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JudgeNeilGorsuch
JudgeNeilGorsuchcurrentlysitsontheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsforthe10thCircuit.
PresidentGeorgeW.Bushappointedhimtotheappellatecourtin2006,andhisconfirmation
wasuncontroversial.GorsuchobtainedhisundergraduatedegreefromColumbiaUniversity
andhislawdegreefromHarvardLawSchool.HewasaTrumanScholaratHarvardanda
MarshallScholarattheUniversityofOxford,andclerkedforJudgeDavidSentelleoftheU.S.
CourtofAppealsfortheDistrictofColumbiaCircuitandSupremeCourtJusticesByronWhite
andAnthonyKennedy.Followinghisclerkships,JudgeGorsuchworkedasalitigatoratKellogg
Huberandservedforayearastheprincipaldeputyassociateattorneygeneralinthe
DepartmentofJustice.Hismother,AnneGorsuchBurford,waschosenbyPresidentRonald
ReaganasthefirstwomantoheadtheEPA.
JudgeGorsuchhasbeenthoughttobeafront-runnerforaSupremeCourtvacancyforsome
time,andmanyhavedescribedhisasanaturalfittoreplaceJusticeScalia.Aformerclerkhas
remarkedthathehasa“deepcommitmenttotheoriginalunderstandingoftheconstitution
andtheruleoflaw.”DavidFeder,TheAdministrativeLawOriginalismofNeilGorsuch,YaleJ.on
Reg.:Notice&Comment(Nov.21,2016),http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-administrative-laworiginalism-of-neil-gorsuch/.
FourthAmendment/CriminalLaw/DeathPenalty
JudgeGorsuchtakesatextualistapproachtocriminallawthatechoesJusticeScalia,andisnot
afraidtointerpretthelawagainstthegovernmentwhenheseesfit.Healsoappearstobea
championoftheFourthAmendment,oftenupholdingitsprotections.Forexample,inUnited
Statesv.Ackerman,831F.3d1292(10thCir.2016),GorsuchheldthattheNationalCenterfor
MissingandExploitedChildren’s(NCMEC)warrantlesssearchofthedefendant,duringwhich
theyfoundchildpornography,mayhaveviolatedtheFourthAmendment,reversingthetrial
court’sdenialofamotiontosuppress.JudgeGorsuchviewedtheNCMECasagovernment
agent,ifnotagovernmentagency,andheldthatbecauseitperformedthesearchwithouta
warrant,itmayhavecommittedaFourthAmendmentviolation.
InUnitedStatesv.Krueger,809F.3d1109(10thCir.2015),thedefendantmovedtosuppress
statementsmadeduringaninvestigationonthegroundsthatasearchwarrantwasinvalid
becausethemagistratejudgelackedstatutoryauthoritytoissuethewarrant,asheresidedin
theDistrictofKansasbutissuedthewarrantforahomeinOklahoma.Inaconcurringopinion,
JudgeGorsuchagreedwiththemajority’sholdingthatthemagistratedidnothavethe
authoritytograntthewarrant,asthesearchoccurredoutsideofhisstatutoryjurisdiction.He
stated:
Thegovernmentasksustoresolvebutonequestion,boldasitis:whethera
warrantissuedindefianceofpositivelaw'sjurisdictionallimitationsona
magistratejudge'spowersremainsawarrantforFourthAmendmentpurposes.I
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wouldnothesitatetoanswerthatquestionputtousandreplythatawarrant
likethatisnowarrantatall.
