WHAT COULD EARLY UNIONS DO FOR WORKERS?
THE CASE OF ILLINOIS COAL MINING IN THE 1880S
William M. Boala
Drake University
May 2016
ABSTRACT: This study asks what unions did for Illinois coal miners in the 1880s. It measures
the outcomes provided by a traditional union and the Knights of Labor, primarily via differencein-differences applied to a panel of coal mining counties in Illinois. Neither the traditional union
nor the Knights of Labor was able to raise wages, provide benefits, or reduce hours per workday,
but the two unions may have been able to produce other outcomes valued by workers.
Circumstantial evidence suggests the unions were able to ensure prompt payment of wages due.
JEL CODES: J51, L71, N31, N51.
KEYWORDS: coal industry; early unions; Knights of Labor.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: This draft has benefited from comments by Peter Orazem, Jeff
Owen, and John Pencavel, and by participants in seminars at Drake University and Iowa State
University.
a
Address: College of Business and Public Administration, Drake University, 2507 University
Avenue, Des Moines, IA 50311. Email: [email protected] .
1
WHAT COULD EARLY UNIONS DO FOR WORKERS? THE CASE OF ILLINOIS
COAL MINING IN THE 1880S
1. Introduction
What outcomes can unions deliver for workers? The most frequent answer given by economists
is higher wages and other compensation.1 The importance of wages to economists is
demonstrated in both empirical and theoretical studies of trade unionism. A large2 purely
empirical literature attempts to measure the effect of unions on wages, and recent estimates
usually show an average wage gap of 10 to 20 percent, though with considerable variation across
industries and occupations.3 A smaller literature demonstrates that union members receive more
non-wage compensation as well.4 A theoretical literature modeling trade union behavior always
includes wages as an argument of the union’s objective function.5
What other answers are given? A second possible answer is shorter hours and fewer days of
work. Unions often negotiate for reductions in hours or days of work per year.6 A third possible
answer is better working conditions—for example, more agreeable and safer surroundings. A
fourth possible answer is better treatment by employers and protection from arbitrary actions by
supervisors.7
To what extent were unions in the early labor movement able to deliver these outcomes?
Historians of the labor movement have emphasized the struggle by unions both for immediate
material gain—“less work and more pay”8—and for long-term political goals. Some have
acknowledged that individual workers were sometimes just as interested in “friendly society”
benefits provided by unions like sickness insurance and funeral funds.9 Yet little quantitative
evidence has emerged on what outcomes these early unions were actually able to provide.
1
“The historical record seems to suggest that American workers form and join unions largely to win higher wages
and shorter hours,” according to Rees (1977, p. 25). “The standard view of trade unions is that they are
organizations whose purpose is to improve the material welfare of members, principally by raising wages above the
competitive wage level,” according to Booth (1995, p. 7).
2
Other commonly applied adjectives include “numerous” (Hirsch and Addison 1986, p. 116), “large” (Lewis 1986,
p. 1), “voluminous” (Pencavel 1991, p. 11), and “enormous” (Booth 1995, p. 7). In any event, “everyone ‘knows’
that unions raise wages” (Freeman and Medoff 1984, p. 43).
3
See Blanchflower and Bryson (2007), Lewis (1986), and Pencavel (1991).
4
See Budd 2007 for a survey.
5
Booth 1995, pp. 87-94. Hirsch and Addison 1986, pp. 10-18. Pencavel 1991, pp. 54-94.
6
Earle and Pencavel (1990), comparing union and nonunion sectors of the U.S. economy, found that over time,
unionism tended to reduce full-time hours of work, but with considerable variation across occupations and
industries.
7
Slichter (1941, p. 2) emphasized “the desire of the workers for protection against the arbitrary and uncontrolled
discretion of management..” An often-cited study by Seidman, London, and Karsh (1951) found that this reason for
joining the union was cited by 39 percent of local union leaders, 21 percent of active members, and 15 percent of
rank-and-file inactive members.
8
Slogan of 25,000 marchers at parade organized by the International Labor Union, May 8, 1878 during the textile
workers’ strike at Fall River (Foner 1962, vol. 1, p. 504).
9
Webb and Webb (1920, p. 158), Booth (1995, p. 71), Boyer (1988), Hatton, Boyer and Bailey (1994, pp. 442-444).
2
This study investigates what early unions could deliver for coal miners in Illinois in the 1880s. It
takes advantage of surprisingly detailed data available for that industry, state, and time period,
collected mostly by the then-new Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics (hereafter, IBLS). An
interesting feature of these data is that unionism spread rapidly but unevenly during this period,
which facilitates plausibly causal estimates via difference-in-differences. Another interesting
feature is that two unions coexisted in the same industry—a traditional coal miners’ union and
the Knights of Labor—and their effects on coal mining can often be measured separately. I find
little evidence that either union was able to raise wages, but some evidence that the unions were
able to deliver other outcomes that would appeal to workers. In particular, I find circumstantial
evidence that unions were able to assure that coal miners were paid the wages they were
promised—an important benefit of unions not reported elsewhere, to my knowledge.
2. Historical setting
Growth of Illinois coal mining. Coal was mined in Illinois as early as 1833. Output grew to just
over 6 million tons in 1880, eight percent of the U.S. total (U.S. Geological Survey 1902, pp.
308-313). Output continued to grow rapidly in the early 1880s, then slumped in the middle of
the decade before resuming growth toward the end of the decade (see figure 1). The slump in
output was undoubtedly related to the long national recession from March 1882 to May 188510
and produced a large drop in coal prices and a smaller drop in wages (see figure 2).
Most Illinois coal was mined underground in shaft mines. Workers were lowered down a shaft
to reach the coal seam, often hundreds of feet below the surface, where they moved horizontally
to work the coal seam. Most mines extracted coal using the room-and-pillar method but some
used the longwall method. Workers at the coal face (“miners” in the narrow sense) were paid on
piece, per ton of coal loaded, because of the impossibility of close supervision. Other employees
laid track for coal cars, attended the hoisting machinery, and did maintenance work. These
workers, a minority of the mine work force, were paid a daily wage. Machines for cutting coal
were introduced at a few mines in this period with mixed success. By 1888, 29 mines in Illinois
were using machines, employing about 3000 machine workers who were mostly paid a daily
wage (IBLS 1888, pp. 337-342).
Coal mining accidents were frequent by modern standards, killing about one worker in 500 or
600 in Illinois in most years. About 60 percent of fatalities were caused by falling coal or rock,
which killed one or two workers at a time (IBLS 1894, pp. LI-LIII). Occasional disasters killed
many workers simultaneously. Illinois suffered two disasters during this period, both in 1883:
10
NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee, http://nber.org/cycles.html , accessed August 2012.
3
ten miners were killed in an explosion at Coulterville in Randolph County, and 69 workers were
killed in a sudden flood at Braidwood in Will County.11
A law providing for mine safety inspections was passed by the Illinois legislature in 1872 and
amended in 1877. It required each county board to appoint and pay a mine inspector. However,
inspection was lax, according to the IBLS, because county inspectors were underpaid, usually
worked only part-time or part-year, and were easily influenced by coal operators (IBLS 1881, pp.
221-222). Smaller counties sometimes left the position vacant (IBLS 1882, pp. 107-111). To
improve the effectiveness of mine inspections, the legislature created an Office of the State
Inspector of Mines in June 1883. The state was divided into five districts, each with a full-time
mine inspector employed by the state (IBLS 1884, pp. 418-21). In addition to checking mines
for safety violations, the inspectors collected a great deal of data, some of which will be used in
the analysis below.
Early unionism. Strike activity in Illinois coal mining was reported as early as 1861. In that
year, a series of strikes near the city of LaSalle, in northern Illinois, prompted the state
legislature to pass the so-called “LaSalle Black Laws,” rendering it a crime to influence
employees through threat or intimidation to cease work. According to the IBLS, these laws
made it “virtually a crime to belong to a trades union,” but were rarely enforced after 1865 (IBLS
1881, pp. 8, 230; David 1936, pp. 43-44).
The earliest record of formal unionism in Illinois coal is also from 1861, when miners from
Illinois and Missouri formed the American Miners’ Association (McBride 1887, pp. 245-246;
Roy 1907, pp. 60-67). This organization lasted until 1868. Later, in 1871, a convention at
Bloomington organized the Illinois Miners’ Benevolent and Protective Association to provide
benefits to disabled miners, but apparently it did not last long (McBride 1887, p. 248). The
Miners’ National Association, organized at Youngstown, Ohio in 1873, attracted some members
from Illinois and over 20,000 members nationwide, but after costly strikes and legal battles
defending its leaders from prosecution, it collapsed in debt in 1876.12
Union activity in Illinois coal mining apparently remained very weak at least until the early
1880s. Some local coal unions were organized in Illinois in the spring of 1877, but did not
survive long (Evans 1920, vol. 1 p. 85). In 1881, the IBLS observed that, for the Illinois union
movement as a whole, “there seems to have been little progress made in the past five years”
(1881, p. 229). Occasional local bargaining by informal organizations of miners was reported in
1881 and 1882 (IBLS 1882, pp. 79-81; IBLS 1883, p. 76) as well as frequent strikes (IBLS 1883,
p. 79; IBLS 1888, pp. 246-313). Nevertheless, as late as 1884, the IBLS noted that formal
unionism had since 1877 been “practically inoperative” in Belleville, a major coal mining center
11
The Coulterville disaster is described briefly in IBLS 1883, p. 89. The Braidwood disaster is described in detail in
IBLS 1883, pp. 97-109, and Roy 1907 pp. 190-194.
