8/31/2015
Campaign Finance and the Supreme Court
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CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND THE SUPREME COURT
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Overview
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The 10th amendment to the U.S.
Constitution preserves for the states all
powers not explicitly delegated to the
federal government.
Overview
Buckley v. Valeo
First National Bank of Boston
About State Legislatures
Agriculture and Rural Development
Civil and Criminal Justice
Education
Elections and Campaigns
Campaign Finance
This amendment provides the basis for
states controlling the administration of
elections, including regulation of
campaign finance. Congress plays a role
in election administration, and agencies
like the FEC and EAC provide regulations, but the majority of election
management is done at the state level.
v. Bellotti
Though states must foot the bill and institute provisions for elections and any
campaign finance regulations, the federal government retains judicial review over
these in the form of U.S. Supreme Court rulings. Binding for all 50 states, these
decisions oftentimes force states to amend or completely change their election
protocols. Each state is also subject to decisions from both local and federal
courts.
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Ethics
Government PAC
Financial Services and Commerce
This page provides an overview of some of the most important Supreme Court
decisions dealing with Campaign Finance. For more information on the methods
state use to regulate campaign finance, head back to the Campaign Finance
Overview page. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
Significance: Contribution limits are constitutional, expenditure limits are not.
Election Administration
Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley
Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce
McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission
Initiative and Referendum
StateVote Election Results and Analysis
Energy
Environment and Natural Resources
Fiscal Policy
Health
Human Services
Randall v. Sorrell
Davis v. Federal Election
Commission
Immigration
International
Labor and Employment
Military and Veterans Affairs
Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission
McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission
Summary: Any discussion of campaign finance­related Supreme Court decisions
Additional Resources
has to start with Buckley, which represents the court’s reaction to the passage of
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in 1971. After Congress amended the
About This Project
FECA in 1974 to (1) limit and require disclosure of contributions, (2) limit
expenditures, and (3) mandate participation in a publically financed presidential
CONTACT
election program, both Republicans and Democrats filed suit claiming these
provisions violated both First Amendment free speech protections and Fifth
NCSL's election team, 303­
Amendment Due Process guarantees. The court agreed in part, striking down
864­7700
limits on expenditures, making public financing optional, upholding the FECA
disclosure requirements, and allowing limits on contributions. These contribution
limits were upheld because they act as a deterrent to pro quo corruption, where contributors to campaigns are given
preferential treatment because of their financial assistance. Buckley established the principle that political money is
speech, because “virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society require the expenditure of
money.” After this case, many states implemented contribution limits in line with the federal limits outlined in the FECA,
which would come under attack 24 years later in Nixon.
Redistricting
State­Tribal Institute
Telecommunications and Information
Technology
Transportation
Share this: First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
Significance: States cannot prohibit corporations from contributing money to ballot proposals.
Summary: When Massachusetts legislators prohibited corporations from donating to ballot initiatives that did not
directly affect their business, First National Bank and other corporations filed suit. Justice Powell wrote the decision,
which allowed corporations to make contributions to ballot initiatives, because “the inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual.” (776)
We are the nation's most respected bipartisan
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connections and a strong voice on Capitol Hill.
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981)
Significance: There can be no contribution limits to ballot initiatives.
Summary: A companion case to First National Bank, this case saw the Court decide that state governments have no
compelling interest in limiting speech, including money, about ballot issues. Recognizing that contribution limits help to
limit quid pro quo corruption, the court ruled that “[w]hatever may be the state interest . . . in regulating and limiting
contributions to or expenditures of a candidate . . . there is no significant state or public interest in curtailing debate
and discussion of a ballot measure.” As a result, the California law that set contribution limits on ballot initiative
campaigns was invalidated.
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
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Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
Significance: Corporations must keep a separate account from which they can make political contributions, usually
by establishing a PAC.
Summary: A challenge to the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, which barred corporations from using money from
their own treasury to make political contributions, came before the court. The court upheld the Michigan statute,
because it was “precisely targeted to eliminate the distortion caused by corporate spending while also allowing
corporations to express their political views.”
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000)
Significance: States can also limit the amount of money that any one individual or group can contribute to a state
campaign.
Summary: While the Buckley decision allowed the FEC to cap contributions at $1,000 to federal campaigns, the court
remained silent about contributions to state campaigns until 1998, when Missouri legislators passed a statute setting
the contribution limit for state campaigns at $1,075. Nixon, a candidate for statewide office in Missouri, challenged this
statute, claiming it violated his freedom of speech and due process protections. The court disagreed, wary of the
corruption “inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions to candidates for public office.”
