CHAPTER 3: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERPOL
This chapter describes in detail the circumstances under which Interpol came into
being and how it subsequently evolved. As the organization evolved, so did its
focus and areas of concern.. The chapter attempts to highlight particular
organizational developments, which reflected the international political scene. It
also highlights the important roles played by Interpol's Secretaries-General in
shaping its development. An attempt has also been made in this chapter to explore
whether homogenous membership has played any role strengthening the
organization.
The International Criminal Police Congress
Though transnational crime was not a new phenomenon in the 19th century, it was
accentuated and qualitatively transformed by the scientific and technological
advances ofthe century. Improved transport and communication facilities,
coupled with relaxed national boundaries, not only redefined the socio-economic
activities of the criminal, but also increased his mobility, away from the place of
crime and criminal justice (ICPR 1986: 149). Simultaneously, legitimate
constraints such as territorial limitations on jurisdiction, respect for national laws,
and limited resources hindered the police from taking any concerted action against
transnational criminals. Amongst the first to realize the increasing importance and
threat of international crime and the resultant need for international police
cooperation was German criminologist Franz Von Liszt in 1893. In an
introduction to his book on comparative legislation, he described the crime
situation and criminal justice thus:
When the professional thief or swindler feels equally at
home in Paris, Vienna or London, when counterfeit roubles
are produced in France or England and passed in Germany,
when gangs of criminals operate continuously over several
countries, when human passions and weaknesses at home or
28
abroad are all variations on the same basic theme, how can
the criminal police in the various countries possibly avoid
using certain common fundamental ideas as the basis for
their work? Indeed, they will soon be forced to do so
(Nepote 1977: 281).
While pointing out the limitations of national police jurisdiction, Liszt was the
first to sensitize the police to the need for international cooperation to combat
crime. Seeking support for the same cause was Juan Vucetich, a famous
Argentinean criminologist and eminent fingerprint expert. At the second Latin
American Scientific Congress held at Montevideo, Uruguay, in March 1901,
Vucetich proposed a plan for international cooperation to identify criminals. He
formulated the idea of setting up 'regional identification bureaus', one each in
Europe, North America, and South America (Fooner 1989: 29). His idea took
concrete shape with the draft of 'International Police Convention' drawn up in
Buenos Aires in October 1905. As per the draft, the police forces of Buenos Aires,
La Plata, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago agreed to exchange details of
the criminal records of dangerous offenders (Fooner 1989: 30). Later, in 1920,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay became
signatories to the draft convention (Nepote 1977: 283). Police cooperation in the
South American region is now carried out under the Interpol's auspices.
Other police officials, who also felt the need for a cooperative mechanism to
combat transnational crime and criminals, were making similar efforts. The
earliest conceptual formulations of such a mechanism were expressed at the
sessions ofthe International Criminal Association in 1888 at Germany and 1905 at
Hamburg (Fooner 1989: 31). In 1912, the German Police Conference in Berlin
provided further impetus to the growing consensus on international cooperation
for crime prevention. Similar discussions were being held outside Europe, in the
Americas. Police congresses were held at Montevideo in 1901, Buenos Aires in
1905, Sao Paulo in 1909 and 1912, and Washington, DC in 1913 (Fooner 1989:
32).
29
111
At the beginning of the 20 century, advances in communication increasingly
allowed offenders to evade arrest by the police in countries where they had
committed crimes and so the concept of international police cooperation came to
be recognized as a social necessity. The need was acutely felt in Europe, where a
larger number of countries were grouped in close proximity and crimes committed
in one country had an impact on other countries as well. Thus it seemed
appropriate that Prince Albert I of Monaco, aided by his Chief of Police Henri
Simart, convened the First International Criminal Police Congress on 4 April 1914
in Monaco (Bresler 1992: 12).
The First International Police Congress was attended by 188 delegates, including
three women, representing 24 countries. Many eminent personalities from the
fields of penal law, criminalistics, and police were part of the official delegations
from Monaco, France, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary,
Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Tsarist Russia, Persia
(Iran), Egypt, Turkey, Mexico, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Brazil, the United
States, and Britain (Bresler 1992: 12). At the opening session of the congress,
Simart articulated the pressing need for international police cooperation:
The idea of convening this Congress was prompted by the
high number of serious crimes we have witnessed over the
recent years. We have seen science and modern discoveries
being used by unscrupulous men for their wicked purposes.
Present international registration is inadequate and, despite
their courage and highly developed sense of duty, police
officers are constantly hampered by the restrictions
imposed on them by the laws of their respective countries
(Nepote, 1977: 282).
Chaired by Larnaude, Dean of the Paris Faculty of Law, and held from 14-20
April, the congress passed many important resolutions relating to the
establishment of centralized international criminal records and called for a
standardized and speedy extradition procedure. French was accepted as the
common language of communication (Bresler 1992: 14) until 'Esperanto', the
new international language formulated by Polish oculist Zamenhof, became
universally accepted. Congress participants included Dr A R Reiss, Director of
30
Lausanne Forensic Science Laboratory; Mouquin, Honorary Director-General of
Paris Prefecture de Police; Mouton, Director of Police Judiciaries at the Paris
Prefecture de Police; and Philippe David, Deputy Head of the Criminal
Identification Department at the Paris Prefecture de Police. The congress closed
with Bucharest, Romania's capital, being chosen as the venue for the second
congress to be held in August 1916 (Bresler 1992: 14). However, with the
outbreak of World War I in 1914, progress towards concrete international police
cooperation was hampered, indeed shelved.
The involvement of Prince Albert I, in what was otherwise a police endeavour,
requires some comment. The Prince seemed an unlikely candidate for supporting
such an initiative, as Monaco did not have a crime problem so acute as to host an
international police congress. The only explanation forthcoming is from writer
Francois Beauval, as recorded by Fenton Bresler ( 1992: 12). According to
Beauval's findings, Prince Albert had permitted a female acquaintance of his, a
pretty young German girl, to use the palace's secret passage to get to his private
apartment. Having got familiar with the secret passage, the girl had put it to good
use by conspiring with her boyfriend to rob the Prince! After their success, both
criminals left for Italy. Due to unsatisfactory police procedures, Prince Albert
could not initiate legal action, despite tracing them to their specific location.
Beauval suggests that this was the precise reason that prompted Prince Albert to
seriously pursue Simart's suggestion that Monaco convene the First International
Criminal Police Congress.
With the war coming to an end in 1919, fresh attempts were made to promote
international police cooperation and revive the initiative undertaken at the first
Monaco Congress of 1914. In the first such attempt in December 1919, Captain
M. C. van Houten of the Royal Netherlands Police sent out a circular to several
European police chiefs, sensitizing them to the need for some form of machinery
to combat international crime. He proposed that this machinery could be part of
the newly formed international political body, namely the League ofNations
(Nepote, 1977: 283). He stated:
31
In their operations and searches, the police constantly come
up against the almost in surmountable barriers of national
border. In most cases, cooperation can only be detained
through diplomatic channels and this usually means losing
of valuable time. Obviously, criminals take advantage of
this situation. In reply to the question, "Is it possible to set
up an organisation to eliminate these difficulties and foster
cooperation"; I feel I can give a firm "yes" .... To overcome
any possible shortcoming and to ensure the fullest possible
cooperation, I would suggest setting up an International
Police Bureau at the League ofNations Council...
Unfmiunately for van Houten, his efforts did not bear fruit, as the magnitudes of
post-War developments were yet to make their full impact. The time was not ripe
yet for an international police conference, not until 1923.
Post-War Europe featured a dismembered Austro-Hungarian Empire and new
states carved out of the old map. Placed against the background of chaos that
inevitably follows any political cataclysm, Europe ofthe 1920s became 'a happy
hunting ground for forger, swindlers, and black marketers'. Taking advantage of
the general disorder, they moved from country to country with ease (Fooner 1973:
13). Crime had changed to the extent that it was no longer the 'international
villainy of affluence'. It was the criminality of the poor, the hungry, and the
gullible, tinged with political violence and ruthlessness from militants on all sides.
Dominating the scenario were the anarchists who were blowing up trains,
nationalists who carried out political assassinations, right-wing extremists,
dedicated communists, and several other such determined groups. The Great
Depression and the economic ruin following the war was creating havoc and
perpetuating anarchy.
