Nationalism and Violence: A Mechanismic Explanation
With Special Reference to the Theories of Charles Tilly and Michael Mann
Andreas Pickel
[email protected]
Working Paper CSGP 07/1
Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada
www.trentu.ca/globalpolitics
1. The Problem
“Sovereignty is the issue, and political and geopolitical instability is the process in
which things can get really nasty. Without their combination, riot cycles ensue,
not truly murderous ethnic cleansing.” (Mann 2005, 501)
Nationalism is implicated in a whole range of direct and indirect, mass and small scale
manifestations of violence – from genocide to individual acts of Auslanderhass.1 Though
this is an undisputable fact, the question is, how exactly is nationalism related to
violence, in particular collective violence? What are the social mechanisms –political,
economic, psychological – that account for the relationship? And what is the nature of
this relationship – causal, necessary, historical, contingent? Drawing on Charles Tilly’s
work on collective violence and Michael Mann’s work on ethnic cleansing, this paper
attempts to identify the crucial mechanisms turning nationalism violent.
Some of the usual suspects involved in nationalism and violence are familiar from
the nationalism literature. The problem with conventional approaches to nationalism –
perennialism, primordialism, various structuralisms, ethno-symbolism – is that they
explain both violent and non-violent forms of nationalism, but do not supply us with
reliable tools to distinguish between them. There is a similar problem with different
approaches to violence, whether ideal or behavioural. They are useful as a starting point,
but inadequate as a systematic account of violence.2 For any analysis of nationalism and
violence attempting to go beyond specific historical cases in search of more widely
applicable generalizations, a number of basic questions arise immediately. Are some
nationalisms violent “by nature” while others are peaceful? Is nationalism a general
ideology with local variants, like liberalism or conservatism; or is the nationalism of each
1
The range of what “nationalism and violence” can refer to is illustrated by two periods in Germany’s
history of nationalist violence. Under the Nazi regime, 6 million lost their lives in the holocaust, 60 million
died as a result of World War II, brought on and sustained by aggressive nationalism. In post-unification
Germany since 1990, upwards of 135 people were killed in extreme right violence (Former 2007). This
paper is interested primarily in the relationship between nationalism and collective violence rather than
individual acts of violence. It uses “nationalist violence” and “violent nationalism” interchangeably to refer
to this relationship.
2
I rely on, but in the limited scope of this paper cannot present in any detail, Charles Tilly’s (2003)
conceptualization of collective violence.
1
nation sui generis, and more or less violent? Does a nation have one or many
nationalisms, each more or less violent? Do nationalisms change over time, especially
with respect to violence? Is nationalism an outdated and violence-prone ideology in the
age of globalization? Is nationalism best understood as an ideology, or is it something
more broadly cultural, internally inconsistent, diverse, and ephemeral, even “banal”? Or
is nationalism like all ideologies irrelevant for explanatory purposes, a mere
epiphenomenon of the real material structures that breed violence?
The findings to be presented here cannot avoid the questions and problems raised
above. Answers to these fundamental questions are, logically speaking, prior to any
theories of nationalism and violence. Yet fundamental questions of this kind are rarely
stated explicitly and de facto answers are usually contained in implicit assumptions. This
analysis of the relationship between nationalism and violence invests up front in
conceptual clarification in order to put theoretical and empirical work on a firmer – or at
least on an explicit – foundation (sections 2-3). The paper then moves to a systematic
discussion of the relationship between nationalism and violence (sections 4-5). The
following theoretical points and arguments will be made:
1. Nationalizing mechanisms never work on their own to produce violence but always
combine with other social and biosocial mechanisms. Nationalism as such is therefore
neither violent nor non-violent. Nationalism as such is banal and its relationship with
violence highly contingent.
2. a. There are no special nationalizing mechanisms that keep nationalism from turning
violent.
2. b. There are no special nationalizing mechanisms that make nationalism turn violent.
In both cases, they are the normal nationalizing mechanisms that are always at work.
They are sometimes involved in producing violence, while at other times they help keep
the peace or are instrumental in bringing about collective achievements. Obviously,
nationalizing mechanisms are by definition always involved in nationalist violence, but in
explanatory terms they are secondary.
2
3. a. There are no special social-psychological mechanisms that keep nationalism from
turning violent.
3. b. There are no special social-psychological mechanisms that make nationalism turn
violent.
While often involved in the spread or containment of nationalism, there are no particular
social or psychological mechanisms responsible for the presence or absence of violence.
In explanatory terms, these mechanisms are secondary.
4. a. There are special political mechanisms that keep nationalism from turning violent.
4. b. There are special political mechanisms that make nationalism turn violent.
Political mechanisms are always involved in both the occurrence and the avoidance of
nationalist violence. In explanatory terms, these mechanisms are primary.
5. To say that nationalism causes violence is therefore a faulty diagnosis. The
counterintuitive conclusion of this analysis is that nationalism is never the major cause of
violence, and may even be a major part of the cure.3
When it comes to collective violence, nationalism is often involved, but along with other
social and psychological mechanisms it represents a secondary set of mechanisms that are
systematically mistaken for primary mechanisms. The true primary mechanisms,
however, are political.
To explain and support each set of theses, some important preliminary work needs to be
done. In particular, this catalogue begs answers to the following questions: What is
nationalism? What are nationalizing mechanisms, and how do they combine with other –
political, economic, psychological – mechanisms to produce or prevent violence? These
questions will be addressed in section 3. Before sketching out a systematic conception of
nationalism as nationalizing mechanisms, the stage will be prepared by identifying some
typical theoretical and conceptual fallacies in nationalism studies.
3
Pacification or settlement of violent nationalist conflict has to work in the context of the nationalisms
involved, and may derive some positive elements from them.
