCCT considers the base responses for all crises to be:
instructing and adapting information. Instructing information makes stakeholders aware of
what action steps they should take for protection from physical threats. Adapting information
helps stakeholders cope with any psychological threats caused by the crisis (Fisher Liu, 2010).
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Once the crisis manager has communicated this information with stakeholders the next step is
to begin to address the crisis using the response strategies outlined by SCCT: deny, diminish,
rebuild, and reinforce.
The deny response is enacted when an organization wants to argue that the crisis does
not exist or that they are not responsible. This type of response seeks to eliminate any
reputational threat that may be imposed by the crisis (Coombs, 2006). The deny response is
recommended when the organization is involved in a rumor and is presented with unwarranted
challenges (Coombs, 2014; Fisher Liu, 2010). Within this response there are three options for
strategy: attack the accuser, denial, and scapegoat (Heath and Coombs, 2006). Fisher Liu (2010)
enhanced this response by adding the strategy of “ignore”. Her study found that although this
strategy was not a part of SCCT it was used as a deny response by major companies who
implicitly stated that a crisis did not exist by disregarding the crisis.
The diminish response is enacted when an organization tries to limit their responsibility
in the crisis and in doing so tries to provide an: excuse or justification. Using the excuse strategy
requires the crisis manager to deny the intent of wrong doing or claim their inability to control
the events triggered by the crisis. Justification occurs when the organization attempts to make
light of the crisis effects (Coombs, 2006, 2007). The recommended usage of these strategies
involves a) accident crisis situations where there is no prominent history of crisis or poor
relationship history and b) victim crisis situations where there is a crisis history and/or poor
relationship history (Coombs 2014; Fisher Liu, 2010). Fisher Liu (2010) enhanced this response
by adding the strategy of “separation”. Her study found that although this strategy was not a
part of SCCT, it had been discussed before as an option for image repair (e.g. Hearit, 2006). This
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response strategy allows for organizations to disassociate themselves from the responsible
party within their organization (Fisher Liu, 2010, p. 343).
The rebuild response is enacted when an organization is dealing with a preventable
crisis. This response involves two strategies: compensation and apology. Compensation is
usually given to the crisis victims in the means of financial support. Apology is used as a way to
show remorse or regret (Coombs 2014; Fisher Liu, 2010).
The reinforce response is enacted in conjunction with the other responses (Heath and
Coombs, 2006). The strategies outlined within this response (bolstering, ingratiation, and
victimage) are secondary and should only be used if another strategy has been employed.
Bolstering requires that the organization reminds the public of their past good deeds.
Ingratiation is important for maintaining relationships with stakeholders by praising them.
Victimage is when the organization maintains a position as the victim within the crisis (Coombs,
2007; Fisher Liu, 2010). In addition to the response strategies listed above, endorsement, has
been recognized by crises communication scholars (Fisher Liu, 2010) as an alternative reinforce
response strategy. Although it has not been added to SCCT model, it is suggested that
organizations may use endorsement to identify third-party support for the organization
experiencing a crisis.
Campus Administrative Leaders as Crisis Managers
As highlighted throughout campus administrators are key players in regards to affecting
the campus climate, especially in their efforts to promote a diverse and inclusive environment.
Tierney (1999) posits that instead of focusing so much attention on structure, campus leaders
should instead put their time and energy into establishing culture (p. 153). However, the push
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for structural change entails a concerted effort from administrative leaders to affect change in
both policy and competency. McCaffery (2004) supports this notion when he suggests that
“effective management…is contingent upon getting the right ‘fit’ between management style
and organizational culture right” (p. 30). As crises develop, administrators must maintain an
understanding of their institution’s culture (climate). Furthermore, as offered by Zdziarski et al
(2007), administrators must carefully consider what actions can be taken inside the campus
community to reduce the likelihood of a crisis occurring (p. 48). It is also important for
administrative leaders to be knowledgeable of their campus (culture) climate so that they
respond effectively as crises develop. Tierney (1999) understands leadership to exist within a
cultural framework and as something that cannot be turned on and off (p. 51). Therefore,
effective leadership fosters an effective response during crisis situations, as administrative
leaders begin to think more holistically in their approaches to managing.
Crisis Handling Throughout Higher Education
Colleges and universities have the crippling task of serving as spaces for breeding
knowledge and growing intellectuals while at the same time functioning as a business. Like in
any business, there are going to be crises that happen unexpectedly. However, the reputational
threat that is associated with major crises throughout these institutions carries much more
weight than most government and privately owned organizations. Winter (2009) considers
college and universities to be both “crucibles of learning and development” and “profit-making
enterprises” (p.124). Recognizing these institutions as organizations, forces us to understand
the role of crisis managers throughout higher education, and more importantly the role of
higher education administrative leaders on college campuses. Drugus and Landoy (2013)
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identify the role of “managers” within higher education through their “ability [in] serving as
means to achieving organizational objectives” (p. 126). The role of “leaders”, as suggested by
Hogg (2001) “involves actively influencing other people” (p. 189). The role of higher education
administrative leaders stands at the forefront of crises when it comes to influencing
stakeholders, partners, and the community.
Wang and Hutchins (2010) posit that like their corporate counterparts, higher education
institutions in the United States have been beset by an increasing number of crisis events at
different levels (p. 553). There are two types of crises that can occur at institutions of higher
education: man-made and natural disasters (Lindell, Prater and Perry 2007; Booker, 2014).
Natural disasters are seen as predictable such as weather related attacks (tornadoes,
hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.). While man-made disasters have almost a zero-percent
predictability rate. Scholars have suggested a list of 13 man-made disaster event categories that
apply to college campuses: sexual assault, stalking, campus dating violence, hate crimes, hazing,
celebratory violence (riots), attempted suicides, suicides, murder/suicides, manslaughter,
aggravated assault, arson, and attack on faculty and staff (Booker 2014).
Recent “man-made” crisis events on college campuses have began to spark interest in
crisis communication scholars. Wang and Hutchins (2010) provide a case study example of the
Virginia Tech Massacre highlighting the unpreparedness of college and universities when it
comes to crisis handling. Using Mitroff’s (2005) crisis management model they critiqued the
way in which the University failed to react to the crisis. Their many examples included findings
such as: an inadequate emergency response plan and training, police errors, containment
errors, and inefficient dissemination of information (Wang and Hutchins 2010). Their study
19
revealed how crises as such can result in substantial local and state-wide policy changes in
medical reporting, gun policy, and emergency notification procedures (p. 569). In the case
where a crisis situation does occur, the organization is likely to recover substantially faster and
at much less cost under the leadership of a well-trained, interdepartmental crisis management
team (Mitroff, 2006). This is further supported by Jenkins and Goodman (2015) who posit that
crisis management plans have to empower those working at the operational level to make
necessary decisions (p. 4). I argue that in order to create equilibrium during a crisis it is equally
important to develop a plan that can be enacted without the presence of the full team, as crises
are unpredictable and communication may be stifled. The literature maintains this argument
positioning that “such consultation may lead to delays in responding effectively and
information overload for the central management team” (Jenkins and Goodman, 2015, p. 4).
At times crises do not always follow an active-shooter scenario and providing an
effective plan that can be used widely is important. Recent studies have shown that an effective
crisis response requires leaders to develop a plan, test it and then apply it effectively in rapidly
changing circumstances with both centralized and decentralized decision-making authority as
conditions evolve (Jenkins and Goodman, 2015). In their study Jenkins and Goodman (2015)
confirmed this by completing a case study on the recent UMass Dartmouth response to a crisis
that sparked out of the Boston Marathon Bombing on campus. The shooting (which took place
a week prior to the response) involved a university student and sent the campus in havoc when
they were unsure of his whereabouts. The case study found that even with the Chancellor not
on campus during the height of the events, student affairs personnel where able to work
effectively in some ways by making decentralized decisions in regards to the student’s safety.
20
Students who were located in off-campus hotels and spaces were reassured safety due to the
effectiveness of this type of blended decision-making (Jenkins and Goodman, 2015). However,
there were problems in dissemination of information because of the impulse decisions that
were made as well, similar to that of Virginia Tech’s response mentioned above (Wang and
Hutchins 2015).
Crisis and Campus Racial Tensions
In the 90’s, Hurtado (1992) posited that the research on minorities in higher education is
extensive, yet a surprisingly small number of empirical studies have focused specifically on
campus racial climates, more importantly the crises that develop in climates as such. It is not
surprising that this still rings true today as we have moved into the 21st century. It is also not
surprising that through increasing diversity efforts that most universities and colleges have
prioritized the inclusion of a diverse student body, with a particular focus on racial/ ethnic
diversity (Stotzer and Hossellman, 2012, p. 646). While the inclusion of diverse racial and ethnic
minorities at PWIs helps to bring in more stakeholders and promotes a more representative
campus climate, this also presents a risk for crises. Courts at all levels are struggling with
whether or not diversity is a compelling interest of the state, and thus, higher education
(Stotzer and Hossellman, 2012, p. 646). With lack of support from the state and courts, it has
become more of a challenge to promote diversity within the realm of higher education.
Seemingly, what was suggested by Hurtado (1992) that “instances of overt racial conflict can no
longer be viewed as aberrations or isolated incidents, but rather are indicators of a more
general problem of unresolved racial issues in college environments and in society at large” (p.
540) is still an ever-present issue today throughout our higher education institutions.
21
In 2003, University of Texas (UT) at Austin prospect Abigail Fisher, was denied admission
to the university causing uproar when she challenged the University’s decision saying it was
essentially due to her race as a White female. UT Austin’s response was the most alarming
aspect of the crisis when they admitted that students of color reported they felt isolated on
campus and that African American and Latino students remained underrepresented in
undergraduate classes (Garces, 2014). This crisis helps to highlight the lack of representation in
regards to students of color at predominantly White institutions and speaks to the tensions that
are presented as a result. While Fisher did not win her case it resulted in many proceedings and
provided a catalyst for conversations around race-based admission processes on college
campuses. The crisis challenged the notion that higher education institutions are facing a
political climate that has become increasingly hostile to affirmative action policies, as evidenced
by laws in eight states that ban the consideration of race altogether in postsecondary
admissions policies (Garces, 2014).
Lack of representation and limited amount resources are just a few examples of the
challenges presented for ethnic minorities at PWIs. In conjunction with the more macro-issues
that are imposed by government sanctions, institutional restrictions, and allocations, students
of color are faced with what Solorzano, Ceja and Yosso (2000) consider microaggressions.
Defined as, “subtle insults (verbal, nonverbal and/or visual) directed towards people of color”,
micoraggressions are often enacted unconsciously (Solórzano, Ceja and Yosso, 2000, p. 60). The
day-to-day mundane attacks on students of color are examples of what their experiences are
while trying to navigate a system that has an obligation to provide them with an education.
These attacks are preempted by the tensions that each individual brings with them when
22
entering college and makes way for the bigger macroaggressions to have effect on the overall
student experience. Giovanni (1994) offers that “there are discomforts attached to attending
predominantly White colleges, though no more so than living in a racist world” (p. 112). The
student experience is not always reciprocated due to the fact that at times college is for many,
especially White students, an introduction to diversity. In fact, “under conditions of increasing
cultural diversity . . . the differences between groups become salient on an everyday basis. For
the first time, many students must learn to deal with classmates and roommates who are
different” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2000; Stotzer and Hossellman, 2012). This type of oneway interaction results in heightened campus racial tensions presenting more opportunity for
crises to arise.
Recent University of Oklahoma (OU) incident such as well known fraternal organization,
Sigma Alpha Epsilon (SAE), singing racist chants is an example of the crises that stem out of
these microaggressions. Videos revealed the predominantly White fraternity chanting in unison
and singing racial slurs referring to the lynching of Blacks. This crisis unfolded as the video went
viral and OU President, David Boren, gave SAE members two days to vacate the university
owned frat house (Kingkade, 2015a). The support from the President set the precedents for
expectations and relief from tensions among students, faculty/staff and the community.
Hurtado (1992) maintains the notion that an institutional commitment to diversity can
substantially improve minority and, to some extent, White student perceptions of race
relations. Administration’s response also helped to draw in support from the rest of the world
who watched the crisis closely via media coverage.