JudgeGorsuchisalsowillingtodissentinFourthAmendmentcaseswhenhedisagreeswiththe
majorityandfindsapotentialFourthAmendmentviolationwherethemajoritydoesnot.For
example,inUnitedStatesv.Carloss,818F.3d988(10thCir.2016),themajorityaffirmeda
districtcourt’sdenialofthedefendant’smotiontosuppressevidence,whenthedefendant
arguedtheFourthAmendmentviolationaroseoutoftheofficersknockingonhisdoorafter
passinganddisregardingseveral“NoTrespassing”signs.JudgeGorsuchdissented,explaining
thatbypassinga“NoTrespassing”signandwalkingtothedefendant’sfrontporchfora“knock
andtalk,”thepoliceofficersdidinfactviolatetheFourthAmendment.Id.at1005.His
concurrenceincludedathoroughexplanationofhisunderstandingofFourthAmendmentlaw:
Whetherinarguingthatthestateenjoysanirrevocablelicensetoenterorin
suggestingthatNoTrespassingsignsarecategoricallyinsufficienttobarits
agents,thegovernmentappearstobemovedbythesameworry:thatifclearly
postedNoTrespassingsignscanrevoketherightofofficerstoenterahome's
curtilagetheirjobofferretingoutcrimewillbecomemarginallymoredifficult.
ButobediencetotheFourthAmendmentalwaysbearsthatcostandsurely
bringswithitotherbenefits.Neither,ofcourse,isitourjobtoweighthosecosts
andbenefitsbuttoapplytheAmendmentaccordingtoitstermsandinlightof
itshistoricalmeaning.Besides,itishardlythecasethatfollowingtheFourth
Amendment'steachingswouldleavethegovernmentasbereftoflawful
alternativesasitseemstosuppose.TheAmendmentandthecommonlawfrom
whichitwasconstructedleaveampleroomforlawenforcementtodoitsjob.A
warrantwillalwaysdo.Sowillemergencycircumstances.After-the-factconsent
maysufficeiffreelygiven.And,ofcourse,there'snoneedforconsentwhen
officerssearchonlyopenfieldsratherthancurtilage.Neitheristhereneedfor
consentwhenofficersentercurtilageforanon-investigativepurpose.Ourduty
offidelitytothelawrequiresustorespectalltheselawenforcementtools.Butit
alsorequiresustorespecttheancientrightsofthepeoplewhenlaw
enforcementexceedstheirlimits.
InanotherFourthAmendmentcase,Cortezv.McCauley,478F.3d1108(10thCir.2007),the
courtmajorityfoundnoprobablecauseforanarrest.AlthoughGorsuchagreedthatthe
arrestingofficerslackedprobablecause,hewouldhavefoundsoonmuchnarrowergrounds
thanthemajority.Particularly,hetookissuewiththemajority’s“laundrylistofthingsthe
officersmighthavedone,butdidnotdo,tocorroborate”ayoungchild’sstatementthatthe
officersputforthastheirprobablecauseforthearrest.JudgeGorsuchexplained:
WhileIdonotdoubtforamomentthatadditionalinvestigationwouldhave
beenagoodidea,askingwhethertheofficersmight've,could've,orshould've
donemoreinvestigationbeforeeffectinganarrestisnotthetestforevaluating
whetherprobablecauseexistedatthetimeofthearrest.Wehavenever
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previouslyimposeduponofficersadutytoinvestigatecertainleadswethink,in
retrospectandwiththebenefitofhindsight,mighthavebeenwarrantedorwise
beforemakinganarrest.Rather,precedentinstructsustoexaminewhatthe
officersactuallydid,askingwhether,onthefactstheyhadbeforethem,
probablecausewasorwasnotpresent.
InCortez,Gorsuchalsotookissuewiththemajority’sviewthatitshouldbeobvioustothe
officersthatahearsaystatementfromatwo-year-olddoesnotestablishprobablecause.He
reiteratedinhisdissentthattheofficers,indeterminingprobablecauseforanarrest,may
indeedrelyonhearsay.
