New Wine in an old Bottle? President Mwanawasa’s New Deal Government and its
Impact on Zambian Society (2001 – 2006)1
Alex Mwamba Ng’oma
Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Zambia, and
Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, USA.
Abstract
When, in 2001, Levy Patrick Mwanawasa became Zambia’s third Republican
President, he informed his supporters that he was going to give the nation a New
Deal government. This article asserts that the concept of the New Deal that
Mwanawasa used to symbolize his style of administration was not his innovation,
although he wanted it to look that way among unsuspecting Zambians.
Mwanawasa actually borrowed, or copied this term from Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, America’s thirty-second President (1933–1945). Roosevelt is widely
acknowledged as having popularized the use of the term New Deal during the
Great Depression; he used it to describe the series of reform programs that he
formulated and implemented, in an effort to stabilize the American economy
during that turbulent era. Taking a leaf from Roosevelt’s administration, this
article posits that Mwanawasa adopted the New Deal approach to governmental
affairs because he hoped to make drastic policy changes. Understood from this
perspective, the anticipated changes should have constituted a substantial
departure from the President’s party manifesto, in favor of reason, professional
experience and personal beliefs. The article comes to the conclusion that
Mwanawasa did not actually succeed in departing substantially from his party’s
manifesto.
Key words: government, New Deal, change, ideology, manifesto, Great Depression
Introduction
When Presidents ascend to the corridors of power, they do so normally with a clear
national agenda to follow. In some cases, such an agenda reflects the President’s party
ideology and/or manifesto. In other, less common, cases, it turns out to be largely an
innovative program of action reflecting the individual leader’s professional experience
and personal beliefs. What determines whether a particular President follows the former
or the latter approach, or indeed any other approach is, nonetheless, a topic for a different
article altogether.
1
The presidential term of office in Zambia is 5 years. Mwanawasa was controversially declared the winner
of the presidential poll that was conducted in December 2001. He was sworn in as Zambia’s third
Republican President only in January 2002.
When Levy Patrick Mwanawasa moved to State House as Zambia’s third
Republican President in 2001, he announced that he was going to give the nation a New
Deal. The concept of a New Deal aroused a lot of curiosity in Zambia at that time. For
one thing, the concept was not contained anywhere in the Movement for Multi-party
Democracy (MMD)’s party manifesto, Mwanawasa’s political party. For another thing,
the concept was unfamiliar to the ordinary Zambian, because it was not a regular term in
everyday language or, indeed, in Zambian media jargon per se. As such, members of the
press as well as members of the general public begun asking the President to shed some
light on what exactly he meant by his chosen style of administration. Surprisingly, the
number one citizen flatly refused to yield. At the same time, however, the President
expected the people of Zambia to rally behind him and to support his administration even
if they did not understand what exactly it stood for.
This article posits that Mwanawasa’s New Deal administration took a cue from
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945), America’s thirty-second President (1933–1945).
Roosevelt, popularly known as FDR, is widely acknowledged as having popularized the
use of this term during the Great Depression. In his speech accepting his nomination as
the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate for the summer elections of 1932,
Roosevelt asserted: “I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a new deal for the American
people” (Edsforth 2000: 1). Afterwards, Roosevelt repeatedly used the term New Deal to
characterize the set of economic reform programs that he formulated and implemented in
an effort to stabilize the American economy during that turbulent era.
Former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, (1997-2007), is also believed to have
presided over a New Deal type of administration. According to the British media, Blair’s
New Deal government was, among other things, a long-term job-creation program. And
according to Rile and Young (2001: 1), “Welfare-to-work programs (such as Britain’s
New Deal) were implemented in several OECD countries during the 1990s.” Some of
these OECD countries are: Australia, Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden (OECD 1996).
Britain joined them as a latecomer in 1997.
This article uses data gathered through desk research to assert the view that
Mwanawasa’s New Deal is not genuinely a case of “new wine in an old bottle.” Rather, it
is a case of old ideas that are recycled and presented in an old approach unknown to the
local people. To lay the groundwork for this discussion, this paper first of all recounts
Roosevelt’s and Blair’s New Deal programs which appear to have inspired Mwanawasa’s
administration.
Evolution of the Concept
Roosevelt’s New Deal Programs. In November, 1932, Roosevelt (a Democratic) defeated
Herbert Hoover (a Republican) in the presidential election and moved to the White House
a year later, as America’s thirty-second President (1933–1945). At that time, the now
famous Great Depression was already in its third-year.
The Great Depression was the culmination of the instability that had characterized
the global market in the late 1920s. On Tuesday, October 29th, 1929, that instability,
which was marked by falling commodity and stock prices, finally caused the American
stock market at the Wall Street in New York to crash (Edsforth 2000). The crash, in turn,
triggered off the Great Depression whose impact reached all the corners of the globe. For
this reason, Tuesday, October 29th, 1929, is now historically referred to as Black
2
Tuesday. In America in particular, the impact of the Great Depression was catastrophic.
Most hit by it was the banking sector which was instantly thrown into disarray: 20
percent of the banks simply folded up, leading to a 15-percent loss of the people’s
deposits held in them (Brogan 1950). It was not surprising, therefore, that many
Americans lost confidence in their banking sector and hastily began to withdraw their
money from the surviving banks and keeping it at home. Falling manufacturing output,
poor agricultural performance, and sky-rocketing unemployment were the other
symptoms of the Great Depression in America.
At the beginning of his first-term of office in 1933, Roosevelt, aged 51, did not
have a clearly defined reform program to tone down the ill-effects of the depression. At
the same time, he appeared to have had no wish to follow the prescriptions of his party’s
manifesto or ideology. Rather, he opted to depend on his professional experience and
personal beliefs. Coming from a legal back ground, his experience in public life included
his term of office as Senator of New York (1910-1913), his appointment as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy in President Woodrow Wilson’s administration (1913-1919), and
his two-term reign as a distinguished Governor of New York State (1928-1932).
