Mr. Udell
Academic/AP Government
Two Views of the Presidency
To the People of the State of New York:
To the People of the State of New York:
THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates,
that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the
genius of republican government. The enlightened
well-wishers to this species of government must at
least hope that the supposition is destitute of
foundation; since they can never admit its truth,
without at the same time admitting the condemnation
of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a
leading character in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the
community against foreign attacks; it is not less
essential to the steady administration of the laws; to
the protection of property against those irregular and
high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt
the ordinary course of justice; to the security of
liberty against the enterprises and assaults of
ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. The ingredients
which constitute energy in the Executive are, first,
unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate
provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.
Federalist #70
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition….
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival
interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced
through the whole system of human affairs, private as
well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all
the subordinate distributions of power, where the
constant aim is to divide and arrange the several
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check
on the other; that the private interest of every
individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.
These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite
in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
--Federalist #51
My view was that every executive officer. . . in high
position, was a steward of the people bound actively
and affirmatively to do all that he could for the
people. . . . I declined to adopt the view that what was
imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be
done by the President unless he could find some
specific authorization to do it. My belief was that it
was not only [a President’s] right but his duty to do
anything that the needs of the Nation demanded
unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution
or by the laws. . . . I did not usurp power, but I did
greatly broaden the use of executive power. In other
words, I acted for the public welfare. . .unless
prevented by direct constitutional or legislative
prohibition.
—Theodore Roosevelt, 1913
My judgment is that the view of Mr. Roosevelt,
ascribing an undefined residuum of power to the
President, is an unsafe doctrine…. The true view of
the Executive function is, as I conceive it, that the
President can exercise no power which cannot be
fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of
power or justly implied and included within such
express grant…. Such specific grant must be either in
the Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress
passed in pursuance thereof. There is no undefined
residuum of power which he can exercise because it
seems to him to be in the public interest.”
If the construction of the constitution is to be left to
its natural course with respect to the executive
powers of this government, I own that the insertion of
this sentiment in law may not be of material
importance, though if it is nothing more than a mere
declaration of a clear grant made by the constitution,
it can do no harm; but if it relates to a doubtful part of
the constitution, I suppose an exposition of the
constitution may come with as much propriety from
the legislature as any other department of
government. If the power naturally belongs to the
government, and the constitution is undecided as to
the body which is to exercise it, it is likely that it is
submitted to the discretion of the legislature, and the
question will depend upon its own merits.
–Madison, speech to Congress
—William Howard Taft, 1916