12
On the Miners’ National Association, see Evans 1920, vol. 1, pp. 46-85; McBride 1886, pp. 249-251; Roy 1907,
pp. 169-176; Suffern 1926, pp. 25-31.
4
near St. Louis, and that several unions had been started “with only partial success” in Streator, a
major center in northern Illinois (1884, pp. 433-436).
Meanwhile, a different type of labor organization was achieving some success. The Knights of
Labor, founded by Philadelphia garment workers in 1869 (Wright et al. 1887, p. 398; Perlman
1918, p. 197), differed from traditional trade unions in several respects. First, the Knights
operated as a secret organization, to shield members from employer retaliation. Second, the
Knights admitted members from all occupations. At the local level, the Knights were organized
into both “Mixed Local Assemblies” of multiple occupations, and (beginning in 1882) “Trades
Assemblies” of particular occupations.13 Third, the Knights officially favored arbitration over
strikes. Fourth, the Knights sought legislation and government regulation to improve wages and
working conditions for all workers, not just their own members. In practice, the differences were
less substantial. Like traditional trade unions, the Knights were in fact primarily composed of
skilled workers and did occasionally use strikes as a weapon.14 Like the Knights, traditional
trade unions often tried to settle disputes without strikes and also sought protective labor
legislation.15
As the Knights were beginning to grow, a new, more effective traditional trade union appeared in
Illinois coal mining. The Miners and Mine Laborers Benevolent Protective Association
(hereafter, Miners Association) was organized in the late 1870s (IBLS 1886, p. 167). Its
representatives participated in an interstate convention at Pittsburgh in May 1883 and in a second
convention at Indianapolis in September 1885. The latter convention organized the National
Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers, a loose confederation of state miners’ unions. Yet the
Miners Association was apparently still weak then. Its president, Daniel McLaughlin, told the
Indianapolis convention that he had only a small number of members, confined to northern
Illinois.16
Rapid growth of unionism in 1885-1886. The Miners Association began an “energetic”
organizing drive in 1885 which resulted in remarkable growth (Evans 1920, vol. 1, p. 145; IBLS
1886, p. 167). A survey by the IBLS in 1886 discovered that most of the Miners Association’s
lodges, or locals, had been founded in late 1885 or early 1886 (see figure 3). From early 1885 to
13
Trades assemblies were encouraged by the Knights General Assembly of 1882 (Foner, 1962, vol. 1, p. 512).
An analysis of occupations of Knights by the IBLS classified 70 percent as skilled, 26 percent as unskilled, and 4
percent as “non-producers.” (1886, p. 169). The same IBLS report listed 15 coal strikes led by traditional trade
unions from 1883 to 1886 (1886, table XXXIX, p. 405) and 33 coal strikes led by the Knights of Labor during the
same period (IBLS 1886, table XL, p. 409). With respect to strikes and other concerns, “local and district
assemblies [of the Knights] were virtually autonomous and did as they pleased” according to Foner (1962, vol. 1, p.
508).
15
See Evans (1920, vol. 1, pp. 87-88), IBLS (1886, pp. 159-163), and Perlman (1918, pp. 335-348).
16
Evans 1920, vol. 1, pp. 108, 137-138; McBride 1887, pp. 253-255; Perlman 1918, p. 425; Roy 1907, pp. 227-228.
In view of the McLaughlin’s statement, it is curious that the IBLS was able to find quite a few unionized coal
miners. In a survey of consumer expenditures of working families conducted in early 1884, the IBLS found that of
232 coal miners in the sample, 73 (or 31 percent) paid dues to unspecified labor organizations (IBLS 1884, table IX,
pp. 328-329). However, it seems likely the sample was not random.
14
5
July 1886, membership rose from a few hundred to over 7000 (see figure 4). A triumphant state
convention in February 1886 approved the incorporation of the Miners Association under state
law and created district organizations within the state (Evans 1920, vol. 1, pp. 198-199).
Meanwhile, the Knights of Labor as a whole were also growing rapidly. Overall national
membership grew with “unprecedented rapidity” in 1885-1886 (Wright et al. 1887, p. 423),
gaining 600,000 new members according to Foner (1962, vol. 1, p. 509). Figure 5 shows a huge
surge in national organizing: at the end of 1887, about two thirds of the Knights’ Local
Assemblies had been organized in just the previous three years. Similarly in Illinois, the IBLS
reckoned that at the close of 1886, “the present number [of Local Assemblies] is two or three
times as large” as in July 1884.17 Membership appears to have grown at a similar rate (see figure
6). However, these numbers include all trades, not just coal miners.
The timing of coal miners’ entry into the Knights of Labor is somewhat less clear. Garlock
(1982) counted a final total of 126 Local Assemblies in Illinois that were dominated by coal
miners (61 Trades Assemblies, 20 Mixed Assemblies, and 45 Assemblies of unknown status).18
Garlock’s data, displayed in figure 7, reveal rapid organization of Illinois coal miners in 1886,
but not the huge surge seen in all trades in figures 5 and 6. Nevertheless, in May 1886 the
Knights created a special sub-organization devoted to coal miners, National Trade Assembly No.
135, no doubt partly in response to increasing coal miner membership.19 So coal miners’
membership in the Knights of Labor probably grew roughly simultaneously with membership in
the Miners Association, but perhaps not as abruptly. The exact timing is difficult to pin down
from available sources.
Later developments in unionism. The Miners Association and sometimes the Knights
participated in joint wage negotiations with fellow unionists and coal operators from
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana, which were initially successful. The Miners Association sent
representatives to joint wage negotiations at Chicago in October 1885, at Pittsburgh in December
1885, at Columbus in February 1886, and again at Columbus in February 1887. At first, coal
operators from northern Illinois participated actively in these negotiations. Later, they
complained that fellow operators in southern Illinois, where the Miners Association was weaker
and the Knights were stronger, were not complying with the negotiated wage scale. Finally, in
17
IBLS 1886, p. 192. According to an IBLS survey, of 204 local assemblies of the Knights of Labor in Illinois in
late 1886, 144 local assemblies (or 71 percent) had formed in 1885 or 1886. Of 29,034 employed members of the
Knights of Labor in all occupations in late 1886, 19,371 (or 67 percent) were members of Local Assemblies that had
formed in 1885 or 1886 (IBLS 1886, table V “Recapitulation,” p. 210).
18
By contrast, the IBLS counted only seven Knights trades assemblies composed strictly of coal miners: the first
was organized in 1883, the second in 1884, three more in 1885, and two more in early 1886 (IBLS 1886, table V,
pp. 203-210). The disparity between Garlock’s count and the IBLS count might be partly explained by the latter’s
exclusion of mixed-occupation local assemblies dominated by miners.
19
Evans 1920, vol. 1, p. 205; Perlman 1918, p. 425; Roy 1907, pp. 243-244. According to Perlman, National Trade
Assembly No. 135 was created partly in response to the organization of the rival National Federation of Miners and
Mine Laborers the previous year.
6
early 1888, operators from northern Illinois withdrew from joint wage negotiations altogether,
claiming that they could not compete against southern Illinois operators paying a lower wage.20
A year later, in spring 1889, coal operators in northern Illinois unilaterally reduced wages 10
cents per ton below the union scale, prompting the Miners Association to strike beginning May
1. The strike continued into autumn, when the miners and operators finally compromised on a
reduction of 7 ½ cents per ton.21 It seems likely that the union lost membership and influence
during the long strike (Evans 1920, vol. 1, pp. 481-482; Roy 1907, p. 252) and the Knights of
Labor may have lost membership as well (Evans 1920, vol. 1, p. 428). Yet these losses were
probably not catastrophic. The wage reduction was reversed when coal demand increased at the
end of 1889 (IBLS 1890, p. XX). Any membership slide was probably temporary: the number
of Illinois miners later covered by the union’s so-called “Columbus Wage Scale” of 1894 was
nearly the same as the total number of Association members reported in 1886 (IBLS 1894,
appendix pp. 7, 20, 22, 24).22 But it is difficult to say how strong the two unions were after the
long strike of 1889.
At the end of the 1880s, mergers transformed coal unionism. In December 1888, the Miners
Association and coal unions in other states abandoned their loose confederation and merged to
form the National Progressive Union (Evans 1920, vol. 1, pp. 389-407; Roy 1907, p. 250).