In his inaugural speech as President, Roosevelt, a survival of poliomyelitis (1921)
which left him walking in crutches for the rest of his adult life, courageously urged the
American people not to allow themselves to be overwhelmed by what they saw around
them. “The only thing we have to fear,” he suggested infectiously, “is fear itself” (Brogan
1950: 44). His short-term response to the economic malaise came in the form of a set of
practical measures, dubbed as the New Deal, which were largely experimental. Edsforth
(2000: 1) confirms this when he writes that:
“The New Deal” is what the new President, the Press, and everyone else in the
country called the laws Congress began enacting just days after FDR took office
in the first week of March 1933. This New Deal, an unprecedented expansion of
federal government programs during Franklin Roosevelt’s first two
administrations, was America’s national response to the Great Depression.
Political historians suggest that Roosevelt adopted the term New Deal from the title of
Stuart Chase’s book, A New Deal, and began using it to distinguish his reforms from
those of his uncle and former President, Theodore Roosevelt. The latter’s economic
measures had been known as the Square Deal (Bernstein, in Bernstein [ed], 1968).
Roosevelt’s New Deal reform programs implemented between 1933 and 1937
came in two phases, known respectively as the “First New Deal” (1933-1934) and the
“Second New Deal” (1935-1937) (Brogan 1950: 360). These programs had three main
components: financial reforms, general economic recovery programs, and direct relief
measures; together they were referred to as the Three Rs (Edsforth 2000; Spies 1999).
Through these reforms, Roosevelt sought to address the various effects of the Great
Depression. In so doing, he also hoped to undo the excesses of the unfettered
individualism that had characterized Hoover’s economic plans.
Hoover had been an ardent believer in the private-sector as an engine for
economic development. As such, he gave the big corporations all the lee way they said
they needed in order to propel the American economy to greater heights. Roosevelt
responded to this scenario by passing a set of laws, especially in his first 100 days in to
3
reverse the trend. The measures of the First New Deal were designed to address group
interests, to ensure that no American starved to death (Edsforth 2000). For instance, they
were the ones that created the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), among other
government agencies, to provide employment to Native Americans and to young people,
in rural-based development programs where special skills were not required. These laborrelated measures reduced unemployment from 24.9 % in 1933 to 1.9 % in 1945 (Spies
1999). The reforms of the Second New Deal, on the other hand, passed the Social
Security Act in 1935, among many others, leading to the creation of social security and
unemployment insurance programs. Through such reforms, Roosevelt allowed his
government to exercise greater control over the people’s private domains of life
generally.
Roosevelt’s New Deal programs were based, in part, on the prescriptions of the
British economist, John Maynard Keynes, that government had a role to play in economic
affairs. That role, in Keynesian economic theory, was that of providing an enabling
environment for business to flourish. Roosevelt’s opposition to monopoly and his overt
sympathy and support for the disadvantaged turned him into an instant enemy of the wellto-do in society. His New Deal reforms inspired hope in many American people. The
reforms are believed to have been successful in arresting the down-turn of the American
economy, although they did not end the Depression. Roosevelt ruled America for four
consecutive terms, having been re-elected three times more after his first-term of office.
He died of cerebral hemorrhage while still in office, on April 12th, 1945, at Warm Springs
in Georgia (Spies 1999).
For a majority of Americans who lived through the Great Depression and a
majority of their children, the New Deal was understood to be a great national
achievement, something akin to establishing the Republic or abolishing slavery”
(Edsforth 2000: 2).
However, for Roosevelt’s critics (the conservatives), especially the bankers and
businessmen, the New Deal reform programs were ideologically incoherent. The critics,
thus, began to ridicule them by referring to them as the “alphabet soup,” in apparent
reference to the many alphabet agencies that the President had created, to deal with the
various problems of that time. The critics abhorred the fact that political power,
especially as it pertained to decision-making, came to be concentrated in the Executive
Branch. They also argued that the New Deal programs were costly for the nation and,
thus, needed to be halted. On that account, they began to challenge some of them in
Court, and were actually successful in stopping some of them (Brogan 1950).
Blair’s New Deal. Tony Blair, whose full names are Anthony Charles Lynton Blair, led
his Labor Party in implementing a type of New Deal too, beginning in 1997 (Stephens
2004). Two years before that, Blair had mobilized to repeal Clause IV of his party’s
Constitution, thereby abandoning the policy of common ownership of national assets
(that is, nationalization), and replacing it with democratic socialism (Rentoul 2002). Blair
popularized the use of the term New Labor, to emphasize the point that his party was,
under his leadership, very different in its outlook, aims and orientation, especially by
being pro-market and less collectivist (Beckett and Hencke 2004).
4
Born on May 6th, 1953, Blair, a charismatic person and a Member of Parliament
(MP) for the Constituency of Sedgefield (1983-2007), assumed the leadership of the
Labor Party in July 1994, following the untimely demise of the incumbent, John Smith.
Blair went on to become Britain’s Prime Minister on May 2, 1997, at the age of 43. He
was re-elected in 2001 and again in 2005. He voluntarily stepped down ten years later,
half-way through his third-term of office, on June 27th, 2007. He now has gone down the
annals of political history as Britain’s longest-serving Prime Minister in almost two
centuries. His voluntary departure from public office half-way through his third-term of
office is believed to have been intended to allow his successor, Gordon Brown (Blair’s
former Chancellor of the Exchequer), to consolidate himself in power, in readiness for
the next round of general elections.
On October 1, 1996, Blair, in a speech he delivered at his party’s pre-election
conference, declared that his government would make education a priority in combating
unemployment. “Ask me my three main priorities of government,” he taunted, “and I will
tell you: education, education and education” (Rentoul 2002: 501). True to his word, his
regime provided training for the unemployed as well as subsidized jobs.
Blair’s Employment-Creation Schemes
Program
Participants
Found Work
Young People
931, 400
550, 840
25 Plus
559, 780
213, 680
Lone Parents
575, 210
318, 620
Disabled People
120, 6000
54, 580
Partners
98, 040
33, 860
50 Plus
120, 600
54, 580
2, 405, 630
1, 226, 160
Total
Source: Department of Work and Pensions SR2004, p. 27.
