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Political Behavior, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 2005 (? 2005)
DOI 10.1007/s 11109-005-3076-7
DECISIONDEMOCRATIC
DELIBERATION,
MAKINGAND INTERNAL
POLITICAL
EFFICACY
Michael E. Morrell
Empirical research into the possible positive consequences of deliberation increasingly
reveals that there is a complex relationship between deliberation and its effects on
citizens. In this experimental study I examine the relationship between internal
political efficacy and one type of deliberation: deliberative decision-making. I also test
whether different structures of decision-making mediate between deliberation and
internal political efficacy. The data suggest that deliberative decision-making had no
direct effect on a global measure of internal political efficacy. Participants in face-toface deliberative decision-making, though, had higher scores on a situation-specific
measure of internal political efficacy than participants who only voted. The structures
of decision-making had no effect on either measure of internal political efficacy. These
results support claims that deliberation will not necessarily lead to direct, positive
effects on citizens' internal political efficacy, but they also highlight the likelihood that
face-to-face deliberation can lead citizens to feel more competent in their deliberative
abilities.
Key words: deliberation; deliberative democracy; internal political efficacy; situationspecific political efficacy; democratic theory.
Drawing upon a review of the empirical research on the effects of
democratic deliberaiton, John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse conclude that "real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively, can
exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials among those deliberating, can make people feel frustrated with the system that made them
Michael E. Morrell, Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut, 341 Mansfield
Rd, U-1024 Storrs, CT 06269-1024 ([email protected]).
49
0190-9320/05/0300-0049/0 ? 2005 Springer Science+Business Media Inc.
50
MORRELL
deliberate,is ill-suitedto manyissues, and can lead to worse decisionsthan
would have occurredif no deliberationhad taken place" (2002, p. 191).
Thus, they argue, "gettingpeople to participatein discussionsof political
issues with people who do not have similarconsernsis not a wise move"
(2002, p. 190). In a recent reviewessay, MichaelDelli Carpini,Fay Lomax
Cook, and LawrenceJacobstake a less pessimisticview of deliberation,but
they point out that "empiricalresearch on deliberativedemocracyhas
lagged significantlybehind theory"(2004, p. 316). Insteadof reachingthe
conclusionthat promotingdeliberationis not a wise move, they arguethat
it is more complexthan either theoristsor politicalscientistshave generally
imagined.The possiblepositiveeffects of deliberaitonare dependentupon
we need clearer
many factorsaboutwhich we have limited understanding;
investigationsto determine more precisely how and when deliberation
might be beneficialfor a democraticsystem. My aim is to clarifya small
piece of this puzzle by examiningthe effects of deliberationon internal
politicalefficacy.
In an earlier work, I demonstratedthat the structuresof democratic
participationand deliberationare likelyto affectcitizens'perceptionsof the
democratic decision-makingprocess (Morrell, 1999). Here I examine
whether these different structuresalso affect deliberation'sinfluence on
internalpoliticalefficacy.Internalpoliticalefficacyrefers to citizens'feelings of their own personalcompetenceto participatein politics (see Mattei
and Niemi, 2005), and scholarshave demonstratedthat it has important
consequencesfor democracyby influencingcitizens'politicalparticipation
(see e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, pp. 141-145). More recent
researchcontinuesto demonstrateits importancein understanding,to cite
just a few examples, the role of emotion in campaign involvement
(Rudolph,Gangl,and Stevens,2000), voter registrationand turnoutin the
United States (Timpone, 1998), and voter turnout in semicompetitive
electionsin China(Shi, 1999).Withouta sense of internalpoliticalefficacy,
citizens will likely become apatheticabout, indifferentto and disengaged
from the democraticprocess.
While the natureof my study requiresthat we interpretthe resultscautiously,the datasuggestthat deliberationcan havepositiveconsequencesfor
citizens'internalpoliticalefficacy.It is likely,though,that these effects are
neither guaranteednor as direct as deliberativetheoristsexpect.The structures of deliberationdo not matteras much as whethercitizensdeliberate
face-to-face,and deliberationwill probablyinitiallyincrease situationally
specificinternalpoliticalefficacy.Ultimately,democratictheoristsand political scientistsshouldtake more seriouslythe questionof how positiveexperiences in specific deliberative situations can translate into broader feelings of
political competence.
ANDINTERNAL
DECISION-MAKING
POLITICAL
EFFICACY
51
DEMOCRATIC
DELIBERATION,
AND POLITICAL
DEMOCRATIC
DELIBERATION
EFFICACY
THEORY,
Researchers most often cite Carol Pateman's seminal work, Participation
and Democratic Theory (1970), as the theoretical basis for empirical research
connecting democratic theory and political efficacy. Pateman argues that "the
experience of participation in some way leaves the individual better psychologically equipped to undertake further participation in the future" (1970,
p. 45). John Stuart Mill provides a primary theoretical argument for one of
these psychological effects by claiming that direct participationby citizens in
political decision-making will develop in them the propensity to actively address the problems in their lives (1991, pp. 253-256). It is from this claim that
Pateman derives the connection to political efficacy: "the belief that one can
be self-governing, and confidence in one's ability to participate responsibly
and effectively, and to control one's life and environment would certainly
seem to be required (for an active character)...We shall therefore take the
sense of political efficacy or competence to be an operationalinterpretationof,
at any rate part of, the psychological effect referred to by the theorists of
participatorydemocracy" (1970, p. 46).' The crux of Mill's claim, though, is
that "[t]he maximumof the invigoratingeffect of freedom upon the character
is only obtained, when the person acted on either is, or is looking forwardto
becoming, a citizen as fully privileged as any other" (1991, p. 254). It is
primarilythe denial of full inclusion in all the privileges of citizenship that Mill
sees as tending to inculcate passive character;participationin deliberation, in
and of itself, does not have a strong relationshipto an active characterin Mill's
theory. Furthermore,we can safely conclude that there is little in Mill's theory
that argues for the positive effects of deliberation on internal political efficacy.