3
2. Fallacies
The semantic fallacy
The meanings attached to the concept of nationalism are crucial for both nationalist
actors and scholars of nationalism, yet neither group has arrived at a general consensus
on what those meanings are. Different communities and different discourses attach
specific meanings to nationalism. Nationalism in post-World War II Germany, for
example, has always been associated with violence, and the genocide under the Nazi
regime has made the very concepts of nation and nationalism highly problematic in
German discourse. In this view, nationalism is violence – dormant or at a low level for
short periods of time, always ready to burst forth unless carefully checked and controlled
at all times. Nationalism is to be feared and confronted. In other countries, such as
Poland, nationalism carries strong positive connotations, it is a good thing, historically a
source of resistance to the violence that is perpetrated by outside forces and their internal
allies. It is to be proudly embraced and practiced. Not all views on nationalism are
simply pro or con, but for everyone nationalism has a direct and unreflected meaning
which is shaped by the discourse communities to which one belongs. Now the fallacy
consists in the implicit assumption that one’s own meaning of nationalism is the general
or true meaning of the concept. Even scholars, whose business after all is reflection,
rarely reflect upon the semantic aspects of their use of key concepts, and they therefore
remain beholden to the assumptions embedded in their particular cultures (cf.
Wierzbicka). (Wierzbicka, 2005)
The most relevant cultural context shaping the semantics of nationalism, not
surprisingly, is that of the national culture. Nationalism in post-World War II Germany
has probably the opposite semantic load that it has in Quebec or Scotland. All analysts of
nationalism belong to one or another national culture, whether they identify with it or not,
and therefore will carry with them the cultural semantics of their culture.4 Contrary to the
radical claims of linguistic philosophy, we are not life-long prisoners of our culture and
its semantics, yet we are also not the autonomous and detachable individuals of liberal
political philosophy. The fact that this applies to all of us who study nationalism is not a
4
Of course nationalism scholars also belong to other (sub)cultures and communities, in particular their
professional ones, that may reinforce, refine, or weaken the semantics of their national culture.
4
fallacy as such, but the lack of awareness or denial of one’s own cultural semantics is.
This brings us to the next, related fallacy, the normative fallacy.
The normative fallacy
Embedded in our cultural context is a normative orientation vis-à-vis nationalism. It is of
particular importance for scholars of nationalism because the distinction between
normative and empirical-theoretical approaches to nationalism is fundamental in
maintaining a distinction between the scholar and the apologist or critic (Boyer and
Lomnitz 2005). (Boyer & Lomnitz, 2005) Our cultural semantics, however, do not clearly
distinguish between normative and theoretical dimensions of nationalism. While
nationalism as a normative problem is central in many cultures, nationalism as an
explanatory problem is not. More accurately, the two are collapsed into one problem:
given what a particular nationalism is taken to be, it is in this or that situation good or
bad,5 for us or for them, and requires or rules out certain actions. In this sense, we are
talking about nationalism as an ideology. It is a hallmark of ideologies that they contain
“normative fallacies,” that is, they are designed to answer (and sometimes to reformulate)
concrete political and moral questions based on a particular view of reality. In this sense,
ideologies provide a necessary normative leap from is to ought, and from thought to
action.6
In contrast, scholars of nationalism should focus on explaining various
dimensions of reality producing and surrounding nationalism, so normative leaps should
be avoided (Max Weber). Perhaps it is the overpowering normative and political
significance of nationalism that has led so many social scientists (including Weber7) to
ignore nationalism as a topic of serious theoretical analysis (Szacki; Spillman). (Spillman
& Faeges, 2005; Szacki, 2004) Thus the normative fallacy has two sides: one is to study
nationalism based on a strong normative agenda (e.g. by demonstrating how good or bad
5
From a liberal perspective, “civic” and “ethnic” could substitute for “good” and “bad,” a distinction
whose normative and ideological character has been exposed. I agree, however, with Zubrzicky
(Zubrzycki, 2001) that, if used with care, the concepts of “civic nationalism” and “ethnic nationalism” can
be used for explanatory purposes.
6
A detailed and systematic discussion of the fundamental differences in form and purpose of theories,
ideologies, and policies can be found in Pickel 2006, (Pickel, 2006) ch. 4.
7
For an attempt to extract relevant material for a theory of nationalism from Weber, see (Norkus, 2004)
5
it is – a legitimate task for ideologues); the other is to ignore the study of nationalism
because of its strong “ideological contamination.”
The individualist fallacy
Since violence, like all social action, is something individual people engage in, when
trying to establish the role of nationalism it makes sense to ask why individuals commit
acts of violence. The individualist fallacy consists in the view that ultimately social
structures and collective actions have to be explained in terms of individuals
(methodological individualism). There are various approaches holding this view, from
rational choice and intentional models, to approaches focused on subjective ideas or
unconscious drives. There can be little doubt that ultimately it is not nations but
individuals who commit acts of violence, regardless of the scale of the violence. And
therefore these individuals’ reasons, choices, intentions, consciously held ideas and/or
unconscious drives must play a major explanatory role. The individualist fallacy consists
in the methodological assumption that individual-level factors are primary, while
systemic and relational factors are secondary. It is sufficient for present purposes to note
the relevance of this long-standing methodological debate in the social sciences for the
problem at hand. There is a corresponding collectivist or holist fallacy that reverses the
order of explanatory significance ((M. A. Bunge, 1998)). The position followed in this
paper is neither individualist nor holist but mechanismic and relational. Adopting this
approach (presented in section 3 below) will make an enormous difference in how the
question of nationalism and violence is conceptualized and examined.
A brief illustration of the centrality of the individualist fallacy comes from the
policy field. The most popular model for the control of violence in society assumes that
individuals’ violent impulses are at the root of the problem, and their social inhibition is a
major part of its solution. The impulse-inhibition model, however, may lead to faulty
policy conclusions if violent impulses are not the primary factors accounting for violent
action, as this paper will argue in the context of nationalist violence.
Essentialist fallacies
A well-known and widely criticized instance of the essentialist fallacy is to see
6
nationalism as a political ideology among others such as liberalism, conservatism,
environmentalism, feminism, or marxism. Traditionally given its own chapter in
textbooks on modern ideologies, nationalism is presented as a system of ideas. Of course
there are variations among nationalist ideologies, but the basic template is the same: a
system of political ideas in support of a nation’s right to self-determination. It is the
centrality of ideas which makes this approach into an idealist essentialism. Note that for
ideological purposes, idealist essentialism is not a fallacy but a necessity, since for a
national movement or state to be successful, a particular system of nationalist ideas that is
attractive and convincing is precisely what is needed. Admittedly, nationalism should in
part be explained in terms of the ideas surrounding it, but as I will argue in the next
section, nationalism should be conceptualized in different and much broader terms for
explanatory purposes.
