Welcome to the Introduction to Special Operations Forces course lesson on Special
Operations.
In this lesson we will discuss the term Special Operations and identify some of the
characteristics, requirements, and advantages of Special Operations, as well as, some
of the differences between Special Operations and conventional operations.
To understand Special Operations warfare we need to first answer “What are Special
Operations?” This understanding is necessary to appropriately and effectively
conduct planning, execute operations, resource, support, and integrate Special
Operations without competition but as a complement to conventional forces and
other governmental agencies.
Most armed forces are designed as large organizations for employment against
military threats. The equipment, training, and tactics are standardized for application
to a wide range of operations. Conventional forces conduct operations with baseline
tactical units against tactical level objectives. Special Operations provide an option to
conduct Tactical Operations using direct or indirect methods to achieve strategic and
operational level objectives. Understanding what Special Operations are is a
foundation to build follow on learning about Special Operations Forces, core tasks,
and employment.
Depending on one’s frame of reference, past experiences, and individual notions the
term Special Operations can have a different meaning and be easily confusing with
other terms and acronyms. Before proceeding it is important to fully understand
some terms and acronyms that are easily confused. Special Operations or SO which
are acts or activities.
Special Operations Forces or SOF are forces or units of the military services
designated by the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support Special Operations.
Examples of Special Operations Forces include units such as the Army’s 75 th Ranger
Regiment, the Navy’s SEAL Team 10 and Special Boat Unit 22, the Air Force’s 320th
Special Tactics Squadron and 353rd Special Operations Group and the Marine’s 1st
Marine Special Operations battalion.
Special Forces or SF are specific U.S. Army Forces, organized, trained, and equipped to
conduct Special Operations with an emphasis of unconventional warfare capabilities.
At the individual level, Special Forces are those individuals who have attended and
successfully completed a qualification course and been awarded the Army Green
Beret.
Doctrinally, Special Operations are Tactical Operations conducted using either direct
or indirect methods to achieve strategic or operational level objectives using military
capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.
In addition to achieving military objectives, Special Operations can also be used to
support the application of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of
power.
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SO can be conducted in all environments but are particularly well suited for denied,
hostile and politically sensitive environments.
Special Operations can be conducted independently or in support of conventional
forces, other U.S. government agencies, or partner nations and may include
operations by, with, or through indigenous, insurgent, or irregular forces.
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To fully understand the doctrinally definition of Special Operations we need to look at the
definitions of each of the levels of war.
Strategic level of war — The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of
nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security
objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these
objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives;
sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other
instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those
objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic
plans.
Operational level of war — The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are
planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other
operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational
objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the
operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain
these events.
Tactical level of war — The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and
executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at
this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to
each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.
Special Operations are tactical operations, engagements, or activities that can have an
immediate effect at the operational and strategic levels of war.
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Special Operations differ from conventional operations in a number of ways. They require specialized
personnel and equipment along with special tactics, techniques, and procedures exceeding that
resident in conventional forces.
These specialized forces require regional expertise, cultural knowledge, and language skills. Many of
America’s Special Operations Forces are focused on a specific geographic region of the globe. The
ability to speak the host nation language(s) coupled with an in depth understanding of the culture are
powerful tools when trying to establish relationships, trust, and mutual respect.
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Special Operations tend to accept a higher degree of physical or political risk. In many cases their
objective is a high value target located in a denied area and away from friendly support bases and
combat support units.
Operating in small teams, Special Operations Forces will often be numerically inferior to their
adversaries. This requires the implementation of risk mitigation measures into the operation. Given
the situation the decision to conduct a special operation can have a high degree of political risk, but it
can also reduce the chance of escalation.
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Special Operations rely on a variety of unique modes of employment in order to infiltrate and
exfiltrate to and from a target area undetected.
Examples include freefall airborne operations which could be either high altitude high opening
(HAHO) and high altitude low opening (HALO) techniques.
Other modes include SCUBA operations or the use of underwater submersibles and low-level terrainfollowing fixed and rotary-wing operations.
All of these different modes represent unique capabilities that are not resident in conventional forces.