TheCortezcasealsoconsideredaquestionofqualifiedimmunity,onwhichJudgeGorsuch
dissentedfromthemajorityandwouldhavegrantedtheofficersqualifiedimmunitydespite
lackingprobablecause,ashedidnotviewtheretobeadequateauthorityputtingtheofficers
onclearnoticeoftheillegalityofthearrest.Indeed,incriminalcasesinvolvingquestionsof
qualifiedimmunityforofficersaccusedofconstitutionalviolations,JudgeGorsuchtendstofind
fairlybroadqualifiedimmunitycoverageprotectingofficers.Hehasstatedthatplaintiffscarrya
“heavyburden”intryingtoovercomethispresumptionofimmunity.Kernsv.Bader,663F.3d
1173,1180(10thCir.2011).
Immigration
JudgeGorsuchhasfewpublishedcasesthatconsidertherightsofimmigrants.InPorrov.
Barnes,624F.3d1322(10thCir.2010),theTenthCircuitconsideredwhatconstitutional
provisionthecourtshouldusetoanalyzeafederalimmigrationdetainee’sclaimofexcessive
force,withGorsuchholdingthat“thedueprocessguaranteeistheproperdoctrinalprism
throughwhichtoanalyzeclaimsoffederalimmigrationdetaineeswhodon’tchallengethe
lawfulnessoftheirdetentionbutonlytheforceusedduringthatdetention.”Heelaborated:
ExcessiveforceclaimscanbemaintainedundertheFourth,Fifth,Eighth,or
FourteenthAmendment—alldependingonwherethedefendantfindshimselfin
thecriminaljusticesystem—andeachcarrieswithitaverydifferentlegaltest.
Weholdthatitisthislast,dueprocess,standardthatcontrolsexcessiveforce
claimsbroughtbyfederalimmigrationdetaineeslikeMr.Porro.Whyhewas
beingdetainedattheJeffersonCountyJail—whether,forexample,hehad
violatedhisparoleorwasawaitingdeportation—Mr.Porrodoesnottellus.But
neitherdoeshedisputethathehadbeenlawfullyseizedanddetained.Inthis
way,heisunlikethecitizenwhocomplainsabouttheforceusedtoeffecthis
seizureinhisinitialencounterwiththepolice,whichwouldtriggertheFourth
Amendment'sprotections.Mr.Porroalsoappearstobeunliketheconvicted
prisonerwhomaybelawfullysubjectedtopunishmentaspartofhissentence,
butwhocomplainsthathispunishmentinvolvesexcessiveforceandsomust
resorttotheEighthAmendment.NooneallegesthatMr.Porro'sdetention
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cameafteranyconviction.Inthesecircumstances—circumstancesinwhich
manyfederalimmigrationdetainees'claimsofexcessiveforcemustsurely
arise—Mr.Porroappearstowalkinmuchthesameshoesasanarraignedpretrialdetainee.Heisthereforeprotectedbythedueprocessclause(inthiscase,
theFourteenthAmendment'sdueprocessclause,giventhatMr.Porro's
complaintisagainststateofficials).Wenotethatothercourtsconfrontingthe
statusofimmigrationdetaineesbeforeushavereachedthissameconclusion,
assessingtheirexcessiveforceclaimsunderthedueprocessrubric.
SecondAmendment
JudgeGorsuchhasnotweighedinclearlyontheSecondAmendment.Hehaswrittenabout
firearmsinothercases,thoughnotexplicitlyintheSecondAmendmentcontext.InUnited
Statesv.Games-Perez,667F.3d1136(10thCir.2012),theTenthCircuitconsideredthefederal
lawprohibitingtheknowingpossessionofagunbyafelon.Specifically,thecourtconsidered
whatmakesaviolation“knowing.”Isthelawviolatedwhenafelonsimplyknowinglypossesses
agun,ormusttheyknowthattheyhavebeenconvictedofafelony(whichisnotalwaysclear
basedonthenatureofthecrimeorresultingpenalty)?Games-Perezappealedhissentencefor
possessionofafirearmbyafelon,arguingthathewasunawarethathewasactuallyafelon,
butthemajorityaffirmedbasedonTenthCircuitprecedentinUnitedStatesv.Capps,77F.3d
350(10thCir.1996).Concurringinthejudgment,JudgeGorsuchelaborated:
Ourdutytofollowprecedentsometimesrequiresustomakemistakes.