There are other essentialist fallacies common in the study of nationalism that can
only be mentioned in passing. An early one, nowadays often ridiculed, is ethnographic
essentialism, according to which it is possible to identify nationally specific mental and
physical traits. A contemporary cousin, methodologically more sophisticated, is value
essentialism, which through social surveys tries to establish the prevalence of certain
collectively held values, as conceptualized by the researcher rather than as understood by
members of the culture ((Hofstede, 2001) ; critically: (Wierzbicka, 1997)). Another
essentialism with a long history in philosophy and the social sciences is materialist
essentialism, such as the view held by Marx and others that ideologies like nationalism
represent an instance of “false consciousness” in the context of class conflict. There is
also sociobiological essentialism, which argues that nationalism is basically small group,
biologically determined behaviour writ large (ref). The contemporary self-declared
counterposition to all essentialisms is radical constructivism8, i.e. the view that national
culture, nationalist ideology, national symbols, etc. are merely social constructions rather
than independent, objective realities. Variants of this view ironically can appear rather
essentialist themselves. Take, for instance, linguistic essentialism, which holds that
nations are constructed, and ultimately exist, only discursively ((Dryzek, 2006) ). To be
sure, all of these essentialisms capture important dimensions of reality, a point radical
8
One of the key texts is (Berger & Luckmann, 1966)
7
anti-essentialisms tend to deny, but they do remain partial and incomplete and are often
reductionist when informing explanations of nationalism and its effects. Nationalism in
general, and nationalism and its relationship to violence in particular, require a broader
conceptualization if we want to avoid these standard fallacies of analysis.
3. Nationalism
An adequate conceptualization of nationalism should fulfil the following requirements.9
First, it should be applicable cross-culturally, but without implicitly universalizing
features of nationalism that are in fact culture-bound, such as the distinction between
“civic” and “ethnic” nationalism. Since the meanings of key concepts from nation to
self-determination are not universal but semantically embedded in particular national
cultures, they need to be treated as such. We need an ontology of national culture and a
methodology of how to study it. I propose four central, partially overlapping dimensions
of national culture that together provide an encompassing conception that are nationally
specific but crossculturally applicable: knowledge, discourse, identity, and habitus.10
•
National culture as repertoire of common knowledge
The nation as process produces and reproduces general, cultural knowledge that is the
basis of all group-specific beliefs, including ideologies.
Such cultural knowledge, or cultural common-ground, may be defined as the (fuzzy) set of those
beliefs that are shared by (virtually) all competent members of a national culture, and that are held
to be true by those members by similarly shared criteria of truth. . . . [W]e may simply call this
the repertory of ‘common knowledge’ of a [national culture]. It is this knowledge that all new
members of a culture have to learn (e.g. during socialization, formal education, through the media,
etc.) in order to become competent members (van Dijk 1998, 37).
The repertory of common knowledge also provides a shared epistemic and moral order.
9
I provide a more detailed presentation of this conceptualization in Pickel (2006), ch. 6.
Note: there is often more than one national discourse or national identity in a given state; the crucial
point is that they all refer to the same national frame of reference (and therefore usually to each other). This
breakdown draws on (van Dijk, 1998), esp. 37, 39, 120, 126, 196. VanDijk’s project is to develop a new
concept of ideology “that serves as the interface between social structure and social cognition” (ibid., 8).
He is however opposed to the concept of habitus (ibid., 47) and does not speak about national culture.
10
8
All specific group beliefs as well as the very interaction, communication and mutual
understanding of members of different groups in society presuppose such cultural
knowledge. Cultural knowledge is therefore also the basis for all evaluative beliefs.
•
National discourse as meta-discourse
The nationalizing process occurs in large part as and through discourse.
National
discourse refers to all the text and talk, or the discourses of a whole national culture, in a
particular historical period. We may also use the very abstract and generic notion of the
‘discourse’ of that period, community or culture--including all possible discourse genres
and all domains of communication. In this sense, the national discourse is a metadiscourse.
•
National identity as social representations and process
In the same way that national groups may be said to share knowledge and attitudes, we
may assume that they share a social representation that defines their identity or “social
self” as a national group. “National identity as process” refers to the reproduction and
change in cognitions and social representations of the nation. Identity thus becomes a
process in which a national collectivity is engaged, rather than a property of individuals
and collectives.
•
National habitus as characteristic social practices
While national identity refers primarily to the cognitive realm, national habitus may be
defined in terms of the characteristic social practices of group members, including typical
forms of collective action. National habitus partially overlaps with national discourse,
but refers primarily to non-verbalized as well as unconscious social behavior. (Hassin,
Uleman, & Bargh, 2005)
A second requirement for an adequate conceptualization of nationalism is that it treats the
national as an explanatory problem11 rather than as a normative or political problem. The
power of nationalist ideologies and the devastation wreaked by collective violence in the
twentieth century in the name of the nation has made it extremely difficult for many
scholars to analytically remove their work from these ideological contexts. Similarly, the
11
Not only as explanandum, but also as explanans (see Pickel (Pickel, 2003))
9
faith in the legitimating and liberating power of particular nationalisms (defensive, anticolonial, etc.) has made it equally difficult for many other scholars to keep ideology and
politics at arms-length in their own work. Still others have simply avoided nationalism as
a theoretical problem. The central question for social science is, how does nationalism
work – in most general terms, at middle level of theory, and in specific historical cases
and periods. In addition to the conception of national culture just introduced, and
equipped with a critical awareness of the potential normative pitfalls of studying
nationalism, it is now possible to spell out a more specific methodology.