They require specialized equipment and training which is often of higher physical risk than that of
conventional operations.
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Special Operations are quite often dependent on very detailed and real-time intelligence
requirements. Depending on the mission, this could include things like guard schedules, the height
and thickness of walls, precise locations of both friendly and hostile forces, which way doors open
and close, to name a few.
Additionally, the level of intelligence collect efforts to conduct Special Operations against widely
dispersed global terrorist threats are far different than those required in traditional warfare. In
traditional warfare it takes a relatively low level of effort and resources to find the enemy but a
substantial amount of resources to defeat them.
Take the cold war for example; we knew where the Soviet forces were located, their order of battle,
what equipment they had, and their capabilities. They were not hard to find because they
maneuvered in very large formations and quite often did not try to conceal themselves.
Consequentially it took a rather low level of effort to find the enemy but a substantial effort to engage
and finish them.
The current campaign against violent extremis organizations is just the opposite. It requires a
substantial level of effort and resources to find the target but a much smaller force to quickly conduct
a finishing operation.
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Special Operations are often conducted at great distances from major operating bases with operating
units widely separated and disbursed across the operational area. This makes Special Operations
independent from friendly support and service support and more reliant on indigenous support and
assets.
Because Special Operations are conducted over extended distances they require sophisticated and
redundant voice, data, and video communications that can literally communicate around the world.
Additionally, those systems must be compatible across the service Special Operations Forces or
Special Operations information enterprise as well as with the conventional forces.
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Special Operations are typically defined by one or more of the following
characteristics:
• Low visibility or clandestine operations
• Conducted across the entire range of military operations
• Complimentary to conventional operations
• Often conducted by, with, or through non-U.S. forces
• Direct and indirect approaches
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Special Operations are typically low visibility or clandestine operations. Low visibility
operations incorporate actions to limit the exposure of those involved and/or their
actions. Examples include the use of civilian aircraft and vehicles or unmarked
Department of Defense aircraft to travel or the wearing of civilian clothes to reduce
the U.S. signature.
Clandestine operations are operations conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy
or concealment of the operation. Clandestine operations differ from covert
operations which are operations that do not necessarily hide the operation or act but
rather hide the sponsor of the act. Covert operations provide the sponsor plausible
denial. The Department of Defense does not typically perform covert operations.
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Special Operations are conducted across the full range of military operations from
peacetime engagement to major operations and campaigns. They are typically an
integral part of a theater campaign plan.
Although Special Operations can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific
theater or national objectives, they are most often designed and conducted to
support the overall success of the geographic combatant commands’ campaign plan.
Special Operations do not substitute or compete with conventional operations but
rather support and complement them.
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Special Operations are often conducted using indigenous or surrogate forces. The
use of non-U.S. forces has several advantages to include providing legitimacy to the
operation and reaching a resolution favorable to the United States or its allies
without the need for an overt U.S. conventional force commitment.
The opening days of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan provides a good
example of the use of indigenous forces. In early October 2001 U.S. Special
Operations Forces infiltrated into Afghanistan, linked up with insurgent forces of the
Northern Alliance and assisted them in overthrowing the Taliban controlling the
country. The initial U.S. force operating with the Northern Alliance was two teams,
twenty-four men, from the Army’s Fifth Special Forces Group.
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Special Operations have some unique requirements.
• They rely on individuals and small units proficient in specialized, nonconventional
combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation.
• Special Operations normally require precise tactical-level planning, detailed
intelligence, and knowledge of the culture and language of the area in which the
mission is to be executed.
• Rigorous and often unique training, along with detailed mission rehearsals, are
integral to the conduct of most Special Operations.
• And, as previously pointed out, Special Operations often rely on the use of
sophisticated or unique methods of insertion and extraction from hostile, denied,
or politically sensitive areas conducted at great distances from friendly support
and sanctuary.
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Strategic or operational objectives are often more vulnerable to a small unit than to large conventional
formations.
Special Operations provide military responses that minimize political liability or risk of escalation
associated with larger more visible build up and use of conventional forces.
Well equipped and proficient forces can be deployed to avoid detection and failure in order to accomplish
politically sensitive missions.