The International Criminal Police Commission
The new political configuration that emerged at the end of World War I saw
several new states rise and demand complete autonomy. The lack of cooperation
between various new national police forces only worked to the advantage of the
32
criminals, facilitating for them quick and easy passage across national boundaries.
These circumstances convinced Johannes Schober, Chief of Vienna Police, that it
was time to revisit, re-examine, and implement the ideas put forward by the
Monaco Congress. He took adequate measures, with the help of his government,
to convene the Second International Criminal Police Congress in Vienna in 1923
(Fooner 1989: 32). Schober was aware of the acute need for international
communication and inter-agency police collaboration. Attempting to concretize
Prince Albert's idea of an international police organization, Schober sent out over
300 invitations to police chiefs across the world (Bresler 1992: 17). To emphasize
the continuity of the initiative started in 1914, Schober had these invitations
countersigned by Robert Heindl, Police Counsellor from Dresden and a veteran of
the 1914 Congress.
The congress was attended by 131 representatives from 17 countries: China,
Czechoslovakia, Fiume (which ceased to exist within a few weeks due to its
annexation by Italy), Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, the
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Yugoslavia
(Fooner 1989: 7). Conspicuously absent were delegations from Monaco and
Britain (Bresler 1992: 18). Monaco joined the organization only after 27 years, in
1950. Britain, on the other hand, conscious of its undisputed reputation of
possessing the best police force in the world saw no reason to be part of what it
thought would be a mediocre gathering. Moreover, being geographically isolated
from the rest of Europe, Britain did not experience the emergent transnational
criminality.
At the opening address, Schober (1977: 286) said:
This convention may seem a somewhat rash undertaking,
but it is being conducted by a police authority which
struggled to carry on its work throughout the war years, the
revolution and the collapse of the Empire ... The aim is not
merely to review contacts with the police authorities in the
newly formed countries on the territory of the old Empireit is to establish new contacts between the peoples of the
world, linking them together rather like a railway service
which is operated in the interest of all (Nepote 1977: 286).
33
The congress was successful; after five days of earnest debate, from 3 to 7
September 1923, the International Criminal Police Commission came into
existence (ICPR 1986: 149). Finally, the hopes of Von Liszt, Vucetich, and van
Houten became reality when Johannes Schober, aided by Robert Heindl and other
delegates, put together a functional international organization, a permanent body
with a constitution, officers, a headquarter, and operational procedures. The
organization was named the International Criminal Police Commission (lCPC)
and its constitution, comprising I 0 articles, was written and adopted by the
delegates (ICPO-Interpol1995: 2). The ICPC was set up with a permanent
international bureau at Vienna, housed in a place donated by the Vienna City
Police Department. Annual General
Asse~blies
were scheduled to be held in
various European capitals. Schober was elected as the President. Schober chose
Dr Oskar Dressler, Aulic Councillor at the Austrian Police Headquarters, as the
Secretary-General and another Austrian, Dr Schulz as the Vice-President, Johann
Adler, a retired Austrian Army Officer and then working at the Austrian National
Bank became the resident counterfeit expert (Nepote 1977: 287). The rest of the
staff was also entirely Austrian, paid for by the Austrian government. The
Austrian police files became the nucleus of the international crime records office.
French and English came to be accepted as the official languages (Bresler 1992:
18).
The second congress was significantly different from the first in one aspect-the
composition. The delegation was more homogenous as participants no longer
included magistrates, lawyers, or diplomats but only police chiefs from various
countries. This difference is particularly significant, considering the success the
second congress attained, culminating in the formation ofthe ICPC.
While Prince Albert's real motives for convening the first congress are not quite
well understood, Schober's motives are quite apparent. He was motivated by two
considerations: political and technical. As a former official ofthe Austrian
Empire, he was anxious to find an opportunity for his country to regain some of its
lost prestige. He was also motivated by technical considerations. Earlier, the
14
police of Vienna, capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, had maintained an
extremely extensive criminal record of the entire territory. Consequent to losing
World War I, the Empire had broken up into separate nations. The police files
remained in Vienna, when the city was reduced to being the capital of only
Austria. Logically, the police of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and
Romania-all of which had been part of the old Empire-were dependent on the
Vienna police for the criminal files (Nepote 1977: 185). Schober made good use
of this situation and the Vienna police files became the bases for ICPC's
international police records filing system. Thus, political considerations aided by
technical advantages made it possible for Schober to convene the second congress,
which was successful in creating the ICPC.
In 1956, the ICPC was renamed as the International Criminal Police Organization
(ICPO) to give it a sense of permanency (Valleix 1986: 92). The term 'Interpol'
signifying 'International Police' was adopted by the ICPC in 1946 for its
telegraphic use (Bresler 1992). Ever since, the organization is better known as
Interpol (Lee 1975: 19) Since the current ICPO-Interpol is a continuation of the
commission initiated in 1923, it declares its existence from 7 September 1923.
Soon after the ICPC's inception, Secretary-General Dressler, with help from VicePresident Schultz, commenced the task of consolidating its criminal data bank. A
subtle lawyer and a brilliant linguist, proficient in German, French, Spanish,
English, and Latin, Dressler had been trained in the imperial civil service tradition
and was an able jurist and administrator. Along with Schultz, an equally
distinguished administrator and jurist, Dressler organized the international bureau
into departments dealing with currency counterfeiting, fingerprinting, passport
forgeries, drug trafficking, and dangerous criminals.
Next to be set up was an international crime records office, much in line with the
old Austro-Hungarian format. Dressler supplemented the primary database of the
Vienna police files with fresh information requested from member states
regarding current exploits of international criminals. The forms he supplied to
member states to build the records were extensive and asked for several details;
35
today, they would be viewed as great intrusions into personal privacy. They
included infmmation relating to the person's religious and personal
beliefs--whether the person was a Jew or a Christian, a Catholic or a Protestant, a
gypsy, a homosexual, etc. Though such vast information was demanded for
tracing the criminal by establishing his habitat easily, Dressler's convictions and
actions during the war period (1939-45) raised serious doubts regarding the true
intentions of exhaustive dossiers on criminals (Nepote 1977: 287).
Adler, for his part, as head of the Counterfeit Record System, created a unique
central records system of the world's money counterfeiting activities, probably the
first example for a globally complete record of a particular criminal activity and
product. So well organized was this record system that it continues unchanged to
this day (Nepote 1977: 288). Adler also started the publication of Counterfeits and
Forgeries Review. The counterfeit section of the ICPC was so well conceived that
the League ofNations sought ICPC's assistance in drafting the 1929 Convention
on Currency Counterfeiting and also designated it as the agency for the
implementation of the Convention's purposes.
In 1925, the ICPC brought out the first issue of its regular fortnightly magazine,
International Public Safety, edited by Dressler (Bresler 1992: 27). It was
published in German, French, English, and Italian and had articles relating to the
general crime scenario and its impact on society. But most important, it contained
a section on International Wanted Notices, listing the most important men and
women wanted by member states for crimes of international nature (Fooner 1989:
133 ). Regarding the circulation of 'wanted notices', Dressler wrote in the
inaugural issue:
The police authorities will not only be informed of
criminals who are wanted by various states, but will also
have full knowledge of the activities in the world of the
international criminal: what he is planning, what new ideas
he has invented to circumvent the police, etc. In this way,
the police will be in a position to take valuable preventive
measures (Bresler 1992: 27).
International Public Safety appeared as Internationale Kriminalpolizei during
World War II, and from 1946 on, stated appearing as the International Criminal
Police Review (Fooner 1989: 153).
Right from its inception, the ICPC enjoyed comprehensive financial support from
the Austrian government, including space for official work as well as staff for the
officers. The framers of the ICPC constitution had taken Austria so much for
granted that they completely overlooked providing the ICPC with a budget. It was
only at the fifth General Assembly held in Antwerp (Berne) in 1928 that member
states finally decided to provide the ICPC with a budget (Bresler 1992: 19). The
member states vowed to pay one Swiss franc for every 10,000 of their inhabitants.
The Swiss franc was chosen because Swiss currency was considered the most
stable. This population-related budget system seemed inappropriate as countries
with relatively low populations, like Switzerland would be more concerned with
international crime than China or India with their large populations. Contribution,
therefore, needed to be linked instead to the magnitude of crime and the extent of
need for transnational cooperation. This ill-suited budgetary system finally gave
way to the budget unit system in 1956 after the revision the ICPC's constitution
(Fooner 1989: 166).