According to the Department of Work and Pensions, 2, 405, 630 people
participated in Blair’s New Deal’s preparatory programs, to improve their employability.
During their period of training, referred to as the “gateway,” which lasted for four to six
months, the participants were entitled to a job-seekers’ allowance (Stephens 2004). Their
training consisted of discussions of their individual job needs, aspirations and openings.
Such discussions were held with personal advisers and were designed to help each
participant to choose among one of the four options: “(a) a subsidized job; (b) full-time
education or training; (c) voluntary work; and (c) work with the environmental task
force” (Blair 1999: 1).
Once they graduated from their preparatory programs, the participants had
another paid four months in which to prepare to pursue their chosen option. Of all the
people who went through Blair’s New Deal programs, 1,226, 160, according to the
5
Department of Work and Pensions, finally found employment. The majority of the
program participants were said to be young people. Blair’s administration refrained from
adjusting income tax upwards, to avoid disadvantaging the new employees even further.
His administration also set the National Minimum Wage for all, to ensure that the
entrants in the labor market were not underpaid because of their lack of work experience
generally. Employers who absorbed some of the New Deal program participants, or took
part in training them, were given some weekly subsidies, for a period of up to six months.
To discourage undue dependency on the New Deal programs’ unemployment benefits,
Blair’s administration denied such benefits to anybody who went through the New Deal’s
preparatory programs but later refused to take up reasonable salaried-employment. In his
newsletter published in the Oxford Mail (January 28, 1999), Blair described his “New
Deal jobs scheme as an unqualified success.”
Nonetheless, the results of a research recently conducted by Riley and Young
(2001: 1), on “welfare-to-work” programs, suggest that the impact of Blair’s New Deal
programs has been minimal, contrary to Blair’s claims. In the view of the two researchers
from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Britain’s unemployed
could have found employment even without going through the New Deal’s preparatory
programs, going by the many job openings that were popping up in the ever expanding
civil service. And Field (2007: 2), an MP who once served as Britain’s Minister for
Welfare Reform, asserts that “new statistical evidence … rebuts some recent claims by
the Government that youth unemployment has, in Britain, been virtually abolished.”
Field’s assertion turned out to be a very welcome finding to the Conservative Party (the
party of the Tories), which vowed to scrap Blair’s New Deal programs (Blair, 2005),
once in power again. According to the Tories, the New Deal programs have simply
tended to inflate the national budget. Following this line of critique, Hale (2006: 3), has
surprisingly claimed that “… Blair and Labor did not, and have never been
communitarian despite frequent appeals to community …” By making this assertion,
Hale pleads ignorance of the contents of Blair’s pamphlet, The Third Way: New Politics
for a New Century, which lays out Blair’s communitarian inclinations.
Mwanawasa’s New Deal
To assess Mwanawasa’s New Deal, it is necessary to compare the policies, programs and
objectives of his regime with those contained in his party’s manifesto. To be a real New
Deal, the policies, programs and objectives of Mwanawasa’s regime must be
substantially different from the prescriptions of his party manifesto.
According to the MMD manifesto (2001: 3), to begin with, the party, in 1991, ten
years before Mwanawasa’s Presidency, “rejected dictatorship” in the form of the OneParty State, as well as “economic bondage,” in the form of state control of the economy.
In their place, the party promised democratic governance based on the rule of law, as well
as economic reforms with three components: “the Public Sector Reform Program, the
Privatization Program, and Export and Investment Promotion” (International Labor
Organization 2002: 1). In pursuance of these IMF-sponsored reforms, the MMD
government, under Dr. Frederick, J.T. Chiluba’s Presidency, drastically reduced the size
of the civil service, liberalized the economy and privatized most of the parastatal
organizations. By June 1996, ninety-seven companies had already been privatized,
“resulting in the realization of US$119 million” (World Bank 1996: 2). Chiluba’s liberal
6
agenda actually brings him closer to Hoover and away from Roosevelt, in terms of
economic orientation.
When Mwanawasa became Zambia’s President in 2001, he did not offer a clear
and direct explanation of what exactly he meant by a New Deal government. As such, to
gain an insight into the intentions of his administration, one has to pick up bits and pieces
of information here and there and then knit them together, to form a picture of some kind.
To begin with, Mwanawasa, a lawyer like Roosevelt, seems to have chosen to be guided
by his professional experience and beliefs, just like Roosevelt had done, rather than being
guided by ideology or party manifesto per se2. Although Mwanawasa did not state
explicitly, in his early days, that he was going to be his own man in his Presidency, his
regular public pronouncements actually told it all. Many times, Zambia’s third
Republican President declared publicly that his government was going to be a
government of laws rather than a government of men. The ordinary Zambian generally
took this kind of language at its face value, to imply that Mwanawasa possibly intended
to use his superior legal skills to ensure that Zambian Law was enforced more forcefully
and uncompromisingly than ever before. Analysts, on the other hand, avoided being so
simplistic; they took Mwanawasa’s assertions to a higher level where they wondered
whether the President implied that the regime of his predecessor, Chiluba, had not been
based on the Rule of Law as such. One way of resolving this polarization of viewpoints is
to look at where Mwanawasa was coming from, to arrive at the decisions and the political
strategy that came to characterize his administration.
During the economic adjustment that took place in the decade before
Mwanawasa’s Presidency, the Zambian economy shrunk remarkably; copper mining,
which is Zambia’s many stay, was halted and the once vibrant mining towns of Kitwe,
Chingola, Ndola and Luanshya were literally turned into near ghost towns.
Unemployment soared, impoverishing up to 80 % of the population, and inflation3 and
interest rates simply went through the roof (Southern African Press Association 2005).
The International Labor Organization (2002: 1) succinctly summarized the negative
effects of Chiluba’s economic reforms when it stated that:
The (Zambian) economy remained virtually stagnant during Chiluba’s Presidency
(1991- 2001). Copper production fell sharply. Average economic growth was
negative… GDP per capita declined from US$ 375 in 1980 to US$ 305 in 1990
and then to US$ 257 in 1995 (in 1987 US$). In 1998, the economy contracted by
2 per cent, thus lowering income per capita by around 5 per cent.
