2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation
Exercise Series
State of Texas
Combined After-Action Report and
Improvement Plan
March through June 2016
Publication date: October 11, 2016
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Reports and Improvement Plans for the combined 2016 Rio
Grande Valley Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series, included the
following:
Dallas/Tarrant County Workshop
Rio Grande Valley Workshop
San Antonio / Bexar County Workshop
State Operations Center Workshop
Annual State EM Council Hurricane Workshop
2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane Evacuation FSE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
March 10, 2016
March 22, 2016
April 14, 2016
April 20, 2016
May 24, 2016
June 2 – 9, 2016
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
The information contained in this document is classified For Official Use Only
(FOUO) and should be handled as sensitive information not to be disclosed. At
a minimum, this document should be safeguarded, handled, transmitted, and
stored in accordance with appropriate security directives to avoid theft,
compromise, inadvertent access, and unauthorized disclosure. Reproduction of
this document, in whole or in part, without prior approval of the Texas Division
of Emergency Management (TDEM) is prohibited.
The points of contact for this document are:
Tom Polonis, CEM
Deputy Assistant Director
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Department of Public Safety
512-424-7627 (Office)
[email protected]
Chuck Phinney
State Coordinator
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Department of Public Safety
512-424-5353 (Office)
[email protected]
Lee Schnell, CEM
Section Administrator
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Department of Public Safety
512-424-7264 (Office)
[email protected]
Handling Instructions
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TDEM
After-Action Report/
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2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
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Handling Instructions
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2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Table of Contents
HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS .................................................................................................. 1
EXERCISE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... 5
EXERCISE OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 11
PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS....................................................................................... 13
APPENDIX A: DDC 21 .................................................................................................. A-1
APPENDIX B: SAN BENITO HIGH SCHOOL EMBARKATION HUB ......................................... B-1
APPENDIX C: AIRPORT INCIDENT COMMAND POST .......................................................... C-1
APPENDIX D: GENERAL POPULATION APOE .................................................................. D-1
APPENDIX E: MEDICAL APOE ........................................................................................E-1
APPENDIX F: TARRANT COUNTY SHELTER AND APOD .................................................... F-1
APPENDIX G: DALLAS COUNTY SHELTER AND APOD ..................................................... G-1
APPENDIX H: AUSTIN SHELTER AND APOD ................................................................... H-1
APPENDIX I: SAN ANTONIO SHELTER AND APOD ............................................................. I-1
APPENDIX J: STATE OPERATIONS CENTER ...................................................................... J-1
APPENDIX K: TEXAS ETN AND TECHNICAL ISSUES ......................................................... K-1
APPENDIX L: CITY OF FORT WORTH BYOE AAR/IP ........................................................ L-1
ANNEX 1: ACRONYMS .................................................................................................A 1-1
ANNEX 2: PARTICIPANTS .............................................................................................A 2-1
Table of Contents
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Table of Contents
4
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After-Action Report/
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2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
EXERCISE SUMMARY
The 2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series was developed to
determine the ability of the State of Texas to assist local communities evacuate
people (general population and medical needs population) from an area of impact
to a safe region by providing air transportation assets, and building a 120-Hour prelandfall response timeline.
The exercise series linked core capabilities to the exercise objectives which were
evaluated by Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM) and Texas A&M
Engineer Extension Service (TEEX) evaluators using specific Exercise Evaluation
Guides (EEG). These evaluations are the primary basis for this after action report.
This report also contains input from exercise participants, written comments on
feedback forms, as well as participant verbal comments offered at multiple AfterAction Reviews conducted in July and August 2016.
This section provides a broad overview of observed strengths and areas for
improvement. Appendices A-J discuss the specific strengths and areas for
improvement for each evaluated exercise node and includes a node specific
improvement plan. Appendix K is a list of brief participant comments and
statements related to the beta-tested Texas Emergency Tracking Network (ETN).
Appendix L contains the After Action and Improvement Plan for the City of Fort
Worth. The Fort Worth conducted a “Bring-Your-Own Exercise” in conjunction with
the June FSE and addressed issues beyond the scope of the State Exercise.
The State of Texas developed and conducted a series of tabletop/workshops in
preparation for the June full-scale exercise. Each one aided the state in developing
a comprehensive H-120 pre-landfall response timeline and a Hurricane Air
Evacuation Plan. This After-Action Report and Improvement Plan describes and
evaluates the entire exercise series, which included the following six exercises:
Dallas/Tarrant County Workshop
DPS Region 1 Contact: Marty Penney, State Coordinator
Location: Joint Emergency Operations Center; 275 West 13th Street, Fort Worth,
Texas 76102
Date: March 10, 2016
Time: 0830-1230
Number of participants: 62
Rio Grande Valley Workshop
DPS Region 3 Contact: Tony Pena, Jr., State Coordinator
Location: Casa Del Sol, 221 E. Madison, Harlingen, Texas 78550
Date: March 22, 2016
Time: 0830-1600
Number of participants: 72
Exercise Summary
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Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
San Antonio / Bexar County Workshop
DPS Region 6 Contact: Mike Miller, State Coordinator
Location: San Antonio/Bexar County EOC, 8130 Inner Circle Drive, San Antonio,
78235
Date: April 14, 2016
Time: 0830-1230
Number of participants: 100
State Operations Center Workshop
State Operations Center Contact: Tom Polonis, Deputy Assistant Director
DPS Region 7 Contact: Mike Miller, State Coordinator
Location: State Operations Center; 5805 North Lamar Blvd., Austin, Texas 78752
Date: April 20, 2016
Time: 0830-1630
Number of participants: 118
Annual State EM Council Hurricane Workshop
State Operations Center Contact: Tom Polonis, Deputy Assistant Director
Location: State Operations Center; 5805 North Lamar Blvd., Austin, Texas 78752
Date: May 24, 2016
Time: 0830-1630
Number of participants: 66
2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane Evacuation Full-Scale Exercise
Exercise Director Contact: Lee Schnell, Section Administrator
Locations: DPS Regions 1, 3, 6, 7, State Operations Center, Texas
Date: June 2-9, 2016
Number of participants: 1,000+
Each of these exercises emphasized the same Core Capabilities and associated
exercise objectives. The exercises addressed:
1.
Operational Coordination
2.
Operational Communications
3.
Situational Assessment
4.
Logistics and Supply Chain Management
5.
Mass Care Services
6.
Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services
7.
Critical Transportation
8.
Planning
Exercise planners developed a series of workshops, presented in a tabletop format;
the results were collectively integrated into the Hurricane Annex of the State of
Texas Emergency Management Plan, the Hurricane Play Book and the H-120
Hurricane Action Timeline, which made them officially workshops.
These exercises provided an opportunity for State Operations Center (SOC)
personnel, State Emergency Management Council representatives, DPS Regions,
Disaster Districts and local communities to review current hurricane planning
documents and make changes. State agency partners met for the Annual State
Hurricane Workshop in the SOC. Participants reviewed and clarified hurricane
Exercise Summary
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Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
evacuation checklist and implementation, the use of state and federal support
teams and their assets, evacuation plans and procedures; and shared information
to increase response capabilities across organizational lines.
Video
Exercise video: Hurricane Tejas – The Rio Grande Valley Air Evacuation Exercise is
available at: https://vimeo.com/176366158
Strengths
Evaluators noted many areas of strength. These included numerous observations
regarding good working relationships. This was particularly true at Aerial Ports of
Debarkation (APOD) and shelter locations where numerous local, state, and
volunteer agencies worked together to receive and shelter evacuees. While the
process was not trouble free, the positive aspects of receiving and sheltering,
outweighed those areas that will need improvements.
APOD reception was successful at all locations as were sheltering operations.
Community shelters provided basic care for the one night stay of evacuees with no
major issues noted. One shelter offered Wi-Fi capability provided by a nonprofit
organization. Evacuees staying in this shelter greatly appreciated this. Wi-Fi is
more than a luxury as it provides a convenient way for evacuees to use their smart
phones, tablets, or laptops to stay in touch with family or to conduct personal
business. Growing dependence on such devices, along with some evacuees’
reliance on portable medical equipment, such as Continuous Positive Airway
Pressure (CPAP) machines, also requires that shelters provide sufficient power
outlets for equipment operation and battery charging.
Evaluators believed the overall embarkation hub design at San Benito High School
was good. They also thought the bus plan to pick up evacuees at previously
designated bus stops in the community and take them to the embarkation hub
worked well. It decreased traffic and competition for limited parking. The use of a
medical ambulance bus from Willacy County was an invaluable capability. It
enabled efficient and comfortable movement of up to 20 evacuees who were bed
confined or required medical support such as continuous oxygen. This capability,
and more like it, may well be needed in any future real evacuation.
The reception, triage, staging, and embarkation of medical evacuees at the Medical
Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) seemed well organized. As ambulances or buses
arrived from the embarkation hub, medical evacuees were off-loaded and then
screened for weapons as a security precaution before being taken to the triage
area. At triage, evacuees were confirmed for flight and then moved to a staging
area where they were monitored until loading onto an aircraft.
There is a general need for additional Functional Needs Support Services (FNSS)
planning for evacuees even though the City of Irving shelter had prepared for FNSS
Exercise Summary
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evacuees. Wheel chairs and specialized sleeping accommodations, such as bariatric
beds, were available.
This exercise also afforded the State Operations Center (SOC) an opportunity to
exercise a hurricane scenario. While it has been several years since a hurricane
affected the state, the SOC effectively coordinated and responded to resource
needs.
Areas for Improvement
While evaluators thought the evacuation hub design was good, they also identified
a number of areas needing improvements. An incident command post was set up
at the embarkation hub and an incident action plan published, but Incident
Command System processes need more emphasis. Agencies beyond Cameron
County Department of Health and Human Services need to provide representation
in the ICP and more fully participate in information exchange and issue resolution.
Several processes within the embarkation hub are in need of improvement. Medical
screening was an area needing more definition. In addition, procedures dealing
with animals, weapons, and evacuees without identification require more clarity.
Evaluators also thought that some other elements of the embarkation hub merited
additional planning. These included external and internal security as well as the size
of the TSA screening areas. None of these were major issues for the exercise, but
evaluators believed more law enforcement officers would be needed for traffic
control and internal security during a real evacuation. Similarly, they viewed the
exercise TSA screening area as too small to accommodate the larger evacuee
throughput expected during a real world evacuation.
Aside from the FNSS accommodations offered at the Irving shelter, most nodes
need more FNSS planning. Facility accommodations for the mobility impaired was
largely absent at the embarkation hub and General Population APOE. Exercise
planners should consider inclusion of more FNSS evacuees in future exercises as a
way to identify needed FNSS improvements.
Some participants in the General Population or Medical APOEs believed the two
locations should be separate. In particular, the space for handling medical
evacuees was too small for the exercise so it would undoubtedly be too small for a
real world evacuation with additional evacuee numbers.
Necessary data exchange between the Valley nodes and the APODs needs
improvements. APODs sometimes received conflicting information about flight
arrivals and could not get passenger data, such as medical needs, before the flight
arrived at the APOD. All nodes need to be more cognizant of communicating
essential data to the recipients who need it.
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Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
The most common complaint voiced by evacuee actors was they did not receive
sufficient information about what was going to happen to them. Many expressed a
feeling of having no idea what to expect next. The staff operating the evacuation
hub and APOEs, who are in contact with evacuees, must do a better job of
communicating with them. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) need to define
what information evacuees receive. One would expect exercise participants to be
familiar with their agencies SOPs; however, that was not always the case.
The most frequently mentioned system issue was Emergency Tracking Network.
While overall its performance was reasonably good, it was often a source of
frustration for those placing wristbands on evacuees, scanning the bands for data
input, or attempting to generate manifests. ETN technical help was essential to
ETN operations at the embarkation bub.
There were some complaints about other systems as well. WebEOC was a key tool,
but too many users were not familiar with recent upgrades. To optimize the utility
of this system, user training must be more frequent. Similarly, the new State of
Texas Assistance Request (STAR) version caused problems for some users.
Whether this was a training issue, a system issue or a combination of both, needs
to be determined.
Exercise Summary
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Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
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Exercise Summary
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EXERCISE OVERVIEW
Exercise
Name
2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Dallas/Tarrant County TTX/WS, March 10, 2016 (0830-1230)
Rio Grande Valley TTX/WS, March 22, 2016 (0830-1600)
Exercise
Dates
San Antonio / Bexar County TTX/WS, April 14, 2016 (0830-1230)
State Operations Center TTX/WS, April 20, 2016 (0830-1630)
Annual State EM Council Hurricane WS, May 24, 2016 (0830-1630)
2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane Evacuation FSE, June 2-9, 2016
Scope
Mission Area
Capabilities
The scope of this full-scale exercise is to determine the state’s overall
ability to assist local communities in the evacuation of its citizens out of
the hurricane impact area using air transportation for both general
population and medical evacuees.
Response and Recovery
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Operational Coordination
Operational Communications
Situational Assessment
Logistics and Supply Chain Management
Mass Care Services
Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services
Critical Transportation
Planning
Objective 1. Show the ability to receive and deliver information in a
timely and sufficient manner in order to inform decision makers
regarding needed actions in support of an evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
Objective 2. Test the means of multi-agency communications, utilized
in support of an evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Objectives
Objective 3. Evaluate the integration of resources in support of a valley
evacuation within all regional, state and federal entities in accordance
with established protocols.
Objective 4. Test the mobilization of critical resources and establish
command, control, and coordination structures within the receiving
communities and other coordinating agencies.
Objective 5. Test the ability of local jurisdictions to coordinate the
Exercise Overview
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return of evacuees following a disaster, repopulation.
Objective 6. Examine the ability of the State of Texas to evacuate
people from an area of impact to a safe region by providing
transportation assets.
Objective 7. Move and deliver resources to meet the needs of
evacuees, including individuals with access and functional needs.
Objective 8. Show the ability to establish, staff, and equip emergency
shelters and other temporary housing options (including accessible
housing) for an evacuated population.
Objective 9. Coordinate and mobilize governmental, nongovernmental,
and private sector resources within and outside of the affected area.
Objective 10. Demonstrate ability to provide medical services in
support of an air-evacuation.
Objective 11. Examine the ability to conduct evacuee tracking and
communicate data to and from agencies outside the impacted area.
(TDEM Internal Objective)
Objective 12. Show the ability of embarkation and debarkation ports to
implement the Emergency Tracking Network.
(TDEM Internal Objective)
Threat or
Hazard
Hurricane
Scenario
A Category 5 hurricane threatened the Rio Grande Valley and evacuation
support requested by local communities. Evacuees processed through a
reception hub in the Rio Grande Valley and moved to an aerial port of
embarkation (APOE). Evacuees flew to aerial ports of debarkation
(APOD) in San Antonio, Austin, Dallas, and Fort Worth where they were
sheltered overnight before returning to the Valley reception hub.
Sponsor
Texas Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management
Dallas/Tarrant County TTX/WS: 62
Rio Grande Valley TTX/WS: 72
San Antonio / Bexar County TTX/WS: 100
Number of
Participants
State Operations Center TTX/WS: 118
Annual State EM Council Hurricane WS: 66
2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane Evacuation FSE: 1,000+
An estimated 1,200 local, regional, state and federal personnel
participated in the exercise series.
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PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS
Federal
92nd Civil Affairs Battalion, U.S. Army
Federal Air Marshal Service
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VI
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region VI IMT
National Weather Service
National Hurricane Center
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
U.S. Air Mobility Command (AMC)
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Border Patrol
State
Local
Alamo Regional Command Center (ARCC)
Department of Information Resources (DIR)
Texas A&M Forest Service (TFS)
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)
Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT)
Texas Health and Human Services Commission
Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS)
 Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR)
 Disaster District Committee 4A – Hurst
 Disaster District Committee 4B – Garland
 Disaster District Committee 12 – Austin
 Disaster District Committee 18B – San Antonio
 Disaster District Committee 21 – Weslaco
 Region 3 Incident Management Team
 Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM)
 Texas Highway Patrol
Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS)
 DSHS Health Service Region 2/3
 DSHS Health Service Region 8
 DSHS Health Service Region 11
 Emergency Medical Task Force
Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services (DADS)
Texas Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services (DARS)
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)
Texas Military Department (TMD)
Texas Procurement and Support Services (TPASS)
Cameron County
 Cameron County Emergency Management
 Cameron County Department of Health and Human Services
Participating Organizations
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City of Austin/Travis County
 Austin-Bergstrom International
 Austin Police Department
 Austin Emergency Management
 Delco Center
 CTECC-Austin / Travis County Emergency Operations Center
 Austin Emergency Medical Services
City of Brownsville
 Brownsville Police Department
 Valley Regional Medical Center
 Valley Baptist Medical Center
City of Dallas/Dallas County
 Dallas County Emergency Operations Center
 Dallas County Schools
 Dallas Police Department
City of Edinburg
 Edinburg Fire Department
 South Texas International Airport
City of Fort Worth
 DFW International Airport
 DFW International Airport Emergency Management
 DFW International Airport Emergency Operations Center
 Tarrant County Emergency Operations Center
 Worth Heights Community Center
City of Harlingen
 Harlingen Fire Department
 Valley International Airport
 Valley Baptist Medical Center
City of Irving
 Love Field Airport
 Love Field Emergency Management
 Senter Park (Shelter)
City of San Antonio/Bexar County
 Bexar County Emergency Management
 San Antonio Emergency Medical Services
 San Antonio Fire Department
 Kelly Field
 Police Department
 San Antonio/Bexar County Emergency Operations Center
 San Antonio Emergency Management
 San Antonio Police Department
 San Antonio Shelter (First Responder Shelter)
 Southwest Texas Regional Advisory Council
Participating Organizations
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City of San Benito
 San Benito/Cameron County Emergency Operations Center
 San Benito Emergency Management
 San Benito High School
 San Benito Independent School District (ISD)
 San Benito Police Department
 San Benito Public Health
Private
American Red Cross
Child and Family Services
CSI Aviation
Gulf Aviation
H-E-B
Mercy Chef’s
Private Jet Services
Salvation Army
San Antonio Food Bank
Southern Baptist Convention of Texas
Texas Baptist Men
Valley Grand Institute
Participating Organizations
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Participating Organizations
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APPENDIX A: DDC 21
District Disaster Committee 21 activated in Weslaco, Texas. During the exercise,
26 persons representing 15 federal, state, and local agencies participated. This
node maintained situational awareness of the events, provided information to the
State Operations Center, validated support requests, and provided other support
and information as needed to the jurisdictions supporting the San Benito High
School Embarkation Hub and the evacuation flights from the APOE at the Valley
International Airport.
Analysis of Core Capabilities
The below table includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and
performance rating for each core capability observed during the exercise. Following
the table is a discussion of strengths and areas of improvement noted during the
exercise.
Core
Capability
Objective
1. Show the ability to
receive and deliver
information in a timely
and sufficient manner in
order to inform decision
makers regarding
needed actions in
support of an evacuation
from the Rio Grande
Valley.
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Situational
Assessment
2. Test the means of
multi-agency
communications, utilized
in support of an
evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
X
Operational
Communications
3. Evaluate the
integration of resources
in support of a valley
evacuation within all
regional, state and
federal entities in
accordance with
established protocols.
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
X
Operational
Coordination
X
Ratings Definitions:
Appendix A: DDC 21
TDEM
A-1
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
Performed without Challenges (P): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core
capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively
affect the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to
additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was
conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.

Performed with Some Challenges (S): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core
capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively
impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to
additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was
conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.
However, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified.

Performed with Major Challenges (M): The targets and critical tasks associated with the
core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s), but some or all of
the following were observed:
demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the
performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public
or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans,
policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.

Unable to be Performed (U): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core
capability were not performed in a manner that achieved the objective(s)
Objective
1. Show the ability to receive and deliver information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order to inform decision makers regarding needed
actions in support of an evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Situational Assessment
Strengths
1. The DDC staff established and maintained good situational awareness
through careful monitoring of communications as well through internal
briefings, updates, and face-to-face interaction among staff members. A
staff member monitored and tracked WebEOC messages and another
transmitted and received radio messages. Texas A&M Forest Service
personnel obtained and documented information, which was used to create
situation reports and an incident action plan. Overhead electronic screens
prominently displayed pertinent information, such as weather maps, status
boards, and asset tracking charts.
2. Situational awareness is the ability to understand the response
organization and their role in it. While many were already familiar with the
DDCs Incident Command System (ICS) structure, some new members were
not. To help ensure everyone knew their role in the organization and to gain
clearer understanding of the flow of information, new DDC members received
ICS training.
Appendix A: DDC 21
TDEM
A-2
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Areas for Improvement
1. Overuse of unfamiliar acronyms.
Analysis: Even though the DDC staff is comprised of personnel from
many different agencies, not everyone understands the acronyms
individuals routinely use in their normal jobs. It is difficult for
everyone to learn everyone else’s acronyms, especially when time is of
the essence. Consequently, personnel should avoid using acronym
when possible. This will lessen the potential for confusion or
misunderstanding.
2. Although situational awareness was overall very good, at least one request
bypassed the DDC Chairperson.
Analysis: A meal request for the DDC went directly to the American
Red Cross representative in the DDC. The request was processed, but
the DDC chairperson was unaware.
Objective
2. Test the means of multi-agency communications,
utilized in support of an evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
Capability
Operational Communications
Strengths
1. DDC 21 effectively used multiple means of communications to coordinate
and respond to requests. Staffers used wired telephones, mobile phones,
radio, television, and Internet-based communications such as WebEOC.
Areas for Improvement
1. Some DDC 21 staff members were not familiar with recent upgrades to
WebEOC.
Analysis: WebEOC is a key communications and information source for
emergency management at the state and local level. However, to
maximize the utility of the software, users need to remain current.
WebEOC refresher training is essential, especially for those personnel
assigned to DDC 21 during activation.
Appendix A: DDC 21
TDEM
A-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
2. Unfamiliarity with WebEOC led to duplicate submission of State of Texas
Assistance Requests (STAR).
Analysis: After submission, STAR requests would sometimes
“disappear.” Once an action occurred, the STAR would change position
from the lineup and therefore apparently “disappear.” The DDC could
not determine a specific technical cause during the exercise. Their
only solution was to recreate and resubmit the requests, which
duplicated the STAR.
Objective
3. Evaluate the integration of resources in support of a valley evacuation
within all regional, state and federal entities in accordance with established
protocols.
Capability
Operational Coordination
Strengths
1. Agencies coordinated well with their
partner agencies. DDC 21 responded
and fulfilled all necessary requests
during the exercise.