After its first General Assembly in 1923, the ICPC commenced operations with an
office only in Vienna. It was soon realized that its functioning could be enhanced
by setting up separate bureaus in member countries, dealing exclusively with
ICPC work. These bureaus would be manned by the national police of the member
countries and serve as liaising units with the ICPC. Belgium set up its bureau in
1925, followed by Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Romania, and Bulgaria. Thus
was conceived the idea of the National Central Bureaus (NCBs), now an integral
part of Interpol. What started as an option was soon made mandatory; in the 1956
charter revision, the institution of an NCB was one of the preconditions for
membership (Article 32, Interpol Constitution).
Another landmark in the ICPC's development was the installation of its own radio
network in 1935 (Bresler 1992: 45). The executive radio link facilitated direct
37
contact between police forces in Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, Budapest,
Bucharest, Paris, Pressberg-Bralislava (Czechoslovakia), Vienna, Warsaw, and
Zurich. There was also a remarkable increase in membership. By the beginning of
193 8, there were almost 34 members, nearly double those that attended the 1923
Congress in Vienna (Bresler 1992: 45-46). With a few exceptions, the ICPC
largely remained an all-European organization. Members now included Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dutch East Indies,
Dutch West Indies, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Free City of Danzig,
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Persia (Iran), Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.
Simultaneous to the ICPC's development at the organizational front, there were
political developments. That the organization should not involve itself in political
crimes is crucial because nations would consider such an intervention as an
erosion of their political sovereignty. Interpol's existing status clearly states that
"it is strictly forbidden for the Organisation to undertake an intervention or
activities of a political, military, religious or racial character". Though it had been
widely presumed that the pre-World War II ICPC also had similar stipulations,
this presumption is far from true. The Commission only pledged itself to do all
that was necessary 'to forward the fight against criminals'. Moreover, the brief 10
articled statutes of the ICPC had no mention of any categorization of crime in
terms of political, non-political, or ordinary law crime. Though Schober outline at
the keynote address in 1923 that "the objective that we are pursuing [in setting up
the Commission] is devoid of all political aims. It is an effort or pure civilisation,
for we are addressing ourselves solely to the common enemy of all human society,
the criminal of general law," he tactfully avoided placing that restriction in the
statute. This only points out that the ambiguity regarding the ICPC's involvement
in political crime was purposely maintained to provide the Commission with
enough leverage to function efficiently.
Despite its apparently apolitical character, the ICPC involvement in solving
politically motivated crimes is evident in the following examples. In 1931, four
38
instances of train track sabotage were detected in the neighbouring areas of
Vienna and Budapest. The instances took a serious angle with the death of 20
passengers in the bombing of a passenger express. All three police forces from
Austria, Germany, and Hungary-after concerted action through the ICPC-were
able to track down the criminals who were dedicated communists attempting to
sabotage the political process of capitalist countries (Bresler 1992: 41-42).
Another striking example of the ICPC's involvement in solving a political crime
came when, in October 1934, Dressler permitted the French police to utilize the
ICPC's channels to warn the German police of a plot to assassinate Hitler (Bresler
1992: 42-43). The ICPC was yet again involved in a political imbroglio in
October 1934, when ethnic 'patriots' gunned down King Alexander ofYugoslavia
and French foreign minister Louis Barthou at Marseilles. While three conspirators
were arrested in France, two others were traced in Turin, through ICPC's
networking. The non-political ICPC aided their atTest but could not get them
extradited due to 'political reasons', as stated by Italy.
Under Nazi Shadow
Changes at the global level had impacts on the ICPC. Austria was not alone in
facing the threat of annexation by Hitler's Germany-the ICPC's professional
police delegates from Gennany were being gradually replaced by pro-Nazis. Sir
Ronald Howe, the British representative to the ICPC, remarked: "While hitherto
Germans had sent as delegates to the Commission's General Assemblies men who .
were professional police officers of high standing, they now began to send up and
coming Nazi thugs" (Bresler 1992: 44). Part of Germany's delegation were Kurt
Daluege, Count Wolf von Helldorf, Police Commissioner of Berlin; Arthur Nebe,
Head of German Crime Investigation Department (CID); and Karl Zindel, Police
Assistant to the German Interior Minister. These men were Nazi supporters, either
strong or mild. But the real threat to the ICPC came when Germany annexed
Austria in March 1938. Foreseeing any German takeover ofthe ICPC, the General
Assembly held at Vienna in 1934 passed a resolution to the effect that for a trial
period of five years, the ICPC President would be an Austrian and the serving
39
Police Chief of Vienna (Bresler 1992: 47). But this did not deter the German
police from attempting to take over the ICPC. Dr Michael Skubl, then Vienna's
police chief and ICPC President, was forced to render his resignation the day
Germany annexed Austria. Arrested after his resignation, Skubl was released only
eight years later when the Allies won and liberated scores of political prisoners
(Bresler 1992: 4 7).
After Heinrich Himmler, the German Chief of Police, forced Skubl to resign,
Reinhard Heydrich, second-in-command to Himmler, was only too eager to
become President of the ICPC. Surprisingly, Dressler was not arrested along with
Skubl, and he in fact aided Heydrich in his venture. Heydrich declared, "Since the
adoption of the resolution in 1934, the Head of the Vienna police has been the
President ofthe ICPC. Austria is now an integral part of Germany, and the
resolution should therefore apply to the Director of the Sicherheitspolizei
[Security Police] of the Third Reich, namely myself' (Bresler 1992: 46). Applying
the same logic, Heydrich wanted to shift the ICPC headquarters from Vienna to
Berlin. Dressler, expecting the United States to join the ICPC at the 141h General
Assembly scheduled to be held at Bucharest in June 1938, advise Heydrich to wait
until after that. As a stopgap arrangement, Dressler suggested granting the
President's position to Otto Steinhaus!, a former high-ranking Austrian police
officer and notorious Nazi, who had recently been released. That he was an
Austrian would be in line with the resolution of 1934 and that he was a Nazi
would be favourable to the new German masters. More significant of Steinhaus] 's
choice was the fact that, suffering poor health, he would not live long and thereby
would not keep Heydrich waiting for long. That Dressler had conspired for such a
German takeover of the ICPC only reiterated the fact that Dressler had been a
Nazi sympathizer all along and with the final German annexation of Austria, his
loyalties became more pronounced, more explicit. Writing about the pioneers of
policing, former Secretary-General oflnterpol (1963-78) Jean Nepote remarks:
"Whatever his previous qualities, Dressler lost all merit as an international official
by contributing to the takeover" (Nepote 1977: 287).
40
As advised by Dressler, Steinhaus! became President of the ICPC on 15 April
1938. The 14th General Assembly was held as scheduled from 7 June 1938.
Through the Western powers, especially France and Britain, were not pleased with
the Nazi provincial police chief heading the ICPC, they could do little about it.
Dressler's careful planning enabled the General Assembly to be a peaceful event,
except for one instance when the French Police delegate Louis Ducloux proposed
that the headquarters be shifted to Geneva, where the League ofNations was also
stationed (Bresler 1992: 48). After intense debate, his proposal was rejected. The
General Assembly for the next year was scheduled at Berlin, and as foreseen by
Dressler, the United States joined the ICPC on 10 June 1938. The FBI (Federal
Bureau oflnvestigation of the US) had sent representatives to the ICPC's General
Assemblies only in 1936 and 1937 after waiting since 1923. Finally, by an Act of
Congress signed into law on 10 June 1938, the FBI was authorized to be the only
federal law enforcement agency to liaison with the ICPC (Fooner 1989: 53-54). J.
Edgar Hoover was subsequently appointed as the American Personal
Representative to the ICPC.
The General Assembly scheduled for Berlin in 1939 never took place, as World
War II broke out following the German invasion of Poland. Though the common
perception is that the ICPC did not function during the war period (1939--45),
Fenton Bresler, attempting to trace the ICPC's history during the War, has proved
that it worked during the period and even published International Public Safety,
though under a different name-Jnternationale Kriminalpolizei ("International
Criminal Police"). This was further substantiated by Interpol President Francois
Mitterand at the inauguration oflnterpol's new headquarters in Lyons in 1989. He
stated, "As was only to be expected, the Nazi invasion led to the institution being
used for
una~ceptable
end, against the wishes of its founders and most of its
members ... After the war, the problem of continuity did not arise for the
Organisation since ICPC had continued to function during the war, and its
activities were apparently interrupted only in 1945" (Bresler 1992: 51-52).