The reason Pateman does not distinguish between external and internal
political efficacy is that researchers only articulated the difference between
the two after she wrote Participation and Democratic Theory.
Researchers at the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center originally introduced the concept of political efficacy in their mid-twentieth
century studies of national elections in the United States. Campbell, Gurin,
and Miller defined efficacy as the "feeling that individual political action does
have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties" (1954, p. 187). Later researchers convincingly argued, though, that efficacy is not simply a unidimensional
construct (e.g. Balch, 1974). Instead, efficacy consists of at least two related,
but distinguishable, concepts: (1) external efficacy, which refers to citizens'
perceptions of the responsiveness of the political system to their demands, and
(2) internal efficacy, which refers to the citizens' feelings of personal competence "to understand and to participate effectively in politics" (Craig,
Niemi, and Silver, 1990, p. 290). Returning to Mill's claim, citizens to whom
the political system denies full access could, theoretically, still feel completely
52
MORRELL
capable of participating in it, for example African-Americansprior to the
passage of civil rights protections. It is also theoretically possible that those to
whom the political system gives full citizenship privileges may still not feel
personally competent to exercise those privileges. While I believe we can
legitimately claim that active citizens would have feelings of personal competence, we would have to finesse Mill's arguments to reach the conclusion
that his theory supports the connection between deliberation and internal
efficacy. There are some theorists, though, who have made this connection.
In his recent work on deliberative democracy, John Gastil posits a more
explicit relationshipbetween deliberation and political efficacy. He claims that
the "potential benefits of deliberation include more informed and reflective
judgments, a greater sense of political efficacy, and an increase in the frequency of political action" (2000b, p. 358). In outlining his proposal for using
deliberative citizen panels, one of his main goals is to combat "civic neglect," a
key component of which is self-efficacy:"When open and egalitarianpolitical
institutions are in place, civic neglect can still become widespread if citizens
lack the sense of efficacy and motivation necessary to use those institutions
effectively" (Gastil, 2000a, p. 29).2 He argues that "the citizen panel process
could have a restorative effect by graduallybuilding up citizens' deliberative
skills, interest in politics, and confidence in the electoral process" (Gastil,
2000a, p. 178). Beyond those who participate in the more formal citizen
panels, Gastil argues that "[n]onelectoralcivic deliberationwould complement
the citizen panel process by cultivating the very attitudes and aptitudes that
strengthen the public's vote and voice" (2000a, p. 185). Theoretically, then,
citizens who engage in deliberation get a training for democracy, and like
practicing an activity develops one's confidence in doing that activity, deliberation could increase citizens' confidence that they can understand and
participatein the political system. My research aims at examiningwhether this
is likely by testing deliberation's effects on internal political efficacy.
PREVIOUS
RESEARCH
Pateman'stheoreticalwork has been the impetus for most of the subsequent
research examining the connections between democratic theory and political
efficacy.Manyof these studies, though, have examinednon-deliberativeforms of
politicalparticipationsuch as voting, referendaand initiatives,campaignactivity,
protest, and partisan activism (e.g. Bowler and Donovan, 2002; Clarke and
Acock, 1989; Finkel, 1985, 1987; Stenner-Day and Fischle, 1992). Other
researchershave investigatedforms of participationthat are more direct, during
which it is likely that at least some deliberation occurred. Examining direct
participationin Americancities, Berry,Portney,and Thomson (1993), found that
even controlling for SES, face-to-face participation is strongly related to
efficacy,"and "is more closely related to internal than externalefficacy"(1993,
ANDINTERNAL
DEMOCRATIC
DECISION-MAKING
POLITICAL
EFFICACY
53
DELIBERATION,
p. 265).3 Once they employed a reciprocal model to test the direction of
causation,however, they found that while participationplays "a somewhat more
important role in influencing external political efficacy than efficacy plays in
determining participation",the same did not hold for internal efficacy. Greenberg's (1986) analysis of worker cooperatives in plywood companies in the
northwesternUnited States indicates that workers in participatorysettings did
not show greater feelings of political efficacy than those in non-participatory
workplaces,even after five years, though the study did not differentiatebetween
internal and external political efficacy (1986, p. 122).4 In a follow up study,
Greenberg,Grunberg,and Daniel found that in the workplacetwo variableshad
direct effects on respondents'internal political efficacy: direct participationin
workplace decisions and workers' sense of self-mastery (1996, pp. 318-319).
