y_<
I
British
submarine policy
Michael Wynford
A thesis submitted
1853-1918
Dash
for the degree of Ph. D. at King's
University of London
Department
of War Studies
1990
BIBL.
LOND[h. .:,
UNIV..
College,
ABSTRACT
O
Abstract
The
is used as a case study to
submarine
developing
suggests that
Study of
technology.
naval
Admiralty
the
British
examine
the Royal
Navy's
was less conservative
to
attitudes
submarine
policy
is
able than
and more
often supposed.
in
The British
were thoroughly
underwater
warfare
drawn
between
inadequate
from
of the potential
appreciation
adequate
appreciation
of
developments
conversant with all significant
if
abstract,
of submarine boats, but a distinction
must be
1853.
technical
the
There
was
an
assessments of
strategic
early,
early
consequence
submarines
and
developments
of
in
submarine warfare.
Development
of
agreements concerning
firm,
of
British
policy
influenced
was greatly
the type of vessels to be built
by
restrictive
by the Vickers
arms
by the character and personal beliefs of successive Inspecting Captains
Submarines,
responsibility
Imperial
British
experience
of
other
defence
policy
is
powers.
is
of
performance
of
submarine
The
Navy's
decision
warfare
boats
policy.
in
context
by
a
importance
of
the
the
is
blockade
submarine
RN
into
put
discussed,
unrestricted
post-war
Royal
the
to
resume
partial
for coast defence from the Army.
British
policies
by
and
patrol
assessed,
examined.
the
Great
study
coastal
In
War
failure
the
the
is
the
set
final
submarine
submarine
influence
submarine's
and
of
to
on
the
anticipate
chapter,
against
to
pre-
the
and
O
BRITISH
Introduction
1.1
Genesis
1:
An
incident
John
Innovation
1.4
British
1.5
The
in
3.2
Lord
Victorian
submarines
Turnaround
1898-1901
desire
submarine
the
Acquiring
3:
Materiel
Submarines
17
34
39
46
.................
57
...............
75
80
.....................
85
90
...............
94
1900-1914
and
the
British
and
the
submarine
Vickers
and
the
Electric
Vickers
and
the
Admiralty
The
of
British
...........
.............................
Vickers
end
Palmerston
.............................
1853-1900
policy
design
.............
........................
2:
the
............
1856-1885
policy
development
Acquiring
12
15
..................
Consort
Navy
submarine
Chapter
3.1
the
Nordenfelt
Prince
and
submarine
British
2.2
1866
French
Chapter
..........
limitations
the
and
Russell
Scott
footnotes
and
Valparaiso,
at
Bauer
1.3
2.1
7
utilisation,
Wilhelm
1853-1918
1853-1898
Inspiration,
1.2
POLICY
..........................................
in the
text
used
Abbreviations
Chapter
SUBMARINE
the
submarine
monopoly
arms
industry
........................
Boat Company
.........
100
............
115
..........................
1900-1914
107
108
........................
development
99
..........
122
I
4.1
'The
4:
Chapter
Submarine
4.2
5.1
endurance
and
and
safety
Captain
RHS Bacon
Captain
SS Hall
Captain
RJB
Chapter
The
5:
137
service
health
Crew
1901-1918
Trade'
A volunteer
0
factions
Piracy
and
........................
morale
153
......................
156
................................
160
..................................
Keyes
164
................................
of
problem
Naval
147
the
and
prejudice
1901-1914
assessment
submarine
.................
176
.............................
5.2
Exercises
5.3
The
foreign
context:
.........................
Russia
and the United
The
foreign
context:
France
The
foreign
context:
Germany
6:
Chapter
and
Planning
naval
strategy
and
6.2
British
coast
defence
policy
the
and
submarine
7:
189
199
......................
206
.....................
the
submarine
to
1903
.........
Counter-measures
The
development
The
problem
The
participants
of
214
227
.............
mine
.......................
defence
Submarines
scheme of coast
and the Admiralty
blockade
The fall
of the British
and rise
........
to predict
The failure
commerce warfare
..........
Chapter
7.1
States
1901-1914
British
6.3
184
manoeuvres
6.1
The
172
229
235
244
257
1901-1914
anti-submarine
.......................................
.................................
warfare
........
265
266
269
I
0
7.2
Anti-submarine
Prevention
nets
Cure
destroyer
-
mines
and
failure
The
of
underwater
-
Capitulation
7.3
The
8.1
British
8.2
The
submarines
post-war
British
patrols,
275
281
and
the
ram
282
285
in
1914
288
......
1914-1918
in
submarines
Fleet
aerial
screens,
.................................
detection
.........................
gunfire
explosions,
Revelations
274
.................
......................................
warfare
anti-submarine
of
state
8:
Chapter
1901-1904
warfare
the
War
Great
290
..............
306
.................................
retrospect
..........................
1901-1918
policy
submarine
315
321
...............
Appendixes
1
Robert
2
Tom
Fulton's
Johnson
British
and
the
submarine
first
British
designs
1804-1806
submarine
c. 1812-1828
....................................
Great
estimates
of the
3
Submarine
4
Vickers
5
Drafting
6
Distribution
7
British
submarine
8
British
and
Bibliography
Index
and
the
submarine
for.
regulations
of
British
German
export
Powers
1893-1914
335
market
1900-1913
338
1909
..........................................
in
losses
340
.........
1906,1910,1914
submarines
submarine
..................................................
329
submarines
performance
327
the
Great
1914-1918
War
342
...
....
346
348
350
362
I
0
in
Figures
Submarine
British
text
to
submissions
submarine
dockyard
and
shipyards
under
the
work
by
1900-1918
construction
-
1900-1914
times
per
1853-1900
Admiralty
construction
building
Submarine
Vickers
the
of
contract
104
......................
class
-
breakdown
......
of
Number
month
submarine
of
35
........
117
submarines
.....................
120
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Between
allied
bald
1918,
1914 and
shipping
Quite
the ironclad
It
mobile
blow
at British
command
of
predominantly
of
the mine,
a new dimension
supremacy;
naval
the
sea
military
could
nations
lines of communication
surface fleet.
impact
and
[1].
This
a new
of
naval
in
power
do
more
insidious
to naval
and though
it
with
weapon of
no
than
the simple
submarines
building
the submarine
the
hoping
to
it
alone,
a ruinously
gain
offered
hazard
to
fish
a heavy
striking
power
which
that
way
had never done.
-
warfare,
the means with
and supply without
a
By exposing merchant shipping to the continual
unseen attack,
British
the Central Powers
even the naval gun itself
-
than
brought
It
torpedo.
balance
existing
Dreadnought,
was more
of
in naval history.
the
upset
the terrible
tons
the submarine was and remains the single most
simply,
dramatic innovation
It
sank 11,148,027
won the war for
and nearly
is a measure of
statistic
destruction.
U-boats
maritime
expensive
danger of an
made the new war at sea as terrible
as the
war to come on land.
It may seem perverse,
submarine
policy.
French
own boats. American
then,
for this study to concentrate
inventiveness forced
was German
formidable.
Britain,
whose flag
as well
as the battle
merchant
Great
shipping
navy ever seen, had more
rivals,
and was nearly
magnitude
the Royal Navy to build its
business sense provided the Admiralty
to do so, and it
of the threat
ruthlessness that
flew
with the means
made the new weapon so
over
of
75%
because she failed
to
of
the
squadrons of
reason to fear the submarine
ruined
on British
the
most
world's
powerful
than any of her
appreciate
it posed. But the roots of Britain's
the
failure
true
lie in
the naval history of the preceding 60 years.
1
[1] Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow:
(Oxford 1961-70),
V, 110
era, 1904-1919
the Royal Navy in the Fisher
INTRODUCTION
This study has two main aims: to explore the ways in which a complex
such as the Royal Navy adapted to new technology
organisation
of change, and to explain why that organisation
the
submarine
war
1914-1918
of
it
that
was so poorly
in an era
prepared
was nearly
humbled
into two fairly
distinct
by
for
the
"weapon of the weaker power".
In structure,
The first,
sections.
which consists of the long opening chapter and the first
looks at nineteenth
two,
chapter
the thesis can be divided
and puts the history
of British
century
submarine
submarine
part of
in some detail
policy
in the years 1900-1918
warfare
in context for the first time.
Underwater
as a control
to
used as a tool
are
with
to
which
explore
naval
can be introduced
change because the submarine
to technological
attitudes
open
craft
in an assessment of the degree to which the Royal Navy was
innovation.
steam, ironcladding,
the
The
inventions
major
nineteenth
and breech-loading
shell guns, rifling
battleships
the
the
of
-
British
century
-
combined
to
naval
power
depended. To a lesser extent the same could be said of the torpedo,
which
enhance
of
efficiency
on
which
the RN expected to use in the melee of a fleet action.
For this reason the
sooner or later,
Navy was more or less bound to adopt these inventions,
whatever the level of conservatism and apathy in the service.
The Victorian
submarine,
on the other hand, was almost entirely
to a naval power such as Great
the
nineteenth
reason, British
to
attitude
Navy
Royal
century
submarine
to
change:
was no pressing need for
us much
RN
whether
about
decisions
response to developing
has never been properly
of new evidence uncovered suggests that
earlier
histories have argued
-
the RN sneer at the immorality
policy
upon an irrational
commonly
submarine
examined
the Navy's
real
were
based
on
in the
technology
before,
but the wealth
did not
the Admiralty
close its mind
as all
-
to the submarine.
Nor
did
of a weapon of sneak attack and base its
distaste for
underwater
warfare,
as popular
works
from
a realistic
policy
suppose.
The Navy's conservative
opposed to innovation
informed
this
the naval hierarchy.
moral revulsion and blind conservatism afflicted
years 1853-1900
For
the degree to which
technical or strategic assessments, and more particularly
The Royal Navy's
boats.
possess submarine
can tell
policy
technological
There
Britain.
useless
of
for
developments
strategy was developed
its own sake. The
in
underwater
Admiralty
warfare
technical assessments of most of the submarines built
was generally
and
made
in this period,
well
accurate
though
INTRODUCTION
it never understood
the strategic
inability
of its intelligence
French
navy
in
of underwater
combined
with
failure
a
significance
of the work being done by the American
and Simon
Lake,
left
RN
the
But
warfare.
the
to evaluate the progress made by the
organisation
1890s,
the
potential
to
civilians John
and forced
vulnerable
it
the
appreciate
to
Holland
hurried
place
orders for Holland type submarines in December 1900.
The second portion
1901-1918,
the period
examines
the
important
part
degree
built
submarines
British
Admiralty's
The
the
Captains
of
to
for
submarine
the
Royal
the
personnel
Submarines.
and in
By
the
new perspective on the RN's
an
by
the
lack of urgency shown in the development
The
major
early history
of British
theme of British
failure
warfare
attempts
ports
at
the
upon
could
by suggesting
responsible for
to the
warfare.
in chapter
ASW is dealt with
to evaluate the true potential
to assess a developing
looks
and contributed
of anti-submarine
is discussed in more detail in the fifth
of
enemy submarines
of crew endurance was directly
defences of British
neglect of the underwater
the
crews, it offers a
not operate off the east coast of England or in the Atlantic
that serious under-estimation
of
design
four
forced
compromises
belief that
of
successive Inspecting
and train submarine
puzzling
three
effective
second part
influenced
played
discussing the
to recruit
Vickers
the
more
development
the
in
discusses the
is assessed. Chapter
role
policy
Chapter
and
in
granting
monopoly
Navy
and
firm
for
are outlined,
known.
submarine
arms
motives
which
as it attempted
Admiralty
Vickers
the
over construction
monopoly
chapter
by
played
the
of
submarine
it is somewhat
being better
the story
history
construction
boats.
British
no less detailed
and though
bare bones of
the
concise,
of the thesis deals with British
7, and the
of submarine
which examines RN
chapter,
its performance
weapon by examining
in
manoeuvres and in service with rival navies. In chapter six the submarine is
placed in the context of contemporary
on
both
ignorance
the
defensive
of the type's
submarine
submarine
unrealistic
and
into
branch
the
offensive
potential,
British naval strategy, and its impact
operations
caused in part
a closed service,
Navy's
offensive
decision to resume full
is
delayed
strategy,
responsibility
for
described.
General
by the decision
the
incorporation
while
Admiral
to make
of
craft as defensive craft long after they were technically
the
Fisher's
coast defence from
army at short notice had the unwelcome effect of pigeon-holing
offensively.
naval
the
underwater
capable of operating
The tardiness with which the RN recognised the role submarines
could play in re-establishing
a close blockade, and the failure
to anticipate
INTRODUCTION
German
submarine
unrestricted
tendency to identify
warfare,
the
incorporate
into
submarines
submarine,
a
design.
pre-war
coherent
aircraft-carrying
strategic
value
of
problems
inadequacy
The
submarine.
in the seventy years from
and
fully
in
craft
and
close
and, eventually,
the
anti-submarine
in detail at submarine policy
1853 to 1918 can we understand why the Royal
Navy was taken largely by surprise by the submarine's
War
fleet
surface
British
of
Admiralty
the
underwater
using
to
the steam-powered
the
obsessed
tactics was ruthlessly exposed. Only by looking
Great
submarines
struggling
strategy,
overall
with capital ships; the submarine monitor;
co-operation
the
of pre-war
in
But
resources to useless projects:
whose
tactical
the
obscured
of
soundness
doomed itself to devoting
fleet
Individual
policy.
feats made possible by the excellence
extraordinary
and
to
part
of RN submarines in the Great War only emphasised
the existing strengths and weaknesses of British
training
in
the submarine as a defensive weapon.
The performance
performed
due
both
were
explain
why
British
the
performance
in the
came so close to
empire
defeat by starvation.
Three earlier
Royal Navy,
and
Dr Alan Cowpe's
studies -
Dr David Henry's
1869-1918,
1919-1939,
policy,
Admiralty:
conflict
1914-1921
and
Michael
British
in
to shape the
weapons and the
development
submarine
Wignall's
collaboration
have helped
-
Dr
and
Underwater
Scientists
thesis. Thanks
present
on the history
during
activities
of the torpedo,
World
War
1,
and
which really belong to the post-war
The
Geoffrey
whole
Till
Compton-Hall
greatly
from
work
the
savaging it
Cambridge,
chapters
two and three.
London,
of Worcester
College,
Furlong
and
Mr
by
Clive
He also has the dubious
Oxford,
analysis of the performance
Richard
and
by my supervisor,
Commander
of British
Andrew
Wilton
Pembroke
of
distinction
being the
of
to me. Nick
Lambert
me with a copy of his
torpedoes in World
performed
Richard
has read and criticised
submarine policy
very kindly supplied
Dr
It has benefited
Trebilcock
of Messrs Vickers,
to suggest the study of British
submarine,
period.
received.
the historian
branch's
was begun before 1918 but
of the RN Submarine Museum at Gosport.
College,
first
College,
have had to
classes of
has been read and criticised
Kings
of
those
whose development
subsequent to the K-boats,
to these
on the anti-submarine
on
the
warfare,
anti-submarine
works I have felt able to exclude much that would otherwise
be written
and
the
War
arcane
I. Finally,
task
of
INTRODUCTION
computerising
statistics and graphs. Remaining
and typing are all my own work.
errors
of fact,
m
interpretation
INTRODUCTION
Abbreviations used in the text and footnotes
ABSP
Arthur Marder, The anatomy of British sea power: a history of
British naval policy in the pre-Dreadnought
era, 1880-1905 (London
1940)
Additional Manuscripts series in the Department of Manuscripts,
Add. Mss.
British Library
Kew, and the
Admiralty
Adm
papers in the Public Records Office,
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich
Armed merchant cruiser
AMC
AS Anti-submarine
ASW Anti-submarine
warfare
bhp Brake horse power
BNA
Brassey's naval annual
Chief Engine Room Artificer
CERA
Commander-in-Chief
CinC
CO Commanding officer
Commodore (S) Commodore (Submarines)
Cowpe
Alan Cowpe, Underwater weapons and the Royal Navy, 1869-1918
(London University PhD, 1979-80)
DEY
D'Eyncourt papers, National Maritime Museum
DNC
Director of Naval Construction
Director of Naval Intelligence
DNI
Director of Naval Ordnance
DNO
DOD
Director of the Operations Division
DSF
Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal
Navy in the Fisher era, 1904-1919 (5 vols, Oxford 1961-70)
EBC
Electric Boat Company
Engine Room Artificer
ERA
Committee,
FIC
Foreign
Intelligence
the precursor
the Naval
of
Intelligence Department
FG
Arthur Marder (ed), Fear God and dread nought: the correspondence
of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone (3 vols, London
1952-59)
Foreign Office papers in the Public Records Office, Kew
FO
FP Fisher papers in Churchill College Archives Centre
Halpern
Paul Halpern (ed), The Keyes papers: selections from the private
and official
correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Baron Keyes of
Zeebrugge (3 vols, London 1972-81)
GF British Grand Fleet
HSF Imperial German High Sea Fleet
ICS Inspecting Captain of Submarines
Inspector General of Fortifications
IGF
Imperial Japanese Navy
IJN
KP Keyes papers in the Department of Manuscripts, British Library
branch of the Royal Navy, concerned
Mobilisation
M-branch
with
manning
MM
Mariner's Mirror
NID
Naval Intelligence Department
NM
Roger Keyes, The naval memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger
Keyes (2 voll, London 1934-35)
NYPL
New York Public Library
PRO Public Records Office, Kew
RA Rear Admiral
RMA
Reichs Marine Amt, the German Navy Office
INTRODUCTION
m
RN Royal Navy
Royal United Services Institution Journal
RUSI Jo.
SM Submarine
SRLB Surveyor's recommendation letter book, Admiralty papers, Kew
TB
Torpedo boat
TBD
Torpedo boat destroyer
TH
Technical history of World War I in the Naval Library, Ministry
Defence
TrINA
Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects
USN United States Navy
USNI Proc. Proceedings of the United States Naval Institution
War Office papers in the Public Records Ofice, Kew
WO
W/T
Wireless telegraphy
of
Submarine specifications -depend on whether a boat is submerged or at
/
Thus
the surface. The
slash denotes surface/submerged
specifications.
198/220 tonnes" indicates a surface displacement of 198
"displacement
tonnes and a submerged displacement of 220 tonnes.
m
INTRODUCTION
Author's note
All emphases in quotes from
original.
primary
and secondary sources are from
the
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
Genesis
BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1853-1898
An incident at Valparaiso, 1866
Valparaiso
had a population
trade
of about 80,000, most of them supported by the seaborne
the
around
Horn.
Even
in
place, full of Italians and Britons,
But
shipping.
the 1860s the city
was a cosmopolitan
though German was the foreign
language
heard; the ships of a dozen nations swung at anchor in the
most commonly
bay.
at about
South. It is the second city of Chile and in the last century
33°
latitude
towards the Pacific
lies at the foot of hills that tumble
the
broad
sweep of
The
deep
water
the
coast offers
harbour
be
can
no
natural
frighteningly
to
protection
rough,
has
and
claimed vessels displacing more than 3,000 tons.
a Spanish
In 1866 Valparaiso was a city under siege. Two years earlier
islands off
naval squadron had siezed two guano-rich
Chile
was drawn
Valparaiso
Nunez.
the subsequent hostilities
was blockaded
Seeing
Spaniards,
into
that
by
six
ships
conventional
the Chileans
as an ally
commanded
naval
power
searched desperately
for
the Peruvian
by
novel
Peru,
of
Admiral
would
coast;
and
Mendez
defeat
not
weapons.
the
Early
in
1866, a group of patriots planned a torpedo attack on the Spanish squadron
in
bay,
the
scheme -
and at the same time
-
possibly
in
she was built
Mendez
damage
to
rapidly
Nunez
trade
bombarded
and merchandise
the
city,
and creating
wall.
of the larger boat;
and launched towards the end of April,
had
this
with
two submarines were laid down in factories by the harbour
A German named Karl Flach supervised the construction
after
connection
causing
a few weeks
$15,000,000
a profound
sensation
of
in
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
Europe.
After
her
on the
experiment
the
of 3 May
morning
was the builder
confident
trials,
preliminary
craft
eleven
with
people
board. So
on
would be a success that
the submarine
for
submerged
was
he took
his only son with him.
boat had
The
4
When
dawned
squadron
detached
situation
was
"application
from
gradually
to
Rear
Admiral
for
getting
surface,
weaker
had all ceased." [1)
Leander,
reported
towards
evening,
The inventor,
to
She
them
she
Despite
was submerged.
early
designs,
probable
lacking
to
the 42-pdr,
with
the
her movement underwater,
control
provision
indicated
by air
day,
that
morning
boat, armed with a
creep
which
of
up
to
could
primitive
the
in a
blockaders
be fired
while
hydroplanes
to
however, the boat had the fault of many
longitudinal
stability
that she took on an uncontrollable
down in 150 feet of water
apparatus...
gun and a 2.5 inch cannon carried
was designed
unseen and bombard
when
his son, and nine crew were drowned.
42-pounder
cupola.
waterproof
The
that
by Saturday
and which
Flach's submarine was a 45 foot long hand-cranked
short breech-loading
a flying
during
rise
the
command.
was clearly
continued
flying
of
the aid of divers and diving
which
the
reappeared,
Pacific
Courcy
hours.
eight
Commodore
Denman's
de
of
not
frigate
de Courcy,
had gone down
torpedo
the
had
submarine
Michael
was made to me for
rising
endurance
help to the British
hopeless,
already
the spot where the
bubbles
for
Captain
of
pendant
underwater
Flach's
and
Chileans turned
alarmed
broad
May
an anticipated
when
submerged.
It
seems
forward
inclination
and,
going
in the deepest part of the harbour,
her sides
must have collapsed under the increasing pressure.
Flach's
craft
was a fairly
typical
example of the
nineteenth-century
Built
and crewed by enthusiastic amateurs, she was conceived to
fulfil a specific tactical function, but lacked the most basic qualities of an
efficient
warship. Her motive power was inadequate and her weaponry
submarine.
dubiously useful. Insufficient
the difficulty
attention
had been paid to hull strength and to
of navigating submerged, blind and with zero buoyancy.
(1J De Courcy letter of proceedings no. 18,22
May 1866, Adm I/5970.
For the
background to this story, see William Columbus Davis, The last Conquistadores: Spanish
intervention in Peru and Chile, 1863-1866 (Atlanta 1950), especially pp. 285-6,300-06,
de Chiloe (1826)
and Roderigo Fuenzalida Bade, La armada de Chile desde la liberation
hasta el fin de la guerra Espana (1866) (np, Chile 1978) pp. 638-9.
Bade names a
German engineer, Benen, as the designer of the submarine. Flach's crew is said to have
Englishman.
comprised five Germans, two Frenchmen, two Chileans and an un-named
The latter thus became the first Briton to die in a true submarine.
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
As an experiment
was useless, since the blockade
boat was even launched
within
-
inventor
de Courcy,
as
Flach
encouraged
showed
nor
was too little,
offered
They
experimented.
took
before
the
were suspended
shows British
and the Navy, looked on
careful
for
enthusiasm
hostilities
at Valparaiso
this incident
submarine policy at work. Commodore
the
irony
and by a bitter
as a weapon of war she
had been lifted
Valparaiso
of
her loss. But
a week of
was a failure;
the submarine
but
notes,
his design.
neither
help
The
they
and came too late.
When it became clear that rescue was impossible, the Chileans asked de
Courcy
As his divers
to raise the wreck.
at salvage were as close as the Royal
his attempts
a submarine in the nineteenth
acquiring
to
attach
cannot have known
the Commodore
hawsers and chains to the boat,
fruitlessly,
struggled,
Navy was to
that
get to
century.
Inspiration, utilisation, limitations: a survey of submarine development in the
nineteenth century
The
first
David
name in the history
significant
The
Bushnell.
Yale
inspiration,
direct
submarine,
and although
submarine
experimentation,
contemporaries
Washington
most
Turtle
or indirect,
it
his
and
himself
American
was
called it, while John
his
"An
Holland
as 'the
father
complete
example
effort
is that
of
were
the
Turtle
to construct
drew on a vigorous
tradition
that
fired
of
genius",
of
the
his
George
than
believed
the
the most perfect
and
submarine')
vessel, by far
a
of
both
(a man with a better claim
submarine boat built before 1881. " [2]
Bushnell was born in 1740 in Connecticut.
Yale
warfare
every subsequent attempt
successors.
to be "a remarkably
effective
for
Bushnell
his
and
be remembered
to
graduate
of submarine
to
underwater
read
divinity,
warfare,
called mining.
but
instead
his principle
It was a common
At the age of 31 he went to
immersed
preoccupation
himself
in
the
study
of
being what would
today
be
fallacy of the day that an explosion
would
Indiana 1976) pp.