Dressler's book Die Internationale Kriminal Polizeiliche Kommission und Jhr
Werk ("The International Criminal Police Commission and its Work") detailed the
41
ICPC's wartime activities. The stopgap president Otto Steinhaus!, as predicted by
Dressler, had succumbed early to ill health on 20 June 1940. Heydrich, who had
been waiting in the wings, now staked his claim. Once again, Dressler aided the
official transfer of the ICPC into German hands. He sent notices to alllCPC
members seeking their permissions to make Heydrich the President and proposing
the transfer of the ICPC's headquarters to Berlin. Dressler provided only three
weeks for them to revert, further stating that their silence would be considered an
assent. Only 15 countries bothered to reply, all in the affirmative: Germany; Nazi
occupied territories of Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands; proHitler states of Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey; and
Finland, Greece, Switzerland, and Sweden. While US chose not to reply,
Dressler's letters to Britain, France, and Ireland never reached their destinations;
the German post office refused to forward them due to the raging war (Bresler
1992: 54). The farce of a legality resulted in Heydrich 'unanimously' becoming
the President in August 1940. Arthur Nebe, head of the German CID, became the
Director of the International Bureau, a post especially created for him. The ICPC
became the RSHA's (Reich Security Main Office's) fifth Bureau dealing with
criminal intelligence; the Gestapo was the fourth. Thus, the ICPC became a
coordinating agency with the Gestapo.
The second part ofHeydrich's proposal took shape when the headquarters ofthe
ICPC were shifted from Vienna to Berlin. The only casualty of such a move was
the loss of support from the FBI. Edgar Hoover directed his office: "In future no
communication be addressed to the International Criminal Police Commission,
whose present address is Berlin, Germany" (Bresler 1992: 56).
Heydrich continued as President until his assassination on 27 May 1942 by Czech
patriots of the Free Czechoslovak Forces. Arthur Nebe became the acting
President until Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Head of the Security Police and Director of
RSHA, was appointed President. Not much change was registered in the ICPC; its
magazine continued its publication with circulation of 'wanted' notices. Though
there was a definite rise in wartime crime, there was not much change in the type
42
of crimes committed. Certain member countries continued to send in their wanted
notices and crime statistics to the ICPC's magazine.
Countries like Sweden and Switzerland chose to continue their dealings with the
ICPC during the war years, when it was totally under the control of German
forces. This raises doubts of their alleged neutrality during the war. More startling
is the fact that Colonel Werner Muller, Chief of Security Police and Criminal
Police of Berne, Switzerland, served as a member of the editorial board of the
Commission's magazine during the entire war period (Bresler 1992: 53).
The general perception that the ICPC was 'defunct' in the war period stems not
from the notion that it was not functioning during the war, but from the lack of
international character in its functioning. It has been alleged, and only partly
proven, that the ICPC files had been put to sinister use by German forces.
Evidently, this has not only robbed the ICPC of its international character but also
damaged its reputation (Forrest 1955: 29) Of even more serious consequence has
been the allegation that its files had aided the Gestapo in tracing and eliminating
Jews in particular as well as gypsies and homosexuals. Heydrich and
Kaltenbrunner, then President of the ICPC, targeted these three groups as
'undesirable elements'. Though their targeting was not based on their capacity as
Presidents, rather as heads of RSHA, the fact that the ICPC files were at their
disposal to identify their target groups raises enough suspicion. The ICPC files,
the most exhaustive of all criminal files with details of addresses, race, religion,
and sexual preference, could have been of immense use to the German forces.
While Nepote, comments, "I have not the slightest idea but it would certainly have
been very practical", Sir Hartley Shawcross, Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg,
states, "It is of course a long time ago and it is quite possible that Kaltenbrunner
did use the ICPC network to hunt down anti-Nazis, but I am afraid I simply cannot
confirm that this was the case" (Bresler 1992: 54). Though it's never been proven,
it's the possibility has not been entirely ruled out either.
Another incident quite unbecoming of the ICPC is its alleged involvement in
abetting international crime. The ICPC's files had been allegedly used in
43
'Operation Bemhard', the largest money counterfeiting scheme launched by the
Germans to destabilize the British economy (Bresler 1992: 55). It was the
brainchild of Alfred Naujocks, a young officer working directly under Heydrich.
Since Hitler did not want to risk a physical invasion of Britain across the English
Channel, Naujocks proposed weakening the British economically by circulating
counterfeit British pound notes all over the world. Expert, world-class
counterfeiters, former criminals and allegedly traced through Interpol files, were
pressed into the work of massive scale. Large-scale production of counterfeit 5,
10, 20 and 50-pound notes took place in the German concentration camp at
Sachsenhausen. Unfortunately for Naujocks, Operation Bernhard did not create
the imagined impact, i.e. to destabilize the British economy. It did, however, help
the Germans pay off their second-class collaborators and spies in counterfeit
pounds! Here again, though not fully proven, the possibility that Operation
Bernhard gained from the ICPC files is quite high. Simon Wiesenthal, a famous
post-war Nazi hunter, in a Dutch documentary film Dossier Interpol claims that
the ICPC files were indeed put to such use (Bresler 1992: 73).
Despite these changes, the ICPC functioned through the war years until in May
1945 after Germany was defeated and US armed forces took possession of the
ICPC office; the ICPC headquarters were located in the American Zone of
Occupied Berlin. The last issue of the German-held ICPC's magazine appeared on
20 February 1945. When American forces took possession ofthe headquarters, it
was bereft of its President, Secretary-General, and the much-acclaimed files;
while Kaltenbrunner was arrested, Dressler managed to slip away to Austria. 1f
international police cooperation had to continue, the ICPC had to begin all over
again; post-War socio-economic conditions compelled such a beginning.
The Rebirth
The third attempt by police officials of various nations to re-establish international
police cooperation began in 1946. It was an initiative borne of necessity.
Economic suffering, compounded by the physical and psychological torture
44
perpetuated by World War II, directly led to an alarming increase in crime rate.
Refugee camps not only provided a conducive atmosphere for the perpetuation of
criminal behaviour, but also offered a strategic location for many well-organized
criminal gangs. The transnationa!ity of crime assumed disturbing proportions as
ill-defined boundaries still persisted and nascent governments struggled to
consolidate political power and adjust to post-War developments. The magnitude
of crime and its impact on society was tremendous-the need for international
police cooperation was felt stronger than ever before. Florent Louwage, DirectorGeneral of Belgian Internal Security wisely exploited this growing momentum for
international police cooperation when he convened the ICPC's 15th General
Assembly.
Louwage had been associated with the ICPC even before the War; he had, in fact,
been its Pennanent Rapporteur during the War. He conceived the idea of
convening a meeting of police chiefs of various countries and, to maintain the
continuity of the ICPC, labelled this meeting the 15th General Assembly of the
ICPC; the 14th had been held in June 1938 at Bucharest and the 15th scheduled to
be held in Berlin in 1939 never took place. Seventeen countries-Belgium, Chile,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Iran, Luxembourg the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and Yugoslavia-sent 43 delegates in an attempt to 'revive' the ICPC (!CPR
1986: 148). As indicated earlier, though there is proof of the ICPC 'functioning'
in the war period, the lack of its international character during the period had
prompted the police officials of various countries, particularly Allied countries, to
declare the ICPC as 'defunct'.
Louwage sent out invitations for the 15th General Assembly to many police chiefs,
particularly pre-War members of the ICPC. He succeeded not only in getting the
Belgian Ministry of Justice to transmit the invitations through diplomatic
channels, but also in persuading the Belgian government to host the entire General
Assembly-all expenses paid.
45
Held from 3 to 5 June 1946 at Brussels, the General Assembly was largely
successful. In his opening speech, Lou wage declared the purpose of reviving the
ICPC:
In 1923, the psychosis of destruction and misery, born of
the 1914-1918 world war, the disappearance of some
countries and the rising of others, the upsetting of frontiers,
the transferring of large masses of population, the disorder
caused within the criminal police services of those countries
which took part in the war, created or situation which called
for a closer cooperation between the departments
responsible in every state for the struggle against Common
Law criminals. Hardly one year has elapsed since the end of
this last war and, because the repercussions of this last
terrible cataclysm are deeper than before, the reasons put
forward in favour of the creation of the International
Criminal Police Commission in the first place are even
more valid now for its reformation. Our organization
intends, according to national and international law, to
contribute with all possible strength, to restore order and
peace all over the world, with the help of men of goodwill
conscientiousness, such as you are. Let the flame not die
(I CPR 1946: 10).
