Lifting the ‘Blue Curtain’
By VincentE. Henry, New York
City Police Department and
Griffith University.*
The issue of police corruption
has recently generated a consider­
able degree of debate and
controversy throughout Australia
in the private and Government
sectors, as well as in police circles.
The issues and problems of po­
lice corruption, however, are by no
means confined to the Australian
experience. The possibility of cor­
ruption exists in every society and
every police system throughout the
world in which the police role en­
tails the discretionary use of
coercive power.
It is no coincidence that efforts to
'reform' police agencies typically
and historically revolve around the
notions of police discretion and
control. Specifically, successful re­
form efforts have almost universally
attempted to limit or redefine the
individual police officer's discre­
tion (regardless of rank or position
within the organisation), while
concomitantly extending police
management's control through the
imposition of increased account­
ability.
The familiar themes of discretion,
accountability and control have
emerged most recently in Australia
as a result of the Fitzgerald Inquiry
in Queensland. The Queensland
Police Service is currently immersed
in the painful process of reform, a
movement spearheaded not only
by its own management, but also
by the external quasi-governmental Criminal Justice Commission.
Police reform is necessarily a pain­
ful process insofar as it involves
modifying traditional definitions of
the police role in society, refining
and redesigning many police pro­
cedures and practices, and
changing the behaviours of indi­
vidual police officers throughout
the agency. Both individual and
organisational distress occur as a
result of these fundamental changes
in traditionally accepted (and of­
ten, within the police subculture,
traditionally acceptable) activities,
policies and roles.
The painful process of reform is
not, however, confined to Queens­
Page 14
Police corruption and corruption control strategies are a topic of
increasing concern, both in Australia and world wide. This paper,
reprinted from the National Police Research Unit’s “Review"(Mo\.Q,
1990) discusses three of the strategies developed in the New York
City Police Department (NYCPD) during the early 1970s which
proved effective in reducing police corruption by increasing account­
ability and piercing the ‘blue curtain of silence’ upon which much
corrupt activity depends.
land. All police agencies, at some
time, can and should expect a wave
of reform, since reform movements
are a necessary and valuable tool in
their revitalisation and continuing
evolution. Perhaps even more than
other human organisations, police
agencies tend to become stagnant,
insular and monolithic if left to their
own devices. This resistance to
change must be overcome if polic­
ing is to keep pace with the rapidly
changing and constantly evolving
social, cultural, economic and tech­
nological changes which will define
the Australian experience in the
coming decade and century, and if
policing as an occupation is to make
'Police subculture
places great
value upon the
norm of loyalty
and silence...'
strides toward professionalism.
Enhancing police corruption con­
trol strategies are but one facet of
this reform process.
The New York City Police De­
partment (NYCPD), for example,
underwent a vigorous and painful
period of reform in the early 1970s
as the result of a major corruption
scandal and an official inquiry
known as the Knapp Commission.
The history of the Knapp Commis­
sion and the corruption which gave
rise to it are not unlike the history of
the Fitzgerald Commission and the
recent experience of the Queens­
land Police (Henry, 1990).
After holding two years of public
and private hearings, the Knapp
Commission issued a report which
detailed many of the forms of cor­
ruption which were rife within the
NYCPD, and it recommended a
variety of specific management
remedies to reform the agency.
Among the recommendations were
the expansion of the NYCPD's in­
ternal investigative mechanisms,
the adoption of policies and proce­
dures designed to limit the police
officer's exposure to situations and
circumstances which give rise to
corruption, and to decrease the
temptations of corruption by sub­
jecting both the police and the public
to more significant risks of detec­
tion, apprehension, conviction and
penalties for engaging in corrupt
activities.
Unlike the current situation in
Queensland, however, in which the
Criminal justice Commission has a
statutory and predominant role in
transforming the agency and estab­
lishing its future direction, the
impetus of the NYCPD's reforms
came from within the department
in the person of a reform Police
Commissioner, Patrick V. Murphy.
Murphy, a scathing critic of police
management in New York and
throughout America, was deter­
mined (even ruthless) in his efforts
to transform the agency and im­
pose
clearly
delineated
accountability structures upon it.
The controversy and resistance en­
gendered by Murphy's innovative
policies and programs lasted be­
yond his three-year tenure, and
some of these policies continue to
raise debate and resentment from
within the agency despite the pass­
ing years.
Two particular policies sparked
special resentment, since they were
aimed directly at destroying the
'blue curtain of secrecy' which has
often been identified as central to
corruption. In Queensland, for ex­
ample, Fitzgerald noted that the
police subculture places great value
upon the norm of loyalty and si­
Platypus 34 - January 1992
lence, and in his report he expanded
upon the role it played in allowing
corruption to spread throughout
the agency (Fitzgerald, 1989). This
code of silence seems to be a feature
of police subcultures throughout
the world, and has been a thorn in
the side of many reform adminis­
trations, frustrating their attempts
to bring about positive change.
