The Limits of Campaign Finance Reform

The Limits of Campaign Finance Reform
by Avi Green and Hannah Reuter, Scholars Strategy Network
The 2016 Presidential election brought conversations about money in politics to the fore, as
Bernie Sanders attacked Wall Street contributions and Donald Trump promised to “drain the
swamp” of DC lobbyists and influence peddlers. Such arguments resonated. According to a 2015
poll, 84 percent of Americans think that money has too much influence in U.S. politics.
Reformers advocate three key changes: disclosure laws, contribution limits, and public financing
of elections. In a survey of 15 leading scholars, support for disclosure was unanimous. But
researchers find that contribution restrictions and public financing have fallen short. Advocacy
for political reforms is difficult and costly. Focus on one reform can potentially crowd out other
possibilities. Reformers would be wise to consider the trade-offs as they develop agendas.
Disclosure – Now More than Ever
Disclosure about campaign donations and spending, lobbying, and the financial interests of
candidates and elected officials is valuable for researchers and even more important for
journalists and citizens. Allegations that disclosure chills political speech are not borne out by
research. Right now, there are far too many dodges, undisclosed ways for well-heeled people and
interests to spend money to sway elections or influence policymakers.
Contribution Limits Don’t Keep Money Out and May Promote Extremism
The desirability of legal limits on contributions to candidates, political action committees, and
political parties may seem intuitive, but even before the Supreme Court’s Citizens United
decision in 2010, political donors found plenty of ways to channel unregulated money to
organizations like “Swift Boat Veterans for Truth” and “America Coming Together.” In 2016,
the Koch network of hundreds of millionaires and billionaires deployed three-quarters of a
billion dollars to Americans for Prosperity and other free-market organizations, creating a
political-party-like operation rivaling the GOP itself. Although this spending had a powerful
effect on the election, it was not legally classified as electoral in nature, so it would not have
been touched by restrictions on independent campaign expenditures even had they been in place.
Another troubling bottom line is this: limits on contributions to political parties may increase
political polarization. SSN Member Ray La Raja finds that imposing limits on contributions to
state political parties makes policy more extreme and renders elected officials less responsive to
constituents. Because strong political parties have some need to promote broadly popular
policies, they may channel money to more moderate electable candidates. In contrast, outside
organizations are often more ideological because they are controlled not by elected officials but
by activists and donors.
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Public Financing Solves Few Problems, but Gives Candidates Time
Public financing of political campaigns aims to level the playing field – ideally by allowing a
wider array of regular citizens to run for office and win, and by allowing candidates, challengers
and incumbents alike to spend less time fundraising from wealthy donors and more time in
conversations with ordinary constituents.
However, data from Maine and Arizona, both of which have had public financing programs in
place for nearly 20 years, show very mixed results. Political scientist Michael Miller has found
that public financing has changed how some candidates allocate their time, increasing
interactions between candidates and constituents. But it remains unclear how, if at all, such
increased contact affects policy outcomes. And public funding does not seem to reduce the
reelection chances of incumbents.
Overall, public financing and the limits that accompany it have produced imbalanced partisan
results, because Democrats find this approach more attractive than Republicans. For ideological
and practical reasons, GOP candidates are reluctant to accept public financing, while Democrats
are more willing to go this route. As a result, in Maine and Arizona, publicly financed
Democratic candidates have often been defeated by GOP incumbents who raise money, recruit
volunteers, and mobilize conservative organizations. Ironically, like self-financed candidates,
publicly financed Democratic candidates may have fewer incentives to develop compelling
messages and effective mobilization strategies.
Public Financing Does Not Necessarily Help Progressives
In the 1990s and 2000s, reformers who advocated new rules for money in politics were mostly
progressives. Since then bipartisan groups such as “Represent Us” have also taken the field.
Bipartisan reformers should be heartened by evidence that public financing does not appear to
differentially help progressives or Democrats compared to conservatives or Republicans.
Yet reformers who see limits on money in elections as a way to fight inequality should also take
note. For years, left-leaning reformers have argued that campaign reforms can reduce political
inequality. Progressives, in particular, believe that their side raises and spends less money for
elections than conservatives and business groups, and they presume that such an imbalance in
election spending leads to differential policy outcomes. However, every part of this argument is
up for debate as evidence accumulates.
Progressive money in politics reformers point out that labor unions are often outspent by
corporations, that environmentalists are outspent by Big Oil, and so forth. But those who make
such claims often lump together lobbying expenditures with election spending. Public financing
reforms might address imbalances in election spending, but they do nothing to address disparities
in lobbying and insider clout.
When government policies are at issue, outcomes are not always based on which side has the
most resources. Furthermore, as Henry Brady, Kay Schlozman and Sidney Verba have shown,
unequal political inputs take many different forms. Some people have more time for volunteering
than others; some organizations employ lobbyists while others do not; and some people and
groups have more knowledge about how to intervene effectively. Consequently, limitations on
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spending for election or public financing of candidates may not solve all of the problems
progressives are trying to address – or even address the forces that do the most to promote
policies that exacerbate inequalities.
The bottom line is that public financing of election campaigns is a reform that could garner
growing bipartisan support, but this approach is unlikely to be a game-changer from a
progressive point of view. Once again, Arizona and Maine show that Republicans and bipartisan
reformers can take heart from the way such reforms have played out. Even with campaign
finance reforms in place for two decades, Maine and Arizona progressives have not won clear
advantages compared to their counterparts in other New England and Southwest states.