Since they did not measure the level of deliberationin the workplace,however,
this only provides indirect and inconclusive evidence that deliberation can
positivelyinfluence internalpoliticalefficacy.Mansbridge(1980) did not directly
examine the effects of deliberation in her studies of a New England town
meeting and a participatorycrisis intervention center, but she did compare
participantson a varietyof attributesand correlatedrespondents'scores on these
attributes with their scores on an index of political efficacy. For the town of
"Selby,"higher socioeconomic status and residing in the village were the only
two attributesthat correlatedsignificantlywith her index of local politicalefficacy
(Mansbridge,1980, p. 99). For the crisis interventioncenter, length of time in
the organization,physical proximityto the social center, and parents'socioeconomic status correlated significantlywith respondents reportingthemselves as
high in "say"and "power"(1980, p. 185).The difficultywith Mansbridge'sstudy
is disentanglingthe question of causalityamong these measures.While severalof
the attributesthat demonstratedrelationshipswith efficacy also correlatedwith
measures of participation, we cannot with confidence determine from this
that deliberation and higher political efficacy are causally related, and more
importantly,in which direction the causal arrowpoints.5
While most previous research has not directly examined the relationship
between deliberation and internal political efficacy, some evidence raises the
possibility that a positive connection may exist between the two. Gastil and
Dillard catalogue several qualitativestudies in which citizens who deliberate in
National Issues Forums (NIF) report an increased confidence in their abilities
to participate in politics (1999, pp. 186-187). Doble, Higgins, Begasse, and
Fisher, using reports from participants and interviews with moderators, give
anecdotal evidence that the NIF forums affect "people's sense of what they can
accomplish in their communities,""help people feel more efficacious and selfconfident," and allow people "to develop a public voice or sense of agency
while deliberating"(1996, pp. 39-40). Tom W. Smith reports that participation
in the National Issues Convention (NIC), a deliberative poll that took place
during the 1996 presidential election in the United States, resulted in "large
54
MORRELL
gains" in participants'sense of political efficacy (Smith, 1999, p. 54).6 Smith
derives his claim for large gains in political efficacy by examiningchanges from
the pre-test to the post-test in the percentage of respondents in each answer
category (agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, disagree
strongly,and don't know) for the five efficacy items, although he does not show
any analysis of what changes were statistically significant (see Smith, 1999,
pp. 54-55). There is some evidence, therefore, that democratic deliberation
may lead to increases in citizens' feelings of political competence.
Other studies raise doubts about these conclusions. Gastil found that adult
basic literary students who participated in NIF deliberation did not score
significantly higher on measures of self-efficacy, but did report statistically
significant "lower levels of group efficacy than non-participants" (2004,
p. 320).7 In a second study, Gastil discovered that participantswho had read
the NIF briefingbook prior to deliberationshowed higher levels of self-efficacy
than those who had not, but again the result was not statistically significant
(2004, pp. 323-324). Katherine Walsh found that data from participants in
what she calls "IntergroupDialogue Programs"(IDPs) "suggestsome evidence
of a positive effect on external efficacy, though the evidence is mixed" (2003,
p. 21). As for internal efficacy, she found no effects, in part because "IDP
volunteers tend to enter the programs with high levels of internal political
efficacy"(2003, p. 14).8If participantsin IDPs begin with high internalpolitical
efficacy, it would be difficult for deliberation to increase it even further.
In general, then, the evidence from prior studies on the relationshipbetween
deliberation and internal political efficacy is mixed at best. There have been,
however, two major difficulties in this area of research. First, very few studies
have examined specifically and systematicallythe relationship between deliberation and internal political efficacy. There is some anecdotal evidence from
the NIF forums that the relationshipis positive, while most of the evidence we
have, whether positive or negative, requires us to make inferences about
deliberation based upon various forms of participation.The two exceptions to
this are Gastil's(2004) study of adult basic literacy students and Walsh's (2003)
study of two SCRC dialogues, but this points to a second concern: none of the
research specific to deliberation has employed the measures of internal political efficacy that testing has shown to be reliable and valid (see Niemi, Craig,
and Mattei, 1991; Morrell, 2003). My aim is to specifically and systematically
test whether deliberation can positively affect internal political efficacy as
measured using these reliable and valid items.
TYPES
STRUCTURES
OF DECISION-MAKING
OF DELIBERATION,
AND SITUATIONAL
SPECIFICITY
As noted above, Delli Carpini et al. (2004) make a compelling case that the
relationship between deliberation and possible positive outcomes is complex.
ANDINTERNAL
55
DEMOCRATIC
DECISION-MAKING
POLITICAL
EFFICACY
DELIBERATION,
Most research in the past has done little to control or catalogue the various
factors that may mediate between deliberation and outcomes, attitudes and
beliefs. The first factor that deserves elucidation is the type of deliberation, of
which I think there are three basic categories: civic dialogue, deliberative
discussion, and deliberative decision-making.Walsh (2003, pp. 3-18) presents
a persuasive argument that the civic dialogue that occurs through programs
such as Study Circles differs from other forms of deliberation, because the
purpose of dialogue is to bring together different stakeholders in order to
foster "better understandingamong people of divergent backgroundsliving in
the same community, as a step toward future civic engagement" (2003, p. 2).
Deliberative discussion, in contrast, primarily aims at a thorough and
informed discussion among citizens about issues of current importance,
whether national or local, the most obvious examples of which are the
National Issues Forums and the deliberative (public opinion polling done by
Fishkin (1995) and his colleagues (see McCombs and Reynolds 1999). The
point of deliberative discussion is not for citizens to reach a group decision,
and in fact, the deliberative poll specifically tries "to insulate the participants
as much as possible from the social pressures of reaching a consensus on the
substance" of the issues (Fishkin, 1995, p. 185). While dialogue and a thorough exploration of the issues are important components of the final type of
deliberation, deliberative decision-making requires citizens to take one final
step and actually make a decision on the issue. It does not necessarily require
citizens to reach a consensus, but it does require the group to make some form
of a decision. In my research, I am interested in examining the effects of this
type of deliberation, deliberative decision-making, on citizens' internal political efficacy.