Unfortunately,thisisthatsortofcase.InUnitedStatesv.Capps,77F.3d350
(10thCir.1996),thiscourtconsidered18U.S.C.§§922(g)&924(a)andtheir
collectiveruleforbiddingfelonsfromkeepingguns,ultimatelyholdingthat"the
onlyknowledgerequiredfora[criminal]convictionisknowledgethatthe
instrumentpossessedisafirearm."Inthecasebeforeus,Mr.Games-Perez
concedesheknowinglypossessedafirearmbutproteststhathehadnoideahe
wasaconvictedfelon.InlightofCappsthisisaneasycaseandwemustaffirm
theconvictionbecauseMr.Games-Perez'sprotests,whatevertheirmerit,are
besidethepoint.Asmycolleaguesrightlyobserve,itmattersnotatallunder
CappswhetherMr.Games-Perezeverknewabouthisfelonstatus.Butjust
becauseourprecedentindubitablycommandsthisresultdoesn'tmeanthis
resultisindubitablycorrect.
GorsuchthendelvesintoanexplanationofwhyCapps’interpretationofthestatute“simply
can'tbesquaredwiththetextoftherelevantstatutes.”Later,whentheTenthCircuit
consideredapetitionforrehearingenbanc,JudgeGorsuchdissentedfromthedenial,695F.3d
1104(10thCir.2012),explaining:
Intheend,Idonotforamomentquestionthatthestandardforrehearingen
bancisahighoneorthattheargumentsonemightmusteragainstrehearingare
thoughtfulorprincipled.Inmyjudgment,however,noneofthesearguments
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compelsustoperpetuatetheinjusticeofdisregardingtheplaintermsofthelaw
Congresswroteanddenyingdefendantsthedayincourtthatlawpromises
them.
Inanotherfirearms-relatedcase(butagainonenotexplicitlycoveringSecondAmendment
rights),U.S.v.Rodriguez,739F.3d481(11thCir.2013),JudgeGorsuchjoinedanopinion
writtenbyJudgeBaldock,whichhasbeencriticizedbysomewhoseeitastoonarrowaviewof
gunowners’rights.TheTenthCircuitconsidered“whetherapoliceofficerwhoobservesa
handguntuckedinthewaistbandunderneaththeshirtofaconveniencestoreemployeehas
reasonablesuspicionthattheemployeeisunlawfullycarryingadeadlyweapon,”justifyinga
“stopandfrisk,”andansweredintheaffirmative.Notablyinthiscase,theofficerdidnotmake
anefforttodeterminewhetherRodriguezwascarryingthefirearmlegally(i.e.,inNewMexico,
whetheritwasunloaded)beforetakinghisgun.
FirstAmendment/EstablishmentClause/ReligiousLiberty
MostofthecasesthatJudgeGorsuchhasauthoredconcerningFirstAmendmentrightsdeal
withreligiousliberty,andheisanarticulatedefenderofpersonalreligiousliberties.Hehasnot,
however,writtenwidelyontheFirstAmendmentoutsideofthereligiouscontext.
InoneFirstAmendmentcasenotconcerningreligiousliberty,VanDeelenv.Johnson,497F.3d
1151(10thCir.2007),theTenthCircuitconsideredallegationsthatcountyofficialsviolatedVan
Deelen’sFirstAmendmentrightsbyseekingtothreatenandintimidatehimintodropping
varioustaxassessmentchallenges.Thedistrictcourtgrantedsummaryjudgmentforthe
defendants,findingthatVanDeelen’staxchallengewasnotamatterof“publicconcern.”In
reversingandremanding,JudgeGorsuchexplainedthat
[T]heconstitutionallyenumeratedrightofaprivatecitizentopetitionthe
governmentfortheredressofgrievancesdoesnotpickandchooseitscauses
butextendstomattersgreatandsmall,publicandprivate.Whateverthepublic
significanceormeritofMr.VanDeelen'spetitions,theyenjoytheprotectionsof
theFirstAmendment.
