For Official Use
TAD/FI(2014)12
Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
21-Mar-2014
___________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________
English - Or. English
TRADE AND AGRICULTURE DIRECTORATE
FISHERIES COMMITTEE
TAD/FI(2014)12
For Official Use
FISHING FOR DEVELOPMENT - BACKGROUND PAPER FOR SESSION 2
REBUILDING
10-11 April 2014
This background paper is intended for participants to “Fishing for Development”, a joint meeting of the OECD
Fisheries and Development Assistance Committees, with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations and the World Bank that will be held at OECD Headquarters on 10 and 11 April 2014.
This paper provides context for the discussions that will be held during session 2 on the role that the rebuilding
of fisheries can play in promoting sustainable development and improving economic outcomes in the fisheries
sector worldwide. It targets particularly participants with a development assistance background and potentially
limited knowledge of the fisheries sector. This paper brings together basic information on the current state of
world fish stocks, identifies the losses currently being incurred, highlights some potential benefits from
rebuilding fish stocks and fisheries and seeks to explore some of the challenges in rebuilding stocks and fisheries
particularly in developing countries.
This paper was drafted by Frank Meere, consultant.
For further information please contact:
Claire Delpeuch ([email protected])
English - Or. English
JT03354795
Complete document available on OLIS in its original format
This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of
international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
TAD/FI(2014)12
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................4
Why rebuild fisheries? .................................................................................................................................5
How can fisheries be rebuilt? .......................................................................................................................6
What are the policy coherence for development issues and what can be done? ..........................................8
Particular challenges for developing countries.........................................................................................9
Role for Development cooperation ........................................................................................................10
References ..................................................................................................................................................11
Boxes
Box 1. Key points brought to the attention of participants to “Fishing for Development” .........................3
Box 2. Discussion questions ........................................................................................................................3
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Box 1. Key points brought to the attention of participants to “Fishing for Development”







Rebuilding fisheries is a broader approach than rebuilding fish stocks and encompasses the social,
economic and environmental dimensions of fisheries.
There are huge economic losses in current fishing operations which have impacts on fish stocks, the
broader environment and on communities. “Business as usual is not an option”;
Without reform and fisheries rebuilding, the economic contribution of fisheries will diminish with clear
consequences: poorer fishing communities;
Rebuilt fisheries will have a positive effect on food security, on-going economic well being and broader
development;
Rebuilding challenges cut across all areas: developed and developing countries and high seas fisheries.
There are different but equally difficult challenges in each area;
Broad stakeholder involvement is an essential element in developing rebuilding plans;
The development of long-term alternative employment and livelihood opportunities for fishing communities is
an essential prerequisite for successful fisheries rebuilding;
Box 2. Discussion questions



How do we establish the necessary preconditions for successful fisheries rebuilding and how can
development cooperation contribute to rebuilding efforts?
What role must developed distant water fishing nations play in reducing their excess fishing capacity, fishing
effort and catches both domestically, on the high seas and in other coastal states’ EEZs?
How can we influence domestic decision-making in support of fisheries rebuilding? What role can
development cooperation, the private sector and NGOs play in this respect?

How do we establish the broader consensus necessary to implement rebuilding plans?

How can we establish long-term alternative employment and livelihood opportunities for displaced fishers?
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Introduction
1.
The world’s catch from marine fisheries increased significantly from 16.8 million tonnes in1950
to a peak of 86.4 million tonnes in 1996, and then declined before stabilizing at about 80 million tonnes.
Global production in 2010 was 77.4 million tonnes. The Pacific is a major contributor to this production
providing close to 41 million tonnes in 2010; with the northwest providing 21 million tonnes, the
western/central 12 million tonnes and the southeast about 8 million tonnes.
2.
This spectacular rise in production corresponded with an equally spectacular decrease in the
status of the stocks being harvested. The percentage of over-exploited stocks has increased steadily over
the years from 10 per cent in the early 1970s to 26 per cent in the late 1980s and has continues to increase
since then.1 Non-fully exploited stocks have gradually decreased over time while fully exploited stocks
have remained fairly static at around 50 per cent of stocks. The FAO The State of World Fisheries and
Aquaculture 2012 Report 2012 (FAO SOFIA Report, FAO, 2012) provides the following information on
the status of stocks:

Overexploited – 29.9 per cent

Fully exploited – 57.4 per cent

Non-fully exploited – 12.7 per cent
3.
Fully exploited stocks are producing catches that are very close to their maximum sustainable
yield, theoretically, the largest yield (or catch) that can be taken from a species' stock over an indefinite
period. This means there is no scope to increase production from these stocks without running the risk of
declining catches and stock collapse due to poor management or environmental perturbation. Most of the
stocks of the top ten species, which account in total for about 30% of the world marine capture fisheries
production by volume, are fully exploited.
4.
Overexploited stocks have been depleted and produce lower catches than their biological
potential. They require rigorous rebuilding plans and must be monitored closely to ensure rebuilding
targets are being met. Only when they are rebuilt will they be fully productive and sustainable.
5.
Non-fully exploited stocks are generally under lower fishing pressure and often have scope for
increased production. However, these stocks may have two characteristics which limit their potential, they
may be of little/less interest to consumers and may not be highly productive (for example because they are
slow growing/long lived and not highly fecund). Given these later characteristics, if they are exploited they
need to be carefully managed (OECD, 2012).
6.
These figures may well underestimate the extent of the problems faced in wide capture fisheries,
as they rely on a formal stock assessment being available to determine the state of the stock. To the extent
that this is not available for stocks then the situation is unknown, likewise where there is limited biological
data on a specie or stock, this may limit the quality (and hence reliability) of a stock assessment. IUU
fishing also directly limits the information available on stocks as catches are not recorded and hence
generally not part of any formal stock assessment.
7.
It is against this broader backdrop of static catches and declines in status of fish stocks that in
2002 the World Summit on Sustainable Development agreed to the ambitious goal to “Maintain or restore
stocks to levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield with the aim of achieving these goals for
depleted stocks on an urgent basis and where possible not later than 2015”. While this is unlikely to be
1
FAO uses three categories of stock status. Overexploited (overexploited, recovering and depleted); fully
exploited and non-fully exploited (moderately exploited and underexploited).
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achieved for a variety of reasons, it highlights that for more than a decade it has been acknowledged that
overfishing is causing serious losses and that fish stocks and fisheries more generally need to be rebuilt.
Why rebuild fisheries?
8.
The environmental and economic impacts of overfishing have been widely studied. Fisheries that
are overfished are less productive, less resilient and if overfishing persists prone to collapse. The economic
and social consequences of further declines or collapses in fish stocks are significant, particularly for those
developing countries which are heavily reliant on the fisheries sector for food security and broader
economic activity.
9.
Probably the most recent quantitative study of direct relevance to this paper is the joint World
Bank and FAO study The Sunken Billions (World Bank and FAO, 2008). This substantial study examines
the losses from current fisheries management failures and looks at potential pathways to reform and
improved economic and ecological outcomes. The study concludes that marine fisheries are an
underperforming asset and calculates that the difference between the potential and actual net economic
benefits from these fisheries is in excess of USD 50 billion annually. The USD 50 billion figure does not
include the losses associated with illegal fishing nor the economic contribution of associated activities such
as fish processing and distribution and makes no attempt to value biodiversity losses. As such the study
suggests that losses to the global economy could substantially exceed USD 50 billion per year.
10.
This is not to say that these losses are solely due to depleted fisheries, but the study identifies two
key factors:

Depleted fish stocks – there are less fish to catch and, therefore, the cost of catching is greater than
it could be; and

Fleet overcapacity – too many boats chasing to few fish, meaning that the potential benefits are
dissipated through excessive fishing effort.
11.
The message is that just as the depletion of a country’s fish stocks is a loss of national wealth, the
depletion of global fish stocks represents a loss of global natural capital. Eliminating these losses and
building healthy and economically sustainable fisheries can deliver an on-going flow of economic benefits
and avoid causing an economic drain on individual countries or the global community more generally as is
the case currently.
12.
To recover the losses identified by the study the report recommends:

A reduction in fishing effort to increase productivity, profitability, and net economic benefits from
a fishery; and

Rebuilding fish stocks which will lead to increased and if well managed sustainable yields and
lower fishing costs.
13.
Other studies have come to similar conclusions. A 2012 study by Rashid Sumaila and colleagues
(Sumaila et al., 2012) found that restoring fish populations to optimal levels through stock rebuilding
would increase the annual value derived from fisheries by USD 66 billion. Rebuilding would involve
reducing global fishing fleets to sustainable levels and ending harmful subsidies, which contribute to
excessive fishing capacity. They estimated that this would result in an increase in catch value (increasing
from the current level to USD 100 billion), a reduction in fish catching costs (down from USD 73 billion to
USD 37 billion - more fish hence easier to catch) and a decrease in subsidies (from current levels to about
USD 10 billion).
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14.
The study estimates that such reforms would cost in the order of USD 200 billion, which would
include buyback schemes and adjustment payments to fishers to leave the industry. It concludes that the
improved profitability would exceed the cost of rebuilding after about 12 years. Employment and total
returns on capital from fishing would decline, but the remaining fleet would become more profitable,
produce more food, and generate more tax revenue.
15.
As in the World Bank study, Sumaila et al. (2012) do not account for associated benefits in the
estimated USD 66 billion benefit mentioned above. These would include, activity in related sectors such as
fish processing, associated ecotourism activities such as recreational fishing and diving and importantly
food security – the study estimates rebuilt fisheries could cover the food deficit for an estimated 20 million
people in the world’s poorest countries.
16.
Undertaking necessary stock rebuilding would thus offer a range of benefits, including more
resilient and productive stocks, better catches and improved food security for those who rely directly on
these resources. For developing countries, where this rebuilding is accompanied by the development of
robust fisheries management it will enable them to maximise the returns from their EEZs and produce an
on-going flow of economic benefits.
How can fisheries be rebuilt?
Reform design
17.
In the report Rebuilding Fisheries: The way forward (OECD, 2012), the OECD COFI has
developed a set of practical and evidence-based principles and guidelines to consider when designing and
implementing rebuilding plans, whilst preserving the livelihoods that depend directly or indirectly on this
activity. These principles and guidelines follow from a broad analysis of rebuilding fisheries that goes
beyond just the rebuilding of fish stocks. “Rebuilding fisheries” refers to programmes (governmentsponsored or otherwise) that seek to improve at once the stock status as well as securing both the integrity
of ecosystems and livelihoods that depend on fisheries. An improved understanding of the economic,
social and institutional issues that underlie successful rebuilding efforts indeed increases the likelihood that
fisheries rebuilding programmes will meet their objectives.
18.
Rebuilding fisheries therefore needs to be addressed as one that encompasses all facets, be they
direct fisheries adjustment, fisheries governance, local employment including in the processing and
marketing sector, regional impacts or the need for alternative employment and livelihood opportunities and
food security. This will vary depending on the particular country/region and circumstances. In this regard it
is recalled that wholesale reform is often needed to address the underlying problems that initially led to
overfishing.
19.
OECD Key principles for rebuilding include the idea that rebuilding plans should be based on
social, biological and economic principles which should be incorporated throughout the design and
implementation process in an integrated fashion, as opposed to sequentially or in isolation. Addressing risk
and uncertainties should be explicitly incorporated into the rebuilding plan. Efforts to rebuild fisheries
should aim at restoring a sustainable fishery with a potential to generate profits and employment with
careful consideration of costs and benefits and their distribution. Finally, rebuilding fisheries should take
into account relevant international fisheries instruments, as well as environmental and ecosystem
considerations and the interactions between the fishing activity and other industries. These principles as
well as more specific guidelines can be found in the Council Recommendation that was adopted by the
OECD in April 2012 (OECD, 2012).
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20.
The World Bank and FAO (2008) also endorses an approach which is not just about rebuilding
fish stocks, but one which is about rebuilding fisheries (the economic, governance and social issues
associated with managing fisheries). The publication finds that successful reforms require the
strengthening of tenure systems, the equitable sharing of benefits from fisheries and the curtailing of illegal
fishing.
21.
For all rebuilding programs an important question will be what is the appropriate target?
Traditionally, fisheries managers and scientists providing advice on stocks have focussed on MSY as an
appropriate target. However, there will be stocks for which reliable stock assessments are not available, or
where there is limited data. In these circumstances contemporary thinking suggests where there is limited
data and, or, environmental changes are being observed, a more precautionary target may be appropriate.
The downside with such an approach is that it may take longer to reach the agreed target and involve
greater short-term costs. This will need to be understood in supporting rebuilding programs.
22.
A management challenge in any rebuilding program will be impacts on related stocks, i.e. stocks
that may not need to be rebuilt but which are caught in association with the stock subject to the rebuilding