Finally, the results of Special Operations are normally disproportionate to the size of the force employed.
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Special Operations are conducted using direct and indirect approaches. Both approaches are designed to
influence the behavior of adversaries.
These approaches enable the full potential of Special Operations Forces capabilities. They can be applied
across the range of military operations and can be employed separately, intertwined and simultaneously.
How and when the approaches are applied depends on the objective or desired end-state.
Keep in mind that direct and indirect approaches are activities, not people, units, or capacities.
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The direct approach is a short, sharply focused offensive action to isolate and
defeat a threat.
Direct approaches focus on the physical or material such as a specific terrorist
or critical piece of infrastructure.
These activities are normally associated with violent kinetic actions and have
clarity of purpose and a clearly defined aim. The direct approach is
characterized by technologically-enabled small-unit precision lethality,
focused intelligence, and interagency cooperation integrated on a digitallynetworked battlefield.
Extreme in risk, precise in execution, and able to deliver a high payoff, the
effects of the direct approach are immediate, often visible to the public and
have tremendous effects on the enemies’ networks.
They are decisive at impact but do not necessarily achieve a definite end
state.
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Indirect approaches are focused on the psychological.
They seek to prepare, shape and influence the environment, and target the
minds of an adversary and/or a population.
Indirect approaches are normally much longer in duration than direct
approaches, some may take decades. They are normally planned for and
executed in a protracted, methodical, and deliberate manner and are often
conducted by, with, or through surrogate or indigenous forces to preserve
legitimacy or obscure the sponsor.
Special Operations activities that support the indirect approach include
training, equipping, advising, and supporting foreign or partner nation forces,
Civil Affairs operations and the conduct of both tactical and strategic level
information support operations and campaigns.
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The services all have some sort of mantra that identifies the realm in which they
operate. The mantra of the Air Force for example is airpower. Airpower is the
application of military strategy and strategic theory to aerial warfare. The mantra of
the Navy is Sea Power. It refers to the projection of military power and strategy from
the sea.
SOF doesn’t really have a mantra since they tend to work in more than one realm.
However, the concept of applying or conducting Special Operations by direct and
indirect methods might actually be looked at or considered the SOF mantra. The way
SOF applies direct and indirect methods depends on a number of different variables
and is comparable to the theory of Yin and Yang.
The Taoist theory of Yin Yang is used to describe how polar opposites or seemingly
contrary forces are interconnected and interdependent in the natural world, and how
they give rise to each other in turn. Yin Yang are not opposing forces, but
complementary opposites, unseen and seen that interact within a greater whole, as
part of a dynamic system.
We can relate this theory to the direct and indirect approaches SOF use to conduct
operations. No matter which approach is being used or which one is weighed more if
using both in concert SOF are always prepared to rapidly transition from one method
to the other and back again as the operating environment dictates.
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The Doolittle Raid conducted in the early days of World War two offers an excellent historical
example of a special operation.
Following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, Japanese forces were
rampaging through the Pacific capturing Wake Island and Guam and attacking the Philippine Islands.
America did not have the capability to retaliate against Tokyo. We did not have Army Air Corps bases
in proximity to launch an attack on Japan and the Navy did not have the capability to get close
enough to Japan to launch aircraft carrying a payload of any significance. The Japanese seemed
unstoppable and American morale was severely low.
In January of 1942 a project was devised to launch Army Air Corps B-25 bombers off of a Navy aircraft
carrier. The objective of the project was to bomb the industrial centers of Japan. It was hoped that
the damage done would be both material and psychological. Material damage was to the destruction
of specific targets with ensuing confusion and retardation of production.
The psychological results, it was hoped, would be the recalling of combat equipment from other
theaters for home defense, thus affecting some level of relief in those theaters, the development of a
fear complex in Japan, improved relationships with our allies, and a favorable reaction on the
American people.