UC Campus Racial Tensions and The Greater Cincinnati
23
The University Of Cincinnati (UC) is not exempt from the racial tensions that continue to
plague higher education institutions and society as a whole. UC’s history was birthed in the idea
of separatism and has had racism woven into its fabric. UC is a PWI located in an urban-inner
city area and provides a myriad of disciplines to over 40,000 students across three campuses,
serving as a public-research- based higher education facility. Founded in 1819 and reestablishing itself in the Heights of Cincinnati, the institution was chartered on the basis of
White supremacy. In 1858, when noted philanthropist, Charles McMicken, sowed the future of
UC into his will he made sure to highlight that the donation he was making would be “for the
education of White Boys and Girls” (McMicken, p. 19). The culture of UC has carried itself out in
such manner and the history of relations with Black people in Cincinnati has proven over and
over again to be expressed in overt ways. In fact, UC has a history of crises including a similar
incident with the institution’s SAE chapter. In January of 1982, UC administration caught wind
of a Martin Luther King “trash party” which involved close to 100 SAE members dressing up in
derogatory Black face and encouraging “creativity and a festive party spirit”. Then President,
Henry Wrinkler stood in support of a 2-year suspension for the SAE fraternity at UC after being
accused of taking the situation too lightly (Wilken, 1982). What is significant here is that the
University at the time had roughly around 39,000 students on campus while 3,730 of them
were Black (New York Times, 1982). According to the University’s website fact page, 2015
enrollment numbers have increased to a high 44, 251, however, there is actually a decrease of
African American students with numbers sitting at a low 3,706 (uc.edu). This is a stark contrast
from what was predicted by The National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) that just in
24
ten years from their 2007 report, enrollment would increase for White students 4% and 26% for
Black students (Stotzer and Hossellman, 2012).
As recruitment efforts have increased enrollment numbers have grown, yet we still see
a small representation of what is present within the Cincinnati community. According to the US
Census Bureau, the City of Cincinnati has a Black population of 44.8% (2015). This is not
reflective in the city’s public university makeup of only 8%. Racial tensions in the city are and
always have been a divisive factor in regards to education and opportunities. When the SAE
incident took place it was noted that, “The University of Cincinnati is a reflection of the city. If
anything, UC is less racist than the city itself” (Wilken, 1982, p. 54). The city was awakened in
the late 1960’s after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King when locals of urban
neighborhood Avondale rioted in the streets leaving over 3$ million dollars in damage, 220
injured, 260 arrested and 2 killed (Keisewetter, 2001). Riots resurfaced in 2001, when White
police officer shot and killed unarmed Black man Timothy Thomas. The American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) and a local Black community group filed a suit accusing the Cincinnati Police
Department of racial profiling a few months before the incident. Officer Stephen Roach who
shot Thomas was only acquitted on misdemeanor charges. The ACLU’s lawsuit finally settled
and due to the nature of Thomas’ traffic ticket record a study was conducted on the Cincinnati
Police Department’s video footage of 194 traffic stops. The study found that relative to White
drivers, Blacks were between three and five times more likely to (a) be asked if they were
carrying drugs or weapons, (b) be asked to leave the vehicle, (c) be searched, (d) have a
passenger searched, and (e) have the vehicle physically searched in Cincinnati (Dixon, Schell,
Giles and Logos, 2008, p. 540). The final findings of the study concluded that Black drivers
25
experienced extensive policing during the stop, while White drivers experienced positive quality
of communication, and when the officer/driver were the same race communication behavior
was more positive as well (Dixon, Schell, Giles and Logos, 2008). It is also important to note that
between the years of 1995 leading up to the death of Thomas another 15 Black males were
shot by Cincinnati police (NPR, 2001). Events as such have scarred the city making it harder to
enact reform causing race relations to take over the moral of its people.
UC Racial Crises and Sam Dubose
The relationship between police and the community in Cincinnati has transcended
throughout the campus community. It is not surprising that the University of Cincinnati Police
Department (UCPD) have contributed to the number of deaths involving Black men. The first in
1997, Lorenzo Collins, a mentally-ill Black male age 25, was shot 3 times by UCPD and Cincinnati
Police Department (CPD) officers. Collins had escaped from the University’s medical center
after being placed under watch for mental illness (Bricking, 1997). None of the officers were
charged, in fact officers responded that they “are trained to use deadly force to stop a threat”
(Weintraub, 1997). As a response UC enforced that officers carry tasers and the event was
called a “confusion”. In 2010, Kelly Brinson signed himself into the University’s hospital to
receive psychiatric care and at some point became “agitated” then restrained by UCPD and
shocked into a cardiac arrest, dying three days later. Officers were dismissed on charges and to
this day are still employed at the University. In 2011, Everett Howard, an 18 year old Black male
high school graduate visiting UC for a summer experience was tasered and killed by UCPD. No
criminal charges were filed on UCPD officers and while one officer was placed on administrative
leave the then UCPD Assistant Chief made a statement that the “Officer was very distraught”
26
(Thompson, 2011). Similar to Mr. Brinson, the young man was described as “agitated”. UC
settled for $2 million and provided a bench area on the outside of campus in remembrance of
Mr. Howard. UCPD’s taser privileges were taken away and university President, Santo Ono,
made a statement sending his “deepest regrets”.
In the most recent incident, UCPD officer Ray Tensing shot and killed unarmed Black
male Sam Dubose in the head after pulling him over for not having a front license plate. During
the traffic stop Dubose displayed signs of panic in addition to starting his vehicle prior to being
shot. His behavior is said to be a reaction to the also impulsive behavior of Officer Tensing.
Studies have shown that disadvantaged Blacks may be likely to believe that police routinely
engage in verbal and physical abuse of African Americans in their communities because they
observe or personally experience such abuse in their neighborhoods (Weitzer and Tuch, 2002,
p. 450). Officer Tensing, who is White, was a graduate of UC’s Criminal Justice program
graduating cum lade just a few years prior to the incident. Gurin (1999) found that students
with increased exposure to diversity in college went on to have increased involvement in
community organizations as adults. Taking this into account, it can be suggested that the lack of
representation at UC provided the pattern of racial bias found during Tensing’s 13-month
tenure with the University. Gregory Baker, UC Director of Police Community Relations,
acknowledged Tensing's record of stopping Black motorists nearly four times as often as Whites
(WCPO, 2015). Police have been accused of making “pretextual” stops of persons who fit a
certain profile as drug traffickers, gang members, or other offenders, and African Americans
have been prime targets-a phenomenon often referred to as “driving while Black” (Harris, 1997,
1999; Weitzer and Tuch, 2002). The traffic stop incident sparked national headlines when
27
reports showed that Tensing’s report of what happened, accusing Dubose of dragging him with
his vehicle, did not match what was displayed in the body camera video. Initially, there were
also statements provided from 2 witnessing officers who said they saw Tensing being carried by
the vehicle. These statements were later changed after going under oath. The officers, Phillip
Kidd and David Lindenschmidt, were at first placed on administrative leave and later placed
back on duty shortly after. Tensing is currently awaiting trial and has appealed the action of
firing him from his job and has plead not guilty to the charges of murder and voluntary
manslaughter(WPCO, 2015).
The University enacted many strides in regaining trust and providing transparency.
President Santa Ono called for the UCPD to stop patrolling off campus after being questioned
about the increasingly high number of traffic stops from the period of 2012-2015. In 2015 alone
there were over 2000 traffic stops made prior to the end of July (Kroll, 2015). The actions of
UCPD are just examples of the social structures that inhibit racism and implicit bias. The
broader structures help to create the ideologies that Black men are agitated threats to society.
The justice system helps to reinforce the systemic oppression that Blacks face and promotes
the use of militant force to control and maintain what is considered “order”. In similar fashion,
institutions created for the development of education also help to articulate the ideology of
racism and oppression, seen forth throughout the examples of unarmed Black men being killed
at the hands of University police. This crisis, similar to the many mass shootings across the
nation at educational institutions is worth studying. The university has hired criminal justice
professional Dr. Robin Engel as Vice President of Safety and Reform and while there have been
attempts to reform UCPD and restructure their training procedures. The current crisis handling
28
at UC has resulted in students standing in opposition as Black students have created a student
advocacy group called theirate8. The group, compromised of Black student leaders at UC, made
their debut on August 31, 2015 taking to social media and providing a unity statement that
states:
“UC, your efforts, while hopeful, are not enough. We demand your attention
and we demand that you acknowledge publicly that #Blacklivesmatter,
because we Black students are under fire here at the
#hottestcollegeinamerica." (theirate8.com)
Administrative efforts have happened over the course of 6 months in which this study will seek
to interrogate to reveal strategies for crisis handling in regards to racially charged crises
specifically throughout Higher Education.
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Chapter 3
Methods and Methodology
This chapter will serve as an understanding for the chosen methodology. It begins with
an overview of the methodology which will include the rationale, a discussion of critical
discourse analysis, and will then introduce the research questions that help to further guide the
study. After the research questions have been presented, the chapter will then provide a
backdrop of the types of discourse chosen. Immediately following, will be an in-depth
description of the process for data collection and will conclude with a discussion of the
analytical techniques of the study.
Understanding Critical Discourse Analysis
This study focuses on the discourse presented by the administrative leadership at the
University of Cincinnati. For this reason the study chooses a critical lens and takes into
consideration the methods of a critical discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a
form of discourse analysis. While discourse analysis generally focuses on patterns of language
outside of the text, CDA focuses more heavily on the discourse dimensions of power abuse and
the injustice and inequality that result from it (Van Dijk, 1993; Rahimi, 2013). Language is still
the most important aspect of CDA as Fairclough (2001) notes, “language is a part of society;
linguistic phenomena are social phenomena of a specific sort; and social phenomena are
linguistic phenomena” (p. 23). CDA attempts to interrogate the patterns presented within
discourse that help to explain the language being interpreted. According to Wodak (2001),
discourse can be understood as a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated
linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as
30
thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as 'texts' that belong to
specific semiotic types, that is genres”. It is also important to note that CDA has never been or
has never attempted to be or to provide one single or specific theory (Wodak and Meyer,
2009). As suggested by Van Dijk (1993), unlike other discourse analysts, critical discourse
analysts (should) take a sociopolitical stance, as the aim of CDA is to bring about change
through critical understanding (p. 252). In all, the aim of CDA is to shed light on the linguistic
discursive dimension of social and cultural phenomena and processes of change in late
modernity (Rahimi, 2013). This study chooses to utilize CDA to provide critical suggestions on
the ways the predominantly White institutions may engage in handling racially charged crises.
Research Questions
Following the response strategies offered from SCCT (in Chapter 2), this study further
seeks to answer the following questions: 1) To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s
response to campus racial crisis reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of
denying the racial crisis? 2) To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to
campus racial crisis reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of diminishing the
racial crisis? 3) To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial
crisis reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of rebuilding during the racial
crisis? 4) To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of reinforcing during the racial crisis?
These questions help to guide the study and seek to provide examples of each strategy used
throughout UC administrative leadership responses.
31
Data Collection Process
This study takes into consideration the discourse presented by UC administrative
leaders in response to the murder of Sam Dubose. Data was collected from 3 separate types of
discourse: 1) UC’s President, Santa Ono’s Twitter posts 2) University-wide emails sent from
administration (particularly the President’s office) 3) UC Safety and Reform website. Discourse
from these 3 avenues was gathered from the date of the murder (July 19, 2015) to last day of
that first semester (December 12, 2015). There were a total of 59 pages of discourse collected
over this time period. This information was obtained through my access as a graduate student
of the University and having the opportunity to collect public information off of Twitter and the
University’s website.
Once the information was collected it was then organized into the 3 separate types of
discourse. At that point the level one coding process began. First-level coding is focused on
“what” is present within the data and requires little interpretation (Tracy, 2013, p. 189). This
process was enacted as I started to take pieces from each discourse and categorize them into
the different response strategies (denial, diminish, rebuild, and reinforce). For instance, if a
piece of discourse offered an example of the diminish strategy it was coded as such. To assist in
organizing this data I created a charting system (see Appendices A-E). Doing so also helped in
defining general themes that would later be used for the analysis. These general themes were
offered by SCCT and consisted of: scapegoat, denial, ignore (deny); excuse, justification
(diminish); apology, compensation (rebuild); bolstering, ingratiation, and victimage (reinforce).
The examples provided within each category were then taken into consideration during the
32
level two coding process, which Tracy (2013) considers to be more analytic and interpretive (p.