Areas for Improvement
1. A specific policy, addressing evacuees in possession of personal weapons,
attempting to board evacuation aircraft, is not available at this time.
Analysis: Two individuals with handguns attempted to board a
government contracted evacuation flight at the general population
APOE. The individuals identified themselves as commissioned Texas
peace officers, an ISD police chief, and a San Antonio city marshal.
The TSA agents contacted their liaison in the DDC to determine the
course of action. After considerable discussion in the DDC, they
directed the TSA to lock the weapons in a secure container and store
them on the aircraft with controlled access. While this decision
resolved the issue at hand, there is a need for a weapons policy during
evacuations.
Appendix A: DDC 21
TDEM
A-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
DDC 21 Improvement Plan
This improvement plan was developed for DDC 21 during the 2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane Evacuation Exercise
June 2-9, 2016
Note: Capability Elements are planning (P), organization (O), equipment (E), training (T), or exercise (Ex).
Area for
Improvement
Corrective
Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
1. Unfamiliar
acronyms were
used too often.
1. At activation,
remind
participants of
the necessity to
use plain
language
T
DDC
John O’Valle
07/01/2016
Ongoing
2. Although
situational
awareness was
overall very
good, at least
one request
bypassed the
DDC
Chairperson.
1. At activation,
reinforce the
requirement
that the DDC
chairperson is
to be informed
of all actions
affecting the
DDC
T
DDC
John O’Valle
07/01/2016
Ongoing
Operational
Communications
1. DDC staff
not familiar
with recent
upgrades to
WebEOC.
1. Coordinate
with TDEM for
appropriate
WebEOC
training
T
DDC and
TDEM
Jeff Newbold
07/01/2016
Ongoing
Operational
Communications
2. STAR
requests had
to be
submitted
twice.
1. Coordinate
with TDEM to
determine
cause
T
DDC and
TDEM
Jeff Newbold
07/01/2016
Ongoing
Capability
Situational
Assessment
Situational
Assessment
Appendix A: DDC 21
TDEM
A-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Operational
Coordination
Area for
Improvement
3. A specific
policy to
address
evacuees who
attempt to
board
evacuation
aircraft with
personal
weapons is
needed.
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective
Action
Capability
Element
2. If training is
the issue,
coordinate with
TDEM for
appropriate
STAR training
T
1. Coordinate
with TDEM to
address with
TSA and other
agencies as
needed.
Evacuees must
adhere to the
FAA and TSA
regulations of
boarding an
airplane with a
weapon during
an evacuation.
P
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
TDEM and TSA
Orlando
Hernandez
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
Appendix A: DDC 21
TDEM
A-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
APPENDIX B: SAN BENITO HIGH SCHOOL
EMBARKATION HUB
The Cameron County Health Department (CCHD) was the lead agency for planning
and staffing the embarkation hub. Elements of the Texas Military Department
(TMD), Transportation Security Agency (TSA), Texas Department of Public Safety,
San Benito Independent School District, San Benito Police Department, Cameron
County Sherriff’s Department, and the American Red Cross also played significant
roles in the establishment and operation of the hub.
During the exercise, the hub processed five busloads of evacuees plus some
evacuees who arrived by private auto. In all, over two-hundred-sixty evacuee
actors processed through the hub. From the hub, buses transported them to the
General Population Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) and the Medical APOE for
flights to aerial ports of debarkation (APOD).
Analysis of Core Capabilities
The below table includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and
performance rating for each core capability observed during the exercise. Following
the table is a discussion of strengths and areas of improvement noted during the
exercise.
Objective
1. Show the ability to
receive and deliver
information in a
timely and sufficient
manner in order to
inform decision
makers regarding
needed actions in
support of an
evacuation from the
Rio Grande Valley.
2. Test the means of
multi-agency
communications,
utilized in support of
an evacuation from
the Rio Grande
Valley.
3. Evaluate the
integration of
Core Capability
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Situational
Assessment
X
Operational
Communications
X
Operational
Coordination
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
X
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
B-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
TDEM
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Objective
Core Capability
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
resources in support
of a valley evacuation
within all regional,
state and federal
entities in accordance
with established
protocols.
6. Examine the
ability of the State of
Texas to evacuate
people from an area
of impact to a safe
region by providing
transportation
assets.
Critical
Transportation
X
9. Coordinate and
mobilize
governmental,
nongovernmental,
and private sector
resources within and
outside of the
affected area.
Logistics and
Supply Chain
Management
X
Public Health,
Healthcare, and
Emergency
Medical Services
X
10. Demonstrate
ability to provide
medical services in
support of an airevacuation.
Ratings Definitions:
 See initial ratings description
Objective
1. Show the ability to receive and deliver information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order to inform decision makers regarding needed
actions in support of an evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Situational Assessment
Areas for Improvement
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
B-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
TDEM
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
1. Reception hall staff at the embarkation hub could not use the Emergency
Tracking Network (ETN) to count the evacuees who had processed through
the reception hall.
Analysis: Embarkation hub staff was unaware of the number of
evacuees already processed, making it difficult to project logistical
requirements. It is unclear if the ETN system allows visibility of the
processed count; reception hall staff did not know how to determine
that figure. Additional ETN training would eliminate this shortfall. If the
ETN system does not have this capability, future system upgrades
could add this feature.
Objective
2. Test the means of multi-agency communications, utilized in support of an
evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Operational Communications
Areas for Improvement
1. Sensitive data projected on the ICP WebEOC screen, potentially
compromised information.
Analysis: The incident command established its post in a room
between the practice gym and the varsity gym. This permitted a
centralized location for command staff, but it also placed them near
the flow of evacuees. This proximity could enable evacuees to see
potentially sensitive data projected on WebEOC screens. The selected
room may be the best location for the ICP, but staff must conceal
sensitive data from evacuees.
2. ICP communications were not fully successful.
Analysis: WebEOC was established and used successfully to enter and
track significant events. ETN registration data was also available
through WebEOC. The ICS 205 in the IAP designated radio channels
for external and internal staff radio communications. External radio
communications worked sufficiently well.
Internal radio communications were less successful. Not everyone
needing a radio received one, which was especially true for medical
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
B-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
TDEM
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
triage. The San Benito police officers and the EMS unit providing realworld medical support missed several radio calls. TMD radios were
incompatible with those used by CCDHHS so interoperable radio
communications between CCDHHS and TMD was not possible. This
affected the overall ICP situational awareness and contributed to some
uncoordinated movement of evacuees. While the ICS 205 was
adequate, ensuring radio distribution to those organizations that do
not have compatible radios and conducting radio checks prior to the
start of the exercise or incident will improve radio communications.
Objective
3. Evaluate the integration of resources in support of a valley evacuation
within all regional, state and federal entities in accordance with established
protocols.
Capability
Operational Coordination
Strengths
1. The embarkation hub’s reception hall was adequate in size and sufficient
staff was available. Embarkation hub staffed four primary reception stations
with the capability to activate four overflow stations when needed.
2. Safety was a priority at the embarkation hub. The ICP assigned a safety
officer. Particular safety concerns included heat, mosquitos and trafficpedestrian interaction. Drinking water was sufficiently available as was
mosquito repellant.
3. The ICP issued a detailed evacuation IAP that identified objectives,
organizational structure, staffing assignments, and communications plan.
4. The overall embarkation hub design for San Benito High School was good.
5. Whether arriving by bus or by auto, security personnel provided by TMD
and local law enforcement met evacuees outside the school and guided them
to the registration hall entrance.
6. The ICP issued a detailed repopulation IAP.
Areas for Improvement
1. ICS processes were inconsistent.
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
B-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
TDEM
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Analysis: The Incident Commander (IC) established an ICP for the
embarkation hub and prepared an IAP that including a communications
plan. Due to insufficient staffing at the ICP, monitoring actions in the
hub was difficult, conflicts were not resolved, and information sharing
was limited. In addition to the IC, the ICP had a planning
representative and a record keeper present during the exercise. Other
sections operated by CCDHHS personnel either had representation
during some of the exercise or they checked in frequently. Other
participating agencies did not have representation in the ICP nor did
they periodically report to the ICP to receive a briefing, provide
updates, or clarify responsibilities. Requiring supporting agencies to
have representatives in the ICP, monitor activities at the IAP, follow
the IAP, and exchange information should improve overall response.
Additionally, depending on the contributions of various supporting
agencies, a Unified Command may be an appropriate consideration.
All assigned to the ICP should have appropriate ICS training.
2. Exercise traffic control measures may not be sufficient for a real event.
Analysis: Signs guided vehicles to drop off points and to the staging
area. Although this was sufficient for the exercise, some bus drivers
were initially confused about where to pick up evacuees for travel to
the General Population APOE at the airport. During a large-scale
evacuation, significantly higher numbers of vehicles will increase the
chances that drivers will misread signs or not see them and go where
they should not. This may lead to traffic congestion in critical areas
and delay the evacuation process. Assigning law enforcement officers
or TMD personnel to control traffic at critical road junctures will help
ensure traffic moves as planned.
3. Exercise security measures may not be sufficient for a real event.
Analysis: Overall security for the exercise was adequate, but the
higher numbers of evacuees and vehicular traffic associated with a real
evacuation will require a larger number of security personnel.
Personnel for traffic control and posting at all unsecured doorways will
be necessary. Additionally, barriers could funnel evacuees at certain
points in the process. For example, using a barrier fence from the
registration hall entrance to the bus offloading point will facilitate
evacuee movement and prevent them from wandering into the
roadway.
4. The embarkation hub plan needs additional, specific guidance about
decision-making authority in some phases of the evacuation process.
Analysis: Texas Military Department personnel were responsible for
providing security in the gym holding area, but there was confusion
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
TDEM
B-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
about who had the authority to release evacuees from there to TSA for
screening. Similarly, there was confusion about who had the final
authority to release a bus to the APOE once it is loaded. The military
security escort on one bus asked for approval to depart, but no one
seemed sure who could give that approval. Specific approval authority
needs clear outlines in the embarkation hub plan.
5. The TSA screening area will be too small during an actual evacuation.
Analysis: The TSA screening area established for the exercise was
adequate for the number of evacuees processed. During an actual
evacuation, the number of evacuees will be significantly larger. In
that event, the TSA screening area would need to be larger to avoid
becoming a chokepoint in the evacuation process. The exercise TSA
screening area was able to check two evacuees’ identification at a
time, but only one could process through the one magnetometer.
For a real event, TSA will need to expand their screening operation to
keep pace with the evacuation process. This may mean using another
part of the school rather than the cafeteria. Further planning should
consider the need for expanded TSA operations.
6. Additional planning needs to identify processes regarding evacuees who do
not have identification.
Analysis: The exercise did inject an evacuee actor who did not have
identification. The evacuee processed through security after a body
search and verbal questioning, and allowed onto the aircraft.
The additional screening time did not significantly interrupt the overall
evacuation process. However, in a real event there may be substantial
numbers of persons without identification. Planning should address
how significant numbers of persons without identification would be
vetted for air transport or if they should be assigned to ground
transport. Early identification of evacuees without identification is
essential. A TSA agent assigned to the registration hall could preidentify these individuals early in the registration process.
7. The flow through the evacuation hub was not clear to all participants at
the start of the exercise.
Analysis: Members of the TMD and the CCDHHS staffed the
embarkation hub. TMD and CCDHHS staff worked in pairs and
performed tasks such as directing patient flow, forming evacuees into
groups, placing ETN wristbands on evacuees, and then scanning the
bands. However, the TMD evacuee flow process was different from
those anticipated by the CCDHHS. The TMD process was based on
previous embarkation hub experience while CCDHHS staff had only
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
TDEM
B-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
received just in time training the day before the exercise. Some
CCDHHS participants stated they did not feel sufficiently trained on the
evacuee process flow prior to the exercise.
As the exercise progressed, the procedural issues were resolved.
However, if the two organizations are to share responsibilities, they
need to agree on procedural issues and then ensure that both
organizations have sufficiently trained personnel to execute those
procedures.
8. The embarkation hub plan needs to better accommodate FNSS evacuees.
Analysis: Although CCDHHS staff successfully used sign language to
communicate with one hearing impaired evacuee, additional hub staff
will need to understand sign language during an actual evacuation.
Estimates places the number of hearing impaired in the Rio Grande
Valley at over 10,000. Staff with other special skills will have to be
prepared to work with non-English speaking evacuees, the vision
impaired, and the mobility impaired.
The physical layout of the embarkation hub did not include FNSS
signage or accommodate mobility-impaired persons. The designated
entrance into the embarkation hub required walking up concrete steps.
A ramp was not available for wheel chair users. Once in the
embarkation hub entrance, there were choke points that would have
been difficult for some mobility-impaired persons to navigate. Some
FNSS evacuees would not have been able to negotiate the steps
leading to waiting buses. Consideration for the handling of FNSS
evacuees should be part of planning and site visits for any facility
considered for use as an evacuation hub.
9. The paper ETN form did not provide enough room for handwriting.
Evacuees had difficulty filling out ETN forms.
Analysis: The space allowed for writing on the ETN form was
insufficient. Evacuees attempted to write in the provided spaces but
the result was sometimes illegible. Evacuees received an ETN form to
fill out; however, they often had nothing to write with or firm to write
on. This slowed the reception process. Providing clipboards with pens
is one way to speed up and improve the intake process.
10. Banding procedures were inconsistent and, at times, slow.
Analysis: Some evacuees were banded on their left wrist, others their
right. There seemed to be no specific reason for choosing right or left.
Some evacuees received a red armband while others did not.
Participants did not receive an explanation why theirs were different.
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
B-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
TDEM
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
The average reception hall processing time for five randomly selected
groups was 7 minutes and 12 seconds. In some instances, banding
time was a significant part of the processing time. While adequate for
the exercise, faster times and more reception stations will speed up
the processing in a larger scale evacuation.
11. Evacuees did not know what to expect next in the evacuation process.
Analysis: Evacuee actor review forms often cited a lack of awareness
of “the next step.” Many did not know where they were going or
might go. When they arrived on the bus, they had no knowledge of
what to expect. Once processed, staff directed evacuees into the gym
for TSA screening; they were not sure where in the gym they could or
could not go. They had no idea of approximate wait times. In a real
event, evacuees will already be under considerable stress. Not
knowing what comes next will only add to their stress. Information
updates, especially in holding areas, are essential and frequent
updates will keep evacuees informed. A bus “greeter” who boards each
bus as it arrives could also give arriving evacuees a basic idea of what
will happen to them and inform them about basic comfort issues such
as food and restrooms.
12. During the registration and screening process, several evacuee family
members became separated from their family units.
Analysis: Evacuation hub staff received instructions to keep families
together during the registration and screening process. While that
normally was the case, evacuee actor evaluations reported several
instances where families were split for expediency at various parts of
the registration and screening process. Additional emphasis and
supervision is needed at the embarkation hub, to ensure families are
not separated.
13. Weapons screening of evacuees did not occur prior to them entering the
reception hall.
Analysis: Evacuees may come to the evacuation hub with a weapon.
Even though most weapons may be legal, weapons screening should
occur before evacuees enter reception for the safety of all concerned.
A magnetometer is one possibility. If this approach is used, it should
not replace the magnetometer screening by TSA. Procedures should
be in place addressing the proper handling and securing of discovered
weapons. As a means to minimize the number of weapons, public
service announcements should inform the public of existing weapons
policies for evacuees.
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
B-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
TDEM
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
14. Current plans do not include a policy defining baggage and baggage
tagging.
Analysis: There is minimal guidance about the number and size of
luggage. One APOD expected no luggage. Procedures for tagging bags
were inconsistent and confusing at best. Once a new baggage plan is
developed, the specific policy needs integrating into training for those
who will be tagging bags at the embarkation hub.
15. Some evacuees did not think military personnel communicated with them
effectively.
Analysis: Various complaints focused on military personnel
communications. Some evacuees characterized them as rigid,
unsmiling, or too authoritative. TMD personnel are responsible for key
components in an evacuation, but those who will deal directly with
evacuees should be reminded to interact with evacuees as fellow
citizens and not opponents.
16. A public information campaign that identifies the embarkation hub, what
services it will provide, and what evacuees should and should not bring to the
hub is needed.
Analysis: Managing the public’s expectations of what will happen at the
embarkation hub will help minimize the congestion expected when
thousands of people attempt to leave the Rio Grande Valley in a short
time period. The public needs information regarding policies related to
firearms, animals, and personnel vehicles. The public will need
reminders to bring critical life support items such as prescription
medications, and they need to know whether there is food available at
the hubs and what to expect at a shelter.
17. Future evacuation planning should reflect changes in federal screening
requirements.
Analysis: Federal exemptions allow some latitude for security
screening during a disaster evacuation. Embarkation and APOE
operations should reflect these rules accordingly.
Objective
6. Examine the ability of the State of Texas to evacuate people from an area
of impact to a safe region by providing transportation assets.
Capability
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
B-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
TDEM
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Critical Transportation
Strengths
1. The bus plan to pick up evacuees at previously designated bus stops in the
community and take them to the embarkation hub worked well. Using buses
minimized the number of evacuees arriving in their own vehicles thereby
decreasing traffic congestion and competition for limited parking.
Objective
9. Coordinate and mobilize governmental, nongovernmental, and private
sector resources within and outside of the affected area.
Capability
Mass Care Services
Areas for Improvement
1. Food service was insufficient.
Analysis: The American Red Cross provided meals for hub staff and
evacuees. The provided meals did not arrive in time for the first
departure flight. However, the American Red Cross did not receive a
good count on the number of meals required. If asked, local
emergency management could have assisted.
Additionally, there were no snacks or drinks available for the evacuees
while waiting for flights. Although not planned to be a long wait, in
some cases it was more than two hours. It is advisable to designate a
food unit leader responsible for coordinating food for hub staff and
evacuees. Food items need to include choices appropriate for diabetics
and other special food requirements.
Objective
10. Demonstrate ability to provide medical services in support of an airevacuation.
Capability
Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services
Strengths
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
B-10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
TDEM
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
1. The deployment of a medical ambulance bus from Willacy County was a
useful capability. It enabled efficient and comfortable movement of evacuees
who were bed confined or required additional medical support such as
continuous oxygen. This resource could transport up to 20 supine patients.
This capability is vital in any future evacuation.
Areas for Improvement
1. The medical triage group did not have any medical equipment to provide
basic life support care until EMS arrived.
Analysis: Texas Military Department personnel received assignments
to support the triage area. However, the requirement was not
sufficiently articulated. The personnel arrived, but they did not bring
any equipment such as an emergency first aid kit or jump kit. Having
at least limited medical capability would be critical in situations where
evacuation delays occur and individuals begin to experience the
cumulative effects of stress, changes in feeding, and potentially the
need for medication administration and monitoring for conditions such
as diabetes or cardiac problems. There may also be a requirement to
charge battery powered medical devices. Supplementary oxygen
refilling and charging apparatus needs pre-staging with additional
cylinders for change out.
2. The task of the Department of State Health Services (DSHS) Medical
Incident Support Team (MIST) was not well defined.
Analysis: The MIST is a state asset employed to coordinate key federal
and state medical movement support during a crisis. Team members
should have been briefed that their role in the hub was to coordinate
for ambulance patient movement either to the areo-medical hangar or
via ground to medical shelters or hospitals. The MIST does not do
triage. There are other EMTF assets that can do so if requested
through a STAR.
3. No one screened evacuees for communicable diseases prior to entering
the reception hall.
Analysis: The congregation of large numbers of evacuees in and
around the reception hall presents an opportunity for a communicable
disease to spread. Screening evacuees for communicable disease prior
to allowing them into the reception hall should be part of an overall
triage process.
4. There seem to be no clearly defined triage procedures in place.
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
B-11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
TDEM
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Analysis: The medical screening questionnaire given to evacuees was
minimal, and the specific purpose of the triage process was not well
defined. Defined screening procedures such as those used by American
Red Cross shelters may be a start. New defined procedures will assist
in further defining the size and composition of the medical triage group
needed during an evacuation.
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
B-12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
TDEM
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
San Benito High School Embarkation Hub Improvement Plan
This improvement plan was developed for the San Benito High School Embarkation Hub during the 2016 Rio Grande
Valley Hurricane Evacuation Exercise June 2-9, 2016
Note: Capability Elements are planning (P), organization (O), equipment (E), training (T), or exercise (Ex).
Capability
Situational
Assessment
Area for
Improvement
1. Reception hall
staff could not
use the ETN to
count the
evacuees who
had processed
through the
reception hall.
Corrective Action
1. Determine from
TDEM if cumulative
count is a capability
2. If ETN is capable of
a cumulative count,
train operators
3. If ETN is not
capable, determine it
can be added
Operational
Communications
1. Projected
WebEOC data in
the ICP could be
inadvertently
compromised.
1. During setup,
ensure monitors
cannot be viewed by
evacuees.
Operational
Communications
2. ICP
communications
were not fully
successful
1. Locals need to
submit STAR for TICP
Operational
Coordination
1. ICS processes
were
inconsistent.
1. All key
participating agencies
provide
representative to ICP
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
TDEM
Jeff Newbold
07/01/2016
12/31/2017
T
CCDHHS
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
P, E
TDEM
Sam Miller
07/01/2016
Ongoing
O
CCDHHS,
TMD, and all
supporting
agencies
06/15/2016
Ongoing
E
T
E
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
CCDHHS
/TMD
TDEM
B-13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Area for
Improvement
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
P
DDC,
CCDHHS and
local law
enforcement
DDC,
CCOEM
07/01/2016
Ongoing
P
DDC,
CCDHHS and
Local LE
DDC,
CCOEM,
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
P
CCDHHS
CCOEM,
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
P
DDC,
CCDHHS and
TSA
DDC, CCOEM,
CCDHHS, TSA
07/01/2016
Ongoing
2. Consider
establishing Unified
Command
P
3. Ensure ICP
participants have
adequate ICS training
T
Operational
Coordination
2. Exercise traffic
control measures
may not be
sufficient for a
real event.
1. Consider adding
law enforcement or
TMD personnel at key
intersections
Operational
Coordination
3. Exercise
security
measures may
not be sufficient
for a real event.
Operational
Coordination
4. The
embarkation hub
plan needs more
specific guidance
about decisionmaking authority
in some phases
of the evacuation
process.
1. Review planning
guidance and add
specific details about
decision making
authority at each
point in the
registration and
screening process.
Operational
Coordination
5. A larger TSA
screening area
may be needed
for an actual
evacuation.
1. Review current
plan to determine if a
larger TSA screening
area is needed for an
actual evacuation.