[2) Alex Roland, Underwater warfare in the age of sail (Bloomington,
Submarine warfare:
67,70-4;
Richard Compton-Hall,
monsters and midgets (Poole
1985) p. 93; John Holland, 'Submarine navigation' in Cassier's Magazine, marine number
1897 p. 541
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
dissipate itself
that,
realised
determine
the
on
and do no damage to solid
water
under
and direction
the extent
by
began his experiments
He
water
contrary,
pressure
and -
War of Independence
designed a much larger
Bushnell was not the first
man to construct
against
action
one-man
an
with
was armed
detachable
The
joined
inventor
intended
clockwork
could
the stern of the British
was
In
a
secured
via
shape she
a
lanyard
distance
safe
a
and drive
would
mine
to
the little
submerge,
The
to
and she
to paddle
man-of-war,
victim.
a
tiny
then be
while
the
by Sergeant Ezra Lee to attach Bushnell's
mine to
74 HMS Eagle is perhaps the best-known
story in
Lee set out from
the annals of submarine warfare.
the evening of 6 September
down
several miles
flagship
survive.
to
craft
fuse wound down.
The heroic attempt
Turtle
herself
her operator
withdraw
boat, but he
hence the name -
-
mine
of the intended
Turtle
the
and
released
the hull
does not
together
boat out to the anchorage of a British
the auger into
of the
underwater
submarine
description
1501b clockwork
a
auger.
The
enemy.
vessel whose exact
resembled two turtle-shells
the
In 1775 he
mine.
a submarine
was the first
was the first to arm one, and the Turtle
into
in
charges
to carry this charge into battle.
and his brother built the Turtle
go
to
effect.
spurred on by the outbreak
coastal waters off New England,
-
harnessed
devastating
with
21b gunpowder
detonating
quickly
be
could
of an explosion
Bushnell
objects.
Staten
lay off
the New York shore on
he had propelled
1776 and later claimed
harbour
the
Island,
only
to
the
to find
spot
that
where
he could
Lord
the
Howe's
make his
not
It hardly matters that recent research [3)
auger bite into the warship's
hull.
has shown Lee was probably
nowhere near the Eagle on that or any other
he
that
night,
poisoning,
may
exploits
important
I,
in order
by
overcome
to save face,
carbon
monoxide
and that
American
of Washington
tributes
inspired
them.
David
and Holland
Bushnell's
prove that Ezra
example
was more
than his achievement.
Twenty
another
had
been
inventiveness has ever since been allowed to obscure the
facts. The extravagent
Lee's
have
his story
concocting
pride in Bushnell's
well
years after
American
the Turtle
designed
a
[3) Compton Hall, op. cit. pp. 88-94
set out to challenge
submarine
for
use
the Royal
against
Great
Navy,
Britain.
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
himself
Finding
French
the
Republic
capable
submarine
in
money, he offered
1797. Fulton
the
Hoping
coast.
suggestion failed
demonstrated
was
collapsible
sail
the American
mine-and-auger
but
surface
hydroplanes
candid
right
moments,
"extremely
and
though,
was
incorporated
to be fitted
American
the
which he
her
a
with
armed
many
with
a
Bushnell's
of
Fulton
was able
found
he could
the help of a pair of
to a submarine.
In his more
confess that
his boat was
would
to manage. " [4)
the inventor
received a government
grant of 10,000 francs
his boat and take her out to attack the British,
has been claimed)
[51 and
the
Nautilus
successfully.
When
Decres
October
in
of Marine.
copper-skinned
and after some practice
the first
-
were (it
invention
She
The
provided
over her while submerged with
aft
difficult
At one point
to refit
inventor
the
propulsion.
arrangement
rough control
but
cause for the next two years. With
in 1800 and 1801.
to dive her to depths of 25-30ft
retain
interest,
became Minister
but was 21ft long and carried a crew of four.
innovations,
of prize
himself.
laid down a boat called Nautilus
hand-cranked,
for
a
Britain's
rewards
to arouse the Directory's
Fulton's
at Paris and Brest
submarine
build
to
and had himself designed a submarine as early
as 1783; he was to champion
support,
engineer
enforcing
to reap the rich
the boat's construction
was a naval architect
Forfait's
the civil
proposed
men-of-war
his luck changed in 1799 when Pierre Forfait
Forfait
Wars,
presented a set of plans to the Directory
December
to finance
inventor's
The
the Napoleonic
attacking
of
of the French
blockade
during
painter Robert Fulton
and portrait
of
in France
forewarned
was too
Forfait
1801,
by an excellent
slow and too
French
intelligence
unwieldy
was replaced by the more
the
but the blockaders
government
to
close a target
conventional
lost
system
interest
Admiral
in
the
[6].
[4] Wallace Hutcheon, Robert Fulton and naval warfare (George Washington
PhD thesis 1975) p. 67, quoting Fulton to Volney et al, 12 March 1810
University
[5] Cf. warning letters to Captain Samuel Linzee of L'Oiseau (14 September 1800, Adm
2/140
and Linzee's reply of 21 September 1800, Adm 1/2067) and Admiral Lord Keith
(19 June 1803, in Christopher Lloyd, ed, The Keith papers 111, London 1955 pp. 21-2).
The warning issued to Linzee was made after a report on Fulton's submarine dated 9
September 1800 was received from General Gordon; see precis of miscellaneous secret
papers, Adm 1/4362. The efficacy of these letters must be in doubt; Nautilus was at sea
between Le Havre and La Hogue from 12-15 September. See also 'Admiral Lord Keith',
21 June 1803, digest cut 59-8,
Adm 121103; Hutcheon op. cit. pp. 60,62,82-3
16) Roland op. cit. pp. 89-94;
Hutcheon
op. cit. p. 84
®1
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
The British
to
in
and
admit,
inducement
Prime
were more concerned by Fulton's
1803
the American
Pitt,
signed a contract
and Fulton
the
of
construction
provided
less faith
fourteen
for
in Fulton's
was never fully
submarine
implemented,
States in 1806 to devote his energies to
ships for
Submarine warfare progressed no further
The inspiration
by the
Melville,
Lord
to his inventions
rights
the agreement
steam
1804. Interviewed
of the Admiralty,
had rather
to the United
financial
a substantial
guaranteed him a salary of £200 a
the exclusive
politicians;
returned
Lord
which
the Admiralty
But
had Britain's
the
and the First
in exchange for
years [7].
than
was offered
which brought him to London in April
Minister,
month
inventor
the
than they cared
activities
which
he is best remembered.
for a number of years.
by Bushnell and Fulton
was important
because
it was cherished by a small group of engineers and inventors who had little
else to encourage them.
that
a submarine
The
of Bushnell's
story
even a tiny,
-
Turtle
man-powered
seemed to prove
boat
could
-
attack
warship and be foiled only by bad luck; it inspired designers grappling
inadequate technology.
most celebrated
His reputation
engineers
(a
by an age rich
could
in engineering
talent.
genius lent credence to the somewhat
his submarine.
contemporary
with
on the other hand, was one of the
and his acknowledged
projectors
governments
Fulton,
produced
claims made for
extravagent
other
Robert
a
term
for
be persuaded to finance
Fulton's
experience
inventors)
in
the
the construction
encouraged
belief
that
of submarine
boats, and his example encouraged his numerous successors. Since the first
Nautilus
from
was launched in 1800, at least seven boats have borne the name,
Jules Verne's
fantastic
creation
first
to the world's
nuclear-powered
submarine [8].
The British
naval archives contain
inventions
submitted
would-be
pioneers who submitted
Many
sought
naval
to
the
approval
Admiralty
and
details of more than 300 submarine
between
1800
and
such schemes had a variety
Admiralty
money.
A
few
1900.
The
of motives.
cranks
were
[7J Articles of agreement between Fulton and the British government, 20 July 1804, Adm
1/5121/22. See also Hutcheon op. cit. pp. 84-88,90,
and E. Taylor Parks, 'Robert Fulton
21 (1962) pp. 177-82.
Affairs
and submarine warfare'. Military
influence,
[8] On Fulton's
see also
American's fame that in February 1880
claiming to be Fulton's grand-nephew
inventions. The application was refused.
Adm 12/1060.
digest cut 59-8.
Roland, op. cit. pp. 120-33.
So great was the
a man named Stevenson wrote to the Admiralty
and requested remuneration for his great-uncle's
'Mr J. Stevenson', 25 February and 7 April 1880,
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
inspiration
their
certain
£10-£15,000
sum,
a considerable
was worth
figures
and
of
demanded for a look at some plans; in
were not uncommonly
1892 a Mr G. Buckley asked £200,000 for the rights to his submarine boat,
suggesting that a pension of £500 a week be thrown
[9].
Thirty-seven
in 1855, the Surveyor
years earlier,
rejected
the plans of Cumberland
Mr Hill
appears to be to get Employment
old as his wish to fly
like a bird,
in the Government
inventors
were
significant
number
not
primarily
obsession into
commercial
1850s.
Phillips
for
who turned
an
years before
the
pearl-fishing
and wrecking
ships [11].
Without
governments
Phillips
for
and
torpedoes
to
private
financial
his
-
funding,
The
Lake
submarines,
make
them
which
suitable
for
third
specific
desperate
enemy;
group
tasks.
The
attempts
the
of
projectors
press
to
submarines
of
war
counter
the
designed
a Chicago
be
such inventors
progressive
were
use,
overwhelming
Bushnell,
with
indicates
sunken
turned
to
of
the
guns
and
realistic
to perform
boats
naval
Flach
a
of the world.
submarines
caused several
often
out
for
useful
modification
fitted
military
constructed
by
Phillips,
valuables from
appraisal of what was needed to interest the admiralties
A
and diving
would
recovering
though,
support.
World
First
on the Great Lakes early in the
submarines
is,
that
D.
the
mining
underwater
by Lodner
anticipated
that
Lake,
exploration.
two successful craft
suggested
A
considerations.
-
designed submarines for salvage work,
who built
Indeed most competent
among them
as a tool
ideas were
and
Simon Lake prominent
a successful business in
His
of submarine
put into the construction
by
motivated
the American
-
envisaged the submarine
shoemaker
of
Service. " [10]
and the sheer attraction
craft becomes intelligible.
of underwater
operations.
had
"the object
on the grounds that
must be grasped before the effort
development
War,
Hill
Navy
the
of
played an equal part. Man's desire to swim like a fish is as
Imagination
navigation
in for good measure
be
to
superiority
and
very
built
in
of
an
a Confederate
[91 'Plans of a submarine torpedo boat' 29 November 1892, digest cut Ila,
Adm 1211241
[10] Surveyor's recommendation letter book [S. R. L. B. ) 24 October 1855, Adm 92/18 fol. 2;
see also 'Submarine boat invented by Signor CA Regis', 18 August 1865, digest cut
59-8,
Adm 12/765
[11] Description of 'Phillips' sub-marine
boat', dated 3 January 1859, submitted to Sir
Baldwin Wake Walker, the Surveyor of the Navy; Wake Walker papers WWL 1, National
Maritime Museum.
The most accessible account of Lake's theories is Submarine: the autobiography of
Simon Lake (New York 1938). Readers should note that while the book is broadly
accurate in outline, it is unreliable in detail.
1800-1900
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT
led by the New Orleans
syndicate
McClintock,
James
named
for
prominence
unusual
generous with
to
coming
the
fatalities
not-infrequent
this point
to be less than usually critical
of
(in the short term at least), and
of failure
saw action
contemporaries
and
historians.
boats
were
associated with
such
of
a sort,
thus
Even
the
from
significant
of view.
Wartime
The
War,
Civil
Innovation
were
was suddenly
McClintock
syndicate
at
blockaded
all
by
premium,
and
advantage
of
a
took
all
War
the
of
intended
for
Secession,
the
states, during the
Wars, and the Confederate
during the Napoleonic
American
during
colonialists,
commonly
most
were
submarines
blockade-busting.
French,
by
frequently
were
and they often
of
notice
achieved
projects
backed
they
.
in wartime,
funding;
Such
examples.
reasons:
devices, more tolerant
submarine
more
two
tended,
which
governments
typical
are
and an inventor
Hunley
Horace
broker
Fulton
Bushnell,
fact
this
enemy.
naval
powerful
a
to
the
and
official
secure
backing for their submarine projects.
The last notable use envisaged for underwater
A
and destruction
of harbours
was the infiltration
built
submarine-cum-diving-bell
Scott Russell during the Crimean
which was holding
Cronstadt,
submarine
with
which
up the Allied
British
John
naval architect
to breach the barrier
named Brutus de Villeroi
while
During
at
the
produced a
the rebel base at
to attack
CSS Virginia
age
obstructions.
fleets in the Baltic.
navy hoped
the Federal
and destroy the formidable
Norfolk
of underwater
War was intended
War a French inventor
Civil
American
by the
in the Victorian
craft
she was fitting
out
[12].
For
all
few significant
this activity,
eight decades of the nineteenth
there
was
little
continuity
necessary intellectual,
boats,
and
century.
Most
effort.
Such
of
technological
submarines
advances were made in the first
inventors
and financial
intended
for
service
men
worked alone,
and
lacked
the
generally
resources to build successful
in
war
were
invariably
abandoned when peace was restored.
It is important
was freely
I
to make a distinction
here between inspiration
available to the aspiring designer -
(12] James Baxter III, The introduction
of the ironclad
Records of the Union and Confederate
p. 286; Official
series I vol. 7 (Washington 1902) pp. 488,523-4
and information,
-
which
which was
warship (Cambridge, Mass 1933)
Navies in the War of Rebellion,
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
Many
not.
difficult
problems
inventor
the Irish-American
devoted nearly 40 years of his life
submariner,
it
and
was
forever.
and disappointment
of the Royal Navy's first
John
submarines,
to an obsession; few were prepared
In the absence of official
make such a sacrifice.
an inventor's
would-be
frustration
to stomach continual
Holland,
the
confronted
encouragement,
to
moreover,
chances depended as much upon his persistance and financial
resources as they did upon the merits of his creation.
most obvious difficulty
The
Fulton,
hand-cranking
favoured
was some
Confederate
to
resorted
2.5
knots,
HL
submarine
about
Hurley
mechanisms
specially-designed
proved so inefficient
the
including
and
as that
same
could
oars which
Bushnell
upon
the
Fulton's
best
relied
(in
by
obtained
113). Other
years later
sixty
the
designers
be feathered
theory)
by Villeroi
in
that she was converted to screw propulsion
by
while submerged, but the 16-oared
1861 -2
inventors,
This imposed severe limitations:
muscle power of their crew.
speed
system capable
a propulsion
a submarine beneath the sea. Early
of driving
and
lay in finding
boat built at Philadelphia
Civil War [14).
the Federals during the American
More promising were various proposals to make use of stored power.
the years 1858-9
Plongeur,
a French
a 420-tonne
filled
naval captain,
craft,
Brun.
They
which
drove an 80hp engine,
the
with
Simeon Bourgois,
help
the
of
but the British
grossly
submerged.
fuelled
however,
officers
inefficient
and
A few years later
by the 'ammoniacal
Orleans
could propel
capable
that
a
storage
maximum
calculated
-
first
power,
four
require
"the
the
knots
that an engine
in New
street-cars
gas could not,,
and a commission of British
[13] Secretary of the Admiralty to Lord Keith,
(London 1955); statement by James McClintock,
[14] Louis Bolander, 'The Alligator
Proc. 64 (June 1938) pp. 845-54
the first submarine
along at five knots. The
would
she
predicted
shipbuilding
gas' he had seen powering
a submarine
its
of
James McClintock
be safely generated on board,
stated
Charles-
constructor
naval attache
to be built and systematically developed by a major
was
designed Le
her to capacity with 23 huge cylinders of compressed air
would not be successful, and 'he was right [15]. Though
boat
In
attainable
greatest
19 June 1803, in Lloyd op. cit.
30 March 1872, FO 5/1372
Federal submarine of the Civil
naval
III,
War',
21-2
USNI
[15] FO precis of Captain Hore's naval attache's report
no. 27, dated 23 May 1862,
Palmerston papers ND/D/24/2,
Broadlands Mss. (Department of Manuscripts, Southampton
University Library); Henri Le Masson, Les sous-marin
Francais, des origenes (1800) a
nos fours (Brest 1980) pp. 19-27
I
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
loss from
to prevent
accuracy of workmanship...
leakage at joints,
0
glands
[16]
becoming
boat
"
in
the
the
to
vitiated.
air
guard against
and so
&c.,
was harnessed to
Steam
drive
Confederate
semi-submersible
David
as early as 1862, but the furnaces needed oxygen which was,
torpedo-boats
of course, in short supply once a true submarine had ventured under water.
and adapted for use on the London
San Francisco street-cars
It
Railway.
fitted
latent
utilised
his
in
one
fireless engine was developed
the Lamm
In the 1870s, however,
heat
1879
Liverpool
and the
George
built
at
drove the little boat along at two or three knots. Similar
the four submarines designed by Garrett
Thorsten
arms-maker,
engine did,
of
submerged
Birkenhead.
and no Nordenfelt
20
miles.
impossible.
More
than
more
was therefore
inside
a Garrett/Nordenfelt
water
was superheated.
fourth
by a Swedish
and built
1880s; the
the
their
engines were used
claimed
partners
[17].
last boat
and
boat
The
rose to
effect
Prolonged
or
this had on
repeated
the
significantly,
crew
travel
temperature
farenheit
1000
three
had an underwater
submarine
over
a
The
fully
have serious disadvantages. It took
however,
of
action
for
knots
days to heat the reservoir,
radius
in
Nordenfelt,
submerged speed of five
Lamm
Garrett
flashed into steam when released into the boiler)
Superheated water (which
to propel
Underground
curate
Resurgam,
submarine
to power
efficiency
when
the
is easily
imagined.
suggest it,
in
1861;
two
years
designed the first dual-propulsion
submarine
effort
in attempts
in the same year,
later
the
submarine,
steam on the surface and electricity
considerable
Riou was the first to
was the answer. The Frenchman Oliver
Electricity
envisaging a boat powered by
an electric
abandoned
Alstitt
engineer
when submerged. McClintock
to perfect
but
Confederate
the
for
motor
expended
his second
idea as impractical
and
converted the boat for hand cranking [18].
Workable
of
electric submarines were not really feasible until
the storage battery,
[161 Captain Nicholson
McClintock of Mobile',
August 1871 p. 131
conceived
in 1837 but
not
commercially
available
and Mr Ellis, RN, 'Report on a submarine boat invented by Mr
19 October 1872, Adm 1/6236 box II; see also The Engineer, 25
[17] William Scanlan Murphy, Father of the submarine: the life
Garrett
Pasha, (London
1987) p. 234; Richard Compton-Hall,
beginnings of underwater warfare (London 1983) pp. 48-53,64-71
[18] Compton-Hall
1/6236 box II
the invention
op. cit. pp. 72-3;
of
statement by James McClintock,
the Reverend George
Submarine
boats: the
October
1872, Adm
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
until
the 1870s. (The lead acetate battery used in the first
craft
was developed in 1880. ) [19]
be overcome.
to
problems
naval lieutenant,
Isaac Peral,
built
there were still
were
heavy,
fumes.
The
attache
naval
the boat is a complete
down three times,
but was never able to move more
It
submarine.
accumulator
French
the
was
Gymnote
first
"the
revealed
seems to be that
[20]
significant
inefficient,
help
government
with
Holland
and
modern
by a Spanish
in 1888, was not a conspicuous success, and
the British
of
enquiries
cells
early
poisonous
submarine,
electrically-powered
the
leak
to
prone
worryingly
The
Even then
British
failure...
finally
who
in
was launched
general
Lieutenant
produced
opinion
Peral went
than a few yards. "
efficient
an
1888 and powered
electric
by a 564-cell
battery which was perfected only after years of frustrating
trial
and error [211.
Then
there
was the
problem
progress was made before 1880, although
for
a projector's
Stefan
Drzewiecki
clamoured
inventor
mines
enemy warships as they lay at anchor,
against
a
submarines
vessel in
in
in
first
which
who
little
too
of redundant
Fulton,
could
but which
Drzewiecki,
motion.
Russia (the
a profusion
Bushnell,
attention.
favoured
Here
armament.
of
useful
systems
the
Polish
be planted
under
and
would have been useless
built
1877 and the
two
quite
second two
advanced
years later)
intended his boats to dive beneath a ship and release floating* charges which
would
bob upwards and be trapped
experiments
with
this system failed
were constructed by the British
and the American
which
carried
Holland
installed
planning
range
Oliver
divers
underneath
[22].
Other
the target's
hull.
All
submarine
mining
Halstead (in the 1860s); both designed submarines
breach
explosives
to
pneumatic
'dynamite
guns' in several of his early
to bombard his victims
and discharge a projectile
[20] Captain William
231/22
history
May,
vessels
John Scott Russell (in the 1850s)
shipbuilder
and
[19] John Maber, 'The
Ministry of Defence.
his
of
'Spain -
from
into
an awash position
the
the electric
fleet,
underwater
target's
battery',
dockyards &c. ', NID
boats,
or close to short
side from
pamphlet
obstructions.
underwater.
P1001, Naval
no. 346, April
Library,
1893, Adm
[21] Le Masson op. cit. pp. 44,48,50
[22] Captain Ernest Rice, 'Report, with tracing, of a submarine boat', 27 November 1880,
29 January 1879, FO
Stanley, despatch no. 3 Political,
Adm 116551; Consul-General
65/1054
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
Phillips and Flach fitted
Other
had
designers
buoyant
with
experimented
to dive his submarine
onto
submarine guns to their craft.
but
in practice
from
boat's commanding
in
boats
the
did
and the Hunley
years the
only)
to carry a
by the
bow; it was to be detonated
least
at
the
simplicity
a submarine
on which
with
and
Federal
the
(and for fifty
the first
on 17 February 1864 -
occasion
of
virtues
her famous encounter
survive
not
Housatonic
sloop-of-war
Hunley
at least as dangerous to friend- as it was to foe,
it was, however,
certainty;
to keep the
and was successfully used by Russian torpedo
had
1877)
of
difficult
machine
after he had rammed his target. The spar (which
officer
war
idea was
original
charge was secured to a 22ft yellow-pine
the submarine's
to Le Plongeur
was also fitted
it
he found
McClintock
and
an infernal
thus drawing
Instead his syndicate converted
A 901b gunpowder
pole projecting
Fulton
McClintock's
towed torpedoes.
the target,
device clear of its parent.
spar torpedo.
ideas.
own
under
hull,
the enemy's
their
sank an enemy
warship
[23].
The
torpedo
-a
for
had to wait
submariners
pioneer
the fish
of
device that could strike at a distance and reduce a projector's
dependence on the suicidal courage of his crew For
potential.
significant
invention
the
damage to an enemy
plausibly
hope
to
to themselves, submarines
would
never (wrote
unless they
than
to acquire a weapon of
could
do
more
naval attache to France in the late 1880s) "be sufficiently
Captain Domville,
a bugbear" [24].
The
was, in
problem
fact,
a little
appeared, and Robert Whitehead's
-
was not fitted
with
enthusiasm
could
intention
celebrated torpedo
-
it
than
complicated
first
in service by 1869
to a submarine until 1885. This may seem odd, given the
which
1870s, but there
who
more
were
afford
of fitting
to
the
weapon was adopted
good reasons for
purchase
the
Whitehead
which led the world in torpedo
use on board ocean-going
[23] On the details of
story of Confederate
Eustace Williams, Tice
1958, typescript in the
[24] Captain William
1889, Adm 231/16
the delay.