Deliberative decision-making, though, can itself take on different structures. Probably the most familiar form of decision-making structure is
Robert's Rules of Order, a set of rules that allow for orderly debate, discussion, amendment, and examinationof issues. For ease of reference I refer to
these rules as parliamentary procedures. Robert's Rules, though, do not
exhaust the possible approachesto deliberative decision-making.For example,
the participationdescribed by Benjamin Barber in Strong Democracy (1984)
embodies more community-and consensus-building than what might occur
under the formal rules of parliamentaryprocedures. Barber does not clearly
describe any formal decision-making structures, but Crittenden's generative
procedures take into account the reciprocity and listening that characterize
strong democratic talk (1992, pp. 111-114). Under these generative or
agreement-oriented procedures, participants begin by pooling the perspectives of all who wish to speak, with no debate about the merits of any of the
perspectives. The participantscan then criticize the perspectives offered, but a
key component of this step is mirroring-whenever participants wish to
criticize the perspectives of others, they must restate those perspectives to the
56
MORRELL
satisfaction of the one who offered it. The participantsthen divide into small
groups to reformulatethe issue in a way that would be acceptable to the small
group and report their main conclusions back to the group as a whole. After
any final comments, a majorityvote decides the issue. Crittenden calls these
procedures "generative" because they aim at generating intersubjective
understandingand are agreement-oriented. Unlike parliamentaryprocedures,
they aim at creating commonalities and consensus, though by ending deliberation with a secret vote they avoid forcing a false consensus. With this
distinction between parliamentary and generative procedures in mind, my
goal was to develop a study to examine whether deliberative decision-making
would positively influence internal political efficacy, and if so, whether
different structures of decision-making would have different impacts.
Before discussing my research design, I want to make one final theoretical
point. For the most part, neither deliberative theorists nor political scientists
have paid much attention to the difference between global and situationspecific political efficacy.9Though they appear to have developed separately,
political scientists' concept of political efficacy and psychologists' concept of
self-efficacy are strikingly alike. Self-efficacy "refers to the beliefs in one's
capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to manage
prospective situations" (Bandura, 1995, p. 2). Each individual holds "a selfefficacy expectancy, the person's belief that he or she is or is not capable of
performing the behavior or behaviors in question" (Maddux and Stanley,
1986, p. 250). The similarities are so remarkablethat I would argue that selfefficacy and political efficacy are both aspects of the same concept, the main
differences being that political efficacy is less general than self-efficacy and
that political scientists have developed the two separate components of
internal and external efficacy. These separate components, however, both
relate to the idea of self-efficacy since they indicate the beliefs people have
about their ability to influence politics. Believing that I can influence the
political system in a representative democracy requires that I feel capable of
participatingin the system (internal efficacy) and that the system is responsive
to my input (external efficacy). Thus, while they are distinct, we can conceptualize internal and external political efficacy both as parts of the broader
psychological concept of self-efficacy.
Although self-efficacy is a more general concept, social psychologists have
recognized the importance of context to feelings of personal competence
(see e.g. Bandura, 1986). Self-efficacy "is most useful when defined,
operationalized, and measured specific to a behavior set or set of behaviors
in a specified context" (Maddux, 1995, 8 emphasis added). The example
self-efficacy scholars often give is that if you want to assess a person's selfefficacy for driving an automobile, then you must specify the context in
which the driving will occur. A person who feels perfectly competent to
drive on surface streets in a suburban neighborhood on a sunny day will
ANDINTERNAL
DEMOCRATIC
DECISION-MAKING
POLITICAL
EFFICACY
57
DELIBERATION,
not necessarily feel as competent driving in a snowstorm in Boston or on
the freeways of Los Angeles during rush hour. Although it is more specific
than self-efficacy, political scientists and theorists usually discuss and
measure political efficacy as a global concept within the political world.
This has often proven fruitful in the past, but we should not ignore the
possibilities that may arise from acknowledging the distinction between
general and situation-specific efficacy.
In general, political scientists ought to concern themselves with situationspecific efficacy because it may reveal relationshipswe have been missing, and
thereby lead to a better understanding of the political world. Wollman and
Strouder, in the one political study that has specifically examined the issue of
situational specificity, give evidence that suggests that "the more situationspecific the feelings of efficacy, the greater the predictability of political
behavior" (1991, p. 557). Context specific measures of internal political efficacy may allow us to better predict citizens' participation within those particular contexts, but it also may help us understand the global measure more
clearly by pointing to those contexts from which citizens are most likely to gain
a greater sense of general political efficacy. Increases in situation-specific
feelings of personal political competence may lead to increases in more
general feelings of internal political efficacy over time. More specificallyto my
research, situation-specific internal political efficacy is important because it
speaks to the possibility of continuing deliberation. Even if citizens remain
unconvinced of their ability to participatein the wider political system, if they
feel competent to participatein deliberationwith their fellow citizens, this will
increase the likelihood that they will participate in deliberation in the future.
Deliberative democracy requires that deliberation be an ongoing process, not
a single moment, and thus we need to know whether citizens feel competent
to continue to participate in the deliberative process. In my research design,
therefore, I also included measures that allowed me to examine situationspecific internal efficacy.
RESEARCH
DESIGN
Method
To investigate these questions, I designed an experiment because it had
several advantages over other methodologies. First, it gave me the control
necessary to compare deliberation to non-deliberation, as well as to compare
different structures of deliberation. Though many "real world" institutions
utilize parliamentaryprocedures in their deliberation, very few employ anything approximating the generative (agreement-oriented) procedures. An
experimental approach allowed me to compare the parliamentary and
generative procedures to the greatest extent achievable because I could
58
MORRELL
control the deliberative structures of the different experimental groups.'0 An
experimental approach also enabled me to compare groups of similarly situated respondents and randomly assign them to experimental treatment
groups; it is unlikely that those who deliberated differed significantly from
those who did not, and by using a pre-test/post-test design, I could control for
respondents' pre-deliberation efficacy. Any positive findings, therefore, are
likely due to a causal relationshipbetween deliberation and efficacy instead of
uncontrolled or unmeasured variables. While experiments are by their very
nature artificial,these advantageswere sufficient to warrant an experimental
methodology. The goal is to add my findings to those from "realworld"studies
in order to increase our cumulative knowledge of the relationship between
deliberation and political efficacy.