2
Mwanawasa was born in Mufulira on 3rd September, 1948. He acquired a law degree from the Law
School of the University of Zambia where he was once Secretary General of the student union (UNZASU).
President Kaunda, Zambia’s first Republican President, appointed him as Solicitor General in 1985 only to
fire him a year later. Mwanawasa proved to be very useful during the formative months of the MMD when
he won several injunctions on behalf of the MMD. He is married to Maureen with whom he has four
children.
3
“Zambian consumers suffered high levels of inflation throughout the 1990s, with the rate peaking at 188%
in 1993, before falling to an annual average of 26% at the end of the decade. The Kwacha (national
currency) fell by 22% and 53.8% against the dollar in 1999 and 2000 respectively” (International Labor
Organization 2002: 2)
7
The economic downturn that Zambia experienced during Chiluba’s Presidency
(1991-2001) is, coincidentally, reminiscent of the economic malaise that America
experienced during Hoover’s Presidency (1928-1932). However, that is not the only
negative entry there is to be found on Chiluba’s résumé. The former President is also
believed to have presided over an administration in which corruption in high places was
believed to have reached alarming proportions. Details of the scam began to surface when
the privately owned Post Newspaper, on August 17, 2001, carried an editorial entitled “A
thief for President,” referring to Chiluba (The Post, July 9, 2002). Following that
editorial, Fred M’membe (Post Editor), Bivan Saluseki (Post reporter), Dipak Patel and
Edith Nawakwi (opposition Members of Parliament) were indicted to face charges of
conspiring to defame the President. Their charges were dropped only when Mwanawasa
moved to State House as Zambia’s third Republican President.
In 1993, Stanford Hlazo, MMD Member of Parliament for Mumbwa district,
resigned from the party, citing rampant corruption in the MMD government as the reason
for his resignation. “Men who were with nothing (before the transition elections) on
October 31, 1991,” deplored Hlazo, “have become overnight billionaires” (Weekly Post,
12 November 1993). Mwanawasa, like Hlazo, resigned his government portfolio as
Chiluba’s Vice President in 1994, to distance himself from his boss’s failure to deal
firmly and decisively with allegations of corruption (Lewanika 2005). Baldwin
Nkumbula (Minister of Youth, Sport and Child Development), and Akashambatwa
Mbikusita Lewanika (Minister of Education, Science and Technology) also resigned from
Chiluba’s cabinet, in protest against the President’s failure to combat corruption. In July
2001, “Paul Tembo, former campaign manager for Chiluba who joined the opposition,
was murdered shortly before he was due to testify against three ministers, in a high-level
corruption case” (Sichalwe 2004: 1). Meanwhile, the donors decided to withhold US$96
million of the US$860 million that they had pledged to the Zambian government in
bilateral assistance. Their demand was that corruption had to be dealt with before the rest
of the pledges could be released (Africa Report, March-April 1993).
These, in a nutshell, were some of the effects of the murky world of the plunder of
national resources that prevailed just before Mwanawasa moved to State House at the
beginning of his Presidency in 2001. Zambia was, at that time, ranked by Transparency
International (TI) as the 90th most corrupt country in the world and as the 9th most corrupt
country in Africa. “This is not an achievement (to be proud of)” (SABC NEWS, March
15, 2002), lamented an angry Mwanawasa, and added: “Zambia must be the number one
corruption-free country in the world.” It was not surprising, therefore, that immediately
he assumed power, the number one citizen established the country’s National Movement
Against Corruption (NAMAC). Through NAMAC, Mwanawasa launched a serious
assault on corruption in high places. It is, in fact, no exaggeration to state that
Mwanawasa made the fight against corruption the centerpiece of his administration. The
President, who explicitly regarded corruption as the “AIDS of democracy” (Hope, Sn.
1999: 289), urged his African counterparts to exercise zero tolerance for corruption by
prosecuting anyone implicated in it. He suggested to them that democracy should, in the
contemporary era, be defined, above everything else, in terms of the fight against
corruption in all its various forms.
Seven months into his first term of office, Mwanawasa, in July 2002, addressed
Parliament and requested it, as required by the national Constitution, to lift his
8
predecessor’s presidential immunity, so that Chiluba could answer corruption charges
(BBC News, Friday 12 July, 2002; Mulafulafu, in Drevensek [ed], 2002). This
constitutional act shocked Chiluba beyond imagination, considering the fact that Chiluba
was actually single-handedly responsible for making Mwanawasa President of Zambia.
The act also seemed “to go against the continent’s unwritten policy of not pursuing
former rulers who committed economic crimes” (Open Society Initiative for Southern
Africa 2007: 1). Mwanawasa stated that he was prepared to pardon Chiluba if he
accepted the charges leveled against him and also “returned 75% of the cash he allegedly
stole” (BBC News, 2004). However, the former President rejected his successor’s offer
and defiantly declared himself innocent. Chiluba contended that the charges leveled
against him were politically motivated and deserved to be dropped.
From the foregoing account, it appears that Mwanawasa’s vision for his
Presidency was shaped largely by the economic crisis Zambia found herself in as well as
by rampant corruption in high places. More information about Mwanawasa’s response to
the economic crisis and to other related national issues is contained in the conclusion of
the budget speech delivered to Parliament on Friday, March 1, 2002, by Emmanuel
Kasonde (MP). Kasonde was Mwanawasa’s Finance and National Development Planning
Minister at that time. According to the local media (Daily Mail, Saturday 2, 2002; The
Post, Saturday 2, 2002; Times of Zambia, Saturday 2, 2002), the Minister’s budget speech
stated that Mwanawasa’s New Deal meant:
•
•
•
•
•
•
human-centered development, defined in terms of benchmarks that measured
material improvements in people’s lives;
good governance, based on strengthened governance institutions;
advancing national interest in the international arena, by pragmatically accepting
that Zambia is part of the global village and must interact with the rest of the
world;
the development of a vibrant private sector, and working in partnership with the
government, to boost economic growth, to make Zambia competitive, and to
substantially reduce poverty;
ensuring food security, by providing affordable fertilizer to small-scale farmers,
making concessionary financing to commercial farmers as a way of encouraging
large-scale investment in the sector, establishing a crop marketing institution, and
reducing taxes on diesel and electricity to make them affordable to farmers; and
improving access to health and education, by providing bursaries for basic school
students and free health and education to the most vulnerable.