InconsideringchallengesarisingundertheEstablishmentClause,JudgeGorsuchhasbroken
fromthemajorityoftheTenthCircuitandwouldhavegrantedrehearingenbancfortwocases
concerningChristiansymbolserectedonpublicproperty,AmericanAtheists,Inc.v.Davenport,
637F.3d1095(10thCir.2010),andGreenv.HaskellCountyBoardofCommissioners,574F.3d
1235(10thCir.2009).InGreen,atissuewastheremovalofaTenCommandmentsdisplay,as
orderedbythecourt,thatwasadmittedlyerectedwithoutareligiouspurposeandinthe
contextonlyofalargerhistoricalpresentation.JudgeGorsuchwroteadissenttothedenialof
rehearingenbanc,takingissuewiththeTenthCircuit’sapplicationofthetestarticulatedin
Lemonv.Kurtzman,403U.S.602(1971),fordecidingEstablishmentClausedisputes.In
Gorsuch’sview,theLemontesthasbeencalledintoquestionbytwoothercases,McCreary
County,Kentuckyv.AmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofKentucky,545U.S.844(2005),andVan
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Ordenv.Perry,545U.S.677(2005).ItappearsthatGorsuchwouldlikelyfindthesecasesto
supplanttheLemontest,ashaveanumberofothercircuits.Regardless,hebelievedherethat
evenundertheLemontest,themonumentshouldhavebeenallowed,stating,“displaysofthe
decaloguealongsideothermarkersofournation'slegalandculturalhistorydonotthreatenan
establishmentofreligion.”
ThesameissuearoseagaininAmericanAtheists,whichconcernedcrosseserectedbythestate
highwaypatrolonpubliclandtohonorstatetrooperskilledinthelineofduty.Again,Judge
Gorsuchfoundhimselfdissentingfromadenialofrehearingenbanc,makingmanyofthesame
argumentsandcitingGreen.JudgeGorsuchwrote:
Itisundisputedthatthestateactorsheredidnotactwithanyreligiouspurpose;
thereisnosuggestioninthiscasethatUtah'smonumentsestablishareligionor
coerceanyonetoparticipateinanyreligiousexercise;andthecourtdoesnot
evenrenderajudgmentthatitthinksUtah'smemorialsactuallyendorsereligion.
MostUtahans,therecordshows,don'tevenreverethecross.Thusitisthatthe
courtstrikesdownUtah'spolicyonlybecauseitisabletoimagineahypothetical
"reasonableobserver"whocouldthinkUtahmeanstoendorsereligion—even
whenitdoesn't.
Basedonhisexistingjurisprudence,itappearsJudgeGorsuchwouldnotbelikelytofindan
EstablishmentClauseviolationforanythingshortofcompellingreligiousobservance,andhe
viewsreligiousliberty–andindeed,allindividualliberties–asimportantconstitutionalvalues.
Notably,JudgeGorsuchdoesnotlimithisviewsonthefreeexerciseofreligionandthe
EstablishmentClausetoChristianity.InYellowbearv.Lampert,741F.3d48(10thCir.2014),
Gorsuchauthoredanopinionoverturningagrantofsummaryjudgmentfordefendantsona
prisoninmate’sReligiousLandUseandInstitutionalizedPersonsActof2000(RLUIPA)claim
basedonselectivedenialof“accesstohisprison’ssweatlodge–ahouseofprayerand
meditationtheprisonhassuppliedforthosewhosharehisNativeAmericanreligioustradition.”