While these advantages justify the choice of methodology, that choice
also carries some implications for the dependent variables appropriate for
the study. Subjects would have little reason to believe that their participation would have any affect at all in the "real world" political system, and
thus it is theoretically untenable to expect the experimental treatment to
have an effect on external political efficacy. Therefore, I chose to focus
exclusively on the effect of deliberation on subjects' feelings of internal
political efficacy." I believe that even in an experimental setting direct and
interactive democratic deliberation can theoretically have the educative
effect of increasing citizens' feelings of personal competence, much like
practicing a sport can increase people's confidence in their ability to
actually play that sport.
The experiment lasted one week, involved students from a large southwestern university, and occurred three times, with variations each time. I
randomly assigned subjects to experimental and control groups with stratification based upon gender. One group of subjects did not deliberate and acted
as a control group. I assigned a second set of subjects to the parliamentary
procedures group and a third to the generative procedures (agreementoriented) group. On a Monday respondents filled out pre-test surveys that I
disguised as surveysof their opinions on current issues in politics, and they then
received material to read on the topic they were to discuss. They spent
Wednesday and the beginning of Friday-approximately one and a half
hours-deliberating and coming to a group decision on what policy to adopt on
the issue. To give the deliberation a context, I framed it as a national participatory referendum. Instructionstold subjects to think of themselves as part of
one of many groups of citizens following the same process, similar to the
caucuses used in states such as Iowa to choose parties' Presidential nominees.
Their votes, added together with the votes of all other citizens, would determine the final decision on the policy. While the experiment was artificial,my
general impressionwas that subjects took the experiment seriously and, for the
most part, engaged honestly in the deliberation and decision-malking.
ANDINTERNAL
EFFICACY
59
DEMOCRATIC
DECISION-MAKING
POLITICAL
DELIBERATION,
ExperimentOne: Medical Marijuana
The focus of deliberation in experiment one was the legalization of medical
marijuana.I provided students material drawn from arguments that appeared
in the election pamphlet for and against California Proposition 215 (1996). I
altered the arguments by changing the names and organizationsrepresented
in the pamphlet so that they reflected a national referendum, and I constructed the referendum by slightly altering the proposition. Since the generative procedures institute an open agenda, subjects in this group did not
have to simply approve or amend the proposition. For this experiment I chose
an actual political issue-one that had been a referendum in California-so
that the treatment would be as real as possible within the constraints of the
experiment's artificiality.Obviously, though, students knew that they would
not affect actual public policy, so to test whether the hypotheticalnature of the
deliberations affected my results, I repeated the experiment but changed the
issue to one that would directly affect the subjects.
ExperimentTwo:Class Grading
For experiment two, subjects made a deliberative decision on an isssue that
would directly affect them: the percentage of their final grade for which the
various class assignments (tests, final, homework and participation) would
count. I gave both deliberative groups a minimum percentage for each
assignment, and in order to have a specific "referendum,"I gave the parliamentary procedures group a specific distributionthat they could then amend.
To maintain an open agenda for the generative procedures group, I did not
give them any specific distribution and allowed them to discuss anything
dealing with the class grading system.12Since this "issue" related only to this
specific class, I could not frame it as a national referendum, but to mirrorwhat
would occur in the other experiments, I told subjects that all three groups
votes would determine the final decision. While this issue was not "political"
in the traditionaluse of the term, this variation allowed me to check whether
subjects react differently when the issue upon which they deliberate has a
direct impact upon their lives.'3
ExperimentThree:School Vouchers
Experiment three returned to a political issue as the focus of deliberation-school vouchers-but I altered the experiment by adding a fourth
subject group. In addition to the control, parliamentary procedures, and
generative procedures groups, I also randomly assigned subjects to a group
that voted on the issue but did not participate in face-to-face deliberation.
This group simply received the reading material on Monday and then voted
60
MORRELL
on the proposedreferendumon Friday;for ease of reference, I refer to
this groupas the voting only group.14lincludingthis groupallowedme to
make additionalcomparisonsbetween the two face-to-face deliberative
groups and a form of decision-makingthat relies on individual,internal
deliberation.
Measures
Researchhasindicatedthatsomeof the originalmeasuresof efficacy-used
mostnotablyin the AmericanNationalElectionsStudies-are of questionable
validity and reliability(see Craig and Maggiotto, 1982). While several
researchersargued for the continueduse of these items (e.g. Acock and
Clarke,1990;Acock,Clarke,and Stewart,1985), repeatedanalysishas indicated that there are better ones, especiallyfor internalpoliticalefficacy(see
Craiget al., 1990; Niemi et al., 1991; Morrell,2003). As noted earlier,no
previousstudyexaminingthe relationshipbetween deliberationand internal
politicalefficacyhasfullyutilizedthese newitemsto measureinternalpolitical
efficacy.The measureis based upon askingrespondentsto respondto the
followingstatementson a 5-pointscalerangingfromagreestronglyto disagree
strongly:
(1) "I considermyselfwell-qualifiedto participatein politics."
of the importantpolitical
(2) "I feel that I have a prettygood understanding
issues facingour country."
(3) "Ifeel thatI coulddo as gooda job in publicofficeas mostotherpeople."