Beyond this brief statement, information about what Mwanawasa’s New Deal stands for
is rare to find. The print media (the main source of information on government activities
in Zambia) are fraught with accounts that simply state what the New Deal has done, or
intends to do. For example, “Mwanawasa’s New Deal government flags off the Chembe
bridge project” (Times of Zambia, Wednesday, 11 October 2006); and “Mwanawasa’s
New Deal government is in a hurry to develop North-western Province.” Such statements
are not very helpful when it comes to understanding what the main tenets of the New
Deal.
9
Impact of Mwanawasa’s New Deal Measures
Mwanawasa’s failure to explain to the Zambian people what exactly he meant by a New
Deal government created long-run uncertainty in the nation. That uncertainty did not go
away even when Kasonde attempted to put it to rest, in his budget speech. For, Kasonde’s
explanation was regarded by the ordinary Zambian simply as his own interpretation of
the New Deal and not Mwanawasa’s formulation of it. Furthermore, the budget speech
that Kasonde took advantage of was actually an inappropriate forum on which to try and
shed some light on a buzz word, such as a New Deal. For, the ordinary Zambian simply
does not pay much attention to such things as budget presentations.
The lack of clarity on Mwanawasa’s New Deal also denied many people an
opportunity to understand the kind of government that was obtaining at home at the turn
of the Century. That information gap made it difficult for the people to think critically
and constructively about governmental affairs as well as to follow the twists and turns of
political life in the nation generally. It was not surprising, therefore, that the New Deal
concept stood indicted in the court of public opinion in Zambia. Some of Mwanawasa’s
opponents began to satirize the New Deal regime by referring to it as the “New Ordeal”
government. Other critics, either out of sheer frustration or simply in jest, tended to
misapply this term to anything unfortunate that happened in their lives, such as being
broke half-way through the month. A third category of citizens simply dismissed the
notion of the New Deal as Mwanawasa’s new slogan for his political party, the MMD.
Kasonde’s budget address stated that Mwanawasa’s New Deal meant “humancentered development” (Daily Mail, Saturday 2, 2002). The concept of human
development is, however, not Mwanawasa’s innovation too; it is an alternative
development strategy that has been popularized by the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), in the publications that the Agency has been churning out annually,
since 1990. The publications are entitled simply as the Human Development Report.
According to Kasonde, Mwanawasa’s New Deal “defined (human-centered development)
in terms of benchmarks that measured improvements in people’s lives” (The Post,
Saturday 2, 2002). However, Kasonde failed to state the specific “material
improvements” that were foreseen by the regime, in the people’s lives. He equally failed
to state the specific “benchmarks” that Mwanawasa’s New Deal intended to use in
measuring the said “material improvements” in the people’s lives. This, therefore, makes
Mwanawasa’s human-centered development look more of a theory than a practical
development strategy.
Human development, as a practical development strategy, was concisely
summarized by Griffin and McKinley (1994: 1) when they wrote that:
The objective of development, (when properly conceived), is not to produce more
‘stuff,’ more goods and services (as in mainstream development approaches).
Rather, its objective is to enrich human lives, (by increasing) the capabilities of
people to lead full, productive, satisfying lives… Material enrichment, (measured,
say, by gross national product per head) may contribute to (the attainment of) this
(objective).
Thus, the core of human development is the centrality of mankind in the thinking about
national development and planning. This centrality is meant to ensure that people
10
rightfully become the intended as well as the actual beneficiaries of all development
activity, rather than being mere agents of it. To make this objective a reality, human
development requires governments of nations to design and implement short- and longterm policies, programs and plans that consider people first. These policies, programs and
plans should, according to Griffin and McKinley (1994: 2), also specify development
objectives in terms of enabling the people to acquire “... knowledge, skills, ideas, and
experience” that they need in order for them to live decently and to be able to function
one way or another in their environment. The people can, according to this view, acquire
the various abilities they need in a variety of ways, but especially through formal and
informal education, training and apprenticeship programs. Thus, human development, as
defined by the United Nations, is a process of creating opportunities for people to enlarge
their abilities, in order for them to “acquire knowledge … (and, in turn) to have access to
resources needed for them to lead a decent, long and healthy life” (UNDP 1990: 10).
Mwanawasa’s regime should have designed its policies, programs and plans in similar
language if it really intended to be a human-centered New Deal government.
Concerning “good governance” (Times of Zambia, Saturday 2), Mwanawasa’s
administration did not do very well with regard to upholding democratic ideals, such as
political participation, political competition, and respecting civil and political liberties.
To begin with, Mwanawasa himself stifled political participation in the nation, by his
intolerance to the criticism leveled against the way he handled some of the national
affairs. The President appeared to be a “one-man army” who wanted to be left alone to do
exactly as he pleased with national affairs, hoping that the members of the general public
would simply concentrate on their private lives. The President also tended to use the
Police to silence his critics by intimidating them with unwarranted arrests. Over and
above that, the President often used the Police to contain the activities in the opposition
camps, for example, by ensuring that opposition political parties wishing to hold rallies
were denied Police permits to do so. Civil society organizations (CSOs) intending to hold
protests also often suffered the same fate at the hands of the Police.
Political violence, which has characterized routine politics in Zambia’s new era,
did not attract the full attention of the Police as required by law; all that one heard in the
media was that government was concerned about it. The perpetrators of political violence
were largely cadres from the ruling party, the MMD. The Electoral Commission of
Zambia, which is responsible for organizing Presidential, Parliamentary and Local
Government elections, was (and still is) run by government-appointed Electoral Officers.