194). This process was enacted out by ciphering through the information placed into categories
and completing the discourse analysis to find empirical data that supported the themes.
Essentially the themes presented in the study were chosen based off redundancy in occurrence
and similarity to response strategies found within previous SCCT literature (see Coombs 2007;
Fisher Liu 2010).
Analytic Technique
This qualitative study uses a grounded approach to gain understanding and to further
interrogate the response strategies used by UC administrative leaders. “Grounded theory is
marked by simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis, its most important basic
rule being: “study your emerging data” (Charmaz. 2006, p.80). In conjunction to the grounded
approach, the results in this study were derived using more “iterative” methods. According to
Tracy (2013), “an iterative analysis alternates between emic, or emergent, readings of the data
and etic use of existing models, explanations, and theories” (p. 184). She also notes that
“iteration is not a repetitive mechanical task, but rather a reflexive process” (p. 184). This
reflexive process allowed me to sit with the data and revisit key pieces of literature to interpret
results from the themes presented within the discourse.
In order to better understand the data I took to a technique used within qualitative
study called typology. Typology is a classificatory system for ways of doing something (Tracy,
2013, p. 211). This technique helps researchers to take bigger concepts and connect it to the
smaller concepts that relate to the study. Typologies can make up a subset of the analysis (as
33
was the case for this study) or frame an entire study (Tracy, 2013, p. 211). An example of this is
type of framework was carried out by Orbe and Allen (2008) when trying to find out how
matters of race were studied and articulated throughout articles in the Journal of Applied
Communication Research (JACR). Using articles that were written over the course of 22 years
the authors developed a race scholarship typology of six different genres of race scholarship.
They found that most JACR articles fell under a genre called “White scholarship” and were able
to note that there was a lack of articles that discussed the “ experiences of people of color and
Whites are multidimensional, similar and different, and inextricably linked” (p. 206). This
technique helped to place information into the separate categories (or themes) for the current
study.
Decision Criteria
Each piece of discourse analyzed had to have the following characteristics to be
considered for the study: 1) Represent a response from official UC administrative leader, 2)
pertain to the ideal of campus racism and 3) respond to the crisis presented by the death of
Sam Dubose. These types of discourse were chosen because studies have shown that out of
college students polled nationwide 72 percent of students are checking their emails daily, while
73 percent of college students prefer the internet for information searching rather than the
library (Jones, 2008). It is also important to note that UC’s President has over 58,000 followers
on his Twitter account (Twitter, 2015). This information was taken into consideration when
choosing the types of discourse to use throughout the study. While there were a total of 59
34
pages of discourse collected, only those that fit the criteria listed above were used for analysis
resulting in 10 pages of charts (see Appendices A-E).
Self-Reflexivity and Confirmation
My current status as a graduate student at the University allowed me to look at the data
in a self-reflexive manner. As offered by Macbeth (2001), reflexivity leads the analyst to take up
the knots of place and biography and to deconstruct the dualities of power and antipower,
hegemony and resistance, and insider and outsider to reveal and describe how our
representations of the world and those who live there are indeed positionally organized (p. 38).
Being able to provide the lens as a Black student within the institution helped me to provide a
stronger counterargument to the master narrative presented within the discourse. Also
suggested by, Emmanuel et al. (2004), reflexivity is the act of continuous and iterative reading
and listening to the data with a reflective consideration for self, subjects cross-checking and
context to provide transparency in the data analysis process. With this in mind, in order to
maintain dependability throughout my analysis, a stepwise replication of my coding process
was completed by my advisor to ensure confirmation of the results.
35
Chapter 4
Analysis
This chapter will present the findings of the current investigation. The findings are reflective of
the discourse mentioned throughout the methods section (for reference: UC’s President, Santa
Ono’s Twitter posts; university-wide emails sent from administration (particularly the
President’s office); and the UC Safety and Reform website). Charts that help arrange the
discourse are included in the appendix. This chapter will present quotes and excerpts from
discourse that reflects the responses of UC’s administrative leadership. These findings help to
explore the usage of situational crisis communication theory to interrogate a predominantly
White institution’s response to a campus racial crisis through the following four specific
research questions:
1) To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of denying the racial crisis?
2) To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of diminishing the racial crisis?
3) To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of rebuilding during the racial
crisis?
4) To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of reinforcing during the racial
crisis?
36
The analysis is organized according to the four categories of response arranged according to the
previously mentioned four research questions, and driven by data found within the discourse.
The categories are: (1) denial, (2) diminish, (3) rebuild and (4) reinforce. Across the categories a
total of twelve thematic subheadings emerged which are outlined within SCCT. More
specifically, each category included two to four thematic subheadings as shown in table 4.1.
Prior to the breakdown of each section and category mentioned above there will be a brief
analysis of the crisis type and level followed by a presentation of the base strategies enacted by
UC administrative leadership in response to the crisis.
RQ #
1
Table 4.1 Emergent Categories and Themes
Research Questions
Categories
To what extent does UC
Deny
administrative leadership’s
response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis
communication (SCCT) strategy of
denying the racial crisis?
Themes
• Scapegoat
• Denial
• Ignore
2
To what extent does UC
administrative leadership’s
response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis
communication (SCCT) strategy of
diminishing the racial crisis?
Diminish
•
•
•
Excuse
Justification
Separation
3
To what extent does UC
administrative leadership’s
response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis
communication (SCCT) strategy of
rebuilding during the racial crisis?
Rebuild
•
•
Apology
Compensation
4
To what extent does UC
administrative leadership’s
response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis
Reinforce
•
•
•
•
Bolstering
Ingratiation
Victimage
Endorsement
37
communication (SCCT) strategy of
reinforcing during the racial crisis?
Establishing Type and Level of Crisis
Before presenting the analysis of discourse it is important to establish what type of crisis
the following is considered in reference to SCCT. As mentioned in the literature review, there
are three types of crises within SCCT: victim, accidental, and preventable. Because this crisis
involves a human error accident (shooting of Sam Dubose) and requires a high level of
responsibility (became a part of a national issue) it is considered “preventable”. This is also
suggested within the executive summary of the Kroll Report which is included on the
University’s Safety and Reform website. The Kroll Report (2015) states that “The fatal shooting
of Samuel Dubose during an off-campus traffic stop on July 19 never should have occurred. This
incident, which resulted in a tragic loss of life, was entirely preventable” (p. 6).
The high level of responsibility that this preventable crisis presents is further
distinguished by the crisis history at the institution. Again as mentioned in chapter two, UC has
a high level of similar type crisis history that involves the death of Black men and the university
police department. Knowing that this crisis is considered preventable type matched with a high
level of responsibility, we must further seek to understand the “intentionality of crisis”. This
concept is borrowed from Zdziarski, Rollo, and Dunkel (2007), who suggests that crises are
either unintentional or intentional. An unintentional crisis occurs by accident and is unexpected
or develops a result of an unexpected action (i.e. workplace injuries, sports injuries). An
intentional crisis occurs by deliberate action as an individual or group purposely take steps to
cause the event that has an impact on others and is further characterized by at having at least
38
one victim and one perpetrator (p. 43). The current analysis reveals the murder of Sam Dubose
as an intentional crisis, as well as being preventable and presenting a high level of
responsibility.
Base Responses
It was also noted in chapter two that SCCT recommends before an organization (or in
this case institution) attempts to address a crisis using the 4 response strategies it must first
employ the base responses of: instructing and adapting information. The analysis presented
that the instructing information (what action steps stakeholders should take for protection)
within the discourse to be: 1) the body cameras held all truth to the event so allow the story to
be told and no individual responsibility has to be taken. The adapting information is as follows:
1) direct corrective action will be enacted (ex: firing of Officer Ray Tensing), 2) action of
emotion will be enacted immediately (ex: creating an on-campus exhibit for expression, healing
conversations, forums). These base responses were vital pieces of information the UC
administrative leadership shared with internal and external audiences to employ an immediate
response. The subsequent sections provide an in-depth analysis of the discourse as it relates to
SCCT.
Category One: Deny
As shown forth in table 4.1, category one, corresponds with RQ#1 and is “Deny”. The
chart used to organize and analyze the discourse within this category is located in Appendix A.
Discourse within this category relate to the strategy of deny found within SCCT. Coombs (2007)
suggests that this strategy is offered as a primary response because it should serve as a first
“answer” when responding to crises if needed. The deny response strategy is considered when
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seeking to establish a crisis frame by attempting to remove any connection to the crisis and the
organization. Those who employ the “deny” strategy try to deny the truth of the matter or
refute what is being considered as immoral conduct enacted by the organization. If this frame is
accepted by stakeholders, media, and the audience in which the response is intended for then
the organization’s reputation is not harmed.
Throughout this analysis the category deny was enacted through response strategies
such as: “Scapegoat”, “Denial” and “Ignore”. The use of the “Scapegoat” theme shows that the
university attempted to deny the act of wrong doing on their part at certain points throughout
Sam Dubose’s murder and the events that trailed thereafter. This is considered a primary
response strategy that was not deemed as successful to the campus community and the
university’s audience nor stakeholders as it was not accepted the way it was framed. The
“Denial” theme is an example of UC administration trying to assert that there is not a problem
and is used in conjunction with “Ignore”. The “Ignore” theme reveals that the university did not
focus on one deny response strategy and attempted to enact this strategy more than once. This
is similar to what was posited by Fisher Liu (2010) in her application of SCCT when she
introduced “ignore” as a possible deny response strategy. It has since not been accepted into
the SCCT structure, but is considered in the current analysis.
Scapegoat
This theme reflects the way the UC administration tried to remove the connection of the
crisis from the university. From the beginning, administration attempted to hand the crisis over
to the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) as protocol and to take the heat off of the university.
Administrative responses also attempted to place blame on other city and state personnel for
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any discrepancies that resulted in the investigation of the murder of Sam Dubose. For instance,
when the indictment of Officer Ray Tensing was to be released and tensions were high on
campus and its surrounding community, UC decided to close early for the day. An email sent to
the UC community stated the following:
The University of Cincinnati will cancel all classes on the Uptown and Medical campuses
at 11:00 a.m. today including all classes in session at that time. Offices on these
campuses also will close at 11:00 a.m. This decision is made with an abundance of
caution in anticipation of today’s announcement of the Hamilton County grand jury’s
decision regarding the July 19 officer-involved shooting of Samuel Dubose and the
release of the officer’s body camera video.
Greg Vehr, UC’s Vice President for Governmental Relations and University Communication and
University Spokesperson, released a statement reiterating the above message saying:
The safety of our students, faculty, staff and visitors is our top priority. As an abundance
of caution, we decided to close our Uptown campuses at 11 a.m. We want to assure the
UC and Cincinnati community this is precautionary only. Because we are a state
university we are working with state safety officials…
Due to the fact that the University’s explanations for doing so was followed up with such
assurance that it was due to safety reasons and not fully their own doing, it leads one to believe
they were attempting to “deny” the real reason was because they felt people would react with
protest. UC administration’s target audience in the above message was to the internal campus
community to inform those on campus and those with intent to travel to campus that it would
be closed. Lawson (2007) suggests that it is important for administrators to take the time to
understand how each target audience can affect the communication process. I posit that it is
more important to understand how the communication process may affect the audience.
Sending a message of “denial” may bring about feelings of distrust and anger to the Black
community and those who stand in opposition to the decisions offered by administration. The
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attempt to “deny” the role of the institution in making this decision only highlights that this
community was not considered a target audience throughout the message and confirms that
the “safety” of those discussed speaks to the majority. In short, in an attempt to make the
majority feel safe, the audience left out felt more marginalized. This is further explained by
Lawson (2007) as a “vacuum”, which is when some of the internal audience is forgotten and
there is an absence of information that leads to speculation.
Denial and Ignore
These themes were both enacted by the University President, Santa Ono, when he
tweeted in regards to the “welcoming” nature he understood Cincinnati to have. While there
are obvious racial tensions persistent throughout the Cincinnati community, which had been
acted out in the very own community Ono has leadership control over, he attempted to “deny”
and “ignore” these tensions in a tweet sent right after the murder of Sam Dubose that read:
I don't for a moment understand the view that Cincinnati does not welcome
newcomers. It's the most welcoming place I've ever lived.