Efforts to merge with the Knights, after repeated failures, finally succeeded in January 1890,
when the National Progressive Union merged with the Knights National Trade Assembly No.
135 to become the United Mine Workers of America.23
The analysis below will focus on the period ending June 1889, at the start of the long strike and
six months before the merger of the Miners Association and the Knights. The rapid growth of
both unions in 1885-1886 will be exploited to measure each union’s effects on Illinois coal
mining.
3. County-level panel on Illinois coal mining, 1879-1889
What could these two unions—the Miners Association and the Knights of Labor—do for Illinois
coal miners? The remainder of this study will seek to answer this question using quantitative
evidence. One might not expect much quantitative evidence to be available from this period.
20
See Evans (1920, vol. 1, pp. 145-365), George (1898, p. 198), IBLS (1885, pp. XXIX-XXXII), IBLS (1889, pp.
114-117), McBride (1887, p. 256), Perlman (1918, p. 426), and Roy (1907,pp. 231-241). Interstate bargaining was
not resumed until 1898 (Evans 1920, vol. 2, pp. 634-637; IBLS 1898, pp. 2-4).
21
See Evans (1920, pp. 464-482), IBLS (1889, pp. XVII-XXXI), IBLS (1890, pp. XIX-XX), Lloyd (1890; Suffern
1926, pp. 47-50).
22
Even the miners of Spring Valley Coal Company, in Bureau County, who endured a devastating six-month
lockout in 1889 (Lloyd 1890; IBLS 1889, pp. XXVIII-XXX, 20-21, 109; U.S. Commissioner of Labor 1894, vol. 1,
pp. 1282-1285), were able to mount a strike two years later (IBLS 1891, pp. 74-75, 319).
23
See Evans (1920, vol. 2, pp. 13-17), Perlman (1918, p. 487), and Roy (1907, pp. 249-259).
7
However, remarkably detailed data on Illinois’s coal mines were collected from operators by
coal mine inspectors and the staff of the Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics (IBLS) in the 1880s.
Beginning in 1882, the IBLS published data annually on production, employment, wages, prices,
and other coal data for up to 50 counties. I combined these data with less complete data for 1879
from county mine inspectors and for 1880 from the U.S. Census (1886). Descriptive statistics of
the resulting county panel data set are shown in table 1, panel a, and details of its construction
are given in appendix A.
Union membership data were collected and reported by the IBLS only in 1886, but union
membership in other years can be extrapolated with some confidence in view of historical events
described in the previous section, as I now explain.
Membership in Miners Association. In 1886, the IBLS conducted a survey of labor unions in all
occupations in Illinois. A special section of the Fourth Biennial Report, entitled “Labor
Organizations,” reported membership in each local union of the Miners Association (IBLS 1886,
table I, pp. 172-178). Total membership was over 7000. For this study, employed union local
membership was summed to the county level, where Miners Association density was computed
as “members employed” divided by total coal mining employment in 1886. The results are
summarized in table 1, panel b and displayed in figure 8. As the figure shows, the Miners
Association was strongest in the northeast part of the state.
Of 50 locals listed as affiliated with the Miners Association, all but two were organized in 1885
or early 1886. Those two older locals had only 107 charter members (IBLS 1886, table III, pp.
196-198). So while the Miners Association existed in Illinois as early as 1876, it seems fair to
assume that the organization had little influence until its rapid growth in late 1885 and early
1886. For this study, therefore, union density for the Miners Association before July 1885 will
be assumed to equal zero. Data for the year ending July 1886, the period of rapid union growth,
will be excluded from the analysis below.
Available historical information described in the previous section suggests that the Miners
Association remained strong in the following years, until at least the summer of 1889. Miners
Association density from July 1886 through July 1889 will therefore be assumed constant at its
July 1886 level. Extrapolation beyond 1889 seems hazardous, however, first because the long
strike beginning May 1889 may have reduced union membership and secondly because the
merger of the Miners Association with the Knights in January 1890 may have attenuated any
differences between the two unions.24
Membership in Knights of Labor. The same section of the Fourth Biennial Report also reported
current membership in the Knights of Labor by county and by occupation (IBLS (1886), table
24
How much the merger changed the behavior of union locals is an open question. While the merger brought all
locals under the same district and national organization, locals were allowed to continue some of their former
practices. For example, locals were allowed to retain their old organizational structure, and to continue as secret or
open organizations (Roy 1907, pp. 253-254).
8
XVIII, pp. 273-294). For this study, Knights members whose occupations were "coal miners,"
"mine laborers," or "miners" were summed to the county level. At the county level, Knights
density was computed as coal-miner membership divided by total coal mining employment in
1886. The results are summarized in table 1, panel b and displayed in figure 9. As the figure
shows, the Knights were scattered throughout the state but were strongest in the southern
counties. They totaled over 3500, about half as numerous as Miners Association members.
The dates when coal miners joined the Knights were not given by the IBLS or by Garlock
(1982), but, as noted in the previous section, available information suggests that the Knights
grew roughly simultaneously with the Miners Association. In the absence of more precise
information on timing, Knights density in coal-mining will be assumed to equal zero before July
1885, while Knights density from July 1886 through July 1889 will therefore be assumed
constant at its July 1886 level. Data for the year ending July 1886, a year of rapid growth for the
Knights nationwide, will be excluded from the analysis. In short, the same timing assumptions
will be made for the Knights as for the Miners Association, though with admittedly less
confidence.
The Fourth Biennial Report also reports the number of coal miners who were members of both
unions. Subtracting this number from the total of Association and Knights membership, I
computed overall union density in either union. The results are summarized in the bottom row of
table 1, panel b.
The county panel. The data set to be analyzed is thus an annual panel of counties. The panel
includes six years of no unionism (1879, 1880, 1882, 1883, 1884, and 1885), and three years of
substantial unionism (1887, 1888, and 1889) with Association and Knights density assumed to
be constant at their July 1886 levels. The panel is not quite balanced because some counties are
not represented every year—for example, only 16 counties are available for 1879. Also, some
data are not available for every year—for example, wage data begin in 1883. Details are given
in appendix A.
The following sections estimate the effect of unionism on various outcomes by regressing those
outcomes on county effects, time trends or year effects, and union density. The effects of the
Miners Association and the Knights can in principle be separately identified because the two
unions enjoyed different degrees of organizing success in different counties. Moreover, 17
counties (mostly small) never had miners in either union. So the research design is essentially
“difference-in-differences,” with the qualification that union density varied across counties and
never reached 100 per cent.
Exogeneity of unionism. Econometric identification assumes that the surge in unionism in
Illinois coal mining in 1885-1886 was not driven by the outcomes to be explained. For example,
it assumes unionism was not caused by a downward (or upward) trend in wages at particular
counties. Is this assumption reasonable? Certainly the timing of this surge was related to a
9
nationwide increase in labor agitation outside of coal mining. The year 1886 saw a sharp
increase in strike activity throughout the United States and Illinois (figure 10) and a nationwide
campaign for an eight-hour workday (IBLS 1886, pp. 473-474; Perlman 1918, pp. 375-386;
Kemmerer and Wickersham 1950). Unionists like George McNeill (1887, pp. 170-171) were
convinced that “the year 1886 [would] be known as the year of the great uprising of labor.” In
Illinois, trade unions in many industries experienced rapid growth simultaneously with the coal
miners. Of 229 Illinois trade unions counted by the IBLS in July 1886 (excluding coal miners)
96 had been organized in the preceding 18 months (IBLS 1886, table III, pp. 195-199). So the
timing of the surge in unionism in Illinois coal was apparently driven largely by trends outside
coal mining and even outside Illinois.
The geographic distribution of the Miners Association surge may have been driven in part by
proximity to Chicago. That city was a major center of union organizing: of 72,945 employed
members of labor organizations in the state of Illinois in July 1886, two-thirds (49,052) resided
in Cook County (IBLS 1886, table VII, p. 218). Strikes and demonstrations in Chicago in favor
of the eight-hour day attracted hundreds of thousands of participants in spring 1886, despite the
tragic events at Haymarket Square in May (IBLS 1886, pp. 479-492; Perlman 1921, pp. 384386). As shown in figure 8, Association density was especially high in coal-mining counties
close to Chicago: Bureau (55 percent), Grundy (38 percent), LaSalle (42 percent), Vermilion (34
percent) and Will (56 percent).25 In fact, the correlation of 1886 Miners Association density with
distance from Cook County is -0.3.26 This pattern again suggests that the Miners Association
surge was driven largely by events outside coal mining.
Figure 11 offers some visual evidence on the exogeneity of unionism by comparing wage trends
in three groups of counties: one group that later enjoyed substantial Miners Association
membership, a second group that enjoyed substantial Knights membership, and third group that
experienced no unionism. Before unionization in 1986, all three groups appear to follow parallel
trends: a slight increase in wages from 1883 to 1884, followed by decreases in 1885 and 1886.
For wages, at least, there is no evidence that unionism was driven by the outcome to be
explained.