This being the case, the opposition felt, and genuinely so, that the Electoral officials were
there simply to manipulate the electoral process, in favor of the appointing authority.
Indeed, the Electoral Commissioners should have been appointed by the major political
parties in the nation and not by the government.
Apart from that, Mwanawasa, who had vowed to run a government of Laws,
chose to disobey the National Constitution as it pertains to the death penalty. He was
totally opposed to capital punishment, although capital punishment was enshrined in the
national Constitution. The President, who is an excommunicated member of the Watch
Tower Movement, argued that he did not want blood on his hands. Thus, in his first term
of office, not even a single death-row convict was executed. In fact, the President chose
to commute to life imprisonment, the death sentences of some of the soldiers who were
convicted in the 1997 coup plot.
11
However, Mwanawasa’s call for zero tolerance to corruption, on one hand,
appeared to have found fertile ground in the nation, theoretically at least. Many Zambians
became more enlightened than ever before, that “Corruption is a cancer that eats away at
the fabric of society” (The Corruption Eye 2002: iii). As a result of that enlightenment, it
was not uncommon to hear many Zambians remind each other, albeit in jest: “Be
careful,” they would say, “or, the law will visit you.” It was also in this spirit that civil
society joined Mwanawasa in pushing for a full investigation into allegations of
corruption in government during the Chiluba era. Luckily, the Zambian Parliament that
had the mandate to make appropriate decisions on matters of presidential immunity
clearly understood the mood in the nation at that time. Thus, without hesitation, it voted
to lift Chiluba’s presidential immunity, so that the former President could face
prosecution. This, then, set in motion, the machinery that saw Chiluba and his cronies
prosecuted for corruption and abuse of public office. “On 24 February 2003, Chiluba was
formally arrested and charged, along with about 20 of his cronies, with over 65 counts of
theft by public servant” (Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2007: 1). Chiluba
was subsequently released on bail while his passport was confiscated by the State, to
ensure that he did not go into hiding abroad. The former President and his cronies were
indicted not only in the Zambian Courts but also in those of the British government,
because the crimes they were alleged to have committed, as explained in the ensuing
paragraphs, extended there too.
According to the details of what the media came to describe as Chiluba’s “money
laundering matrix” (Global Safety Security Analysis 2002: 1), Chiluba, from about 1995,
used Katele Kalumba, his Minister of Finance and Economic Development Planning, to
channel huge sums of money from national coffers to a local account, known as Permace
General, held at the government-owned Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZANACO)
in Lusaka, and operated by the Zambia Intelligence Service (ZIS). From Permace, the
money was channeled to the ZAMTROP Account in London, at the ZANACO Branch.
Xavier Chungu, Chiluba’s intelligence chief, was later made the sole signatory to the
London Account. Following Chiluba’s instructions, Chungu regularly traveled to London
where he used the ZAMTROP Account to make several payments to several individuals
and corporations “for dubious supplies as well as for straight theft of public resources”
(Global Energy Security Analysis 2002: 1).
The members of Chiluba’s inner circle who were either direct players or were
believed to have benefited from the money-laundering matrix included4: Xavier Chungu
(US$ 58M); Francis Kaunda (former Chairman and Chief Executive of Zambia’s mining
conglomerate); Attan Shansonga (Chiluba’s ambassador to the UK and later to the US);
Regina Chiluba (Chiluba’s wife – US$ 120, 000); Faustino Kabwe (Director of Access
Finance Services – US$ 53M); Moses Katumbi (Chairman of Chani Fisheries); Aaron
Chungu (Co-Director of Access Finance Services – US$ 27M); Mike Sikazwe (Access
Finance Services); Benjamin Yorum Mwila (Business magnet and Chiluba’s former
Minister of Defense); Bede Mpande (Chief Economist in the Ministry of Finance);
Boniface Nonde (former Permanent Secretary in Chiluba’s government); Kashiwa
Bulaya (Chiluba’s former Permanent Secretary of Health); Stella Chibanda (former
Finance Permanent Secretary in Chiluba’s government – US$ 58M); Professor Benjamin
4
The amounts of money stated after the names of some of the players are the amounts that the players were
believed to have received, through their involvement in Chiluba’s money-laundering matrix.
12
Mweene (former secretary to the Treasury); Chief Justice Ngulube; Vernon J. Mwaanga;
Bimal Thacker (of Cave Malik, a Law Firm), and Raphael Soriano (a Congolese citizen
whose nickname was Katebe Katoto – US$29M) (South Africa Press Association,
27/09/2005). Great Britain moved swiftly and pronounced the accused guilty of
embezzlement of public funds. Chiluba defiantly rejected the ruling, arguing that he was
answerable only to the Zambian people and in Zambian Courts.
However, Mwanawasa’s anti-corruption crackdown has come to be criticized on a
number of grounds. First, the prosecution of plunderers of national resources appears to
have been very selective; it was confined only to the government sector. The public
contends that the boundaries of the crackdown should have been made national rather
than sectoral. Second, Mwanawasa’s ruling MMD still has, in its leadership, people who
were named as key players in Chiluba’s infamous “money laundering matrix.” Most
notable among them is Katele Kalumba who was Chiluba’s former Minister of Finance.
Kalumba is the current National Secretary of the MMD; he is also MMD Member of
Parliament for Nchelenge district. He is even aspiring to replace Mwanawasa as
President. The belief is that Kalumba is being shielded from the long arm of the Law, by
the government machinery which is actually supposed to be prosecuting him. Third, the
prosecution of suspected plunders of national resources proceeded at a snail’s pace – it
was characterized by several procedural challenges and adjournments. That resulted in
frustration and desperation among the members of the general public who concluded that
the prosecutors were simply incompetent and that was why they lost most of the cases
they took to the courts. In August 2007, for example, the government dropped corruption
charges against Regina Chiluba, due to lack of witnesses to buttress its case.
Regina is charged with nine counts of failing to account for property believed to
have been stolen (from the State). The property in issue includes a 61-inch Toshiba
color television set, K447 million cash, real estates in Ndola and Kitwe (The Post
Newspaper, Friday September 07, 2007).