Most
inventor's
expensive
to submarine
boats.
the
navies in
by many
obviously,
secret
The
the
those
had
Royal
no
Navy,
development during the 1870s, envisaged its
warships, perhaps as a sort of long-range
ram
the Hunley's armament, see Milton Perry, Infernal
machines: the
submarine and mine warfare (Baton Rouge 1965) pp. 98-99
and
Confederate submarine Hunley documents (np Van Nuys, California
New York Public Library)
Domville,
'France:
guns and torpedoes 1889', NID
no. 211, December
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT
in the confused
Mersey class torpedo
Other
of this policy.
that
were expected to characterise
melees that
3,000-ton
Britain's
nations
at short
of the Whitehead
'secret'
manouevrable
torpedo
Whitehead's
-
knew nothing
of its officers
The majority
(destroyed
belief
the widespread
by the explosion
this boat and those like her will
the
commanding
that
the boat. " [28]
boat
French
"when
it fired
Not until
was it acknowledged
that
into the secret, and
'fish'
[26).
weapon. The
fate of the
torpedo)
encouraged
own
submarines
were seriously at
HMS
I that "it remains to be shown how far
stand the effect
distance. " [27)
short
at a comparatively
workings;
In 1885 the research station
action.
of the Norden felt
Vernon remarked
of her
that all torpedo-armed
they went into
risk every time
Beresford
of the
of obtaining
of the torpedo's
was in any case a controversial
torpedo
Hunley
ignorance
the privilege
only a handful of men fully understood a Whitehead
HL
the 1860s
and during
initiated
before
being
to
silence
neophytes were sworn
The
that
plans, the Royal Navy was not about to reveal them to the
the inventor's
world.
their
was well guarded. Little
paid £15,000 for
Having
capabilities.
for
depended
were kept in profound
inventors
and the 1870s submarine
boats
torpedo
balance chamber
the
-
to outsiders,
was made available
products
submarine [25].
enabled the weapon to travel at any set depth
or no information
but
range,
safety on speeds far beyond any contemporary
The
a war at sea.
cruisers were the logical
small,
preferred
press home an attack
could
1800-1900
Gustave
Eleven
Zede
its own torpedo
of a submarine explosion
years later,
suggested to
was only
Lord
Charles
the concussion could smash
the French conducted careful
a submarine
the officer
trials in the 1890s
endangered
if closer than
[25] Alan Cowpe,
Underwater
1869-1918
(London
weapons and the Royal Navy,
University
Ph. D. 1980) pp. 26-8,69,71,114-27,172-81.
Proponents of underwater
craft often pointed out that Whitehead's torpedo was in effect a miniature automatic
submarine boat; and indeed the German Navy considered in 1874 a proposal that the
British inventor should design them a submarine. RE Stotherd, 'Report on the German
torpedo establishments at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven &c. ' 25 November 1874, GT Phipps
Museum. Similarly,
Louis
Homby
the inventor
papers PHI 109/3, National Maritime
Brennan, designer of a short-range
torpedo for coast defence, suggested that
wire-guided
he should build a submarine for the Royal Navy; Wilson memo 'Submarine boats'. 15
January 1901, Adm 117515.
[26] Coape
op. cit. pp. 18,35
[27] HMS Vernon annual report
[28] The memoirs of
Lord
1885 p. 63, Adm 189/5
Charles Beresford
(London 1914) 1,362
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
[29].
75
torpedo
to
explosion
a
about
yards
importantly
Most
from
torpedoes
discharge
underwater
feasible until
torpedoes was not technically
of projecting
the
all,
of
the early 1880s. The
concern for the possibilities
decision to place a ship's
technique
submerged tubes was not perfected
end of the decade [30], and the impetus for this development
from
Whitehead
of
of torpedo-armed
the
until
stemmed not
submarines but from
where they were least vulnerable
Whiteheads
a
to
enemy gunfire.
impractical
It was, in short,
before
the middle
planned
which
Nordenfelt
this reason Thorsten
1880s, and for
the Nordenfelt
to equip
I
two Lay
with
also patented
in 1883 before fitting
electric torpedo of his own invention
at first
torpedoes,
wire-guided
on deck. The Swedish arms tycoon
were mounted
tube
to arm any submarine with a torpedo
an
his boat with a
Whitehead tube in 1885. The Whitehead could only be discharged when the
submarine
was at the
the crew being
surface,
to
required
out on
climb
deck to trigger the torpedo [31].
For a surface vessel, the problem
protecting
forward
against the rush of displaced water caused by the ship's
a 'fish'
motion.
of submerged discharge was one of
For
a submarine,
difficulty
the chief
lay in compensating
no evidence that
was some time
suddenly lightening
weapon.
arranging
the Norden felt
before
for
a couple
preferred
happy
to
externally-mounted
to the pressure hull,
fit
heftily-built
of
a Whitehead
the
craft
supplied
idea
of
by firing
the
problem
by
the
for'ard
carrying
a
was discharged. The less innovative
experimental
torpedoes,
where
stokers to run
the
about
1900s the Royal Navy got around
heavy box at the moment
French
felt
one end of their delicately-trimmed
In the early
and it
I ever discharged her Whitehead,
submariners
early
is, in fact,
There
for the sudden loss of weight when a torpedo was fired.
submarine
without
they were difficult
Gymnote
tubes and fixed
to maintain
with
two
by pylons
and vulnerable
[29] Theodore Ropp, The development of a modern navy: France 1871-1904 (Harvard
University Ph. D. 1937) p. 545; Le Masson op. cit. pp. 50-1.
For American experiments (c. 1894) see Frank T Cable, The birth and development of
the American submarine (New York 1924) pp. 100-01. For British experiments (1907), see
section 7.2
[30) Cowpe op. cit. pp. 71 -82;
Ruddock Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone
1973)
(Oxford
Experiments with submerged discharge were conducted by the Royal Navy's
pp. 153-56.
Torpedo Committee from 1870, but the tube was for years fixed and stationary.
[31) CW Sleeman, 'The Lay and other locomotive torpedoes',
BNA 1887 p. 406; Murphy op. cit. pp. 93-4
pp. 63,67-8;
RUSI
Jo.
XXVII
(1883)
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
to damage. Later French boats were fitted
Drzewiecki
external
'drop
collars',
of tubes and
with a combination
which
the
permitted
torpedoes
be
to
crudely angled [321.
But many projectors
Keeping
a submerged boat on an even keel proved
Submarines
problem.
buoyancy,
positive
bottom
the
never got the chance to worry
dive
by
and (broadly
unless trimmed
in
taking
they
finely-balanced
a craft.
decidely
to
tricky
Nordenfelt
when
tanks. swilled
Portuguese
the
and
handle
boiler
partially-full
The
naval
intractable
Don
for
because the
upsetting
trim.
Fontes
Pereira
their
plunge to
buoyant.
neutrally
submarines,
about,
destroy
to
the longitudinal
submerged
lieutenant
an almost
then happily
become
years it seemed almost impossible to maintain
weaponry.
water
enough
speaking) they will
so that
about
For
stability
of so
example,
were
water
in
their
Nordenfelt,
Lake
de Mello
(with
Fontes, 1892) were among the designers who steadfastly refused to dive a
submarine
at an angle, as Holland
trimmed
stopped and carefully
vertical
propellers
trials
Instead, their
boats were
down until just awash, then clawed under by
mounted on deck, for fear that the submarine might take
forward
on an uncontrollable
The solution
recommended.
inclination
to this problem
of Le Plongeur
and dive to her destruction [331.
eluded even the determined
French.
The
were abandoned in the 1860s when it was realised
that she was excessively unstable. At 140 feet in length, she was by far the
largest submarine
the boat for
built
diving,
in the nineteenth
and even then she showed a disturbing
which act as horizontal
to many boats from
of
arranged,
formally
reliable
rudders to control
the Nautilus
trials
(1893-99)
and the problem
commissioned.
source that
to trim
tendency
to
[34]. Hydroplanes,
a submarine's
pitch,
were fitted
onwards, but were rarely placed abaft the
The Gustave Zede underwent
where they were most effective.
propeller
It took an hour
between the surface and the sea-bed
veer uncontrollably
years
century.
before
her
hydroplanes
were
satisfactorily
was by no means solved by the time
In May 1899 the British
she was "a failure,
that
[321 Le Masson op. cit. pp. 48,51,59;
Bacon
submarine boats' 2 July 1901, Adm 1/7522
her
report
Admiralty
learned
ever coming
'Drzewiecki
six
she was
from
a
back from
discharge
gear
for
[33] Thorsten
Nordenfelt,
'On submarine boats', RUSI Jo. )OOC (February
1886)
'A new submarine boat', Scientific
American 66 p. 137,27 February 1892
pp. 159-60;
134] Captain Hore,
naval attache's report no. 11,19
February 1864, Adm 1/5901
'
®1
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
[and]... that she has
Marseilles, after her recent trip, was problematical,
...
never dived for more than eleven minutes, and that only once. That was
during the trip back from Marseilles, and they thought they would go lower
and lower and never come back again... the Captain is not at all happy... "
[35]
The
than
underwater
simple
oxygen
endurance
in
consumption
nineteenth
to
reluctance
the
ocean
was limited
depths.
The
the supply
air
cylinders
available
of
to them.
compressed
air,
endurance tended to be measured in minutes rather
Fenian Ram had air "for
at least half an hour"
grace claimed for
a submarine
George
American
Baker
Such estimates
42
inches
hand-crankers
Twenty
including
it
without
when
submerged
than hours.
Holland's
IF
[37],
Alexandrofsky
and the hour's
built at Chicago early in the 1890s by the
was described
by
the
British
naval
attache
as
[38].
"considerable"
long,
the
under water [36), an early
to dive for 45 minutes
the ability
with
caution
inventors,
submarine designed in 1863 by the Russian photographer
was credited
in
fear of suffocation)
Many
and
of
physiology
submariners to err on the side of
of
by more
understood
well
but prudence (and a not-unnatural
century,
installed
Fulton,
plumb
submarines
enclosed spaces was not
encouraged most pioneer
estimating
of early
-
were
in
needlessly pessimistic.
the
beam
and
crewed
The
by
tiny
Hunley
hard-working
eight
established an endurance record in the winter
five minutes
of 1863-4.
she had submerged the air was so foul
after
40ft
-
that a
candle would not burn, but the crew stayed down for more than two and a
half hours [39].
the surprising
Numerous disasters and near-disasters
endurance
of humans trapped
have since confirmed
in a submarine;
the artificers
who cut a hole in K13, a British boat stranded for 35 hours on the bottom
of the Gairloch
in January
1917, were almost overwhelmed
[35] Jeffreys to Egerton 27 May 1899, Adm 1/7422. (Jeffreys
Captain of HMS Vernon. )
[36] Archibald
Consul-General
was DNO
and Egerton the
(Archibald
to Thornton 20 December 1880, FO 5/1746 fols. 186-9.
in New York, and Thornton the British Ambassador to Washington)
[37] Arthur Wellesley,
Mitchell, A history of
[38] Captain
Adm 231/22
by the Stygian
Gerald
January 1873, Adm
military attache's report no. 9,22
Russian and Soviet seapower (London 1974) p. 181
Langley,
'United
States: Navy dockyards,
[39] Personal account by WA Alexander in the New Orleans
1902, copy in RN Submarine Museum archives A1985/63
materiel
Daily
was
1/6281; DW
&c. ',
Picayune,
July
1893,
29 June
`
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900
blackness of
the
escaped from
which
air
her
but
-
it
with
came 47
survivors [40].
Not
Captain
1901 did
until
Reginald
Bacon,
the
Royal
Navy's
first
Inspecting Captain of Submarines, lock himself and two full crews in one of
the
building
then
submarines
"Although
oxygen consumption.
"it
memoirs,
the
Navy
Barrow
at
less from
of "an elderly
the efforts
along a flute
human
that
representative
of the Holland
bodies in
he and
and who played
the best of times the flute
"At
instrument, " recalled Bacon, "but the dirges to which we
is not an inspiring
I believe caused us
were treated that night, in the bowels of the submarine,
to
after,
close
who had
company
to while away the time",
wherewith
their
air than they did from
the effects of vitiated
the long watches of the night.
on through
ever
measure
did not give off poisonous exhalations. " In the event,
his men suffered
all,
to
now, " wrote Bacon in his
we know better
by no means certain
was then
confinement
brought
for
look
on the
flute
a large
with
measure of
personal
enmity. " [41]
The
last great
technical
problem
was that
of
There were no charts detailing
underwater currents.
hulls
a submarine
and
electric
motors
of
submarine
navigation.
The thick iron pressure
combined
to
distort
compass
bearings, while the chances of makings accurate observations at the surface
were restricted
by the longitudinal
instability
of most early boats; periscopes
were useless if a submarine could not be controlled
difficult
was, therefore,
to attain
the pin-point
at a specified depth. It
accuracy
necessary for
a
succesful attack.
Contemporary
Key,
Senior
Naval
appreciations
Lord
from
made much of this point.
1879 to 1885,
thought
Sir Astley Cooper
"very
little
of
any
vessel intended to be navigated under water as it is not possible to see any
distance, " [42]
and as late as 1902 a Major
details of an invention
to secure "immunity
Everitt, The K boats: a dramatic
submarines (London 1962) p. 76
[40) Don
first
Marrow
from
report
sent the
submarine
on the Navy's
Admiralty
attack...
inky
most calamitous
[41)
Reginald Bacon, From 1900 onward (London 1940) pp. 56-7.
Further experiments
were conducted by the RN as late as 1905, when Professor Haldane and 15 men shut
themselves inside AS for 24 hours and emerged unscathed. Talbot diary 20 + 21
September 1905, Imperial War Museum 81/42/2
[42) Bound volume of reports on the 'Supposed Fenian submarine torpedo boat in the
course of construction at New York', fol. 25: Key minute to Archibald despatch Secret
no. 70,7 January 1881, Adm 1/6551
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT
1800-1900
fluids to be discharged to becloud and discolour
to
vessel
"The
difficulty
position. " [44]
The
to
coming
to
surface
showing themselves briefly
but the element
of surprise
must be
one's
ascertain
type -
were
at the surface to
again before guns could be trained
bearings and diving
system worked,
the
with
distance
as it
notably those of the Holland
Several boats -
in fact designed to 'porpoise',
get their
to the problem
is one of the great difficulties,
frequently
be
to
was found
as it
of seeing a vessel at a very moderate
boat,
an underwater
necessary
[43]
whereabouts. "
inasmuch
"a failure
Lord Hood, drew the Board's attention
and the DNO,
from
its
to see a vessel at a distance of more than two yards, "
impossible
the remark:
finding
from
submarine
boat was accounted
Alexandrofsky's
almost
a
prevent
the
the water surrounding
was often
on them.
lost, giving an
enemy the chance to manouevre out of harm's way.
failure
The
to
weapon
effective
It
consequences.
in
restricted
evolve
and
reliable
meant
that
their
choice
the
most
probable
submarine
boat
might
were
torpedo
efficient
an
motor,
hydroplanes
Stationary
of targets.
In
be
probably
had
obvious
hand-cranked
early,
victims.
a useable periscope,
1873
of
defences, but not so efficient
important
and
submarines
Hood
considerable
defences
for
"a
that
observed
value
very
were
vessels and fixed
Lord
an
destroying
nearly as a means of attack against
vessels especially when in motion. " [45]
Similarly,
primitive
submarines had a tiny radius of action
few miles at best. The perspiring
submarine
Fulton's
out
to
attack
Confederate
Yankee
raised
privateer
blockader
and
anchor
submarine
to come
miles
without
when the British
further
moved
HL
within
four
than
was rendered impotent
Nautilus
usually a
oarsmen who rowed John Scott Russell's
manage no more
could
-
Hunley
range;
spent
she could
out
Robert
relief.
vessels it had set
to
sea,
the
and
months
waiting
travel
no more
for
a
than
twelve miles in a night [46].
[43] 'Immunity
12/1377
from
[44] Wellesley report
attack from
no. 9,22
submarine
January,
vessels' 9 January
1902, digest cut Ila,
Adm
and Hood minute 8 March 1873, Adm 1/6281
[45] Ibid
for consideration'
[46] Scott Russell 'Memorandum
GU/RU/1149
enc. 1; Roland op. cit. pp. 100-01,103;
RN Submarine Museum archives A1985/63
28 January 1856, Palmerston papers
Alexander's account 29 June 1902,
DEVELOPMENT
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE
It can hardly
be emphasised too strongly
constructed
during
the nineteenth
century,
misleading.
Without
an efficient
periscope,
have
would
to
submergence
attack
1893 Intelligence
awash
while
therefore,
was,
was an
Department
that,
the
surface,
contemplated
only
quite
submarine
complete
when
evasive
manoeuvre.
idea
"the
that
observed
is
and
defensive
essentially
report
'submarine'
torpedo-armed
the
at
to boats
when applied
term
any
or
generally
Diving
was required.
action
1800-1900
of
An
attacking
under water actually is not believed to be practicable. " [47]
At this transitional
stage in her development,
rather than her speed. "It
of
production
submerged, "
to
a craft
construct
Cyprian
"The
reported
the
United
NID
States appear to have acquired
in
May
1900,
to navigate her awash until
have to come to
the
"but
she
from
partially
American
The
a successful vessel, "
hardly
can
be
called
type as it is apparently
fire,
she gets under
surface
all
in 1900 were subject to the same
being more of a 'submersible'
'submarine',
1889 [48].
in
that
be only
shall
which
Bridge
submarines purchased by Britain
criticism:
on her invisibility
vessel, but
sunken
actual
or
Captain
noted
was really
would appear that no recent design aims at the
sub-marine,
now desire
projectors
Holland
a real
for protection
boat which relied
no more than a torpedo
the submarine
time
to
but even then,
time,
so as to
a
intended
she will
rectify
her
course. " [49]
Most submarine builders therefore
with
as low a silhouette
more
than
18"
of
as possible.
Norden f elt
I
steaming on the surface [50]. )
difficulty,
(It
was the inventor's
was visible
towers,
inches out of the water.
It was this imperative,
field
of
vision
and
in turn
left
the
restricted
of
'United
[48] Bridge minute 17 April
[49] Intelligence
231/31
Department
States: Navy dockyards, materiel
a few
the commanding
swamping
ever-present;
steaming with the hatches closed, on the other hand, both officers
[47] Langley report
was
boats with
their
kept hatches only
severely
danger
submarine
no
not some technical
not to fit
the absence of which
This
boast that
the
when
that persuaded the early submariners
decks and conning
officer's
devoted themselves to designing boats
and men
&c. ', July 1893, Adm 231/22
1889, Adm 1/6998
report
'Submarine
[50] Statement cited in despatch from
May 1882, FO 188/144
Horace
boats',
NID
Rumbold
no. 577, May
(HM
1900 p. 5, Adm
Ambassador,
Stockholm)
I
1
1.2 BRITISH
M
SUBMARINE
POLICY
DURING
THE
CRIMEAN
were denied fresh air and kept cooped up below
usually in conditions
sea -
WAR
while the vessel was at
so cramped and unpleasant that crew endurance
was minimal.
That was why the Royal Navy had little
being
built
in
offensively-minded
the
nineteenth
century.
use for the sort of submarines
It
low freeboard
and defence. Their
useless in the steep coastal waters of the British
the weapons to attack
slowly, reluctantly,
highly
a
mobile,
service. If submarines were taken seriously at all, it was
as weapons of desperation
the speed nor
was
rendered them
Isles, and they had neither
warships on the move.
and for seconds rather than minutes,
hours. On the rare occasions that a submarine
lived
They
dived
minutes rather than
up to her fine title,
she was a menace to nothing but herself.
Bauer and the Prince Consort
Wilhelm
Real British
16 years of Victoria's
inventions
letter
and
amount
of
War.
on the subject [51] had reached the Admiralty
Only one communication
the first
boats can be dated to the Crimean
interest in submarine
but from
reign,
in
1853 a steady stream of
and reports were digested in the bulky volumes that record every
submission
by the
received
Secretary
by the Admiralty
business transacted
of
the
Admiralty.
was huge,
even in
The
the
quiet years of the mid-Victorian
era, and the proportion of that
business which concerned submarines was, of course, tiny. But the Royal
relatively
Navy soon became familiar
Surveyor rejected Lodner
does not
appear
that
with underwater weapons. As early as 1859 the
Phillips'
there
is
submission with the weary observation,
any
great
advantage in it over the numerous propositions
novelty
in
the
plan
or
"it
any
in regard to the construction
of boats for similar purposes. " [52j
[51] 'Bassett's submarine gun boat' 9 August 1849, digest cut 59-8,
Adm 12/509. During
the research for this chapter,
digests were searched for the period
the Admiralty
1793-1900,
Three
and the Surveyor's Department records for the years 1812-1860.
projects were submitted between 1800 and 1809, four between 1810 and 1819, tvm from
1820 to 1829, and none between 1830 and 1849. Aside from its dealings with Robert
Fulton, the Admiralty did become involved in one other submarine project early in the
Tom Johnson is
nineteenth century: the RN's relationship with the submarine-builder
described in Appendix 2.
[52] S. R. L. B. 2 June 1859, Adm 92/20 fol. 591
Graphs
la
Submarine submissions
Total received
DISCUSSION
Graph la shows the number of
submissions
concerning
by
the
submarines
received
Admiralty
between
1853
and
1900. Data has been drawn from
digests, cuts Ila
the Admiralty
(boats) and 59-8
(projects
for
annoying the enemy), and from
Surveyor's
department
the
for
the
records
period
1853-1860.
The
latter
series
in its old form
was discontinued
in 1860.
Submarine submissions
lb
Admiralty
by
annually
Annual change
No. of submissions
Change
40
from
previous
year
15
10
30
5
20
0
-6
10
-10
0
-16
1865
1880
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1896
1900
1855
1860
1865
1870
Year
1c
1876
1880
1886
1890
1895
1900
Year
Submarine submissions
Cumulative total
350
Total No. of Submarines
300
The digest entries record all
submissions sent to the Secretary
Admiralty,
the
the
of
and
Surveyor's papers all submissions
his office.
If
the
sent to
Surveyor found a submission of
some merit or significance he
would submit a brief report on
it to the Board of Admiralty;
thus some of the Surveyor's
records are duplicated in the
(I
have
secretariat
papers.
duplicated
counted
submissions
only once for the purpose of
these figures. ) The
preparing
less meritous of the Surveyor's
submarine
submissions
were
never seen by the Secretary of
In
1860 the
the Admiralty.
Surveyor was elevated to the
Board of Admiralty
with the
title of Controller, and thereafter
all submissions were channelled
through the Secretary and,
hence, into the digests.
The
number
of
submissions recorded between the
inception of the Admiralty
digest
in
1793 [1)
British
the
and
in
adoption
of the submarine
1900 was 328 [2]. Of these, 318
were received between the years
1853 and 1900, an average of
6.8
This
per
year.
statistic
should be enough to dismiss the
popular
that
the
notion
Admiralty
in
happy
remained
ignorance of the submarine until
late
in
very
the
nineteenth
It is, indeed, apparent
century.
Royal
that
Navy
the
was
perfectly
well - informed
about
developments
in
submarine
warfare during the Victorian
era.
The use to which
it put this
knowledge is, of course, another
matter.
250
200
150
100
50
0
1855
total
1860
1865
1870
1875
Year
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
Discussion of a simple
is,
average
nevertheless,
misleading, and the number of
submissions
received
varied
from year to year.
significantly
in
Notable
peaks are recorded
1878,1885,
the
and
years
1893-4,
and from 1893 to the
end of the century the number
the
exceeds
submissions
of
average in every year. Graph Ib
shows these peaks more clearly
difference
illustrating
by
the
between each year's
total and
submissions
the
of
number
during
the
previous
received
in
increase
Thus
the
the
year.
received
number of submissions
in 1877 was 7, in 1878 it was 9
largest
in
1885
the
and
increase recorded - it was 14.
The probable significance
of
these peaks is debatable, but at
least two appear
to represent
in submarine
interest
increased
by
designs
generated
trials
of
popularly-reported
vessels. The great
experimental
in 1885 was
increase recorded
the
of
result
certainly
almost
Nordenfelt's
with his
experiments
first boat. The greater number
in
the
made
of
submissions
1890s
the
probably
reflects
increased
pace of development
in France
(note
the peak in
1893-4,
coincides
with
which
the launching and early trials of
Gustave
Zede)
the
the
and
the
that
growing
certainty
development
of a truly efficient
the
submarine
was just around
Graph lc, a cumulation
corner.
of the 318 submissions received
between 1853 and 1900, could
legitimately
be said to reflect in
form
the
of
pace
visual
century
nineteenth
submarine
development.
Notts
[1] The scheme was worked out
in the years 1808-1812, but the
system
was
applied
to
the
retrospectively
1793 to
correspondence from
1808.
(2) For the record, the earliest
submission (dated 14 September
1800) was a letter to Captain
Samuel
Linzee of
L'Oiseau,
warning him to be on his guard
for Fulton's submarine. Digest
Adm 12/87; Linzee
cut 59-8,
to Admiralty 21 September 1800,
Adm 1/2067.
SUBMARINE
1.2 BRITISH
POLICY
The first notable invention
'hyponaut
the
DURING
CRIMEAN
THE
to the Surveyor's
submitted
devised by a Bavarian
apparatus'
projector,
the Surveyor's
however,
was to power
Department
to interview
come to the Admiralty
The
Bauer.