JudgeGorsuchalsoweighedinonthetwohighprofilecasesHobbyLobbyStoresv.Sebeliusand
LittleSistersofthePoorHomefortheAgedv.Burwell.InHobbyLobby,723F.3d1114(10thCir.
2013),thecompanychallengedthecontraceptionmandateintheAffordableCareAct,arguing
thatitsubstantiallyburdeneditsfreeexerciseofreligion.JudgeGorsuchconcurredwiththe
majorityjudgmentfindingforHobbyLobby.Hisconcurrencemakesclearhisviewthatcourts
shouldlistentotheproponentsregardingstatementsabouttheirfaith,andtakethemattheir
word.InLittleSistersofthePoor,aTenthCircuitpanelenteredjudgmentagainsttheLittle
SistersontheirclaimsunderthesameprovisionoftheACA.JudgeGorsuchjoinedadissent
fromadenialofrehearingenbanc,799F.3d1315(10thCir.2015),maintainingagainthatthe
courtsmustdefertotheproponent’sexplanationoftherequirementsoftheirreligion.
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SeparationofPowers/Chevron
JudgeGorsuchplaceshighvalueontheseparationofpowersandthechecksandbalances
establishedbyourconstitutionalframework,andhasfrequentcommentaryinhiscaselaw
regardingtheseprinciples.Forexample,inKrueger,JudgeGorsuchstated:
Butourwholelegalsystemispredicatedonthenotionthatgoodbordersmake
forgoodgovernment,thatdividinggovernmentintoseparatepiecesbounded
bothintheirpowersandgeographicreachisofirreplaceablevaluewhenit
comestosecuringthelibertyofthepeople.SeegenerallyBondv.UnitedStates,
564U.S.211(2011);TheFederalistNos.28,32(AlexanderHamilton),Nos.46,51
(JamesMadison).OursisnotsupposedtobethegovernmentoftheHunger
Gameswithpowercentralizedinonedistrict,butagovernmentofdiffusedand
dividedpower,thebettertopreventitsabuse.Congresshasrepeatedly
displayedapreferenceforgeographicallydividedpowerinitstreatmentofthe
federaljudiciarysincetheJudiciaryActof1789—"almostinvariably
observ[ing],"forexample,theprinciplethatfederaljudicialdistrictsshouldnot
crossstatelines.RichardH.Fallon,Jr.etal.,HartandWechsler'sTheFederal
CourtsandtheFederalSystem21(7thed.2015).And,sensitivetothefactthat
magistratejudgesdonotenjoylifetenureandotherindependence-assuring
protectionsfoundinArticleIII,Congresshastakenparticularcaretolimitthe
geographicrangeoftheirauthoritysincetheveryinceptionoftheoffice—andit
wouldbemorethanalittleironicforanArticleIIIcourttodenyeffectto
Congress'sattentiveworkinthisarea.SeegenerallySharonE.Rush,Federalism,
Diversity,Equality,andArticleIIIJudges:Geography,Identity,andBias,79Mo.
L.Rev.119(2014);HenryJ.Bourguignon,TheFederalKeytotheJudiciaryActof
1789,46S.C.L.Rev.647(1995);ThomasE.Baker,ACatalogueofJudicial
FederalismintheUnitedStates,46S.C.L.Rev.835(1995).
AndinGames-Perez,discussingtheroleofCongressversustheroleoftheCourts,heremarked:
Irecognizethatprecedentcompelsmetojointhecourt'sjudgment.Butcandor
alsocompelsmetosuggestthatwemightbebetteroffapplyingthelaw
CongresswrotethantheoneCappshypothesized.Itisaperfectlyclearlawasit
iswritten,plaininitsterms,straightforwardinitsapplication.Ofcourse,if
Congresswishestorevisetheplaintermsof§922(g)and§924(a),itisfreetodo
soanytime.Butthereissimplynorightorreasonforthiscourttobeinthat
business.