(4) "IthinkthatI am as well-informedaboutpoliticsandgovernmentas most
people."
I then added subjects'responsesto these four items to form an index of
internalpoliticalefficacythat rangesfrom4 to 20, with higherscoresrepresentinggreaterefficacy.
To allow an examinationof the situationalspecificityof internalpolitical
efficacy,the post-test surveyincluded measuresof efficacyspecific to the
deliberativeprocess engaged in by participants.I constructedthese by
wordsandphrasesin the politicalefficacyquestions,
substitutingappropriate
in
the
framing questions the past tense, andprefacingthe questionswith the
statement,"Allquestionsreferto the groupyouworkedwithin deciding[X],"
where [X]referredto the issue the groupdiscussed.As with the globalitems,
the surveyasked subjectsto respondto the statementson a 5-point scale
rangingfromagreestronglyto disagreestrongly:
(1) "I consideredmyselfwell-qualifiedto participatein the groupdecisionmaking process.
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(2) "I felt that I had a pretty good understanding of the important issues
discussed by my group."
(3) "I felt that I did as good a job in the group decision-makingproess as most
other people."
(4) "I think that I was well-informed about the issues discussed by my group."
Adding these items together produced a scale ranging from 4 to 20, and
analysishas demonstrated that these are reliable and valid measures (Morrell,
2003). Since subjects had not yet worked with their groups, it was impossible
to include these items on the pre-test surveys, and since the control group did
not deliberate, the items did not appear on their version of the post-test. To
distinguish the two measures, I use the traditionalreference internal political
efficacy to refer to the global measure and situation-specificinternal political
efficacy for the situation-specific measure.
RESULTS
The results of the experiment do not support claims made by deliberative
theorists regarding global internal political efficacy. The data indicate that for
all three experiments deliberation did not have a substantial or statistically
significant effect on subjects' post-test internal political efficacy scores, controlling for their pre-test scores (See Table 1).
In the table, the constant represents the baseline control group and dummy
variables represent each of the experimentalgroups. As one would expect, the
pre-test scores were highly significantpredictors of post-test scores, but none
of the dummy variables were significant. This indicates that in all three
TABLE 1. Effects of Deliberative Decision-making on Internal Political
Efficacy
Experiment
Variable
Constant
Pre-testInternalPolitical
Efficacy
ParliamentaryProcedures
Generative Procedures
Voting Only
R Squared
N
MedicalMarijuana ClassGrades
5.70** (.89)
.65**(.06)
.47 (.57)
.15 (.56)
.54
112
4.57** (1.18)
.74**(.07)
1.11 (.61)
-.05 (.60)
51
.70
SchoolVouchers
3.43** (.91)
.72**(.06)
.29 (.66)
-1.00 (.71)
.64 (.66)
.69
66
Notes:Cellentriesrepresentunstandardize
linearregressioncoefficientswithstandarderrorsin
parantheses.
**p<.001,* p<.01
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experiments the experimental groups did not differ significantly from the
control group; there is no evidence to demonstrate that deliberation or voting
on an issue improved citizens' general feelings of internal political efficacy.I
Although I could not compare the experimentalgroups to the control group
on their situation-specific efficacy scores, I could compare the experimental
groups with each other to analyze the relative importance of the different
decision-making structures. The results indicate that there were significant
differences between the face-to-face and voting only groups, though the
structures of deliberation did not matter (see Table 2).
While I did not have pre-test scores for the situation-specific measure of
efficacy, I included the pre-test scores on the global measure as a control
variable. For the medical marijuanaand class grading experiments, the parliamentaryprocedures group served as the baseline, and I included a dummy
variable for the generative procedures group; for the school vouchers experiment, the voting only group served as the baseline, and I included dummy
variables for the parliamentaryand generative procedures groups.
The first result that stands out is the relationship between the global and
situation-specific measures of internal political efficacy. In the medical marijuana and school voucher experiments, there was a significant positive relationship between the two measures, while there was no such relationship for
the class grading experiment. This indicates that subjects' evaluations of their
efficacy in the deliberative context were independent of their evaluations of
their general political efficacy when they focused on a non-political issue.
Subjects that deliberated about political issues, however, demonstrated a
tendency to connect the two evaluations.
The results also indicate another interesting difference between the three
experiments. In the medical marijuana and class grading experiments, the
generative procedures variable did not significantly affect political efficacy;
this indicates that there were no differences between the parliamentaryand
TABLE 2. Effects of Deliberative Decision-making on Situation-specific
Internal Political Efficacy
Experiment
Variable
MedicalMarijuana ClassGrades
Constant
14.82**(1.03)
Pre-testInternalPolitical
.22* (.07)
Efficacy
Procedures
Parliamentary
GenerativeProcedures
.11 (.60)
R Squared
.13
N
73
SchoolVouchers
16.67**(1.92) 11.36**(1.28)
.32* (.09)
.16 (.13)
-.72 (.88)
.07
29
2.57* (.92)
2.86* (.97)
.36
41
Notes: Cell entries represent unstandardizelinear regression coefficients with standarderrors in
<.001,*p<.01.
parantheses.**p
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generativeproceduresgroups.In the schoolvouchersexperiment,however,
both the parliamentary
proceduresand generativeproceduresvariableswere
substantivelyand statisticallysignificant.On average,and controllingfor pretest scoreson the globalmeasureof internalpoliticalefficacy,subjectsin both
internalefficacyscores over 2.5 points higher
groupshad situation-specific
thanthe votingonlygroup.In this case,then, face-to-facedeliberationdid do
better than simply voting, though as with the first two experiments,the
structuresunderwhichparticipantsdeliberatedhad no effect.