1. Review current
security plan and
consider adding
additional personnel
and physical barriers
at critical locations
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
TDEM
B-14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Capability
Area for
Improvement
Operational
Coordination
6. Additional
planning is
needed to
process evacuees
who do not have
identification.
1. Review current
procedures and
determine policy and
organizational
changes needed.
Operational
Coordination
7. The
evacuation hub
evacuee flow
process was not
clear to all
participants.
1. Develop additional
training for all
participants.
T
1. Identify
requirements for staff
with special skills
such as languages.
P, O
2. Conduct on-site
inspection of facility
to determine what
changes need to be
made to
accommodate FNSS
evacuees.
P, E
Operational
Coordination
8. The
embarkation hub
plan needs to
better
accommodate
FNSS evacuees.
Corrective Action
3. After inspection,
determine actions and
associated costs to
implement necessary
changes.
Operational
Coordination
9. The paper ETN
form did not
provide enough
room for
handwriting.
1. Revise form to add
necessary writing
space. Provide
clipboards with pens.
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
CCDHHS and
TSA
DDC, CCOEM,
CCDHHS, TSA
07/01/2016
Ongoing
CCDHHS
CCOEM,
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
CCDHHS
CCOEM,
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
TDEM
Jeff Newbold
07/01/2016
09/01/2016
P, O
P
P, E
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
TDEM
B-15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Operational
Coordination
Operational
Coordination
Operational
Coordination
Operational
Coordination
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Area for
Improvement
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
10. Banding
procedures were
inconsistent and,
at times, slow.
1. Review ETN
banding procedures;
determine where
improvements can be
made, and conduct
additional training on
revised procedures.
P, T
TDEM
Jeff Newbold
07/01/2016
Ongoing
CCDHHS
CCOEM,
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
CCDHHS
CCOEM,
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
CCDHHS
CCOEM,
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
11. Evacuees did
not know what to
expect next in
the evacuation
process.
12. Evacuee
families were
separated during
the registration
and screening
process.
13. Evacuees
were not
screened for
weapons prior to
entering the
reception hall.
1. Address with all
participants the
importance of
effectively
communicating with
evacuees.
T
2. Emphasize this
point in future
exercises.
E
1. In future training/
exercises emphasize
importance of keeping
family groups
together.
T
2. Instruct
supervisors to
monitor processing to
keep families
together.
T
1. Review current
weapons policy.
Consider adding
weapons screening of
evacuees prior to
them entering the
reception hall.
P
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
TDEM
B-16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Area for
Improvement
Operational
Coordination
14. A policy
defining baggage
and baggage
tagging is
needed.
Operational
Coordination
Operational
Coordination
Operational
Coordination
Mass Care
Services
15. Some
evacuees did not
think military
personnel
communicated
with them
effectively.
16. A public
information
campaign needs
to identifies
embarkation hub
services and
allowable items.
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
1. Develop luggage
policy.
2. Determine
procedure for tagging
bags and train staff
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
CCDHHS,
supporting
agencies
CCOEM
07/01/2016
Ongoing
TMD
TMD
06/15/2016
Ongoing
CCDHHS,
local
jurisdictions
CCOEM,
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
P
P, T
1. Remind military
personnel their role is
to assist fellow
citizens and treat
them appropriately.
T
1. Develop plan
P
2. Exercise plan as
part of future exercise
E
17. Future
evacuation
planning should
reflect changes in
federal screening
requirements.
1. Adjust screening
procedures as allowed
by FAA/TSA
P
CCDHHS, TSA
DDC, TSA
CCOEM
07/01/2016
Ongoing
1. Food service
was insufficient.
1. Establish a food
unit leader
responsible for
coordinating food for
hub staff and
evacuees
P, O
CCHD and
ARC
John O’Valle
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
TDEM
B-17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action Report/
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Area for
Improvement
Public Health,
Healthcare, and
Emergency
Medical Services
1. The medical
triage group did
not have any
medical
equipment to
provide basic life
support care until
EMS arrived.
Public Health,
Healthcare, and
Emergency
Medical Services
2. The task of the
DSHS MIST was
not relayed
correctly to the
hub.
Public Health,
Healthcare, and
Emergency
Medical Services
3. Evacuees were
not screened for
communicable
diseases prior to
entering the
reception hall.
Public Health,
Healthcare, and
Emergency
Medical Services
4. Triage
procedures
should be better
defined.
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
1. Review current
plan for needed
medical equipment
and identify who will
provide the
equipment
P
CCDHHS
CCOEM,
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
1. Ensure partners
understand the
mission of the MIST
P
Chris Medina
06/10/2016
10/01/2016
2. Exercise MIST
during future exercise
CCDHHS and
DSHS
E
1. Add public health
screening station
before evacuees enter
reception hall
O
CCDHHS
CCOEM,
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
1. Determine the
objective of the triage
process
P
CCDHHS
CCOEM,
CCDHHS
07/01/2016
Ongoing
Corrective Action
2. Once objective is
determined, staff and
train a triage group
accordingly
O, T
Appendix B: San Benito High School Embarkation Hub
TDEM
B-18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
APPENDIX C: AIRPORT INCIDENT COMMAND POST
The Airport Incident Command Post (AICP) activated at the Valley International
Airport in Harlingen. Texas Military Department (TMD), Transportation Security
Agency (TSA), and the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) staffed the AICP.
The AICP coordinated with external agencies such as the DDC 21, San Benito High
School Embarkation Hub and the Medical Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) and the
General Population APOE. During the exercise, they coordinated the loading and
safe departure of three civilian flights and two military medical evacuation flights to
aerial ports of debarkation (APOD).
Analysis of Core Capabilities
The below table includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and
performance rating for each core capability observed during the exercise. Following
the table is a discussion of strengths and areas of improvement noted during the
exercise.
Objective
Core Capability
1. Show the ability to receive
and deliver information in a
timely and sufficient manner
in order to inform decision
makers regarding needed
actions in support of an
evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
2. Test the means of multiagency communications,
utilized in support of an
evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
3. Evaluate the integration
of resources in support of a
valley evacuation within all
regional, state and federal
entities in accordance with
established protocols.
6. Examine the ability of the
State of Texas to evacuate
people from an area of
impact to a safe region by
providing transportation
assets.
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Situational
Assessment
X
Operational
Communications
X
Operational
Coordination
X
Critical
Transportation
X
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
Ratings Definitions:

See initial ratings description
Appendix C: Airport Incident Command Post
TDEM
C-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Objective
1. Show the ability to receive and deliver information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order to inform decision makers regarding needed
actions in support of an evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Situational Assessment
Strengths
1. Internal coordination among agencies staffing the Airport ICP was
excellent and information was shared as needed. AICP staff developed and
maintained good coordination with the APODs, APOEs, and the embarkation
hub. The DPS representative maintained close contact with DDC 21 and DPS
troopers escorting the buses to the airport and guiding them to the entry
point. TSA communicated with counterparts at the General Population APOE
and at the embarkation hub located at San Benito High School for updates of
screening operations via cell phone and radio. Texas Military Department was
in frequent communications via cell phone and radio with the transportation
officer who directed aircraft movement and evacuee loading.
Objective
2. Test the means of multi-agency communications, utilized in support of an
evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Operational Communications
Areas for Improvement
1. The Airport ICP did not develop a comprehensive communications.
Analysis: Airport ICP personnel noted external communications issues
during the exercise. This was due to uncertainty of the means of
communications with external agencies. They recognized a completed
ICS 205 would have provided guidance of the proper communications
channels and equipment.
Appendix C: Airport Incident Command Post
TDEM
C-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Objective
3. Evaluate the integration of resources in support of a valley evacuation with
all regional, state, and federal entities in accordance with established
protocols.
Capability
Operational Coordination
Strengths
1. Good internal coordination resulted in quick problem resolution. For
example: One of the buses carrying evacuees to the airport became trapped
in the mud and blocked the designated airport bus entrance. While TMD
personnel attempted to pull the bus free using a heavy-duty military vehicle,
the AICP coordinated with the airport director to authorize a second entry
point for subsequent buses. This quick action prevented delay because the
bus remained stuck and was only freed after its passengers were off-loaded.
Areas for Improvement
1. The DPS sergeant in the AICP had limited authority to make decisions.
Analysis: Decision-making authority lies with superior officers, which
resulted in some delays. Consideration should be to assign a more
senior officer to the AICP who has appropriate authority, or to grant
authority to more junior personnel assigned to the AICP.
2. Airport operations were not represented in the airport AICP.
Analysis: Airport operations staff is the go to source for information
about what can and cannot be done on the airport grounds. Having
one of their staff in the airport AICP can help resolve issues quickly.
Objective
6. Examine the ability of the State of Texas to evacuate people from an area
of impact to a safe region by providing transportation assets.
Appendix C: Airport Incident Command Post
TDEM
C-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Capability
Critical Transportation
Areas for Improvement
1. An alternate access gate to the airfield needs identification in case the
primary entry gate is obstructed.
Analysis: During the exercise a bus got stuck in the mud and blocked
the only authorized entry gate. The AICP quickly resolved the issue
with the airport director by getting access to a second gate. However,
anticipating the need for an alternate access to the airport should be
part of future planning.
2. For an actual evacuation, the aircraft staging area may be too small.
Analysis: For the purpose of the exercise, aircraft staging was
sufficient. However, the transportation officer believed that during an
actual air evacuation requiring more aircraft, current aircraft staging
plans might not be sufficient. A review of existing plans will determine
what adjustments are necessary.
3. There was no weather contingency plan.
Analysis: The rain that fell during the exercise, as it probably would
during an actual hurricane evacuation, delayed some departures and
softened the ground to the extent that one bus became stuck.
Deteriorating weather conditions will cause delays in a real event and
planners should address this issue. Evaluation and review of the
current plans will assist in determining if alternative staging areas are
advisable and if operational changes will have to be made.
Appendix C: Airport Incident Command Post
TDEM
C-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Airport Incident Command Post Improvement Plan
This improvement plan was developed for the Airport Incident Command Post during the 2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise June 2-9, 2016
Note: Capability Elements are planning (P), organization (O), equipment (E), training (T), or exercise (Ex).
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
1. A
communications
plan was not
completed before
the exercise.
1. Develop and
disseminate a
communications
plan to all relevant
agencies prior to
an exercise or
operation
P
Operational
Coordination
1. The DPS sergeant
in the AICP had
limited authority to
make decisions.
1. Grant required
decision making
authority to senior
DPS person in
AICP
Operational
Coordination
2. Airport operations
were not
represented in the
airport ICP.
1. Coordinate with
airport for a
representative in
the AICP
Critical
Transportation
1. An alternate
access gate to the
airfield is needed in
case the primary
entry gate is
obstructed.
1. Designate a
secondary gate as
part of the plan.
Critical
Transportation
2. For an actual
evacuation, the
aircraft staging area
may be too small.
1. Review existing
plan and
determine if the
aircraft staging
areas can be
Capability
Operational
Communications
Area for
Improvement
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
TDEM, DPS,
and TMD
DDC/TMD
06/15/2016
Ongoing
P, O
DDC,
DPS/TDEM
DDC,
DPS/TDEM
07/01/2016
Ongoing
P, O
TMD, Valley
International
Airport
DDC/TMD
06/15/2016
Ongoing
P
DDC, TSA,
Valley
International
Airport
Operations
DDC, TSA,
VIA
07/01/2016
Ongoing
P
TMD, Valley
International
Airport
Operations
TDEM/TMD/
Valley
International
Airport
06/15/2016
TDEM/TMD/
Valley
International
Airport
Appendix C: Airport Incident Command Post
TDEM
C-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Area for
Improvement
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
P
TMD, Valley
International
Airport
Operations
Valley Airport
15 June
2016
Valley
Airport
expanded
sufficiently to
handle the number
of aircraft expected
during a real
evacuation.
Critical
Transportation
3. There was no
weather contingency
plan.
1. Review existing
plan and
determine what
storm-related
alternatives need
to be considered
.
Appendix C: Airport Incident Command Post
TDEM
C-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
APPENDIX D: GENERAL POPULATION APOE
The General Population Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) was established at Valley
International Airport and staffed by members of the TMD, DSHS, TDEM and other
partner agencies. The APOE coordinated with the contracted airlines, the
embarkation hub, and the Airport Incident Command Post (AICP).
During the exercise, participants received general population evacuees by bus from
the San Benito High School embarkation hub. Upon their arrival, APOE personnel
validated passenger manifests and loaded the evacuees and their luggage onto
contracted civilian aircraft for flights to aerial ports of debarkation (APOD).
Analysis of Core Capabilities
The below table includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and
performance rating for each core capability observed during the exercise. Following
the table is a discussion of strengths and areas of improvement noted during the
exercise.
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Objective
Core Capability
1. Show the ability to receive
and deliver information in a
timely and sufficient manner
in order to inform decision
makers regarding needed
actions in support of an
evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
Situational
Assessment
X
Operational
Coordination
X
Critical
Transportation
X
3. Evaluate the integration of
resources in support of a
valley evacuation within all
regional, state and federal
entities in accordance with
established protocols.
6. Examine the ability of the
State of Texas to evacuate
people from an area of impact
to a safe region by providing
transportation assets.
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
Ratings Definitions:

See initial ratings description
Appendix D: General Population APOE
TDEM
D-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Objective
1. Show the ability to receive and deliver information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order to inform decision makers regarding needed
actions in support of an evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Situational Assessment
Strengths
1. Agencies at the high school embarkation hub and the APOE shared
information regularly. As buses departed the embarkation hub; notices were
sent out to partner agencies regarding departure times and estimated arrival
times.
Objective
3. Evaluate the integration of resources in support of a Rio Grande Valley
evacuation with all regional, state and federal entities in accordance with
established protocols.
Capability
Operational Coordination
Strengths
1. Good coordination and cooperation enabled the APOE to overcome
weather delays, mechanical issues, and a stuck bus.
Objective
6. Examine the ability of the State of Texas to evacuate people from an area
of impact to a safe region by providing transportation assets.
Capability
Critical Transportation
Strengths
1. Texas Military Department and DPS handled the movement of air and
ground transportation very well. TMD personnel directed aircraft staging and
loading evacuees while DPS coordinated all evacuee ground transportation.
Appendix D: General Population APOE
TDEM
D-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Areas for Improvement
1. Inconsistencies with passenger manifests caused some boarding delays.
Analysis: When a bus departed the high school embarkation hub, the
TMD representative on the bus received a passenger manifest. The
airline security officer matched this manifest against one they had
been provided. On at least two occasions, the lists did not match.
Resolving the list’s inaccuracies delayed the aircraft departure at least
30 minutes.
2. Inadvertent placement of air stairs damaged the door of one aircraft.
Analysis: The door damage was minor and a provided airline mechanic
was able to repair the damage. Caution around aircraft and airport
equipment is essential and needs to be restated frequently.
3. Evacuee actors complained they could not hear instructions given to them
on the bus prior to disembarking the bus and boarding the aircraft.
Analysis: When a bus arrived at an aircraft, a TMD representative
boarded the bus and briefed the evacuees about what they were
supposed to do and what was going to happen. However, many
complained they could not hear the instructions over the general noise
of the bus and the airfield. Some type of voice amplification system
could eliminate this issue.
Appendix D: General Population APOE
TDEM
D-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix D: General Population APOE
TDEM
D-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
General Population APOE Improvement Plan
This improvement plan was developed for the General Population APOE during the 2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise June 2-9, 2016
Note: Capability Elements are planning (P), organization (O), equipment (E), training (T), or exercise (Ex).
Capability
Critical
Transportation
Area for
Improvement
1.
Inconsistencies
with passenger
manifests caused
some boarding
delays.
Critical
Transportation
2. Inadvertent
placement of air
stairs damaged
the door of one
aircraft.
Critical
Transportation
3. Evacuee
actors
complained they
could not hear
instructions given
to them on the
bus prior to
disembarking the
bus and boarding
the aircraft.
Corrective Action
1. Review existing
procedures to
determine shortfalls.
2. Institute
corrections to SOPs as
needed.
1. Remind all
personnel of need for
safety procedures,
especially around
aircraft.
1. Provide some type
of voice amplification
to person providing
instructions, such as a
microphone if
available on the bus
or a battery operated
bullhorn.
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
TMD, TSA
CCHD/TMD
15 June
2016
Ongoing
T
Airport
Operations,
TMD
Contract
Airlines
15 June
2016
Ongoing
E, T
TMD
TMD
15 June
2016
Ongoing
P, T
P
Appendix D: General Population APOE
TDEM
D-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix D: General Population APOE
TDEM
D-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
APPENDIX E: MEDICAL APOE
The Medical Aerial Port of Embarkation (MAPOE) was established at Valley
International Airport and staffed by members of the TMD, DOD, DSHS and other
partner agencies. The Medical APOE coordinated with Embarkation Hub and the
Airport Incident Command Post (AICP). During the exercise, participants received
medical evacuees by bus or by a specialized ambulance bus from the San Benito
High School Embarkation Hub.
Upon their arrival, Medical APOE personnel assisted medical evacuees off the bus or
provided four-person litter teams for litter patients from the ambulance bus.
Staffers provided Medical care as needed while evacuees waiting for flights. Once
passenger manifests validation was complete, Medical APOE personnel assisted
medical evacuees board Texas Air National Guard C-130s for flights to Kelly Field in
San Antonio.
Analysis of Core Capabilities
The below table includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and
performance rating for each core capability observed during the exercise. Following
the table is a discussion of strengths and areas of improvement noted during the
exercise.
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Objective
Core Capability
1. Show the ability to
receive and deliver
information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order
to inform decision makers
regarding needed actions in
support of an evacuation
from the Rio Grande Valley.
Situational
Assessment
X
Critical
Transportation
X
6. Examine the ability of
the State of Texas to
evacuate people from an
area of impact to a safe
region by providing
transportation assets.
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
Ratings Definitions:

See initial ratings description
Appendix E: Medical APOE
TDEM
E-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Objective
1. Show the ability to receive and deliver information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order to inform decision makers regarding needed
actions in support of an evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Situational Assessment
Strengths
1. The Medical APOE communicated with the AICP as needed to maintain
good situational awareness.
Objective
6. Examine the ability of the State of Texas to evacuate people from an area
of impact to a safe region by providing transportation assets.
Capability
Critical Transportation
Strengths
1. The reception, triage, staging, and embarkation of medical evacuees were
well organized. As ambulances or buses arrived from the embarkation hub,
medical evacuees were off-loaded by stretcher if necessary and then scanned
for weapons as a security precaution before entering the triage area. After
being asked about their medical history in the triage area and after final
patient flight determination, evacuees were given a second wristband to
facilitate movement to the correct aircraft. From triage, evacuees were
moved to staging to wait for embarkation onto the aircraft. Medical
evacuees were periodically re-assessed after triage until they were loaded
onto the aircraft.
Areas for Improvement
1. Some evacuee mentioned that heat could be a safety issue in a real-world
event.
Analysis: No one reported heat-related issues at the Medical APOE, but
some evacuee actors believed it could become a patient comfort issue
Appendix E: Medical APOE
TDEM
E-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
if left in the staging area for an extended period. More fans or
portable cooling equipment may be needed in hot weather operations
to keep staff and evacuees safe.
2. The space for the Medical APOE was too small.
Analysis: Proximity with the General Population APOE and the size of
the hanger did not provide much space for the Medical APOE,
especially during the offloading of litter patients from the ambulance
bus. For an actual evacuation handling many more medical evacuees,
Medical APOE space will need to be much larger and possibly
completely separated from the General Population APOE. Federal
planning requirements are for 12,000 square feet, however, the only
available hangar prior to the exercise was for 7,200 square feet.
3. Key leaders and agency representatives were not readily identifiable at the
Medical APOE.
Analysis: With the large number of personnel and evacuees in the
Medical APOE area, leaders were not easily identifiable. Key personnel
need to have some readily seen identification. Vests, colored lanyards
or some other system would assist in identification. Access control into
these areas should be controlled by one organization.
4. The process for refueling generators was inefficient.
Analysis: Personnel made numerous trips to a fueling station to refuel
generators. While this worked for the exercise, a more efficient
method, such as a refueling by a contractor, would ensure continuous
fueling. Activating existing contracts for refueling during an exercise
would test the contractor and enable uninterrupted generator support.
5. During a storm, shelter tents at and around the APOE were blown down.
Analysis: The shelter tents used were sufficient for normal weather.
The brief storm during the exercise blew over some and demonstrated
to planners that sturdier, hard shelters should be part of an allweather approach to evacuation planning. The tents were assembled
and in place to support the Disaster Aeromedical Staging Facility
storage requirements for a separate exercise. If any outside future
storage requirements are needed, storage containers should be used.
6. Current capability gap for future Aeromedical Staging Facility Operations
Analysis: While DASF operations were successful, a gap remains for
Texas to conduct hurricane aeromedical staging facility operations
without the Department of Defense (DOD) Disaster Aero-Medical
Appendix E: Medical APOE
TDEM
E-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Staging Facility (DASF). The DASF provided most of the medical
capabilities at the APOE medical hangar to include: reception, triage,
staging, final patient flight determination and short term medical care.
This was done in order for the State to determine what right looked
like and replicate these tasks without Federal assistance.
Appendix E: Medical APOE
TDEM
E-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Medical APOE Improvement Plan
This improvement plan was developed for the Medical APOE during the 2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane
Evacuation Exercise June 2-9, 2016
Note: Capability Elements are planning (P), organization (O), equipment (E), training (T), or exercise (Ex).
Area for
Improvement
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
Critical
Transportation
1. Some
evacuee review
forms thought
heat could be a
safety issue.
1. Consider portable
fan units or portable
cooling units for
operations during
very warm weather
P, E
TMD
TMD/DSHS/EMTF/
Valley Airport
06/15/2016
June 2017
Critical
Transportation
2. The space for
the Medical
APOE was too
small.
1. Review airport for
alternate locations
which with larger
space for operations
P
TMD and
Valley Airport
Operations
TMD/DSHS/EMTF/
Valley Airport
06/15/2016
June 2017
Critical
Transportation
3. Key leaders
and agency
representatives
could not be
readily identified
1. Determine
appropriate
identification means
and use during future
operations
P, T
TMD
TMD
06/15/2016
Ongoing
Critical
Transportation
4. The process
for refueling
generators was
inefficient.
1. Activate existing
fuel contracts
P
TMD
TDEM/TMD
06/15/2016
Ongoing
5. Shelter tents
used around the
APOE were
blown down
during a storm.
1. Replace soft
shelters with storage
containers for future
storage operations. If
soft shelters are to
be used, ensure they
are used per
manufacture
recommendations.