Neither methodological individualism – nations are merely the sum of individual
members – nor methodological holism – nations are social entities with their own
properties that shape individuals – are adequate to the task. The alternative methodology
proposed here focuses on processes and mechanisms. At the most general level, there is
an all-encompassing nationalizing process in the global system of the early twenty-first
century. Politically, the global system is a system of states in which internally and as
well as externally the national plays a key role in a myriad of political, economic,
cultural, and psychological processes. The conception of national culture introduced
above describes some of the elements of this grand nationalizing process which is at work
globally. What is generally perceived and referred to as “nationalism” is only the more
visible part of a larger nationalizing process.
While it is important to keep in mind the global and encompassing nature the
nationalizing process has achieved by the late-twentieth century, methodologically
speaking we need much more fine-grained tools to study specific nationalizing processes.
For this purpose, middle-level theorizing appears to be most promising.12 To be sure, the
levels to which this refers are not the territorial levels from the global to the national and
local that widely serve as basic categories in social analysis. In fact, specific
nationalizing processes occur at all these levels of analysis. It may make sense in the
context of certain explanatory problems to focus on specific levels – whether the
international level or the level of the classroom in a country’s primary school. While
nationalizing processes provide descriptions of nationalisms, nationalizing mechanisms
go deeper and are therefore crucial in their explanation. For example, a commonly
12
“Middle-level theorizing” (Merton) is closely related to mechanismic explanation. See (Pickel, 2004)
10
known nationalizing process occurs in the schooling of children who enter first grade for
the most part ignorant of large collectivities of any sort, but upon graduation leave as
conscious members of a nation. Specific nationalizing mechanisms include familiarizing
students with the nation’s history and values, implanting the idea that they belong to the
nation while others don’t, and demonstrating ways in which a good member of the nation
behaves. These nationalizing mechanisms explain how this particular nationalizing
process works by revealing how the knowledge, discourse, identity and habitus that
compose a national culture are passed on.
It is important to note two further points of methodological significance in this
context. The first is that since nationalizing mechanisms always occur in concrete (real)
social systems, such as a primary or secondary school in the example above, relevant
social systems have to be made explicit13 since they shape the working of these
mechanisms. Other social systems in which nationalizing mechanisms occur are
families, as well as economic and political organizations of various sorts. In fact, few
social entities today could be considered “nation-free.” The second point is that
nationalizing mechanisms never work alone but always in conjunction with other
mechanisms. To return to our school example, the nationalizing mechanisms mentioned
there only work in conjunction with teaching mechanisms. This may be obvious, but it is
not necessarily unproblematic, which is why such a mechanism might have to be taken
into account explicitly in an explanation of how national cultures are passed on. Teaching
approaches may or may not play a central role in how the nationalizing process in schools
works. In other explanatory contexts, there is no question that social mechanisms
combining with nationalizing mechanisms have to be identified since it is their particular
combination that explains how they work. For instance, the nationalizing mechanisms at
work in schools in the province of Ontario will be affected by what particular type of
school system with its particular mechanisms we are dealing with, such as public, private,
13
Of course some social systems that are widely considered to be self-evident, are primarily just a level of
analysis. The so-called “national level,” with “its” state, economy, culture and society enjoy the status of
self-evident systems in much current social science research when in fact this conceptualization assumes
what often needs to be explained, i.e. the composition, structure and working of concrete systems. An
unsatisfactory critique of “methodological nationalism” in defense of an ill-defined “cosmopolitan”
alternative, see (Beck & Sznaider, 2006) For a more balanced assessment of “methodological
nationalism,” see (Chernilo, 2006)
11
or religious schools in which the inculcation of civic-mindedness, class-consciousness or
faith may be primary.
For an explicit ontology of the national, it is useful to return briefly to the various
essentialisms discussed in the previous section. Nationalism is of course a type of
ideology, as idealist essentialism holds, but it is unlike other political ideologies.
Nationalism goes beyond the political, which is particularly well illustrated by countries
in which nationalism is said not to play a central role – think of England, Holland, or
Sweden.14 The semantics of nationalism, which mark it as a particular ideology such as
neoliberalism or conservatism, are misleading. There are many different nationalisms,
which is reflected in the fact that nationalism scholars have not been able to settle on a
common definition. In my view, nationalisms are part of larger and deeper social
realities, that is, they are part of concrete national cultures. The breadth and depth of the
national is reflected in my conception of national cultures as composed of national
knowledge, discourse, identity and habitus – from which any specific ideology of
nationalism is derives and in which it is firmly embedded.
The value approach to nationalism that attempts to establish beliefs, attitudes,
norms, etc. prominently held by individuals in particular national societies, while going
beyond the “nationalism as ideology” conception, is problematic for other reasons (
(McSweeney, 2002)). “Collectivism” or “individualism,” to name two commonly used
analytical constructs, do not necessarily have the same significance and meaning in the
national cultures that are being compared. Data on their relative strength derived from
international social surveys therefore offer at best rough indicators of underlying realities
that cannot be easily accessed through quasi-universal analytical concepts.(see
Wierzbicka on the general problem) The broader conception of national culture
advocated here could avoid the fallacies of the value approach by paying attention to
nationally specific knowledge, discourse, identity, and habitus structures.
Let me indicate in passing that other essentialisms mentioned earlier – materialist,
sociobiological, linguistic-constructivist – each highlight dimensions of biosocial and
symbolic reality that need to be part of a defensible conception of the national. The
14
On contemporary Swedish nationalism, see for example (Löfgren, 2000)
12
problem with these as with all essentialisms tends to be an ontological reduction of reality
to a favoured dimension, thus obviating the need for exploring the structure, working, and
potential multidirectional interaction between systems and mechanisms of other types.
4. Mechanisms
Although collective violence certainly occurs in conquest and revolution, it more frequently
results from governmental use of violent means to defend beneficiaries of inequality from
challenges by victims of inequality.
Victims of wars and other large-scale collective violence concentrate disproportionately in
countries where most people also live miserably in other regards. (Tilly 2003)
The quotations from Tilly’s book on collective violence remind us of two basic structural
facts: The powerful – whether classes, elites, countries, or organizations – control the
means of violence, and they frequently wield them against challengers of the inequality
enshrined in the status quo. The defense of the beneficiaries of inequality is perhaps the
most basic social mechanism accounting for violence and is reflected in all the specific
mechanisms – political, economic, cultural, and psychological15 – identified in this paper.