This comment is subjective to President Ono’s own experience and inconsistent with what the
community affected by the Sam Dubose murder has expressed. Lawson (2007) reminds us that
consistent messaging is vital as inconsistent messaging can and will increase anxiety. It can be
assumed that anxiety will further point out speculation and as further suggested by Lawson
(2007) may undermine the credibility of an institution’s experts. These types of actions from
someone who is understood to be under hyper-surveillance during a crisis can be detrimental
to the overall voice that the institution is trying to maintain. President Ono denying the fact
that there are prevalent issues within the community is not good for the university. In fact it
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may imply that the institution is ignoring the perspectives of those deeply affected by the
murder of Sam Dubose.
The persistent demand for change within the community reveals that what is being
stated by Ono is not consistent with the community’s response to the crisis. The consequence
of inconsistencies between internal and external audience responses, which can lead to an
understanding of ineffective leadership from the outside community, is discussed through
McCaffery’s (2004) suggestion of “knowing your institution”. He notes that to be an effective
[leader] you must have a keen appreciated of the distinctive features and nuances of your
institution (p. 28). It can be argued that in the example given above, a distinctive feature of UC
is the relationship with the surrounding community. Ono’s comments provide an understanding
of his personal perception that is very different from those within the community showing that
as President he is not in touch with those who he serves.
Category Two: Diminish
The second category, which corresponds with RQ#2 was “Diminish” (see Table 4.1). The
chart used to organize and analyze the discourse within this category is located in Appendix B.
Discourse within this category relates to the strategy of diminish found within SCCT. Coombs
(2007) offers this strategy as a response to argue that a crisis is not as bad as people think or
that the organization lacked control over the crisis (p. 171). In order for this response to be a
success the audience and stakeholders must accept existing frames that are seen as valid.
Harmful effects may be reduced if the organization successfully presents a frame that
dissociates them from the crisis.
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Throughout this analysis the category diminish was enacted through response strategies
such as: “Excuse” and “Justification”. The “Excuse” strategy shows that UC administration
attempted to argue the reason for the murder of Sam Dubose and the events that took place
after. This is also considered a primary response as once the strategy is used and fails it loses
validity and the institution starts to lose credibility. The “Justification” strategy was utilized
more frequently by UC administrative leadership and highlights their attempt to make light of
the situation and to build a frame that supports the institution lacked control over the murder
of Sam Dubose. These two response strategies were used in tandem throughout many
examples noted in the discourse allowing the two at times to work synonymously. Fisher Liu
(2010) suggested another response strategy of diminishing through her application of SCCT in
regards to racially charged crises called “Separation”. This strategy is enacted when an
organization or institution attempts to disconnect themselves from the responsible parties
within their organization (p. 343). This strategy was also identified within the current
investigation, more specifically being used in conjunction with other diminish response
strategies.
Excuse
This theme reflects the way that UC administrative leadership tried to reduce their lack
of intent and/or volition in the crisis. This enactment of the “Excuse” strategy is suggested by
Coombs (2007). The university attempted to do so throughout the Safety and Reform website
when the following message was posted:
The University was fully ready to release the video to the public. However, the Hamilton
County Prosecutor determined that the video would not be released until the
prosecutor’s investigation was complete and the grand jury had rendered its decision.
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President Ono also asked the prosecutor to allow the family to view the video prior to
the grand jury decision.
The above example clearly highlights the University’s attempt to make an excuse for the
video not being released to the public. One can argue that this is also an example of the
aforementioned deny response strategy “Scapegoat”. However, Coombs (2007) recommends
to avoid mixing the deny response with diminish strategies as it will erode the effectiveness of
the overall response (p. 173). With that being said, because of the fact that the community
looked to the University of Cincinnati and particularly the UC Police Department (UCPD) as the
primary responsible party, this is more so an excuse as to why the video was not being released
as promptly as expected. The act of placing the blame on the Hamilton County Prosecutor is the
“Excuse” the university made in an attempt to subside speculation of misinformation in regards
to the video and the overall investigation. This excuse was further justified by the President in a
Tweet that read:
I have encouraged the Hamilton County Prosecutor to share the incident video with
Samuel Dubose's family in view of their requests.
The President is trying to reiterate the “Excuse” response strategy in this example and ensure
the community and those in opposition that it was not the intent of the university to withhold
important information. At this moment the University’s goal was to instill trust and the
President wanted to remind the community of the overall volition of UC administration. The
above examples also employ the usage of the “Separation” response strategy. The delay of
the video being made public presented a conflict of transparency to the already developed
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crisis and UC administration wanted to separate the speculation that this brought back to the
University.
The “Excuse” response strategy is exemplified similarly throughout the Kroll Report
which is also found on the University’s Safety and Reform website. The report presented a
comprised summary from the top-to-bottom review of UCPD and the Sam Dubose murder
case. The report offers the following statement:
Rather than de-escalating the encounter and allowing DuBose to drive away and
subsequently calling in a request for assistance, Tensing escalated the situation by
improperly reaching into the car in an attempt to restrain DuBose. This violated
standard police practice.
Like the above example, this statement is highlighting the volition and intent of wrong doing by
Officer Tensing as an individual in order to “Excuse” the UCPD as a whole. This use of the
“Excuse” strategy neglects to take into account the prior history of UCPD at the university and
did not succeed in providing any new affirmations to the target audience, hence the further
speculation.
Justification
This theme reflects the many ways that UC administrative leadership attempted to
remove the severity of the crisis by either lessening the role that the University or UCPD made
in the systems that allowed for Sam Dubose to be murdered. The following example comes
from the Kroll Report mentioned earlier that was posted to the University’s Safety and Reform
website:
Tensing's initial tactics, demeanor, and approach in addressing DuBose were
appropriate.
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This excerpt highlights the “Justification” response that the report enacted investigation. It is
important to note that the firm (Kroll) was hired by the university and essentially became a
stakeholder once that partnership was made. However, as an outside group Kroll’s goal should
be to help lessen the attributes of the institution to already prominent stakeholders of the
university. Their role as stakeholder (benefitting off the institution’s reputation) may or may
not have provided the institution with a biased report that should be taken into consideration.
For example, the theme of “Justification” is used again to attribute less responsibility of
the crisis to the institution. In the following excerpt provided by the Kroll Report there is an
attempt to diminish the traffic stop overall:
Officer Tensing conducted a lawful and justified traffic stop ... His actions were
authorized by UCPD policy, state law and the Memorandum of Understanding with the
City.
This response was not accepted by stakeholders as the City of Cincinnati later suspended the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which at one point allowed UCPD to make such traffic
stops outside of campus areas. This example is further justified by the university in a response
to a Q&A found on the Safety and Reform website:
UC has a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the City of Cincinnati. This
agreement permits UC police officers to patrol neighborhoods surrounding the
university’s Uptown Campus.
There is a reiteration of the same information being presented through different avenues to
help diminish the “bad” reputation in which UCPD attracted from the crisis. UC administration
continuously attempts to diminish the idea that UCPD is unqualified by justifying that Officer
Tensing does not represent the whole, this may also be considered an attempt to enact the
alternative diminish response strategy of “Separation”.
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As discussed previously, many of the response strategies within the “diminish” category
were utilized in tandem throughout the discourse presented in UC’s administrative responses
to the Sam Dubose murder crisis. The following excerpts found within the discourse provide
examples of the usage of both the “Excuse” and “Justification” strategies at the same time. In
doing so the institution is trying to further diminish the crisis and decrease the responsibility of
the University. This is important to the institution because as Coombs (2006) reminds us, “the
more responsibility stakeholders attribute to the organization the more the crisis response
strategy must seem to accept responsibility for the crisis. For instance, there were two officer
statements provided by UCPD personnel (Officer David Lindenschmidt and Officer Phillip Kidd)
that initially claimed that they “witnessed” Officer Tensing being dragged by Sam Dubose’s
vehicle causing commotion and the reaction to shoot him. However, in order to ensure that the
frame presented making Officer Tensing ‘solely’ responsible for his own actions and not a full
representation of the UCPD, the following was determined in the Kroll report:
Officer Kidd made some initial statements on the scene of arguably questionable
credibility … Nevertheless, his subsequent detailed statement to CPD and to Kroll
reasonably clarified more precisely what he did and did not see in the first few seconds
of when he arrived on the scene.
This attempt to “Excuse” and make “Justification” of the Officer’s initial comments is a
response strategy to help lessen the attributions of UCPD and provide the university with less of
a responsibility to the crisis as well. This statement was in complete contrast to what was
provided in an official police report filed on July 20th that read, “Officer Kidd told me that he
witnessed the Honda Accord drag Officer Tensing” (Weibel, 2015). It was then further justified
and excused in an attempt to remove all responsibility from the second officer who provided a
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statement. The Kroll report exclaimed that the officer was honest and truthful and released the
following:
Officer Lindenschmidt appeared to have answered all questions put to him truthfully
and accurately.
President Santa Ono wanted to further “excuse” the actions of the officers and “justify” the
University’s decision to fight to have UCPD continue patrolling the areas in the manner in which
had done so prior to the murder of Sam Dubose. While sending condolences through UC Email
the following statement in regards to the crisis:
We also know that police officers risk their lives every day, and when their efforts to
protect themselves and our community result in a death, it is a tragedy.
The intent of this email was to express regret to the campus community and in doing so it is
expected that the institution is accepting responsibility. However, following up with
“justification” and “excuse” is what Coombs (2006) recommends against, because as
stakeholders start to attribute more responsibility to the institution, the more the crisis
response strategy must accept that responsibility for the crisis.
Category Three: Rebuild
The third category, which corresponds with RQ#3 was “Rebuild” (see Table 4.1). The
chart used to organize and analyze the discourse within this category is located in Appendix C.
Discourse within this category relates to the strategy of rebuild found within SCCT. Coombs
(2006) offers this strategy as a way for organizations to rebuild legitimacy and protect their
reputation (p. 249). This is enacted by changing the perception of the organization during the
crisis by presenting new and positive information about the organization and reminding
stakeholders of past good works (Coombs, 2007). Legitimacy is inevitably linked to reputation,
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because as legitimacy decreases the likelihood of stakeholder’s perception (reputation) will
decrease as well (Coombs, 2006, p. 249). Crises that have high reputational threats such as an
intentional or accidental crisis involving a prior crisis history or bad reputation will require this
response most frequently.
Throughout this analysis the category rebuild was enacted through response strategies
such as: “Apology” and “Compensation”. The “Apology” response strategy shows that UC
administrative leadership struggled with taking responsibility for the crisis at first. There were
delayed attempts in sending condolences to the family and this may or may not have caused
speculation of sincerity. The “Compensation” response strategy shows that UC administrative
leadership was mostly focused on rebuilding the institution’s legitimacy and therefore their
reputation by allocating funds that provided new positions and initiatives focused on diversity.
Apology
This theme reflects the ways in which UC administrative leadership expressed regret or
concern (Coombs, 2006) to the target audiences. This response strategy was mostly enacted by
President Santa Ono, however, his initial response was delayed. The first apology was sent two
days after Dubose had been shot via UC Email stating:
On behalf of the University of Cincinnati community, I want to extend our condolences
to the family and loved ones of Samuel Dubose. Our hearts grieve for his loss.
Although this response sent regret to the family, it was previously noted that regardless of the
situation there was a loss of life and considered a “tragedy” (Ono, 2015). The delay in response
did not help to imply that UC administration considered it as such. In fact, the institution
received backlash for the delay and resent another UC Email reiterating the above message.
The statement is very similar yet directly acknowledges the mother of Sam Dubose:
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Our hearts go out to Mr. Dubose’s mother, family and loved ones. We mourn with them
relative to this heartbreaking loss of life.
After relaying this message President Ono met with the family and expressed the following in
an email to the UC community:
Once again, I want to extend our thoughts, prayers and condolences to the family and
loved ones of Samuel Dubose. I was able to talk to his mother and other family
members today to express our deep sorrow in person.
Throughout the previous apologies President Ono continuously sends condolences to
the family of Sam Dubose. However, he neglected to send apologies to the UC community most
likely because the institution wanted to decrease responsibility. Instead he apologizes on behalf
of the university. Lawson (2007) identifies two target audiences at an institution during a crisis:
internal and external. The constituents that fall into each audience are organic to the
institution. For the purpose of this analysis we will focus on internal audiences which include:
students, faculty, staff, administrators, and relatives and friends of the victim. While continuing
to update the campus community on regrets sent to the family President Ono neglected to
send an apology to the rest of the internal audience which is vital in the communication
process.