P, E
DSHS
Chris Medina and
James Merton
06/10/2016
06/30/2017
Capability
Critical
Transportation
Appendix E: Medical APOE
TDEM
E-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Critical
Transportation
Area for
Improvement
6. Gap for future
Aeromedical
Staging Facility
Operations
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
1. TDMS committee
form a working group
and formalize CONOP
and determine roles
and responsibilities
between state
organizations. Codify
in DSHS’ Standard
Operating Guide.
P, E, T, Ex
DSHS
Barbara Adams
10/01/2016
06/30/2017
Appendix E: Medical APOE
TDEM
E-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
APPENDIX F: TARRANT COUNTY SHELTER AND APOD
The Tarrant County Shelter and APOD received evacuees from the Rio Grande
Valley and sheltered them overnight in a Forth Worth shelter. DDC 4 A, the Texas
Department of Public Safety (DPS), local emergency management, local law
enforcement, Fort Worth Parks and Recreation Department, The Salvation Army,
the American Red Cross, and other participating agencies provided airport
reception, transportation to the shelter, shelter registration, meals, and sleeping
facilities for the evacuees.
Analysis of Core Capabilities
The below table includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and
performance rating for each core capability observed during the exercise. Following
the table is a discussion of strengths and areas of improvement noted during the
exercise.
Objective
Core Capability
1. Show the ability to
receive and deliver
information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order to
inform decision makers
regarding needed actions in
support of an evacuation
from the Rio Grande Valley.
2. Test the means of multiagency communications
utilized in support of an
evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
4. Test the mobilization of
critical resources and
establish command, control,
and coordination structures
within the receiving
communities and other
coordinating agencies.
8. Show the ability to
establish, staff, and equip
emergency shelters and
other temporary housing
options (including accessible
housing) for an evacuated
population
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Situational
Assessment
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
X
Operational
Communications
X
Operational
Coordination
X
Mass Care
Services
X
Ratings Definitions:

See initial ratings description
Appendix F: Tarrant County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
F-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Objective
1. Show the ability to receive and deliver information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order to inform decision makers regarding needed
actions in support of an evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Situational Assessment
Strengths
1. The DDC 4 A and Tarrant County/Fort Worth combined EOC maintained
good situational awareness about APOD and shelter related issues. Projected
WebEOC and ETN screens were available for the entire EOC staff. The EOC
could monitor ETN scans in real time.
Objective
2. Test the means of multi-agency communications, utilized in support of an
evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Operational Communications
Areas for Improvement
1. Agencies at the shelter did not use WebEOC.
Analysis: Shelter staff used mobile phones for external
communications. While adequate for the exercise, another form of
communications that offered redundancy would be beneficial. Shelter
personnel did not use WebEOC because they did not have log-on
rights. For extended periods of operation, as well as a way to get
needed information such as passenger manifests, WebEOC would be
helpful.
Objective
4. Test the mobilization of critical resources and establish command, control,
and coordination structures within the receiving communities and other
coordinating agencies.
Appendix F: Tarrant County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
F-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Capability
Operational Coordination
Strengths
1. There was good coordination between Dallas Fort Worth Airport OEM and
TMD to de-plane evacuees and load them and their luggage onto waiting
buses. TMD personnel recorded arrivals using an ETN application on mobile
phones, which enabled them to scan evacuee wristbands. DPS provided
escort for the buses in route to the shelter. The overall process was timely
and efficient.
Objective
8. Show the ability to establish, staff, and equip emergency shelters and
other temporary housing options (including accessible housing) for an
evacuated population.
Capability
Mass Care Services
Strengths
1. Fort Worth Parks and Recreation Department, Salvation Army, and
American Red Cross personnel displayed excellent cooperation and
coordination to set up and operate the shelter. As evacuees entered the
shelter, TMD personnel scanned their arrival into ETN with the same mobile
phone application used to record their arrival at the airport.
2. The Information Technology Disaster Resource Center, a non-profit
organization provided a Wi-Fi capability to the shelter. A communications
van parked next to the shelter and generated the Wi-Fi signal. This
capability allowed evacuees to contact loved ones or attend to personnel
business. The evacuees very much appreciated this.
Areas for Improvement
1. A medical assessment capability was not available at the shelter when
evacuees arrived.
Analysis: Although there were no health issues with this group, the
ability to conduct medical assessments is important to screen out
Appendix F: Tarrant County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
F-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
potentially infectious persons or those with emergent health issues
who may need urgent care.
2. The shelter only had one shower each for males and females.
Analysis: A single shower for each sex was inconvenient, but was
manageable for the short duration of stay. However, for extended
shelter operations, plans for additional shower capacity are desirable.
3. Some food items were not available or were late arriving.
Analysis: Gluten free and lactose free food items were not available for
those who needed them. Milk was available but was not cold. Coffee
was brewed too late in the morning to be available to everyone who
wanted it.
Appendix F: Tarrant County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
F-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Tarrant County Shelter and APOD Improvement Plan
This improvement plan was developed for the Tarrant County Shelter and APOD during the 2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise June 2-9, 2016
Note: Capability Elements are planning (P), organization (O), equipment (E), training (T), or exercise (Ex).
Capability
Operational
Communications
Mass Care
Services
Area for
Improvement
1. WebEOC was
not used at the
shelter.
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
P, E
ARC, DDC
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
ARC, Local
Emergency
Management
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
ARC
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
1. Incorporate
WebEOC into shelter
communications
2. Ensure shelter staff
have necessary log-in
approval and system
training
1. A medical
assessment
capability was
not available at
the shelter when
evacuees arrived.
1. Arrange for some
medical capability at
the shelter.
2. The shelter
only had one
shower each for
males and
females.
1. Determine if
portable, trailer
mounted showers or
similar capability can
be provided
3. Some food
items were not
available or were
late arriving.
1. Add special diet
items to shelter food
P
P, E
P
Appendix F: Tarrant County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
F-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix F: Tarrant County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
F-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
APPENDIX G: DALLAS COUNTY SHELTER AND APOD
Numerous state and local agencies coordinated with each other to receive a flight of
evacuees at Dallas Love Field and transport them to an Irving shelter for an
overnight stay. DDC 4B, various Dallas County and city of Dallas agencies, city of
Irving agencies, Texas Military Department, and the American Red Cross all
provided some element of support to the sheltering operation. The next morning,
the evacuees were bused to Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) International Airport to
connect with ground transportation home or for a flight to Harlingen.
Analysis of Core Capabilities
The below table includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and
performance rating for each core capability observed during the exercise. Following
the table is a discussion of strengths and areas of improvement noted during the
exercise.
Objective
Core Capability
1. Show the ability to
receive and deliver
information in a timely
and sufficient manner in
order to inform decision
makers regarding needed
actions in support of an
evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
2. Test the means of
multi-agency
communications, utilized
in support of an
evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
4. Test the mobilization of
critical resources and
establish command,
control, and coordination
structures within the
receiving communities and
other coordinating
agencies.
5. Test the ability of local
jurisdictions to coordinate
the return of evacuees
following a disaster,
repopulation.
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Situational
Assessment
X
Operational
Communications
X
Operational
Coordination
X
Operational
Coordination
X
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
TDEM
G-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Objective
Core Capability
8. Show the ability to
establish, staff, and equip
emergency shelters and
other temporary housing
options (including
accessible housing) for an
evacuated population
Mass Care
Services
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
X
Ratings Definitions:

See initial ratings description
Objective
1. Show the ability to receive and deliver information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order to inform decision makers regarding needed
actions in support of an evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Situational Assessment
Strengths
1. Good cooperation and coordination were evident among the jurisdictions
at the APOD. The district coordinator was on site and well informed of issues
as they unfolded. Updates on flight information were frequent via mobile
phone calls or text messages. Additionally, various agency representatives
verbally briefed each other while waiting for the flight to arrive.
Objective
2. Test the means of multi-agency communications, utilized in support of an
evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Operational Communications
Strengths
1. Staff parked the City of Irving’s mobile command center at the shelter to
ensure adequate communications. While most communications was via
smart phone, radio, to include satellite radio, was available as well.
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
G-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Areas for Improvement
1. The smart phones used for ETN scanning, even after updating the
software, did not synchronize with printers to print manifests.
Analysis: Ultimately, the solution was determined to be the printer.
Once the printers were initialized and new ink cartridges added, they
functioned properly, however, considerable time was lost. An
operational check prior to evacuee arrival could have found the
problem and identified a solution sooner.
Objective
4. Test the mobilization of critical resources and establish command, control,
and coordination structures within the receiving communities and other
coordinating agencies.
Capability
Operational Coordination
Strengths
1. Buses provided for the movement from the airport to the shelter were
sufficient in number and were air-conditioned. The buses had law
enforcement escorts.
2. EMS personnel boarded the evacuee flight upon arrival to screen for any
medical issues before passengers deplaned. EMS was present at the shelter
as well.
Areas for Improvement
1. Dallas Love Field did not allow ETN scanning.
Analysis: DDC and APOD personnel were aware that Dallas Love Field
would not allow the use of ETN scanning devices while evacuees
transferred from the aircraft to buses. As such, they were prepared to
track evacuees manually. APOD personnel controlled evacuee
movement on the ground, conducted head counts and eventually
reconciled their count with the aircrew’s manifest. Further planning
with Dallas Love Field to allow scanning as evacuees deplane may help
provide better accountability in the future.
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
G-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
2. The reception team at the APOD was not able to determine if any inbound
evacuees had medical needs.
Analysis: As part of their reception planning, the APOD had an EMS
unit available at the airport. However, they wanted information of any
specific medical needs inbound evacuees might have. This would have
allowed them to have additional medical capability available if needed.
Better coordination between the APOD and the APOE could provide
such information.
3. Evacuees did not receive information updates upon their arrival in Dallas.
Analysis: Many evacuees appeared confused. They did not know
which buses to board, what would happen to their belongings, and
their destination shelter. Consequently, anxiety levels were elevated.
4. The reception team at the APOD did not know that some passengers had
weapons stored on the aircraft.
Analysis: Shelter policy does not permit weapons. The reception
team recognized they do not have specific policies that address the
disarming of evacuees or where to store weapons.
5. Past planning efforts did not include medical support for general
population shelters in Dallas.
Analysis: Although EMS was available at the airport and at the
shelter, local participants stated that planning for evacuee with
medical-support-needs needs better definition.
6. Additional security, as well as food and water, will be required during a
real-world evacuation at the airport.
Analysis: Several participants thought that better security
arrangements would be needed for a real evacuation. In addition,
they believed that evacuees could be at the airport for an extended
period waiting transportation to shelters. Consequently, they believed
stocks of food and water should be available at the airport.
7. The sharing of key information was difficult and limited.
Analysis: Participants gave several examples of coordination issues.
Information regarding the aircraft’s arrival time was unavailable. The
shelter did not have an accurate number of expected evacuees.
Participants also thought information exchange with the airport
operations needed improvement.
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
G-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Objective
5. Test the ability of local jurisdictions to coordinate the return of evacuees
following a disaster, repopulation.
Capability
Operational Coordination
Areas for Improvement
1. Evacuee transportation from the shelter to DFW was not properly
coordinated.
Analysis: The intended departure plan organized the evacuees into
three groups for transport, but agencies used only two buses. The first
bus was to depart at 6:25 a.m. with evacuees flying back to Harlingen
from DFW. The second bus was to depart at 8:20 a.m. to a DFW
parking area to connect evacuees with ground transportation. The first
bus was then to return to the shelter, pick up the third group and take
them to a DFW parking area for ground transportation home as well.
The first bus departed on time and arrived at DFW at 7:10 a.m.
Clearance to board the aircraft caused some delay. The flight
eventually cleared to for departure, but the first bus could not depart
for its return to the shelter until 9:21 a. m. and did not arrive until
10:30 a.m. Meanwhile, the second bus had departed for the airport,
but DPS personnel directed it to return to the shelter because of
airport congestion. At 9:25 a.m., the bus finally departed the shelter.
Compounding the unanticipated delays, breakfast times and
anticipated bus departure times were not effectively communicated to
all evacuees the night prior to departure. Consequently, some
evacuees were not fully prepared to depart when they were expected
and some of them did not have time for breakfast.
Objective
8. Show the ability to establish, staff, and equip emergency shelters and
other temporary housing options to include accessible housing for an
evacuated population.
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
G-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Capability
Mass Care Services
Strengths
1. Various responder functions were available to support shelter operations.
The district coordinator came to the shelter location after the arrival of the
evacuee flight. Irving police were at the shelter for security and searched
evacuees before they were registered. EMS was present for medical
emergencies, and personnel to accept pets were available.
2. The shelter prepared for FNSS evacuees. Wheel chairs were available and
specialized sleeping accommodations such as bariatric beds, were available.
3. General population shelter accommodations were good. There were
sufficient cots for the general population and 16 separate cots for FNSS
evacuees. Evacuees received cot assignments marked on a visual grid
document, which matched the layout of the cots. This procedure made it
easy for evacuees to find their assigned cots. Everyone received comfort kits.
Evacuee actors complimented the food.
4. Safety issues were a major concern throughout the exercise. Specific
areas included aviation ground safety at the airport, ground movement
safety between the airport and shelter, as well as personal safety and the
security of evacuee belongings at the shelter.
Areas for Improvement
1. The shelter registration process slowed evacuee settlement.
Analysis: Evacuees entered into the shelter’s foyer to register. After
they did so, they received a meal band but then had cut back through
the registration line to receive their cot assignment. However, once at
their cot, if they chose to use the restroom or go to the food service
window, they again had to cut through the registration line to reach
these facilities. The result was delayed settlement for everyone.
Shelter staff should conduct a walk-through of the registration process
to identify choke points and ensure optimal traffic flow prior to the
arrival of evacuees.
2. Shelter showers did not drain properly.
Analysis: A mobile shower trailer provided six showers: three each for
males and females. While the facilities were adequate, the trailer was
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
G-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
not leveled properly. This caused water pooled in certain areas of the
showers, eventually resulting in unsanitary conditions.
3. All shelters should have adequate Wi-Fi and power connections for
evacuee use.
Analysis: Today, most evacuees have smart phones or iPads. These
items are key communications devices for displaced persons and
provide them a way to communicate with worried relatives and
friends. The ability to charge these devices is essential. Additionally,
some evacuees will have battery operated medical devices such as
oxygen or CPAP machines, which will require charging. Shelters need
to accommodate these needs with adequate Wi-Fi capacity and power
connections for everyone who needs them.
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
G-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
G-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Dallas County Shelter and APOD Improvement Plan
This improvement plan was developed for the Dallas County Shelter and APOD during the 2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise June 2-9, 2016
Note: Capability Elements are planning (P), organization (O), equipment (E), training (T), or exercise (Ex).
Capability
Area for
Improvement
Operational
Communications
1. The smart
phones used for
ETN scanning,
even after
updating the
software, did not
sync with
printers to print
manifests.
1. Conduct an
operational test of
equipment prior to
use.
Operational
Coordination
1. ETN scanning
not allowed at
Dallas Love
Field.
1. Address with Love
Field to determine if
ETN can be used at
debarkation in the
future.
ETN scanning is allowed at the airport. During the exercise it was a matter of
time exercise players were inside the secured area of the hangar that was
limited.
Operational
Coordination
2. The reception
team at the
APOD was not
able to
determine if any
inbound
evacuees had
medical needs.
1. FAA Regulations
for medical
emergencies should
be followed
Evaluator was not aware of current FAA regulations.
Operational
Coordination
3. Evacuees did
not receive
information
updates upon
their arrival in
Dallas.
1. Develop
procedures and
designate who should
provide a “welcome”
brief to arriving
evacuees.
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
TMD
CSI/TMD
06/15/2016
Ongoing
Shelter Staff
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
10/31/2017
E, T
Exercise artificiality, during an actual evacuation, staff would be available to
receive inbound evacuees with information and directions. Policies and
procedures are in place for evacuee reception. Only limited staff was
available for the exercise.
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
G-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Capability
Area for
Improvement
Operational
Coordination
4. The reception
team at the
APOD was not
informed that
some
passengers had
weapons stored
on the aircraft.
1. Develop policy to
handle evacuee
weapons at the
airport
Operational
Coordination
5. Medical
support for
general
population
shelters has not
been addressed
in planning.
1. Develop medical
support plan for
general population
shelters
Operational
Coordination
Operational
Coordination
6. Better
security and
food and water
for evacuees
may be needed
at the airport.
7. Key
information was
not always
shared.
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
P
Local OEMs,
Sheltering
Working Group
TSA
DC
10/15/20016
10/30/2017
Exercise artificiality, the issue was addressed with a local working group prior
to the exercise and plans are in place.
1. Review existing
plans and determine
if additional security
is needed.
P
2. Determine how
much food and water
is necessary and who
should supply it.
1. Review existing
information sharing
procedures and
adjust as necessary.
2. Reinforce
importance of sharing
information and
emphasize during
exercises
DDC, Local
OEMs
DC
10/15/20016
10/30/2017
DDC, Local
OEMs, ARC,
Airport
Operations
Marty Penney
06/15/2016
09/30/2016
P
T, E
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
G-10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Area for
Improvement
(For Exercise
Objective 5)
Operational
Coordination
Mass Care
Services
Operational
Coordination
Operational
Coordination
1. Evacuee
transportation
from the shelter
to DFW was not
properly
coordinated.
1. The shelter
registration
process slowed
evacuee
settlement.
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
1. Review
procedures for
sharing information
among DDC, law
enforcement, OEMs,
and shelter staff
2. Review and revise
procedures for shelter
staff to provide key
information to
evacuees in the
shelter
1. Prior to evacuee
arrival, conduct a
walk-through of the
anticipated
registration
procedures to identify
choke points or
inefficiencies
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
DDC, Local
OEM, Shelter
Staff
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
10/31/2017
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
10/31/2017
P, T
P, T
O, T
2. Shelter
showers did not
drain properly.
1. Test shower facility
after set up.
E, T
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
10/31/2017
3. All shelters
should have
adequate Wi-Fi
and power
connections for
evacuee use.
1. Determine best
way to provide Wi-Fi
and adequate power
outlets for evacuee
use
P, E
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
10/31/2017
Shelter Staff
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
G-11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix G: Dallas County Shelter and APOD
TDEM
G-12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
APPENDIX H: AUSTIN SHELTER AND APOD
State and local agencies received evacuees at Austin-Bergstrom International
Airport and transported them to an American Red Cross (ARC) operated shelter. In
addition to ARC personnel, participants from the Texas Division of Emergency
Management (TDEM), Texas Military Department (TMD), the city of Austin, and
volunteers from a Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) took part in
either the sheltering or the APOD portion of the exercise.
Analysis of Core Capabilities
The below table includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and
performance rating for each core capability observed during the exercise. Following
the table is a discussion of strengths and areas of improvement noted during the
exercise.
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Objective
Core
Capability
1. Show the ability to
receive and deliver
information in a timely
and sufficient manner in
order to inform decision
makers regarding
needed actions in
support of an evacuation
from the Rio Grande
Valley.
Situational
Assessment
X
Operational
Coordination
X
4. Test the mobilization
of critical resources and
establish command,
control, and coordination
structures within the
receiving communities
and other coordinating
agencies.
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
Ratings Definitions:
 See initial ratings description
Objective
1. Show the ability to receive and deliver information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order to inform decision makers regarding needed
actions in support of an evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Appendix H: Austin Shelter and APOD
TDEM
H-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Capability
Situational Assessment
Areas for Improvement
1. Agencies could not readily share handwritten ICS forms.
Analysis: Sharing handwritten ICS forms among partner agencies
proved difficult. The shelter never received an incident action plan. If
all involved agencies implemented a tool such as WebEOC, information
sharing would improve.
Objective
4. Test the mobilization of critical resources and establish command, control,
and coordination structures within the receiving communities and other
coordinating agencies.
Capability
Operational Coordination
Strengths
1. Multiple agencies worked well together to establish and operate the
shelter. The Austin-area agencies and organizations that established and ran
the shelter demonstrated excellent coordination. The ARC, in charge of the
shelter, actively involved local CERT and TMD personnel participation in the
shelter’s operation.
2. Specific areas of the shelter were marked off with tape for easier
identification of the shelter’s functional areas. Shelter command staff
provided a briefing, just in time training, and a walk-through of the shelter
for those operating the shelter.
3. Austin-area agencies ensured a seamless transition for evacuees from
their aircraft to buses to shelters.
Areas for Improvement
1. Shelter command did not receive aircraft information in a timely manner.
Analysis: The shelter needs to know aircraft arrival information to
ensure they are ready to perform registration, billeting, and feeding of
Appendix H: Austin Shelter and APOD
TDEM
H-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
evacuees upon their arrival. The Valley DDC should communicate
aircraft departure information and estimated arrival time to the Austinarea DDC, which in turn provides the information to the APOD and
shelter. Other useful information about the flight should include tail
number, passenger count, baggage on board, as well as any FNSS
related information.
Appendix H: Austin Shelter and APOD
TDEM
H-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix H: Austin Shelter and APOD
TDEM
H-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Austin Shelter and APOD Improvement Plan
This improvement plan was developed for the Austin Shelter and POD during the 2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane
Evacuation Exercise June 2-9, 2016
Note: Capability Elements are planning (P), organization (O), equipment (E), training (T), or exercise (Ex).
Capability
Situational
Assessment
Operational
Coordination
Area for
Improvement
Corrective Action
1. ICS forms
were not readily
shared.
1. Develop means to
electronically share
ICS forms among all
necessary agencies.
(e.g. all implement
WebEOC)
1. Aircraft
information was
not relayed to the
shelter command
in a timely
manner.
2. Ensure appropriate
communications
equipment is available
3. Test procedures
and equipment during
future exercise
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
P, E
DDC, Shelter
Staff
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
P, E
Shelter Staff,
DDC
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
E
Shelter Staff
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
Appendix I: Austin Shelter and APOD
TDEM
H-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix I: Austin Shelter and APOD
TDEM
H-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
APPENDIX I: SAN ANTONIO SHELTER AND APOD
Kelly Field was home to the APOD operations in San Antonio. The site received two
flights of medical evacuees aboard Texas Air National Guard C-130s. After landing
the first flight, staff off-loaded, triaged, and prepared the medical evacuees for
transportation to an appropriate medical facility. Once accomplished, the actor
patients became part of the general population for overnight sheltering.
The second flight arrived with general population evacuees, able to walk off the
aircraft. They also were sheltered as part of the general population sheltering
operations. Numerous agencies participated in the APOD and sheltering operations
to include the Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM), Department of
State Health Services (DSHS), various city of San Antonio agencies, elements of the
Texas Military Department (TMD), and the American Red Cross.