Withregardtoexecutivepower,JudgeGorsuchhasbeencriticaloftheSupremeCourt’s
decisionsinChevronandBrandX.InGutierrez-Brizuelav.Lynch,834F.3d1142(10thCir.2016),
JudgeGorsuchlaidouthisviewthatChevronandBrandXwereinconsistentwithseparationof
powersasenvisionedbytheframersoftheConstitution,who,heexplained,knewthat“[a]
governmentofdiffusedpowers...isagovernmentlesscapableofinvadingthelibertiesofthe
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people.”InChevron,theSupremeCourtheldthatcourtsshoulddefertofederalagency
interpretationswhentheyadministerastatuteenactedbyCongressthatisbroadlyworded,as
longastheinterpretationisnotclearlyforbiddenbythestatute.InGorsuch’sview,thisholding
leftprotectionofindividuallibertiesatrisk.Statingthat“[t]here’sanelephantintheroomwith
ustoday,”JudgeGorsuchwrotethat“thefactisChevronandBrandXpermitexecutive
bureaucraciestoswallowhugeamountsofcorejudicialandlegislativepowerandconcentrate
federalpowerinawaythatseemsmorethanalittledifficulttosquarewiththeConstitutionof
theframers'design.Maybethetimehascometofacethebehemoth.”Heexplainedhis
approach:
Whenthepoliticalbranchesdisagreewithajudicialinterpretationofexisting
law,theConstitutionprescribestheappropriateremedialprocess.It'scalled
legislation.Admittedly,thelegislativeprocesscanbeanarduousone.Butthat's
nobugintheconstitutionaldesign:itistheverypointofthedesign.Theframers
soughttoensurethatthepeoplemayrelyonjudicialprecedentaboutthe
meaningofexistinglawuntilandunlessthatprecedentisoverruledorthe
purposefullypainfulprocessofbicameralismandpresentmentcanbecleared.
Indeed,theprincipleofstaredecisiswasone"entrenchedandreveredbythe
framers"preciselybecausetheyknewitsimportance"asaweaponagainst...
tyranny."MichaelB.W.Sinclair,AnastasoffVersusHart:TheConstitutionalityand
WisdomofDenyingPrecedentialAuthoritytoCircuitCourtDecisions,64U.Pitt.L.
Rev.695,707(2003).
InGorsuch’sview,ChevronandBrandXputtheseimportantprinciplesatrisk,tothedetriment
ofprotectingpersonalliberties.
Alsoimportanttoensuringindividualliberty,inJudgeGorsuch’sview,isthenondelegation
doctrine,bywhichtheconstitutionlimitscongressionalabilitytodelegatelegislativepower.In
UnitedStatesv.Nichols,784F.3d666(10thCir.2015),Gorsuchexplainedthisviewpointinhis
dissentfromadenialofrehearingenbanc.Hearticulatedthejustificationforthe
nondelegationdoctrine,inpart,as:
Withoutadoubt,theframers'concernsaboutthedelegationoflegislativepower
hadagreatdealtodowiththecriminallaw.Theframersworriedthatplacing
thepowertolegislate,prosecute,andjailinthehandsoftheExecutivewould
invitethesortoftyrannytheyexperiencedatthehandsofawhimsicalking.
Theirendorsementoftheseparationofpowerswaspredicatedontheviewthat
"[t]heinefficiencyassociatedwith[it]servesavaluable"liberty-preserving
"function,and,inthecontextofcriminallaw,noothermechanismprovidesa
substitute."RachelE.Barkow,SeparationofPowersandtheCriminalLaw,58
Stan.L.Rev.989,1011-17,1031(2006).
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ToJudgeGorsuch,theconstitutionalseparationofpowersandtheimportanceofenforcing
them–evenwhenchallenging–isrequiredtopreserveindividuallibertiesandfulfillthe
constitutionalframers’vision.
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