The conception of nationalizing mechanisms presented in section 3 focuses on
sociocultural processes surrounding national discourses, national knowledges, national
identities, and national habiti. If nationalizing mechanisms were claimed as ultimate
explanations for nationalist phenomena, including nationalism and violence, this view
would constitute another instance of idealist essentialism, albeit broader and more
sophisticated than the “nationalism as ideology” essentialism discussed in section 2. A
particular national culture or nationalism as such does not produce or prevent violence.
Rather, cultural mechanisms always work in combination with other social mechanisms –
political, economic, psychological. As thesis 1 argues, nationalism as such is banal and
its relationship with violence highly contingent. But at the same time, nationalizing
mechanisms provide opportunities for powerful combinations with political mechanisms.
We will explore these below.
15
Corresponding with the major types of social power. See (Mann, 1993)
13
Nationalizing mechanisms
Thesis 1: Nationalizing mechanisms never work on their own to produce violence but always
combine with other social and biosocial mechanisms. Nationalism as such is therefore neither
violent nor non-violent. Nationalism as such is banal and its relationship with violence highly
contingent.
If there is one master mechanism for nationalism, it is the sovereignty mechanism: it
combines a political mechanism – territorial control – with a cultural mechanism – the
perceived right of a nation to self-determination in its territory. The working of this
master mechanism goes a long way toward explaining both violent and non-violent
nationalisms. As has long been recognized, this is because all of the mechanism’s main
elements – territory, control, nation, and self-determination – are highly contestable and
potentially politically explosive. In a number of states, at least during certain periods of
their history, such contestation is minimal. It is widely assumed that where the contest
has been temporarily settled or is institutionalized in a stable fashion, the sovereignty
mechanism will not threaten violence.16 This assumption, however, represents an
explanatory oversimplification and a convenient political myth. Think of contemporary
Britain, a showpiece of stable democratic institutions, where nationalist violence has long
been endemic both internally (Northern Ireland) and externally (Falklands, Iraq most
recently, colonialism for centuries). In any event, the sovereignty mechanism alone,
which is at work globally, contains more than enough potential for violent contention.
But the sovereignty mechanism never works alone. It is the combination with other,
primarily political mechanisms that adds up to a more satisfactory explanation of
nationalism and violence, as will be argued further below.
Thesis 2. a. There are no special nationalizing mechanisms that keep nationalism from turning
violent.
Thesis 2. b. There are no special nationalizing mechanisms that make nationalism turn violent.
In both cases, they are the normal nationalizing mechanisms that are always at work. They are
sometimes involved in producing violence, while at other times they help keep the peace or are
instrumental in bringing about collective achievements.
16
Collective violence is of course precisely the problem the originators of the doctrine of sovereignty in the
sixteenth and seventeenth century tried to solve. See Pickel (2006), ch. 2.
14
Theses 2.a. and 2.b. advance the more specific claim that there are neither special
nationalizing mechanisms that turn nationalism violent, nor are there special
nationalizing mechanisms that prevent nationalism from turning violent. First consider
the following familiar mechanisms widely considered as safeguards against violence that
bring out the counterintuitive nature of 2.a.:
•
A national discourse that consistently defends human rights, especially nondiscrimination of ethnic minorities.
•
National memories that celebrate the nation’s past of external non-aggression and
of internal incorporation of minorities and refugees.
•
A national identity that is liberal, pluralist and tolerant of minorities.
•
A national habitus that is welcoming to foreigners and respectful of minorities.
In explanatory terms, all of these elements of nationalism are frequently held accountable
for the absence of violent nationalism. The argument is plausible because states free of
nationalist violence do indeed host some or all of these nationalizing mechanisms. Take,
for example, Sweden, Holland, or Switzerland. Thesis 2.a., by contrast, which denies this
strong causal link, therefore seems unconvincing.
Next consider well-known nationalizing mechanisms generally suspected as
promoting violence that underscore the counterintuitive character of 2.b.:
•
A national discourse that brands a minority group in the state as enemies of the
nation.
•
National memories that link a minority group to atrocities committed against
members of the nation.
•
A national identity that is ethnic, exclusionary, and undemocratic.
•
A national habitus that is ethnocentric, authoritarian, with displays of cultural
superiority.
In explanatory terms, all of these elements of nationalism are frequently held accountable
for the presence of violent nationalism. Once again, there is no shortage of cases of
nationalist violence in countries where nationalizing mechanisms of the second kind are
prevalent. The argument is plausible because states with nationalist violence do indeed
host some or all of these nationalizing mechanisms. Think of Germany prior to World
15
War II, independent Serbia and Croatia, and Turkey. Thesis 2.b., by contrast, which
denies this strong causal link, therefore seems as unconvincing as 2.a. What would
support my counter-intuitive claim that none of these nationalizing mechanisms,
individually or in combination, play a central part in bringing about the generally
anticipated results – keeping the peace (2.a.) or causing violence (2.b.)?
As Karl Popper, following David Hume, demonstrated long ago, no amount of
confirming evidence for an empirical hypothesis can seal the case for its validity. For the
case at hand, this means that neither set of nationalizing mechanisms is nearly enough to
provide a compelling causal explanation for either the absence or presence of nationalist
violence. But is there more evidence than skeptical epistemological arguments in support
of my otherwise implausible theses 2.a. and 2.b.? Let us try some indirect, empirical,
evidence. Imagine a country in which most or all the nationalizing mechanisms against
violence identified in the first list above are at work, but the country nevertheless is
confronted with ongoing and significant manifestations of nationalist violence. Such a
case would provide indirect but compelling evidence in support of thesis 2.a.: “There are
no special nationalizing mechanisms that keep nationalism from turning violent.”
Empirical examples include India, especially since the 1980s; Britain, especially in
Northern Ireland, but also the wars waged in the Falklands and Iraq; post-Franco Spain;
Venezuela since the 1990s; and perhaps most strikingly the United States since World
War II, and especially since the 1990s. In spite of the presence of numerous
nationalizing mechanisms widely believed to hold nationalist violence in check, these
countries display significant levels of such violence.