Analysis of Core Capabilities
The below table includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and
performance rating for each core capability observed during the exercise. Following
the table is a discussion of strengths and areas of improvement noted during the
exercise.
Objective
Core Capability
1. Show the ability to
receive and deliver
information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order
to inform decision makers
regarding needed actions
in support of an
evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
2. Test the means of
multi-agency
communications, utilized
in support of an
evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
4. Test the mobilization of
critical resources and
establish command,
control, and coordination
structures within the
receiving communities and
other coordinating
agencies.
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Situational
Assessment
X
Operational
Communications
X
Operational
Coordination
X
Appendix I: San Antonio Shelter and APOD
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
TDEM
I-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Objective
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Core Capability
5. Test the ability of local
jurisdictions to coordinate
the return of evacuees
following a disaster,
repopulation.
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Operational
Coordination
X
8. Show the ability to
establish, staff, and equip
emergency shelters and
other temporary housing
options (including
accessible housing) for an
evacuated population
Mass Care
Services
X
10. Demonstrate ability to
provide medical services in
support of an airevacuation.
Public Health,
Healthcare, and
Emergency
Medical Services
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
X
Ratings Definitions:

See initial ratings description
Objective
1. Show the ability to receive and deliver information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order to inform decision makers regarding needed
actions in support of an evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Situational Assessment
Strengths
1. All partner organizations and agencies were included in a clearly defined
information sharing system. The San Antonio EOC effectively shared
information vertically within law enforcement, fire and rescue, EMS, and
other appropriate agencies in a timely and effective manner.
Areas for Improvement
1. Informal communications channels lead to some confusion about flight
arrival status.
Appendix I: San Antonio Shelter and APOD
TDEM
I-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Analysis: In addition to the well-defined information sharing system,
most personnel used informal communications channels to obtain
information. This resulted in a large number of conflicting reports
through too many channels about flight status.
Objective
2. Test the means of multi-agency communications, utilized in support of an
evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Operational Communications
Strengths
1. An ICS 205 was included in the Incident Action Plan (IAP) and designated
an 800 MHz frequency for shelter operations.
Areas for Improvement
1. The Texas Military Department ETN team had limited success using smart
phones to scan arriving evacuees at the APOD and again later at the shelter.
Analysis: The TMD ETN team was equipped with 10 iPads and 10
iPhones for ETN scanning. However, at Kelly Field only one iPhone
worked. Users blamed this on poor cell phone reception at Kelly Field.
The phones also had limited success at the shelter. There was a Wi-Fi
network at the shelter, but the bandwidth did not appear to be
adequate for ETN scans as the system worked very slowly. Further
testing at both locations should determine if the issue is a reception
issue or if there was an issue with the scanners.
2. The personnel at the APOD tried to implemented joint operations;
however, roles and responsibilities were unclear.
Analysis: The joint airfield use at Kelly Field led to confusion. DSHS set
up to triage arriving evacuees but there was uncertainty about who
was in charge of triage. Additionally, it was unclear as to who has the
authority to off-load patients and who is in charge of transporting
them to general population or medical shelters. Clear guidelines for
establishing command and control, as well as, roles and
responsibilities need addressing in future planning.
Appendix I: San Antonio Shelter and APOD
TDEM
I-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Objective
4. Test the mobilization of critical resources and establish command, control,
and coordination structures within the receiving communities and other
coordinating agencies.
Capability
Operational Coordination
Strengths
1. At 11:00 a.m. on June 8, the Texas Division of Emergency Management
Region 6 Coordinator conducted a conference call of all stakeholders. Air
flight times were reporting as being ready and all logistical needs met. The
RMOC reported they were polling area hospitals for available bed space, and
police officers had deployed to provide security for reception and the
movement of buses and private vehicles into and out of the reception area.
Coordination occurred at all levels for the movement of evacuees from the
APOD to the shelter and their return by bus to their point of origin.
Interagency coordination continued throughout the exercise.
2. The city of San Antonio IAP designated the shelter manager and the
number of people that needed for shelter staffing from San Antonio city
resources. The shelter manager maintained contact with the exercise EOC
and with DDC 18 and the TDEM Region 6 Coordinator. These state agency
representatives also monitored shelter activities and were on site for the out
processing and loading of buses to take the evacuee volunteers back to the
Rio Grande Valley.
3. The IAP included a strike team at the APOD for litter patient ground
reception and transportation. Special instructions were included for air and
ground operations to brief evacuees on how to exit an aircraft or vehicle
safely used for transportation. EMS ambulances and buses were on site for
transportation from the APOD to designated shelters and medical facilities.
Existing contracts established the use of local civilian buses for
transportation. Staffers developed a written traffic flow plan for the network
of road the buses were to use from the APOD to the shelter and return to the
APOD.
Appendix I: San Antonio Shelter and APOD
TDEM
I-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Objective
5. Test the ability of local jurisdictions to coordinate the return of evacuees
following a disaster, repopulation.
Capability
Operational Coordination
Strengths
1. The transportation plan for the shelter coordinated with a local bus service
to and from the APOD. The same bus service was to transport volunteer
evacuees back to the Rio Grande Valley.
Objective
8. Show the ability to establish, staff, and equip emergency shelters and
other temporary housing options (including accessible housing) for an
evacuated population.
Capability
Mass Care Services
Strengths
1. The city of San Antonio successfully staffed and equipped a functional
shelter that met the needs of all evacuees. The San Antonio Metropolitan
Health District conducted an epidemiological vector survey prior to shelter
activation and occupation. The city of San Antonio planners incorporated
actions by all relevant city agencies to ensure that the health and safety
needs of evacuees were met to include heating and cooling, running water,
restroom facilities, electrical lighting, and electrical outlets located on interior
building pillars. The San Antonio Meals on Wheels prepared the meals at a
central location and transported the food to the shelter in a manner that met
food safety requirements. The San Antonio Metropolitan Health Department
set up and staffed a medical clinic in the shelter to include a physician from
the Bexar County Medical Society. The San Antonio Police Department
provided 24-hour security. American Red Cross volunteers helped set up and
staffed the shelter on a 24-hour basis to include in-processing, outprocessing, and serving meals. A TMD ETN team was onsite to perform ETN
scanning.
Appendix I: San Antonio Shelter and APOD
TDEM
I-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Objective
10. Demonstrate ability to provide medical services in support of an airevacuation.
Capability
Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services
Strengths
1. The IAP included the task organization and assignments for triage, medical
treatment, and EMS transfer of patients to area hospitals or to shelters. San
Antonio EMS and Metro Health and The University Health System coordinated
effectively as needed. The Air Reception Strike Team triaged evacuees by
using the aircraft manifest for accountability and the data on patient
wristbands for patient category and diagnosis.
2. Safety directions in the IAP included briefs to evacuees for safe egress
from the C-130 aircraft and transportation vehicles.
Areas for Improvement
1. Upon arrival of the aircraft, there was confusion as to who was responsible
to off load the litter patients.
Analysis: Neither the San Antonio medical resources waiting for the
aircraft nor the C-130 flight crew believed it was their responsibility to
off load the litter patients. The Texas Division of Emergency
Management Region 6 Coordinator resolved the issue by directing San
Antonio police and EMS to off load the litter patients. To avoid this
issue in the future, the responsibility for offloading patients’ needs
addressing in the IAP.
Appendix I: San Antonio Shelter and APOD
TDEM
I-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
San Antonio Shelter and APOD Improvement Plan
This improvement plan was developed for the San Antonio Shelter and APOD during the 2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise June 2-9, 2016
Note: Capability Elements are planning (P), organization (O), equipment (E), training (T), or exercise (Ex).
Capability
Situational
Assessment
Operational
Coordination
Operational
Communications
Public Health,
Healthcare, and
Emergency
Medical Services
Area for
Improvement
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
Informal
communications
channels lead to
some confusion
about flight
arrival status.
1. Review and update
SOP as needed
P
DDCs
Tony Gross
06/15/2016
05/30/2017
Roles and
responsibilities at
the APOD were
unclear.
1. Establish guidelines
for command and
control, and roles and
responsibilities at the
APOD
P
DDC, DSHS
Sammy Sikes,
Colin Davis,
Carolyn
Rutherford
06/10/2016
07/30/2017
1. Locals can request
a TICP through a
STAR request for
interoperability and if
Verizon coverage is
available, a hotspot
will solve the issue
E
DDC
Tony Gross
06/15/2016
Ongoing
2. Incorporate
interoperability
solution in training
T
TDEM CIS
Sam Williams
06/15/2016
Ongoing
DDC, DSHS
Tony Gross,
Sammy Sikes,
Colin Davis,
Carolyn
Rutherford
06/10/2016
07/30/2017
TMD had limited
success using
smart phones to
scan arriving
evacuees at the
APOD and again
later at the
shelter.
1. Upon aircraft
arrival, there was
confusion as to
who was
responsible to off
load the patients.
1. Determine who is
responsible and
include in SOG and
IAP
P
Appendix I: San Antonio Shelter and APOD
TDEM
I-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix I: San Antonio Shelter and APOD
TDEM
I-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
APPENDIX J: STATE OPERATIONS CENTER
The SOC Council fully staffed the State Operations Center. The Council represents
all the major state agencies involved in the coordination of services during and after
a disaster. Federal partners from FEMA Region VI, the National Weather Service,
and the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers provided support during the exercise. The
SOC Council needs to be commended for its perseverance and commitment. The
Council was working a real-world incident and at the same time participated in the
exercise to its fullest.
Analysis of Core Capabilities
The below table includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and
performance rating for each core capability observed during the exercise. Following
the table is a discussion of strengths and areas of improvement noted during the
exercise.
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Objective
Core
Capability
1. Show the ability to
receive and deliver
information in a timely
and sufficient manner in
order to inform decision
makers regarding
needed actions in
support of an evacuation
from the Rio Grande
Valley.
Situational
Assessment
X
2. Test the means of
multi-agency
communications, utilized
in support of an
evacuation from the Rio
Grande Valley.
Operational
Communication
s
X
3. Evaluate the
integration of resources
in support of a valley
evacuation within all
regional, state and
federal entities in
accordance with
established protocols.
Operational
Coordination
X
6. Examine the ability of
the State of Texas to
evacuate people from an
area of impact to a safe
region by providing
Critical
Transportation
X
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Appendix J: State Operations Center
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
TDEM
J-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Core
Capability
Objective
Performed
without
Challenges
(P)
Performed
with Some
Challenges
(S)
Performed
with Major
Challenges
(M)
Unable to
be
Performed
(U)
transportation assets.
7. Move and deliver
resources to meet the
needs of evacuees,
including individuals with
access and functional
needs.
9. Coordinate and
mobilize governmental,
nongovernmental, and
private sector resources
within and outside of the
affected area.
10. Demonstrate ability
to provide medical
services in support of an
air-evacuation.
Mass Care
Services
X
Logistics and
Supply Chain
Management
X
Public Health,
Healthcare, and
Emergency
Medical
Services
X
Ratings Definitions:

See initial ratings description
Objective
1. Show the ability to receive and deliver information in a timely and
sufficient manner in order to inform decision makers regarding needed
actions in support of an evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Situational Assessment
Strengths
1. The Spot Report is a new, informal document produced to inform the
Council of weather conditions and actions taken. The agencies found this
information of great value to further their understanding of the situation and
enabled them to take appropriate actions.
2. Pertinent information sharing occurred among the agencies and regions to
ensure clear understanding of the present situation. The SOC shared
information during its daily “Weather Calls” with the impacted and sheltering
regions. During these calls, the weather service provided their forecast and
possible impact on the predicted landfall region.
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
3. State agencies readily shared information with partner agencies to
increase situational awareness and foster communication and coordination
capabilities.
4. The battle rhythm used during SOC activation served the Council well. It
incorporated floor reports specifically designed to achieve the highest level of
situational awareness among agencies represented during activation.
5. Information flow within the SOC, both vertically and horizontally, was
effective.
6. The flow of information across agencies and across disciplines was
effective and timely.
7. Situational maps, including inundation maps were a great resource. The
maps were user friendly, informational, and increased overall situational
awareness.
Areas for Improvement
1. Information that directly influences the transportation of resources into
the impact area did not reach the SOC, leading to a possible delay in the
deployment of needed assets.
Analysis: On June 8, as agencies in the SOC were busy processing
resource requests, the degree of situational awareness seemed to
decrease. The possible initiation of contraflow was mentioned in a
conference call early on. However the detail that contraflow was
actually started (simulated) was never communicated to the SOC.
With limited road access to the evacuation zone and resources
transports into the area, not being aware that roads are closed due to
contraflow could severely affect the ability to provide resources.
2. The Council did not have ready access to the SOC Clock.
Analysis: The SOC Clock, which is an important tool for the Council as
it counts down to H-0, did not work within the WebEOC, and it was not
displayed on the SOC floor or adjacent conference rooms. Council
members had to Google search to access it. While the clock should be
visible within WebEOC, it would be helpful for Council members to see
it clearly displayed on the SOC floor.
3. The SOC used limited mapping programs while more advanced programs
are available.
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Analysis: Several mapping programs are available through agencies
(National Weather Service (NWS), U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE)) represented in the SOC. However, the SOC is not using
these resources during an activation or exercise which will enhance
overall situational awareness.
4. TDEM Situation Reports did not define all aspects of a resource.
Analysis: Situation reports did not define if a resource was in transit
or assigned to a DDC or specific agency. At the state level, only the
number of missions completed is tracked, not the physical location of
the mission. The state relies on the DDC to know and report transit
status and its physical location. A new resource tracking system is
being developed, but including specific information in situation reports
will improve overall situational awareness.
Objective
2. Test the means of multi-agency communications, utilized in support of an
evacuation from the Rio Grande Valley.
Capability
Operational Communications
Strengths
1. While it has been many years since an actual hurricane has affected the
state, the Council effectively communicated the needs for resources in
response to possible cascading effects.
Areas for Improvement
1. There are no business rules to streamline communications between the Air
Operations Center (AOC) and the SOC.
Analysis: On June 8, the AOC and the SOC fully activated. Because
they are located at two separate sites, DPS Headquarters and Camp
Mabry, instant access to information at the AOC, such as when air
assets deployed, was not available, which resulted in a delay in
communications between the two centers. After the SOC Manager
requested a liaison from the AOC, the flow of communications between
the two centers was effective and timely. Establishing information
sharing business rules between the two centers is essential to ensure
streamlined communications.
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
2. Agencies need an alternative or secondary form of communications with
the buses to ensure continuous connectivity.
Analysis: The newly established Transportation Group within the
Human Services Branch executes bus contracts and monitors ground
transportation from the time of deployment to the time of
demobilization. The group has information and visibility of every bus in
the theater. It is able to communicate with every bus driver mainly
through cell service. Relying exclusively on functioning cell service to
communicate with the drivers was effective during the exercise but
could pose a problem during an actual event.
3. Communications broke down between the AOC and the SOC because of
acronym use.
Analysis: NIMS and ICS urge all agencies to use plain English to
communicate. However, the AOC sent emails with so many strings of
military acronyms unknown to the recipients that the subject and
intent of the emails were not clear. The use of clear messages in plain
English is essential when communicating information from one agency
to another.
4. The receiving airport in the Rio Grande Valley did not receive information
regarding departure and arrival times of planes returning evacuees.
Analysis: Following overnight sheltering, evacuees returned to the
airport by bus for the flight to the Valley. The plane departed from
DFW but the Harlingen Airport did not receive notification of the
approximate time of arrival.
5. Communications between the VOADs and the Human Services Branch in
the SOC was very slow.
Analysis: While the cause for the communications lag was not
immediately identified, the delay resulted in loss of situational
awareness. The cause needs to be determined.
6. Members of the Transportation Group voiced concern about the availability
of communications channels to track buses.
Analysis: There are no business rules in place for bus tracking.
7. STAR III needs improvements.
Analysis: With the rollout of STAR III, it was difficult for many
agencies to follow the progress of their resource request. Many STARs
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
generated by the SOC Transportation Group and DDCs “disappeared”
once submitted. The STAR submitter was unable to determine if any
actions resulted from their request and if so, how soon a resource
would stage or deploy.
Objective
3. Evaluate the integration of resources in support of a valley evacuation
within all regional, state and federal entities in accordance with established
protocols.
Capability
Operational Coordination
Strengths
1. Coordination between the SOC and the DDCs is well developed. Once the
SOC fully activates, a battle rhythm is established. The level of effort to
coordinate services and fill identified needs among state agencies
represented in the SOC during the exercise was commendable.
2. The SOC Council coordinated resource needs effectively and in a timely
manner.
3. Established task forces such as TX-TF-1 and the newly created
Transportation Group focused their actions on particular tasks or functions
and made coordination with partner agencies more efficient.
4. The SOC Council members are for the most part very experienced and
should be commended for their outstanding coordination with their partner
agencies, their outreach to local jurisdictions to supply needed resources;
and their coordination with FEMA Region VI and other federal agencies.
5. Members of the FEMA IMT present in the SOC made federal resources
more readily accessible.
6. Operations and planning sections coordinated well to accomplish the
mission.
7. The Transportation Group coordinated with contractors, local facilities, and
agencies such as TxDOT to ensure resources were in place to support buses
and drivers during evacuation and repopulation. Even though this is a new
group within the Human Services Branch, their coordination with other
agencies was efficient.
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Areas for Improvement
1. Coordination using WebEOC and STAR III was difficult at times.
Analysis: Council members did not have the needed training to utilize
all of the technology resources available to them on the SOC floor.
2. The SOC lacks business rules that clearly define coordination efforts.
Analysis: While it has been years since a hurricane threatened the
Texas coast, coordination and reporting on the progress of filling
resource requests was, for the most part, effective and timely. In
addition, workflow efficiency increased over the course of the exercise.
However, there is a need for a more clearly defined, formal
coordination process. Formalization of the resource request process,
especially for large ticket items, such as an IRAT or basecamp, need to
be developed or updated.
Objective
6. Examine the ability of the State of Texas to evacuate people from an area
of impact to a safe region by providing transportation assets.
Capability
Critical Transportation
Strengths
1. Proactive coordination with partner agencies placed resources in strategic
areas ahead of time reducing response time after the storm. The
Transportation Group and Texas Department of Transportation coordinated
with appropriate agencies regarding support for evacuation routes. Needed
resources were identified rapidly and teams dispatched for support. In order
to effectively monitor evacuation and make real-time adjustments, a
comprehensive traffic management plan would help agencies navigate
resources and manpower.
2. TMS will deploy a small team to the ARCC in San Antonio and a liaison will
deploy to the SOC Transportation Group to have eyes on the ground.
Areas for Improvement
1. There is no comprehensive traffic management plan.
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Analysis: To effectively monitor evacuation and make real-time
adjustments, a comprehensive traffic management plan would help
agencies navigate resources and manpower. A comprehensive traffic
management plan is under development.
2. Resource needs were entered into WebEOC utilizing STAR III, but many
agencies struggled to get all requests filled.
Analysis: STARs “disappeared” from the system on many occasions
forcing several agency representatives to re-enter them, which
increased the workload in an already busy environment. Agencies
need training on WebEOC and STAR III to work effectively and
efficiently.
3. The exercise revealed several bus-related issues that need to be resolved.
Analysis: The newly established Transportation Group worked well with
the contractors and partner agencies to route buses into the
evacuation area. Coordination with the ARCC and the Staging Area in
Edinburg seemed well thought out. However, the following issues
emerged that will require resolution to ensure buses get to their
destinations on time:
 Tracking individual buses was difficult at times with no dedicated
communications channel to track buses.
 There are no business rules established for tracking vehicles
 There are no SOPs for incoming and outgoing buses, for the
demobilization process, or for the release of buses upon mission
completion.
 The GPS system used for tracking buses is not always effective.
 Due to the loss of tracking ability, bus arrival was delayed which
could lead to fewer people evacuated. Vehicle tracking drills could
increase accuracy and timeliness.
 Addresses used for staging and destination areas were not always
accurate or were confusing.
 DDCs should know bus arrival and departure times.
 Transportation assets need secure roads to reach destinations.
Objective
7. Move and deliver resources to meet the needs of evacuees, including
individuals with access and functional needs.
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Capability
Mass Care Services
Strengths
1. Coordination among agencies within the Human Services Branch was
effective and timely.
2. The new organizational structure worked well.
Areas for Improvement
1. Communications with the American Red Cross chapters was slow and not
readily available in all areas.
Analysis: American Red Cross coordination with partner agencies to
support medical evacuation, embarkation hub support, and shelter
support went well. Needs were identified rapidly and the proper
notifications made. However, communications with ARC chapters
needs to improve to ensure full ARC support occurs.
2. VOADs cannot readily access secure areas of the Valley International
Airport. This created confusion in the SOC Human Resources Branch and led
to service delays.
Analysis: Airport food services fall under special rules due to strict TSA
security regulations. Under emergency conditions, evacuees do not
process through the regular airport terminals. They are usually
temporarily sheltered in large covered, utility facilities such as
hangers, which are not air-conditioned. Consequently, VOADs
provided water, food, and comfort items are essential for evacuee
sustainment. In order to provide services, volunteers and their
provisions need to clear security. To minimize delays, the VOADS, the
airport, and TSA need to coordinate services.
3. VOADs did not fully utilize their reach back and coordination capacity.
Analysis: VOAD staff identified feeding needs for evacuees at the
embarkation hub, the various airports, and the shelters. The VOADs
seemed to struggle with the allocation of resources, mainly the feeding
of evacuees at multiple venues. One report stated that food did not
arrive on time.
4. The Human Services Branch needs operational business rules.
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Analysis: The Human Services Branch implemented a new
organizational structure to streamline its effectiveness for the first
time. While the new organizational structure worked well, new
operational business rules will optimize performance.
5. The Human Services Branch did not readily receive information about the
numbers of evacuees who were on aircraft.
Analysis: Without knowing the numbers of evacuees on each flight, the
Human Services Branch was not able to inform VOADs. The VOADs
need these numbers to provide enough food and comfort items to the
expected evacuees. Without accurate data, the chances of providing
insufficient food and comfort items increases.
6. The American Red Cross did not have ETN access.
Analysis: While the TMD provided ETN services during the exercise,
the American Red Cross has its own ETN and WebEOC accounts.
Activating their accounts and practicing with them should provide the
needed access to ETN data.
Objective
9. Coordinate and mobilize governmental, nongovernmental, and private
sector resources within and outside of the affected area.
Capability
Logistics and Supply Chain Management
Strengths
1. Agencies were very knowledgeable regarding the resources needed during
a hurricane evacuation.