DISCUSSION
Beforediscussingthe implicationsof these results,I mustacknowledgethat
the limitationsof my studyrequiremy conclusionsto be preliminary.
Subjects
were similarin their age and educationlevels, and the artificialnatureof an
experimentshould cause one to be cautiousin interpretingthe resultstoo
broadly.Even given these limitations,though, I believe my results reveal
importantinsightsregardingthe relationshipbetween deliberativedecisionmakingand internalefficacyand point to questionsthat future research
shouldaddress.
Initially,the dataindicatethatsubjectswho engagedin face-to-facedeliberative decision-making
did not displaygreaterinternalpoliticalefficacyafter
deliberationthaneitherthosewhoonlyvotedorthosewhodidnotdeliberateat
all;this evidencecastsdoubton the claimthatthere is a simplepositiverelaand internalpoliticalefficacy.
tionshipbetweendeliberativedecision-making
Onemightexplainthe lackof significantresultsasresultingfromthe artificiality
orshorttimeframeof theexperimental
design,butI believeitwouldbe a mistake
to takethistack.The resultstendto reinforcepreviousfindingssuchas thoseof
Gastil(2004),andtheygo evenfurtherby showingthat,whentestedusingthe
most reliableand valid measureof internalpoliticalefficacy,it is likelythat
deliberativedecision-makingwill not necessarilydirectlyincrease citizens'
feelingsof personalpoliticalcompetence.Thisis alsoin linewiththe empirical
evidence Hibbingand Theiss-Morsereporton the effects of deliberationin
three areas:improvingdecisions,improvinglegitimacyand improvingpeople
(2002,ch. 8). Althoughtheydo notspecificallydiscussinternalpoliticalefficacy,
the conceptmostclearlyfits into the generalcategoryof "improving
people."
That deliberationdid not significantlyaffect the global measureof internal
politicalefficacylendssupportto theirclaimthatdeliberationwill not achieve
whatdeliberativetheorists'expectin regardsto makingbettercitizens.
The evidence also indicatesthat there is no differencein the effect on
internalpoliticalefficacybetweenthe two structuresof face-to-facedeliberative decision-making;
whether deliberationwas face-to-facewas the only
important factor in explaining the differences among experimental groups.
Structures designed to include a more open agenda, more mutual listening
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and response, and more directed toward agreement fared no better than
traditionalparliamentaryprocedures in affecting subjects' global or situationspecific internal political efficacy. Previously I demonstrated that the
structures of decision-making did matter to subjects' evaluations of the decision-makingprocess, but even in that case it was the traditionalparliamentary
procedures that performed better than the generative (agreement-oriented)
procedures (Morrell, 1999). Perhaps over a longer period of time strong
democratic structures might do more to enhance citizens' feelings of personal
competence, but the more research we accumulate, the more this claim
appears to be unsupportable.
Politics often involves conflict, and as Mansbridge (1980) argued over
20 years ago, conflict changes the dynamics of face-to-face decision-making.
One of the main reasons Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) cite for the
reluctance of citizens to get more directly involved in politics is their dislike of
conflict. It appears that strong democratic procedures do not provide a significantly better method of dealing with this conflict. I am becoming
increasingly convinced that for deliberative decision-making to function and
have the positive benefits claimed by deliberative theorists we must more
thoroughly understand the effects of the structures of deliberation; evidence
to this point indicates that traditionalparliamentaryprocedures are probably a
better choice for deliberative democratic decision-making than strong
democratic procedures.
The results regarding situation-specific internal political efficacy highlight
some further important facets about the relationship between deliberative
decision-making and political efficacy that no one has revealed before. The
fact the situation-specific measure relates to, but is distinguishable from,
the more global measure of internal political efficacy provides evidence that
the situation-specific measure is tapping into a political attitude that deliberative theorists and political scientists have not fully examined before.16Even
after controlling for general internal political efficacy, subjects who engaged in
face-to-face deliberative decision-making showed higher levels of situationspecific efficacy than those who only voted. This evidence supports the
conclusion that engaging in face-to-face deliberation would likely increase
citizens' perceptions of their capability of participating in deliberation more
than when they simply vote directly on an issue without talking about it with
their fellow citizens. It also opens some prospects to the claim that face-to-face
deliberative decision-making can affect citizens' feelings of personal competence; it just may not do so as directly as deliberative theory posits. Greenberg
et al. (1996) reach parallel conclusions regardingworkplace democracy, both
as to the indirectness of the effect of participationand the differences between
face-to-face and non-face-to-face structures. Situation-specific efficacy is
important for political scientists to study and political theorists to consider,
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and if we do not do so, we risk missing important information about the
political world.
What my results cannot demonstrate, though, is the degree to which greater
situation-specific internal political efficacy can lead to broader feelings of
political competence, or how much effect it may have on citizens' political
behavior. Maddux notes, "Perceived efficacy in one behavioral-situational
domain will generalize to other behaviors and situations depending on the
extent to which the behaviors and situations share crucial features and require
similar skills and functions" (1995, pp. 8-9). Given my results, deliberative
decision-making is most likely to affect internal efficacy in deliberative situations. Whether internal efficacy generated in the deliberative setting will
transfer to other political settings is not clear, because one of the distinguishing features of deliberative theory is that it highlights the differences
between the traditionalpolitical system and deliberative democracy.While the
subject matter may be the same, the "skillsand functions" in the two settings
may be different enough that a diffusion of positive feelings of personal
competence would not occur.