Conversely, imagine a country in which most or all the nationalizing mechanisms
for violence identified in the second list above are at work, but the country is nevertheless
largely free of manifestations of nationalist violence. Such a case would provide indirect
but compelling evidence in support of thesis 2.b.: “There are no special nationalizing
mechanisms that make nationalism turn violent.” Examples include China since the late
1970s, Cuba after 1962, the Baltic states since 1991, and independent Ukraine. While
hosting numerous violence-promoting nationalizing mechanisms, these countries have
been surprisingly free of nationalist violence.
16
Social-psychological mechanisms
3. a. There are no special social-psychological mechanisms that keep nationalism from turning
violent.
3. b. There are no special social-psychological mechanisms that make nationalism turn violent.
Once again, the two theses advance a set of counterintuitive arguments. We may accept
the conclusion of the previous discussion that typical nationalizing mechanisms are not
significant enough either to cause or prevent violence. But, so many would argue, this is
because more powerful and deeper social-psychological mechanisms come into play in
nationalist violence. Most of these mechanisms predate the age of nationalism, and most
can be expected to survive its demise. Some of those presumed social-psychological
mechanisms are familiar from the nationalism literature itself – that is, causal factors that
some scholars of nationalism have claimed underlie nationalist phenomena. These tend
to be of two kinds: sociobiological and ethnosymbolic ((Smith, 2001)). Continuing the
format established in the discussion of nationalizing mechanisms, consider the following
social-psychological mechanisms that are widely believed to prevent nationalism from
turning violent.
•
Values and practices that do not place the collective above the individual
(individualism).
•
Open and postmodern ideologies that stress universal human rights above the
rights of states (universalism).
•
Mass contentment or mass apathy with respect to the social order (active or
passive legitimacy).
•
Multiculturalism that transcends ethnocultural divisions and its attendant passions
(tolerance).
The parallels of this set of social-psychological mechanisms with the nationalizing
mechanisms listed above are evident and should not be surprising. Nationalizing
mechanisms, themselves part of a larger sociocultural process (i.e. the nationalizing
process) are in large part a special historical kind of social-psychological mechanism. In
explanatory terms, all of these social-psychological mechanisms are frequently held
accountable for the absence of violent nationalism. The argument is plausible because
states free of nationalist violence do indeed host some or all of these social-psychological
17
mechanisms, and we can point to the same examples (Sweden, Holland, or Switzerland)
referred to earlier. Thesis 3.a., by contrast, which denies this strong causal link, must
therefore seem unconvincing.
Now consider the following social-psychological mechanisms that are widely
considered as causes of violent nationalism.
•
Values and practices that place the collective above the individual (collectivism).
•
Closed and inflexible ideologies that stress culturally based rights above universal
human rights (particularism).
•
Mass discontent and mobilization challenging the social order (lack or loss of
legitimacy).
•
Primacy of ethnocultural divisions and its attendant passions (intolerance).
In explanatory terms, all of these social-psychological factors are frequently held
accountable for the presence of violent nationalism. Once again, there is no shortage of
cases of nationalist violence in countries where social-psychological mechanisms of the
second kind are prevalent. The argument is plausible because states with nationalist
violence do indeed host some or all of these mechanisms (and the same examples
provided earlier could be cited as supporting evidence: Germany prior to World War II,
independent Serbia and Croatia, and Turkey). Thesis 3.b., by contrast, which denies this
strong causal link, therefore seems as unconvincing as 3.a. What would support the
counter-intuitive claim that none of these social-psychological mechanisms, individually
or in combination, play a central part in bringing about the generally anticipated results –
keeping the peace (3.a.) or causing violence (3.b.)?
As in the cases of theses 2.a. and 2.b. above, indirect empirical evidence is
illuminating. In support of thesis 3.a., such evidence is provided by countries in which
most or all the social-psychological mechanisms against violence identified in the first
list above are at work, but which are nevertheless confronted with ongoing and
significant manifestations of nationalist violence. (India, Britain, post-Franco Spain;
Venezuela since the 1990s; and the United States since World War II.) Thus in spite of
the presence of numerous social-psychological mechanisms widely believed to hold
nationalist violence in check, these countries display significant levels of such violence.
In support of thesis 3.b., the evidence comes from countries in which most or all the
18
social-psychological mechanisms for violence identified in the second list above are at
work, but the country is nevertheless largely free of manifestations of nationalist
violence. (China since the late 1970s, Cuba after 1962, the Baltic states since 1991, and
independent Ukraine.) While hosting numerous violence-promoting social-psychological
mechanisms, these countries do not suffer from nationalist violence.
In conclusion, it is important to stress that the four theses defended in this section
do not call into question that nationalizing mechanisms and social-psychological
mechanisms of the kind described above are involved in and therefore significant for the
explanation of nationalist violence. They clearly are involved and they therefore should
not be ignored.17 However, none of these mechanisms, individually or in combination,
have sufficient social power and therefore causal weight to bring about and account for
the presence or absence of violent nationalism. As the following section will argue, there
is only one kind of mechanism that seems to have this high degree of social and
explanatory power.
Political mechanisms
Thesis 4.a. There are special political mechanisms that keep nationalism from turning violent.
Thesis 4.b. There are special political mechanisms that make nationalism turn violent.
After defending three sets of counterintuitive theses (1-3), the present argument now
advances a fourth set of theses on political mechanisms that at first glance are equally
implausible. Admittedly, it might be more prudent to moderate the claims contained in
theses 1-4. But for the purpose of theoretical argument, it is more useful to keep
individual assertions sharp and pointed, at least for now. The attentive reader may have
noticed that the pool of cases from which I have drawn illustrative examples to support
my counterintuitive theses was rather small. The main reason for this is that the number
of instances confirming the intuitive view is indeed high, whereas number of
disconfirming cases, while small, is sufficient to undermine its general validity of the
intuitive view. There is another important, historical, reason. Nationalisms change and
episodes of nationalist violence come and go. All countries seem to be capable of such
17
The same goes for many other mechanisms, such as economic mechanisms (see e.g. (Helleiner & Pickel,
2005) and Pickel 2003).