Areas for Improvement
1. Resource ordering needs to happen early due to the limited time to
deploy.
Analysis: To evacuate thousands of people from the impact area,
assets must deploy as soon as possible. It takes some time to deploy
resources, but time is very limited before weather conditions
deteriorate. The ordering of aircraft in support of an evacuation needs
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
to happen very early because of the time required to establish air
operations.
2. The SOC received too many single item or repetitive requests.
Analysis: From previous experience, grouping resource needs into
mission-ready packages is more cost effective and reduces deployment
time. For example, a mission-ready package for an embarkation hub
should include all of the essential items needed to set up the hub.
Providers should encourage requestors to create Mission-Ready
Packages (MRP) whenever possible.
3. There are no clear processes or business rules for the demobilization of
resources.
Analysis: There are adequate processes in place for ordering and
deploying resources. After the resource has completed its mission, it
should be demobilized, but clear processes are not in place to do so.
Objective
10. Demonstrate ability to provide medical services in support of an airevacuation.
Capability
Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services
Strengths
1. Staff activated current ambulance contracts in a timely and efficient
manner.
2. Trained staff was available at the local and state level to provide support.
3. Medical shelter contracts were appropriate and activation went well.
4. Texas Department of State Health Services representatives in the SOC
worked well with regional staff members. The coordination between the SOC
and the DSHS regions went well while identifying needs and sharing
resources. DSHS representatives provided management and coordination for
medical operations at various venues in an efficient manner.
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Areas for Improvement
1. Current ambulance contracts do not include the use of air ambulances,
which are needed to evacuate critically ill patients.
Analysis: During a hurricane evacuation, it will be necessary to
evacuate patients from hospitals and nursing homes as well as FNSS
citizens. The majority of medical patients will evacuate via ground
transport and ambulance contracts are in place to support that
requirement. However, the remaining high acuity patients will need
specialized air transport to evacuate. DSHS currently contracts with
the EMTF State Coordinating Office (SCO) on civilian air ambulances to
provide this capability for high acuity throughout Texas.
2. The state agencies need a list of specialized medical equipment to support
an evacuation along with the means to acquire it.
Analysis: There is a need for specialized medical equipment, such as
oxygen monitors, ECG machines and ventilators during a major
evacuation and sheltering operation. This equipment has different
transport needs. The Disaster Aeromedical Staging Facility (DASF), as
part of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), can provide
these assets, which are not currently available within the state.
However, the DASF cannot be requested or activated without the full
activation of the NDMS. Although the activation and deployment of
the DASF is fast, NDMS activation takes time, which an approaching
hurricane does not afford. Therefore, the SOC Manager requested the
development of a list of essential medical equipment needed during an
evacuation that contractors could provide. DSHS and TDEM will
further explore the availability of DASF resources to determine if those
resources could be made available on short notice without full
activation of NDMS. Texas DSHS Preparedness Coordinating Council’s
recommendation is not to support high acuity medical patient
evacuations on Texas military aircraft which would require this
equipment. Aeromedical evacuation using military aircraft should only
be for low to mid acuity patients. Any high acuity patients needing
advanced air worthy equipment will be transported via civilian air
ambulance.
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Objective
Various
Capability
Planning
Strengths
1. The newly revised H-120 timeline and the Hurricane Playbook seem to
reflect all aspects of the pre-landfall/pre-disaster response.
2. TX-TF-1 position manuals worked very well.
3. Agency SitReps were good and forwarded to the Situation Unit Leader
(STL) in a timely manner.
Areas for Improvement
1. Agencies need procedures to be able to sharply compress the H-120
timeline and still accomplish necessary tasks.
Analysis: The recently revised H-120 timeline is a solid baseline
describing all of the tasks that need accomplishing before ground and
air movement halts due to deteriorating weather conditions. However,
agencies realize that actual lead-time greatly diminishes in most
cases. The average time the state will have is 83.4 hours with an
approaching hurricane and only 48.7 hours for a tropical storm.
2. Asset deployment to the Valley is slow.
Analysis: TX-TF1 reported that basecamps work well; however, the
state needs to be able to bring assets to the Valley faster. H-48 is too
late. The state needs to look at possibly pre-staging or housing
resources closer to the coast for deployment.
3. The reporting process was duplicative which increased work and increased
the chances for error.
Analysis: Reporting and documenting is essential before and during
disaster response. Evaluators observed duplication of effort during the
exercise. Streamlining the reporting process and eliminating
duplication would make the process more efficient. More concise
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
reporting also increases accuracy. One exercise example is patient
movement numbers varied greatly because of multiple reports.
There is no standardized format for recording information, which
makes it difficult to find specific information or ensure accuracy. In
addition, because reports are not standard, agencies and branches are
not able to readily share files, which could make information sharing
easier and more efficient. Further, business rules do not include a
naming convention for shared documents, making identification
difficult at times. Standardized reports and business rules for their
creation, dissemination, and sharing will improve the reporting
process.
4. Several agencies use advanced technology that the SOC is not utilizing
and which could increase situational awareness and boost efficiency.
Analysis: Several agencies in the SOC use internal technology
applications that would be able to provide greater situational
awareness to the entire Council. Inundation maps from the United
States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) or satellite imaging from the
NWS is two examples. These agencies would like to share these tools
with the SOC. Additionally real-time video feeds would allow the
Council to observe what is actually happening on the ground. For the
most part, the SOC Council is far removed from disaster-impacted
areas whether it is a hurricane making landfall in Brownsville or a
tornado outbreak in Dallas. Technology is able to fill this gap.
5. SOC Council members need more training opportunities and better
position guidance.
Analysis: SOC staffing before and during disaster events is difficult
because daily routine tasks still need to be completed. Having a
consistent staff in the SOC is even more difficult once the SOC is
working a 24-hour schedule over an extended time. While some
agencies have multiple trained staff members who know how to work
in the SOC, other agencies have only one or two persons available.
SOC staff training varies greatly and training during disaster activation
is not optimal. Additional training opportunities during the year may
help.
Some Council members mentioned that it would be helpful to have
business rules or SOPs that address “Who calls who”. There is a need
to develop better position guidance that addresses such questions.
6. The Transportation Group does not have a traffic management plan or
business rules to guide them.
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Analysis: The new Transportation Group’s mission is to deal with all
aspects of transport during an evacuation. The staff is very
knowledgeable but has no business rules to guide them. An actual
traffic management plan would aid staffers in the future to implement
their tasking even if core staff is not available.
7. DDC reports to the SOC were often late.
Analysis: Several Council members mentioned the DDCs seemed to
have difficulty getting organized. The DDCs are not active on a regular
basis and disaster response is only a small part of their responsibility.
Most DDCs do not have standard operating guides. Standard operating
guides could facilitate DDC organization and reporting procedures and
timelines.
8. There are no guidelines for media on the SOC floor that guide what can be
filmed or whether reporters need to be escorted or not.
Analysis: The SOC Council floor is normally off limits to the news
media. However, on occasion, some photographers and reporters get
permission to access the room. While Council members try to
safeguard sensitive information at all times, it becomes more difficult
when the media takes pictures or films. There is a need for guidelines
addressing those situations when media enters onto the SOC Council
floor.
9. SOC agencies and branches were not able to share computer data files
readily.
Analysis: The ability to share computer data files enhances
collaboration and information sharing. A new shared-drive is in
development. Once active, this drive should allow agencies and
branches to share files.
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
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Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
State Operations Center Improvement Plan
This improvement plan was developed for the State Operations Center during the 2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane
Evacuation Exercise June 2-9, 2016
Note: Capability Elements are planning (P), organization (O), equipment (E), training (T), or exercise (Ex).
Capability
Situational
Assessment
Area for
Improvement (AFI)
1. Information that
directly influenced the
transportation of
resources into the
impact area was not
shared with the SOC.
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
T
TDEM SMT
Rhonda
Lawson
06/01/2016
Ongoing
E
TDEM
Jeff Newbold
07/01/2016
06/01/2017
P, T
TDEM CIS
Mike Ouimet
06/15/2016
Ongoing as
technology
evolves
1. Reinforce to DDCs
and all agencies, the
necessity to sustain
situational awareness
through accurate and
frequent updates
1. Locate the SOC
Clock on the SOC
floor if feasible
Situational
Assessment
Situational
Assessment
2. The Council did not
have ready access to
the SOC Clock
3. Available mapping
programs were not
used.
2. If not feasible,
determine how to
make it visible within
WebEOC
1. Discuss which map
programs provide
greatest utility and
determine how to
integrate them into
SOC operations
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Situational
Assessment
Area for
Improvement (AFI)
4. TDEM Situation
Reports did not define
all aspects of a
resource.
1. There are no
business rules to
streamline
communications
between the Air
Operations Center
(AOC) and the SOC.
2. Asset deployment
to the Valley is slow.
Operational
Communications
3. An alternative or
secondary form of
communications with
buses is needed to
ensure continuous
connectivity.
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
1. Encourage DDCs to
include resource
location and in/outof-service information
in Situation Reports
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
TDEM SMT
Darrick
Hesson
06/01/2016
Ongoing
P, T
2. Continue with
efforts to develop
resource-tracking
software.
P
1. Develop
information sharing
business rules for the
AOC and SOC
P
TDEM, TMD
TDEM, TMD
06/15/2016
Ongoing
1. The state needs to
look at possibly prestaging or housing
resources closer to
the coast for
deployment.
P
TDEM, TMD,
TxDOT, TX-TF1
TDEM
06/15/2016
Ongoing
1. Review technology
options which may
provide a cost
effective method of
alternate
communications
P
TDEM
Jeff Newbold
06/15/2016
Ongoing
2. Test selected
alternatives
E
3. Purchase or
contract for selected
choice(s)
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Operational
Coordination
Area for
Improvement (AFI)
4. Communications
broke down between
the AOC and the SOC
because of acronym
use.
Operational
Coordination
5. The departure and
arrival times of planes
were not clearly
communicated to the
receiving airport.
Operational
Coordination
6. Communications
between the VOADs
and the Human
Services Branch in
the SOC was very
slow.
Operational
Coordination
7. Members of the
Transportation Group
voiced concern about
the availability of
communications
channels to track
buses.
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
1. As part of
information sharing
business rules in
Operational
Communications AFI
#2 above, include
requirement for plain
language use
P
All
TMD
06/15/2016
Ongoing
T
TDEM, DDCs,
SMT
Darrick
Hesson
06/01/2016
Ongoing
TDEM
Larry Shine
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
TDEM
Jeff Newbold,
Orlando
Hernandez
07/01/2016
05/30/2017
1. Reinforce with all
DDCs and
participating agencies
the need to share
information
1. Determine cause of
communications lag.
P
2. Initiate appropriate
solution once cause is
determined.
1. Develop business
rules for bus tracking
2. Incorporate rules
for any technical
solutions from
Operational
Communications AFI
#3 above
P
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Area for
Improvement (AFI)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
1. Determine if cause
is user training or a
system issue
Operational
Coordination
8. STAR III needs
improvements.
Operational
Coordination
Critical
Transportation
2. There was a lack of
business rules in the
SOC that clearly
defined coordination
efforts.
1. There is no
comprehensive traffic
management plan.
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
TDEM
Jeff Newbold
07/01/2016
06/01/2017
TDEM
Jeff Newbold
07/01/2016
06/01/2017
P
2. If a training issue,
arrange and schedule
necessary training
T
3. If a system issue,
initiate action to
resolve
1. Coordination using
WebEOC and STAR III
was difficult at times.
Responsible
Organization
E
1. Determine best
way to provide
needed systems
training
T
1. Develop a formal
coordination process
for SOC participants
2. Validate process
during the next
exercise
TDEM has documents completed. Evaluator may not have been aware of all
documents being used in the SOC.
1. The Texas DPS
Highway Patrol has a
current
comprehensive traffic
management plan,
that is reviewed and
updated
P
TDEM
Appendix J: State Operations Center
Orlando
Hernandez
06/10/2016
09/30/2016
TDEM
J-20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Area for
Improvement (AFI)
2. Resource needs
were entered into
WebEOC utilizing
STAR III, but many
agencies struggled to
get all requests filled
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
1. Provide training on
WebEOC
T
TDEM
Jeff Newbold
06/10/2016
Ongoing
3. The exercise
revealed several busrelated issues that
need to be resolved
1. Communications
with the Red Cross
chapters was slow
and not readily
available in all areas.
Mass Care
Services
2. VOADs cannot
readily access secure
areas of the airport.
3. VOADs did not fully
utilize their reach
back and coordination
capacity.
4. The Human
Services Branch
needs operational
business rules.
Finding was not specific enough to form concrete solution.
1. Determine causes
for communications
lags.
P
ARC
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
1. See Operational
Coordination AFI #3
P
ARC, TDEM
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
1. Identify
breakdowns and
initiate actions to
resolve
P
VOADs
Alvin Migues
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
1. Develop
operational business
rules.
P
Human
Services
Branch
Gisela RyanBunger
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
2. Initiate solution as
appropriate
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Area for
Improvement (AFI)
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
5. The Human
Services Branch did
not readily receive
information about the
numbers of evacuees
who were on aircraft.
1. During the exercise
a manifest was
provided to the
Transportation group,
which in turn updated
the SOC Manager and
Human Branch of the
number of evacuees
on the airplane
P
Human
Services
Branch
Orlando
Hernandez
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
ARC
Jessica
Debalski
01/10/2017
12/31/2017
1. Activate existing
ETN accounts
6. The ARC did not
have ETN access.
1. Resources need to
be ordered earlier
due to limited time
frames to deploy
them.
Logistics and
Supply Chain
Management
P
2. Train on ETN
system
T
1. Reinforce
requirement to order
critical resources
early
T
TDEM SMT
Wade Parks
06/01/2016
Ongoing
2. The SOC received
too many single item
or repetitive requests.
1. Emphasize
grouping
requirements into
mission ready
packages
T
TDEM SMT
Wade Parks
06/01/2016
Ongoing
3. There are no clear
processes or business
rules for the
demobilization of
resources.
1. Develop
procedures for
resource mobilization.
P
TDEM SMT
Darrick
Hesson
06/01/16
12/31/2016
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Public Health,
Healthcare, and
Emergency
Medical Services
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Area for
Improvement (AFI)
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
1. Current ambulance
contracts do not
include the use of air
ambulances, which
are needed to
evacuate critically ill
patients.
1. Contract with EMTF
SCO is already in
place to provide
tracking system.
P
DSHS
Barbara
Adams
06/10/2016
09/28/2016
P
TDEM SMT,
DSHS
Barbara
Adams
06/10/2016
07/30/2017
P
TDEM SMT,
DSHS
Darrick
Hesson
07/01/2016
12/31/2017
2. A list of specialized
medical equipment to
support an evacuation
is needed along with
the means to acquire
it.
1. As part of the
TDMS Evacuation
Working Group,
conduct a cost-benefit
analysis to determine
if the State should
procure this
equipment
2. Determine if
contracting or DASF
or a combination of
both can provide the
items on the list
Planning
1. Agency procedures
to sharply compress
the H-120 timeline
are needed to
accomplish necessary
tasks.
1. Initiate planning to
determine ways to
shorten evacuation
response times
P
TDEM
Plans Section
06/30/2016
12/31/2017
Planning
2. The reporting
process was
duplicative which
increased work and
increased the chances
for error.
1. Examine existing
reports and rules for
report generation and
dissemination
P
TDEM SMT
Darrick
Hesson
07/01/2016
12/31/2017
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Area for
Improvement (AFI)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
P, E
TDEM
Jeff Newbold
07/01/2016
Ongoing
TDEM
Preparedness
and SMT
Chuck
Phinney,
Rhonda
Lawson
07/01/2016
Ongoing as
staff
changes
TDEM Life
Safety and
SMT
Orlando
Hernandez
06/01/2016
06/01/2017
2. Where feasible use
standardized reports
and rules to
streamline report
creation and
dissemination
Planning
3. Many agencies use
advanced technology
that could be used in
the SOC to increase
situational awareness
and boost efficiency.
1. Review technology
needs and determine
what additional
technology will
enhance SOC
situational awareness
and operational
coordination
2. See Situational
Assessment AFI #3
Planning
Planning
4. SOC Council
members need more
training opportunities
and better position
guidance.
5. The Transportation
Group does not have
a traffic management
plan or business rules
to guide them.
1. Determine best
method and timing of
delivering SOC
position training
T
2. Review and update
existing position
guidance to include
basic business rules
P
1. Develop a traffic
management plan
and business rules
P
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Capability
Planning
Planning
Area for
Improvement (AFI)
6. DDC reports to the
SOC were often late.
7. There are no
guidelines for media
on the SOC floor that
guide what can be
filmed or whether
reporters need to be
escorted or not.
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
Capability
Element
1. Determine the
need for standard
operating guides for
DDCs as a way to
improve their
efficiency
2. Develop guides as
appropriate and
validate during the
next available
exercise
Responsible
Organization
Organization
POC
Start Date
Completion
Date
TDEM SMT
Darrick
Hesson
01/01/2017
06/01/2017
TDEM SMT and
Chief of Staff
Office
Darrick
Hesson
06/01/2016
06/01/2017
P
P, E
1. Develop guidelines
for media interaction
on the SOC floor
P
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix J: State Operations Center
TDEM
J-26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
APPENDIX K: TEXAS ETN AND TECHNICAL ISSUES
This appendix briefly summarizes the findings of the new Emergency Tracking
Network (ETN) and related technology issues. Statements and comments came
from CIS staff and exercise participants alike. The goal of the beta test was to try
out the new ETN software, which is available for download onto smartphones.
Permitted access to users insures data security and integrity. This, being the first
test, provided solid information regarding the capabilities and user-friendliness of
the new system.
Overall, the test of the ETN was successful. CIS staff was able to monitor the ETN in
the SOC without any difficulty. While the training users will be one of the most
important aspects in the future deployment of the ETN system, a technical support
system will ensure proper functionality. During the exercise, the technology staff
received more than 300 calls for assistance, most involved issues regarding
unfamiliarity with the equipment.
The startup was expectedly slow; because most players had just finished their
training, (250 users received training as part of this exercise).
While the ETN has tremendous capabilities, it still relies on the interaction with
outside systems. This became clear when an AT&T tower became overloaded and
CIS staff did not have the visibility it needed.
Most reported issues seem to fall into the following categories:
 Software
 Procedures
 Materials, and
 User Knowledge and Training
Several issues may seem to fit into more than one category and the CIS staff is
working to determine the best way to improve resolve any problems. At the
publication of this report, several issues are already resolved.
ETN Beta Test Findings
Software
 ETN scanning initially failed because of incorrect or outdated software.
Once the scanning application on the phones updated, the scanning
worked.
 Users were unable to save entered data.
 Difficulty to print manifests of departing and arriving evacuees.
 Evacuee data manually entered into the ETN database caused delays.
 Users were unable to track ambulances.
 Once data was entered into the Lonestar Server, visibility seems to be
lost.
Appendix K: Texas ETN and Technical Issues
TDEM
K-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)




2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Users reported differing numbers of processed evacuees. Not having
accurate numbers makes it difficult for shelters to prepare.
DDCs did not seem able to track buses.
After locations were entered manually, the system seemed to drop them.
Tracking individuals was not possible when an evacuee moved from one
DDC to the next.
Procedures
 Only a very limited number of users can change data within ETN.
 Amount of patient data allowed in ETN must be determined.
 There are no FNSS accommodations within ETN.
 Some locations had two names. For example, San Benito High School also
lists as embarkation hub.
 Several evacuees were told they could not return if they lost the
armband. This caused anxiety, even in the exercise.
 Placement of the bands on right and left wrists caused confusion and
slowed scanning at times.
 The actual position of the armband made a difference. A marking on the
band, indicating the correct direction would make it easier to read the
barcode.
 Results of scanning wristbands with smart phones were inconsistent.
Materials
 ETN wristband fasteners were difficult to use, hard to close and lock into
place. It took as long as three minutes to affix each band due to the twobutton closure design.
 While some bands were loose and wearers could slip them over their
wrist, others restricted proper blood flow.
User Issues and Training
 Users often needed assistance and technical guidance.
 Data from the scans automatically entered into the ETN database.
However, staffers were not able to generate passenger manifests for the
shelter from ETN. It is unclear if this was due to unfamiliarity with the
system.
 ETN end-users performed better after personalized assistance that
connected trainees with appropriate applications.
 Some users do not have WebEOC access, which made the provided
training difficult.
 Hospitals and other agencies needed more time for training.
Appendix K: Texas ETN and Technical Issues
TDEM
K-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Technology-Related Findings
STAR III and WebEOC Observations
It was difficult to route a STAR to a specific agency. Users seemed confused about
the process of using the STAR format and mentioned repeatedly the need for
training following the release of a new version.
Users at the local, regional, and state level seemed unfamiliar with the new
versions of WebEOC and STAR III. Resource ordering uses WebEOC and STAR III.
Orders entered into the system “disappeared” from view and consequently entered
more than once.
The high number of STARs generated in this exercise displayed over 15 pages
within WebEOC. While the number of requests was very real, it makes navigation
and finding certain STARs very difficult. This difficulty increased when a user
opened a STAR (For example on page 5) and closed it. Instead of returning to page
five, the STAR defaults to page one every time. Additionally, if the STAR from the
example recorded an action, it shifted position in the line-up, making it very difficult
for the user to find it again.
It would be helpful if STARs could be visually marked when designated for EMAC
and FEMA requests.
The STAR does not let the requester verify that an asset has actually been
resourced.
A DEMOB tab would allow users to identify the status of an asset that is no longer
in service so it is ready for re-allocated in another area as needed.
Using some of the filters in the STAR seemed to shut down certain functions.
Financial reporting software does not have the capability to capture daily burn rate
and cost reporting.
Several agencies in the SOC mentioned the need for an interface for multi-agency
standard forms.
There is a need to display flood and inundation plains. The USACE is not able to
display certain models and neither is the weather service. Model hydraulics and
search mapping capabilities are available but not utilized even though agencies
could present these in the SOC.
Appendix K: Texas ETN and Technical Issues
TDEM
K-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
TDEM Technology Improvement Plan
This improvement plan was developed for TDEM Critical Information Systems to
resolve technology issues during the 2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane Evacuation
Exercise June 2-9, 2016
Corrective Action
Responsible
Organization
Start Date
Completion
Date
TDEM CIS
06/15/2016
09/21/2016
1. Remove "Group Add" from
Navbar.
2. Location Details and Guest
Details links do not work.
3. Not checking "Pet Friendly"
checkbox on Locations page
does not put "No" on display.