The one positive indication that a spillover effect might occur is that the
global and situation-specificinternal efficacy measures were related when the
deliberation focused on political issues, but they were not when subjects discussed an issue that was not clearly political. It seems clear that these are two
distinct, but related, political attitudes, but their relationship is not exactly
clear. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse remind us that we must distinguish between
social and political capital, and at times, the two are inversely related to one
another (2002, p. 187). Situation-specificefficacy, though, is a potential source
of political capital;we need to know how much return it can provide. Further
research should attempt to determine whether and how situation-specific
feelings of personal competence could lead to increases in more general
feelings of political efficacy.We also need to know whether deliberation,under
the right conditions, could mitigate citizen's dislike and fear of politicalconflict,
as well as their lack of self-confidence in their abilityto participatein politics. If
we answered these questions, we would then understand how deliberation
could contribute to convincing "the people that political conflict often springs
from them and is a good and natural part of any democratic political system"
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002, p. 228). To carry out this research successfully, though, deliberative theorists and political scientists must pay
attention to situation-specific internal political efficacy and more closely
examine the relationship between it and global internal political efficacy.
CONCLUSION
As Delli Carpini et al. (2004) point out, the positive potential of deliberative
democracy is more complex than most theorists and political scientists have
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acknowledged;this study contributes to our understandingby untangling a few
small knots in this complex cord. Deliberation can take several forms-civic
dialogue, deliberative discussion, and deliberative decision-making;the results
from this study indicate that at least one type of deliberation, deliberative
decision-making,will probably not lead to immediate gains in general feelings
of internal political efficacy. Instead, the data show that citizens who engage in
face-to-face deliberative decision-making, rather than citizens who just think
about and vote on an issue, will likely have higher levels of internal political
efficacy relative to the specific deliberative situation. The data also suggest that
we can accomplish this just as well when citizens' use Roberts' Rules of Order
as when they use strong democratic procedures. Face-to-face deliberative
decision-makingwill probablygive citizens greater confidence in their abilities
to participate in deliberative decision-making, and thus, make citizens more
likely to participate in future deliberation. What remains for us to discover is
whether citizens' positive evaluations of personal competence in specific
deliberative situations can lead to broader increases in internal political efficacy, and from this, change's in their political behavior beyond deliberation.
Acknowledgments.I thank Kim Fridkin, Ken Goldstein, Thomas Keating,
Greg Marfleet, and Brian McCormack for their assistance in collecting the
data for this study. I would also like to thank Jeff Ladewig, the editors and
the anonymous reviewers for their exacting and helpful suggestions on the
manuscript.
NOTES
1. Pateman also discusses the theories of Jean-JacquesRousseau and G.D.H. Cole, but neither
theorist is helpful for my purposes. Rousseau specifically argues against public deliberation,
while G.D.H. Cole is more interested in workplace participation.
2. Gastil eschews the terms internal and external political efficacy; instead, he refers to selfefficacy and system responsiveness (see Gastil, 2000a, 203 footnote 51).
3. They measured political efficacy with two questions: "People like me don't have any say about
what the government does" (internalefficacy), and "Sometimes politics and government seem
so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on" (external
efficacy).
4. Greenberg used one question to tap efficacy:"There is almost no way people like me can have
an influence on the government" (1986, p. 209).
5. I would also like to note that Mansbridge's general conclusion was that direct democratic
participationdid not create many of the effects envisioned in participatorydemocratic theory.
6. Smith does not distinguish internal from external political efficacy. The NIC poll included the
following questions: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does,"
"Public officials care a lot about what people like me think," Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on,"
"Nationalpolitical leaders are out of touch with the rest of the country,"and "I have opinions
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
about politics that are worth listening to" (Smith, 1999, p. 55). Of these, recent research
demonstrates that the first two measure external efficacy, while the third combines aspects of
both external and internal efficacy (see Niemi et al., 1991; Morrell,2003). The last two are not
common in the political efficacy literature,though the last one does seem to be a faciallyvalid
measure of internal efficacy.
Gastil measured self-efficacy with three items: "I am capable of participating effectively in
group discussions about important political issues," "As an individual citizen, I am able to
engage in political action,"and "I can't think straightabout politics, regardlessof how much I
read or talk about the issues" (reverse coded) (2004, p. 314).
Walsh used three items to tap internal efficacy:"Votingis the only way that people like me can
have any say about how the local government runs things," "Race relations seem so complicated that a person like me could never make a difference for the better," and "Sometimes
local politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on" (2003, p. 21).
For one of the exceptions, see Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan (1992).
Admittedly, Barber'sis a comprehensive theory of how citizens would be different if they lived
and actively participated in a strong democracy, and such a system cannot be sufficiently
approximatedeither in the real world or in an experimental setting.
I did analyze the data for external efficacy, and the results mirror those I report here.
They even discussed the possibilities of taking attendance, dropping an exam score, and
having student graded evaluations of class participation.
The decision the students made did structure the majorcomponents of the gradingsystem for
the course.
I intentionally avoid the claim that these subjects did not deliberate. As Robert Goodin,
among others, makes clear, individualscan deliberate in their own minds (see Goodin, 2004;
Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003). This is why I do not refer to this group as "non-deliberative."
To test whether the experimental groups differed from one another I also performed an
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)on the post-test scores with the pre-test scores as covariate
and the group as the factor. There were no significant differences among the groups for
experiment one (F(110,2)= 0.36, n.s.), two (F(49,2) = 2.18, n.s.), or three (F(63,3) = 1.59,
n.s.).
Other analysisI do not report here also demonstrated that for every experimentalgroup in all
three experiments subjects' situation-specificinternal political efficacy was significantlyhigher
than their global political efficacy. This is not really surprising, but it lends even further
credence to the importance of the situation-specific measure.
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