Lessons Learned
from
the TE P C O Nuclear Power Scandal
Hiroyuki K uroda
M anager
Corporate Co m m unications Dept.
Tokyo Electric Po w er Com pany (T EPC O)
Sum m a ry of a Series of C a ses
of M i sconduct
‹July 2000: MITI asked TEP C O to inquire inappropriate
handling of maintenance records and reports
‹M ay 2002: GE inform ed T EPC O that inspection records
might also have been inappropriately handled
‹June 2002: TEPC O set Internal Investigative Com mittee
and checked 29 cases by GE btw 1986 and 2001
‹T EPC O found 16 cases of misconduct and reported to NIS A
P C V Leakage Tests
‹Sep. 2002: A newspaper reported inappropriate
conduct of leak test in P C V in U nit 1
in Fukushima Daiichi N PS.
‹A investigation team of external lawyers formed by
T EPC O found inappropriate actions during the leak
test in 1991 and 1992.
Background to C a ses of
M i sconduct (1)
‹Deficiencies in fitness for service
- technical standards were established on
an‘as-constructed’basis
Background to C a ses of
M i sconduct (2)
‹ Nuclear engineers’over-confidence
of their nuclear knowledge
- The engineers’conservative m entality
to avoid reporting problems to the
national governm ent as long as they
believed that safety was secured
Internal Factors Resulting in
M i sconduct
‹Problems in Quality Assurance System
‹Problems in Observance of the Code of
Ethics and Corporate Culture
‹Inadequacy of Safety Culture
C o nsequences of M i sconduct
‹Dam aged public trust to ward TEPC O
‹Forced to shut do w n 17 nuclear reactors
for safety inspection
‹Possibility of po wer shortage in sum m er
2003
To Prevent Similar Incidents (1)
‹“Create a mechanism that does not permit
people to perform any dishonest act, and
create a culture that encourages people to
refrain from performing any dishonest
act.”
To Prevent Similar Incidents (2)
‹ Improvem e nt in the Quality Assurance
System
To Prevent Similar Incidents (3)
‹T E P C O set up internal audit function
-the N uclear Q uality M anagem ent Departm ent
-the Nuclear Safety and Q uality Assurance
Conference
To Prevent Similar Incidents (4)
‹ Strict Observance of the Code of Ethics
and Reforms in Corporate Culture
-formed Business Ethics Task Force for
co mpliance
-rewrote the Corporate Code of Conduct
To Regain Public Trust (1)
‹ Set up local liaison meetings around N P S
K a shiw a zaki-Kariw a N P S
M eetings:
held once a month since M ay
2003
M e m bers:
opinion leaders, anti-nuclear
activist, etc.
Secretariat:
Kashiwazaki City
Official website:
http://w w w.tiikinokai.jp/ (only
in Japanese)
To Regain Public Trust (2)
Three Progra ms
‹Thorough enforce m ent of safety
m anagem ent
‹ Boosting of com m unications with
cooperating co mpanies
‹ Thorough disclosure of information
T h orough disclosure of
inform a tion
¾ Improved the disclosure standard of
nuclear incidents in TEPC O
(Novem b er 2003)
Increase in the num b ers of
press releases
30
K ash iw azak iK ariw a
25
20
F u k u sh im a
D aiich i
15
F u k u sh im a
D ain i
10
5
20
0
4/
2
4/
1
0
20
3/
12
0
20
20
0
3/
2
3/
1
0
20
20
0
2/
12
0
Disclosure on the website (1)
On the TEPC O W ebsite:
w w w.tepco.co.jp (in Japanese)
-topics, nuclear data, press releases, etc
- New content
On dem and video titled“I work at a NPS”
English version: ww w.tepco.co.jp/en/
will be relaunched on M arch 27, 2004.
It will have topics, nuclear update and press
releases
Disclosure on the website (2)
On the website of nuclear po wer stations:
w w w.tepco.co.jp/fukushima1-np/
ww w.tepco.co.jp/fukushima2-np/
ww w.tepco.co.jp/kk-np (all only in Japanese)
- operation status
- radiation data on real tim e base
- activities with local co m m unity
- press release
- minor troubles
Lessons Learned from
the Scandal (1)
‹ Share nuclear information (even
minor information) with stakeholders
Share nuclear infor m ation with
stakeholders
Local governm ents
(prefecture, city, village)
Local Com m unity
M e d ia
Lessons Learned from
the Scandal (2)
‹ More co m m unication with local co m m unity
Li st en
Part i ci pat e
in
T he voice of local residents
Local activities