[53].
submarine and to have persuaded other
seriously.
In January
of Holstein,
Duke
Duchy's
Ministry
instituted
by
Prussian talers from
clockwork-driven
Danish
the naval budget.
With
to have built
boat to the
forces
of a full-sized
driving
for
crewmen
the craft
Bauer,
structure.
water
this money he built
On her first
through
Brandtaucher
Austria
and local civilians.
large
turned
of
funds
diving
had
trial
to an
the
him
(1 February
Britain.
the time
captain
to
a screw,
to
Unfortunately
weaken
and Bauer
the stricken
boat's
the
1851) she shipped
and the inventor
By
-a
connected
speed of three knots.
forced
contributions
Named Der Brandtaucher,
treadwheels
to escape alive from
was unsalvageable,
and then
a large,
was charged with
leaky glands to become unmanageable,
were lucky
30
boat.
along at a maximum
a shortage
companions
for
who
him
to allocate
she displaced 30 tons and was manned by a crew of three
two
the
model which was successfully demonstrated
working
members of the army
and
break
during
The submarine was built at Kiel with the help of voluntary
from
of the
such a vessel might
naval
a
to take him
a submarine
assemblage of notables. In due course a commission
construction
in Wilhelm
in the army
and persuaded the Ministry
revolt,
1854,
Faraday to
governments
the plans for
He suggested that
Schleswig-Holstein
inventors
corporal
of Marine.
blockade
the
an artillery
Bauer submitted
On 26 August
an interest
taking
workable
1850, while
enough,
him [54].
he was one of the few submarine
Firstly,
Predictably
than Professor Michael
had several reasons for
Admiralty
Bauer,
Wilhelm
took the unusual step of re-examining
scheme, asking no less a figure
Bauer's
his submarine.
was unimpressed by the invention
the Admiralty
was
and refused to give details of the allegedly
Isaac Watts and Thomas Lloyd
engine that
Department
by the naval constructors
in 1853. But Bauer was evasive when questioned
revolutionary
WAR
enough
and his
submarine.
Der
left
Germany
he reached London,
Wilhelm
eventually
[53) Surveyor to Bauer 30 July and 5 August 1853, Adm 91/15; 'Bauer's hyponaut
apparatus'. S.R. L. B. 16 August 1854, Adm 92/17 fol. 82. Brief details of Bauer's submarine
may be found in his patent application (25 May 1853), copy in RN Submarine Museum
archives A1853/1
(54] Surveyor to Bauer 24 August 1854, Adm 91/16; S.R. L. B. 22 August 1854, Adm 92/17
fol. 82
1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR
--m
had demonstrated
Bauer
his model
his successor, Maximillian
submarine
to Ludwig
I of Bavaria,
11, and to the young Austro-Hungarian
to
emperor
Franz Joseph [55].
reason for
The second and far more compelling
Bauer was the patronage the Bavarian secured from
at Osborne [56],
to the Royal family
and Albert
lost.
Consort
Prince
The
had
a
technology,
took an interest in a wide variety
sufficiently
unconventional
Cowper
Coles' controversial
proposals gripped
priori'
become
to
his model submarine
his imagination,
Indeed
Bauer
the
instigation
of
First Lord,
first
Admiralty's
the
Prince
a prominent
proponent
and he became convinced
contact
he would
the
with
who wrote
investigation
to request a prompt
and
and was
Captain
of
Bavarian's
is 'a
"it
that
and new a fact as submarine navigation
ensured
Consort,
science
of naval inventions,
should be useless in the hands of men of genius. " [58)
a supporter,
in
ship a decade later [57). The
turret
impossible that so important
powerful
impressed
model when the first
interest
lifelong
in
Arriving
was sufficiently
Bauer with the funds to construct another
to provide
was
Prince Albert.
late in the summer of 1852 he demonstrated
in Britain
interest
Admiralty
By acquiring
be treated
inventor
to Sir
with
so
respect.
at the
was, made
James Graham,
the
[59].
The RN's willingness to reinvestigate Bauer's proposals in 1854 may also
be attributable
to the fact
much more concrete
Albert's
suggestion,
form
that
the German
projector's
plans took
between July 1853 and August 1854. At
he was introduced
to the
noted
Isle of Dogs, and had made the Prince
as
Exhibition.
to
secretary
the
committee
Consort's
that
acquaintance
had
organised
By 1853 he was already engaged in building
[55]
Eberhard Rossler, The U-boat:
submarines (London 1975) pp. 10-12
the
evolution
and
Prince
John
naval architect
Scott Russell late in 1853 [60). Russell owned a shipyard at Millwall
earlier
on a
technical
two
years
Great
the
Brunel's
history
on the
singularly
of
German
[56] The Times court circular 6 August 1852 p. 5 col. c
[57] Stanley Sandler, The evolution of the modern capital ship (Newark, Delaware
engineer and
p. 184; George Emmerson, John Scott Russell: a great Victorian
architect (London 1977) p. 84
[58] Albert
to Palmerston 9 January 1856, Palmerston papers RC/H/59
[59] Albert
Library
to Graham
25 June 1853, microfilm
[60] Rossler op. cit. p. 12
43, Graham
papers, Cambridge
1979)
naval
University
1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR
Great Eastern
ambitious
in the world
by far the largest ship yet laid down anywhere
-
system of shaping
wave-line
of the double bottom,
and as the inventor
-
Naval Architects,
of the Institute
vessels, and co-founder
the Englishman
of the
pioneer
of
to help Bauer construct
was well qualified
a new submarine [61].
Bauer moved down to Greenwich,
and by August 1854 had fleshed out
was to help the poorly-educated,
a new set of plans. Russell's contribution
intuitive
Bavarian
to
Surveyor's
Department,
yard
to the submission of
prior
but
ideas
his
present
form
a
was laid
no submarine
26 August.
to
acceptable
down
in
the
Millwall
the
Bauer and Russell may well
to back the project
have hoped to persuade the Admiralty
major
in
before incurring
expense.
If so, they were unsuccessful. Bauer's lack of English (he spoke through
interpreter)
an
unsatisfactory
and
Bauer
the meeting
that his co-workers
in
1853,
inventor
Grand
but
by now
Crimean
the
submarine,
Constantine,
War
Shortly
thereafter
was under
way
trip
and
to
the
with the patronage of
Marine,
he
a
large
which was intended to attack the Allied
Fleet
This boat was quite successful and conducted numerous
trials
Le Diable
in the Baltic.
Minister
he was "acquainted
during a brief
took himself and his plans to Russia. There,
Duke
an
were poaching his ideas. He
had proved equally suspicious of French collaborators
Paris
him
make
distinct. "
have not been sufficiently
became convinced
to
combined
and two days after
witness,
that his explanations
nature
mistrustful
the
Marin,
of
built
in the waters off Cronstadt [62].
Several interesting
Britain.
The
conclusions can be drawn from Bauer's experiences in
German
inventor
to take him
persuaded the Admiralty
boast
a powerful
submarine
patron
construction;
enjoyed
and
a
track
shipyard
of
record
not enjoy even his limited
success.
[62] 'Bauer's hyponaut apparatus' 28
Bethge, Der Brandtaucher:
Hans-Georg
(Rostock 1968) p. 36
Consort (London
August 1854,
ein tauchboot
which
could
government-sponsored
to back them up. From
that those who followed
Prince
projector
of a respected naval
of view, it is unsurprising
[61] Robert Rhodes James, Albert,
pp. 85-6
advantages
No other
seriously.
none had the help
and the resources of a major
unique
some
architect
this point
in Bauer's footsteps did
1983) p. 185; Emmerson
op. cit.
digest cut 59-8,
Adm 12/589;
- von der idee sur wirklichkeit
1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR
It is, moreover,
first arrived
that when the Bavarian
evident
the Royal Navy had no intention
a boat to his specifications.
of building
by the Surveyor's
The country was at peace, and the brief report submitted
committee
made
interested
in the
which
it
Faraday
that
clear
inventor's
84hp
Rocket Composition
Navy's
the
Admiralty
than
more
once
feature of a submarine
associates
is to be used as the source of
to
attitude
his
and
showed
in
Victorian
the
considerably
more
heat and gas"
interest
by the well-known
Liverpool
intrigued
shipbuilder
to ascertain whether it could really
overcome
-
the
Josiah Jones. The
by the boat's electric light,
attitude suggests that
-
itself.
naval
authorities
In
developed
was
being eager
[64].
be made to work underwater
century
the
some
Admiralty
their Lordships
while there were so many technical
nineteenth
in
than it showed in the submarine
the Navy requested details of the submarine
typical
and
era,
1878, for example,
particularly
more
in
was fairly
This preoccupation
submarines
project
were
"Gas-Steam-High-Pressure-Engine,
than they were in his submarine [63].
of
in Britain,
This
problems to be
were
not
much
concerned with the submarine for its own sake.
John Scott Russell and Lord Palmerston
Bauer's departure for Russia passed unnoticed
British
fleet for operations
in the Baltic.
Crimean
War quite unprepared
confront
it;
its
line-of-battle
[63] 'Bauer's hyponaut
Adm 92/17 fo1.83
in the scramble to prepare a
The Royal Navy had entered
to meet the special problems
fleet
was unsuited
apparatus and gas engine: report
upon'.
to
that
operations
the
were to
in
the
S. R. L. B. 28 August 1854,
[64] 'Submarine boat and electric light' 9 and 22 January, 2 February, 2 March 1878,
Adm 12/1023. Like many submarine projectors, Jones was a notable
digest cut 59-8,
innovator in other fields. He had come to the Admiralty's
attention in 1859 as the
inventor of a system of inclined armour; cf James Baxter III, The introduction
of the
ironclad warship (Cambridge, Mass. 1933) pp. 162-3. Similar examples are legion: Fulton
did significant work as a canal designer and proponent of the steam engine; Holland
puzzled over the problems of mechanical flight; Bauer invented a 'camel' for use in
diving dress.
salvage operations, and George Garrett the pneumataphore, a self-contained
James McClintock devised a machine for the manufacture of minie balls, while Simeon
Bourgois was an early proponent of the screw propeller and a leading jeune ecole theorist.
The first British submariners were no less original. Murray Sueter contributed
to the
development of the tank and claimed to have originated the concept of the torpedo
bomber; Hugh Williamson was a major figure in the early development of the aircraft
carrier.
1
1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR
restricted waters of the Gulf
of Finland,
and a host of unusual vessels had
Suddenly innovation
to be designed to meet these new conditions.
Gunboats,
premium.
mortar
1
and floating
rafts
vessels, armoured
was at a
batteries
were built in numbers [65].
the Russian
Meanwhile,
Cronstadt
controlled
fleet from
Allied
the
'fleet
in
St
stretched
prevented
of the strategically
vital
waters of the
John Scott Russell revived
engineer Sir Charles Fox,
the
the idea of building
diving
destroy
Cronstadt.
at
to Der
relation
screw driven,
one officer
inverted
Brandtaucher
completely
who
boat...
Whether
fixed
or
Le
it,
"was merely
It went down to the bottom
to walk along the bottom
thwarts
a submarine
civil
the
had
been
back, the new invention
bore
or
Diable
not
Russell
Marin.
Bauer
and propel
a large
diving
designed
according
bell,
like
to
an
with men under it; they were
the boat by pressing against against
to the under side. " Crew members in diving
leave the vessel and attach
early in
the two men drew up the
enclosed boats. Russell's new craft,
examined
Navy
bell to be crewed by divers and used to
examining Bauer's plans behind the Bavarian's
little
Royal
The
of Fox *& Henderson,
one of the principals
plans of a large mobile
barrier
several miles
the help of the well-known
that had built the Crystal Palace. Together
the
harbour.
the
before it could attack the Russian fleet.
1855. A new design was sketched with
firm
by a great barrier,
across the shallows outside
had to break through this barrier
base of
naval
and
eastern Gulf. Cronstadt itself was protected
long,
at the great
Petersburg
to
approaches
gaining command
being'
explosives to the target [66].
dress were to
Russell and Sir
Charles Fox seem to have drawn more consciously on the inspiration
French designer, Dr Payerne, who built the submarine L'Hydrostat
of a
in 1846
and later converted her into a diving bell. In her new guise Payerne's boat
was successfully employed in the construction
of a breakwater for Cherbourg
harbour [67].
[65] Baxter op. cit. pp. 69-91;
Andrew Lambert. Battleships
the steam battlefleet 1815-1860 (London 1984) pp. 41 -52
in transition:
the creation
of
[66] Key at the Royal United Services Institution, 5 February 1886, RUSI Jo. )O(X (1886)
the Baltic and the Russian war 1854-1856
p. 164; Andrew Lambert, Great Britain,
(London University Ph. D. 1983) p. 280, citing Palmerston to Wood 17 December 1855,
Halifax
Lambert
York.
has expanded on
Institute,
papers A4/63 fol. 54, Borthwick
British naval policy in the Baltic in a recent book,
The Crimean War (MUP 1990)
[67] See F Forest and H Noalhat, Les bateaux sous-marins (Paris 1900) vol. 1 pp. 28-37.
The Fox/Russell boat deserves the title 'submarine' insofar as it. was both mobile and
independent of any surface ship.
M
1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR
Whatever her deficiencies,
creation
two
of
famous
Fox's and Russell's un-named
stalemate her inventors
had little
to sponsor the project.
Like Winston
Prime
Minister
by the possibilities
excited
of
Churchill
in
Baltic
submarine
Paul observed that "there
plausibly
pretend
to
be more
warlike
to Andrew
Lambert,
"Palmerston's
Palmerston
devices,
and was
nineteenth
century
military
The
warfare.
Herbert
was no public
Lord
than
man who could
[68],
Palmerston".
enthusiasm for
and the Ordnance. " [69]
Disraeli
and
new weapons
knew no bounds; he pressed every scheme that was sent to him
Admiralty
at a
in later years, the Victorian
novel
historian
according
in the
war
trouble in persuading Viscount
interest
had a strong
the
and with
engineers,
vessel was the
noted in November
onto the
1855 that
is for blowing up Cronstadt having got a discoverer who builds
"Palmerston
crews, & who are practising
by submarine
ships worked
submarine
on the
Thames with, they say, complete success." [70].
Prime
The
to him.
finance
from
the
was unable to interest
but he told
experiments,
of
Minister
First
Admiralty's
the inventors
to press on and leave the problem
high-handed
attitude
This
Lord,
position:
Charles
Sir
"I
in Russell's
the Admiralty
do
not
Wood,
quite
drew
who
an irritable
hastened
to
from
understand
yesterday what you have done as to Sir Charles Fox's
response
explain
your
note
the
of
proposed boat, " he
wrote in March 1855.
"I understood before he was building...
bought or not as it turned
[her]...
at his own risk to be
out. If that is all you mean I have not a
word to say. If you mean that you have authorised
boat at the risk of the Govt.,
"He has never brought
[I]...
it is quite a different
him to build
matter.
any of the plans or information
asked for when I saw him.
his
We know enough of him
which...
to know
that he is not a man to be depended on and we cannot be answerable
for
an expedition
forming
upon
which
we have not
had the
opportunity
of
an opinion. " [71]
(68] Quoted in Bernard Semmel, Liberalism and naval strategy:
power during the Pax Britannica (Boston 1986) p. 57
ideology,
interest
and sea
1691 Lambert op. cit. p. 279
(70]
Disraeli to Lord Derby 20 November 1855, quoted in Emmerson
trials referred to were, in fact, conducted at Poole. (See below. )
[71] Wood to Palmerston 26 March 1855, Halifax
op. cit.
p. 86. The
papers Add. Mss. 49562 fols. 27-8
r
0
1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR
With
interest
and Prince Albert
of Palmerston
the support
in submarine
ordered on 22 March
the Fox/Russell
warfare),
(who
had kept up his
submarine
was nevertheless
[72].
1855 and launched on 5 October
She carried a
crew of 12, most of whom were employed in sculling the boat along at her
maximum surface speed of two knots. Russell hoped that his oarsmen would
also be able to
technique
row
them"),
any of
justified.
Although
Diver
that
reporting
the submarine killed
and on
must
be several
to propel
her under
"there
confidence
(who
McDuff
still they are timid. " McDuff's
water; although they are willing,
dangerous
this
his men gradually,
train
descents before the men will have sufficient
entirely
Chief
captain,
by Russell "to
enjoined
drown
no account
boat's
the
but
submerged
while
submarine
tried,
was never
had been strictly
the
caution was..
there
no-one,
were some
exceedingly narrow escapes [73].
for
Anxious
Poole Harbour
to
Bartholomew
hydrographer,
Cronstadt
The
invention.
Sulivan,
been suggested by John
Naval
the HMS Captain
The
initial
thoroughly
Lord.
Scott
Hope,
investigation
testified
who
to
the
another
circumstances,
successful employment
[72] McDuff's
'Journal
the
talented
technical
scientist,
thorough;
of
officer
and
presided
over
of the
Fleet [74].
themselves with examining
the inventors,
and some Thames
seeing any distance
that although
murky
to
commissioners
very
and her tender,
difficulty
The first was a
the
was not
submarine
Captains
the waters in which the
with
and became an Admiral
Sulivan and Hope then reported
other
familiar
were
and the approaches
Russell) was a noted
court martial
the
selected
officers
a committee
Of the latter two, Key (whose name had
remained in London and contented
the captains of
three
to appoint
whose surveys of the Baltic
had made him
Senior
Admiralty
Astley Cooper Key and James Hope.
submarine would have to operate.
future
boat to the seclusion of
the designers sent the
and persuaded a reluctant
their
examine
brilliant
secrecy,
waters off
under
the boat might
Cronstadt
would
divers
water.
Key,
be useful in
preclude
her
there [75].
of the submarine ship 1855', Palmerston papers GC/RU/1149
'Memorandum
for
HN Sulivan,
[74] Wood to Palmerston 17 December 1855, Add. Mss. 49565 fols. 44-5;
life and letters of Sir Bartholomew James Sulivan... (London 1896) pp. 372-3
The
[73)
Scott
Russell to
consideration', ibid.
Palmerston
28 January
1856 and his enclosed
[75) Albert to Palmerston 9 January 1856, Palmerston papers RC/H159; Wood to Albert
January 1856, Add. Mss. 49565 fols. 67-9
31
M
1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR
The
matter
insisting
to Palmerston
wrote
Outraged that
in action,
had not seen Scott Russell's craft
the three naval officers
the invention
that
should
the
of
a copy
was sent by Wood to the Prince Consort.
report
committee's
but
have ended there,
perhaps,
might,
Albert
be forgotten.
not
and late in January 1856
Wood's response was to reconvene the committee,
he sent its members to Dorset to examine the submarine.
Hope
Both
Sulivan
and
success in the clearer
disappointed
by the
that
committee
and his crew completed
took
they
were severely
on 25 January
place at Poole
a preliminary
suddenly shot out of the water,
dive.
Then
they
submerged again,
20 minutes, the prow of the submarine
blew like a whale and went down again.
back in a swirl
before slipping
briefly
later the boat reappeared
of water.
Soon those at the surface heard the sounds of a hammer
was hurriedly
brought to the surface by a safety line
attached to her beforehand.
which
Russell had thoughtfully
pulled
out, gasping but alive, to explain
patch of Poole mud. McDuff
The
The crew were
that they had become stuck in a
to surface, but one of the two
had attempted
The
be released snagged on some obstruction.
Chief
other
rose unchecked to the surface and most of the air
end of the submarine
escaped.
being
sides of the submarine. This was the agreed distress
struck against the iron
had to
their
marked
Moments
weights that
1856.
Russell's
McDuff
Scott
from
tender,
watched
the icy sea. After
signal, and the craft
be a
would
hose advancing slowly across the harbour
and a buoyed air
progress through
boat
the
but
waters of the south coast,
trial
While the Admiralty
that
were optimistic
Diver's
presence
of
mind
saved his
crew,
for
he
gathered the men by one of the tanks of compressed air used to keep the
sea out
of
the
and
fed
them
Britain's
first
official
boat,
oxygen
while
they
waited
to
be
rescued.
This
concluded
Admiralty
the
officers
left
Poole
in
submarine
what
trial.
Russell
considerable alarm and disappointment. " They retrieved
which
they now considered too favourable,
damning
indictment
of the submarine [76].
Not
surprisingly,
termed
"a
their
earlier
and submitted
state
of
report,
a second, more
The boat was brought
back to
[76] Scott Russell to Palmerston 28 January 1856, Palmerston papers GC/RU/1149; Wood
There are two slightly distorted
to Albert 31 January 1856, Add. Mss. 49565 fols. 67-9.
versions of events by members of the Admiralty committee; see Key's account in RUSI
Jo. XXX (1886) pp. 164-5; Sulivan op. cit. pp. 373-4
f
M
1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR
and left to rust [77].
London
On
summary
the
of
concentrated
her
bell,
1856, Sir
31 January
through
committee's
means of locomotion,
to recommend
there
a
had
officers
as a diving
of seeing any distance
difficulty
had little
bell, they felt that Russell's craft
to the Cherbourg
inferior
bell
designs. Nor was she fast enough to be useful
seemed
still
to
be
little
very
for
being used in waters clear enough
submarine
The
the boat's qualities
her, and she was considered
Finally,
action.
and the
As a diving
and to the latest American
in
judgement.
--
Consort
sent the Prince
Wood
revised
he wrote
on three points,
the water.
Charles
the
of
chance
the crew to see where
they were going [78].
Palmerston
had been little
made one last attempt
know
what
known
undertaken
First
The
has been gained
before,
of his by forwarding
more than a personal project
to Sir Charles Wood.
and
the experiment
by Mr
in
actually
Lord
the Royal Navy in what
to involve
was not
amused.
Russell's
"I
experiment
use before, "
he
we should have looked
the bill
do not
really
was not
which
"If
rejoined.
we
had
after it and paid for
it.
We knew nothing of its being going on, and never till I received your note
yesterday that we were to pay for it. I have spent my last farthing
year's votes and made no provision
such vote as would cover a hundredth
British
to the
important
Albert
The
this analysis of early
The first concerns naval and civilian
had established
attitudes
a policy
it
for the next 40 years. The Royal Navy refused to sponsor
believing (correctly)
that the submarine would be a failure.
In so doing it resisted strong pressure from
land.
from
By 1856, the Admiralty
new weapon.
Russell's project,
part of the expense. " [791
can be drawn
conclusions
submarine construction.
would maintain
It would come I suppose
for we can make no use of the machine and I have no
under experiments,
Two
in the next.
of this
boat owed
her
and Lord Palmerston,
1771 Delaney to Walker
Museum
178) Wood to Albert
existence
to the
the highest authorities
private
enthusiasm
both of whom were keen innovators
10 January
1859, Wake Walker
papers WWLI,
of
in the
Prince
and firm
National
Maritime
31 January 1856, Add. Mss. 49565 fols. 67-9
(79) Wood to Palmerston 19 March 1856, ibid fols. 84-6.
The cost of the submarine was
about £10,000; 'Journal of the submarine ship 1855' (entry for 22 March), Palmerston
papers GC/RU/1149
1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR
intended
for
(and
a specific
offensive)
Russell's craft was
destruction
the
operation,
and would never have been completed
at Cronstadt,
barrier
Furthermore,
'new technology'.
believers in the Victorian
of
the
had the country
been at peace.
When Sir Charles Wood bowed to the wishes of the Prime Minister
the
Consort,
Prince
did
he
so with
good
grace
Fox/Russell boat was given a trial by highly qualified
that
ensured
and
and
the
just as
naval officers,
had gone out of his way to secure the services of Michael
the Surveyor
Faraday in August 1854. For all their lack of initial
enthusiasm, the officers
the
assessment of
to
appointed
This
demerits.
mechanical
a sound
submarine
made
pattern
considerable
-
than
naval
than tactical
for
enthusiasm
such projects,
the
of those that were investigated
criticism
civilian
construction,
and
her
become
to
reluctance
reasoned resistance to the idea of submarine
involved,
rather
examine
technical
rather
was evident time
-
and again during the next four decades.
The
marked
impractical
enthusiasm
to the Munitions
front-line
defensive
civilian
devoted
troops
protective
non-combatants
were
up-to-the-minute
technology (electric
and
Kennett's
way. "
far
equipment,
"overwhelmingly
the
to
War
of
sent
I suggests
development
of
submitted
by
based
on
inventions
the
while
inventions
the World
ingenuity
Analysis
offensive",
in the 1850s, tanks and
death-rays
The
submarine
projects
the
of
Crimean
War
fit
model rather well.
Equally significant
"There
[80].