4. Wages and benefits
Coal miners would surely have valued increased wages and benefits. Did the Miners
Association and the Knights provide them?
Wages. Early writers including Lewis (1963, p. 76), Douglas (1930, pp. 142, 562), Ulman
(1955, pp. 28-32), and Suffern (1926, pp. 43-52), noting low union density and weak interstate
25
For the state as a whole, Miners Association density was 19.4 percent.
Distance between counties taken from NBER County Distance Database, created by Jean Roth from Census data,
posted at http://www.nber.org/data/county-distance-database.html, and accessed March 30, 2016.
26
10
bargaining in coal mining in the late nineteenth century, conjectured that there was little union
wage premium. Later writers provided empirical estimates confirming these conjectures using
cross-sectional data on workers. 27 Dillon and Gang (1987, p. 523), using a national survey of
workers from 1889-1890, found a slightly negative union relative wage effect for coal miners.
Eichengreen (1987, p. 512), using a survey of Iowa workers 1894, found a substantially negative
union effect on wages of “miners and quarrymen”.28 (Both studies found positive union wage
effects for most other occupations.) In this section, I attempt to confirm or reject these findings.
Table 2 shows ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the log average peak-season (winter)
wage rate per ton of coal on union density, using the county panel. The piece rate varied with
geological conditions, but county fixed effects should largely control for such conditions. The
estimated coefficients of union density predict the percent increase in wages if, extrapolating
hypothetically, union density in a county were to reach one hundred percent. At actually
observed levels of union density, the coefficients measure the average “wage gain” to all workers
from unionism, including any threat effects or spillover effects on nonunion workers in the same
county.
Column (i) shows estimates of the effect of the Miners Association and the Knights, using a time
trend and its square to control for unobserved statewide time-varying effects such as supply and
demand conditions. The estimated effects of both the Miners Association and the Knights are
very small—about 2 percent and zero percent, respectively. However, the cluster-robust
standard errors are large, especially for the Knights, so caution is advised.
Remaining columns report alternative specifications for the wage equation. Column (ii) reports
estimates that additionally control for the output price of coal (which should have a positive
effect on labor demand) and the average size of coal mines in the county (which measures any
employer size-wage effect). The coefficients of the controls have the expected signs, but the
estimated effects of the Miners Association and the Knights remain essentially zero. Columns
(iii) and (iv) replace the time trends with year dummies, and the estimated effects of the Miners
27
By contrast, Hatton, Boyer, and Bailey (1994) estimated a union relative wage effect of 12.7% for British coal
miners in 1889-90 (p. 449), where union density was about 57 percent (p. 440). They speculate that newlyorganized unions may have had especially large effect on wages due to an “impact effect” (p. 451). For U.S. coal
mining, studies have estimated positive union wage effects in the early twentieth century. For 1912-1923, Fishback
(1992, pp. 207-209) estimated a union relative wage effect of about 8 percent, though his standard errors were more
than half as large as the point estimates. For West Virginia coal mining, Boal and Pencavel (1994, p. 283) estimated
union relative wage effects from 5 to 12 percent in 1897-1912, and from negative 1 percent to positive 8 percent in
1913-1920, depending on specification, though again standard errors were more than half the point estimates.
28
Eichengreen estimates separate regressions for union and nonunion workers, but union differentials for any
occupation can easily be computed at the sample means. Inserting sample means for age, marital status, foreign
birth, and skill learned abroad (from table 1, p. 505) into Eichengreen’s OLS estimates for these two groups of
workers (table 5, p. 512, columns (ii) and (iii)) yields wages of unionized “miners and quarrymen” that were 0.27
log points below that of their nonunion counterparts. Inserting the same sample means into Eichengreen’s
selectivity-corrected estimates (table 5, p. 512, columns (v) and (vi)) yields wages of unionized “miners and
quarrymen” that were 0.09 log points below that of their nonunion counterparts. Standard errors cannot be
computed from Eichengreen’s tables.
11
Association and the Knights are again very small. Columns (v) and (vi) measure the effects of
overall union density. Again, the estimated effects of unionism are very small. Weighted least
squares estimates (not shown) produce roughly similar results except that the point estimate of
the Knights’ effect rises to about 0.10 and the standard errors of all the other coefficients
increase. In short, the point estimates from the county panel data suggest no wage gain from
unionism, though the standard errors are large, especially for the Knights.
The estimated wage gain from unionism could be zero because spillover effects from unionism
depressed nonunion wages while raising union wages. Or the wage gain could be zero because
operators (the source of the panel data) for some reason did not acknowledge paying union
workers more. To check these possibilities, I turned to an alternative source of wage data
reported by unionists. As part of the 1886 survey of union locals described above, the IBLS
asked what wage was received by members (IBLS 1886, table XVII, pp. 272-273). By
comparing union–reported wages to the average wage reported by operators in the same county,
I can measure the “wage gap” between union workers and the average wage in the same county.
Figure 12 plots wages reported by 49 Miners Association locals against average wages reported
by all operators in the same county in the same year (1886). Piece rate wages varied across and
within counties for many reasons, including differences in difficulty of working coal seams, so it
is not surprising that the figure shows considerable scattering around the 45-degree line.
Nevertheless, the figure shows no tendency for union wages to be greater than county averages.
Indeed, the mean ratio of union wage to county average is 0.995 (with standard error 0.023) and
the median ratio is exactly 1. The estimated wage gap, like the wage gain, is essentially zero.
Again, the evidence indicates the Miners Association had little or no effect on wages. 29
Benefits. Few coal operators provided benefits in this period,30 but some unions maintained their
own accident, sickness, or funeral funds (Saposs 1918 , p. 124-125). In Britain, for example, 77
percent of union members were eligible for funeral benefits and 48 percent for sickness benefits
(Boyer 1988, p. 320). The Webbs (1920, pp. 157-158) noted that such funds could attract new
members who might not see other advantages of unionism. As part of its 1886 survey of union
locals and Knights assemblies, the IBLS asked whether any such funds were maintained. Of 45
Association locals responding, only 8 (that is, 18 percent) had such funds. Of 182 Knights
29
Another piece of evidence on the union relative wage effect is available but probably less useful. The IBLS
surveyed workers in all trades in 1884, before the statewide surge in unionism. That survey included 232 coal
miners (IBLS 1884, table IX, p. 328). The 73 coal miners who were "connected with trades unions" enjoyed
average annual earnings of $400 while the 159 coal miners "not connected with trades unions" enjoyed average
annual earnings of $379. This amounts to a 5.5% earnings gap—greater than zero but less than estimates for other
occupations by Eichengreen (1987), Dillon and Gang (1987), and Mullin (1998). The usefulness of the IBLS
estimate is limited because there were no controls for geographic location or days of work per year. Not even the
identity of the union or unions was reported.
30
Later, in the early 1890s, a few coal companies arranged mandatory accident and life insurance policies for their
employees (IBLS 1893, pp. 111-114).
12
assemblies responding, only 65 (that is, 36 percent) had such funds.31 So most members of the
Miners Association and the Knights did not enjoy the benefits of such funds.
In summary, the available evidence indicates that the Miners Association could not offer Illinois
miners increased wages or union-provided benefits. The evidence for the Knights is less
complete but not much more favorable. I turn now to other workplace characteristics that might
have been improved by these unions.
5. Working time
Coal miners would likely have valued shorter daily hours of work. Certainly, workers in many
other industries were campaigning for shorter hours at this time.32 By contrast, however, they
would likely have valued more workdays per year. Coal demand was seasonal, and varied
inversely with temperature, because coal was used for heating but was difficult to store (IBLS
1887, pp. 10-11). Work was scarce and wages were often lower in the summer off-peak season.
Because of the drop in demand during the summer, miners worked fewer weeks per year than
most other workers. An 1884 IBLS survey of 2129 households found that workers in all
occupations worked an average of 43.5 weeks per year, but coal miners in the same survey
worked an average of only 36 weeks per year, a difference of nearly 20 percent. The typical
miner, according to the IBLS, “is usually eager to work, and … it is the irregularity of his
employment quite as much as the smallness of his pay which keeps him poor.”33 Did the Miners
Association and the Knights provide shorter hours and more regular employment?
Hours of work. The IBLS did not report average hours of work annually at the county level.
However, the same 1884 IBLS survey mentioned above found that all coal miners worked an
average of 9.25 hours per day before the surge in unionism. Two years later, a survey of Miners
Association locals found that hours of work varied from 8 to 12, with the majority working 10
hours per day. The average (weighted by workers) was 9.8 hours per day. A survey of Knights
Assemblies found that hours of work for coal miners varied from 7 to 14, with a majority also
working 10 hours per day. The Knights’ average (again weighted by workers) was 9.6 hours per
31
Miners Association locals: IBLS (1886, table XLV, pp. 436-437). Knights assemblies: IBLS (1886, table XLVI,
pp. 438-443). The Knights data include all trades, not just coal mining. Miners Association dues were
correspondingly modest. For the 45 locals responding, average annual dues were $2.17 (median dues were even
lower at $1.50) (IBLS 1886, table XLV, pp. 436-437.) These dues are well below the “3% or 4% of annual wages”
cited by Mullin (1998) for unions in other occupations.