Fourth, the Zambia police, which was part of the prosecution, was perceived by many
citizens to be the most corrupt institution in the nation. The dominant theory was that the
extremely low salaries of the policemen compelled them to engage in corrupt practices,
thereby undermining law enforcement in the country. The alleged corrupt behavior of the
police officers, according to this theory, led to a lot of suspected corrupt officers being let
off the hook when, in fact, they should have ended up behind bars, serving long jail
sentences. Understandably, this led to anger and frustration among the Zambian people.
As one media institution confirmed:
Today, the Zambian people say that their government has become as corrupt as
the authoritarian State it replaced. Graft is as endemic in institutions ranging from
the police department to the soccer association, Zambia’s biggest source of pride
today…. (The New York Times, January 30, 1994).
Fifth, the failure or refusal, by the ruling party, to privatize at least some of the
government-owned media institutions has prevented these institutions from playing an
objective and independent role as the people’s watch dog for corruption and abuse of
13
office especially by public officials. For, the official position on the operations of the
government-owned print and electronic media is that none of them should ever criticize
the government or any of its activities, or their editors-in-chief will be fired. Sixth, the
government has been very hard on civil society organizations, especially NGOs. This has
caused them to operate cautiously, for fear of de-registration, as was once the fate of
SACCORD, a conflict resolution Zambian NGO.
On the economic front, and on a positive note, Mwanawasa’s pursuance of what
one commentator has aptly described as a “prudent economic policy” (Times of Zambia,
January 6, 2007) caused the national economy to slowly begin to come alive again. In
April 2005, the administration’s strict fiscal and monetary policy led to the country’s
attainment of the IMF and World Bank’s completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) (Wood 2005). In return, the two money-lending institutions wrote off
US$ 3.8 billion of the country’s national debt. Around the same time, Zambia also
qualified for inclusion in what was known as the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, a
program in which 18 African nations’ debt was cancelled by their co-operating partners.
In this spirit, furthermore, Zambia’s bilateral partners that are members of the Paris Club
decided to write off the country’s debt in full. Thus, Zambia’s debt that stood at about
US$ 7.2 billion in 2005 was substantially reduced to a mere US$ 500 million. However,
critics of the government came to argue, and rightly so, that the national savings that
were made from the foregoing debt-relief did not translate into benefits for the ordinary
people.
Copper mining also slowly began to make a steady return to normalcy. Following
the abrupt departure of the Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) which had dominated
the mining sector in the country’s mining towns of the Copperbelt, the Lumwana Mining
Company (LMC), a subsidiary of Equinox Minerals Ltd., was happy to move in and take
its place, in 1998. That was, however, at a different location called Lumwana, located 95
kms south-west of Solwezi district in the country’s North-western province. The LMC’s
mining area, which covers a land mass of about 1, 355 square kms, and which has a life
span of 37 years, is believed to be the largest mining operation on the continent of Africa
at the moment. It is also believed to be “the single largest mining investment in the
history of Zambia’s mining industry” (Times of Zambia, July 19, 2007). Harry Michael,
LMC’s Managing Director, explained that his company obtained a loan of about US$584
million from 12 international money-lending institutions5 and pumped it in the
company’s mining operations (Times of Zambia, 28 August, 2007). Some of the
company’s most notable mining sites are found at Chimulundu, Chimuwungo and
Mulundwe.
Lumwana, which is also believed to be laden with gold, uranium and cobalt,
created about 3, 500 jobs. Harris explained that his target was to employee at least 5, 000
people by the time the mines assumed full operational capacity in January 2008. In 2006,
“440, 000 tons of copper were produced by the mines; production is actually expected to
surpass the historical high of 700, 000 tons per year, by 2010” (Times of Zambia, January
6, 2007). Apart from Lumwana, Kansanshi open-pit mine, which was abandoned for
many years, was revived by First Quantum Minerals Ltd, with an initial investment of
5
Most prominent among the international lending institutions that made the money available were: the
African Development Bank, DEG of Germany, the European Development Bank, the Export Credit
Insurance Corporation of South Africa (pty) Ltd, and DEG of the Netherlands.
14
US$ 411 million, as at December 31, 2006. Located 8 KMs north of Solwezi, Kansanshi
currently employs about 1, 105 people in various capacities.
The success story in the mines began to energize business in many other areas of
the economy. Most notable among them were: the stone-crushing companies; the
trucking companies; lime producing companies; cement producing companies, and the oil
marketing companies. Zambia’s North-western province has, thus, slowly begun to
replace the Copperbelt province as the hub of the country’s industrial development.
However, Mwanawasa’s MMD government was strongly criticized, especially by the
opposition, for having given unrealistic tax breaks to the mining companies, in its Mines
and Minerals Act (No. 31) of September 13, 1995, during the Chiluba era. Mwanawasa’s
administration has, thus, been compelled to slowly begin to revisit the issue of tax breaks
for investors.
And according to recent exploration reports, oil and natural gas deposits were
discovered in Chavuma and Zambezi districts of the country’s North-western province.
However, the government suspended the corporate licenses it issued earlier, for the
exploration of the commodities. The reason for the suspension of the licenses, according
to Dr. Kalombo Mwansa, the Minister of Mines and Mineral Development, was that the
Petroleum Act that was passed in 1985, to regulate the exploration of petroleum-related
products failed to meet international guidelines and, thus, required revising (Times of
Zambia, 28 August, 2007). Full scale exploration is anticipated to resume only in 2008.
Following increased activity in the mines, Zambia’s economy registered an
average annual economic growth of five per cent for the first four years of Mwanawasa’s
New Deal government. Inflation also fell to eight per cent, which is the lowest that the
country has recorded in the last 30 years. The Kwacha (national currency) also posted
positive gains against the major international currencies and held firm over the last few
years. That compelled the commercial banks to adjust their lending rates, from 65 per
cent to about 19 per cent. However, the jobs created in the economy, according to The
Post (Monday, September 03, 2007), reduced unemployment only marginally;
“unemployment which stood at 87 per cent” (in 2001) has been reduced only by 12 per
cent, to “75 per cent in” 2007.