The General Assembly ended with the 'reformation' of the ICPC. Louwage was
appointed as the new President and Louis Ducloux, Head of the French CID, was
made the Secretary-General. It should be remembered that it was Ducloux who
had proposed at the 14th General Assembly at Bucharest that the headquarters be
transferred from Vienna to a more neutral place like Geneva. After tense debate,
the already Nazi-controlled gathering had defeated the resolution.
A new statute was adopted in place ofthe older 1923 version. The significant
aspect of this new statute was that no more would there be automatic appointment;
all top-ranking officials would have to be elected. The President, along with seven
elected Vice-Presidents, formed a large honorary Governing Board. Three
'General Rapporteurs' together with the President and Secretary-General formed
the Executive Committee, which actually operated the ICPC. Also referred to as
the 'Big Five', these office-bearers would, as far as possible, 'belong to different
countries' (Article 15, Interpol Constitution).
46
The three General Rappmieurs who were to aid Louwage and Ducloux were Sir
Ronald Howe from Scotland Yard, Professor HatTY Soderman from Sweden, and
Colonel Werner Muller from Switzerland. Each of the 'Big Five' had been
associated with the ICPC even before the outbreak of World War II. While the
reputations of Ducloux and Howe were unimpeachable, the credentials of
Louwage, Soderman, and Muller left much to be desired.
Lou wage served as Inspector-General of Internal Security in Brussels alongside
the Gestapo and was also on the editorial board of Jnternationale Kriminalpolizei;
his co-members were Engen Blanu, head of the pro-Nazi Roman Secret Police;
Jean Felix Buffet, Vichy Police Chief; and Antonio Pizzuto, Mussolini's Police
Chief for Rome. Lou wage was also personally appointed by the then President
Heydrich as permanent Rapporteur to the ICPC. Kaltenbrunner, the next
President, also confirmed Louwage's post. As permanent Rapporteur, Louwage
attended the regular meetings of the Executive Committee held at the ICPC
headquarters at Berlin. That Louwage chose to continue his duties under the
Nazis, who utilized the ICPC's files unscrupulously, slurs his reputation as an
international police officer (Bresler 1992: 86-87).
While every nation severed its ties with the ICPC during the war due to the fact
that it was under Nazi control, Harry Soderman, the long-serving Director of the
Swedish State Criminal Technical Institution, and Werner Muller, Chief of
Security Police and Criminal Police of Berne, continued their contacts and
regularly contributed to its magazine; Muller was even part of the editorial board.
These instances only harm their reputations as police officers of integrity and
character.
Paris was chosen as the new headquarters of the ICPC. A new budget was also
agreed upon, whereby members had to pay 2.5 Swiss francs per 10,000
inhabitants for population under 1 million; larger states paid according to a
complicated sliding scale. Two new official languages, English and French, were
chosen for the ICPC (!CPR 1946: 12).
47
The choice of Paris as headquarters was unforeseen. Fooner explains, "The
reasons for the choice were sensible: France was centrally located, had superior
communications, was a privileged location for international criminal activity and
accepted the financial and other obligations as the host country" (Fooner 1989:
62). On the other hand, Nepote, who had accompanied Ducloux as pmi of the
French delegation and would later become Secretary-General oflnterpol, claimed:
There was no question of Paris being the new headquatiers
at that stage. The Dutch very much wanted it to be in their
country and the Czech's wanted it to be in Prague. In fact,
three high-ranking Dutch officers came to see Ducloux in
Paris before the conference to try and get his suppoti, but I
think that politically the idea was not viewed in favour:
Louwage, the Belgian, was almost certainly going to be
elected President and that would have made it a Benelux
Commission. The Czech alternative was also not politically
acceptable: Czechoslovakia had already fallen under
considerable Communist influence (Bresler 1992: 91 ).
With Paris chosen as the headquarters, and Ducloux becoming the SecretaryGeneral, the French dominated the ICPC until British police officer Raymond E.
Kendall took over as Secretary-General in 1985.
The ICPC's functioning started afresh in 1946 in Paris under Ducloux but it was
under his aide Nepote's able administrative capacity that Interpol reinvented itself.
Commenting on the near scrap that the ICPC had to be built on, Nepote remarked,
"But that's all there was-no money, no paper work except what we brought back
from the Brussels conference, no files, not even headed notepaper" (Bresler 1992:
93). Work commenced in a small room donated by the French government;
whatever secretarial expenditure the ICPC had was also managed by the French,
the only exception being the counterfeit section under Adler of pre-War years,
which was financed by the Dutch.
ICPC's magazine, renamed as International Criminal Police Review (ICPR),
commenced publication from September 1946. To start with, the ICPR was
48
published only in French. Before the end of 1946, another French policeman,
Lucien Au be, joined the ICPC. He translated the ICPR into English and
subsequently became its editor.
On 22 July 1946, with a view to providing the ICPC with a new telegraphic
address, Nepote registered the word 'Interpol'-an abbreviated term for
'International Police'. The term 'Interpol' became so popular that, in later years,
the ICPC came to be referred to only as Interpol. In 1956, when the ICPC was
renamed 'International Criminal Police Organization' (ICPO), to give the police
body a sense of permanency, the word Interpol was added on. The organization
was thus referred to as 'International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL'
or ICPO- Interpol. Further, the term Interpol also came to the used as a prefix for
all the NCBs: Interpol Washington, Interpol New Delhi, Interpol Paris, and so
forth.
As mentioned earlier by Nepote, the ICPC started with virtually no infrastructure;
even the most crucial files were missing. Louwage contributed about 2000 cards
on international criminals maintained by the Belgium police from pre-War times.
In 1948, the US Army transported seven to eight crates of files, probably of the
pre-1956 ICPC, to the ICPC headquarters. The voluminous administrative
paperwork in these crates included approximately 1500 index cards, mostly of
outdated crime and criminals (Bresler 1992: 97-99). It is intriguing that of the
15,000 criminal files present during the American Army seizure of the Berlin
headquarters ofthe ICPC in 1945, only 1500 made their way to Paris, that too in
1948, three years after the seizure. It is quite possible that the Americans had
removed all files relating to Nazi activity, probably to be used against 'wartime
collaborators' after Hitler's defeat. Even this explanation does not fully reveal the
fate of over 13,000 missing files. Thus, Nepote was forced to start a collection of
criminal files all over again. Though these files were similar to the pre-1946 files,
there was one fundamental change: the files had no mention ofthe criminal's
religion. Explaining the cause for the change, Nepote remarked, "The old forms
all had a space for the person's religion-Jew, Catholic or whatever---and it was
absolutely the wrong thing to do. I expunged it" (Bresler 1992: 94).
49
Another significant development at the ICPC was the issue of colour-cornered
notices: red, green, blue, yellow, and black. Introduced by Nepote, these notices
signified the extent of required intemational attention and action through their
colour variations. The red-cornered notice, containing details about the criminal
and his crime, has the validity of an international wan·ant. It authorizes the police
forces of member states to arrest the person pending extradition, provided that the
country seeking the arrest of the person has an extradition treaty with the country
where the person is apprehended.
The green-comered notice is a warning circulated among member countries, about
international criminals and their modus operandi. This facilitates member
countries to take adequate measures and precautions ifthe said criminals try
entering their countries, or are already within. The blue-cornered notice is
circulated to seek more information about a criminal or an alleged criminal.
Yellow-cornered notices are issued to circulate information regarding missing
people or amnesia victims. To identify corpses with no identity or false identity,
black-cornered notices are issued. While red, green, and blue notices directly deal
with criminals and crime, yellow and black notices primarily deal with victims of
crime. Such an elaborate system of notices, solely engineered by Nepote, has great
utility even today.
By the end of the first year, in 1947, the membership oflnterpol increased by
eight with the inclusion of Argentina, Bulgaria, Colombia, Finland, Ecuador,
Hungary, Italy, and Lebanon (ICPR 1947: 1). The General Assembly also
conferred the little 'Assistant Secretary-General' on Nepote, at Louwage's
suggestion.