Kennett
but
65 years later) and intended to "destroy the enemy in some massive
spectacular
1855-56
during
their
and
aircraft
dramatic
War and the 44,000-odd
Department
Inventions
for
projectors
by Lee
gadgets has been described
both the records of the Crimean
that
of
that
the
is the fact that the Royal Navy believed as early as
development
of
an efficient
is no doubt in the world of the possibility
as the
existence
of
people
depressing or raising, " Wood
inside
her
assured Lord
submarine
was inevitable.
of a submarine boat, as
goes,
or
Palmerston.
of
"The
the
power
of
questions are
in War and
[80] Lee Kennett, 'Military
inventions and popular involvement, 1914-1918',
According to Guy Hartcup, only 30 of the 100,000 inventions
Society 3 (1985) pp. 69-73.
sent to the Board of Invention Research during World War I "were likely to be of any
use". The Munitions Inventions Department received 47,949, of which 226 were useful.
The equivalent French body developed 781 of 44,976 inventions. Hartcup, The war of
developments 1914-1918 (London 1988) p. 189
invention: scientific
1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR
and seeing and steering. " [81]
the means of propulsion
later,
First
the
Lord
could
problems:
"Locomotive
insufficient
trial, " he informed
doubt
serious
any
difficulty
envisage
seems to
power
to
solution
two
have
to
me
the Prince Consort,
being
this
of
a
Less than a year
undergone
"but
three
a
very
I do not entertain
There
accomplished.
his
of
be
can
no
more
about a compass in an iron vessel under water than above water.
The real obstacle to the use of these machines for offensive purposes is the
difficulty
(and
of seeing under water in a horizontal
with
forsight),
peculiar
First
the
Lord
this reason
his letter:
concluded
of England
that as far as the Naval operations
afraid
direction. " For
"I
am
they
are concerned
are more likely to be used against us than for us. " [82]
Hope,
faith
in
and Wood
Sulivan
long-term
the
were not the only
future
the
of
Admiralty
May
In
submarine.
officials
1880
with
William
the first Captain of the torpedo school HMS Vernon and a member
Arthur,
of the 1870 committee
that the construction
observed
Arthur's
"the
that
to examine Whitehead's
appointed
of a successful submarine
capabilities
of
such
a
declared
torpedo,
was certainly
vessel would
possible, and
be
great. "
colleague AK Wilson did not doubt that he was right,
for
[83]
"a very
well thought-out
design for a submarine boat was brought to my attention
while commander
of the Vernon
small addition
which
efficient. " [84]
about 1879, which only required
any Torpedo
These were
not
Officer
have supplied
could
the sentiments
of
only one
to make it
naval officers
whose
minds were closed to the possibilities of innovation.
1.3: INNOVATION
Although
still
IN THE
the predominant
that
of
a
ultra-conservatism,
service
VICTORIAN
NAVY
image of the nineteenth
stagnating
modern
research
in
has
the
century
reactionary
suggested
that
Royal Navy is
backwaters
this
view
of
is
[81] Wood to Palmerston 10 May 1855, Add. Mss. 49562 fol. 85
[82] Wood to Albert
[83] Arthur
12 February 1856, Add. Mss. 49565 fols. 72-3
naval attache's report
no. 26,19
May 1880, FO 115/673
[84] Wilson memo 'Submarine boats' 15 January 1901, Adm
that the author is referring here to George Garrett's submarine.
1/7515.
It
seems probable
1
AND THE VICTORIAN NAVY
1.3 INNOVATION
inadequate. The Senior Service had its good and its bad points,
clear that its administration
but it is increasingly
it is true,
was broadly competent
and
its seamen never less than professional.
The Napoleonic
but Britain
retrenchment,
beyond
much
the
The
nation's
resources
Britannica
off
the
coasts of
Africa
fought
in
the
name
policing
an
by the
and it was natural
it
that Britain,
change,
that
tradition,
the
was
technological
taxed
most
the Victorian
by
minor
wars
demands
the
of
should exploit her
nation,
have
generations.
held
difficulty
the
British
of
keeping
of
the
matching
faith
NAM
naval officers.
pace
Rodger
points
onto
have
If they had really been reactionaries,
some
of
the
out
war, and not just on
on how to wage a future
equipment.
of
Nelsonic
with
era had really been one of peace, they might
how to operate future
of
anti-slavery
both France and Russia,
the first industrial
near-impossibility
not
had the leisure to reflect
might
by
of
supremacy to retain a lead over these naval rivals. As the century
progressed
"if
an era
host of
and
empire,
supremacy of the Royal Navy had to be met from
that
was not
stretched
were
naval laurels
almost a dozen naval stations overseas. Serious challenges to the
maintaining
industrial
by a period of
her
to rest upon
and China,
patrols
of
Pax
followed
enough,
could not afford
mid-1820s.
the
peace;
universal
Wars were, naturally
hard-won
wisdom
they
former
of
As it was, they were knowledgeable and enthusiastic proponents
technical
change and material
development
had lost sight of
who
objects for which the Navy existed: highly trained,
the
uneducated. "
and wholly
[85]
It is not difficult
open
to
innovation
nostalgically
early
to evidence the statement
for
of steam. The
highly experimental
of
paddle-steamer
Admiralty
century.
the service
authorised
Far
from
being
was a comparatively
the construction
of a
steamship in 1792. By 1800 there were engines at work
in the Royal dockyards;
probably
of the nineteenth
wedded to the days of sail,
proponent
acquisition
much
that the Royal Navy was
steam
Monkey,
by 1816 the First
tugs.
Britain's
was purchased in
ahead of its nearest rivals,
Lord,
Melville,
first
engined
1821.
the French
By
was urging the
1830
and United
warship,
the
RN
the
was
States navies,
[85] NAM Rodger, 'British naval thought and naval policy 1820-1890:
Strategic thought in
an era of technological change', in Craig Symmonds, ed, New aspects of naval history:
United
States Naval
selected papers presented at the 4th naval history symposium,
Academy, 25-26 October 1976 (Annapolis 1981) p. 149
0
VICTORIAN
1.3 INNOVATION
AND
in its employment
[86].
of steamships
The
French
THE
with
replied
pioneered
[87].
in
later
Other
Rifling
the century.
tested
fire
Armstrong
early
increased
in
rifles
in
1858;
the accuracy
time.
it
1863
interest
followed
of
naval
The
Royal
the
accepted
too
was simply
which
in
weapon
ordnance
the first
for
practicable
breach-loader,
disastrous 110-pounder
shell-gun
tested a similar
advances in
significant
substantially
guns and made long-range
Navy
Britain
the
notably
way over the next decade; French
1829 and adopted it in a limited
was less concerted
innovations,
other
Paixhans.
by Henri-Joseph
NAVY
a
ambitious
product for its time.
its failure
innovation;
until
1881, and in the intervening
in this period
increased rapidly
of HMS Warrior
muzzle-loaders
the 8-inch
from
-
the
short-bore
muzzle loaders fitted
to the 12.5-inch
breach-loaders
(1875) and the Benbow's 16.25-inch
HMS Dreadnought
period
rivals. Gun calibre,
quality of its gunnery fell behind that of its continental
however,
RN did not
The
did much to dent this enthusiasm.
to the breach-loader
return
the naval appetite for
rifle demonstrated
The adoption of the Armstrong
in
ten
years' later [88].
of the steam engine. The
More caution was shown in the development
pioneer
single-expansion
(mounted
engines
as they
that
were
liable
continually
were above the waterline)
damage in any engagement.
In addition,
large
by
powered
were
paddle-steamers
and
to
catastrophically
the sheer quantity
breakdown
and
vulnerable
to
of coal which
voyages, impossible,
the early steam engines consumed made trans-oceanic
and sail was necessarily retained as the principle
inefficient
motive power of the Royal
Navy [89].
Not
provide
until
reign
was underway
line-of-battleships
sail
development
Victoria's
of
the screw
with
propeller
become practical
steam
auxiliary
made it
[86) Ibid pp. 146-7;
Baxter op. cit. pp. 10-11;
power 1815-1853 (Oxford 1963) pp. 197-200
it
did
to
possible
Christopher
Bartlett,
The
power.
site
engines
Great Britain
to
in
and sea
[87) Baxter pp. 17-26,69
[88] Ibid pp.
pp. 99-100,109;
125,131,154,197;
Marder, ABSP p. 5
Sandler,
The evolution
of
the modern
capital
ship
[89) Andrew Lambert, Battleships in transition:
the creation of the steam battleflee:
1815-1860 (London 1984) pp. 18-19; Bartlett op. cit. pp. 211-12; GA Osborn, 'Paddlewheel
fighting ships of the Royal Navy', Mariners' Mirror 68 (1982) pp. 429-33
1.3 INNOVATION
AND THE VICTORIAN NAVY
below
positions
protected
the
guarantee reasonable performance
fitted
with bulky paddle-wheels.
became the first to fit their
Critics
and
have nevertheless
to
reluctant
writes Christopher
helped
to
[90].
with screw propulsion
Navy of
as a motive
essential to note that the eventual perfection
means certain in the first
hoist
impossible when a ship was
Once this problem was solved, the British
ships-of-the-line
steam
screw
under sail -
accused the Royal
adopt
the
and
waterline,
"
being over-cautious
power,
it
and
is
was by no
of steam propulsion
two decades of the Pax Britannica.
therefore
"Above
all, "
Bartlett,
"it was reasonable to doubt in the twenties whether the steamer would
ever be able to fulfil
ship
the traditional
fire
maximum
-
solidity
a blockade
was its
time
it
respect
was
maximum
in all weathers or voyage to any port
the globe. The only tactical
this
sea-worthiness,
maximum
capital
stowage capacity to enable it not only to fight,
and maximum
but to maintain
power,
of the British
requirements
and strategic advantage of the steamer at
independence
less
a
of
of
wind
effective
and
tide;
on
The
warship...
every
other
ultra-cautious
introduction
of steamers ... [in the 1840s]... could thus be justified in no small measure - on the grounds of expediency, economy and
ignorance,
technical
but
as long
only
as no
other
power
took
the
traced
by
lead. " [91]
The
Lambert,
careful,
evolution
of
the
who concludes that
job in producing
1840s and 1850s [92].
deficiencies
role and which retained
[90] Bartlett
a ship
for
vessels superior
The
Crimean
has been
did an excellent,
War,
it
is true,
had become too highly
exposed numerous
but they
years or
.
[92] Lambert op. cit.
[93] Rodger op. cit. pp. 142-4,147-8
(jis,
more
were the
adapted to its peacetime
on its Navy List too many officers
twenty
and suitably
to those of its naval rivals in the
and naval personnel,
op. cit. p. 326
[91] Ibid p. 206
steam battleship
the Admiralty
in naval organisation
defects of a service that
commanded
wooden
[93].
The
who had not
Royal
Navy's
AND THE VICTORIAN NAVY
1.3 INNOVATION
in
performance
innovation
later
the
battleships
the
war
were still
war
was
impressive;
relatively
encouraged when it came to the host of small craft
was strongly
needed for
the
stages of
in
Sea and the
Black
the
produced
Gulf
Finland,
of
long-term
with one eye on their
though
usefulness
in the struggle against France [94].
Under
Napoleon
prestige
and her
Empire
was efficient
III,
France
say in foreign
both
was anxious to enhance
The
affairs.
and innovative,
French
her naval
the Second
navy of
and its new construction
was in the
hands of a man of genius, the naval architect Dupuy de Lome. His wooden
steam battleship
Great Britain
Le Napoleon
into
(1850) and the ironclad
Gloire
a naval race she had hoped to avoid
(1859) forced
but the Royal
-
Navy was not slow to surpass the standards which de Lome
Warrior
British
(1860)
was a great
concealed a wooden frame.
common
Under
-
consent
superior
Warrior,
to
advance
the world's
that
everything
first
had
the progressive leadership of two particularly
Edward
Reed,
the Chief
Constructor,
Gloire,
on
iron
gone
had set. The
whose
armour
warship,
was by
before
conscientious
and the Controller,
projectors
Admiral
Spencer Robinson
-
gave it throughout
the 1860s. Sail, not steam, was now the auxiliary
of British
period
warships.
it
was that
concludes Stanley
"If
the Admiralty
technical
of profound
1860s,
the RN was able to maintain
the
Sandler.
and sails throughout
the
the part of the Admiralty...
perhaps a clearer
total
abolition
British
era of
ship
war
was a
1860s constituted
of sails. " Lance Buhl
doomed
public
The so-called
disinterest,
political
'Dark
the eventual
in his
conclusion
navy [96].
dispiriting
and strict
period
in
were an
economy.
Naval
Lambert op. cit. p. 43
[94] Baxter op. cit.
pp. 70-3;
[95] Baxter op. cit.
pp. 97-100,109-11,122-4,158-60
[96] Sandler op. cit.
technological change
(1974) pp. 703-27
on
that gives us
Ages of the Admiralty'
interference
of masts
of obstruction
demanding
1870s and early 1880s were a comparatively
naval history.
anachronism, "
the retention
comes to a similar
in the post Civil War American
the
the decade of the
of a century
imperatives
power
during
of anything
a conspiracy
It is the hindsight
Sir
the lead the Warrior
characterised
be said that
cannot
view of the technical
study of innovation
The
change that
sailing
"It
was certain
[95].
her
Lance Buhl, 'Mariners and machines: resistance to
p. 78.84-5;
Journal of American History
in the American navy, 1865-1869',
AND THE VICTORIAN NAVY
1.3 INNOVATION
in this climate.
conservatism might have been expected to flourish
the new Chief Constructor,
Barnaby,
ironclad
he was certain
and
Nathaniel
was not a man of outstanding
battleships
and merchantmen
ability,
the
were
only
ship types required by a naval power. Sir Astley Cooper Key, who held the
Senior
of
post
from
Lord
Naval
espoused conservative
unconsciously
to
administration
the
exclusion
substantially improve the materiel
of
1879
1885,
until
was
values by devoting
strategic
himself
He
planning.
who
another
to
did,
routine
however,
of the British fleet [97].
efficiency
The Royal Navy's Dark Age weaknesses were exacerbated by the virtual
absence of any naval threat.
aftermath
exceptionally
War;
Franco-Prussian
the
of
The French challenge all but vanished in the
state; the German
moribund
fleet
Navy
US
the
in
was
an
and the Russians
was tiny
position. .But even the Dark Ages
had their bright spots. The leaders of another age were beginning to make
bedevilled by an unfavourable
geographic
their mark; Jackie Fisher was one brilliant
in
this
supposedly
Senior Naval Lord
reactionary
iconoclast who gained preferment
Alexander
period.
Milne,
who
served
as
1872 to 1876,
between 1866 and 1868 and again from
was one of the most able men ever to hold the post, and Sidney Dacres,
who
headed the Board
entirely
competent;
in the intervening
Admiralty
of
he was also one of the few officers
total abolition
of masts and yards. During
adopted
developed
and
restrictions
and resulted
Polyphemus.
Milne
with
in
himself
the
an
the Dark
creation
of
the
was responsible for
was also
who advocated the
Ages the torpedo
that
enthusiasm
period,
budgetary
overcame
torpedo
pioneering
the creation
was
boat
of rudimentary
but not unrealistic war plans in the middle 1870s.
The slow decline in naval efficiency
of
monetary
violent
restriction
restraint
invasion scares in the 1880s. The
1884, which was initiated
journalist
and political
and enthusiasm inevitable
WT
Stead,
encouraged significant
by Fisher,
renewed
'Truth
was ended by a series of
about the Navy'
HO Arnold-Forster,
public
interest
in an era
in
panic of
and the crusading
maritime
affairs
and
increases in the naval estimates, which were bolstered
by the French invasion scare of 1888. The result was the Naval Defence
Act of 1889, which laid down the policy of a two-power
I
[97] NAM Rodger, 'The dark ages of the Admiralty 1869-1885',
Ruddock Mackay,
62 (1976) pp. 33-46,121-28;
(1975) pp. 331-44;
(Oxford 1973) p. 179
standard.
Mariners'
Fisher of
Under
61
Mirror
Kilverstone
0
AND THE VICTORIAN NAVY
1.3 INNOVATION
the guidance of William
RN began to build
White,
a naval architect
homogenous
classes of first-rate
warships
1880s and 1890s. Royal Sovereigns and Duncans ruled
Victorian
allied,
the
and
era,
was vigorously
threaten
renewed
innovation
of the destroyer
Royal
Navy
newly
believed
would
was decisively
planned by the Admiralty
-
by the
countered
but created,
by private industry [98].
it must be admitted,
This brief
Russia,
and
many
which
in the late
the seas of the late
France
of
boat,
torpedo
of the battlefleet,
the supremacy
British
The
met.
challenge
gloss is not
compare
the history
with
unfavourably
Nor
of a stagnant service.
its
major
did the
Despite
rivals.
experience of the Napoleonic
Wars and despite Paixhans' experiments
1820s, the French
decades to adopt the shell gun [99].
took four
they displayed a suspicion of expensive iron
British,
questioning the degree of protection
splintering
[100).
warships
converted
were
navy suffered
sail-of-the-line;
wooden-hulled
until
Fulton
their
British
even
new
construction
rivals,
the British
United
and in performance
failed
navy
to
develop
France's
and
steam
most
were
to
be
definitely
to
continued
turned
and
of the period
were
under sail 1101].
the
lead
in
steam propulsion
had given it after the War of 1812; Lance Buhl points out that "it
did little
thirty
American
by the UK,
in consequence.
hulls early in the decade. Royal Navy battleships
The
Like the
warships were laid down
than
the late 1860s, while
superior in size, armament
in the
warships in the 1840s,
favoured
trials and experiments
less advanced
the
offered and emphasising the dangers of
the 1850s too many French
of the Frech
the efficiency
iron
In
the step-by-step
without
the
of conspicuous ability,
more than conduct a distant flirtation
years thereafter. "
[102)
States, as elsewhere, until
And despite the impetus provided
capitalize
on
the dazzling
[981 Mackay op. cit. pp. 178[991 Bartlett
op. cit.
with the weapon for nearly
Steam remained
to
auxiliary
the 'outbreak of the American
by this conflict,
innovations
9; Marder,
the United
made during
the
sail
Civil
in
the
War.
States did not
early
1860s. The
ABSP pp. 65-70
pp. 216-17
[100] Baxter op. cit. pp. 63-4
(101] Lambert pp. 97-101,
Sandler op. cit. pp. 44-46
It is interesting to note parallels with French submarine construction policy of the early
20th century, which was similarly biased towards the theoretical. See section 5.3.
[102) Buhl op. cit. p. 704
AND THE VICTORIAN NAVY
1.3 INNOVATION
during the war that remained
Having
history,
internal.
foreign
of
both
funds
the
Liberal
Tory
and
response to
available
weapons
as
resources
both
for
experimentation
the
as
esoteric
The
variables.
governments
UK
the
of
and the
stringent
during
economies
'Dark
the
financial
Political
expediency
and certainly
submarine
human
and
[105].
underpinned
severely limited
precluded
A
expenditure
desire
Britain's
or ships that
for
might
nation,
British
drastically
economise
'wait
and see'
Britain
had little
to innovate.
incentive
expense and drain their
[106],
Minister
rivals
The
would
French)
power?
unwillingness
have to armour
their
treasuries merely to maintain
introduction
and St Vincent's
had lured Fulton
[103] On US development
bureaucrats:
the machine
Connecticut 1982)
of
to start
the chance
[104] Sandler op. cit.
the balance of
This
to
weapons
was the
adopt
the
its
for
lived
if
to
the
potential
up
weapon
shell gun,
the navies of the world
held.
alter
indeed
(and
potentially-devastating
Britain's
on
to
As things stood she was supreme at sea; why should she introduce
already
the
policy.
As the leading maritime
reason
Ages'
of sails long after steam engines were technically
[104].
expensive
coal was
construction
technical
naval
British
climate
political
key
were
rivals
encouraged the retention
efficient;
of
assess the
to
placed
a century
some of them external to the Royal Navy and some of
Obviously,
by both
imposed
better
perhaps
of factors,
activities
almost
summarised
[103].
for another half-century
unexploited
change. This response was not consistent and depended upon a
technological
them
briefly
very
we are
variety
were just two of the weapons developed
and the machine-gun
submarine
m
any radical
the naval
fleets at phenomenal
a position
innovation
'race'
which they
potentially
gave
again on even terms
news that
his Prime
across the Channel to have him build
underwater
unequivocal
of
gun
response to the
the machine-gun,
and the United
Bullets and
see David Armstrong,
States army
1861-1916
(Westport,
pp. 17,85-7
1105) The influence of economy on British naval policy has been widely stressed: cf.
Semmel op. cit. pp. 79-83;
Rodger, 'British naval thought and naval policy' p. 145; Sandler
Paul M Kennedy, The rise and fall of British naval mastery
op. cit. pp. 38-9,79-80;
Baxter op. cit. p. 173; Lambert op. cit. p. 60
(London 1983) esp. pp. 177-79,193-4;
[106) Bartlett op. cit. p. 204,216-17
This argument was, of course, commonly advanced when the RN introduced the
Dreadnought design early in the 20th century. In this case, however, other navies were
already planning very similar ships, and two decades of a naval arms race had increased
public interest in naval affairs and made the governments of the day more willing to
sanction the expenditure involved.
AND THE VICTORIAN NAVY
1.3 INNOVATION
the Royal Navy was often
weapons for
was the greatest fool
"Pitt
0
quoted when this point
was made.
is reported
that ever existed, " the Admiral
to
have said, "to encourage a mode of war which they who command the sea
if successful, would deprive them of it. " [107]
did not want and which,
1858 the Surveyor
In
frequently
put St Vincent's
large
a navy
introduction
forced
of Great Britain
any- important
to adopt
I have
possessing as she does so
change in
have the effect
might
ships of war which
of
her
adoption
by Foreign
ships of a novel character
requiring
similar
upon
become
then
the construction
of
necessary the
rendering
of a new class of very costly vessels until such a course is
by the
it
"As
stated, " he wrote,
is not in the interest
"it
in writing:
policy
matter
a
only
not
of
Powers of
formidable
ships to cope with them...
but
expediency
of
absolute
necessity. " [108]
The
policy
successful implementation
important
British
century
his
and
programme
rejected
out
compound
hand.
of
some might
in
of
rubber
A
fine
example
submarine
and
and
was useless; what
rather
and see' made it
rivals,
and Sir Baldwin
policy
the
of
shell.
extensive
(though
of
Department
rubberised
may be
armour,
lieutenant
Marines
warships in the hope that
Trials
is significant
than condemning
an
open-mindedness
a Royal
which
with
no reasonable suggestion was
investigation
1840
cork
'wait
of the Surveyor's
be used to coat iron
shot
the
up
and experimentation;
Admiralty's
the
incoming
experiments
backed
say empty-headedness)
suggested might
compound
successors
of research
of a strategy of
watch be kept on foreign
that a careful
Walker
deflect
nineteenth
is obvious.
The
found
for
of this statement
significance
at
Woolwich
is that
the
this unlikely-sounding
showed
a
had
it would
that
Admiralty
invention
the
ordered
out of
hand [109].
[107]
St Vincent,
supposedly in an interview with Fulton during October 1805. It is
entirely possible the quotation is apocryphal; we have only Fulton's word for it. What
matters, however, is that St Vincent's adage was widely circulated in the 19th century and
was widely accepted as genuine. See Alex Roland, Submarine warfare in the age of sail
Indiana 1976) pp. 112-13
(Bloomington,
[1081 Walker
submission of 22 June 1858, quoted in Baxter op. cit. p. 117
[109) Baxter op. cit. p. 36
AND THE VICTORIAN NAVY
1.3 INNOVATION
The Surveyor's
iron
of
potential
had an excellent record in such cases. The
Department's
was investigated
armour
thoroughness,
great
with
negative conclusions reached in the 1840s being drawn from
and
eight
series of
major
to
conducted
compare
iron
decided on rolled
rolled
iron,
plating
for armour,
steel was also tried
puddled
In
experiments.
the
cast iron
six years' work
1850s similar
and
were
the
navy
and at the end of the decade
and rejected.