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)
Significance: This case was the first to recognize the link between “soft money” and corruption. Summary: This case is the court’s reaction to the passage of the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of
2002. BCRA imposed bans on soft money (money contributed to political parties for purposes other than supporting
or opposing a candidate, such as to run voter registration drives), and placed limits on advertising by corporations
and PACs immediately preceding an election. Because “there is substantial evidence to support Congress’
determination that large soft­money contributions to national political parties give rise to corruption and the
appearance of corruption,” this provision of the BCRA was upheld. Later, in Citizens United, the court overruled the
portion of McConnell that allowed prohibitions on corporate indpendent expenditures. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006)
Significance: States cannot limit independent expenditures, and must ensure their contribution limits are high
enough to enable the candidate to run an effective campaign.
Summary: Randall involved a Vermont law that limited independent expenditures and set the strictest contribution
limits in the country (allowing a maximum contribution of $400 for a gubernatorial campaign). The court affirmed its
position on independent expenditures, ruling they do not directly affect campaigns or candidates and must be allowed
as free speech. The court also struck down the Vermont contribution limit as unconstitutionally low, as they “prevent
candidates from amassing the resources necessary for effective campaign advocacy.” As a result, states now must
not set their contribution limits so low as to make it difficult to run a campaign and all its related expenses.
Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)
Significance: “Triggering” provisions found in many public financing statutes are unconstitutional.
Summary: Portions of the federal BCRA were challenged by a candidate for New York state senate, who believed
disclosure requirements of the BCRA infringed upon the First Amendment. Electing to finance his own campaign,
Davis was required by the BCRA to disclose just how much money he intended to spend on campaigning. When this
number crossed certain thresholds, Davis’ opponent was allowed to receive contributions in excess of the state’s
limits. The court held that this provision “impermissibly burdens his First Amendment right to spend his own money for
campaign speech.” Davis’ campaign was essentially a series of independent expenditures, and thus could not be
limited and cannot trigger an increase in contribution limits for his opponent.
The elimination of this provision led many states, including Arizona, to strip similar language from their public financing
regulations, decreasing the attractiveness of these programs.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
Significance: States cannot place limits on the amount of money corporations, unions, or PACs use for
electioneering communications, as long as the group does not directly align itself with a candidate.
Summary: The limits on advertising by corporations and PACs that helped frame the McConnell decision came into
play again during the 2008 presidential campaign. When Citizens United tried to run ads critical of Senator Hillary
Clinton close to the 2008 Democratic primary, it was barred from doing so by the BCRA. When brought to the
Supreme Court, Justice John Roberts, on behalf of the majority, struck down provisions of the BCRA that prohibited
corporations, unions, and PACs from making independent expenditures and election communications, as “the
government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.” After this decision,
corporations and unions can spend unlimited sums of money on ads and other communications designed to support
or oppose a candidate. Corporations are still prohibited from contributing directly to federal candidates, but can
contribute unlimited sums to organizations, such as Super PACs and 501(c)4s, that support or oppose a candidate
(Speechnow.org v. FEC).
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014)
Significance: States can place a limit on how much any individual or group contributes to any one campaign, but
cannot impose aggregate limits on how much and individual or group contributes to all campaigns during an election
cycle.
Summary: Another challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act came in regard to aggregate contribution limits.
While the FECA imposed a limit on how much individuals could contribute to any one candidate, individuals were able
to donate to as many candidates as they pleased, provided they did not cross the aggregate threshold, set at
$46,200 for the 2012 election cycle. Shaun McCutcheon challenged this limit as a violation of his freedom of speech.
Chief Justice John Roberts and the majority agreed with McCutcheon, striking down the aggregate contribution limits.
“Campaign finance restrictions that pursue other objectives [besides suppressing quid pro quo corruption] . . .
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“Campaign finance restrictions that pursue other objectives [besides suppressing quid pro quo corruption] . . .
impermissibly inject the government into the debate over who should govern.” The court ruled that there is not enough
evidence that the ability to contribute to as many candidates as one pleases influences quid pro quo corruption in
politics. In order to impose these kinds of limits, states must be able to prove the link between contributions and
corruption, which remains an extremely difficult task. These cases represent some of the most important campaign finance cases heard by U.S. Supreme Court. It is
important to remember that your state or jurisdiction must also adapt to decisions rendered by state and local courts.
The FEC posts in­depth information about these and other important campaign finance cases at this link.
Additional Resources
For more information on ways states regulate campaign finance, see the pages on Disclosure and Reporting
Requirements, Public Financing and Contribution Limits.
Campaign Finance Helpful Links
NCSL's 2015 Database of Campaign Finance Legislation
About This NCSL Project
The content for this webpage was created by Brian Cruikshank from William and Mary Law School, in coordination with
NCSL's staff. If you don't find the information you need, please contact our elections team at 303­864­7700 or elections­
[email protected]. NCSL staff can do specialized searches for legislators and legislative staff. NCSL Member Toolbox
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