It was now discernible that a new kind of crime was emerging and this dictated
the agenda and cooperation of the member countries. The French delegate to the
General Assembly remarked:
50
The international criminals are no longer of the type we
knew of old. War has left behind it stocks of fire-arms and
automatic weapons, guns and tommy-guns, as well as the
knowledge of the technique of parachuting them across
frontiers of countries and even of continents. There is a
temptation for would-be terrorists, temptation for whiteslave traffickers, drug smugglers, and publishers of obscene
literature but, above all, there is now set loose upon the
world a flood of forgers.
At the 1949 General Assembly held in Berne, both Canada and Israel joined the
ICPC. Impressive developments were registered in the assimilation of criminal
files. Starting from next to nothing, the headquarters now had 35,000 new name
cards as well as considerable specialist files on specific offences. Interpol's
logo-a globe with a sword and scales, surrounded by a wreath of laurel leaves on
a background of light blue-came into existence at this General Assembly. The
sword signified police action, the scales represented justice and the laurel leaves
symbolized the peace that the police community wished to preserve. The globe
had in its central line Paris, as Paris was the ICPC's headquarters (Bresler 1992:
119-120). The same year, the United Nations recognized the ICPC's consultative
status as a non-governmental organization (ICPR 1986: 150).
Interpol was involved in another controversy in 1950-51. The walkout by the FBI,
the authorized US agency to liaison with Interpol, was a critical development that
impacted on the organization. To begin with, the ICPC did not emphasize its
apolitical character. Article 1 to the statute adopted in 1946 mentioned its aim
thus:
The purpose ofthe International Criminal Police
Commission is to ensure and officially promote the growth
of the greatest possible mutual assistance between all
criminal police auth<;>rities within the limits of the laws
existing in different states and to establish and develop all
institutions likely to contribute to an efficient repression of
common law crimes and offences.
51
The clause "to the strict exclusion of all matters having a political, religious or
racial character" was added on to the Article only in 1948, at the suggestion of
Ducloux (Bresler 1992: I 06).
By the beginning of 1948, communist domination was gaining ground in central
and eastern Europe. Mysterious assassinations of political leaders were increasing
in frequency as political control changed hands. Fearing that these new communist
countries might quit the ICPC, Ducloux falsely calculated that these countries
would stay on if the ICPC's apolitical character were stressed more explicitly.
Therefore, at the 171h General Assembly held in Prague in 1948, Ducloux
declared,
The strict limitation of our action within the realm of
common law has enabled us to extend the influence of the
ICPC without opposition, and we consider that its future
hangs largely on the strict observance of this neutrality.
Now a reading of the statute brings to light a grave
omission in this respect, which I am sure all the adhering
states will agree must be rectified as quickly as possible
(Bresler 1992: I 06-1 07).
Following his talk, the resolution regarding inclusion of the line, "to the strict
exclusion of all matters having a political, religious or racial character" to Article
1 was unanimously passed. As mentioned earlier, this move was a miscalculation
on the part ofDucloux as members he wished to retain, in any case, left the ICPC;
Bulgaria quit in 195 I and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland in 1952. But the
immediate fallout was the FBI walking out in 1950.
Apart from the FBI's struggle for prominence within and outside the US, which
prompted FBI's walkout, the immediate cause was the issue of red-corner notices
for 10 'criminals,' two ofwhom were pilots. The Czech government wanted them
for hijacking three civilian Dakotas of the Czechoslovakia Airlines from
Bratislava, Ostrava, and Brno to the US-occupied German Area. While the US,
lauding these anti-Communists, provided them political refuge, the Czech
government was successful in getting 'wanted' notices issued for these
52
'criminals'. The wanted people were never handed over and the FBI, representing
the US, walked out of the ICPC because it had issued notices on these people
(Fooner 1989: 9). The debate was whether the crime was political or not and
whether Interpol by issuing notices on these people had violated the newly
extended Article !-non-involvement in political crimes. While the ICPC itself
argued that though the motives were political, the act of kidnapping, by itself, was
criminal. On the other hand, the FBI claimed that crime was political and outside
the purview ofthe ICPC.
Though the FBI had quit, the ICPC by itself did not lose its contact with the US.
The Treasury Department and Narcotics Branch commenced liaison with the
ICPC.
The first political controversy that Interpol got entangled with did much to
demoralize it. This reflected in its incapacity to act in the wake of the dramatic
rise of terrorism in the 1970s.
In 1951, the General Assembly was held at Lisbon. While Louwage's term as
President extended for another five years, Secretary-General Ducloux retired.
Marcel Sicot, another French policeman, took his place and Nepote continued as
Assistant Secretary-General. Though this was the first General Assembly after
Interpol's confrontation with the FBI, the debate did not centre on political crimes.
However, a small working group, managed to discuss the issue and a resolution
was passed unanimously, stating that "in case of doubt with regard to political,
racial or religious character of request", the Secretary-General should have the
discretion to accept or reject it. The resolution also recommended the following to
members and heads ofNCBs.
1. To see that no request in connection with offences of predominantly
political, racial, or religious character, should ever be sent to the General
Secretariat, even if-in the requesting country-the facts amount to an
offence against the ordinary law
53
2. To take care, as far as possible, that the requests which reach them from
foreign police authorities do not appear to violate this principle (Bresler
1992: 73)
By 1952, the number of criminal files had crossed the 60,000 mark. While the
initial files had been only in alphabetic order, the cards were now in phonetic
order as well. Interpol also had 1650 fingerprint cards, 277 descriptive cards, and
2,500 photographic cards. In 1954, Interpol acquired its own radio transmitting
centre at Pomponne (Bresler 1992: 121); until then, it had depended on the French
police network for its own network had been rendered inoperable during the war
years. All Points Bulletins (APBs) were also set up to ensure that in urgent cases,
the red-comer notice could be transmitted immediately by radio. In 1955, the
ICPC acquired its own flag with the emblem that was decided upon at the 1949
General Assembly in Berne. It was decided that the flag would thenceforth be
flown at the headquarters and at General Assemblies. Interpol also devised it own
secret systems of coded messages.
These developments, in their own way, were impressive. But much had to be done
iflnterpol was to stay on top ofthe international scene, combating transnational
crime with all its complexities. The lack of an elaborate constitution, adequate
finances and proper budgeting system, and permanent headquarters in a way
shackled the ICPC's progress. The brief statutes adopted in 1946 were in thei.r
own way pioneering efforts to bring all the police forces together and reinvigorate
the ICPC. Being based on the structures of 1923, the 1946 statutes did not look
beyond, however, into the new realms of criminality and their political
dimensions. The budget, apart from being inadequate, was also obsolete, being
based on population. Nepote recalls, "The subscriptions were calculated according
to population, which is idiotic, because Switzeriand with its six and a half million
people is for more concerned about international crime than India with nearly 700
million." With no suitable headquarters, the Interpol office was constantly on the
move, trying to get into larger accommodation as and when the need arose. Thus
54
if the ICPC had to be given a new lease oflife, change was imminent in all three
areas.
The International Criminal Police Organization
After having made the ICPC functional from the non-entity that it was, Nepote
shifted attention to the pressing need for changes. Though pennanent headquarters
for the ICPC seemed a distant dream, in 1955, Nepote was able to manage at least
suitable accommodation-an old mansion with 40 rooms. While the ICPC paid
the initial installation costs, the French government agreed to pay the rent for a
nine-year lease. With the problem of the headquarters temporarily solved,
attention was shifted to the ongoing discussions regarding a new statute.
At the 25th General Assembly in Vienna in 1956, the new statutes were adoptedthe result of two years of ongoing discussions (!CPR 1986: 150). The new
constitution had 50 articles and annexed to it was the General Regulation
consisting of 60 articles. Few aspects did not register much change with the
changed statute. Article 1 of the new constitution declared that "the seat of the
Organisation shall be in Paris" and Article 43 of the General Regulations
reiterated the same: "The Secretary-General should preferably be a national of the
country in which the seat of the Organisation is situated." The most significant
change in the new constitution was the nomenclature; Article 1 read "The
Organisation called the International Criminal Police Commission shall
henceforth be entitled: The International Criminal Police Organisation-Interpol.
Its seat shall be in Paris."