In a very indirect way, UC administrative leadership provided a statement of sincerity
that was targeted to the rest of the internal community. Within a week and a half of the murder
administration created a webpage where information and updates would be provided to the
campus community. The webpage was hyperlinked onto the University’s website and tagged
vaguely as “July 19 Incident”. The following message was sent by President Ono via UC Email to
make the UC community aware of the update:
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We know that many of you want to be kept informed of the developments related to
the events of July 19. I hope the link below will be very helpful to you during this difficult
time.
This attempt to inform the campus community was not a direct apology and this is where UC
administrative efforts failed. This led to more speculation and distrust from the internal
community and was more comforting to the external audience (i.e. stakeholders, media, and
general public) than those most affected. Lawson (2007) suggests a special crisis link on the
University’s Web page to be effective in informing internal audiences. However, the use of this
tactic does not permit administrators to assume that internal audiences are less important or
already “in the know” and that they are not in need of a direct apology.
Compensation
This theme reflects the ways in that UC administrative leadership provided ‘compassion’
in which Coombs (2006) outlines as an attempt to rebuild by offering money or other gifts to
the victims or their family. Administrative responses throughout the analysis revealed that UC
attempted to allocate funds back into the university providing many examples of
“Compensation”. For example, the University’s Safety and Reform website made an
announcement throughout the summer that new appointed positions would be made for the
upcoming semester. President Ono’s first appointed position was Criminal Justice professor, Dr.
Robin Engel. The website posted the following announcement:
University of Cincinnati President Santa J. Ono today announced that he has appointed
internationally respected criminal justice researcher Robin Engel to the new role of vice
president for safety and reform.
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The budget for Dr. Engel’s new position was factored into a six-hundred and fifty thousand
dollar expenditure on new appointed positions. Her salary is estimated to equaling to a little
over two-hundred thousand of that grand total (WCPO, 2015).
In a similar response monies were allocated out of the six-hundred and fifty thousand to
appoint a new Public Safety Director, James Whalen, and a Director of Police Community
Relations, Gregory Baker. The following statement announcement was sent out in a UC Email to
inform the campus community of the newly appointed positions:
President Santa J. Ono has approved the appointment of two new positions related to
safety and policing. James Whalen has been appointed Director of Public Safety and S.
Gregory Baker as Director of Police Community Relations.
This example of “compensation” aligns closely with the rebuild response strategy as Coombs
(2007) identifies such attempts as “main avenues for generating reputational assets” (p. 172). It
is further maintained by Lawson (2007) that it is important to communicate what initiatives the
university is taking to ensure that a crisis of this type does not happen again.
President Ono enacted this response further when he charged the Chief Diversity Officer
to create a group to recommend to new & enhanced programs for UC's under-represented
students. This effort of “Compensation” was enacted by investing monies into diversity
initiatives to increase the percentage of African American students. While this was prompted
by the crisis, which involved Sam Dubose being murdered, this particular response was in
reaction to the 8 percent of African American students at the university standing up in
protest. Jolly (2005) reminds us that a major cost of crises may be boycotts and/or protests.
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In response to the more vocalized groups within the campus community, and the push from
the external local community, UC administration enacted by providing a budget and timeline
for diversity and inclusion efforts. This statement was found within a UC Email sent through
the ‘Faculty and Staff’ directory:
As a part of the University’s Creating Our Third Century strategic plan, we are investing
more than $40 million in building, supporting and sustaining our faculty diversity
initiatives.
This statement was followed up utilizing similar response strategies as above. These particular
‘Faculty and Staff’ emails and were not shared in the same fashion on the University’s Safety
and Reform website:
At my request a planning committee has been formed to review the space needs of the
African American Cultural and Resource Center.
This was enacted as an attempt to respond to African American students, faculty and staff at
the university who exclaimed that the resource center for African Americans is not equipped for
the success of such student populations. Similar initiatives for increasing the efforts of diversity
and inclusion are coupled in the statements below found within the same UC Emails:
Provost Beverly Davenport is creating three university-level, nationally competitive, fully
funded URM fellowships for doctoral students.
We are excited to announce a new $4 Million investment in hiring six tenured faculty
members whose research, teaching and scholarship will focus on opportunities and
challenges facing urban areas.
Graduate School Dean Marshall Montrose has indicated that we are investing $1 million
this year in the Yates Graduate Scholarship Program to increase both the number and
amount of funding available for URM graduate students who study at UC. Going
forward, this additional funding will support the addition of 25 new Yates Graduate
Scholars to our campus each year.
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Each of these responses was enacted throughout the rebuild response by using the
“compensation” strategy. You see over and over again a reiteration of critical messages being
presented to the audience. Some of this information was resent out depending on how much it
added to the reputation of the institution. For instance, President Ono tweeted the following:
I have asked the University Architect to work with a group of UC students to discuss
future plans for a renovated or new AACRC.
The University of Cincinnati will invest $1 million this year in 25 new graduate
scholarships within the Yates Graduate Scholarship Program.
Both of these were included in the emails sent out and speak highly to the ways in which UC
administration’s focus on diversity and inclusion has shifted since the murder of Sam Dubose. It
is also important to note as to whom the administrative leadership considers as constituents of
the target audience when using the response strategy such as “Apology” and how that
audience differs in the use of “Compensation”.
Category Four: Reinforce
The fourth category, which corresponds with RQ#4 was “Reinforce” (see Table 4.1). The
chart used to organize and analyze the discourse within this category is located in Appendix D.
Discourse within this category relate to the strategy of reinforce found within SCCT. The
response strategies found within this response are considered to be secondary responses.
Strategies within this response most often will deal with the art of adjusting information and
should be considered as supplements to the above three primary response strategies (Coombs,
2007). If this response is used correctly as a supplement to primary response strategies, it can
help to reduce the affect that the crisis presents for the organization. For example,
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organizations may “reinforce” the “compassion” shared by victims through “compensation”
and “apology”.
Throughout this analysis the category reinforce was enacted through response
strategies such as: “Bolstering”, “Ingratiation”, and “Victimage”. The “Bolstering” theme was
enacted by UC administrative leadership to remind the internal and external audiences within
the campus community what past initiatives and efforts the university has done to increase
diversity and inclusion. UC administration also placed a heavy focus on previous plans to
increase the presence of officers on and around campus along with specifics in regards to
training and hiring practices by reinforcing what they have already done. The “Ingratiation”
theme was utilized by efforts of praising certain stakeholders, departments, and/or individuals
that helped to better the reputation of the university during the crisis. The “Victimage” theme
was used less frequently, but nonetheless it was enacted by the university in their initial
responses. Another response strategy not currently a part of SCCT was identified as well.
Similar to what Fisher Liu (2010) has recognized as “Endorsement”, UC administration
employed efforts of endorsing certain activist groups and community members throughout
their crisis responses. As mentioned previously, the “reinforce” response strategy is used as a
supplement and this analysis provides examples of such usage exemplified through UC
administration’s discourse.
Bolstering
This theme reflects the ways in which UC administrative leadership reminded target audiences
of what President Ono has implemented and how successful specific initiatives and decisions
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were. For example, in response to the request to dismantle UCPD and restrict them from their
patrols off campus UC posted the following on their Safety and Reform website:
Crime around UC’s Uptown campus is at a 10-year low. Total crime has decreased about
30 percent from 2004 to 2014. Violent crime is down 55 percent during that same time
period, while robberies have decreased by 57 percent and property crime by 28
percent. In the spring of 2013 UC developed a strategic plan to guide the university’s
public safety priorities and planning.
This statement was a reiteration of what was outlined in the Kroll Report which stated:
[Patrols] have substantially increased police visibility and been a contributing factor to
the steady reduction in crime in the area.
These examples employ the “Bolstering” strategy and align with what Coombs (2007) presents
as a strategy to counter-balance the current negatives from the crisis (p. 172). By reminding
target audiences of what good work has come out of UCPD and their patrolling, one would
concur that they are needed within the campus community.
Administration also chose to utilize this strategy in response to the video of Sam Dubose
being shot. The body cameras on each officer helped to present what actually happened the
day of July 19th. UC administration “bolstered” the fact that the university had such technology
and issued the following statements on the University’s Safety and Reform website:
The university is an early adopter of body cameras. Many forces, including municipal
police departments, don’t yet use them. The use of body cameras is a proactive step to
ensure transparency in support of patrolling beyond our campus borders.
The University of Cincinnati is among the first campus police departments to use bodycameras.
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This message was reiterated yet again, however, with a stronger focus on prior police training
efforts:
Before this tragedy, UC had already begun to engage in a process of providing additional
training to its police related to field training, urban policing, use of force, bias,
procedural justice and Title IX.
These examples provide a backdrop for rebuilding trust within the campus community in
regards to police relations, as well as repairing the image that had been built of UCPD from the
crisis. As posited by Coombs (2007) “Bolstering” offers a minimal opportunity to develop
reputational assets. This may provide insight as to why UC administration chose to utilize this
tactic as a supplemental response strategy.
President Ono enacted the “Bolstering” response strategy by focusing on a different
target audience. While receiving pushback from external community partners, as well as
internal minority lead student groups, Ono decided to focus his attention on the students,
specifically the Black student population. He tweeted the following statistics “Bolstering” the
increasing successes in regards to African American students at UC:
Undergraduate student retention at UC is 88% with the retention of African American
students at 90%.
The # of African-American students matriculating at UC has increased 25% over last
year.
Providing these statistics on Twitter was a strategic response to again remind the campus
community of what UC has been doing. When taking a look at past statements provided on
Ono’s twitter no account of similar activity was presented. This is clearly an example of a
reaction to the crisis presented by the murder of Sam Dubose.
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Ingratiation
This theme reflects that way in which UC administration gave praise to stakeholders and
campus partners in order to reinforce and maintain partnerships. This response strategy is
enacted because as suggested by Coombs (2007) it may generate some good will during a crisis
(p. 172). The critical discourse analysis highlights the tensions and partnerships among UC,
UCPD, CPD (Cincinnati Police Department), Black UC (United Coalition), and the student group,
Irate8. This response strategy was most frequently utilized by President Ono on his Twitter
account. The following are a series of Ono’s tweets that represent the theme:
Talking with Mayor Cranley today about public safety. City and university collaboration
is key, as it has always been.
UC will cooperate fully with the Hamilton Co prosecutor and CPD investigation to help
ensure a swift process.
These responses were echoed throughout the UC Email and the Safety and Reform website as
well:
As we approach the beginning of the school year and students are returning to the
university and the surrounding area, we are partnering with the Cincinnati Police
Department to provide for safety needs.
Under Dr. Ono’s leadership, the City of Cincinnati and UC also have worked
collaboratively together with Duke Energy to enhance street lighting in areas around
campus.
All of these responses exemplify the strategy of “ingratiation” as the university
attempted to maintain relationships with the City of Cincinnati and CPD. These relationships are
important as UC is the City’s only public higher education institution and a lot of investments
have been contributed from the local community. CPD and UCPD also created a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) permitting patrols outside of the internal campus community that
59
since the Sam Dubose murder has been revisited and remains unsettled. The MOU is an
example of what Lawson (2007) discusses as “mutual aid agreements” between on and offcampus responders, such as firefighters, and usually help to establish command responsibility,
confer appropriate enforcement authority, and specify certain financial obligations (p. 129).
In regards to the internal community, UC administration chose to respond to target
audiences such as students and minority faculty and staff. Again, the focus on this specific
internal community was an integral part of the “rebuild” response and was reinforced in many
ways. The following are examples of the reinforce response strategy “Ingratiation” presented
throughout President Ono’s tweets:
Thanks to the #Irate8 for your leadership.
Thank you #irate8 and our faculty and staff for this great event.
Today I received a very thoughtful and useful set of recommendations from BlackUC.
Thanks for your hard work. I look forward to discussing.
I'm looking forward to reading and working together.