32
See Cahill (1932, pp. 137-163), IBLS (1886, pp. 298-306, 466-472), and Perlman (1918, pp. 376-380).
33
IBLS 1884, pp. 352-355. Opportunities for work continued to be low for coal miners in the early twentieth
century, especially in unionized fields (Archbald 1922, pp. 53-68; Drury 1925, p. 187; Fishback 1992, pp. 83-86;
Fisher and Bezanson 1932, pp. 124-153; U.S. Bituminous Coal Commission 1920, p. 25).
13
day. Apparently, neither the Miners Association nor the Knights were able to reduce hours of
work during this period.34
Days of operation. Table 3 shows OLS regressions of log average days of operation on union
density, using the county panel. Column (i) reports estimated effects of the Miners Association
and the Knights with no covariates other than a time trend and its square. Both coefficients are
small, but their standard errors are large. Column (ii) reports estimates that additionally control
for the output price of coal and the average size of coal mines in the county. Small mines tended
to operate only in the peak season, so size is expected to have a positive effect on days of
operation. The Miners Association is now estimated to have reduced days of operation by about
19 percent, though the standard error remains fairly large. The estimated effect of the Knights is
positive, but similar in magnitude to its standard error. Estimates using year effects instead of
time trends (not shown) are quite similar.
What explains the apparent negative effect of the Miners Association on days of work? In other
industries or time periods, one might blame high union wages acting on a fixed labor-demand
curve (Lewis 1964)—but the Miners Association had little effect on wages, as noted in the
previous section. Alternatively, one might blame union strike activity. 35 The IBLS does not
report strikes by county, but the importance of strikes can be checked by excluding 1889, the
year of greatest union strike activity in this decade. Column (iii) reports OLS estimates
excluding 1889. They are nearly identical to those in the previous column. So the negative
effect of the Miners Association on days of work is difficult to explain but seems robust. 36
Thus, the available evidence suggests that the Miners Association reduced and the Knights
increased days of work per year, but the estimates are quite imprecise. Neither the Miners
Association nor the Knights reduced daily hours of work.
6. Working conditions
Though wages and working time were probably coal miners’ chief concerns, they likely cared
about other conditions in coal mines. According to Freeman and Medoff (1979, 1984) unions
34
Nonunion hours: IBLS 1884, table I, p. 352 (the average for workers in all 163 occupations was 9.9 hours).
Miners Association hours: IBLS 1886, table XIX, p. 299. Knights hours: IBLS 1886, table XX, p. 301. An eighthour day was later won by the United Mine Workers in 1898.
35
Coal operators charged decades later that unionism reduced days of operation through strikes and unauthorized
holidays (Bituminous Operators Special Committee 1923, pp. 166-174).
36
A negative effect of unionism on days of operation has also been found in prior research on early twentiethcentury coal mining. Fishback (1992, pp. 207-209) estimated that unionism reduced days of operation from 1912 to
1923 by one or two days per year out of an average of 206 days, though the standard error was more than half as
large as the point estimate. Boal and Pencavel (1994, pp. 291-293) estimated that unionism reduced days of
operation in West Virginia in 1897-1938 by about 14 to 20 percent, depending on specification, and the estimates
were significantly different from zero in most specifications. Most of this reduction was due to a shift in the labor
demand curve rather than a movement along the demand curve caused by an increase in wages.
14
exercise “collective voice,” which can be more effective than individual voice for improving
workplace conditions. Union voice can yield higher productivity and perhaps other outcomes
valued by individual workers.
Productivity. Most workers were paid on piece and set their own pace of work, but were
constrained by the speed of other mine operations, especially the speed with which management
supplied the miners with empty cars and retrieved their loaded cars.37 Holding piece-rate wages
constant, any increase in productivity, whatever the cause, would have increased miners’
earnings. So, all else equal, miners would probably have welcomed increased productivity. Did
the Miners Association and the Knights increase productivity?
Table 4 shows OLS regressions of coal output per worker per day on union density, using the
county panel. Column (i) reports estimated effects of the Miners Association and the Knights
with no covariates other than a time trend and its square. Column (ii) reports estimates that
additionally control for the fraction of coal mined by machine38 and the average size of coal
mines in the county. Columns (iii) and (iv) replace the time trends with year dummies. The
estimated effects of unionism are roughly similar across specifications. The effect of the Miners
Association is positive and large (between 22 percent and 34 percent) but not statistically
significant at conventional levels. The effect of the Knights of Labor is negative and even larger
(between 46 percent and 54 percent) with borderline statistical significance. So the Miners
Association may have increased productivity, but the Knights surely did not.39
Boys in the mines. Many mines employed boys underground, usually assisting their fathers at
the coal face or operating ventilation doors. Adult coal miners likely had mixed attitudes toward
boys underground. On the one hand, boys increased the total coal-mining labor supply and
therefore might have depressed wages. On the other hand, many boys in coal mines worked with
their fathers, helping to augment family income (IBLS 1890, p. XXII).
37
IBLS (1890, p. xx); Archbald (1922, pp. 61-63); Goodrich (1925, pp. 32-35). Slichter (1941, p. 316), referring to
a later era when the union was more powerful, noted “the coal miners’ union is constantly exerting pressure to have
the managements provide more cars and better car service.”
38
It might be argued that machine mining also depended on unionism. Decades later, coal operators claimed that
the union delayed the adoption of machine mining (Bituminous Operators Special Committee 1923, pp. 182-185), a
claim repeated by Emmet (1924, pp. 31-33) and Slichter (1941, p. 266). Boal (1994) found econometric evidence of
a negative effect of unionism on machine mining in West Virginia in the early twentieth century. However, there is
no evidence of such a phenomenon in this Illinois panel. In a regression of fraction of coal mined by machine on the
unionism variables with county and time controls (not shown here) the estimated effects of the Association, the
Knights, and all unionism were positive but less than their standard errors.
39
There is a large prior literature on unionism and productivity, reviewed by by Doucouliagos and Laroche (2003),
and Hirsch (2007). The findings of this literature are mixed, but studies of early coal mining generally find negative
effects. Pencavel (1977) found a negative effect in British coal mining from 1900 to 1913. Boal (forthcoming)
found a negative effect in West Virginia coal mining from 1914 to 1928. However, Pencavel’s and Boal’s estimates
are considerably smaller than the estimated effect of the Knights shown here.
15
For the year ending July 1, 1883, a total of 1256 boys under 16 years were reported to be
working underground in Illinois coal mines, 5.2 percent of the total coal labor force. In June of
that year, mining laws were amended to prohibit boys under 14 from working underground. By
1888, the number of boys under 16 had dropped to 868 (3.0 percent) and by 1889, the number
had dropped slightly further to 859 (2.9 percent).40 The 1883 legislation undoubtedly reduced
the number of boys underground, but did unionism also play a role?
Table 5 shows OLS regressions of the fraction of workers under 16 on union density, using the
county panel. The sample size shrinks because the dependent variable is not available from 1884
to 1887. The estimated coefficients are about -0.02 to -0.03 for each union in every
specification. The estimated union effects are substantial compared to the mean fraction under
16 (0.033). However, the standard errors are greater than the point estimates, so the results are at
best suggestive of a negative union effect on boys in the coal mines.
Safety. Miners surely valued safety. Accidents took the lives of 56 Illinois coal miners per year
on average from 1882 through 1889. To be sure, unionists lobbied for safety legislation at the
state level (Gottlieb 1978) but could individual coal miners enjoy a safer workplace by joining
the union or seeking employment at a unionized mine?
Table 6 shows Poisson regression estimates of the effect of unionism on fatalities in coal mining,
using the county panel. The sample size shrinks because fatalities were not reported in 1880 and
because counties that never experienced a fatality in any year drop out of the conditional
likelihood function (Cameron and Trivedi 2013, p. 352). All specifications control for the
number of workers and the average days of operation. As usual for Poisson regression, the
expected number of fatalities is modeled as the exponential of a linear function of regressors, so
the coefficients of the union densities should be interpreted as percent changes in expected
fatalities. Estimated effects of both the Miners Association and the Knights are negative for all
specifications. Many coefficients are large in magnitude, even larger than other estimates for
coal mining in the literature. 41 However, the cluster-robust standard errors are even larger for
the most part, so the estimates are not significantly different from zero.
Many alternate specifications were estimated but are merely summarized here to save space.
Observations for 1883, the year of the two mining disasters, was excluded. The coefficient of
the log of workers was constrained to equal one. The log of average days of operation was
excluded or its coefficient constrained to equal one. In every specification, the estimated
coefficient of the Miners Association was negative. The estimated coefficient of the Knights
40
IBLS 1883, pp. 12, 109, 135; 1884, p. 418; 1888, p. 326; 1889, p. II.