program. Unless the fishery being rebuilt is based on a single stock with little or no interaction with other
stocks (these fisheries exist but are not all that common) then managing the rebuilding will involve also
managing the related stocks and fisheries. This has implications for the scope of the rebuilding program
and may well increase short and medium term costs.
23.
A final but important question is what happens when the fishery or stocks do not respond in the
way predicted? Sometimes this is as a result of data deficiencies, changes in our understanding of the
biological characteristics of the stock, refinements in the models used to predict rebuilding pathways or
just broader environmental changes, e.g. climate change. However, it may also be due to the fundamental
change caused to the ecosystem from overfishing and depletion of the target stock. Understanding that this
may occur and building this into the rebuilding program will be important.
24.
Another key challenge is to understand the complexity of what is being done and the time
horizons involved in measuring success. There are many examples of rebuilding programs that have failed
to reach targets due to exogenous factors; some of which have not been able to be identified, others can
only be attributed to environmental changes. The lesson learned in most cases it that it is likely to take
longer than originally anticipated. Funding agencies must view these projects as long-term projects
(10+ years) and be prepared to support them for the life of the project.
Reform implementation
25.
Beyond the technical aspects of rebuilding plans, lies an important challenge related to the fact
that implementing the reforms proposed involves substantial short to medium term adjustment costs
whereas the benefits will only be realised in the longer term. The reforms require not only political will
(something frequently lacking) but also broad based social acceptance.
26.
Major fisheries reforms are indeed often politically difficult and history suggests that the longer
necessary adjustment is left, the more difficult it becomes. Reforms cause pain to voters in sensitive
electorates and provoke unrest among focal lobby groups. This is not surprising as, depending on the
circumstances, such adjustments may involve fundamental issues such as; basic food security, the change
to a life long career, the loss of identity, worry about future possible employment or retirement, substantial
change to regional communities and significant changes in potential local employment opportunities. In
many cases politicians with short time horizons have thus opposed them.
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27.
In effect, depleted fish stocks are the result of the inability to deal successfully with such
pressures. In many cases the failure to deal with necessary reforms is due to the impacts these reforms will
have in other areas, be they regional development issues or local unemployment. It may also be as a result
of established ideology or an entrenched ruling party or due to bureaucrats or politicians with vested
interests. The effect has been that the resource has had to bear these adjustment pressures.
28.
OECD (2012) and World Bank and FAO (2008) both highlight that the problem is not just a
fisheries problem but one of the political economy of reform and that reform requires broad-based political
will supported by social consensus. Building consensus around substantial changes in individual’s
employment and livelihoods and the regions, which support the fisheries sector, is a daunting task. It is
one, which many well-resourced developed countries have, and continue to struggle with, as can be
witnessed in both the European Union and Canada, but in other countries too. To ensure that there is
understanding and broad consensus on proposed actions, it will be important to establish exit strategies and
funding alternative employment opportunities, early retirement opportunities, schooling and necessary
safety nets for those affected early in the process, so that they can make informed decisions on their future.
World Bank and FAO (2008) notes that such a consensus takes time to build and needs long-term vision
and “champions” to ensure that momentum is not lost with changes in governments
What are the policy coherence for development issues and what can be done?
OECD countries have an important role to play in rebuilding efforts
29.
The benefits and costs of rebuilding fisheries affect the entire global community. To the extent
that excess fishing capacity results from the failure to adjust this capacity in developed country fleets, it
imposes significant costs on those countries (assuming they subsidise these fleets) and on the resources
they have access to (within their EEZs, in other country EEZs and on the high seas). It also imposes costs
on the broader global community via depleted fish stocks in third countries’ EEZs where excess capacity is
exported to and on the high seas and via the uneven playing field that unsubsidised fleets need to compete
against. Additionally, where this fishing capacity is used to undertake IUU fishing activity it results in
further losses to the global community or specific countries where this activity occurs.
30.
In implementing fisheries rebuilding programs in developing countries or for high sea fisheries,
developed countries with significant high seas capacity, or that have access agreements with developing
countries, thus need to consider the extent to which their domestic fisheries policy may be in conflict with
rebuilding goals. It may be that they can enhance rebuilding outcomes by further refining domestic policies
to reduce overcapacity and fishing effort while also supporting the third country or high seas rebuilding
effort. This will be more relevant for discrete stocks or where the rebuilding involves stocks subject to
access agreements, as the potential negative effects of other parties cannot be quarantined.
31.
More broadly, the problem is that one country or even a grouping of like-minded countries