President Ono’s tweets enact this response strategy by simply praising these groups for the
work they have contributed to creating an environment of inclusive excellence. The Irate8 is
comprised of undergraduate and graduate students throughout the UC campus community
and was created in response to the murder of Sam Dubose. Their primary goal is to “raise
awareness of the experiences of Black students at the University of Cincinnati, and how they
connect with the #BlackLivesMatter movement nationally” (Irate8.com). Black UC (United
Coalition) acts as a similar entity, but involves more of a perspective from faculty, staff and
community members. These two groups are considered target audiences for UC administration
60
and essentially have direct effect on the communication responses therefore require
immediate focus and attention from the institution.
Victimage
This theme reflects the way in which UC administrative leadership reinforced Officer
Tensing as the victim in the crisis. This response strategy served as the initial response from
the institution and was only discovered once within the analysis. The following excerpt
highlights the report sent via UC Email to the campus community in regards to the status of
Officer Tensing after the event took place:
The UCPD officer suffered minor injuries and has been treated and released from the
hospital.
Although considered an initial response, this strategy was presented as a supplement to the
response stating that Tensing had been dragged by Dubose’s car. This immediately leads one to
believe the murder may be an act of self-defense. Coombs (2007) suggests that being
considered as victim evokes sympathy on the organization. Once the body camera videos were
released this response was not accepted by the public presenting more responsibility to the
institution.
Endorsement
This theme reflects the way that UC administration employed the reinforce response by
“Endorsing” certain activist groups and community partners. This response strategy is not
currently listed within the framework of SCCT. However, it has been referenced in SCCT
literature (see Fisher Liu, 2010) and the current analysis provides distinctive examples that
reflect the usage of its strategy. For instance, there were moments that President Ono
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attempted to enact the reinforce response through “ingratiation” by praising certain campus
partner yet, in the following tweet he is “endorsing” the same groups as listed above:
I support the work of irate8. Thanks for your courage and dialogue about making UC a
more inclusive institution.
It is clear that President Ono is endorsing the Irate8 here which is different than the examples
of praise above. He enacts this strategy similarly when asked questions on his Twitter about
the campus African American Cultural and Resource Center (AACRC):
Absolutely AACRC is extremely important.
This example highlights the “endorsing” efforts of the AACRC and identifying as what Fisher Liu
(2010) considers a “third-party” supporter. Doing so helps to reinforce positive attributions and
relationships to and with the university. The most direct example of this is when Ono was asked
if he would claim that “Black lives matter” and he tweeted the following:
I believe #Blacklivesmatter and look forward to building a more inclusive community.
All of these examples reinforce what UC administrative leadership has done to deny,
diminish, and rebuild the university after the murder of Sam Dubose. As offered by Coombs
(2006) and Fisher Liu (2010) reinforce response strategies must be used in conjunction with
another to enhance effectiveness.
Emergent Strategies
Recruitment
This strategy is not considered a strategy by SCCT, nor has it been included in recent
literature in regards to crisis response strategies. However, the current analysis provided many
examples of UC administration enacting “Recruitment” as a possible secondary response
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strategy. Although this strategy is not considered a theme the amount of examples provided
makes it worth acknowledging within the analysis (See appendix E). “Recruitment” was enacted
by UC administrative efforts to target specific audiences throughout the local community in
order to attract prospective students. The following are all tweets from President Ono which
exemplify “recruitment” responses:
Happy that 85 Walnut Hills High School seniors and 2 teachers visited us at University
of Cincinnati.
2000 prospective students and parents will be visiting UC tomorrow.
We are excited that almost 1,000 high school students in Cincinnati now take UC classes
through College Credit Plus.
Each of these responses reflects the ways in which President Ono is responded to the current
crisis in regards to the magnitude of discussion being had over enrollment percentages,
retention, and most importantly recruitment. The above examples express the efforts that UC
administration is doing to ensure that as enrollment increases so does the diversity at the
institution. This response strategy did not present a negative effect on UC administrative
leadership and could most certainly be considered a response to the current campus racial
crisis and maybe even added to the SCCT model.
Selective Support
This strategy is also not considered by SCCT, nor does it show up in recent crisis
response literature. “Selective Support” can be argued in being similar to response strategy
“Ingratiation” and even suggested strategy of “Endorsement”. Yet, the difference in the three is
that “selective support” is a strategy in which the chosen speaker for the institution enacts by
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choosing whom to show support to. However, this strategy unlike the others can be very telling
of who is in the best interest of the individual as well as the institution. For instance, the
following tweets were made by President Ono referencing Cincinnati’s local suburban high
school in effort to show support:
Mason High School is very, very important to University of Cincinnati.
The partnership is very important to UC. Lots of love to Mason.
The use of this strategy is important as recruitment efforts were targeted at
underrepresented communities during the crisis it is imperative to ensure that dominant
communities felt supported as well. Ono’s response to Mason highlights the University’s
attempt to choose to show selective support to a specific community whose reciprocated
relationship is beneficial to the institution.
Targeting Fear
Another strategy that emerged within the analysis is the response of “Targeting Fear”.
This response strategy is also not considered by SCCT and was enacted both indirectly and
directly to evoke the sense of fear in regards to disciplinary actions. The first example is from
a UC Email that was sent from President Ono to the campus community when raciallycharged comments surfaced on an anonymous social media platform called Yik-Yak. The
obscene comments shared were derogatory to the Black community and even threatened the
livelihood of such individuals. President Ono shared the following statement “targeting fear”
of those who would be found held accountable:
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I have asked for an immediate investigation into a particularly offensive post and will
look after the safety of our students.
In the same token, while targeting fear of the responsible party, UC administrative
leadership’s response provided comforted to those who took the comments offensively.
This is much different than the response that was enacted a few months prior by
Assistant Vice President and Dean of Students, Denine Rocco, when she “targeted fear” of
students whom administration felt could damage the institution’s reputation. Just a few days
before the first home football game of the season and back in the newly renovated Nippert
Stadium, Rocco sent out an email to the student body that stated the following:
With our first home football game approaching this weekend, many students, alumni,
and guests will be returning to campus and Nippert Stadium….any student guilty of
aggravated rioting, rioting, failure to disperse, or misconduct, may be ineligible to
receive student financial assistance supported by state funds.
Administration’s attempt to highlight the importance of the game and alumni and essentially
target a group of students in their message created further distance in regards to rebuilding a
community. In fact, many felt that by “targeting their fear” and practice extortion UC
administrative leadership were insinuating behavior that was not considered. This response
strategy was not only used inappropriately, but it can be argued that it was also unethical to
make such reaching claims during a campus racial crisis.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This chapter will serve as the conclusion for the current analysis. After revisiting the
conceptual framework, the chapter will introduce a brief discussion of each category presenting
the major findings as they relate to the research questions. Following this section there will also
be a brief discussion that outlines what it means to restore “peacefulness and calmness” after a
racial crisis at a predominantly White institution taking into account conceptual
recommendations that were developed upon reviewing the analysis. Further recommendations
will be proposed in regards to addressing campus racial crises which involve a new strategy to
be considered called “Reengineering”. This strategy can serve as both a response for SCCT and
as a preventative tool along with community engagement. The chapter will conclude by
acknowledging limitations to the current study and providing suggestions for further research
as well as theoretical and practical implications.
Review of Conceptual Framework
This study used situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) as a conceptual
framework to investigate how University of Cincinnati’s (UC) administrative leadership team
attempted to respond to a campus racial crisis. SCCT response strategies are enacted by an
institution to minimize their reputational threat, which can be detrimental to the institution’s
reputation if no action is taken. The theory outlines 4 types of strategies for response that were
located within the analysis: deny, diminish, rebuild and reinforce. These responses categories
helped to create the research questions which guided the study and are reflected within each
of the four questions found below in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2
RQ #
1
Research Questions
To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of denying the racial crisis?
2
To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of diminishing the racial
crisis?
3
To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of rebuilding during the racial
crisis?
4
To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of reinforcing during the
racial crisis?
Discussion of RQ # 1
To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of denying the racial crisis?
The analysis provided findings that highlighted the ways in which UC administrative
leadership used denying in the following ways: “scapegoat”, “deny”, and “ignore”. These
response strategies show that the University’s initial reaction was to place the responsibility of
the crisis off to other parties such as Cincinnati Police Department and other city and state
personnel. These findings also help to support the use of the “ignore” strategy (not currently a
part of SCCT) which was posited by Fisher Liu (2010) and essentially adds to the current
literature. The university choose to enact the deny and ignore response simultaneously by
attempting to convey that the City of Cincinnati did not have a prevalent race issue that
prompted certain communities to feel “unwelcomed”. In doing so, the university lead
audiences to speculate further as to what responsibility that administration would take and did
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not successfully deploy the response strategy. The analysis did not show any usage of the deny
response strategy of “attacking the accuser”.
Discussion of RQ #2
To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of diminishing the racial crisis?
The analysis provided findings that highlighted the ways in which UC administrative
leadership used diminishing in the following ways: “excuse”, “justification”, and “separation”.
The use of these response strategies show that the university wanted to deflate the attention
from the crisis that presented a reputational threat. UC administration used the excuse and
justification responses to bring more attention to Officer Tensing so that UCPD’s overall
reputation would not be tarnished and in turn justify the importance of campus police. Findings
also help to support the usage of “Separation” as a SCCT response strategy. Fisher Liu (2010)
posited this response strategy in her research on racially charged crises and it has since not
been recycled throughout literature involving SCCT. This study reveals it as an alternative
diminish response that can be used in conjunction with other response strategies. However, the
current investigation presents that UC administration failed to enact these strategies
successfully. This is exemplified throughout their attempt to utilize such strategies of deny and
diminish simultaneously, which is cautioned against (Coombs, 2006), as neither strategy allows
the university to accept responsibility for the crisis.
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Discussion of RQ #3
To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of rebuilding during the racial
crisis?
The analysis provided findings that highlighted the ways in which UC administrative
leadership used diminishing in the following ways: “apology” and “compensation”. The
university made several attempts to apologize to the family (internal audience), but neglected
to formally apologize to the rest of the internal audience (campus community: i.e. students,
faculty, and staff). By allocating funds create and promote diversity initiatives the university
deployed the compensation response strategy. UC administrative leadership at times left out
important internal audience members. Although Lawson (2007) understands the attempt to
reach out to all groups as an “arduous task” it is important to note how this affected the
relationship between the university and the audience who as a result felt neglected prompting
protests, demands, and organization against the University’s initiatives.
Discussion of RQ #4
To what extent does UC administrative leadership’s response to campus racial crisis
reflect situational crisis communication (SCCT) strategy of reinforcing during the racial
crisis?
The analysis provided findings that highlighted the ways in which UC administrative
leadership used reinforcing in the following ways: ““bolstering”, “ingratiation”, and “victimage”
and “endorsement”. The reinforcing response became one of the most frequently used
69
strategies as presented by UC administrative leadership. The institution continuously bolstered
the statistics of crime prevention enacted by UCPD to help rebuild the image that was given
due to the crisis. Directing attention onto other important statistics such as the increasing rates
of African American students in regards to retention was also a reinforcing response used by
President Ono. This was again enacted in conjunction with efforts to praise stakeholders and
endorse certain internal campus groups. In doing so, UC administration attempted to repair the
damage caused by the crisis by using all aspects of the reinforcement response. The only
response strategy that was used minimally throughout the discourse was victimage. This is
most likely due to the fact that crisis was considered a preventable type and presented the
institution with severe reputational threats. Inevitably these response strategies are not a
“universal code” in regards to addressing campus racial crises, but do offer a template for
responding to the issue. The most important aspect that campus administration should lean
towards is solidifying an understanding of what the University’s overall goal of responding to
the crisis will be in advance and developing a plan that will be sustainable throughout.
Seeking “Peacefulness and Calmness”
Griffin (2007) posits that an integral component of a college or university crisis
management plan is a crisis intervention program that encompasses psychological services for
the healing of the campus community. He offers three goals to the crisis intervention program
which are: 1) timely restoration of physical safety and emotional security for those most
severely affected, 2) helping people in crisis cope and adapt to their experience, 3) responding
effectively to the incident in the context of the larger community (p. 152). These goals are what
70
I consider if achieved effectively, to assist in restoring “peacefulness and calmness” throughout
the campus community. By keeping these goals in mind while dealing with a crisis, an
institution can help strengthen efforts of a response employed by SCCT. College and universities
are entities that are driven by cost and production. While there is a focus on stakeholder
relationships and reputation at risk when a crisis develops, it is important not to forget that
there is an internal audience that is directly affected and needs just as much attention, if not
more. The current study has revealed that the goals of the university may not always align with
that of the campus community, yet, it is the responsibility of the administrative leadership team
to become aware of all target audiences and take their views into consideration. Advanced
planning of a crisis intervention program to use during future crises that may develop is
important to restoring “peacefulness and calmness” among the campus community.