Boal (2009), for example, found that unionism reduced fatalities in early twentieth-century coal mining by 30 to
40 percent in the early twentieth century. Morantz (2013) found that unionism reduced tramatic injuries in coal
mining from 1993 to 2010 by 14 to 32 percent. Boal’s and Morantz’s estimates are significantly different from zero
at conventional levels. Fishback (1986) in one study found little effect of unionism on fatalities in early twentieth
century coal mining, but in a later study (1987) estimated that unionism reduced fatalities by 46 percent. However,
both of Fishback’s studies had very large standard errors.
41
16
was almost always negative but smaller than the coefficient of the Miners Association.
However, standard errors were always greater than the point estimates.
It might be conjectured that unionism was driven by accidents. That is, an unusually high
number of accidents in a particular county during the mid-1880s might have encouraged
subsequent union organization. To check this possibility, observations for 1885 were excluded,
but the estimated coefficients for unionism became more negative (and implausibly large).
Observations for both 1885 and 1884 were excluded with similar results. So it does not appear
that reverse causality can explain the negative estimated effects of unionism on accidents.
The county panel data provide some—but hardly overwhelming—evidence that the two unions
improved miners’ working conditions. The Miners Association may have increased
productivity, though the Knights certainly did not. Both unions may have discouraged the
employment of boys underground. Both unions may have reduced accidents. Large standard
errors discourage firm conclusions.
7. Treatment by employers
Yet another concern of coal miners might have been treatment by employers. Faith and Reid
(1986, p. 41) emphasize workers’ need to control “opportunistic behavior by employers.” This
need must have been strong in the 1880s, when labor legislation was almost nonexistent. In
recent periods, records of grievance procedures might demonstrate how a union defended
workers from opportunistic employers, but grievance procedures were not implemented in
Illinois coal until 1898 (Bloch 1931; Justi 1902). Circumstantial evidence is available, however,
in records of strikes.
Assurance of payment. Almost all coal miners during this period were paid once a month.42
Prompt payment would have been important to these workers, most of whom apparently had
little or no savings (IBLS 1884, pp. 394-402). If an employer delayed or reneged on payment,
the courts would have offered little help in enforcing payment of wages—a mechanic’s lien law
for coal miners was not passed in Illinois until 1895 (IBLS 1899, pp. 237-238, U.S.
Commissioner of Labor 1896, p. 283). Would a union help enforce prompt payment?
Circumstantial evidence on this question is provided by strike data collected by the U.S.
Commissioner of Labor.43 Table 8 shows causes of 178 coal strikes reported in Illinois for the
period 1881-1889. Strikes were frequent, but most were small, involving a single coal mine.
Note that 79 strikes, 44 percent of the total, were not ordered by a labor organization. For the
42
IBLS 1886, table XXVIII, pp. 323-324; and table XXIX, p. 325. A law requiring weekly payment was passed in
1891 (IBLS 1991, p. 46) but compliance lagged (IBLS 1992, p. 549).
43
Strike data for 1881-1886 collected by the Commissioner were published by IBLS (1888, pp. 246-313) in a table
entitled “Strikes by Years and Industries.” Data for 1887-1889 were published by U.S. Commissioner of Labor
(1894, pp. 162-258, table I). Bailey (1991) suggests that the Commissioner’s reports undercount actual strikes.
17
most part the causes of union and nonunion strikes were similar.44 However, there is one
interesting exception. Thirty-four percent of the nonunion strikes were for “payment of wages
overdue,” while none of the union strikes were for this cause. What could explain this
difference, which is statistically highly significant?
One possible explanation is selection, that unions tended to organize less opportunistic coal
operators, but it is hard to believe that unions would be more successful in organizing more
contented workers. Another possible explanation is that unions somehow suppressed miners’
desire for prompt payment, but this is equally hard to believe. The most plausible explanation is
that unions were able to enforce prompt payment of wages without a strike.
One naturally wonders whether the Miners Association and the Knights might have helped
secure better treatment in other aspects of the employment relationship, such as frequency of
payment, terms at company stores, and protection from favoritism in workplace assignment.
However, quantitative evidence—even circumstantial evidence—on these points is lacking.
8. Conclusion
What could unions do for Illinois coal miners in the 1880s? It appears that neither the Miners
Association nor the Knights of Labor raised wages, and only a small minority of union locals
provided benefits. Neither union was able to enforce a shorter workday. The Miners
Association apparently reduced days of work per year, but it seems unlikely coal miners would
have valued this result. Thus the usual benefits of union membership were absent in this period.
Nevertheless, the data offer hints of other less salient benefits of union membership. The Miners
Association may have increased productivity, which would have raised earnings for piece-rate
workers, though the Knights surely did not. Point estimates suggest that both unions may have
discouraged child labor in the mines and increased safety, but the estimates are imprecise.
Finally, a comparison of causes of union and nonunion strikes suggests that unions were
effective at ensuring prompt payment of wages due. In short, coal miners’ unions in Illinois
were not able to enforce the usual demand for “less work and more pay,” but they may have
improved other workplace conditions and they probably enforced more reliable pay.
44
The sources do not give the name of the “labor organization,” so union strikes could have been led by either the
Miners Association or the Knights.
18
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22
Appendix A: County panel data set
This appendix describes construction of the county-level panel data set. The Illinois Bureau of
Labor Statistics (hereafter, IBLS) collected and reported data on production, employment, etc.
beginning in 1879. Data on union membership were collected only once in 1886.
Miners Association membership. Detailed data on union membership were published in the
IBLS Fourth Biennial Report (1886). In that year, the Bureau conducted a survey of labor
unions in all occupations in Illinois. The data obtained from the Miners and Mine Laborers
Benevolent Protective Association (hereafter, the Miners Association) were characterized by the
IBLS as especially complete, thanks to the cooperation of the union leadership, but nevertheless,
6 locals and 804 members are missing for unexplained reasons (IBLS 1886, p. 181). A special
section of the Report, entitled “Labor Organizations,” reported the survey results in tabular form.
For each lodge or local union the following information was provided: month and year
organized, charter members, total present members, and present members currently employed
(IBLS 1886, table I, pp. 172-178). “Present” meant as of July 1886 (see IBLS 1886, p. 221, first
paragraph).
For this study, local employed membership data were summed to the county level. The IBLS
itself reported membership at the county level (IBLS 1886, tables VII and VIII, pp. 214-219), but
the IBLS county totals seem to contain errors. For example, the IBLS reported 552 members in
Adams County, which contained no coal mines. Also, the IBLS apparently misallocated the
membership of the local at Illiana, in Vermilion County, to Edgar County, perhaps because the
latter contains Vermilion City. So instead of using the county totals reported by the IBLS, local
employed membership data were summed to the county level by hand. Locals were assigned to
counties using each local’s city address and Bing Maps.
In three counties (Marshall, St. Clair, and Saline) employed membership was not reported by the
IBLS. Now, excluding these three counties, the ratio of employed members to total members for
the entire state was 0.795. So for these counties employed membership was imputed as total
members times 0.795.
Knights membership. In the same volume, the IBLS (1886, table XVIII, pp. 273-294) also
reported current membership in the Knights of Labor by county and occupation as of mid-1886.
For this study, only Knights members whose occupations were "coal miners," "mine laborers," or
"miners" were included. They totaled over 3500, about half as numerous as Association
members. For the Knights, only total membership, not employed membership, is available.
Other data. Beginning in 1883, the IBLS published annual data on production, employment,
wages, prices, and other coal data from coal operators. Wages and employment sometimes
varied seasonally, in which case the winter (peak season) values were used. All data were
reported by county for up to 50 counties. In even years, these data were included in the IBLS
Biennial Report. In odd years, a separate report usually entitled Statistics of Coal in Illinois was
23
published. Both sources reported nearly the same data for the same time periods (years ending
July 1, IBLS 1883, p. 5) and are easily combined into a county panel. However, the panel is not
quite balanced because some counties with very small production do not appear every year.
Moreover, some items were not reported every year (see table A1).
The IBLS also published some data for earlier years, collected by county mine inspectors,
apparently for calendar years (IBLS 1882, p. 42). These include reasonably complete data for
1882, just sixteen counties for 1879, but nothing for 1880 or 1881. Months (rather than days) of
operation were reported in these years (and for 1883) so I imputed days of operation assuming 20
days of operation per month. This seemed satisfactory because average imputed days were then
roughly similar to average days reported for later years. Note that the choice of assumed days
per month (20) does not affect the OLS estimates if days are entered in logarithmic form and
fixed effects for years are included, but any imputation does of course create measurement error.
For 1880 only, limited data were published by the U.S. Census (1886), including coal output,
employment, the price of output, and boys in mines, apparently for the year ending June 1, 1880
(p. xiii). Also, figures for “production capacity” were published, and I used them to impute days
of operation. For some small counties, production capacity seems to have been calculated by the
Census as actual production divided by (unpublished) actual months of operation, times twelve.