Inclined
(tumblehome)
were carried out in 1860 and the idea rejected
experiments
trials
before
steel
the
armour
for a variety of
technical reasons which showed that under Walker and Isaac Watts, Britain's
were fully
naval constructors
fair
capable of conducting
and drawing
trials
reasoned conclusions from the results [110].
is
There
new inventions,
for
Ericsson [112].
practical
policy.
turret
the
adversely
limited,
by
promoted
the
weight,
foc'sle,
warship;
short-range
accurate
hail
and a limited
to the ferocity
value,
fire
The
possible and
Navy's rejection
[110] Ibid pp. 36-9,118,154,162-3,201-07
[112] Ibid pp. 250-67
that swirled
as it did with
politics
freeboard
utility
defects
therefore
and
fitted
when
battleship's
to
in turrets
an
until
tacitly supported
steam
rendered
so until
masts and
of Coles's
was
broadside nor
of an 'old fashioned'
and condemned it to remain
sound. It was, moreover,
[111] Ibid pp. 181-92
lowered
John
have been
gun turret
of shot and shell. These failings
long-range
done away with.
was therefore
which
the
inventor
engineer
of guns that could be carried
its rate of fire bore comparison
made
to
British
the
Swedish-American
the weight of shot in a turret
ship of doubtful
trial
In the
poop, masts and sails all cut down the arc of
the number
turret
fair
a
and it is plain that the controversy
seaworthiness,
and neither
ironclad's
bias in assessing
the Royal Navy's point of view, the principal
its
were
In addition,
largely
gave
pros and cons of the armoured
From
affected
ocean-going
century
mid-nineteenth
the weapon had as much to do with party
around
fire.
warship
[1111 and
Cowles
The
Robinson
and
turret
set out by Stanley Sandler,
of
the
departments displayed significant
Reed
armoured
Cowper
Captain
suppose that
despite the pressures to which they were subjected.
example,
controversial
to
reason
and Controller's
Surveyor's
1860s,
no
initial
the
rifling
sails were
approaches
by Britain's
foreign
m
AND THE VICTORIAN NAVY
1.3 INNOVATION
[113].
in
built
this
turret
period
ships
seagoing
none
rivals;
inventor
The
Admiralty
his powerful
and
'conservatism',
were
supporters
and in the press. There was undoubtedly
technological
in
active
list
resistance to
peppered
who had not been to sea for twenty years was unlikely
officers
many deviants from
naval orthodoxy;
synonymous with
indeed
Admiralty's
far
was a
[114].
Captain
Officers
reaction.
the
Devastation,
in progress,
faith
century's
nineteenth
Conservatism
effective
existence as much to administrative
individual
officers [115].
The
administration
of the Board
members
Navy
the
of
problems
forced
Equally
Navy
the
significantly,
into
as it did to the prejudice
of
and
to
The
criticism.
appointees,
naval
and
disputes. The pressure of public
ill-considered
several
decisions.
political
governments to install
of incoming
the propensity
disastrous
its
institutions
were political
affairs were often caught up in inter-party
opinion
Coles's
was always open
of Admiralty
ironclad
owed
in
rooted
was
was never
coastal
than
warship
many
than incompetent,
Reed's
turret-ship,
up
Navy had the
and this meant orthodoxy
were cautious rather
own
more
But the Victorian
limb.
with
to throw
was too scarce for
employment
to risk going out on a professional
and
An
Navy.
Royal
the
condemn
of the day was regularly
and the administration
berated in Parliament
change
to
quick
their
own Naval Lords meant that the average tenure of a Board of Admiralty
between 1834 and 1871 was little
the
duties of
the naval lords
James Graham reformed
became First Lord
individual
responsibility
departments
Navy.
properly
and their
London-based
No
functions.
of the Naval
duty
collective
members of the Board,
middle-ranking
naval
[113] Sandler op. cit. pp. 51,179-80,194-5
11141 Ibid pp. 183-4,192-4,230-5
[115] Rodger op. cit. pp. 142,145,147
[116] Sandler pp. 41-3
Nor
defined.
when
Between
1832,
were
Sir
and 1869, when Hugh Childers
each member of the Board had two
This system made it impossible
to individual
than three years [116].
the administration,
of the Admiralty,
incompatible
potentially
more
distinction
Lords
was made
between
for the administration
to oversee the administration
to assign responsibility
for
of
the
their
of the
decisions
and in the absence of a staff and of
officers,
the
senior
officers
at
the
SUBMARINE
1.4: BRITISH
Admiralty
spent much of their
1868, " writes
Board
The
POLICY
Rodger,
time
Naval
"the
mechanism
1856-1885
now
performing
Lords
as
an
duties.
clerical
had become
only
existed
routine
"By
mere administrators.
engine
for
dissipating
responsibility. " [117]
In December
and instructed
Admiralty
the
1868, Gladstone
unemployed
produce a comparatively
1890s. But the First
and responsibility
Lord
did not understand
further,
still
George Goschen, the influence
well
into
List
the next
increased
century
reforms
and
helped
His
of
of strategic
Not
by
reform
the
discussion
to be
Although
some
successor,
continued
to be felt
1880s did
the
of
his
rescinded
until
in the
paperwork
policy.
of Gladstone's appointee
[118].
to
the Navy and his decisions
the amount
were
in
permanently
of senior officers
preconceptions.
the development
damaging
more
of the
had merit;
aged or
Navy
the
out
and economic
and inhibited
Childers'
of
Lord
enhanced his own position, ` reduced collective
Board of Admiralty
dealt with,
thinned
policies
for
retirement
young and able generation
based on political
were
compulsory
Childers
officers,
Lord's
new First
the
of
by introducing
particular,
First
him to reduce the naval estimates and reorganise
Many
administration.
made Hugh Childers
the
Admiralty
regain some of the energy it had displayed in the 1860s.
It is in this context
mid-Victorian
to modern
of
that we must view British
This
period.
importance,
Senior Service
and
-
necessarily
which
was relatively
open
glosses over
was very far from
suggest that the institution
Royal
century
many
and that
it
Navy.
of
the
But
perfect.
was never unthinkingly
to innovation,
policy
in the
of course, do real justice
short sketch cannot,
research on the nineteenth
submarine
It omits much
failings
of
the
it does, I think,
reactionary
was unlikely
[119],
that it
to reject
the
submarine as a moral outrage or a wild and hopeless fantasy.
British submarine policy 1856-1885
Underwater
century.
warfare
Mines
[117] Rodger,
evolved
and locomotive
'Dark
in
the
latter
half
torpedoes were familiar
ages' in Mariners'
[118] Ibid pp. 336-8,342-3
[119]
rapidly
Mirror
and Mariners'
of
the
nineteenth
weapons to a new
61 pp. 332-4
Mirror
62 pp. 122-3
As Christopher Bartlett points out, "an intelligent conservative mind could speedily
its
conceal,
reasonable
arguments
reinforce,
and perhaps
prejudice
with
against
Yet... a certain horse-sense was not lacking. " Bartlett op. cit. p. 205
steam-power.
m
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
generation
names in the torpedo
made their
and Tirpitz
Fisher
officers;
naval
of
branch meant prestige,
torpedo
the officer
corps was reported
[120].
The
British
War,
and
the
Civil
American
War.
to
Russia, service
and better
promotion
be "enchanted
the
with
Navy
taught
was
Confederate
The
the
Torpedo
boat"
Crimean
during
had more
Bureau
than all the other rebel naval forces put together,
pay, and
the
lesson
same
in the
torpedo
to be wary of Russian mines in
learned
Federal
the jeune ecole, drew attention
accelerated
to
who
In
weapons; in
submarine
of
possibilities
those
among
respective countries.
services of their
France a new school of naval thought,
the offensive
were
the
success
29 enemy ships
sinking
and damaging 14 more with mines and spar torpedoes [121).
Civil
The
importance,
from
legitimised
War
Teggethoff's
Franco-Prussian
against
both
successes with
war
spar
in 1870, and experimented
torpedo
its
Russian
Royal Navy
fitfully
ports :
during
and
the German
scored
during
torpedos
the
Whitehead
the
adopted
the
littoral
boats
torpedo
locomotive
and
The
1877-8.
of
emphasised
to protect
used mines
fleet,
fleet.
French
superior
and
were sown to defend
war minefields
Russo-Turkish
Italians
Austro-Hungarian
a materially
striking
1866 the
In
warfare
upsurge of interest in the subject
and there was an appreciable
the mid-1860s.
against
submarine
the 1870s
with mines throughout
and 1880s.
The torpedo boat became the bogey-weapon
first
The
crude,
spar-armed
examples
steam engines were developed
carried
by many
the
armed and armoured
to deliver their attacks Torpedo
century.
the
early
type,
Improvements
powerful
the
were
1870s and
independent
boats,
by night.
with
German
under the leadership
-a
most navies in
the late
navy was among the first
semi-submersible
des Torpedowesens
of larger,
in
era.
and dependent on high speed and raw courage
boats were popular
constructing
but
1860s, and second class TBs
ironclads.
preferably
The newly-unified
1870s and Inspektion
the
appeared when small
the 1880s led to the construction
particularly
lightly
of
in
of the mid-Victorian
spar torpedo
of Tirpitz,
boats in
nineteenth
to develop
the
early
who held the commission
number of more conventional
of
boats later
[120] Captain Beaumont report, quoted HMS Vernon annual report 1882, Adm 189/2
Captain Henry Kane report 'Russian manouevres in the Baltic' 3 September
pp. 129-34;
1884, FIC no. 50, Adm 231/5
(1211 Perry op. cit.,
appendix A
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-188S
in the decade [122].
for
attractive,
development
the
Committee
of
1876
reported
guardboats
nor
extra
lookouts
[123], a state of affairs
-
that
neither
could
prevent
that eventually
which had belatedly
-
machine
for
guns and
ironclads
that did not have to close to ram. The British
off torpedo flotillas
as France
made the TB more
of ship-mounted
in the 1880s it proved difficult
artillery
quick-firing
of the fish torpedo
The invention
until
m
to ward
Torpedo
nor
torpedo
nets,
a determined
torpedo
attack
gunfire
encouraged other
naval powers such
in the mid-1870s
began TB construction
to develop the weapon in the 1880s.
In the June 1884 manouevres,
attack on a fleet
full-scale
French torpedo flotillas
launched the first
1,000 yards of
under weigh, closing to within
targets before being seen despite the disadvantage of a bright
their
night,
and coming under fire for less than a minute
torpedoes at a range of 400 yards [124].
This
moonlit
before discharging their
striking
success encouraged
members of the jeune ecole, a group of naval strategists who pointed
that France could not afford
Germany
on land and Britain
capital ships and diverting
flotillas
of cheap torpedo
A sufficient
number
£710,000,000
resources into the production
French
argued the jeune
blockade
of
the
enemy
of
of fast cruisers and
of cruisers could (it was suggested) bring the British
per
battlefleet.
the construction
craft.
annum,
in the Channel
commerce
being,
at sea. The new school now suggested that
to its knees by disrupting
Empire
the
armed forces capable of opposing
naval estimates could be reduced by abandoning
French
worth
to maintain
out
in 1899, to be
a seaborne trade thought,
while
torpedo
flotillas
harrassed
and coast defence ships protected
So long
as the' Marine
coast
resources on commerce protection
and
would
be
the rump
of
had a fleet
in
have to institute
a
Francaise
ecole, the Royal Navy would
unable
British
to
concentrate
its
[125].
14
[122] Charles Chesney report no. 56, 'Submerged iron torpedo boats of Germany'
Gemzell, Organisation,
innovation:
October 1871, Adm 1/6241; Carl-Axel
conflict,
a
1888-1940 (Lund 1973) pp. 58-9;
Mackay
planning
study of German naval strategic
op. cit. pp. 129-30
[123] Cowpe op. cit, p. 19
[124] Ibid pp. 119-20
[125) Geoffrey Till et al. Maritime
strategy
Bryan Ranft, The naval defence of British
D. Phil 1967) pp. 23-7
and the nuclear age (London 1982) pp. 34-8;
seaborne trade, 1860-1905 (Oxford University
The
POLICY
SUBMARINE
1.4 BRITISH
1856-1885
was an attractive
strategy
for
one
suggested, could strike at the heart
.1
obvious
of her old enemy's
prosperity
which most admitted would have to be fought on British
do so cheaply (dozens of torpedo
moreover,
price
an
of
disproportionate
effort
in
and
armourclad)
the
would be required
France,
it
without
the RN in a decisive battle
to wrest command of the sea from
attempting
reasons.
terms. She could,
boats could
be built
knowledge
that
for
a
the
wholly
to track down and despatch each
raiding cruiser.
Sadly for the hopes of the jeune ecole, however, naval developments
the late 1880s and 1890s did
to discredit
much
manoeuvres were inconclusive or downright
flotillas
failed
to locate an enemy battle
of dousing its lights
simple precaution
discouraging;
squadron
by night
boat.
the torpedo
-
had taken the
which
though
crews soon became exhausted;
engines. TB
the flotillas
declined swiftly
they themselves
from
1889,1892
the engine
the efficiency
deflections
sometimes acquired
shook the little
that
vibrations
'Italian'
squadrons from
of
and
of
up
boats [126].
In
and 1893 the defences mobiles of the Mediterranean
not prevent
by their
after several days at sea in poor weather,
those torpedoes that were discharged
to 15°
Later
in 1887 the French
were visible for miles, betrayed by the showers of sparks emitted
over-heated
of
Fleet could
ravaging the French coast more or less
at will [127).
British
flotilla
experiences with
were hardly
the TB
more positive.
In 1894 a
attack on the battle squadron was adjudged unsuccessful despite being
pressed to
300
within
yards,
and
warships. In 1895 Captain AK Wilson
in their
harbour
and British
with a flotilla
torpedo
other
boats attacked
succeeded in blockading
of newly developed torpedo
friendly
'enemy'
TBs
boat destroyers,
had no more success in the manoeuvres of 1896
torpedo craft
[128].
The French nevertheless pressed ahead with TB construction.
dozen torpedo
boat stations were strung
Brest, with more under construction
TBs
were stationed
in
the
[126] Cowpe op. cit. pp. 123-4
[127] Ibid pp. 125-6
[128] Ibid pp. 151 -3
[129] Marder,
ABSP pp. 164-8
Channel
along the coast from
in the Mediterranean,
[129].
But
useful
By 1893 a
Dunkirk
to
and 80 first class
as the
new
large
1.4 BRITISH
to be in coastal waters or the sheltered Med.,
torpedo boats were admitted
they
largely
remained
[130].
grounds
1856-1885
POLICY
SUBMARINE
According
Cowpe,
Alan
to
Navy's
Royal
the
useless on
high
historian
the
seas stamping
of
British
the
torpedo service,
"attempts
to
battleship
were discredited
[the]...
prove...
harbour
the
make
boat
torpedo
thesis,
by the very
in
while
its
manoeuvres
very
in
demonstrated
practice.
advocates were never
was repeatedly
which dramtically
reduced
merely
designed to
as a
claimed
by its
boat
The torpedo
steaming on the high seas,
speed. By night,
its claimed
when it
boat was often
to be at its deadliest, the torpedo
was reputed
the
role
reduced
and coast defence vessel, the capabilities
in difficulties
to
a seagoing threat
unable even to find the enemy. " [131]
Although
a potent
ability
to respect the Whitehead
the Royal Navy continued
'single blow'
to limit
weapon possessing considerable
freedom
an enemy commander's
moral
of action,
torpedo as
effect
it
and the
was, by the
middle 1890s, coming to terms with the torpedo boat menace. Quick-firing
guns,
combined
NID
TBD
the
development
the
and
of
high-speed
evasive
to make life in a surface TB dangerous and unprofitable,
report
the opinion
that probably
on the 1895 manoeuvres quoted one naval officer
"that
all the present
no more will
high speed and low silhouette,
of the RN at least set for the arrival
therefore,
something
of a different
Despite
who was of
and
its advantages of
the surface TB was -
of a spent force
and a
boat are obsolete,
types of torpedo
ever be built. " [132].
tactics
in the eyes
by 1900. The stage was
sort of torpedo boat.
*
The naval authorities
showed no special concern for the submarine
1856 and 1885. They could have done so. There
[130] Ranft op. cit. pp. 272-3.283
11311 Cowpe op. cit. p. 126
[132] lbid p. 152
between
were always a multitude
m
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
in progress at home and abroad,
of projects
build
to
attempts
Navy's
interest
things:
that
in the subject
the Admiralty
the inventions
this
was at best sporadic,
and this suggests two
how a useful
of
and what it should do, against which
information
gathered
it measured
about imperfect
of its naval rivals.
If this model is correct,
in submarines in particular,
and anticipate
indifferent
more compelling
projects
of the
we would expect the
to be more interested in underwater warfare
national
because
vessels not
but because it wanted to learn something
a threat,
they constituted
Admiralty
Royal
The
period.
which came to its notice, and that in the absence of such a
the RN
activities
made in
had an established conception
submarine would perform
machine
boats were
workable
and a good dozen significant
generally than it was
that the Royal Navy would find
than useful but privately-built
submarines.
The
Admiralty's
James McClintock
Bauer, McClintock
inventor
who had acquired
warfare.
When the American
of
a machine
wealthy
lawyer
Baxter
Watson
Government
shop
and
her
to
Civil
Horace
constructed
financial
McClintock
a
1862, however,
applying
for
backing
of
his
partner
and
small
submarine
was launched
on Lake Pontchartrain.
as a privateer,
In April
Hunley,
underwater
of
he was the part-owner
the
This boat, the Pioneer,
trials
submarine
and persistent
experience
practical
With
submariner
mid-Victorian
of
War broke out,
Orleans.
and
Confederate
the
was a self-motivated
considerable
New
broker,
Navy Yard.
operate
Marque.
in
designed
1862 and underwent
interpretation
this
support
Like Wilhelm
policy.
dealings with
clandestine
The
and
Federal forces captured
the
at
in February
inventors
receiving
a
intended
a Letter
the city
of
and the
submarine was scuttled to keep her out of enemy hands [133]. The Pioneer
syndicate escaped to Mobile
and within
a few months
boat, which sank in a storm while under tow off
year.
McClintock
principal
backer,
then
designed
a third
Fort
submarine,
and sent her to the blockaded port
had built
Morgan
named
a second
late in the
her
of Charleston,
as we have seen she sank the Federal warship Housatonic
for
his
where
on 17 February
1864 and was herself lost during the attack [134].
1133) 'CSS Pioneer',
Royal Navy Submarine Museum archives A1872/23
1134) Perry op. cit. pp. 90-108.
Hunley hobbyists have never agreed on the identity of the
submarine's designer; most assume from the craft's name that Horace Hunley himself was
responsible, but McClintock's technical backround makes him a much more likely candidate
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
The
legend,
of the Confederate
exploits
and Frederick
fascinated
many
McClintock
Cridland,
by
the
story
to a dredger
submarine
the British
busy clearing
a description
The
"obtain
the
opinion
inventor's
[you]...
...
Naval
American
of
[136].
Officers"
decided to send the Flag Captain of the North
with
his chief engineer
stage McClintock,
impression
who
so that a full report
had
contrived
he had a submarine
him to 'visit the Royal Alfred
without
the
vessels." [138]
only
he
attained
had
The
had
a terrible
"
var.
,
Nicholson
performing
chief
Mr
of
resources,
"these
and materially
and Ellis concluded that "Mr
all that
Josiah
engineer,
persuasive Confederate
celebrity
to
the
of
it was
to Mobile
At this
the
give
to admit that
were made for
arrived on board the flagship of Vice
conversation
Ellis,
were
McClintock,
and
chemical and mechanical,
better
possible
at Halifax.
intelligence
great
lying
arrangements
Nicholson
the
station
actually
Captain
with
[135].
face
the
American
EG Fanshawe, and in the course of a two-hour
knowledge of all points,
.4
In
Admiral
impressed
and
and if
lying in the bay, was forced
1872 the inventor
and
inventor
could be made [137].
the boat existed only on paper, and alternative
On 18 October
Bay,
was asked to
consul
can on the subject,
tracing
Mobile
authorities
the
in
a Yankee access to his plans, however,
to allow
refusal
waters of
of
was one of
succeeded
with the Confederate
response was cagey, and
the information
all
He
of his submarine to the British
Admiralty's
the stuff
were
consul at Mobile,
the muddy
and in March 1872 obtained an interview
forwarded
service
Hurley.
the
of
0
Flag
"strongly
his
with
connected with submarine
even convinced
submarine
boats
them
if
that,
would
have
have affected
the course of the
McClintock's
boat is capable of
he promises of her, and we consider
his invention
of
for the honour. According to McClintock's partner, Baxter Watson, McClintock designed
the boat, Watson built it and Hunley and his associates paid for it. Letter from Baxter
Watson 11 to Eustace Williams cited in Williams, The Confederate
submarine Hunley
documents, (np Van Nuys, Calif. 1958, typescript in the New York Public Library). But
see also the contrary arguments advanced by Ruth Duncan, The captain and submarine
HL Hunley (privately published, Memphis 1965; copy in the NYPL). Given the importance
of McClintock's dealings with the RN, it seems worth noting that I tend to accept he was
the Hunley's designer.
[135] Cridland
to Foreign Office
5 April
[136] Cridland
to Foreign Office
17 July 1872, ibid
(137J 'Submarine
Adm 12/897
boat invented
by Mr
[138] Fanshawe to Goschen 21 October
1872, FO 511372
McClintock... ' 9 August
1872, Adm 1/6236 box 11
1872, digest cut 59-8,
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
the greatest possible value. " [139]
and believing
"it
that
a boat of
of,
expense
public
Mr
to bring
which
-
good capacity
be
not
would
and
or superintend
the
great
his plans,
to
according
in
he suggested
to England
McClintock
all the necessary means to construct,
with
construction
future
boats had an important
submarine
be very desirable
would
him
afford
that
Fanshawe endorsed their report,
Admiral
comparison
at the
the
with
object. " [140]
the Admiralty
plans before
to London
not make any definite
meet
The
the
money"
because the trip
Royal
Navy
inventor's
did
[142]
"
predicament.
attempt
past and potential
conclusions
can be drawn
the
expenses "from
episode? The investigating
from
British
this unusually
and drew attention
in underwater
warfare
"He
two documents to shew the extent
produced
generally,
had done for the Government
to submit
system of torpedo
defence. " [144]
For
[140) Fanshawe to Goschen, 21 October
to Foreign Office
well--documented
expertise
to it in their
boat
report:
he
work
States, " they noted,
"we
in this
interested in perfecting
the Admiralty
its part,
[139) Nicholson and Ellis 'Report on a submarine
Mobile, US of America' 19 October 1872. ibid
[141) Cridland
trip itself.
he must have acquired
work would be of great value to any government
to
the secret service
of the torpedo
of the Confederate
that the vast experience
interest
Office
Foreign
were impressed by McClintock's
officers
"and
I should find myself
[143], but was simply not prepared to fund McClintock's
What
venture
to bring himself
had cost more than
to Halifax
to persuade
he
of hesitation,
amount
with the Admiralty
arrangement
in a very uncomfortable
England
waned.
a certain
and lay his
I should sacrifice my present means of support, " he wrote,
$600. "If
in
[1411. After
to visit Britain
on the grounds that he could not afford
refused the offer
and his family
was invited
1872 McClintock
In December
invented
by Mr
took
McClintock
a
the
of
1872, ibid
3 January 1873, FO 5/1441
[142] McClintock
to Cridland, letter dated 7 January 1873 but probably written late
December 1872, ibid. When the Admiralty queried his seemingly excessive expenditure, it
learned that "on Mr McClintock's return homeward he was seized with typhoid pneumonia
at Bangor, Maine, and had to remain there confined to his bed for over six weeks. It
appears that through a mistake a large quantity of morphine was administered to him in
place of quinine. His recovery was not expected... " Cridland to Foreign Office 3 January
1873, FO 5/1441
[143) 'Inability
Adm 12/920
of Mr McClintock
to visit England... ' 8 February
1873, digest cut 59-8.
[144) 'Report on a submarine boat invented by Mr McClintock... ' 19 October 1872, Adm
1/6236 box U. Similarly, Alexandrofsky's submarine was considered firmly in the context of
m
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
seriously because of this experience
inventor
and because he had designed
what they understood to be a successful submarine.
Captain
of the North
travel
and
British
authorities
station had been detailed
American
thousand
several
The fact that the Flag
Mobile
to
miles
to leave his ship
impressed by the wartime
were suitably
the
suggests that
strongly
of
achievements
the Confederate submarines.
did
McClintock
inadequate
Hunley's
the
drowned
part
during
anxious
to learn
possible
cost.
jibbed
constraints,
the
record
safety
trials
cost of
about
Navy
Royal
that the Admiralty
extreme
could
the
she had
-
as "a totally
too,
the
McClintock
unnecessary
was
the
least
at
financial
severe
and
his family
of his expenses (he received $250).
on
the
it
spot,
ever had any intention
her
over
Admiralty
submarine
to
of
mention
glossing
-
was subject
bringing
its representatives
of
grisly
Significantly,
as it
and met only a part
enthusiasm
avoided
on the Housatonic
the
at the
He carefully
during
[145]
as much
1872
and
members
crew
the attack
In
them.
armament
performance. "
the
of
Britain,
30
almost
destruction
not disillusion
to
Despite
is unlikely
in
the
of paying the inventor
to build a submarine.