Conceptual Recommendations
Recruitment
The current analysis revealed a response strategy that has not recently been considered
as a part of SCCT literature. “Recruitment” was deployed by UC administrative leadership as
both a rebuild and reinforcement response. The reputational threat posed by the campus racial
crisis revealing the low statistics of African-American students and faculty had a direct effect on
the ways that UC administration responded. Hoffman and Summers (2000) suggests that
representative distribution in students, faculty, staff, and leadership will be the symbol of
institutional sensitivity and commitment to diversity (p. 182). UC’s attempt to respond with
efforts of recruitment is in direct correlation increasing diversity. This response strategy was a
71
big part of the current study and suggests that when dealing with campus racial crises it may
enhance long-term goals of both rebuilding and reinforcing. As supported by Hoffman and
Summers (2000), in an effective college or university every major decision must be taken with
attention to the long-term development of the institution and service to diverse constituencies
(p. 182). Recruitment is offered as a response that can provide long-term sustainable results if
deployed with other SCCT response strategies.
Steering Clear of Selective Support and Fear
While “Recruitment” is suggested as a positive addition to SCCT response efforts, it may
be recommended to be careful when using other strategies that emerged in the analysis such
as: “Selective Support” and “Targeting Fear”. It was shown forth that these strategies can end
up backfiring on the institution and creating more of a divide rather than addressing the
situation in an effective manner. By showing of support to select audiences there is too much
room members of the community to have to choose a side, either for or against. This
polarization can be detrimental when the institution is trying to restore “peacefulness and
calmness” among the whole. During a crisis, as much synergy as possible is recommended so
that SCCT response strategies such as “rebuilding” and effective recruitment can occur.
It is also recommended to steer clear of the use of “targeting fear” as a response
strategy. Playing on the fear of others is unethical and can further promote a divide among
those who are needed to restore “peacefulness and calmness”. UC administrative leadership
enacted this strategy by creating an outcast community within their own internal audience. This
is not effective in strengthening the campus climate and therefore inadequately addresses the
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crisis. In order to begin addressing the issues of campus racial crises in an effective manner,
institutions should incorporate positive additions to the SCCT model and be inventive in
responses that are unique to their college campus. This may involve thinking outside of the box
and challenging traditions that are in place which affect the campus climate.
Reengineering
Another recommendation comes from a concept found within organizational literature
that is referred to as “reengineering”. Focusing on the way it is suggested to fit the current
study, Tierney (1999) maintains that reengineering means making implicit values explicit and
challenging cherished notions of “how we do things around here”. It also helps an
organization’s participants rethink the academic organization. Most importantly, three things
that reengineering is not are: it is not total quality management; it does not overlook or destroy
an organization’s culture; and it is not a quick fix (p. 26). In other words, reengineering seeks
dramatic change instead of improving what is already in place and questions the status quo all
while understanding things will not happen overnight. In addition to the already considered
response strategies offered by SCCT, this concept may provide sustainable results that benefit
the campus community both before and during campus racial crises.
So many of our response strategies seek to repair the institution’s image and maintain
or rebuild the reputation. Reengineering, however, seeks to respond to the crisis over a period
of time allowing for long-term results. Tierney (1999) offers five ways of thinking about the
organization: 1) systems analysis, 2) innovation and experimentation, 3) permeable
organizational structures, 4) cultural audits, 5) shared knowledge and ideology (p. 27). Systems
73
analysis means thinking of problems out of isolation, which allows for us to see how issues
relate to other areas of concern to better provide long-term results. While the ability to
experiment with new ideas and the notion of being rewarded for new contributions leads to
innovation. Reengineering our organizational structures to be more permeable allows for those
who are mostly affected by the decisions being made a part of the decision-making process,
which lessens the level of control and reluctance. By far the most effective aspects of the
proposed way of thinking as it relates to campus racial crises are the ideas of cultural audits and
shared knowledge and ideology. Cultural audits allow for the institution to be reflective and
reexamine the work to constantly improve what is being done. While providing the opportunity
to gain a sense of shared knowledge allows for the entire institution to see what is being done
and for individuals to experience their own role in creating change.
Crisis Prevention Plan
Reengineering is not only an effective response strategy during the crisis, but is an
appropriate addition to a crisis prevention plan. Preventative measures are an important aspect
to ensuring that crises do not develop and if they do occur having a plan for what may come
about allows leaders to better address the situation. As offered by Rollo and Zdiarski (2007),
campus administrators must consider the threats and risks in both the internal and external
environments by completing an assessment or audit of types of crises that may develop (p. 75).
I would suggest that this process could be enacted by utilizing the “reengineering” strategy
prior to campus crises happen. This can allow for more preparedness and understanding of
what consequences there may be for campus racial crises.
74
This brings about the idea of “community engagement”. In reference to developing a
crisis prevention plan for campus racial crises leaders must take into consideration the
relationships with the internal and external communities. Institutions cannot create a
preventative plan that considers the risks of these communities and not have them be a part of
the developmental process. Community engagement can not only strengthen the moral
between neighboring communities, but will also provide a diverse range of perspectives to the
crisis prevention plan. The current study revealed that the dissonance within both internal and
external communities created a further divide in regards to how the university should address
the crisis. Table 4.3 positions “reengineering” and “community engagement” as tools for
structuring a successful crisis prevention plan that will hopefully prevent such issues from
arising.
Table 4.3
Reengineering
Crisis
Prevention
Plan
Community
Engagement
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Implications
Theoretical
The theoretical implications of this study add to the literature of crisis communication in
three ways. First, it provides a further examination of racially charged crises. Crisis
communication literature has neglected include the strategy of SCCT and as a result there is
limited examples in current works. Second, this study uses SCCT to further understand how it
can be deployed as a framework for addressing such crises. Fisher Liu (2010) provided a
foundation for studying racially charged crises using SCCT by looking at these crisis types that
developed within educational institutions, entertainment media, and politics. The current study
revealed that the use of SCCT can be successful if enacted correctly. It is also important to note
that while this framework is useful for responding to campus racial crises , it can be
strengthened by developing a broader response as situations are not isolated to just one racial
group and/or institution. Also, this study uniquely develops both a preventative and rethinking
tool by considering the strategy of “reengineering” within the SCCT framework. Third, this study
advances scholarship by conducting a critical discourse analysis of various forms of discourse as
a means of revealing distinctive themes. The use of this method instead of a commonly used
content analysis allowed for more critical interpretation of an issue that has yet to be explored
in depth. In sum, this study not only adds to the literature of crisis communication, but also
confirms SCCT as a valid theory to use as a framework for studying racial crises and reveals a
discursive perspective that allows for critical analysis to occur.
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Practical
In line with the theoretical implications, this thesis contributes to the realm of Higher
Education and recognizes a phenomenon that has plagued traditional structures since the
beginning of civilization, racism. By acknowledging that this issue is not isolated to any space,
this thesis has revealed that it is in fact an issue of Higher Education and while there is not a
singular strategy for campus racial crises- it is time for a revolution in thinking and most
importantly, a time for a response. This type of crisis is distinctive from other crisis types that
the institution may encounter as they further marginalize certain individuals who are a part of
the internal and external audiences. The lack of response from campus administration in
regards to such crises highlights that there needs to be a plan of action that caters to the
specific characteristics of crises that are racially charged. This study argues for a change in the
way that Higher Ed administrators both view and respond to campus racial crises. The findings
contribute to a broader conversation about microaggressions inside the campus community
and acknowledge how they are essentially consequences of the macroaggressions that take
place within the external community and society as a whole. These notions attest to the value
of studying response strategies in order to understand how to better address campus racial
crises.
Limitations and Future Research
While this thesis notes the critical aspects of specific exemplar discourse produced by
UC administrative leadership, there are limitations to the claims that one can draw from this
analysis. An examination of the specific categories of responses deployed throughout the
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discourse emphasized the usage of situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) as the
primary concept when completing the analysis. Yet, other responses strategies were enacted by
UC administrative leadership that were not discussed outside of the current framework. While
some discussion was provided for examples that did not fit within the SCCT framework, it
should be noted that not all pieces of discourse provided examples worth recognizing. For
example, the strategy of co-option was enacted within the current study as University of
Cincinnati hired new individuals and created new roles for Safety and Reform efforts, however,
these efforts fir more appropriately within other response strategies. Other examples of cooption were also discussed as they aligned strongly within the framework of SCCT. Student
activist groups such as the Irate8 was created as a response from those who felt opposed to
administrations’ response. As a result the University co-opted the ideologies and demands that
the students requested be considered and developed working relationships from within. These
examples are best highlighted as ingratiation and bolstering responses and were not considered
within the framework of co-option.
Additionally, this study was also limited in the scope of discourse that was considered.
Upon completion of the study new developments occurred and UC administration enacted
several response strategies that could add to the current study. With this in mind it would be of
interest to increase the scope of the research past the first semester after the incident to better
gauge the success of UC administrative responses. Due to the fact that this is an ongoing court
case, trial proceedings and testimonies would garner new responses from the institution.
78
Finally, this study has been a critical analysis of discourse and other methods could be
employed to gain results that could be further compared to the findings here. For instance, in
the future I would seek to provide narratives from faculty, staff, and students at the university
which would be obtained by conducting interviews and/or focus groups. The information
provided from this process would serve as counternarratives to the discourse presented within
the current study. This too would increase the validity in determining whether or not
administration’s responses were successful or not in regards to the campus racial crisis.
Future research would also take into consideration paradigmatic sensitizing constructs
such as: genuine empathetic listening, empowerment of change agents, and institutional
structural transformation. These constructs may add the success of response strategies for
campus administrative leaders that would be distinctive for situational crises of racially charged
events. Future work may be implemented practically by using these constructs to develop
programs that allow for administration the opportunities to engage with students, faculty, and
staff to hear genuine concerns in the form of “lunch-talks” and panel discussions that invite
administrators to listen to student experiences. These discussions provide a unique lens for
administrators as they begin to act as change agents for the communities in which they serve.
This is exactly what Higher Education institutions need in order to enact sustainable structural
transformation.
Final Thoughts
As noted in the introduction and throughout, administrative leaders have the biggest
affect on influencing diversity and inclusion education on college campuses. With that said,
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preventative measures should be considered to avoid issues of racial campus crises. Aside from
having crisis prevention program it is important that administration understand the role of
community engagement and expose themselves and the university to diversity. This means
going further than the diversity within the internal campus but also engaging with outside
entities and becoming aware of how these structures affect the campus community as a whole.
Doing so can create more opportunities for courageous conversations to occur and the
formation of diverse partnerships which may help to prevent campus racial crises from
developing. More importantly, before issues do arise the latter provides a platform for open
communication which allow for the campus community to respond more effectively.
As we move forward, we must encourage are administrators to enact change and
provide spaces for permeable conversations with all audiences. We must move past the
obsession with containment and speaking through means of optics, but rather from a place of
genuine concern that seeks peacefulness and calmness to resolve systemic issues that enable
racially charged crisis types from happening on our college campuses. It is only then, when we
have a plan of action which holds everyone accountable for implementing change that we can
move towards a safe and nurturing environment for all of our students
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Appendix A- Deny Response Examples
Discourse
Safety and reform (Greg
Vehr)
UC Email
Ono Tweet
Excerpt
The safety of our
students, faculty, staff
and visitors is our top
priority. As an
abundance of caution,
we decided to close our
Uptown campuses at 11
a.m. We want to assure
the UC and Cincinnati
community this is
precautionary only.
Because we are a state
university we are
working with state
safety officials…
The University of
Cincinnati will cancel all
classes on the Uptown
and Medical campuses
at 11:00 a.m. today
including all classes in
session at that time.
Offices on these
campuses also will close
at 11:00 a.m. This
decision is made with an
abundance of caution in
anticipation of today’s
announcement of the
Hamilton County grand
jury’s decision regarding
the July 19 officerinvolved shooting of
Samuel Dubose and the
release of the officer’s
body camera video.
Description
Denying the fact that it
was their decision to
close, blaming it on state
officials (Scapegoat)
I don't for a moment
understand the view
that Cincinnati does not
welcome newcomers.