For these counties, I backed out days of operation using the Census’s apparent assumption of
“twelve months of twenty-five working days each” (U.S. Census 1886, p. 684):
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 =
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
× 300 .
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
I am reasonably confident in this procedure because the result was always a multiple of 25. For
other counties, production capacity seems to have been estimated by operators, but the Census
characterized the operators’ capacity estimates as excessively “sanguine” in view of
(unpublished) data on days of operation (p. 682). For Illinois as a whole, the Census reported
that the ratio of actual production to production capacity was only 44.10 per cent while the days
of operation were 78.15 percent of the 300-day maximum (table 35, p. 683, columns 10 and 15).
So for these counties, I applied a correction factor:
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 =
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
78.15
× 300 ×
.
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
44.10
Data availability for all years in the sample (with imputations) is summarized in table A1 below.
Calculation of union density. Union density at the county level was computed as follows. For
1886, density for the Miners Association was computed as employed membership divided by
total employment in coal mining. Similarly, union density for the Knights was computed as total
membership in coal-related occupations divided by total employment in coal mining. The
historical record suggests that both unions were weak or nonexistent in the early 1880s, grew
24
rapidly in 1885 and 1886, and remained fairly strong until at least the summer of 1889. Union
density was therefore assumed to equal zero for all counties before 1886. Union density was
assumed constant and equal to its 1886 value after 1886. Observations for the year ending July
1886, the year of rapid union growth, were dropped from the analysis.
Mine-level data. I originally intended to construct and analyze a panel at the level of the
individual coal mine, but this proved to be impossible. The IBLS did report a wealth of minelevel data on production, employment, etc. Unfortunately, these data cannot be matched to union
membership because the IBLS reported only the postal addresses of local unions and not union
members’ places of employment. Even without union data, construction of a panel of mines
would have been difficult because mine names changed frequently during this period, most likely
due to changes in ownership.
Table A1: Data availability--Illinois coal mining counties, 1879-1889
Source of data
Maximum number of observations
Winter (peak season) wage for hand-mining
(cents per ton)
Average days of operation a
Coal output (tons) per worker per day
Boys under 16 as fraction of mine workers
Fatalities
Price of coal at the mine (cents per ton)
Fraction of coal mined by machine b
Number of workers in and around mines
Number of coal mines
Average size of coal mine (workers per mine)
1879 1880 1882
IBLS Census IBLS
16
45
43
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1883
IBLS
46
X
1884
IBLS
49
X
1885
IBLS
50
X
1886
IBLS
50
X
1887
IBLS
50
X
1888
IBLS
50
X
1889
IBLS
49
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
NOTES: Year 1886 excluded from analysis because of rapidly changing levels of unionism in
late 1885 and early 1886.
a
Average days of operation estimated for 1879, 1882, and 1883 as months of operation times 20.
Average days of operation for 1880 imputed using actual production and production capacity
(see data appendix).
b
Fraction of coal mined by machine available in 1882 for only 3 counties (all zero).
25
Figure 1
Growth of Illinois coal mining, 1880-1890
30,000
30
Coal output
0
0
1890
5
1889
5,000
1888
10
1887
10,000
1886
15
1885
15,000
1884
20
1883
20,000
1882
25
1881
25,000
Output: millions of tons
35
Employment
1880
Employment: workers
35,000
SOURCE: IBLS 1890, pp. 285, 288.
Figure 2
Coal prices and wages in Illinois, 1882-1890
$1.60
$1.40
$1.20
$1.00
$0.80
$0.60
$0.40
Price of coal (per ton) at mines
$0.20
SOURCE: IBLS 1890, pp. 291, 292.
1890
1889
1888
1887
1886
1885
1883
1882
1884
Wage paid (per ton) to hand miners
$0.00
26
Figure 3
? 1876
? 1885
Jan. 1885
Feb. 1885
Mar. 1885
Apr. 1885
May 1885
June 1885
July 1885
Aug. 1885
Sept. 1885
Oct. 1885
Nov. 1885
Dec. 1885
Jan. 1886
Feb. 1886
Mar. 1886
Apr. 1886
May 1886
June 1886
July 1886
Aug. 1886
Sept. 1886
Oct. 1886
Nov. 1886
Dec. 1886
500
400
300
200
100
0
Charter members of Miners and Mine Laborers Benevolent
Protective Association, by date local was organized
SOURCE: IBLS 1886, pp. 173-174. Month of organization not reported for one local founded
in 1876 at LaSalle and one local founded in 1885 at Springfield.
Figure 4
Total members as of July 1886
Employed members as of July 1886
Jan. 1885
Feb. 1885
Mar. 1885
Apr. 1885
May 1885
June 1885
July 1885
Aug. 1885
Sept. 1885
Oct. 1885
Nov. 1885
Dec. 1885
Jan. 1886
Feb. 1886
Mar. 1886
Apr. 1886
May 1886
June 1886
July 1886
Aug. 1886
Sept. 1886
Oct. 1886
Nov. 1886
Dec. 1886
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Cumulative membership in Miners and Mine Laborers
Benevolent Protective Association, by date local was
Charter members
organized
SOURCE: IBLS 1886, pp. 173-174.
27
Figure 5
5000
100
4000
80
3000
60
2000
40
1000
20
All U.S.
1887
1886
1885
1884
1883
1882
1881
1880
1879
1878
1877
1876
1875
1873
1872
0
1869
0
Illinois only
All U..S.
Local Assemblies of Knights of Labor,
by date of organization
Illinois
SOURCE: All U.S.: Garlock 1982, p. xix. Illinois only (1877-1886): IBLS 1886, p. 210.
Figure 6
Cumulative membership in Knights of Labor (all trades,
Illinois only), by date Assembly was organized
40000
Charter members
35000
Total members as of 1886
30000
Employed members as of 1886
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886
SOURCE: IBLS 1886, p. 210.
28
Figure 7
Local Assemblies dominated by coal miners, by date
of organization, Illinois only
20
15
10
5
0
1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887
SOURCE: Garlock 1982, pp. 63-92.
29
Figure 8
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from IBLS 1886. Omitted counties contained no coal mines.
30
Figure 9
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from IBLS 1886. Omitted counties contained no coal mines.
31
Figure 10
Number of workers striking, all industries, by year
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
Illinois
200,000
United States
100,000
1890
1889
1888
1887
1886
1885
1884
1883
1882
1881
1880
0
SOURCE: United States Commissioner of Labor 1901, pp. 63, 343.
Figure 11
Trends in peak-season wage for three groups of counties
120
Cents per ton
100
80
Miners Association
density > 0.3 in 1986
60
Knights of Labor
density > 0.3 in 1986
40
No unionism in 1986
20
0
1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889
SOURCE: IBLS (various issues) and author’s calculations. Average wages are weighted by
employment.
32
Figure 12
Wages for hand mining (per ton), 1886
$1.00
Union wage, as reported
by Miners Association locals
$0.90
$0.80
$0.70
$0.60
$0.50
$0.40
$0.30
$1.00
$0.90
$0.80
$0.70
$0.60
$0.50
$0.40
$0.30
County average wage, as reported by operators
SOURCE: Union wage: IBLS 1886, table XVII, pp. 272-273. County average wage: IBLS
1886, pp. 567-622. Solid line is 45-degree line.
33
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of sample
a. Panel of Illinois coal-mining counties, 1879-1889
Winter (peak season) wage for hand-mining
(cents per ton)
Average days of operationa
Coal output (tons) per worker per day
Boys under 16 as fraction of mine workers
Fatalities
Price of coal at the mine (cents per ton)
Fraction of coal mined by machine
Number of workers in and around mines
Number of coal mines
Average size of coal mine (workers per mine)
Obs.
287
377
376
247
352
392
255
395
397
395
Mean Std. Dev.
83.7
23.9
205.5
1.856
0.033
1.142
139.9
0.063
518.2
15.7
53.3
52.2
1.199
0.038
4.164
36.2
0.184
662
19
63
Min.
47.0
Max.
200.0
21.3
0.081
0.000
0.000
68.9
0.000
1
1.000
0.500
420.3
12.113
0.200
70
254
1.000
3491
87
361
SOURCE: Data for 1879, 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, 1887, 1888, and 1889 from Illinois Bureau of Labor
Statistics (various issues). Data for 1880 from U.S. Census (1886). Unit of observation is county.
Year 1886 excluded because of rapidly changing levels of unionism in late 1885 and early 1886.
a
Average days of operation estimated for 1879, 1882, and 1883 as months of operation times 20.
Average days of operation for 1880 imputed using actual production and production capacity
(see data appendix).
b. Union density in Illinois coal-mining counties, 1886
Fraction of workers who are employed
Obs.
49
Mean Std. Dev.
0.114
0.189
Min.
0
Max.
0.791
a
members of Miners Association
Fraction of workers who are members
of Knights of Labor
Fraction of workers who are members
of either union
SOURCE: Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics (1886).
a
49
0.107
0.151
0
0.642
49
0.164
0.182
0
0.656
Miners and Mine Laborers Benevolent Protective Association.