Organizations working for economic, racial, or environmental justice do not seem to have gained
leverage or achieved clear advantages, and neither have Democrats.
More Research is Needed
There are clear gaps in research so far. Publicly financed elections have not been connected to
policies that reduce economic inequality, and candidates funded with public money have not
been shown to be more likely than other candidates to promote policies supported by
constituents. The American electorate is becoming more diverse, and studies show that women
and minorities frequently lack the financial resources and networks needed to run for office.
Public funding programs offer them opportunities to raise funds they otherwise could not. But
even though public financing of elections may reduce some of the barriers to running for office,
such programs do not clearly increase the likelihood of election victories for female candidates
or candidates of color. If public financing is to be touted as a method to reduce economic
inequality, diversify elected officeholders, and enhance democratic accountability, further and
more sophisticated studies will have to document such results.
Moving forward, Seattle will be a key place to study. The city has instituted a first-of-its-kind
local election law known as the Democracy Voucher Program, which gives eligible residents
four $25 vouchers they can donate to candidates of their choice. Because the new Seattle
approach is quite different from previous “Clean Elections” programs that offer lump sums and
contribution matching, it could have different effects on campaigns, election results, and policy.
However, given that Democrats in Seattle are more likely to accept public financing than
Republicans, investigations in conservative jurisdictions will also be crucial. South Dakota, for
instance, recently passed a public financing referendum and its effects can be tracked by
researchers.
Reforms That Work
If campaign contribution limits and public financing do not necessarily change government
policies or shift balances of power, what kinds of reforms might further such results? Policies
that facilitate – or restrict – voting and organizing may be much more consequential than rules
affecting flows of money. In the past few years, right-wing GOP state legislatures have enacted
many new restrictions on voting and union organizing – because, as conservatives understand,
such restrictions do impact electoral outcomes and government functioning.
Improving Access to Voting: Older, wealthier Americans are far more likely to vote than
young, middle and low-income citizens. Such inequalities figure in all elections, but are worst in
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midterm and off-cycle elections. Various reforms can mitigate such inequalities by making voter
registration and actual voting easier – and by timing elections to maximize broad public interest.
Election Day registration has the longest proven track record of reducing class bias in turnout –
and reforms like universal vote-by-mail, moving municipal elections to even year elections, and
Automatic Voter Registration show tremendous promise. And we know that when more
Americans from all backgrounds do vote, government officials respond. SSN members William
Franko, Nathan Kelly, and Chris Witko show that states with less “class bias” in voter turnout
are more responsive to public desires to reduce income inequality and more likely to support
measures like higher minimum wages.
Strengthening Organizing: Union membership has been in decline for a generation. This is
troubling since there is a tight correlation between robust labor unions and stronger social safety
nets. States and cities can use the power of purse to favor unionized firms for contracts and can
nurture strong public sector unions as well. Still, in the face of a hostile federal landscape and the
rapid spread of right to work laws, new solutions are necessary. The long history of unions and
citizen associations active in campaigns to reduce political, economic, and racial inequalities
shows the value of investing in nationwide federated membership organizations that collect dues
and deliver tangible benefits to their members. Interestingly, in recent decades, the right has been
able to rely on large federated organizational networks like the National Rifle Association,
Christian right associations, and Americans for Prosperity, even as the left has been hampered by
the decline of unions.
A Time for Experiments
In addition to studying the implementations of new forms of public financing, it is time to
experiment with new approaches to reducing political inequality. For example, new models of
labor organizing may be possible outside the traditional purview of the National Labor Relations
Act. And there may be new ways to recruit leaders. Stanford University’s Adam Bonica suggests
a system of civic scholarships, like MacArthur Genius Awards, to give promising leaders from
all walks of life the economic wherewithal and specialized knowledge to run for office; and Nick
Carnes of Duke University argues for programs to train candidates, especially from working
class backgrounds.
Finally, Lee Drutman of New America points out that lobbying capacity may be more unequally
distributed than campaign money. He suggests providing public lobbying dollars to help
grassroots organizations bring citizens to meet with elected officials and develop ongoing
reciprocal relationships with policymakers. In addition, much could be done to improve the
knowledge base, staff capacity, and research resources available to elected legislators, because
research shows that legislators tend to turn to privileged outside interests when they lack staff
capacities of their own. Experiments could be done using all of these ideas and findings – and
further research on what really works to reduce political inequality could suggest even more new
possibilities.
Scholars consulted:
Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Drexel University
Adam Bonica, Stanford University
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January 2017
Heath Brown, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York
Nick Carnes, Duke University
Lee Drutman, New America Foundation
Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Columbia University
Pat Flavin, Baylor University
Erika Franklin Fowler, Wesleyan University
Joshua Kalla, University of California, Berkeley
David Kimball, University of Missouri, St. Louis
Ray La Raja, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Adam Levine, Cornell University
Michael Miller, Barnard College
Paul Pierson, University of California, Berkeley
Elizabeth Rigby, George Washington University
Shauna Shames, Rutgers University, Camden
Dara Strolovitch, Princeton University
Ed Walker, University of California Los Angeles
Christopher Witko, University of South Carolina
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January 2017