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In order to meet the mission parameters the aircraft were specially modified to carry more fuel and
conduct bomb targeting from 1,500 feet. To accommodate these modifications other equipment was
removed, including tail guns, the lower gun turret, radios, and the normal targeting sight which
weighed several hundred pounds. One of the aircraft pilots devised a simple, cheap, and lightweight
targeting site to replace the normal aircraft sight. In fact the materials for the improvised sight cost
only twenty cents. Another innovative idea was to replace the removed tail guns with broomsticks
painted black to give the appearance of weapons.
The crews were all volunteers. Initially they volunteered for a mission that would be extremely
hazardous, require a high degree of skill and be of great value to the nations’ defense efforts. They
were not told of the exact mission until they reported for training and rehearsals at Eglin Field,
Florida. Once advised of the mission, they were given an opportunity to revoke their volunteer
statements, but none did.
The plan called for the aircraft to launch from a point 400 miles off the east coast of Tokyo just before
dark, bomb at night, and then fly on to recovery fields in China. To improve bombing accuracy one
plane would take off ahead of the others and fire bomb flammable areas of the city for the other
planes to use as navigation aids. The plan allowed the planes to take off during daylight hours and
arrive at their recovery fields in China prior to darkness.
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Unfortunately the best laid plans are subject to the fogs and frictions of war. At around 0730 on the
18th of April 1942 the Naval Task Force, still some 800 miles from Japan, was spotted by a Japanese
picket boat. Although the vessel was sunk by the task force, there was concern that the element of
surprise might be lost. This resulted in a decision to launch the mission immediately.
An immediate launch, eight to nine hours earlier than planned, would result in daylight attack and a
night time recovery in China. Both of these would significantly increase risk to the aircrews.
Nevertheless, between 0820 and 0920 hours on 18 April 1942, sixteen specially modified aircraft and
eighty men, five per aircraft, departed without incident from the aircraft carrier Hornet on a historic
mission.
Although the bombings were successfully carried out, all of the aircraft involved were lost and eleven
crewmen were killed or captured. The actual physical damage caused by the bombings was negligible
but the strategic effects of the mission were enormous.
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From a psychological aspect the morale of the American public skyrocketed while the Japanese
psyche was severely wounded. Japan’s leaders believed they were invulnerable to an American
attack and made the people believe they were untouchable. However, the daring daylight raid by
American bombers over Tokyo shook the confidence of the Japanese people and caused doubt in
their military leaders.
Militarily, Japan was forced to recall some of its front line forces and instead commit them to
homeland defense. These forces included Japan’s main carrier battle force operating in the Indian
Ocean, which was wreaking havoc against British naval forces and merchant shipping in order to
extend their sea and air picket lines further out to sea. This recall removed a significant amount of
pressure on British forces operations in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, the appearance of twinengine land-based bombers confused the Japanese high command about the source of the attack. It
was later concluded that this strengthened Admiral Yamamoto’s resolve to capture Midway Island
which subsequently resulted in a decisive American victory at the battle of Midway.
The Doolittle raid, which was officially named Special Aviation Project Number One, clearly fits the
doctrinal definition of a special operation and demonstrated many of the characteristics of a special
operation, along with some of the differences from conventional operations. It was a tactical
operation to achieve strategic level objectives. It was accomplished by a small number of specially
trained volunteer forces using modified equipment and tactics that were not routinely resident in the
nation’s conventional forces. The mission demonstrated a capability that the Japanese didn’t know
the United States possessed, was carried out far from friendly lines of support, had a high level of
physical risk to the aircraft and crews, and the recovery phase of the operation was completely
independent of friendly support relying totally on Chinese civil and military assistance.
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This concludes the first lesson in the course. To sum up the lesson:
• Special Operations are tactical level operations best applied to achieve operational
or strategic level effects.
• They are different from conventional operations and have unique characteristics,
requirements and advantages.
• Special Operations are applied across the full range of military operations using
both direct and indirect methods which can be applied separately, intertwined, or
simultaneously.
• Special Operations compliment rather than substitute conventional operations and
should be planned for during development of the theater campaign plan.
• Understanding the characteristics, attributes, and requirements of Special
Operations provides a fundamental understating of the types of missions that U.S.
Special Operations Forces perform. In our next lesson we will look at the
command relationships and authorities in joint doctrine and apply them to Special
Operations Forces.
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