cannot achieve the rebuilding challenge, unless they are all committed to the goal. In a presentation to the
recent World Ocean Summit (February 2014), Martin Stuchtey, a director at McKinsey and Company
presented information on a study undertaken to value the oceans (Intrafish, 2014). According to this study
the 65% of high seas catches come from just 12 nations with 25% coming from just five nations. In total,
of all high seas catches, 85% are taken by developed nations. On the face of this evidence, significant fleet
reductions are needed first and foremost in developed country fleets and while there has been some
progress in some countries in addressing this, clearly more needs to be done.
32.
One of the key issues when it comes to joint management of shared or migratory fish stocks is
that of blatant national self-interest. This is particularly evident in the operations of Regional Fisheries
Management Organizations (RFMOs). The issues associated with the operations of RFMOs are explored in
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more details in a separate background paper for this meeting. The point to make here is that the
deliberations of RFMOs are all to frequently dominated by developed countries, many of whom are distant
water fishing nations (DWFNs), who do not want to see their fleets fishing opportunities diminished (see
background paper for Session 5). This has two potential effects when it comes to rebuilding the stocks
managed by RFMOs. Firstly, RFMO member states are frequently reluctant to agree to the catch
reductions needed to rebuild fish stocks, often in an effort to delay the inevitable by arguing that the
scientific evidence does not support the need for such reductions. Secondly, regardless of who may have
caused the decline in fish stocks, RFMO members often propose that the rebuilding pain should be shared
equally. This is somewhat at odds with the argument frequently advanced by the same countries that when
it comes to long-term catch allocations for these fisheries, they should be based on catch history (as they
frequently have the largest catch history).
Particular challenges for developing countries
33.
History suggests that even well resourced developed countries have struggled to implement
successful fisheries rebuilding. This has tended to be as a result of not being able to deal with the
challenges associated with the political economy of reform, particularly the direct political challenges.
Developing countries are likely to face additional challenges to those experienced by developed countries,
particularly associated with governance but also directly associated with short-term requirements, for
example food security concerns.
34.
A fundamental requirement for the rebuilding of fisheries is to have an effective fisheries
management regime in place. In many developing countries, this is likely to be either inadequate or in need
of further development. An initial fisheries rebuilding requirement, if other political economy requirements
have been met, is to reduce fishing activity and harvest rates. To do this requires a management regime
which can limit access to the fishery, set and monitor harvest rates and provide on-going access rights with
security of tenure.
35.
In countries with large artisanal or subsistence fisheries there is likely to be an immediate tension
in limiting access and restricting harvest – that is the short term need for food and livelihoods versus the
longer term goal of a sustainable fishery. An effective governance structure and social support to deal with
the employment and food security needs of those who are removed from these fisheries will be essential.
The on-going need for alternative employment and livelihoods for displaced fishers must be a priority. In
the absence of effective fisheries enforcement those displaced will seek to re-enter the fishery (Fox and
Sen, 2002 and Palma and Tsamenyi, 2008). Where necessary, integrated government policies, to address
the issues associated with labour displaced from fishing, must be developed to provide long-term
alternative employment opportunities, acknowledging that these will not necessarily be marine-based.
These schemes will need to provide appropriate education and training. There is an important support role
for development cooperation in this respect.
36.
Where developing countries have provided access to foreign fleets, it is unlikely that the
relatively low access fees paid have not gone into developing more effective fisheries management
arrangement and improved enforcement capability. They have more likely been used to supplement
general government revenue. Fisheries access agreements have in the past effectively provided highly
subsidised access for the foreign flagged vessels while providing little real benefit to the local industry nor
supported substantial improvements in domestic fisheries management capacity (Le Manach et al., 2013
and Mbithi Mwikya, 2006). Where these agreements have resulted in overfished stocks it could be argued
that those who had access, should be required to fund the rebuilding of these stocks. In reality, many of
these access agreements involved highly migratory fish stocks and as such other countries fishing the same
resource on the high seas will also have contributed to the state of the stock.
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37.
In a study published in 2008 Salayo et al. analyzed approaches to the management of fishing
capacity in small scale (non-commercial) fisheries in Cambodia, Philippines and Thailand including effort
reduction, gear, area and temporal restrictions and alternative livelihoods. In relation to alternative
livelihoods they conclude that “there was an overwhelming consensus that alternative (providing more than
50% of income) and supplemental livelihoods are needed by the fishers to exit from the fisheries” (Salayo
et al., 2008).
38.
In the developing country context, it will be important to target scarce financial and human
resources, both national and from development cooperation, and identify the most important aspects that
require support. These will include:

Broad based understanding across government and political will to act?

Stakeholder understanding and engagement?

Fisheries management/governance arrangements?

Immediate food security issues?

Alternative employment and livelihood opportunities?

If the country has participated in foreign fishing access agreements, how to manage without the
additional income stream?

How to manage the different requirements of subsistence and artisanal fisheries compared to those
of larger scale industrial fishing?
39.
These issues become more complex in the high seas context as each nation fishing these
resources will need to deal with these issues and to the extent that one or more countries are not prepared
or able to address these, they will be unlikely to support an RFMO rebuilding strategy. Where non-parties
to the RFMO also fish the stock the situation is even more complex. It is unlikely that individual fisheries
or development agencies can significantly influence these decisions.
Role for Development cooperation
40.
Development cooperation has potentially an important role to play in rebuilding projects. The
modalities of such cooperation will need to be further explored. To assist in this process, development
cooperation should be directed to building ongoing fisheries management and enforcement capacity.
Indeed, assisting developing countries develop and implement robust domestic management arrangements,
with appropriate tenure provisions, will not only assist them in the on-going management of resources
within their EEZs but will provide an essential building block for successful fisheries rebuilding projects.
In the long term, productive, sustainable and economically efficient fisheries will provide greater food
security and an on-going stream of economic benefits that can only assist in overall development.
41.
The potential benefits from reducing excess capacity and rebuilding fish stocks will be spread
across all countries and regions. The costs and time to recoup these benefits will vary. The important point
in terms of this meeting is to acknowledge that there will be adjustment costs and these will essentially be
short to medium term, but the benefits will not be realised until the longer term. The timing of the flow of
benefits will vary depending on the extent of the rebuilding required and the biological characteristics of
the stocks being rebuilt.
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