34
Table 2: Estimated effect of unionism on wages
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Fraction of workers who are employed
members of Miners Associationa
0.0215
(0.0655)
-0.0029
(0.0713)
0.0431
(0.0663)
0.0194
(0.0700)
Fraction of workers who are members
of Knights of Labor
-0.0011
(0.1240)
-0.0173
(0.1177)
0.0246
(0.1347)
0.0034
(0.1293)
Fraction of workers who are members
of either union
(v)
(vi)
0.0357
(0.0958)
0.0079
(0.0896)
Log price of coal at the mine
0.2911 ***
(0.0988)
0.2729 ***
(0.0993)
0.2746 ***
(0.0977)
Log average size of coal mine
0.0189
(0.0186)
0.0162
(0.0181)
0.0166
(0.0173)
Annual time trend
-0.0978 ***
(0.0229)
-0.0577 **
(0.0274)
Time trend squared
0.0059 ***
(0.0018)
0.0036 *
(0.0020)
Fixed effects for counties
Fixed effects for years
Adjusted R-square
Number of observations
Yes
No
0.8992
279
Yes
No
0.9093
277
Yes
Yes
0.9082
279
Yes
Yes
0.9163
277
NOTES: OLS estimates. Dependent variable is log of winter (peak season) wage for hand-mining.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are cluster-robust.
a
Miners and Mine Laborers Benevolent Protective Association.
* Significantly different from zero at 10% in two-tailed test.
** Significantly different from zero at 5% in two-tailed test.
*** Significantly different from zero at 1% in two-tailed test.
Yes
Yes
0.9084
279
Yes
Yes
0.9167
277
35
Table 3: Estimated effect of unionism on days of operation
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Fraction of workers who are employed
members of Miners Associationa
-0.0443
(0.2232)
-0.1929
(0.1537)
-0.1909
(0.1882)
Fraction of workers who are members
of Knights of Labor
0.0749
(0.1432)
0.1294
(0.1205)
0.1781
(0.1323)
Log price of coal at the mine
-0.0506
(0.1564)
-0.0673
(0.1732)
Log average size of coal mine
0.1951 **
(0.0758)
0.2065 **
(0.0855)
Annual time trend
-0.0085
(0.0272)
-0.0252
(0.0229)
-0.0280
(0.0249)
Time trend squared
-0.0005
(0.0027)
0.0007
(0.0021)
0.0009
(0.0026)
Fixed effects for counties
Fixed
effects
for years
Adjusted
R-square
Yes
No
0.237
Yes
No
0.3381
Yes
No
0.3129
Number of observations
369
367
321
NOTES: OLS estimates. Dependent variable is log of average days of operation.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are cluster-robust.
Column (iii) omits observations for 1889.
a
Miners and Mine Laborers Benevolent Protective Association.
* Significantly different from zero at 10% in two-tailed test.
** Significantly different from zero at 5% in two-tailed test.
*** Significantly different from zero at 1% in two-tailed test.
36
Table 4: Estimated effect of unionism on productivity
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Fraction of workers who are employed
members of Miners Associationa
0.2901
(0.2327)
0.3394
(0.3012)
0.2314
(0.2493)
0.2192
(0.2919)
Fraction of workers who are members
of Knights of Labor
-0.4590 *
(0.2613)
-0.3723 *
(0.2230)
-0.5429 *
(0.3010)
-0.4705 **
(0.2223)
Fraction of workers who are members
of either union
Fraction of coal mined by machine
0.4221 ***
(0.1523)
0.4182 ***
(0.1442)
Log average size of coal mine
-0.2067 ***
(0.0680)
-0.2070 ***
(0.0675)
Annual time trend
0.0078
(0.0263)
-0.1942
(0.1308)
Time trend squared
0.0005
(0.0028)
0.0155
(0.0097)
Fixed effects for counties
Fixed effects for years
Adjusted R-square
Number of observations
Yes
No
0.4284
368
Yes
No
0.6734
244
Yes
Yes
0.4298
368
NOTES: OLS estimates. Dependent variable is log of coal output per worker per day.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are cluster-robust.
a
Miners and Mine Laborers Benevolent Protective Association.
* Significantly different from zero at 10% in two-tailed test.
** Significantly different from zero at 5% in two-tailed test.
*** Significantly different from zero at 1% in two-tailed test.
Yes
Yes
0.6908
244
37
Table 5: Estimated effect of unionism on boys in coal mines
(i)
(ii)
Fraction of workers who are employed
a
members of Miners Association
-0.0224
(0.0248)
-0.0199
(0.0253)
Fraction of workers who are members
of Knights of Labor
-0.0323
(0.0344)
-0.0268
(0.0356)
Fraction of workers who are members
of either union
(iii)
(iv)
-0.0261
(0.0298)
-0.0206
(0.0307)
Annual time trend
-0.0012
(0.0031)
-0.0012
(0.0031)
Time trend squared
0.0000
(0.0003)
-0.0001
(0.0003)
Fixed effects for counties
Fixed effects for years
Adjusted R-square
Number of observations
Yes
No
0.2994
241
Yes
Yes
0.3148
241
Yes
No
0.2995
241
Yes
Yes
0.3155
241
NOTES: OLS estimates. Dependent variable is fraction of mine workers who are under 16 years.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are cluster-robust.
a
Miners and Mine Laborers Benevolent Protective Association.
* Significantly different from zero at 10% in two-tailed test.
** Significantly different from zero at 5% in two-tailed test.
*** Significantly different from zero at 1% in two-tailed test.
38
Table 6: Estimated effect of unionism on fatalities
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Fraction of workers who are employed
a
members of Miners Association
-0.0589
(0.8009)
-0.6502
(0.8764)
Fraction of workers who are members
of Knights of Labor
-0.2706
(0.8760)
-0.5590
(1.0829)
Fraction of workers who are members
of either union
-0.3539
(0.6539)
(iv)
-1.1577
(0.9843)
Log average days of operation
0.9245
(1.5069)
0.9187
(1.5242)
0.0643
(0.8889)
0.0723
(0.8958)
Log number of workers
1.7283 ***
(0.4100)
1.7076 ***
(0.3885)
1.6260
(0.3735)
1.6175 ***
(0.3637)
Annual time trend
0.1611
(0.1479)
0.1586
(0.1463)
Time trend squared
-0.0246
(0.0161)
-0.0233
(0.0156)
Fixed effects for counties
Fixed effects for years
Log likelihood
Number of observations
Number of countiesb
Yes
No
-327.076
246
35
Yes
No
-326.978
246
35
Yes
Yes
-288.987
246
35
Yes
Yes
-288.374
246
35
NOTES: Panel poisson regression estimates. Dependent variable is log of coal output per worker
per day. Standard errors (in parentheses) are cluster-robust.
a
Miners and Mine Laborers Benevolent Protective Association.
b
Includes only counties with at least one fatality in at least one year. Counties with no fatalities
in any year drop out of the conditional likelihood function (Cameron and Trivedi 2013, p. ???).
* Significantly different from zero at 10% in two-tailed test.
** Significantly different from zero at 5% in two-tailed test.
*** Significantly different from zero at 1% in two-tailed test.
39
Table 7: Causes of strikes in Illinois coal mining, 1881-1889
Cause
For increase of wages
Against reduction of wages
For payment of wages overdue
For reinstatement of employees
For change of screena
In sympathy with strike elsewhere
Against work rules
For employment of checkweighman
For equal wages, winter and summer
Other
TOTAL
All strikes
Number
Percent
52
35
27
15
6
4
3
2
1
33
178
29%
20%
15%
8%
3%
2%
2%
1%
1%
19%
100%
Strikes ordered by
labor organization
Number
Percent
35
25
0
9
5
2
2
1
0
20
99
35%
25%
0%
9%
5%
2%
2%
1%
0%
20%
100%
Strikes not ordered by
labor organization
Number
Percent
17
10
27
5
1
2
1
1
1
14
79
22%
13%
34%
6%
1%
3%
1%
1%
1%
18%
100%
Test of differenceb
Chi-sq
p-value
2.88
3.54
33.84
0.46
1.87
0.05
0.15
0.03
1.25
0.18
0.090
0.060
0.000
0.496
0.172
0.821
0.700
0.873
0.263
0.675
SOURCES: 1881-1886: IBLS (1888, pp. 246-313, table "Strikes by Years and Industries"). 1887-1889: U.S. Commissioner of Labor (1894),
pp. 162-258, table I.
a
Screens were used to sort coal into lumps, for which the miner was paid, and smaller pieces of lower market value, for which the miner was
not paid. Thus the larger the holes in the screen, the fewer lumps retained, and the less the miner was paid. A law requiring payment before
screening went into effect in 1891 (IBLS 1891, p. 46).
b
Chi-square test of homogeneity (1 degree of freedom).
[end of manuscript]