Most
projectors
had
authorities
than
submarine
warfare
Admiralty
sometimes
likely
George
own
this
caution,
Garrett
built
expense and
committee
submarine
without
interest
tentative
practical
in
British
the
to be treated with scepticism,
expressed
of
a small
offered
naval
to
officers.
Navy
arose.
steam-powered
of
and though
the
seemed
that the costs of
In
1879
submarine,
boat
the
Reverend
Resurgam,
her
[146].
at his
put
the
His
proposal
was accepted,
but
Birkenhead
to Portsmouth,
the Manchester
was being towed from
he asked the
disputes
occasional
naval
experience
schemes that
it was always on the understanding
curate lost her in a storm.
through
The boat had cost Garrett
to
his costs the
paces before
while
£1,400 to build,
Admiralty
a
the
but
replied
by
Russian expertise in underwater warfare. See William Houston Stewart minute 9 March
Admiralty to Foreign Office 15 March 1873, Adm 1/6281
and
when
4
Those
from
and the risks of trials were to be borne by the inventor
construction
Despite
McClintock.
continued
to reach fruition,
less consideration
received
[145] McClintock
statement 30 March
refund
1872, FO 5/1372
[146] Cf. 'Letter from Mr William Steel' 5 August 1812, digest cut 59-8,
Adm 12/155;
Adm 12/1023; 'Submarine
'Mr Maguay' 19 February and 18 March 1878, digest cut 59-8,
torpedo launch submitted by Mr F. Windham' 4 May 1885, digest cut 11a, Adm 12/1138
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
denying responsibility,
Admiralty
officers
to trials by
took place "relative
and a correspondence
and alleged
""
Garrett
Mr
to
encouragement
to build
steadfastly refused to compensate the inventor,
boat. " The authorities
the further
December
1880 rejected
submarine
in exchange for
£10,000
and in
suggestion that he should build
on the successful completion
the
another
trials
of
[147].
The
Admiralty
be tired
will
ignored
other
submariners
would-be
enough of projectors
Charles Wood had warned Palmerston
in 1855 [148],
showed little
patience with
send officers
to Slough to inspect the 'patent
Henry
[149],
Middleton
the majority
and turned
them, " Sir
you have done with
before
of civilian
and the Royal Navy
inventors.
submarine
It refused to
ship'
down a request that
built
by Mr
naval officers
to witness the trials of Professor Josiah Tuck's
sent to Annapolis
"You
completely.
be
promising
Peacemaker [150].
Further
evidence
be
Holland.
in
found
Born
was not
interested
especially
in
that did not have the backing of one of its naval rivals
submarine projects
can
the Admiralty
that
an
examination
in 1841 in County
the
of
Clare,
Holland
Philip
John
of
career
early
to the United
emigrated
States at the age of 32. He took with him the rough plans for a submarine
boat
drawn
mathematics
Christian
up
during
years
he
had
Brothers
[151]. Soon after
backers. The
one of the then-active
his arrival
inventor's
of
in
teaching order,
the
in America,
striking
a
blow
at
began
Holland
source of funds was
Fenian societies, and in 1876 his brother
him to just such a group of people:
possibility
children
instructing
most likely
and the leaders of the Fenian Brotherhood.
the
spent
and mechanics at schools run by an Irish
to cast about for
introduced
the
Jeremiah
Michael
O'Donovan
Rossa
These men were impressed by
Britain's
supremacy,
maritime
and
[147) 'Submarine invention - Revd GW Garrett' 8 April 1878, digest cut 59-8.
Adm
12/1023; 'Revd. GW Garrett's submarine torpedo boat' - precis dated 8 April 1878 in
Adm 1211060. See also William Scanlan Murphy, Father of the
digest of 1880, cut 59-8,
submarine: the life of the Reverend George Garrett Pasha (London 1987). Although of a
fairly advanced design, Garrett's little boat had no ballast tanks and no weapons system.
Prolonged dives and effective attacks were therefore out of the question.
[148) Wood to Palmerston 26 March
1855, Add. Mss. 49562 fols. 27-8
[149) 'Mr Henry
Adm 12/1186
submarine
Middleton's
patent
ship'
12 November
1888, digest cut Ila,
[150) 'Professor Tuck's submarine boat' 12 January 1887, digest cut ]la,
[151)
Donal Blake, 'John Philip Holland: his connection with the
privately published paper in RN Submarine Museum archives A1985/49
Adm 12/1170
Christian
Brothers',
m
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
Rossa's Skirmishing
Holland
steam-driven
a diving
Fund agreed to finance the submarine project.
to
set
building
work,
'canoe',
submersible
suit. She worked
a working
then
and
a tiny
6in, long and crewed by a man in
l4ft.
well for
sufficiently
model
larger
a much
boat to be
laid down.
This craft,
Delamater's
Iron Works at a cost of $20,000. She displaced 19 tons, had a
crew
three,
of
the Fenian
1881
made some
Eventually,
was built
in New York
by a1 Shp Brayton
and was powered
boat was armed with a pneumatic
in
Ram,
'dynamite
New
backers grew impatient
in 1883, Holland's
engine.
York
her successfully,
at the slow progress
1883 the British
and in October
The
harbour.
of trials and took possession of the submarine. They were, however,
to operate
by
and upon her completion
gun',
cruises around
well-publicised
petrol
City
unable
Consul
Vice
in a disreputable
found the Ram tied up and neglected at Sewer. Dock,
part
of the harbour.
The
March
British
consulate
1880, while
she was still
the
visited
initially
although
sceptical
of
project,
they quickly obtained
Private
detectives
were
Archibald
himself
took
Cornelius
Delamater
Holland's
plans [154],
officials
submarine:
"The
rumours
that
the
was
Fenians
building,
were
and
behind
the
evidence that this was indeed the case [152].
the
The
keep
to
trouble
of
contractors
and (perhaps
US customs
American
wishes of Her Majesty's
submarine
employed
[153].
persuaded the
the
yard.
and Consul General
Arthur,
while
shipyard
the Ram in
at Delamater's
construction
under
Both the British naval attache, Captain William
Archibald
in
had begun to take an interest
plans, " noted Vice Consul Drummond
of
establishing
the
a
submarine,
relationship
allowed Captain
by citing
will
Arthur
the Alabama
and
with
to copy
claims)
British
keep
a watch
on
the
do anything
to carry
out
the
authorities
government
Government
track
to
with regard to this and any other such
[155].
British
and American
officials
[152] Arthur naval attache's reports no. 12,5
March 1880, and no. 26,19
May 1880, FO
115/673 fols. 18-19,55-6;
Thornton to Foreign Office 24 May 1880, FO 5/1745 fol. 266
[153] Archibald to Thornton
20 December 1880, FO 5/1746 fols. 186-9;
Edwards (Vice Consul, New York) reports political no. 35,14
July 1881,
fols. 315-19;
July 1881, ibid fols. 343-5;
political no. 39,20
political no. 41,25
ibid fols. 367-72
[154] Arthur
naval attache's report
no. 90,2
Pierrepoint
FO 5/1778
July 1881,
August 1881, FO 115/673 foLs.209-I0
[155] Drummond (Vice Consul, New York) telegram 3 September 1881, FO 5/1780 fol. 13;
see also Foreign Office to Drummond 12 September 1881, ibid fol. 32; Admiralty summary
August 1881, in bound volume of reports titled
of Drummond report secret no. 223,1
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
watched
for
Ram
the Fenian
"
so she is
she was "rusted
two years, until
[and] there was some talk of her being sold for
hardly good for anything...
[156].
iron.
"
old
diplomats
Britain's
directed
the
against
1880s, when
Office
Foreign
The
Admiralty.
did
far
the
Fenian
Ram
than
seriously
more
took the
the
several
Nationalist
clamour
threat.
appreciable
was a Fenian
because it
little
Office
the
represented an
was important
displayed
consulate
Fund were
the Skirmishing
links with
Holland's
the mid
was forcibly-
It
submarine
New York
operation
1860s to
diminish.
began to
and the
project,
in her until
interest
the
outrages that the Irishmen
Foreign
the
intelligence
major
societies from
Fenian
convinced by a variety of terrorist
To
a
sustained
made clear.
Admiralty
The
approached
take
possession of
[157]
but
-
shortcomings
Fenian
the
Hopkins,
this
RN
vessel whenever
was more
than in her political
she gets under
interested
significance.
in
system was never perfected.
experiment;
the Foreign Office
Director
of
anticipate
Naval
way.
It
was
Holland
thought
jurisdiction"
our
submarine's
From this point
(unusually)
to
technical
of view, the
she performed
slow, and her weapons
of her as no more
than an
to build bigger, better boats at a later date. While
was spending heavily on private
Construction
judged
that
detectives, therefore,
"there
seems no
that this boat can ever be a real danger to British
we should not recommend
information.
the
the submarine was terribly
under water,
he intended
a different
that "we should have the authority
minuted
Ram was not much of a threat. Although
satisfactorily
4
in
Fenians
his
links
because
the
with
of
seriously
Holland
take
to
prepared
indeed the DNO,
the problem
the spending of
reason
ships...
any money in order
the
to
[and]
to obtain
" [158]
'Supposed Fenian submarine torpedo boat in the course of construction at New York'
fol. 77, Adm 1/6551;
Edwards reports political no. 47,2
August 1881, ibid fols. 118-119,
Foreign Office to Admiralty 3
August 1881. ibid fols. 151-3;
and political no. 49,5
August 1881, ibid fo1.164;
August 1881, ibid fol. 106; Drummond report secret no. 229,8
September 1881, and enclosures, ibid fols. 169-71;
Edwards report political
no. 53,1
Sackville-West
to Foreign Office 20 October 1883, Adm 1/6693
[156] Booker report 26 October 1883, Adm 1/6693. The effort which British officials put
into monitoring Holland's activities may be contrasted with the total indifference alleged by
the Admiralty critic Stanley Bonnett in The price of Admiralty:
an indictiment
of the
Royal Navy 1805-1966 (London 1968) pp. 151-3.
[1571 Hopkins minute 9 August 1881, 'Suppposed Fenian submarine... ' fol. 89, Adm 1/6551
[1581 Barnaby minute 12 June 1880, ibid fol. 7
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
Between 1860 and the turn
built
consequence
boats have been mentioned
Russia's Alexandrofsky
Hurley
during
1860s,
the
experimental
above
Intelligent
Several
submarine.
Le Plongeur
both
Whale,
launched a submarine in 1890 and Portugal's
(1859-67),
in
constructed
(c. 1886).
Peral
In
but persistent rumours
boats of the Nordenfelt
type and tried
in
Italy
addition,
that Germany
them
the
America
Fontes was completed
There were unconfirmed
these
of
(c. 1863 and 1879),
submarines
Spanish
the
and
most naval powers of any
the French
-
and Drzewiecki
Halstead's
and
of the century
least one
at
m
in 1892.
had built two
the naval manoeuvres
of
1890.
inadequacies which
Even setting aside the materiel
bedevilled
all these
submarines, the Royal Navy still had three good reasons, and one bad one,
for doubting
that any would be a real threat.
in conception
the
of
naval
Proponents
authorities.
came and went,
consistency
needed
submarine's
most fervent
Admiralty.
produced
for
ignored
by
Secondly,
it
navies
Royal
it
In
as
addition,
officers
they
the
that
was obvious
Navy
submarine
it
by
were
of
the
boats
the
of
accounted
British
the
in propaganda
being
the
whose views were
issued by
enthusaism of the mass media.
without
with
many
capabilities
were grossly exaggerated
seemed,
of
support
was never developed
were junior
own
and by the patriotic
be conducted,
opponents
success.
supporters
their
and
and the type
long-term
in this period
the inventors
could
diverse as they were
and design, not one of the boats had the unqualified
construction
as easily
Firstly,
"a
No trial
complete
success".
The
seriously,
but its very extravagence set the usually mundane deficiencies
took
never
such
the submarines themselves in perspective.
promoted
underwater
warfare
did
include actual belief in the short-term
Carl
from
Axel
Gemzell
organisational
has pointed
conflict
within
struggling for power and influence
so, they create a rallying
helps
to
give the
group
Thirdly,
so for
coverage
press
the factions
reasons that
did
particularly
of
that actually
necessarily
not
future of the submarine.
out
a
that
naval
naval
innovation
hierarchy,
and
can result
that
often back some new invention.
groups
In doing
and create an association of interest that
an identity [159]. The histories of many early
point
submarine projects fit this model. In France the submarine was the child of
1
[159)
Carl Axel Gemzell, Organisation,
innovation:
conflict,
strategic planning 1888-1940 (Lund 1973) pp. 129-37
a study
of
German
naval
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
m
figureheads was the same
the jeune ecole, where one of the new school's
Simeon Bourgois
build
who 20 years before
Le Plongeur.
had persuaded the French
navy to
States Navy appropriated
$150,000
In 1888 the United
for the construction
of a boat, but President Cleveland
"with
in
the
change
languished. " [160]
The Italian
in 1896 and 1901-02,
naval disapproval
Fisher
interest
administration,
submarine Del lino
[161].
In Britain
was twice in commission,
and
Captain
Inspecting
one
and interference
period of
the type was to be associated with
"you are closely connected with,
whose influence
development
submarine
but she was laid up during the intervening
administration,
warned,
in
lost an election and
Submarines
of
a great man if you like,
the
was
but one
are deeply resented, and who is regarded
with great suspicion by the Service in general. " [162]
One factor remains to be considered: British
had considerably
less faith
in
the
ability
arrogance. The Royal Navy
its
of
naval
to
rivals
produce
submarines than it had in its own capacity to do so.
As we have seen, many foreign
comparatively
support
from
junior
their
naval
who
officers
projects
little
received
were the work of
material
or
moral
For a time the people of Spain were
naval authorities.
the
submarine
Peral's
Lieutenant
"which,
sanguine
about
according
to the Spanish papers, is destined to raise Spain at once to the
rank
of
a
Vice-Consul
prospects
first-rate
reported
power. "
naval
"the
that
interest in Naval and Scientific
to
wonder
invention,
enough,
"how
much
of
of
[163]
From
vessel has
awakened
circles in Spain",
this
is owing
to
[160) Frank Cable,
1924) pp. 331 -2
The birth
and development
of
the
very
intrinsic
the
the submarine
Cadiz
British
considerable
but he was shrewd enough
and how much to. its being a national
Spainish enthusiasm for
submarine
merits
of
production. " [164]
and its inventor
the American
submarine
(who
(New
the
Sure
was
York
[1611 Report 'Relative to the Italian submarine boat Delfino'
21 July 1902, Adm 1/7618;
Vice-Consul
Towey, 'Report on submersible torpedo boats of the Italian
navy' 8 October
1901, Adm 1/7554; Captain Douglas Gamble, 'Italy: fleet, dockyards &c. 1900', NID
no. 586, September 1900 p. 8, Adm 231/32
[162) Keyes to Hall
British Library
nd (December
1163) Captain Cecil Domville,
1889, Adm 231/15/207
1913), Keyes papers 4/22,
'Spain:
fleet,
[164] Henry Macpherson to Foreign Office
dockyards
&c.
Department
1889'.
NID
29 December 1888, FO 7211850
of manuscripts,
no. 71,24
April
m
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
drained away when the boat failed to live up to the extravagent
ennobled)
the
of
expectations
public
Fontes were too junior
Portuguese
"wished
Peral
contemporary
to do more than
to persuade their naval authorities
prototype;
a single
construct
Peral and his
[165).
Government
the
build
to
a
larger boat, and on their refusal to do so, he retired. " [166]
is usually a man in the broad middle
innovator
the
that
successful
observes
the service,
of
ranks
American
the
were wrong,
their
their
of
support
little
Drzewiecki's
was an ulterior
a commission
charged for
subtleties
of
antangonised
the
which
[167].
Of
success of
the
course,
had even less chance
their
own
insidious
effect
the vessels ordered
through
them.
Not
the
of
a percentage
paid
in
for 50 of
suspected there
industry
The
Russian
for
arms
the
order.
motive
being
naval
when it learned
was sceptical
submarines because it
two-man
basis, agents
the
on
for Coast Defence had contracted
1880 that the Russian Minister
Stefan
impact
Admiralty
Admiralty
The
of many nations.
policies
had
corruption
and
to
hearing for these same reasons.
of securing a sympathetic
Greed
experience
They
proposals.
established practice
who plagued the British
inventors
the
that they were right and all others
to assess the likely
have on
would
proposals
civilian
John Parker,
rules and administrative
their superiors with their brash certainty
and failed
lacked
gun)
machine
unwritten
services in
respective
the
of
proponent
and utilise
understand
their
and
he is
innovation
the
of
This would suggest that Peral and Fontes (like Lt.
promoting.
the
the inventor
seldom
Davis
Vincent
States Navy,
in the United
In his study of innovation
suprisingly,
worked on
total
price
costs were
market . would bear, and there were considerable
fortunes to be made by those who could obtain large orders for any sort of
as high
kept
warship.
"The
attache,
"points
official
material,
as the
fact
of
this
being given, "
order
wrote
the
British
more to the anxiety to make money on the part
entrusted
with
the
of
power
than to any conviction
'Isaac Peral and his submarine',
[166] Captain
Adm 231/22
William
[167] Vincent
pp. 43-4,51-3
Davis,
May,
'Spain:
The problem
of some
manufacture
and
on his part of the actual success or value
of the invention. " He was sure that "little
[1651 CH Hilton,
for
contracting
naval
fleet,
of
in
Russians
by
done
be
the
will
USNI Proc. 82 (1956) pp. 1194-1202
dockyards &c.
innovation:
1893',
patterns
in
NID
no. 346, April
1893,
navy cases (Denver
1967)
0
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1856-1885
warfare
actual
invention
an
with
The
attache was quite
so dangerous
to
the
school HMS
of Britain's
construction
Drzewiecki
under
Vernon,
water.
kept
which
Most
were under
them
of
ended
in
except
no-one,
the
an eye on
and
submarine
that "it has been observed by
naval rivals, reported
Russians themselves that
submarines
supports for pontoons and oil jetties,
their inglorious careers as floating
torpedo
The
right.
and dangerous
armed
under
powered,
the
and
actors" [168].
principal
the
so intricate
drunkenness,
a state of
would go into this boat. " [1691
So much,
interest
in
for
then,
the underwater
sent to report
were
pigeon
lofts
considered
on
activities
the subject
to the Admiralty's
worthy
attention
Royal
its naval
of
battleships
equal despatch;
with
The
projects.
national
The
then
officers
a potential
in
enemy
boats that came
primitive
on in spite of their
were reported
take an
improvements
and
that
was enough
of attention.
but
rivals,
and submarines
it
Navy did
deficiencies
and not because the Royal Navy expected much from them.
By now it should be possible to draw a few conclusions about British
submarine
policy in the mid-Victorian
coherent
than
the
reports
varied
representatives might suggest. Although
from
varied
scepticism
the
enthusiastic
Nathaniel
of
construction
and
of a submarine
the
non-existent.
greater
interest
strategic
role,
noticeably
the
Admiralty's
more
far-flung
responses to the submarine
Captain
of
Nicholson
Chief
the conservative
and the Admiralty
1856-1885,
assessment of
altogether
of
rather
to
the
Constructor,
dry
there
change in the tenor of Board minutes on the subject in
was no significant
the period
was, firstly,
individual
interest
Barnaby,
It
period.
to
the
boat in these years. Furthermore,
submarine
problem
The technological
sceptical
and the Admiralty's
harder-headed
never seriously contemplated
than
inadequate
limitations
British
than
technical
those
was
of
the
investigation
rather
than
of a boat were of far
her
intended
tactical
or
assessments were accurate and
most
civilian
enthusiasts
for
submarine warfare.
The Royal Navy kept a watch on the doings of its maritime
rivals, but
[168) Captain Ernest Rice, naval attache's report no. 11,27 July 1880, Adm 1/6551; Jacob
Kipp, 'The Russian Navy and private enterprise: a peculiar MIC' pp. 89-90,
in Benjamin
Cooling (ed), War, business and world military-industrial
complexes (Port Washington,
New York 1981)
11691 HMS Vernon annual report 1885 p. 61, Adm 189/5
1.4 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1855--1885
was not interested
the inventions
that
development
vessels or
imperfect
likely
and
ignored
Admiralty
reassessment of British
[170].
was,
to
energy
body of theory
the comfortable
assumption
so for
remain
that
a
the
in that
on so slim a
that the weapon
forseeable
the
workable
Admiralty
the
-
primarily
rather,
inadequacy,
organisational
devote
submarine
future,
the
force
might
of some consequence. The problem
information
It
it
did
a
naval strategy.
This was a failure
of
Nor
refused to purchase
a fanciful
to
fact
the
and steadily
weapons. This was sensible enough,
base. But by making
materiel
to it,
in erecting
point
per se. It was dismissive of
projects
plans.
of anti-submarine
there was little
lack
submarine
were submitted
completed
either
was
in their
0
a sort
was conspicuously
The
administrative.
intellectual
of
was certainly
well-informed
RN
arrogance,
not
from
suffered
and a peculiar
strategic short-sightedness.
The
of information
diversity
to determine
department
to
Admiralty
officer
Controller
after
such
his
1860).
For
department
existed
no intelligence
Vernon
school HMS
was
[see section 7.1). The Naval Lords had little
issues as the
minor
with
the
systematically
There was no naval staff,
1882, and the torpedo
and understaffed
devote
to
process
it received. No Admiralty
which
before
existed
to
able
was rarely
strategy and tactics.
over-worked
time
Navy
Victorian
own
was the
staff
the
submarine,
and
Surveyor
(known
this reason, the mid-nineteenth
only
as the
Royal
century
Navy was better at assessing technology than tactics.
The Controller's
and
see'
workable
of
Controller's
out-build
behind
any other navy: "There
a submarine
wrote
confident
architecture
Captain
boat
in every
Arthur
of
it
plans
them,
they
a
produce
had no experience
The
existed.
could
would be but little
Fenian
to
was possible
men
that with the accumulated
way superior
the
if
but the department
contingency
no
staff were fully
naval
only
design quickly,
and
work
its faults. The Navy's 'wait
was not without
was a safe one
policy
submarine
such
British
department
to the one under
Ram [1711, and Sir
the
expertise of
out-design
difficulty
of
and
in designing
consideration, "
William
White,
[170] For example, the RN on more than one occasion
secured copies of supposedly secret
Russian submarine plans. Cf. Wellesley report 22 January 1873, Adm 1/6281; G Stanley
(Consul-General,
Odessa) report no. 3 political 29 January 1879, FO 6511054
[171) Captain
fols. 209-10
William
Arthur,
naval attache's report
no. 90 2 August
1881, FO
115/673
m
one of the greatest of
Directors
all
Construction,
Naval
of
asserted that
here the design or construction
in undertaking
was no difficulty
"there
1856-1885
POLICY
SUBMARINE
1.4 BRITISH
of
decided
it
but
do
desirable
to
been
it
so...
was
had
considered
submarines
In
[172]
"
before
developments
a
start.
making
elsewhere
to await
special problems
did
department
from
of designing a submarine
in
not,
have the
fact,
fully appreciated the
nor Arthur
White
is
it
that
neither
apparent
retrospect
Controller's
The
scratch.
to
necessary expertise
produce
a
Navy
decided
Royal
When
to
boat
the
notice.
at
short
successful submarine
build its own craft in 1900, it had to adopt the tried and tested designs of
John Holland.
Holland's
Had
plans
Britain
been available,
not
have found
would
herself at a severe disadvantage. She was then ten or fifteen years behind
her French and American rivals, and it would not have been easy to catch
RN
The
up.
inevitably
would
-
submarine
than
it
have seriously impaired
jeopardised
good time
with
[173].
in
1914
possessed
Britain's
her anti-submarine
for
War
the Great
have entered
actually
a design
have produced
doubtless
could
ability
capability.
the Navy to order
to blockade
The
a foreign
turn
of
a far
This
but
sorts,
less efficient
deficiency
the German
would
fleet
of the century
submarine;
-
and
was a
it was also its last
real chance to do so.
Finally
-
most
the strategic assumptions that
through
think
and perhaps
importantly
discarded the torpedo
-
it did
the
failed
Admiralty
make. The
to
Royal Navy
boat because it had no place in a fleet
action.