Article 2 outlined the aims ofthe ICPO:
1. To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all
criminal police authorities within the limits ofthe laws existing in the
different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights
55
2. To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to
the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes
Article 3 attempted to reinstate the apolitical character of the organization by
declaring, "It is strictly forbidden for the Organisation to undertake any
intervention or activities of political, military religious or racial character." This
was the first time that the organization avowed itself to keep out of even 'military'
intervention and activity. The Executive Committee was to have 13 members: a
President, three Vice-Presidents, nine Committee members, drawn from different
countries giving due geographical representation. In 1964, a 'gentleman's
agreement' was reached, whereby the 13 Executive Committee members were to
be drawn in the following proportion: three from Africa, three from the Americas,
three from Asia, and four from Europe. The Secretary-General was to be chosen
by secret ballot, after getting nominated by the Executive Committee.
The budget was the next focus of attention. At the
27th
General Assembly in
London in 1958, new Financial Regulations were agreed upon. A new system of
budgetary units replaced the old system based on population (Fooner 1989: 16467). Eleven groups were constituted, each with a specific number of budget units.
The 'Budget Unit' was expressed in Swiss francs. Member countries, in
consultation with the General Secretariat, volunteered to the group they wished to
be placed in. This was an original approach of financing an international
organization and has been key to Interpol's success in minimizing defaulters.
Politics plagued the General Assembly of 1959. There was much expectation as
this was the first General Assembly session to be held outside Europe, in Lahore,
Pakistan. With preparations in full swing, Pakistan announced that it would not
invite the Israeli delegation. Aligned with the Arab countries, Pakistan did not
want to invite Israel due to the ongoing Arab-Israel hostility. Even when
Secretary-General Sicot agreed to invite Israel on behalf of the ICPO, Pakistan
refused to issue visas to the delegation members. Sicot called off the General
Assembly at Lahore and held on Extraordinary Meeting ofthe General Assembly
56
at Paris in December 1959. At the session, he announced, "A lesson has to be
taken from this affair and a repetition of it avoided. All that needs to be done is to
see that any delegation making an invitation solemnly undertakes, in the name of
its government, to accept all delegates from any country which is a member of the
Organisation, without exception or reservation" (Bresler 1992: 126). But this was
not the end.
In the course of the meeting, Jorge A. de Castroverde, Head of the Cuban NCB,
raised a political issue again. He wanted red-corner notices issued for former
Cuban police officials who had taken refuge in the US after Fidel Castro took over
political control of Cuba. He said, "These police officers have committed crimes
which, in fact, are against ordinary criminal law. For several years the police force
in my country went beyond its rights and its duties. In fact, these people are really
thieves and criminals pretending to be policemen." His call for a resolution
condemning violent and inhuman methods used by police officers instigated
intense debate. Richard Jackson, a British police officer and member of the
Executive Committee, warned, "When a country asks that the behaviour of its
own police force under a different political regime be investigated by other
countries, it generally means that the request has a political motive." Its request
for international action on the said subject not materializing, Cuba has refused to
pay its dues ever since (Bresler 1992: 127-128).
In 1959, another new initiative took place at the ICPO. An international
symposium was held at Paris for the exchange of confidential, operational
information on specific subjects such as drugs, organized crime, forensic science,
and international fraud. This initiative has now developed into the many working
groups on specific areas that meet regularly. Another new development was the
occurrence of regional conferences, the first one held in 1962 in Monrovia,
Liberia. Since then, many regional conferences have been held to target crime
within a particular region and curb it effectively. This has also resulted in closer
cooperation among police officers of a particular region.
57
Moving into a 40-roomed mansion had only temporarily solved the problem of
Interpol's headquarters. In 1962, it acquired plot at St. Cloud, after stretching its
reserves to the fullest. With the help of the French government, it was able to
procure a 20-year building loan of 4 million French francs. On 25 May 1967,
Interpol moved into its own new permanent headquarters, a seven-storeyed
modem building. When the construction was under way, Nepote had applied to
the French government for tax exemption offered to international organizations in
the public sector. To his surprise, he received this reply: "In the circumstances and
without prejudice of any kind to the contracts negotiated by Interpol, the
Organisation has no legal status in France." The realization of the absence of the
legal status resulted in a 20-year-long effort by Interpol to gain the legal identity
(Fooner 1989: 58--60). This shall be discussed subsequently. When Sicot retired in
1963, Nepote who had been Assistant Secretary-General till then, assumed the
position of Secretary-General. He served for three terms, until 1978.
As far as crime was concerned, Interpol was fortunate enough not to get embroiled
in any political crime for quite some time. Its contribution towards combating
ordinary law crime will be dealt in detail in Chapter 4. With the emergence of
liberation groups and the subsequent growth of terrorism, however, it became
impossible for Interpol not to get involved in political crimes. Skyjacking was
becoming prevalent with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
hijacking the El AI Boeing 707 from Rome to Algiers and holding the Israelis
hostage for two months.
While instances of this nature were increasing, the 1969 General Assembly held at
Mexico voted 35 to 13-with 25 abstentions-to not even consider a report on
skyjacking, all this despite Nepote assuring them that the report had ignored all
political aspects of the problem. The Arab delegates persisted in pointing out that
the problem was political and Interpol, vide Article 3, should refrain from getting
involved. The next General Assembly held in Brussels in 1970 was more
forthcoming in condemning skyjacking but its resolution did not go beyond
requesting the General Secretariat to cooperate with member countries in
installing safety measures at airports and in aircraft.
58
With no clear distinction between political crime and ordinary law crime, and with
no organizational will either, Interpol was totally unprepared when in 1972 eight
Palestinian Arabs from the Black September terrorist organization gunned down
Israeli athletes inside the Olympic village at Munich. The Black September group
was the terrorist wing of Al-Fatah, the main group in the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO). It derived its name from the September of 1970 when the
PLO was driven out of Jordan. Black September did not survive for more than
four years due to its splintering into several factions, but in the brief period that it
was operational, it was successful in carrying out many ruthless attacks.
Significant among these was the Munich massacre.
While a few athletes died, 17 managed to escape and were taken hostage by the
terrorist outfit to negotiate the release of 200 Arabs in Israeli prisons. With Israel
refusing to budge, the terrorists lost the main purpose ofthe operation but they
were successful in their negotiation with the German Chancellor, whereby they
were ensured safe passage to an Arab country along with the hostages. The
Germans, only too eager to have the issue solved while the terrorists were still in
their land, planned a clandestine rescue operation when the terrorists along with
the hostages were being shifted from the army helicopter to the awaiting Boeing
72 7. The rescue mission was a total failure as it resulted in the death of all nine
hostages and five terrorists. Three terrorists were captured alive but had to the
released soon after as Black September threatened to blow up a hijacked WestGerman Lufthansa mid-air. The three terrorists, released on 30 June 1972, were
given a great welcome in Libya (Bresler 1992: 150).
The terrorist episode and its aftershocks shocked the entire world. The German
police, ashamed of its failed rescue mission, realized its inefficiency in tackling
terrorism. With this realization came the immediate formation of 'Group 9
Special' (GSG 9), an elite anti-terrorist commands unit. Subsequent developments
highlighted the inefficiency of Interpol. When the German police requested
information regarding the Arab terrorists following the massacre of the Israeli
athletes, Nepote refused to oblige arguing that the crime was politically motivated
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and within the ambit of Article 3 (Bresler 1992: 152). That Interpol did not
possess any files on terrorist outfits and individuals is an issue in itself.
Article 3 seems to have been not the only consideration for Interpol refusing to act
when it came to terrorism, with particular reference to the Olympic massacre.
Nepote was still bruised by the US walkout in 1950 due to the issue of red-comer
notices against the Czech hijackers to whom the US had given asylum. "He was
terrified that, if he did not hold back and refuse to let his organisation to intervene,
the Arab states would leave en masse and his beloved Interpol would fall apart"
(Bresler 1992: 155). Another element was the strong French influence in Interpol.
France's close ties with the Arab countries cannot be dismissed lightly and it is
probable that the French government would not have been too pleased if Interpol
were to issue notices against Arab terrorists. In addition, the Executive Committee
balance was tilted in favour of the Arabs if any decision were to be taken. The
Vice-President for Africa, Ahmed Ben Ammar, was from Tunisia, which has since
1982 openly supported the PLO. Another Executive Committee member, E. Al
Ali, was from Kuwait.
The lack of a doctrine to combat terrorism is also a reason for Interpol not
responding to the massacre. "We found ourselves with some extremely difficult
decisions on our hands because terrorism is not defined anywhere. There is no
code ... no definition which tells you which people are terrorists and which are
non-political terrorists committing ordinary law crimes" (Bresler 1992: 157).