4. Added Jolly Footer refresh
script to all display pages.
5. Add Search/Filter styles to
People List.
ETN WebEOC
6. Add a "Welcome Page".
7. Vehicle Counts are not
working on "Vehicle Page".
8. Vehicle Placard prompts with
WebEOC error.
9. Requesting a way to "filter"
closed shelters on "Location
Page".
10. Edit Guest button not
functional.
11. Edit Viewlnks that do not
work Locations List/Details/
Transfer and Locations List/
Details/(click on guest name)
/Move To
Appendix K: Texas ETN and Technical Issues
TDEM
K-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
Responsible
Organization
Start Date
Completion
Date
TDEM CIS
06/15/2016
09/21/2016
TDEM CIS
06/15/2016
09/21/2016
TDEM CIS
06/15/2016
Issue has
been
addressed
TDEM CIS
06/15/2016
09/21/2016
TDEM CIS
06/15/2016
09/21/2016
12. Requesting to sort in a
location by name.
13. Assets/Pets columns are
blank on "People List Page".
ETN WebEOC
14. Locations list need totals for
availability, headcount, banded,
capacity and a total that allow
pets on the column headers
15. Requesting an API project
for batch scanning and batch
import, which will be available
in WebEOC.
ETN Mobile
App Login
Page
Add People
Page
1. End-user would get kicked
out when trying to select an
incident.
2. Regarding the scanning key
process, the "scanning key"
status updated WebEOC all the
time.
1. When adding people to a
location or vehicle, the "select
location vehicle" field was not
passing to WebEOC, thus
causing "relationship" issues
between the "Location" and
"People" tables.
1. Removed parentheses if
"City" field is empty, in the
"location" dropdown list.
Group Scan to
Location Page
Search Page
2. End-users were receiving
"Service is down...", or
"WebEOC has encountered an
issue..." messages when trying
to scan people to a location.
1. No warning messages are
prompted to end-user when
searching a UPC.
Appendix K: Texas ETN and Technical Issues
TDEM
K-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action
Responsible
Organization
Start Date
Completion
Date
TDEM CIS
06/15/2016
09/21/2016
TDEM CIS
06/15/2016
09/21/2016
TDEM CIS
06/15/2016
09/21/2016
1. Issue with acquiring and
updating the "scanning key"
status in WebEOC.
2. Issue with comparing
"device" date and time, versus
the "expiration" date and time
from WebEOC.
Settings Page
3. The need of having two
different "bundle ids" for
applying different "scanning
keys", as well as for deploying
ETN app via Apple Store,
DeployGate and Airwatch.
4. Scanning keys needed to be
"approved" several times (from
WebEOC), in order to apply
scanning key.
Vehicle and
Location
Roster Pages
1. When people, assets, and
pets were scanned to from a
location to a vehicle (or vice
versa), scanned people, assets
and/or pets were showing in
both places.
2. Unable to print rosters from
iPad.
1. Provide chargers for
individual devices in addition to
the block charger.
2. Provide a more detailed hand
receipt.
3. Install scan keys on devices
before they deploy.
ETN
Equipment
4. Insure devices have the
proper version of the ETN app
before deployment.
5. Band Closure Issues, we ran
out of band closures. We have
found another band closure and
have enough for the bands
being deployed.
6. Update iOS and Airwatch to
ensure real time tracking of the
device for security.
Appendix K: Texas ETN and Technical Issues
TDEM
K-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
APPENDIX L: CITY OF FORT WORTH BYOE AAR/IP
AFTER ACTION REPORT
2016 RIO GRANDE VALLEY
HURRICANE EVACUATION SHELTER EXERCISE
JUNE 8 – 9, 2016
Jurisdiction Requesting Exercise Credit City of Fort Worth
EMPG Funded Yes
Name of Person Submitting Keith Wells
Position Senior Emergency Management Officer
Address 1000 Throckmorton
Office Phone 817-392-6177
Office Fax 817-392-6180
E-mail Address [email protected]
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Executive Summary
Overview
The 2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Exercise was a full-scale
hurricane evacuation and shelter exercise. Volunteer role players were flown by the
state from the Rio Grande Valley to DFW Airport where Fort Worth Transportation
busses transported them to the Worth Heights Community Center Shelter. They
spent the night in the shelter and were flown back to the Valley the following day.
Shelter operations included providing an evening meal and breakfast.
Major Strengths Demonstrated
City, county, state, and external partner agencies worked well together to plan and
conduct the exercise. Everyone recognized that this was an opportunity to practice
shelter operations in as close to real circumstances as possible.
Areas for Improvement
More detailed planning for shelter operations needs to occur. There has been
significant staff turnover since the last time the City opened shelters in 2008 for
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. We need to conduct more shelter exercises, including
actually setting up a shelter at least once per year. A number of issues were noted;
most related to facility occupancy capacity, cots, food, and shower facilities.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Exercise Overview
1.
2.
3.
4.
Exercise Name
Exercise Date(s)
Exercise Type
Exercise Scenario
4a
Lead Agency
5. Exercise Location(s)
2016 Rio Grande Valley Hurricane Evacuation Exercise
June 8 – 9, 2016
Full Scale
Hurricane Sheltering
City of Fort Worth, Texas Division of Emergency
Management
Worth Heights Community Center, DFW Airport, Fort
Worth Joint Emergency Operations Center
6. Participants
Jurisdiction
City of Fort Worth
Fort Worth
Transportation Authority
MedStar Ambulance
Authority
North Central Texas
Regional Trauma
Advisory Council
Red Cross
Salvation Army
Tarrant County
Agency
City Manager’s Office
City Marshal’s Office
Code Compliance
Economic Development
Financial Management
Services
Fire Department
Mayor & City Council
Office
Neighborhood Services
Office of Emergency
Management
Park & Recreation
Police Department
Property Management
Water Department
Office of Emergency
Management
Precinct 4
EOP
Partner
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
# of
Participants
1
1
1
1
Yes
Yes
1
2
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1
9
Yes
5
Yes
3
Yes
Yes
2
3
1
Yes
Texas A&M Engineering
Extension Service
6
4
3
2
1
2
1
1
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Texas Army National
Guard
Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality
Texas Department of
Aging and Disability
Services
Texas Department of
Public Safety
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
1
3
Highway Patrol
Division of Emergency
Management
Yes
1
3
Yes
3
Texas Department of
State Health Services
Texas Department of
Transportation
Texas Forest Service
Texas State Guard
Total Participants
2
3
5
4
69
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Exercise Objectives
1. Demonstrate the ability to establish staff, equip, operate, and demobilize an
emergency shelter to house a population of approximately 100 people.
2. Provide for safety of evacuees, staff, and responders.
3. Demonstrate the ability to transport evacuees from their point of entry (DFW
Airport) to the shelter location and back in a safe and timely manner.
4. Demonstrate the ability to register and track evacuees.
5. Demonstrate the ability to work with county, state, and other entities to
ensure evacuee needs are met.
6. Maintain situational awareness and communications during the exercise.
7. Document costs incurred and any after action review activity.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Exercise Scenario Events
Hurricane Tejas has developed in the eastern Caribbean with sustained winds of
160 mph and is expected to make landfall in Texas on June 10th.
North Central Texas municipalities have been contacted for possible sheltering of
evacuees.
The City of Fort Worth has identified Worth Heights Community Center as a shelter
location that can hold approximately 100 evacuees. The shelter will be equipped,
staffed, and open on June 8th at approximately 1500 CDT.
On June 8th, the Worth Heights Shelter opened and prepared to receive up to 100
evacuees. The State of Texas evacuated people from the lower Rio Grande River
Valley by air to DFW Airport. The City of Fort Worth coordinated with the Fort
Worth Transportation Authority (The T) to provide transportation by bus from DFW
Airport to the Worth Heights Community Center Shelter.
On June 9th, the evacuees were transported by T busses back to DFW Airport and
then flown back to their homes.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Exercise Objective Analysis
Core Capability
Critical Transportation - Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and
accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the
evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel,
equipment, and services into the affected areas.
Objectives within the Capability
3.
Demonstrate the ability to transport evacuees from their point of entry (DFW
Airport) to the shelter location and back in a safe and timely manner.
Observations & Discussion
The Fort Worth Transportation Authority (The T) did an excellent job of providing
bus transport from DFW Airport to the Worth Heights Shelter and back to the
airport.
The flights did not adhere to schedule. This resulted in staff and bus services being
tied up longer than expected.
Some evacuees indicated that they would like to have a snack as they deplane and
again as they board the plane to return home.
A medical situation developed on the plane while it was en route to DFW.
Recommendations
Develop a system to provide information regarding flights to include accurate status
about the flight at the departure point (boarding status, accurate ETD, accurate
ETA, etc.)
A stand-by ambulance should be provided at the airport to support any medical
situations that develop in-flight.
Snacks should be available for evacuees as they exit the aircraft and again as they
board the aircraft for their return flight.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Core Capability
Mass Care Services - Provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with
a focus on hydration, feeding, and sheltering to those who have the most need, as
well as support for reunifying families.
Objectives within the Capability
1.
Demonstrate the ability to establish, staff, equip, operate, and demobilize an
emergency shelter to house a population of approximately 100 people.
2.
Provide for safety of evacuees, staff, and responders.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to transport evacuees from their point of entry (DFW
Airport) to the shelter location and back in a safe and timely manner.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to register and track evacuees.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to work with county, state, and other entities to
ensure evacuee needs are met.
6.
Maintain situational awareness and communications during the exercise.
7.
Document costs incurred and any after action review activity.
Observations & Discussion
Mass Care operations went well considering that the City has not operated a shelter
for eight years and we have had significant staff turnover during that time. City
staff performed extremely well. As expected, a number of issues were identified
including shelter capacity, condition of shelter supplies, and quality of food.
City, county, state, and partner agency staff worked well together. Working in a
Joint Emergency Operations Center (JEOC) and having experience working together
frequently for special events has resulted in an effective organization with excellent
relationships.
Recommendations
Shelter Set-Up
1.
For City shelters, it will be useful to have a shelter room layout for set-up.
The layout needs to follow ADA and FNSS rules for sheltering. City staff
needs training on ADA and FNSS requirements.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
2.
This shelter could comfortably accommodate 60 cots, although approximately
90 were set up for the exercise. It was unclear if this arrangement of cots
satisfied Red Cross “personal space” guidelines. There was not a clear
consensus among City personnel on what this standard actually recommends
(opinions ranged from 20 – 50 square feet).
3.
Heavy-duty cots were more popular and looked better, while the “regular”
cots were too low to the ground to be used by the elderly and people with
limited mobility.
•
Recommend providing heavy-duty cots after initial set-up, and only for
guests with “physical limitations”.
•
Signage should be posted to indicate the availability of heavy-duty
cots upon request.
•
The heavy-duty cots are 6”-8” longer and wider, and consequently
may require more floor space.
4.
Many new pads are needed for cots:
•
Are there ways to store the pads so that they do not rip and become
rodent-infested?
•
Can we provide single-use covers for the pads at the shelter?
5.
Of the two infant cribs provided, only one was in working condition. It is
unknown if there are more cribs currently stored at Bob Bolen Public Safety
Center.
6.
An inventory of all shelter equipment is needed to fully evaluate current
readiness.
7.
We need to look at how to secure and store luggage in separate room from
the sleeping quarters.
8.
It took about three hours to set up the shelter at Worth Heights.
Health/Safety
1.
There is a need for expanded shower facilities. Some possible solutions
include:
•
Renting portable showers from private vendors, which could range
from around $400 per day for a single stall unit, up to around $4,500
per day for a full-length multiple-stall trailer. Portable showers would
also require daily servicing.
•
Renting portable showers from the State Guard, if any such units
exist.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
•
•
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Constructing our own portable shower facility, using the shipping
container currently used by Neighborhood Services for shelter storage.
Transporting guests to nearby school with locker room shower
facilities.
2.
The contents of most hygiene kits provided to guests had spoiled/expired.
Adequate storage will help alleviate some of these problems: Instead of
storing the kits in an uninsulated shipping container, they will now be stored
indoors at Bob Bolen Public Safety Center.
3.
There were food complaints and there was not provision for those with
special diets and medical needs.
4.
In conjunction with Salvation Army, snacks should be provided for guests as
they exit or enter the airplane.
5.
A stand-by ambulance should be provided at the airport to support any inflight medical situations upon arrival.
6.
There is concern about the impact of new “open carry” laws with respect to
guests possessing firearms. Many questions remain unanswered, including:
•
What can (or cannot) be asked of the owner?
•
Whether the shelter can store firearms upon request, and if so, what
procedures should be used?
•
Which personnel should handle this issue? Some City staff expressed
that they are not comfortable around firearms.
Communications
1.
Investigate if a Nixle message can be sent to guests only, using contact
information from ETN.
2.
There were not good phone numbers established for communication
among personnel.
3.
Internet/WI-FI café set up was successful.
4.
We need to purchase more universal chargers for cell phones.
5.
There are concerns about the privacy of guests with respect to posts on
social media. Signage may be required to request guests to refrain from
such activity in certain parts of the shelter.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Core Capability
Operational Coordination EOC - Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated
operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical
stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
Objectives within the Capability
4.
4. Demonstrate the ability to register and track evacuees.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to work with county, state, and other entities to
ensure evacuee needs are met.
6.
Maintain situational awareness and communications during the exercise.
7.
Document costs incurred and any after action review activity.
Observations & Discussion
There was only one comment received from the JEOC. While this could indicate
that everything went perfectly at the JEOC, it is more likely that JEOC staff needs to
be encouraged to document issues on the WebEOC AAR Board.
Recommendations
It was noted that “there were not good numbers established for communication
with personnel. An ICS 205A Communications List was developed, so it may be
that someone was not aware that an IAP was available (the night shift developed a
“cheat sheet” entitled “Overnight POC List”, that was very useful). Recommend
that ensuring awareness of the IAP be added to the EOC Manager’s guidelines.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Conclusions
The exercise was successful in providing an opportunity to operate a shelter under
very realistic conditions. A number of areas for improvement were identified and
are listed along with recommended solutions in this report. The City needs to
conduct more detailed planning and more carefully document those plans to
mitigate the effects of staff turnover.
All local, state, and external partner agencies worked well together. Everyone was
focused on meeting the needs of the evacuees. The value of having a Joint EOC
was validated once again. Interagency coordination was effective and having
everyone in the same room at the JEOC streamlined the acquisition and deployment
of resources.
Staff at the shelter provided excellent care for the evacuees. Although the exercise
was a major disruption of normal activities at the community center, staff accepted
the challenge and performed their duties with a very positive attitude.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Acronyms Page
Acronym or
Abbreviation
AAR
ADA
CDT
DFW
DPS
DSHS
EOC
ETA
ETD
ETN
FNSS
FWFD
FWPD
IAP
JEOC
OEM
P&R
TDEM
TXDOT
Definition or Term
After Action Report
American’s with Disabilities Act
Central Daylight Savings Time
Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport
Texas Department of Public Safety
Texas Department of State Health services
Emergency Operations Center
Estimated Time of Arrival
Estimated Time of Departure
Emergency Tracking Network
Functional Needs Support Services
City of Fort Worth Fire Department
City of Fort Worth Police Department
Incident Action Plan
Joint Emergency Operations Center
City of Fort Worth Office of Emergency Management
City of Fort Worth Park and Recreation Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Department of Transportation
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Page intentionally left blank
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Corrective Action/Improvement Plan
Objective
Improvement/
Corrective Action
Recommendation
Responsible
Party/Agency
Projected
Completion
Date
3. Demonstrate the
ability to transport
evacuees from their
point of entry (DFW
Airport) to the shelter
location and back in a
safe and timely
manner.
3. Demonstrate the
ability to transport
evacuees from their
point of entry (DFW
Airport) to the shelter
location and back in a
safe and timely
manner.
Develop a system to provide
information regarding flights to
include accurate status about the
flight at the departure point
(boarding status, accurate ETD,
accurate ETA, etc.).
Develop system to
provide accurate flight
status to local
government response
agencies.
OEM in conjunction
with TDEM.
12/31/16
A stand-by ambulance should be
provided at the airport to support
any medical situations that develop
in-flight.
Establish procedure for
an ambulance to meet
incoming aircraft.
Alternatively, ask the
state to have the aircraft
request an ambulance if
necessary in order to
conserve local
government resources.
OEM
09/01/16
3. Demonstrate the
ability to transport
evacuees from their
point of entry (DFW
Airport) to the shelter
location and back in a
safe and timely
manner.
Snacks should be available for
evacuees as they exit the aircraft and
again as they board the aircraft for
their return flight.
Establish procedure to
ensure snacks are
available for evacuees as
they arrive and
disembark and again as
they embark onto the
aircraft or bus.
OEM
09/01/16
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Objective
1. Demonstrate the
ability to establish,
staff, equip, operate,
and demobilize an
emergency shelter to
house a population of
approximately 100
people.
1. Demonstrate the
ability to establish,
staff, equip, operate,
and demobilize an
emergency shelter to
house a population of
approximately 100
people.
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Improvement/
Corrective Action
Recommendation
It will be useful to have a shelter
room layout for set-up. The layout
needs to follow ADA and FNSS rules
for sheltering. City staff needs
training on ADA and FNSS
requirements.
Identify and provide
training for City staff
need training on ADA
and FNSS requirements.
This shelter could comfortably
accommodate 60 cots, although
approximately 90 were set up for the
exercise. It was unclear if this
arrangement of cots satisfied Red
Cross “personal space” guidelines.
There was not a clear consensus
among City personnel on what this
standard actually recommends
(opinions ranged from 20 – 50
square feet).
Heavy-duty cots were more popular
and looked better, while the “regular”
cots were too low to the ground to be
used by the elderly and people with
limited mobility.
• Recommend providing heavy-duty
cots after initial set-up, and only for
guests with “physical limitations”.
• Signage should be posted to
indicate the availability of heavy-duty
cots upon request.
• The heavy-duty cots are 6”-8”
longer and wider, and consequently
may require more floor space.
Develop shelter
floorplans with cot
layouts for all potential
shelters.
Include instructions and
policies regarding heavyduty cots in shelter
procedures.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
Responsible
Party/Agency
•
•
•
•
•
•
Projected
Completion
Date
OEM
Neighborhood
Services
Park &
Recreation
10/01/16
OEM
Neighborhood
Services
Park &
Recreation
10/01/16
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Objective
1. Demonstrate the
ability to establish,
staff, equip, operate,
and demobilize an
emergency shelter to
house a population of
approximately 100
people.
1. Demonstrate the
ability to establish,
staff, equip, operate,
and demobilize an
emergency shelter to
house a population of
approximately 100
people.
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Improvement/
Corrective Action
Recommendation
Many new pads are needed for cots:
• Are there ways to store the pads so
that they do not rip and become
rodent-infested?
• Can we provide single-use covers
for the pads at the shelter?
Of the two infant cribs provided, only
one was in working condition. It is
unknown if there are more cribs
currently stored at Bob Bolen Public
Safety Center.
The contents of most hygiene kits
provided to guests had
spoiled/expired. Adequate storage
will help alleviate some of these
problems: Instead of storing the kits
in an uninsulated shipping container,
they will now be stored indoors at
Bob Bolen.
We need to look at how to secure
and store luggage in separate room
from the sleeping quarters.
Responsible
Party/Agency
Although shelter supplies
are now being stored
indoors, need to develop
better storage methods
and procedures to
periodically inventory
and test shelter supplies
to ensure they are fit for
use.
OEM
Identify secure luggage
storage areas at all
shelters and establish
procedures for evacuees
to access and return
luggage.
•
•
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
OEM
Neighborhood
Services
Projected
Completion
Date
009/15/16
10/01/16
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Objective
1. Demonstrate the
ability to establish,
staff, equip, operate,
and demobilize an
emergency shelter to
house a population of
approximately 100
people.
1. Demonstrate the
ability to establish,
staff, equip, operate,
and demobilize an
emergency shelter to
house a population of
approximately 100
people.
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Improvement/
Corrective Action
Recommendation
There is a need for expanded shower
facilities. Some possible solutions
include:
• Renting portable showers from
private vendors, which could range
from around $400 per day for a
single stall unit, up to around $4500
per day for a full-length multiple-stall
trailer. Portable showers would also
require daily servicing.
• Renting portable showers from the
State Guard, if any such units exist.
• Constructing our own portable
shower facility, using the shipping
container currently used by
Neighborhood Services for shelter
storage.
• Transporting guests to nearby
school with locker room shower
facilities.
There were food complaints and
there was not provision for those
with special diets and medical needs.
Develop better shower
facilities for evacuees.
Responsible
Party/Agency
•
•
•
Work with Salvation
Army and other entities
that may provide food to
shelters to ensure that
food is good quality and
special dietary needs are
addressed.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
•
•
Projected
Completion
Date
OEM
Neighborhood
Services
Park &
Recreation
09/15/16
OEM
Salvation Army
09/15/16
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Objective
1. Demonstrate the
ability to establish,
staff, equip, operate,
and demobilize an
emergency shelter to
house a population of
approximately 100
people.
1. Demonstrate the
ability to establish,
staff, equip, operate,
and demobilize an
emergency shelter to
house a population of
approximately 100
people.
6. Maintain situational
awareness and
communications
during the exercise.
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Improvement/
Corrective Action
Recommendation
Responsible
Party/Agency
There is concern about the impact of
new “open carry” laws with respect
to guests possessing firearms. Many
questions remain unanswered,
including:
• What can (or cannot) be asked of
the owner?
• Whether the shelter can store
firearms upon request, and if so,
what procedures should be used?
• Which personnel should handle this
issue? Some City staff expressed
that they are not comfortable around
firearms.
Investigate if a Nixle message can be
sent to guests only, using contact
information from ETN.
Determine the City policy
regarding open carry in
shelters.
•
•
•
Determine if Nixle
messages can be sent to
guests only, using
contact information from
ETN.
OEM
10/01/16
There were not good phone numbers
established for communication
among personnel.
Develop procedure to
ensure that all staff is
aware that an IAP with
Communications form
has been prepared; and
that the IAP is
disseminated.
OEM
10/01/16
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
OEM
Law
Police
Projected
Completion
Date
09/15/16
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Objective
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Improvement/
Corrective Action
Recommendation
Responsible
Party/Agency
Projected
Completion
Date
1. Demonstrate the
ability to establish,
staff, equip, operate,
and demobilize an
emergency shelter to
house a population of
approximately 100
people.
We need to purchase more universal
chargers for cell phones. Since
shelter operations are infrequent, it
may be more effective to purchase
chargers when they are needed to
ensure current devices can be
charged.