In
doing so, it fell into the trap of assuming that a weapon it thought useless
would
pose no threat
in the hands of an enemy.
the danger of the submarine.
was fit
endurance
all
suggested that
the
seas; low speed,
type
was best
harbour defence, and as such it was of little
Nathanial
was as blind
to
It was evident that no nineteenth century boat
service on the high
for
Britain
low freeboard
suited
for
and low
coastal
and
interest to the Royal Navy.
Barnaby dismissed the submarine because it was useless as an
(1721 Sir William White, cited in Murray
(Portsmouth 1907) pp. 137-8
Sueter,
Submarine
boats, mines and torpedoes
Navy also believed its own naval architects could produce a
[1731 The Austro-Hungarian
workable submarine design unaided, but the plans drawn up by the Naval Technical
Committee in 1904 were inadequate and the KuK Kriegsmarine was forced to order its
first boats from Lake and Krupp. Erwin Sieche. 'Austro-Hungarian
submarines', Warship
V p. 16
1.5 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1885-1898
-0
weapon [174].
offensive
British
implicitly
Key,
Cooper
in
ironclad. " [175]
Naval Lord,
Sir Astley
the same reason by stressing that
for
the squadron to
"be capable of accompanying
having
weather...
But
in dismissing the submarine
Navy
the Royal
to
speed
sufficient
any
a seagoing fleet,
service with
it
rejected
torpedo vessels should
distance
any
years later the Senior
Ten
overtake
as a weapon
its
neglected
unfit
more
an
for
limited
as a scourge of the blockade. In the long run this was to prove a
potential
costly mistake.
The Nordenfelt submarines
Once it had been determined
into the province
to local defence, it fell naturally
the nineteenth
century
boom
searchlights,
lay
and
kept
therefore
Towards
amount
defences and the minefields
its
maintain
the
an
end
time
of
of
and
on
the
promising
the
century
developing
money
torpedo invented by Louis Brennan,
But a dozen years earlier
trials of this peculiar
Captain
naval officer,
General
Lieutenant
Fortifications,
Settlement
Steward,
Lord
I
The
mines.
expended
and
boats used to
coast-defence
regiment
the
at British
arm in the little
seaborne
operated
Engineers
weapons.
a considerable
wire-guided,
shore-launched
a weapon the Royal Navy had rejected.
innovation:
the Nordenfelt
the purchase of
submarine.
sent to Sweden in September 1885 to witness the
vessel comprised three Royal Engineers and only one
Thomas Jackson. The senior army representative
Sir
Andrew
Clarke,
a man best remembered
in
('aquatics')
the Engineers had recommended
an altogether more dramatic
The British delegation
who were charged with
observation
electrically-fired
eye
army. In
coast defences; the regiment
defended ports, and had a maritime
Imperial
of the British
it was the Royal Engineers
for most of Britain's
the responsibility
was a weapon best suited
that the submarine
1870s.
He
a leading
mining
expert,
later
[174] Barnaby minute 12 March
[175] Cited in Philip Colomb,
his governorship
was assisted by
the
Sydenham of Combe
for
General
Inspector
the
Major
and by Colonel
served as Secretary
of
General
of
the Straits
Hardinge
George Clarke, who as
to the Committee
1873, Adm 1/6281
Memoirs
was
of Sir Astley Cooper Key (London
1898) p. 447
of
188S-1898
POLICY
SUBMARINE
1.5 BRITISH
m
Defence.
Imperial
Nordenfelt's
first
was a 60-ton,
submarine
64 foot
steam-powered
craft with a crew of 3, allegedly capable of making 9 knots on the surface
and 4 submerged. On the first day of her trials the boat was exercised on
dipping
the surface,
underwater
but not
occasionally
proceeding
submerged
for any length of time. On the second, she steamed ten miles out to sea
party embarked on Nordenfelt's
her diving
at last commenced
and on the third
and returned,
trials.
The
yacht saw the boat submerge for periods of
up to four and a half minutes.
At best she steamed 300 yards underwater
[176].
A
distinguished
Brazil,
Japan,
Turkey
Wales,
Princess of
of
notables
had
been gathered
from
Britain,
the major
Naval officers
trials.
submarine's
array
and Mexico
the Empress
Russia and
Denmark.
Never before had such a glittering
submarine
boats.
Many
craft.
instability
Yet
the
the
submarine's
of
Norden felt
no torpedo,
European
King
the
powers,
Queen
and
and
of
assembly shown an interest in
was not
faults,
were hidden
when submerged,
Sweden. She fired
I
witness the
as were the Prince
were present,
of
to
in
her
particular
from
impressive
an especially
longitudinal
those who had travelled
took 20 minutes to dive, displayed
little
to
in
the way of endurance, and moved about at low speed. Her most attractive
feature was a long, low silhouette
difficult
target for even a quick-firing
potential
Barrow,
were
initiative
of
faith
water,
in
the
purchased
the Sultan,
opposed to them. " [177]
Naval
Construction
gun, and she seemed to have more
submarines, built in British
by
the
rather
and the British
boats and
it was agreed, would make her a
than as a true submarine.
as an awash-boat
Two more Nordenfelt
under
which,
"the
Turks
than
1886
general
opinion
of
Nordenfelt,
at Barrow,
reportedly
-
They
the navy.
naval attache noted
A fourth
Company
in
yards at Chertsey and
too
rarely
on
the
ventured
the Ottomans
had little
officers
is much
naval
built
in the yards of the
had an even shorter
career.
She
caused a minor sensation by appearing at the naval review held at Spithead
to mark Queen Victoria's
a constructive
I
total
diamond jubilee,
then sailed for Russia, becoming
loss on the coast of Jutland
during
(176] The Times 9 October 1885 p. 13 col. a
(177] Kane report
'Turkish
fleet and dockyards 18861, Adm 231/10
her passage. The
1.5 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1885-1898
Tsarist
claims for compensation
refused Nordenfelt's
government
m
and denied
it had ever intended to purchase the boat [178].
Thorsten
Nordenfelt
designed by
were
Swede's
George
built
He
attracted
royalty
Nordenfelt
world's
I.
and
A Nordenfelt
impressed
Sweden, Steward forwarded
Office.
War
He
that
fairly
to
watch
estimate
for
be observed
for
"almost
all
the
officers
were
certain that foreign
think
that
sum in
the
mines,
merchantile
I to the
very
much
But Sir Andrew
-
stores
question
and
public
trials
that £20,000
boats. Nothing
suggestion in context,
was equal
associated
which
attended-the
to
the
buildings
whole
for
the
Landskrona
brought
trials
observer Sir George Clarke
when he noted that
of
a
submarine
produce results far beyond a mere criticism
op. cit. pp. 152-84;
1885 -
ports in 1885 [180].
understood their true significance
first
the
that £10,000 would be
remarkable
the submarine to sudden prominence. The British
[178] Murphy
from
of
war vessels would
a vessel of this class. " [179]
widespread publicity
"these
of
had witnessed in
they
the purchase of one or two Nordenfelt
submarine
defence of British
The
trials
on the Norden felt
report
came of this request, but to put Clarke's
may
the
even Steward in his enthusiasm, suggesting in April
be appropriated
shrewd
network
respect
five months before he inspected the submarine for himself
it
a
was his name that
more
modest trials
being seen. I certainly
very well spent in providing
outdid
and
if they knew there was a submarine vessel there which
could come out without
Clarke
it
commanded
Palmcrantz.
extensive
and
the
than did that of an unknown.
impressed by it, " and was "perfectly
not lay off a port...
Heldge
and an
bore
that
money
attaches
a favourable
observed
was
His submarines
gun
compatriot,
gun,
naval
invention
by the
machine
projects
of
press and naval authorities
Suitably
a
a reputation
host
a
of
his machine
on the success of
contacts
and the
both
to
contribution
expertise.
marketing
Garrett,
invention
was the
name
Nordenfelt's
was a businessman, not an inventor.
boat
will...
undoubtedly
of the existing craft.
Many
The Times 24 September 1888 p. 9 col. f
[179] Steward at the RUSI 5 February 1886, RUSI Jo. )COC (1886)
'Nordenfelt's submarine boat' 1 October 1885, digest cut 11a, Adm 12/1138
pp. 168-9;
[180] RH Vetch (ed), The life of Lieutenant-General
Sir Andrew Clarke (London 1905)
p. 248; Clarke memo 'Defence of the maritime ports of the United Kingdom' 31 December
1884, War Office papers WO 33143, Public Records Office
have
been set thinking,
heads
shrewd
of attack have been brought
form
however
description,
a force which
It
have excited.
in the American
is
It
Russian experiments.
of
rumours
home with
exploits
of this
and the great possibilities
could
graphic,
read of vaguely described
m
1885-1898
POLICY
SUBMARINE
1.5 BRITISH
is one
to
thing
or indefinite
war,
another
quite
no mere
be
to
matter
brought face to face with a boat which disappears before one's eyes to
reappear in an unexpected
the
perfection
this
of
It may be taken as certain
position...
dangerous
most
of
weapon
that
is only
attack
a
matter of time and brains. " [181]
Nordenfelt's
Although
energetic
promotion
Admiralty
the
weapon,
semi-official
guardedly
favourable
positively
enthusiastic.
the
of
in the
Long,
Samuel
and captained HMS Vernon,
be formed
to assess the recent
the
appearance
of
development
that "in the Nordenfelt
defence which
hope we shall
-
the
RUSI)
was
the Torpedo
Discharge
boat [182],
IV
Jubilee
the
at
off
review
The Engineer
to remark
we have all the elements of a system of attack and
certainly
will
for
press was often
of the submarine
specialist journal
Spithead caused the level-headed
effect.
suggested in 1886 that a committee
Nordenfelt
the
the
at
civilian
chaired
who
its
had
enthusiasm
expressed
and the
mid-1880s,
Committee
and
(as
opinion
service
little
display
to
continued
thus
submarine
have quite
We
blockades to an end...
put
a little
fleet
may
we
-
when Christmas
of Nordenfelts
comes around again. " [183]
For all its scepticism,
both
privately-built
British
in 1886. At least three senior officers
attended
Nordenfelt
the
Nautilus,
Junior
Naval
Construction
practice
bottom
IV
dive
-
Lord,
a
and
on 20 December
at Tilbury
the
the Royal Navy sent representatives
1886, and two of them
and
Sir
William
White,
the
instantly
of the deep-water
became
dock.
stuck
in
The captain,
the
the latter's
Director
glutenous
of
mud
at
the
who had a heart condition,
10 December 1886, digest cut lla,
23 December 1887 p. 519
Naval
boat made a
[181) Anon. report in The Times 9 October 1885 p. 13 col. a. For authorship,
Sydenham, 'The "weapon of the weak"', Naval Review 1933 p. 48
[183) The Engineer
trials
Charles Beresford,
collapsed, and for an anxious quarter of an hour the two Admiralty
[182) 'Submarine boat Nautilus'
on
the
submarine,
were on board when the electrically-powered
and
to report
Adm 12/1154
officials
see Lord
1.5 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1885-1898
were able to consider the merits and demerits of submarine warfare while a
series of increasingly desperate measures were adopted in an effort to free
the
vessel.
Eventually
the
of
one
(for
two
both
the
claimed
credit)
suggested that passengers and crew should rush in a body from one side of
mud to release its grip;
and this induced the
The boat began to roll,
to the other.
the submarine
came to the surface and its relieved
the Nautilus
occupants dragged the submarine's
engineer out of their
way and scrambled
no coincidence that both White
ashore [184]. It was probably
and Beresford
subsequently displayed dislike of the submarine [185].
Despite this setback, the Royal Navy went ahead with an assessment of
the Nordenfelt
to
IV,
the
acquire
that the Russian government
and rumours
may
submarine
influenced
have
well
from
Champness, a second class Naval Constructor
on the boat's construction
Barrow
to report
arrived
at Spithead
in
Arthur
Wilson,
Assistant
the
Steward
Hardinge
May
1887 her
trials
Director
General
and
of
Norden fell
the
Admiral
at Portsmouth,
IV,
would prove of little
a report
Water to witness further
men
chairman
peculiar
of
(one
of
trials.
them,
the Holland
chance,
was sent to
and when the submarine
were
witnessed
by
Also
present
Clarke's
successor
of the Excellent;
Captain
as
were
IGF;
and the naval
suggested that
which
"the
vessel
value in time of war. " [187]
In the week before Christmas
naval
Portsmouth,
HR
Wilson at least was not impressed by
Willes.
submitting
decision.
this
Torpedoes.
Nicholson,
Captains Long of the Vernon and Domville
CinC
[186],
was planning
White's
year after his unfortunate
another
to Southampton
travelled
It included half a dozen naval attaches and
Lieutenant
company)
trip
party
WH
Jaques of
and William
IV
[188],
USN,
a future
the DNC.
White,
to see the Norden felt
experience at Tilbury
the
By a
came exactly one
but he was no more
[184] The Nautilus was an electrically-powered
submarine designed and built by Messrs
Campbell and Ash. See The Times 21 December 1886 p. 11 col. f; Frederick Manning, The
Geoffrey Bennett, Charlie B.: the
White (London 1923) pp. 222-3;
life of Sir William
life of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford (London 1968) p. 140. The third officer referred
The
to was Captain Eardley-Wilmot
of the DNO's office; see Sydney Eardley-Wilmot,
British navy, past and present (London 1904) pp. 56-8
[185] Reginald Bacon, From
Jo XLVIII (1904) p. 308
[186] 'Submarine
1211154
boat:
[187] 'No. ZV trials'
pp. 161-2
Mr
16 +
1900 onward (London
Nordenfelt's
30 May
plans'
1940) p. 53; White
15 November
1887, digest cut Ila,
[188] The Times 21 December 1887 p. 6 col. 1
at the RUSI, RUSI
1886, digest cut
Mm
12/1170;
Ila,
Murphy
Adm
op. cit.
1.5 BRrrISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1885-1898
by
impressed
Nordenfelt
the
Professional
appraisal
Admiralty's
1886 decision
Captain
reject
two
of
Long's
boat
he
than
Nautilus.
the
therefore
on the grounds
"the
that
the
confirmed
it must be said, in advance
reached,
proposal
by
been
projects
significant
-
had
-
to
development
of
submarine boats has not reached a stage to render it necessary. " [189]
French submarine development
After
Plongeur,
Le
abandoning
interest
lost
France
in
submarine
for almost 20 years. From the early 1880s, however,
development
by a number
work was
of designers working
in a private
capacity.
A
Lyons engineer named Claude Goubet completed
the plans for
the first
of
recommenced
two
in
submarines
highly-distinguished
more
1885,
scheme. This
ambitious
Dupuy
naval architect
timing
government interest was fuelled
in
early
and
the
de Lome
suggests that
same
the
year
began to work
the
in part by the publicity
revival
on a
French
of
given to Nordenfelt
and the Swedish trials.
De Lome was, however,
designed Le Napoleon,
first
the
interested himself
ship
of
the
in his own right.
steam battleship,
the ground-breaking
ironclad
modern
a notable innovator
line;
in
in the design and construction
the
late
He had
and Gloire,
1860s he
But the great
of airships.
man made scant headway with the problems of submarine navigation
dying
early
impracticable)
expedite
an
in
having
1885,
conception
invasion
of
of
the naval architect
Minister
of Marine
in March
little
to
a troop-transporting
Britain
protege,
done
[190].
His
Gustave Zede,
flesh
submarine
Aube,
before
novel
which
taken
up
(if
might
by
a
who made a submission to the
1885. It was coldly
received, but Zede's luck
changed in January 1886 when a jeune ecole administration
Theophile
his
out
ideas were
had
led by Admiral
Aube took control of France's naval affairs [191].
a noted theorist,
[189] 'Submarine boat Nautilus'
[190] Le Masson op. cit. pp. 41-2
[191] Ibid pp. 42-3
encouraged the development
10 December 1886, digest cut lla,
of all manner
Adm 12/1154
of
1.5 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1885-1898
torpedo craft,
to finance a French
submarine
launched eighteen months later.
as a
trial
commissioned
until
career
to
submarine
torpedoes
French
fitting
and after
for
a
second
Gustave Zede after
1891 while
At
powder.
the
experimenting
261/270 tonnes,
on a lengthy
out she embarked
the Marine
therefore,
not,
was formally
successors were only
slightly
Francaise
possess a militarily
in
commissioned
more
formidable.
1898,
the
and
useful
submarine
her
immediate
and
By the end of the century
had built an electrically-powered
Morse, and a longer-range,
dual-propulsion
improved
submarine
Zede, the
named Narval.
The
was laid down in 1897, the latter a year later.
Morse
was designed to incorporate
lengthy trials.
experiment,
tons),
wounded in
formally
not
larger than her predecessor, which displaced no more
did
Zede
the
former
was
however,
1893 and named
by an explosive
propelled
and
navy,
series of trials.
The
until
in
down
was
spent most of her long
was learned,
who was mortally
30/31 tonnes,
frustrating
Enough
1908.
Zede was considerably
than
French
the
Gymnote,
the
submarine,
agreed
was approved in
project
She was unarmed,
vessel for
be laid
designer,
pioneer
with
Zede's
programme.
1887, and a small electric-powered
March
had in principle
a month of taking office
and within
Realising that the Zede had been, perhaps,
the French
gave her
internal
made Morse rather
a small
like
But
tube.
tower,
conning
her
had
to
and
charge her
at a shore station.
batteries
was the winner
of a competition
to find
return
too ambitious an
(she displaced
smaller
her
and equipped
predecessor,
electrically-powered
Lockroy,
the lessons of the Gustave Zede's
to
The
the
new
at
port
Narval,
143/149
with
a single
submarine
was
intervals
regular
on the other
organised by the then Minister
to
hand,
of Marine,
a boat capable of steaming 100 miles on the surface and
10 submerged. She was a double-hulled
submersible
capable of 10/5 knots
and armed with four torpedoes in drop collars.
The
Narval's
buoyancy,
French
which
submarine
most remarkable
feature was a 42%
reserve of positive
made her far more seaworthy than her predecessors. "All
boats before
Narval
stored in "accumulators... ", noted a British
are
driven
entirely
intelligence
by
report.
speed renders attacks on other than ships at rest the exception
small radius of action
makes it almost impossible
for
electricity
"The
limited
while their
any of these boats,
1.5 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1885-1898
[192]
"
in
Narval,
to
the
an
enemy.
search
of
go
except
The
of
technical
French
the
intended for
nor were they capable of -
-
determine
course, partly
in
in
1889;
that
choose between
French
the
jeune
Gymnote
ecole theorists;
ordered
naval
slowed French
and
to
asked to
the latter
ram,
in
rife
the
constructed. "
be
1900s.
the
early
of
Admiral
of
Aube and
evaluate
at Toulon,
due...
partly to changes of opinion
sceptical
of Marine
to submarine
opposed
personally
the Gustave Zede is
of Marine on
naval attache in January
the Zede's
true
worth:
1899. This
course, for
"Of
reasons she was bound to succeed, " asserted the DNO,
said she did so, but she is not worth much. " [195]
construction
after
Aube
of
schools significantly
naval
of the numerous Ministers
of
changes
there were 32 Ministers
them
her possible value, " wrote the British
report
the
and you also
Frequent
delay of about ten years in completing
"The
1192] Admiralty
The
to assure him
to Aube
[194]
the leading
development:
boats.
on submarine
Third
that it was you who asked me to draw up the
1905, many
made the Admiralty
of
under debate
began to
navy
which has just been tried
submarine
between 1871 and
political
war
French
the
when
and disputes between
administration
factionalism
1888, Gustave Zede wrote
in November
plan of the submarine
who...
the
service was very much the child
it
were not
would,
was reportedly
boat and a submarine
in
"I have not forgotten
that
Marine
of
to
but beyond
(which
armament
usefulness) was still
Franca-Prussian
the
submarine
expected
choice [193].
was rooted
between
Republic
Minister
the
a torpedo-armed
being Zede's preferred
Indecision
the submarine's
year
initially
were
commerce raiding,
Zede's
Gustave
The
and tactical
strategical
harbours and the coast. They
by patrolling
was decided.
little
Submarines
craft.
underwater
the battlefleet
protect
this
its
for
doctrines
was slow to develop
and it
navy,
the attention
occupied
of submarine navigation
problems
"and they
The French spent little
had been forced
out
of
office
in
'Submarine boats', NID no. 577, May 1900 p. 51, Adm 231/31
[193] Captain Domville report
Adm 231/16
1889 pp. 13-14,
'France:
[194] Zede to Aube 21 November
Adm 231137
April 1903 pp. 70-1,
Guns and torpedoes 1889', NID
no. 211, December
1888, quoted in 'Papers on naval subjects 1903' vol. 1,
[195) Captain Jackson, naval attache's report
Jeffries to Egerton 27 May 1899, ibid. (Jeffries
Vernon. )
no. 14,22
was DNO,
January 1899, Adm 1/7422;
Egerton the Captain of HMS
1.5 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1885-1898
1889; between 1893 and 1899 total
expenditure
amounted to
on constuction
no more than £154,000 [196].
boat were out of favour for much of
The jeune ecole and the torpedo
the 1890s, and the fuss made about
by most Frenchmen.
deep scepticism
appearance
the submarine
of
the new weapon was regarded
"The
the considerable
was not
little
but the fact that comparatively
created,
writes
Theodore
drum
up
Ropp.
the
regarded as just another
the
about
sensation which
that
they
form
did,
the
and
submarine
boat which
of torpedo
it
real notice was taken of it, "
New School had a good deal of trouble
"The
enthusiasm
thing
most curious
with
to
then
was
was being taken up
just as they had taken up successively every naval fad for
by these gentry,
The vigour
the last 15 years...
with
the New School hailed
which
it was
enough to bring it into some discredit. " [197]
The Royal Navy had little
French
through
submarines
the
and
changes
coverage.
The
the French
the
swirling
uncertainties
smokescreen
thrown
up
was exacerbated
problem
navy,
relied
largely
few submarines were being built,
by
of
policy
continual
over-enthusiastic
by the strict
press
secrecy observed by
up to about 1906 [198].
persisted
which
and 1900 the British
chance of making an accurate assessment of
Between
1886
upon guesswork and negative evidence:
they reasoned, so those that existed must
be failures [199].
Only
the private
Admiralty
manufacturer
with information.
officer
to see a two-man
taken
an
Lewis
Wintz,
interest.
The
Claude Goubet was happy to supply the
In 1895 he invited
the Royal Navy to send an
submarine in which the Brazilian
Admiralty
despatched
to Paris and also instructed
the
naval
Captain
Henry
government
hoping no doubt to glean some insights into
the boat's trials
-
being undertaken
by its principle
naval rival.
Captain
attache,
Tudor
The strong British
had
to attend
the work
interest in
this small and largely discredited type underlines the RN's determination
to
[196]
Reports on the French naval estimates in BNA 1893-1900
(see Appendix 3. ) See
French naval policy 1898-1914
also John Walser, France's search for
a battleflee::
(University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) PhD 1976) pp. 166-7
[197] Ropp op.cit. pp. 540-1
[198] 'Reports on foreign naval affairs:
September 1906 p. 11, Adm 231/46
[199] Cf.
no. 70,16
France -
fleet, dockyards &c. 1906', NID
no. 804,
'France - fleet, dockyards and coast defences of the South of France',
March 1889 p. 10, Adm 231/15
NID
1.5 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1885-1898
find
out
Admiralty
anything
could
French
about
submarine
did not have much to learn from
been rebuffed
Captain
it
by the French
Henry
Jackson,
development,
M. Goubet.
The inventor
navy in the 1880s and (as Wintz's
"for
reported)
but
some years they
have
the
had
successor,
practically
ignored him. " [200]
The Royal Navy was forced
assessing French
brought
the discredit
by the jeune ecole and the numerous
technological
policy,
and this
shortcomings
of even the best French
unwillingness
to take its rival's
publicity
boats -
-
together
accounts for the Admiralty's
submarines seriously
generated by the apparently
a reconsideration
in
with
submarine
on the subject
to rely on very inadequate information
successful trials
before 1898. Only
of 1898-1901
the
forced
of this position.
[200] 'Le Goubet' 12 + 13 June 1895, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1282; 'Capabilities of Le
Goubet' nd (1896). digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1295; Jackson report 2 April 1898, quoted in
HMS Vernon annual report 1899 pp. 115-16, Adm 189/19.
The submarine was eventually rejected by the Brazilian navy, and in 1899 Goubet
oresented her to France.