19
shifts, which is why the question isn’t primarily about the character of the nationalisms
and the systems in which they work, but about the mechanisms that account for when,
how and why these shifts from non-violence to violence occur. These mechanisms are
political mechanisms.18
A general process that seems to be part of all episodes of nationalist violence is
polarization. Of course polarization is both cause and effect of violence, and as such is
not a sufficient explanation of violence. But polarization is a key process the description
of which helps us find specific mechanisms that explain when, how and why nationalist
violence erupts. The question when (i.e. at exactly what juncture) nationalist violence
occurs cannot be answered in the general mechanismic terms at the centre of this
analysis. Since timing is always a function of historical conditions in which general
mechanisms are at work, it represents a fundamental contingency that severely and in
principle constrains social scientific predictions of violent nationalism, while preventing
definitive closure of historical reconstructions of violent episodes. The question why
nationalist violence erupts is potentially misleading from a social science perspective
since it favours answers in terms of actors, their preferences, motivations, and intentions.
In contrast, the question about how nationalist violence erupts, gives priority to a search
for the processes and mechanisms involved.19
The process of polarization is relative, that is, polarization today is relative to the
degree of polarization yesterday, last month, or last year. An increase in polarization
increases the likelihood of nationalist violence erupting, while a decrease in polarization
(i.e. depolarization) has the opposite effect. Differently put, depolarization between two
contending parties will reduce nationalist violence or keep it from erupting, whereas
polarization has the opposite effect. Capturing a general process surrounding a set of
specific phenomena to be explained is conceptually an important first step that can
provide an adequate description of what is to be explained in processual terms – think of
industrialization, modernization, democratization, state-building, or economic
18
Tilly (2003) has identified the central political mechanisms behind the creation and maintenance of
inequality as exploitation, opportunity hoarding, adaptation and emulation. For other political mechanisms,
see (Tilly, 1996; Tilly, 2002).
19
On the major dimensions of why questions in different spheres of life, and the importance of
transforming why questions into how questions to make them amenable to social scientific analysis, see
(M. Bunge, 2004; Tilly, 2006)
20
development. The next step is to search for the specific mechanisms that drive the
process. If “relative polarization and depolarization” describes a key process in
nationalist violence, then what if any are the major mechanisms increasing or decreasing
polarization, regardless of any other specific characteristics of the situation?
While more than two parties can be involved in a process of polarization,
polarization occurs by definition between two opposing poles. The crystallization of the
various collective and individual actors around the two poles is an early part of the
polarization process. The most common constellation in the case of nationalism is the
opposition between those in control of a nation-state on the one hand, and its domestic or
international contenders, on the other. Both normal and contentious politics in twentyfirst century states, have a national frame of reference, that is, political processes are
channeled or accompanied, and therefore codetermined, by nationalizing mechanisms
(see above). Nationalism, as has frequently been noted, creates or reinforces an “us” vs.
“them” mentality, but it does so in a large number of different forms and intensities.
Both domestically and internationally, not all states, or groups of states, are part of a
polarized arrangement of mutual confrontation and contention. In many relationships and
structures, polarization may be low or even non-existent. Of course in many others, a
high level of polarization is clearly a central part of the structure. Take, for instance, the
Cold-War era, or the U.S. dominated world order of the early twenty-first century, where
polarization between the U.S. and many other states, especially in the Middle East, has
been consistently growing, and indeed has reached an extremely high level of nationalist
violence.20 To illustrate the domestic side of polarization, let us stay with the example of
the U.S. for a moment. There are many contenders in U.S. politics, but the two most
powerful ones are, or are closely allied with, the two major political parties. Both
polarization and depolarization can be observed, and often in the context of the dynamics
of the same processes at the international level. Thus, as the polarization between the
U.S. government and the government of Iraq increased in the weeks before the start of
the war, the domestic polarization between Republicans and Democrats simultaneously
decreased sharply. Five years into a costly and catastrophic war and occupation in Iraq,
20
I consider the U.S. occupation and their client governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the
various forms of armed resistance as violent manifestations of competing nationalisms.
21
domestic polarization between the two political parties is once again increasing, though
U.S. nationalist violence is played out exclusively in other countries.21 What are the
general political mechanisms behind such processes of polarization?
Recall the general argument of this paper: While various other mechanisms, alone
or in combination, cannot cause the absence of nationalist violence or its occurrence,
certain political mechanisms can. It is now time to deliver on this ambitious claim.
There are two central political mechanisms that, in combination, can explain nationalist
violence: brokerage and boundary activation. Neither mechanism is self-explanatory, so
a brief description follows. Brokerage refers to the establishment of political ties
between previously unconnected collective actors. For example, the anti-war coalition in
the U.S. was initially small, gradually grew over the past four years, and in part as a
result of mid-term elections in the fall of 2006, has come to include members of the
Democratic Party and even retired U.S. Generals. The mechanism explaining the growth
in the anti-war coalition is brokerage, that is, the intensifying connections between a
growing number of actors around the anti-war pole. The end of the war, or more
accurately, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, will result from the weakening or
dissolution of connections between different political actors. Of course there are many
other mechanisms at work, but one of the two crucial ones, or so I argue, is the political
mechanism of brokerage: the creation of linkages and alliances between formerly
unconnected actors and their subsequent breakdown. Brokerage, in turn, stimulates the
second key political mechanism, boundary activation (Tilly 2003; (Tilly, 2004)).
Social boundaries exist everywhere in social life; some are hard and permanent,
others more malleable and temporary. Among the durable ones are categorical
boundaries between men and women, employers and workers, nationals and foreigners,
and occupational and professional groups (cf. (Tilly, 1998)). Although we-they
boundaries are, as Tilly points out, always available in certain settings, “they shift from
being relatively insignificant to absolutely dominant for current interaction.” This shift in
importance is the mechanism of boundary activation. This mechanism is well known in
the nationalism literature under the name of nationalist mobilization (cf. (Deutsch,
21
The “rendering” of so-called terrorists to locales outside of the United States for torturing and killing
could thus be seen as an instance of the exporting of nationalist violence.
22
1953)). Brokerage and boundary activation are the two political mechanisms that, in
combination, can explain the shift from non-violent nationalism to violent nationalism.