It's the most welcoming
place I've ever lived
Denying Example of
ignore making light of
the situation; an obvious
racial tension present
within the city
86
Denying (Scapegoat)
Direct Action
University closes at
11a
Appendix B- Diminish Response Examples
Discourse
UC Email
Kroll Report
Kroll Report
Kroll Report
Kroll Report
Kroll Report
Excerpt
We also know that police officers
risk their lives every day, and when
their efforts to protect themselves
and our community result in a
death, it is a tragedy.
"Officer Tensing conducted a lawful
and justified traffic stop ... His
actions were authorized by UCPD
policy, state law and the
Memorandum of Understanding"
with the city.
Description
Justification and excuse
This was sent forth with
the “condolences”
Direct Action
Justification from the
report in response to the
excuse that Tensing
rightfully pulled over Mr.
Dubose. With no regard
to his (Tensing’s traffic
stop history; attempting
to play down his intent
of wrong doing)
"Tensing's initial tactics, demeanor,
and approach in addressing DuBose
were appropriate."
"Rather than de-escalating the
encounter and allowing DuBose to
drive away and subsequently
calling in a request for assistance,
Tensing escalated the situation by
improperly reaching into the car in
an attempt to restrain DuBose.
This violated standard police
practice."
Justification for the
pulling over of Sam
Dubose
Example of excuse: not
UC’s fault- inability to
control crisis effects and
what happened it was all
Dubose
UC President
Santa Ono
ordered his police
to stop patrolling
off campus, and
city council
suspended the
Memorandum of
Understanding
that allowed UC
police to do it
Officer Kidd made some initial
statements on the scene of
arguably questionable credibility …
Nevertheless, his subsequent
detailed statement to CPD and to
Kroll reasonably clarified more
precisely what he did and did not
see in the first few seconds of
when he arrived on the scene
Officer Lindenschmidt appeared to
have answered all questions put to
him truthfully and accurately
Excuse- deny the intent
of wrong doing and tries
to justify his actions of
misinformation
87
Excuse and justificationhe agreed to the fact
that Dubose car dragged
Tensing and that was
later refuted and proven
Kroll Report
"does not appear to have been the
result of any official policy or
directive of the UCPD."
Safety and
reform
The University was fully ready to
release the video to the public.
However, the Hamilton County
Prosecutor determined that the
video would not be released until
the prosecutor’s investigation was
complete and the grand jury had
rendered its decision. President
Ono also asked the prosecutor to
allow the family to view the video
prior to the grand jury decision
“I have encouraged the Hamilton
County Prosecutor to share the
incident video with Samuel
Dubose's family in view of their
requests
UC has a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the City
of Cincinnati. This agreement
permits UC police officers to patrol
neighborhoods surrounding the
university’s Uptown Campus
Ono Tweet
Safety and
Reform
88
wrong through video and
determined by Joe
Deters
Justification in regards to
the heightened number
of traffic stops; yet does
not dispute results of
Tensing’s record
Excuse
The video later
becomes
public…Tensing is
indicted due to
the fact
To further provide
justification in above
example
Trying to justify the
reasoning for patrolling
in the vicinity Dubose
was murdered
July 20th the
University
temporarily
suspended until
further notice offcampus patrols
Appendix C- Rebuild Response Examples
Discourse
UC Email
UC Email
UC Email
UC Email
UC Email
Excerpt
On behalf of the
University of Cincinnati
community, I want to
extend our condolences
to the family and loved
ones of Samuel Dubose.
Our hearts grieve for his
loss.
Our hearts go out to Mr.
Dubose’s mother, family
and loved ones. We
mourn with them
relative to this
heartbreaking loss of
life.
We know that many of
you want to be kept
informed of the
developments related to
the events of July 19. I
hope the link below will
be very helpful to you
during this difficult time.
Description
Apology- first reaction was
denial (victim)- 2 days later
an apology- video had not
been released to public
Once again, I want to
extend our thoughts,
prayers and condolences
to the family and loved
ones of Samuel Dubose.
I was able to talk to his
mother and other family
members today to
express our deep sorrow
in person
President Santa J. Ono
has approved the
appointment of two new
positions related to
safety and policing.
James Whalen has been
appointed Director of
Public Safety and S.
Gregory Baker as
Apology
89
Direct Action
Email sent to UC
Community 2 days
after incident
Apology
Apology
Compensation for new
positions
“July 19 Event” Web
link/page was
created
2 new
appointments made
and allocation of
funds for safety and
reform
Ono Tweet
Ono Tweet
Ono Tweet
Safety and Reform
UC Email
Director of Police
Community Relations
I have asked the
University Architect to
work with a group of UC
students to discuss
future plans for a
renovated or new
AACRC
I have charged the Chief
Diversity Officer to
convene a group to
recommend to me new
& enhanced programs
for UC's underrepresented students
The University of
Cincinnati will invest $1
million this year in 25
new graduate
scholarships within the
Yates Graduate
Scholarship Program
University of Cincinnati
President Santa J. Ono
today announced that
he has appointed
internationally respected
criminal justice
researcher Robin Engel
to the new role of vice
president for safety and
reform.
Graduate School Dean
Marshall Montrose has
indicated that we are
investing $1 million this
year in the Yates
Graduate Scholarship
Program to increase
both the number and
amount of funding
available for URM
graduate students who
study at UC. Going
forward, this additional
funding will support the
90
Example of compensatefor all of the attention not
given to this office prior
and the neglect to minority
campus partners
Example of compensatetaking recommendations
and providing funding to
new minority student
initiatives
URM
Example of compensateproviding funding and
implementing minority
student initiatives
Minority
scholarships
Compensation to provide
salary for new position
Hiring of VP for
Safety and Reform
Compensation
$1mil investment to
Graduate school
(None of which is
found on the safety
and reform website
FAQ page)
UC Email
UC Email
UC Email
UC Email
addition of 25 new Yates
Graduate Scholars to our
campus each year. This
new additional
investment requires
initial funding from
graduate students' home
departments.
Provost Beverly
Davenport is creating
three university-level,
nationally competitive,
fully funded URM
fellowships for doctoral
students.
At my request a planning
committee has been
formed to review the
space needs of the
African American
Cultural and Resource
Center.
As a part of the
University’s Creating Our
Third Century strategic
plan, we are investing
more than $40 million in
building, supporting and
sustaining our faculty
diversity initiatives
We are excited to
announce a new $4
Million investment in
hiring six tenured faculty
members whose
research, teaching and
scholarship will focus on
opportunities and
challenges facing urban
areas.
91
(None of which is
found on the safety
and reform website
FAQ page)
Compensation
Plans to renovate
and/or rebuild the
AACRC. (None of
which is found on
the safety and
reform website
FAQ page)
Strategic Hiring
Opportunity
Program; The Dual
Career Assistance
Progam; and the
Cluster Hiring
Program (None of
which is found on
the safety and
reform website
FAQ page)
Urban Features
Cluster
Appendix D- Reinforce Response Examples
Discourse
UC Email
Excerpt
The UCPD officer suffered
minor injuries and has
been treated and released
from the hospital.
UC Email
As we approach the
beginning of the school
year and students are
returning to the university
and the surrounding area,
we are partnering with the
Cincinnati Police
Department to provide for
safety needs.
“UC will cooperate fully
with the Hamilton Co
prosecutor and CPD
investigation to help
ensure a swift process”
“Talking with Mayor
Cranley today about public
safety. City and university
collaboration is key, as it
has always been”
Ono Tweet
Ono Tweet
Ono Tweet
Ono Tweet
Ono Tweet
Description
Initial reaction to
shooting was to take the
victim stance in hopes of
Tensing’s story being
true
Ingratiation- to ensure to
“parents” CPD
partnership is there as
they have developed a
more trusting stance in
community since
shooting
92
Update on campus
safety
Example of ingratiationkeeping good with city of
Cincinnati
Example of ingratiationkeeping good with city of
Cincinnati
Example of bolsteringreminding community of
what good things in
reference to diversity
they have enacted
Undergraduate student
Example of bolsteringretention at UC is 88% with reminding community of
the retention of African
what good things in
American students at 90% reference to diversity
they have enacted
Absolutely AACRC is
Example of bolsteringextremely important
reminding community of
the love for AA
community (in response
to AA alumni tweet; also
The # of African-American
students matriculating at
UC has increased 25% over
last year
Direct Action
President Ono and
Goodrich have also
decided to create a
community
advisory group to
work directly with
the UC Police
Department
Ono Tweet
I believe #Blacklivesmatter
and look forward to
building a more inclusive
community
Ono Tweet
Thanks to the #Irate8 for
your leadership
Ono Tweet
I support the work of
#Irate8. Thanks for your
courage and dialogue
about making UC a more
inclusive institution
Thank you #irate8 and our
faculty and staff for this
great event
Ono Tweet
Ono Tweet
I'm looking forward to
reading and working
together
Ono Tweet
The partnership is very
important to UC. Lots of
love to Mason
Ono Tweet
Today I received a very
thoughtful and useful set
of recommendations from
BlackUC. Thanks for your
hard work. I look forward
to discussing
"have substantially
increased police visibility
and been a contributing
factor to the steady
reduction in crime in the
area."
Kroll Report
Safety and Reform
The University of
Cincinnati is among the
first campus police
93
ingratiation)
Example of ingratiationkeeping good with
minority campus
partners and bolstering
what is to come
Example of ingratiationkeeping good with
minority campus
partners
Example of ingratiationpraising minority campus
partners to create and
maintain working
relationships
Example of ingratiationkeeping good with
minority campus
partners (referring o the
teach-ins that were
organized by the irate8.
Example of ingratiationpraising minority campus
partners to create and
maintain working
relationships
Example of ingratiationkeeping good with
community partners
(stakeholders)
Example of ingratiationpraising minority campus
partners to create and
maintain working
relationships (rebuild?)
Bolstering the fact that
growing the UCPD from
45 to 75 officers over a 4
year period was an
effective decision and
helps to justify the
reasoning for more
traffic stops
Bolstering
Developed a plan to
have students sit on
committees
Safety and reform
Safety and Reform
Safety and Reform
Safety and Reform
departments to use bodycameras
Before this tragedy, UC
had already begun to
engage in a process of
providing additional
training to its police
related to field training,
urban policing, use of
force, bias, procedural
justice and Title IX
October 2014. The
university is an early
adopter of body cameras.
Many forces, including
municipal police
departments, don’t yet use
them. The use of body
cameras is a proactive step
to ensure transparency in
support of patrolling
beyond our campus
borders.
Under Dr. Ono’s
leadership, the City of
Cincinnati and UC also
have worked
collaboratively together
with Duke Energy to
enhance street lighting in
areas around campus.
Crime around UC’s
Uptown campus is at a 10year low. Total crime has
decreased about 30
percent from 2004 to
2014. Violent crime is
down 55 percent during
that same time period,
while robberies have
decreased by 57 percent
and property crime by 28
percent. In the spring of
2013 UC developed a
strategic plan to guide the
university’s public safety
priorities and planning.
94
Bolstering
Bolstering
Bolstering-However, this
is contradictory to the
idea of having more
security as increased
lighting provides extra
surveillance. Also, this
has nothing to do with
Sam Dubose
Bolstering
Body cam is what
helped to indict
officer tensing
Phase II “lighting”
initiative
(Thill and Rice –
Dubose site- were
not included)
Appendix E- Other Response Examples
Discourse
Ono Tweet
Excerpt
Mason High School is very, very
important to University of Cincinnati
Ono Tweet
Happy that 85 Walnut Hills High
School seniors and 2 teachers
visited us at University of Cincinnati
Ono Tweet
2000 prospective students and
parents will be visiting UC
tomorrow
The partnership is very important
to UC. Lots of love to Mason
We are excited that almost 1,000
high school students in Cincinnati
now take UC classes through College
Credit Plus
Ono Tweet
Ono Tweet
95
Description
Talks a lot about relationship
importance with suburban school
districts-parents who pay children’s
tuition (ingratiation?)
Relationship with partnering schools.
Brings these “stakeholders” to campus,
yet takes time to visit Mason (affluent)
schools
Same day/time as Yik Yak posts were
made
Stressing the importance of partnership
with this stakeholder
Interesting to see how many of those
are Black and what schools they are
from