In agriculture, Mwanawasa’s predecessor had embarked on a very serious
liberation of the sector in which crop-marketing and inputs distribution were passed on to
the private sector. When Mwanawasa ascended to power, his New Deal government
formulated a 16-year comprehensive “National Agricultural Policy (NAP) encompassing
the following facets” (Ministry of Agriculture 2004: i), to make the government more
involved in the sector:
• food and cash crop production
• inputs
• agro processing
• agricultural marketing, including exports
• sustainable resource use
• livestock and fisheries development
• irrigation
• agricultural research and extension services
• institutional and legislative arrangements
• co-operatives and farmers’ organizations
15
•
•
biodiversity
emergency preparedness and cross-cutting issues, such as HIV/AIDS, gender and
environment.
In its efforts to boost productivity in the agricultural sector, Mwanawasa’s
government began to subsidize fertilizer, to place the commodity within the reach of
every farmer, large and small. The government itself also once experimented with a
summer maize program, which opponents said, was doomed to fail; it did not fail. As a
result of these efforts, growth in the agricultural sector averaged 3.9 per cent during
Mwanawasa’s first-term of office. This translated into additions of “18 to 20 per cent of
the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP)” (Times of Zambia, 3 August, 2007).
Productivity in the agricultural sector resulted in a bumper harvest during Mwanawasa’s
first term of office. Over the years, the government, through the Food Reserve Agency
(FRA), became the chief buyer of maize from the farmers. This move has received
praises from many sectors of society. However, the performance of the agricultural sector
was dwarfed by a number of obstacles. Most notable among them were: the lack of
irrigation systems which compelled farmers to be active only during the rainy season;
poor road infrastructure connecting the farms and the cities, and low producer prices
which made farmers vulnerable to manipulation by unscrupulous traders.
In education, Mwanawasa’s government built more schools and made basic
education (first to the ninth grade) free. The result of that move was that school
enrolment levels went up remarkably while drop-out figures pleasantly went in the
opposite direction. “By 2004, the gross basic school enrolment rate had increased to
93.1%, with over 2 million children (7-15 years old) enrolled in public schools, compared
to 715, 000 enrolments in 2000” (Wood 2004: 2). However, that achievement, in turn,
created a shortage of at least 9000 teachers in the educational system. Unfortunately, the
government could not engage more teachers from those graduating from the country’s
many Teachers’ Training Colleges (TTC). That was because the government was
required by the IMF to observe “a wage and hiring freeze” (Wood 2004: 1), in order to
service IMF loans and finally qualify for debt relief.
Apart from that, the entire educational system in Zambia was heavily
underfunded. That made the learning process ineffective. Many rural schools still lacked
desks, chairs and teaching aids. In many cases, pupils lacked textbooks and still
continued to sit on the floor, in overcrowded classrooms which lacked both electricity
and window panes (Oxfam International, Sept. 2003). Their teachers were generally
demotivated by the meager salaries they were paid. It was not surprising that the teachers
regularly went on strike, to press for better wages. Many of them also opted to spend time
conducting fee-paying private tutorials to supplement their incomes.
Colleges and universities were not better off in any way; many students leaving
high school had to face serious competition for admission to the few colleges and the
country’s two government-owned universities. The tertiary learning institutions have
been dogged by instability caused by striking lecturers, workers, or students; premature
closures are not uncommon. University infrastructure was (and still is) dilapidated
beyond imagination. Crimi (2007: 1) had this to say, in reference to student housing at
the University of Zambia:
16
At first glance, the student residence at the University of Zambia (UNZA) looks
decent (from outside), but there’s a reason why students call (one section of it)
“The Ruins.” The buildings look like they have been destroyed. Buckets line the
hallways to catch dripping water; rooms smell damp and some have leaky
ceilings; the shared toilet and washroom facilities appear condemned; loose wires
are exposed along the walls, and counters are covered in burn marks made by
portable stoves.
Conclusion
This analysis has established that the idea of a New Deal is not completely new as
President Mwanawasa wanted to make it appear. It is an old concept that originated in
American literature and worked its way into American political history. The novelist,
Stuart Chase, first used it as the title of his book, A New Deal, which he authored in 1932.
Thereafter, America’s thirty-second President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933-1945)
adopted it to characterize the series of experimental and pragmatic reform programs
which he implemented, in an attempt to stabilize the American economy during the Great
Depression. Roosevelt used the term New Deal also to distinguish his reforms from those
of his uncle and former President, Theodore Roosevelt whose economic measures had
been referred to as the Square Deal (Bernstein, in Bernstein [ed], 1968).
The concept of a New Deal actually suggests a departure from the doctrine,
philosophy, or manifesto of the New Dealer’s political party, in preference to one’s
professional experience and personal beliefs. In this sense, the New Deal approach
involves practical, usually short-term, trial-and-error measures intended to address
society’s immediate problems. Mwanawasa adopted the New Deal approach largely as an
anti-corruption strategy. However, although Mwanawasa’s predecessor was corrupt, this
does not mean that he never tried to condemn the scourge. Evidence is there to show that
Chiluba actually fired his first Minister of Works and Supply, for corrupt practices
involving the renovation contracts for State House. On this basis, Mwanawasa’s regime is
not a real New Deal in that it does not constitute a substantial departure from the
prescriptions of his political party’s manifesto. His administration still continued with the
IMF and World Bank-sponsored policies started by Chiluba, centered on economic
liberalization, privatization and foreign investment. His government had no strategy for
creating jobs, both in government and in the private sector. His failure to explain to the
people of Zambia what exactly he meant by a New Deal created uncertainty in the nation.
That uncertainty is what explains why the average Zambian actually failed to follow the
twists and turns of political life in Zambia, during Mwanawasa’s first term of office
(2001-2006). Nonetheless, Mwanawasa’s New Deal programs had both positive and
negative effects on Zambian society.
17
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