(The political mechanisms of fragmentation/disconnection and boundary deactivation
should have the opposite effect of diffusing violence.) In many instances, boundary
activation and brokerage form a dual process in which these mechanisms combine and
reinforce each other. What makes these twin mechanisms potentially so powerful and
causally central is that they can override previously existing social relations (Tilly 2003).
This is when previously peacefully coexisting neighbors overnight turn into mortal
enemies. Nationalizing mechanisms and many other social mechanisms such as
mechanisms of inequality that keep social relations stable run in ruts (path dependence),
reproducing themselves and reinforcing each other in the process. As a result, by
themselves they change only slowly and on the whole contribute to social stability.
Brokerage and boundary activation, on the other hand, change ruts and potentially upset
the social order by bringing about rapid change from non-violence to violence. Of
course, intensification of these mechanisms does not always end in violence, but violence
is always preceded by them.
What is the evidence for the centrality of this dual mechanism in bringing about
nationalist violence? We know from our earlier exploration of the role of other
mechanisms that confirming instances are not enough to make a case for their central role
in the process. In other words, even if brokerage and boundary activation are generally
intensifying in the lead-up to violence, there may be a number of disconfirming cases
calling into question the claim for the overriding social power and central explanatory
status of these mechanisms. I submit that contrary to what we found with respect to
nationalizing mechanisms and social-psychological mechanisms earlier, there are no
cases of nationalist violence in which brokerage and boundary activation are not
centrally involved. Put more simply: Brokerage and boundary activation are the crucial
mechanisms causing nationalism to turn into collective violence. This is an empirical
hypothesis open to challenge.
5. Concluding Comments
The two most important contributions of the present paper are (1) a mechanism-based
23
explanatory approach to the problem of nationalism and violence; and (2) a substantive
claim about the primacy of specific political mechanisms in nationalist violence. Charles
Tilly’s work on social mechanisms, nationalism, and collective violence has been a rich
source for both aspects of this analysis. The two political mechanisms he singles out as
central are brokerage and boundary activation. Tilly’s explanatory problem is collective
violence in general, which of course is broader and more general than the problem of
violent nationalism at the centre of the present analysis. I would now like to call on
another theorist of nationalist violence, namely Michael Mann and his book The Dark
Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (2005). Mann is interested in
explaining the worst manifestations of collective violence, that is, ethnicide and genocide.
He asks not, why do they happen, but how do they come about. Without using the term,
Mann in his list of eight theses identifies central mechanisms in the processes leading to
ethnic cleansing. How do Mann’s findings about mechanisms compare with the main
theses of this paper?
Mann’s most fundamental thesis is historical-structural or systemic: murderous
cleansing is modern, because it is the dark side of democracy. In democracy, the basic
political unit is “the people,” or more accurately, “a people.” Demos (the political
dimension) and ethnos (the cultural dimension) are always entwined, and the relationship
is full of potential conflict. The relatively happy picture of by and large non-violent and
institutionalized forms of nationalist conflict in the stable democracies of the West tends
to overlook two basic historical facts: that some of the worst forms of ethnic cleansing
occurred in the settler colonies of those countries, and that liberal democracies
themselves have been built on ethnic cleansing. Mann’s counterintuitive thesis points to
a particular mechanism, that is, democratization, as crucial in fostering ethnic cleansing.
As I argued at the beginning of section 4, if there is one master mechanism for
nationalism, it is the sovereignty mechanism which combines a political mechanism –
territorial control – with a cultural mechanism – the perceived right of a nation to selfdetermination in its territory. I believe the two mechanisms are essentially the same,
though the sovereignty mechanism may have the semantic advantage of being more
easily compatible with violent authoritarian regimes (e.g. Nazi Germany) claiming to
represent the people than the normatively loaded “democratizing regime.” In any event,
24
as Mann argues in his third thesis (and in line with this paper’s theses 2-4), ethnic
cleansing is primarily political, less economic, ideological, or military, since it is based
on competing claims to the same state.
Mann, much like Tilly, identifies ethnicity as a source of durable inequality, along
with class, gender, and regionalism, but argues that ethnicity does not always trump class.
Classlike sentiments, however, can be channeled into ethnonationalism. The decisive
mechanism here is boundary activation (Mann himself does not call it by that name).
Different combinations of class, ethnicity, gender, region (and, we might add, religion)
will lead to serious ethnic conflict only if one is seen as exploiting the other. The
outbreak of violence, according to Mann, requires the working of an additional
mechanism, which we can easily recognize as brokerage. The less powerful side in
nationalist conflict opts for violence when it receives or hopes for external support. The
stronger side believes it has overwhelming military power and ideological legitimacy to
force through a cleansed state with little risk. Importantly, Mann stresses that brokerage
and boundary activation do not necessarily result in collective violence: interaction
between the two sides is crucial, as is the ultimate choice to fight rather than conciliate.
We now enter explanatory territory beyond the nationalist violence at the centre
of this paper. In order for nationalist violence to move over the brink into full-blown
ethnic cleansing, the state exercising sovereign authority over contested territory has to
become factionalized or radicalized in an unstable geopolitical environment or war.
Factionalization is of course the result of brokerage (or its opposite), while radicalization
is the result of boundary activation. This should not be mistaken for state collapse, as
Mann points out, because ethnic cleansing in its most murderous phases is usually
directed by states, requiring some state coherence and capacity. Murderous ethnic
cleansing is rarely the initial intent of the perpetrators, but rather the unintended
consequence of a series of interactions – the mechanism of escalation, with unpredictable
combinations of top-down, bottom-up, and sideways-violent pressures leading to the
worst atrocities. “Banal nationalism” ((Billig, 1995)) can help explain the puzzle of the
“banality of evil” ((Arendt, 1963)) in which ordinary people are brought by normal social
structures into committing murderous cleansing, though Mann stresses (again in line with
the theses proposed in this paper) that “we need a sociology of power rather than a
25
psychology of perpetrators.” This is another way of underscoring the primacy of political
mechanisms over nationalizing mechanisms and other social-psychological mechanisms
in explaining the relationship between nationalism and violence.
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