Though the need was felt at all levels to evolve a doctrine, no concrete steps were
taken until 1985 when Kendall took over as Secretary-General. "We were only
able to act in a rather discreet and hypocritical kind of manner. When there was,
for instance, a serious bomb incident ... we would not call it terrorism. That word
was banned from our dictionary ... we called it violent crime by organised groups"
(Bresler 1992: 163).
By 1975, it was evident that Interpol was not addressing the issue of rising
terrorism. The European countries, badly affected by the scourge of terrorism,
decided to form their own anti-ten·orist group. At the suggestion of James
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Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, a special working group to combat
terrorism within the European Community was formed. It was called the 'Trevi
Group' (Fooner 1989: 11 ).
In addition to the formation of the Trevi Group, police forces of select countries of
the European community also formed the 'Police Working Group on Terrorism'
in 1979. The main nemesis of the working group was the IRA. It now includes
Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Austria apart from 12 other countries of the
European Community. The Group though primarily police in nature and function
had full political support from the member states. Bresler (1992: 160-63) suggests
that this support was responsible for the success it achieved.
The formation of the Trevi Group and the Police Working Group on Terrorism did
hurt the reputation of Interpol. The only saving grace was that despite all their
political backing, they still had to route their arrests and extradition through
Interpol. They still had to utilize the Interpol mechanism of issuing red-corner
notices to trace and nab offenders.
Simultaneous to Kendall taking over as Secretary-General and attempting to draw
up a doctrine to combat terrorism, came the awakening in the US to the full
potential oflnterpol. Backed by the US's renewed interest, it did not take Kendall
long to bring to order confusions relating to ten·orism and chart a course that
Interpol had to take in dealing with future incidents of terrorism. To start with,
Interpol held a series of committee meetings, conferences, and symposia from
1982 to 1985 that gradually defined terrorism and cleared the way for member
countries to deal with it from a law enforcement perspective. In 1976, following
the developments of the Munich Olympic massacre, a set of guidelines on
terrorism had been formulated. However, the sensitivity to the issue then had
prevented it from being tabled. At the Luxembourg General Assembly in 1984,
the guidelines-revised to contemporary conditions-were adopted (Fooner
1989). Further developments in the field of terrorism will be discussed in
subsequent chapters dealing exclusively with international crime.
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After 32 years in effective command, Nepote finally retired in 1978. Andre
Bossard, Nepote's protege, took over as Secretary-General oflnterpol. With
Nepote no longer at the headquarters, complaints and grievances that had been
unheard for long came to be noticed. In addition to retracing the track taken by
Nepote in dealing with tetTorism, demanding immediate attention was Interpol's
increasing slowness in disseminating information and the shortage of modem
equipment. The inflow of criminal information documents at the General
Secretariat was so enormous that it involved over 500,000 searches a year to
examine, analyse, and itemize data into indexes, reference folders, case files, and
dossiers. Despite the wealth of information that it had, the lack of adequate
technology hindered Interpol in disseminating it quickly when member countries
turned in their queries. Finally, in 1984, the Executive Committee approved the
long-pending computerization programme (JCPR 1984: 268).
Before Interpol could enjoy the benefits of computerization, it faced problems
with the French police pertaining to its legal status in collecting information and
storing it electronically. The French Data Protection Act of 1978 prevented the
collection of any nominal information data files naming people. The French Act
was more stringent than its American or British counterparts. Since its inception,
Interpol had operated a central criminal records system without formal authority.
It assumed its legal right to electronic storage of information after the Exchange of
Letters with the French Government in 1984 (Article 15, Interpol Constitution).
This in itself was a long-drawn process and the result of the 1982 Headquarters
Agreement with France.
The Headquarters Agreement was significant not only because it permitted
Interpol to electronically store nominal information but, more important, because
it gave Interpol the legal status that it had been lacking all along. The struggle for
legal status, as indicated earlier, commenced when Interpol found in 1963 that it
had no legal status. Interpol was oblivious to this fact until the French government
pointed it out. To be recognized legally, an international organization should have
the recognition of the United Nations or official legal existence in its home
country. Interpol had neither. It did not have any legal standing either, arising out
62
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of an international agreement or convention. Interpol went about procuring legal
status from the French government through the Headquarters Agreement (Nepote
1966: 2).
On 12 May 1972, the French government signed the Headquarters Agreement
with Interpol, recognizing it as an international organization, entitled to all the
privileges and immunities due to one. By negotiating and signing such an
agreement, Interpol acquired, for the first time, a documented legal existence and
moved trom a de facto legal status to a de jure recognition (!CPR 1984: 272).
As a result ofthe development in its activities and the shortcomings of the 1972
Agreement, Interpol had to renegotiate another agreement that finally fell into
place on 3 November 1982. The need to renegotiate was imperative after the
French Data Protection Act of 1978, which sought govemmental control over all
nominal information. Some noteworthy provisions of the agreement provide
Interpol immunity from legal process and execution. It gave Interpol a special set
of rules governing the communication of information among police agencies and
officers and handling of criminal records with protection of the privacy and rights
of the individuals (Headquarters Agreement 1983). It also accorded Interpol the
fiscal and financial privileges due to international organizations. It made
Interpol's premises, activities, and correspondence all inviolable (!CPR 1985:
I 03). Additionally, Interpol gained right over collection, control, and
dissemination of nominal information (Bresler 1992: 173).
At the Cannes General Assembly in 1983, Bossard was re-elected as SecretaryGeneral for another term. But, in 1984, before the completion of his term, he
resigned on grounds of ill-health. Bresler ( 1992) points out, however, that the
resignation was due to misunderstanding between Bossard and the newly elected
President John Simpson over submission of a report relating to the restructuring of
the General Secretariat. Kendall served as Acting Secretary-General until the next
General Assembly in Washington, D.C., in 1985, when he was made SecretaryGeneral (!CPR 1985: 126).
63
With Kendall at the helm, Interpol experienced radical changes. For one, the
much-neglected area ofte1Torism got immediate attention (Fooner 1989: 91).
Second, Kendall brought about a total restructuring oflnterpol's functioning. But
the most significant aspect is that his appointment marked the end of the French
influence. Kendall, a British police officer, was the first non-French SecretaryGeneral of post-World War II Interpol (ICPR 1985).
In 2000, Interpol geared up for an image overhaul once again, but this time under
a new Secretary-General. Ronald Noble was the first American to become
Interpol's Secretary-General. His entry ushered in new perspectives and focus on
new forms of terrorism, particularly bio-terrorism and catastrophic terrorism.
Even earlier tabooed issues like war crimes came to be discussed in the General
Assembly. Noble's entry also signalled a new opportunity for Interpol, now out of
heavy European influence, to establish itself as a truly international organization
capable of meeting the needs of its members. Though Noble and Kendall were
responsible for restructuring Interpol, Nepote 's pioneering work needs to be
lauded.
The issue of homogeneity requires a brief exploration here, considering the fact it
is possible that it contributed significantly to the success of the organization. The
narrative thus far has established that Interpol has emerged successful despite
various challenges. Various factors have contributed to this. However, the issue of
homogeneity merits special mention as it was one of the crucial differences
between the first police congress that was unsuccessful and the second one which
eventually resulted in the establishment of the ICPC. One of the main tenets of
functionalism is professional bonding, which was possible in Interpol because all
the members were drawn from the same professional background. At the Interpol
General Assembly held in New Delhi in 1997 (which I attended as part of the
Indian delegation), it was observable that the proceedings were conducted in near
clinical fashion with no discord or disagreement. While it is possible that the
issues being discussed were far removed from politics, and therefore less of
arguments, it is also possible that the delegates from various countries came from
the same professional background, that made it much easier for them to reach
64
consensus on matters relating to criminal justice. The same point was emphasized
during my field visit to the Interpol headquarters in Lyons in 2000. The officers
whom I interviewed were of the opinion that professional bonding was significant
in Interpol, despite the different criminal justice systems that members adhered to.
They admitted that there was uniformity in understanding basic criminal justice
issues. Therefore, it can be conclusively argued that homogeneity is a contributing
factor for the success of the organization.
Apart from homogeneity, a principal factor that can be identified to have
contributed to the success of Interpol is its organizational structure. Nepote singlehandedly conceived (and successive Secretaries General have augmented) the
organizational structure that has been fundamental to Interpol's performance. The
following chapter discusses this in detail.
65