In essence, the theory holds that
police are constrained by their cul­
tural values not to report the
incidents of corruption they see oc­
curring around them, guaranteeing
anonymity and protection to cor­
rupt officers, who may or may not
be a minority of the department.
The code of silence perpetuates
corruption, which is a crime of con­
spiracy, and often results in the
co-option of otherwise honest of­
ficers who know of corruption but
are constrained not to report it.
These police officers become tac­
itly, and often unwillingly, involved
in the conspiracy. The strength of
the subcultural norm may over­
whelm even the most honest officers
who feel compelled to ignore or
cover up crimes committed by their
peers.
This institutional­
ised program of
controlled internal
whistleblowing...'
The effect of the 'blue curtain'
upon honest police was com­
pounded by a seemingly
institutionalised ambivalence to­
ward corruption and a distinct lack
of policies designed to encourage
police to report the corruption they
saw, as well as the absence of poli­
cies to protect the police
whistleblower from peer retribu­
tion or other sanctions (Knapp,
1972; Maas, 1973).
During Murphy's tenure, the
NYCPD introduced three programs
designed to pierce the 'blue cur­
tain' and create a department-wide
functional anxiety about corrup­
tion. In the belief that corrupt police
were, in fact, the minority of offic­
ers, and that they depended upon
the rule of silence in order to con­
tinue their corrupt activities,
Murphy both strengthened and
decentralised the agency's internal
investigations capability, concur­
rently introducing two bold new
strategies designed to enhance ac­
countability and undermine the
code of silence. The adoption of
these three policies also signalled a
shift from the Department's tradi­
tionally passive and reactive
investigation of corruption com­
plaints to a more proactive
anti-corruption stance.
The Field Association Program was
perhaps the most controversial of these
three facets, as it struck directly at the
heart of the Hue curtain' and was
effective in reducing the unquestion­
ing solidarity which existed within the
police subculture. Police officers (pri­
marily recruits and younger officers)
were quietly recruited to work as
double agents. In addition to their
ordinary assignments as police offic­
ers, they secretly reported to Internal
Affairs control agents any corrup­
tion they observed in the course of
their duties. Other than the control
agents, only a few carefully
screened high-ranking NYCPD of­
ficials had access to the identities of
field associates, protecting them
from peer retribution (McCarthy,»
AFP’s anti-corruption strategies
The article "Lifting the 'Blue Cur­
tain'" by Vincent E. Henry is inter­
esting and should make AFP per­
sonnel even more determined to
ensure that corruption never gets
a hold in our organisation and that
those who are corrupt do not profit
by it in any way.
The fundamental difference be­
tween the NYCPD at the time of the
Knapp Commission and the AFP in
this context is that what corruption
there is in the AFP seems to involve
a few individuals rather than being
systemic throughout the organisa­
tion.
The fact that the AFP is a young
organisation is probably fortunate
in that regard.
It was the extent of corruption in
the NYCPD which caused the
sweeping changes and draconian
counter measures to be introduced,
undoubtedly causing widespread
resentment and considerable re­
duction of morale.
The thrust of AFP anti-corrup­
tion strategies is directed at pre­
vention being better than cure. The
situation in the NYCPD as reflected
Platypus 34 - January 1992
By Ray Thornton, Internal
Security and Audit Division.
in the article suggests that their anti­
corruption action was too late in
starting so that 'cure' methods had
to be employed.
ISAD believes that eduction is
the single most important anti-cor­
ruption strategy we have. Through
it we can inculcate members and
staff members with a sense of pride
in their professional standards and
the mores of the AFP.
Personnel with such values will
pose a considerable threat to the
would-be corrupt and render their
activities more susceptible to de­
tection and reporting.
The education system, which
should include the security and
anti-corruption obligations of all
employed in supervisory positions,
must be supported by other aspects
of personnel management — par­
ticularly vetting to ensure, as far as
we reasonably can, that we only
employ persons who are honest,
reliable and trustworthy, and who
are likely to stay that way.
While there is a reluctance to re­
port the misbehaviour of col­
leagues, this is not confined to law
enforcement agencies. There is a
common and natural reluctance to
'get involved' and to 'dob in mates'
in most people in all walks of life.
Individuals faced with the dilemma
of whether or not to take proper
action (reporting) when identify­
ing criminal and/or corrupt be­
haviour should examine their own
values and conscience.
In their own hearts, they should
know that their loyalty to individu­
als should not outweigh that to the
organisation at large. This is a mat­
ter of professional standards. It has
been said that failure to report cor­
ruption is itself corrupt. If that is a
bit harsh, such failure is at least
unprofessional.
In the AFP, correct reporting action
is to OIC ISAD, Commander J D Allen
(06) 275 7176, to OICs Canberra
(06) 257 7340, Sydney (02) 286 4177, or
Melbourne (03) 607 7337.
The ISAD Hotline, 008 020614 is
another alternative, and is connected
to a recording machine for use dur­
ing silent hours.
Page 15