Make provisions to
purchase additional cell
phone chargers during
shelter operations.
OEM
1. Demonstrate the
ability to establish, staff,
equip, operate, and
demobilize an emergency
shelter to house a
population of
approximately 100
people.
6. Maintain situational
awareness and
communications during
the exercise.
There are concerns about the privacy of
guests with respect to posts on social
media. Signage may be required to
request guests to refrain from such
activity in certain parts of the shelter.
Develop procedures and
signage to request guests
refrain from such activity in
certain parts of the shelter.
•
•
It was noted that “there were not good
numbers established for communication
with personnel. An ICS 205A
Communications List was developed, so it
may be that someone was not aware that
an IAP was available.
The infrequency of real world shelter
operations has resulted in a loss of
corporate knowledge.
Recommend that ensuring
awareness of the IAP be
added to the EOC
Manager’s guidelines.
OEM
09/01/16
Include annual shelter
functional exercises in the
City exercise schedule.
OEM
06/01/17
1. Demonstrate the
ability to establish, staff,
equip, operate, and
demobilize an emergency
shelter to house a
population of
approximately 100
people.
Appendix L: City of Fort Worth BYOE AAR/IP
TDEM
L-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
OEM
Neighborhood
Services
09/15/16
09/15/16
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
ANNEX 1: ACRONYMS
Acronym
Explanation
AAR
After-Action Report
AICP
Airport Incident Command Post
APOD
Aerial Ports of Debarkation
APOE
Aerial Ports of Embarkation
ARCC
Alamo Regional Command Center
ARCC
American Red Cross
AMC
Air Mobility Command
BYOE
CCDHHS
Bring Your Own Exercise
CEM
Certified Emergency Manager
CIKR
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
CIS
Critical Information Systems
CPAP
Continuous Positive Airway Pressure
CTECC
Austin / Travis County Emergency Operations Center
DASF
Disaster Aeromedical Staging Facility
DC
District Coordinator
DDC
Disaster District Committee
DDC
Disaster District Chair
DFW
Dallas / Fort Worth
DIR
Department of Information Resources
DPS
Department of Public Safety
DSHS
Texas Department of State Health Services
E
Equipment
ECG
Electro Cardio Graph
EEG
Exercise Evaluation Guides
EM
Emergency Manager
EMS
Emergency Medical Services
EMTF
Emergency Medical Task Force
EOC
Emergency Operations Center
ETN
Emergency Tracking Network
Ex
Exercise
FNSS
Functional Needs Support Services
FOUO
For Official Use Only
HHSC
Texas Health and Human Services Commission
HSEEP
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
IAP
Incident Action Plan
IC
Incident Commander
ICP
Incident Command Post
ICS
Incident Command System
IMT
Incident Management Team
IP
Improvement Plan
ISD
Independent School District
Cameron County Department of Health and Human Services
Annex 1: Acronyms
A 1-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
Acronym
Explanation
MIST
Medical Incident Support Team
MRP
Mission-ready Package
NDMS
National Disaster Medical System
NHC
National Hurricane Center
NIMS
National Incident Management System
NWS
National Weather Service
O
Organization
OEM
Office of Emergency Management
P
Planning
POC
Point of Contact
RGV
Rio Grande Valley
SOC
State Operations Center
SOP
Standard Operating Procedure
STAR
State of Texas Assistance Request
STL
Situation Unit Leader
T
Training
TAHC
Texas Animal Health Commission
TANG
Texas Air National Guard
TDCJ
Texas Department of Criminal Justice
TDEM
Texas Division of Emergency Management
TDMS
Texas Disaster Medical System
TECQ
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
TEEX
Texas A&M Engineer Extension Service
TFS
Texas A&M Forest Service
THP
Texas Highway Patrol
TMD
Texas Military Department
TPASS
Texas Procurement and Support Services
TRANSCOM
Transportation Command
TSA
Transportation Security Administration
TxDOT
Texas Department of Transportation
USACE
United States Army Corp of Engineers
USDA
United States Department of Agriculture
VOAD
Volunteers Active in Disaster
Annex 1: Acronyms
A 1-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
ANNEX 2: PARTICIPANTS
Last Name
Abercrombie
Abeyta
Acosta
Adams
Agnarsson
Aguirre
Alejandro
Alford
Allen
Allen
Alonzo
Alva III
Alvarado
Alvarado
Alvarez
Alverado
Anderson
Anderson
Anderson
Andoe
Angerer
Aniol
Anthony
Arambul
Archer
Archie
Arrieta
Arrieta
Arvizo
Arviso
Asevedo
Austin
Bailey
Bailey
Balboa
Barfield
Barfield
Barrow
Barta
Bass
Bassham
Batzel
First Name
William
Roman
Romel
Barbara
Volundr
Javier
Jose
Shane
Cody
Marshall
Ruben
Simon
Christina
Krisna
Jessica
Daniel
Gordon
Chris
Ian
John
Christopher
Adam
Eric
Jessica
James
Dannie
Danny
Elvira
Ian T
Sean
Lori
Dean R.
Bob
David F.
Matthew
George R.
Johnny
Alyson
Les
Doug
Shawn
Kaila
Agency
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Health and Human Services Commission
Texas A & M Forest Service
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of Public Safety
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
City of Irving
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Dallas County
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Baxter
Beckey
Beimer
Beltran
Benjamin
Berger
Besignano
Best
Bjune
Black
Blanco
Blenis
Bodisch
Bolles
Booth
Bower-Lopez
Bramanti
Branch
Brandau
Branford
Branham
Brawner
Brewer
Briggs
Brockett
Broeker
Brown
Brumfield
Bryan
Bryan
Bryan
Bryant
Burgenson
Burkhead
Burks
Burns
Butler
Butler
Cabrera
Camungol
Candaloro
Carmickle
Carmona
Carriere
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Heather
Andy
Mike
Jennifer
Terry
Joseph
John P.
Otis L.
Stephen
Mark
Gabriela
Juli
Kenneth
William "Mike"
Jack
Eva
Matthew
Byron D.
Kirk
Karim
Barry
Robert
Jeffery
Lynda
Brian
Michael
David
Brian
Amber
Erin
Travis
Joshua
Dan
Denson
Laura
Joshua
Chris
Mark
Betsy
N. Bienvenido
Joe
Rachel
Amanda
Jason
Agency
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Department of Transportation - Pharr
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
San Antonio Fire Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
US Airforce
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Military Department
Transportation Security Administration
City of Irving
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Carroll
Carroll
Caspers
Cass
Castillo
Castro
Castro
Cerda
Cervantes
Chadwick
Chapa
Charles
Chavez
Childers
Ciaccio
Clark
Cline
Coffey
Cole
Coleman
Collie
Compton
Connally
Cook
Corso
Corwin
Cox
Crain
Craver
Crespo
Crislip
Crosby
Cruz
Cruz
Cruz
Cuellar
Cummings
Dailey
Davis
Davis
Davis
De Leon
Deal
Deaton
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Rickey
Larry C.
Nicholas
Bob
Raquel
Sharlotte
Maria
Ray
David
Mark
Mario
Thomas
Martin
David
Frank
William
Mary
Darryl
Gregory
Kyle
Fred
Richard A.
Travis
Russell
Michael
Esther
Justin
Shelley
Bennie D.
Francisco
Nathan
Richard
Fabian
Candy
Mannie
Samantha
Tim
Samuel
Colin
Kevin
Craig
Victoria
Pauline
Grady
Agency
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Cameron County Helath and Human Services
Texas Council on Competitive Government
Valley Grande Institute
City of Irving
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
United States Border Patrol
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Bexar County Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Tarrant County
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Parks & Wildlife Department
Texas General Land Office
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas State Technical College
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Decker
DeDecker
Delgado
Denyse
Dillon
Dixon
Doane
Doebbler
Dolgow
Dominguez
Doyle
Dowdy
Dresner
Duda
Economedes
Elestwani
Elizondo
Elizondo
Ellison
Espinoza
Evans
Falcon
Faltot
Finley
Fish
Flores
Flores
Ford
Fore
Foster
Fox
Frank
Franklin
Frausto
Frazier
Fudge
Fuentes
Gaciri
Gahm
Gainley
Galan
Galaviz
Gallaga
Galvan
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Lloyd
Lisa
Rachelle
Walker
Lesa
Carla
Christopher
Jack
Barry L.
Clarissa
Yara
Jerry
Bo
Mark
DeAnne
Margarita
Gleen
Tony
David
Jerry
Quenya
Paul
Richard
Robert
David
Brenda
Sandra
Dustin
Tyler L.
Stephanie
Mark
Dawson
David
Valerie
Randy
William
Jessica
Michael
Joe
Merit
Odilia
Kristin
Adriana
Ramon
Agency
Texas Procurement and Support Services
Texas Department of State Health Services
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Department of Public Safety
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Food Bank RGV
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Food Bank RGV
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Zapata County Sheriff's Office
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
National Weather Service
San Antonio Airport
Texas Military Department
San Antonio Fire Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Education Agency
Valley Grande Institute
Dallas County
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Garcia
Garcia
Garcia
Garcia
Gardner
Garza
Gerth
Gibson
Gilbert
Goldsmith
Gonzales
Gonzales
Gonzalez
Gonzalez
Gonzalez
Gonzalez
Gonzalez
Gore
Gove
Grabowski
Gracia
Graf
Greene
Grieger
Gross
Guajardo
Guajardo
Guerra
Guerrero
Gugel
Guido
Gumm
Gutierrez
Gutierrez
Gutierrez
Gwin
Haak
Haisten
Hall
Hannemann
Hannes
Harbin
Hardinger
Harder
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Alfonso
Ernesto
Abel
Gonzalo
Dillon
Ashley
Keith
Anthony
Eric
Barry
Louis
Adam
Ricardo
Dolores
Casar
Norma
Ricardo
Emily
Steve
Joshua
Rey
Justin
Mark
Jason G.
Tony
Pablo
Esmer
Mario
Paul
John
John
Sabine
Peggy
Kristen
Bruce
David
Sarah
Thomas
Thomas
Steve
Jolynn
John
Mary
D’Angela
Agency
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Parks & Wildlife Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Highway Patrol
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Texas Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Dallas County
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas A & M Forest Service
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Cameron County Helath and Human Services
Baptist Child and Family Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Department of Transportation - Pharr
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Department of State Health Services
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Hardy
Harris
Hastings
Haygood
Hays
Hays
Hayton
Hazard
Helmcamp
Hemby
Henning
Hernadez
Hernadez
Hernandez
Hernandez
Hernandez
Hernandez
Hernandez
Hernandez
Hernandez III
Hernandez
Hesson
Hickman
Hicks
Hilliard
Hinajosa
Hoffart
Hogg
Houlton
Hoover
Hornyak
Hovenkamp
Hubbard
Hull
Hunt
Hunter
Hushen
Huss
Hutto
Ibarra
Iken
Illich
Ireland
Isbell
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Carl L.
Kwaheri
Thomas
Shane
Cody
Sherry
Matthew A.
Shawn
Scott
Olivia
Emil
Jessy
Johnny
Eseil
Amaironi
Angela
Crystal
Jose
Stephanie
Frank
Orlando
Darrick
Morris
James
James (Ron)
Pedro
Johnny B.
Gunnar
Bryce
JaNene
Dave
Mark
Charles
Peter
D. Scott
Tonya
Tom
Jonathan
William
Vanessa
Gwyn
Gregory
Wes
David
Agency
Texas Military Department
City of Arlington
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Procurement and Support Services
Texas Health and Human Services Commission
Texas Military Department
Public Utility Commission of Texas
Texas Department of Insurance
Texas Animal Health Commission
Texas Military Department
Cameron County Helath and Human Services
Texas Department of Public Safety
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Cameron County Helath and Human Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Department of State Health Services
Public Utility Commission of Texas
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Cities of Duncanville/DeSoto/Cedar Hill
Cameron County
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
FEMA Region 6
Texas Military Department
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Jackson
Jackson
James
Jenkins
Jimenez
Johansson
Johnson
Johnson
Johnson
Jones
Jones
Jones
Jones
Jones
Jones
Jones
Jordan
Joseph
Judalet
Justin
Kashimura
Keitz
Kelley
Kerns
Kidd
King
King
Kinsler
Kirkham
Kline
Knight
Komegay
Korn
Kowalko
Kraft
Kreisner
Kuykendall
LaMonte
Langlois
Lanoux
Lares
Larremore
Law
Lawson
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
John E
Bobbie
Shawn
Lee
Virginia
Juliana
Laban
Clifford S.
Anngie
Suzannah
Jeffrey
Joe
Danny
Eric
Rodrick
Jeffrey T.
Gilbert
Martin
Donna
Jimmy
Tomonari
Rickey
James
Ward
Nim
Norm
Jonathan
Christopher
Brenda
Mary
Travis
Almadelia
Marcia
Edward
Brian
Sarah
Michael
Larremore
Tracy
Ray
Richard
Larry
Jon
Rhonda
Agency
Texas Health and Human Services Commission
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
American Red Cross
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Port of San Antonio
San Antonio Fire Department
Dallas County
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of Transportation
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
American Red Cross
Dallas County Schools
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Lead
Leal
Ledbetter
Lehtonen
Leitzel
Lejia
Lemmings
Lemon
Lim
Linardos
Linardos
Little
Littlefield
Liu
Lopez
Lopez
Lopez
Loredo
Losee
Loya
Lozano
Lozano
Lucla
Lynch
Magee
Mahlum
Malamut
Maldonado
Maloy
Mangione
Manning
Mantello
Marcheschi
Marcheschi
Marotta
Marriott
Marroquin
Martin
Martindale
Martinez
Martinez
Martinez
Martinez
Mason
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Odilia Ann
Miranda
Emory
Arto
Robert
Lorena
Cheryl
Kevin
Ariel
James
Jimmy
Fred
Rachelle
Michael
Christina
D'Yanira
Carla P
Richard
Jeanette
Eduardo
Sarah
Marco
Leo-Diaz
Joe
Lanita
Gabe
Alex
Diana
Alicia
Ana
Jeffrey
Donald
Daniel J
Jeannene E.
Michael
Dianne
Leandro
David
Kent A.
Joe
Nick
Margaret
Emilio
Ed
Agency
City of Brownsville
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas A & M Forest Service
Texas A & M Forest Service
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
San Antonio Police Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Food Bank RGV
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Transportation Security Administration
Valley Grande Institute
Cameron County Health and Human Services
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Dallas Love Field Airport
Texas A & M Forest Service
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Valley Grande Institute
Public Utility Commission of Texas
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas – Task Force 1
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
United States Army Corps of Engineers
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Mathews
Mathieu
Mathis
Matula
Maung
Maynard
McCoy
McCright
McCurdy
McDonald
McFarren
McJoy
McKnight
McNabb
McNatt
McNiece
McNutt
Meadors
Meany
Medina
Medina
Medrano
Medrano
Mefferd
Melinds
Melson
Mendez
Mendez
Mendiola
Merton
Messner
Migues
Miller
Mills
Mills
Minor
Montgomery
Moody
Moore
Moran
Moreno
Morgan
Morris
Moss
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Carl
Kellie E.
Kevin
Stephen
Zaw
Gloria
Scott
Michael
David
Kenneth
Jill
Areka
Rosemary
Connie
Jennifer
Patrick
Lee
Michael
Gary
Chris
Russell
Gabriela
Rachel
Andrew
Leo-Rodriquez
Mark
Brandon
Pablo
Martha
James
Walter
Alvin
Mike
Gloria
Michael
Bruce A.
Mark
Sarah
Chris
Miriam
Monica
James
Michael
Michael
Agency
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Public Utility Commission of Texas
Texas Department of Transportation
Texas Military Department
Texas General Land Office
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Dallas/Fort Worth Airport
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs
Dallas County
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
National Weather Service
FEMA Region 6
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Department of State Health Services
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Military Department
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Military Department
Salvation Army
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Southwest Texas Regional Advisory Council (STRAC)
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Mounger
Munoz
Murphy
Murphy
Murray
Murrell
Nanton
Ndzaka
Nemec
Neuendorff
Newbold
Nguyen
Nichols
Null
Nunez
Nuñez
O'Brien
O'Conan
O'Connor
Olveira
Omozeze
O'Neill
Ortiz
Osterhout
O'Valle
Owusu-Ansah
Palmer
Palomares
Parks
Parsons
Pasalic
Patton
Peardon
Pena
Penney
Perper
Perrin
Petreczko
Phillips
Phinney
Pierce
Pitts
Pollok
Polonis
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Christopher
Mari
Richard
Aaron
Joel
John
James
Joseph (Isaac)
Antone
Kendra
Jeff
Tony
Bobby
Mark
Sarah
Jesse
Colin
Meghan
Ryan
Erica
Gabriel
Will
Juan
David
John
Renee
David
Yamilex
Wade
James
Admir
Will
Ronald
Tony
Marty
Adam
Eraina
Jan
JAmes
Chuck
Susan
Kimberly
Roger
Tom
Agency
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Highway Patrol
National Weather Service
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Depart. of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services
City of Fort Worth
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Dallas County
Texas Department of Public Safety
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Price
Proctor
Ramirez
Ramirez
Ramirez
Ramsey
Ray
Raymond
Reese
Reyes
Reyes
Reyes
Rice
Righter
Rivas
Rivera
Robertson
Robinson
Rocha
Rodriguez
Rodriguez
Rodriguez
Rodriguez
Rodriguez
Rogers
Roman
Roman
Romero
Rougeau
Rubio
Rutherford
Ryan-Bunger
Sadler
Saenz
Saenz
Saenz
Salinas
Salinas
Sammons
Samp
Sams
Samuelson
Sanchez
Sandoval
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Dan
Theron
Kristy
Miriam
Orlando
Elmer
Stefan
Anne
David
Irma
Nikole
Rafael
Detlef
Brandon
Ayssa
Alberto
Katie
Barbara
Rene
Robert
Brittany
Kristy
Tessa
Cirilo
William
Isidro
Chelsey
Lina
Tami
Nathan
Carolyn
Gisela
Wendell
Debbie
Diego
Juanita
Phillip
Becky
Michael
Jason
Jay
Randy
Elizabeth
Angela
Agency
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Public Utility Commission of Texas
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Valley Grande Institute
Harlingen Fire Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Valley Grande Institute
American Red Cross
Texas Department of State Health Services
Laredo Health Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas General Land Office
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Sandoval
Schilling
Schliesing
Schmid
Schmitt
Schnell
Schumacher
Scott
Sellman
Shah
Sheard
Shepard
Sherman
Shine
Shoe
Shuey
Sikes
Sims
Siseros
Skat
Skinner
Skym
Sligar
Smith
Smith
Smylie
Sontag
Sosa
Soto
Spies
Standford
Stanley
Stead
Stinecipher
Stites
Stokke
Stoltz
Stringfellow
Stubbs
Suelzer
Sutcliffe
Sutherland
Sutton
Swerdlin
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Azelyn
Richard
Elizabeth T.
Gregory
Kevin
Lee
Karl
Michael A.
Robert
Shiwan
Robin
Sasha
Gary
Larry
Michael
Eric
Sammy
Jonathan
Abel
Shiwan
Christopher
Jeffery
Mark
Debi
James
Brian G.
John
Pedro
Priscilla
Audrey
Jimmy
Christopher
Frank
Deaun
Deirdre
Michael
Candace
Michael
Jason
Tom
Kenneth
Scott
Regina
Larry
Agency
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
2-1-1 Services
City of Irving
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas Military Department
Salvation Army
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas General Land Office
Texas Military Department
Texas Education Agency
San Antonio Fire Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas – Task Force 1
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Council on Competitive Government
American Red Cross
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Talbott
Tarpley
Tasby
Taylor
Taylor
Teeler
Thoerner
Thomas
Thomas
Thompson
Thompson
Torres
Torres
Torres
Torres
Towne
Treat
Tressider, Jr.
Trevino
Trevino
Trevino
Trimble
Troudt
Turner
Ury
Van De Carr
VanSickle
Vasquez
Vasquez
Vatale
Vela
Vessell
Villcunueva
Virnoche
Vleck
von
Wupperfeld
Wagstaff
Wagstaff
Wahlgren
Walker
Walker
Walker
Walle
Waller
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Agency
Brandon
Travis
Jenell
Robert
Worth
Gary
Molly
Bob
David
Harlan
James
Melinda
Elliott E
Jamie
Aurelio
Rheuben W.
Andy
Michael E
Raul
Emma
Lawrence
Lauren
Steven
John
Shawn
David
Gordon
Ernie
Ashley
Don
Raymond
Susan
Bianca
Todd
Kristopher
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Department of State Health Services
Texas Parks & Wildlife Department
North Central Texas Council of Governments
Texas Council on Competitive Government
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
Texas State Technical College
Texas Military Department
American Red Cross
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Valley Grande Institute
City of San Antonio
Dallas County
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
San Antonio Police Department
Texas Military Department
Public Utility Commission of Texas
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Valley Grande Institute
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
City of Brownsville
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Mike
Texas Military Department
David
Shawnie
Bill
Denyse
Christopher
Denyse
Mirta
Gregg
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Valley Grande Institute
National Weather Service
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After-Action
Improvement Plan (AAR/IP)
Last Name
Ware
Watkins
Watson
Watts
Weathersby
Weaver
Webb
Webster
Webster
Wedeking
Wells
Wessel
White
White
Whiting
Wieden
Williams
Williams
Williams
Williams
Willoughby
Wilson
Wilson
Winchester
Winn
Wintz
Wintz
Wise
Witherell
Womack
Wood
Woods
Woodward
Woolbright
Wright
Wright
Wusterhausen
Yampey
Young
Ziesmer
2016 Rio Grande Valley
Hurricane Evacuation Exercise Series
First Name
Cecil
Terry
Roy L.
Susan
Corey G.
Bill
Neal
Edward
Jay
Jon
Gordon
William
Michael
William
Gregg
John
Sam
James
Joey R.
James
Wesley
Ty
Mary
Doyce
Gregory
Cary
Celia
Deborah
Mark
Stephanie M
Craig
Anthony
Tyrel
Lester
Richard
Glenn
Billy
Michael F.
Mary
Frances
Agency
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Highway Patrol
Texas Military Department
University of Texas Center for Space Research
Tarrant County
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
2-1-1 Services
San Antonio Police Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Military Department
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Texas Military Department
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service
Texas Military Department
The 610 names represent only a partial list of exercise participants. Various jurisdictions
participated in a BYOE or Bring Your Own Exercise, attached to the State’s Exercise. These
participants were not captured in this AAR/IP.
Annex 2: Participants
A 2-14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)