Women`s Movements and Democratic Transition in Chile, Brazil

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Women'sMovementsandDemocraticTransitionin Chile,
Brazil,EastGermany,andPoland
Lisa Baldez
In many countrieswomen have respondedto transitionsto democracyby mobilizing
along gender lines to advance their own agendas. In countries as diverse as
Argentina,Korea, Spain, and SouthAfrica, women saw populardemandsfor democracy as an opportunity to press for the democratization of everyday life and the
extension of women's rights. They mobilized across class and party lines to demand
that incoming democraticgovernmentsensuredwomen's equal participationin politics. Yet not all transitionsto democracyhave been accompaniedby the mobilization
of women as women. In most of the transitionsin Centraland East Europe women
who participatedin dissidentmovementsdid not organize on the basis of their status
as women. Withindemocratictransitions,when will women mobilize on the basis of
their gender identity? There are three significant causes of women's mobilization:
resources,the way issues are framed,and the exclusion of women from the agendasetting process within the opposition. The key resources that lead to gender-based
organizingare preexisting formal or informalnetworksin which women participate.
Direct contact with the internationalfeminist community allows women to frame
their situation in terms of their status as women and to organize separately from
men. Finally,the systematic exclusion of women from the process of agenda setting
affordsthem an opportunityto unite in a broadcoalition on the basis of their shared
identity.
This article focuses particularlyon this last point. Women'smovementsrepresent
many differentidentities,interests,and issues.1Despite importantdifferences,however,
many women'smovementsexperiencea particularmoment at which women unite on
the basis of theirgenderidentity.At this moment,the peak of mobilizationin women's
movements,a diversearrayof women'sorganizationscomes togetherto form a coalition thattranscendscleavagesalong class, race, or partisanlines. These peak moments
typicallyoccurat a rally,a demonstration,or a conference.They differfromotherpoints
in the evolutionof a movementin terms of their size, breadthand significance.They
frequentlyconstitutethe largestconvocationof organizationsin the history of a movement. They representthe acme of unity and the ideal expressionof the goals of the
movement,while at the same time encompassinga wide arrayof interestsand issues.
253
ComparativePolitics
April 2003
They typically inaugurate a movement in the public eye and introduce women's
demandsinto the publicarena.
Peaks of protest consolidatewomen's political clout. They attractthe attentionof
(primarily)male politicalactors,who seek to harnesswomen'scapacityto mobilize for
their own electoral goals. Interestfrom political partiesleads to the incorporationof
women's demands in the political agenda and furtherfuels popular support for the
movement.The coalitionsthatemerge out of such momentsoften come to serve as the
institutionalrepresentativesof the women'smovementin the political arena. Scholars
and activistsalike uniformlyacknowledgethe importanceof these momentsin the history of a movement;they take on mythicproportionsin historiesof movementsand in
the memoriesof activists.
The formationof such coalitionsis not inevitable,as women'smovementstypically
includegroupswith diverseand conflictingagendas.Whatpromptswomen'sgroupsto
coalesce is their exclusion from the process of realignment,the point at which actors
within the democraticoppositionformnew allianceswith one another.The exclusionof
women and women'sconcernsfrom the agendasarticulatedby primarilymale opposition leadersheightens the political salience of gender relativeto other cleavages and
triggersthe formationof a unitedfrontamongwomen'sorganizations.
At the same time, these peak momentsprove difficultto sustain.Conflict seems to
breakout among groupswithin the women'smovementalmost as soon as the peak of
unity occurs.But the ephemeralnatureof these momentsdoes not underminetheirsignificance. Peaks of protest demonstratewomen's capacity for mobilization, which
attractsthe attentionof partyelites. Once male politicianssee women as a constituency
worth coopting, they begin to compete for women's support.The advent of electoral
competitionfragmentsthe movement.
This argumentwill be examined with regardto three countries in which women
mobilized duringdemocratictransition-Brazil, Chile, and East Germany-and one in
which womendid not-Poland. These cases providevariationon the dependentvariable
and enhancethe validityof the inferencesthat can be drawnfrom them.2The women's
movementsthatemergedin Chile and Brazilwere two of the largestandmost vibrantin
LatinAmerica;they joined humanrights groups, feminist organizations,and shantytown groups organizedaroundissues of economic subsistence.In East Germanythe
movementincludedwomen'speace organizations,lesbiancollectives,radicalfeminists,
socialists, and neighborhoodgroups. In Poland the level of autonomousorganizing
amongwomenremainedminisculein comparison.
Organizationalresources constitute a necessary but not sufficient variable for
women's mobilization.In all these cases, women participatedin formal and informal
networksthatprovidedthe infrastructure
to build a women'smovement.Only in Chile,
and
East
were
the
othertwo variablespresent.First,directcontactwith
Brazil,
Germany
feminist activistsin othercountriespersuadeddissidentwomen to considerthe advantages of gender-basedmobilization.Second,male oppositionleadersexcludedwomen
254
Lisa Baldez
and women's issues from the agendasthey establishedduringthe process of realignment, as groupswithin the oppositionformednew coalitionsthat challengedthe existing regimes.In Polandonly one of these threefactorswas present:Polishwomen were
highly mobilized throughmembershipin dissidentunions. Yet they had very limited
access to internationalfeminist ideas, and male oppositionleaders includedwomen's
concernsin theirnegotiationswith the existing authoritarian
regime in the early 1980s.
These two factorsgave Polishwomen less reasonto organizeautonomously.
Women'sMovements and Democratization
Initially,researchon democratizationpaid little or no attentionto women'sparticipation,
but studies of the role of women'smovementsin democratictransitionshave exploded
in the past decade and generateda wealth of informationand empiricaldetail about
many cases.3Many explanationsof the conditionsunderwhich women mobilize have
been offered. Most studies concur that women's movementsemerge as a function of
some combinationof resources,framing,and opportunities,but the way in which these
variablesare defined differsfrom case to case. None can be generalizedto explain all
cases. Systematiccomparisonacrosscases andregionsrevealsthreefactorsas criticalto
the mobilizationof women in democratictransitions:organizationalnetworks,direct
contactwith internationalfeminism,andexclusionfromthe process of decisionmaking
withinthe opposition.
Resource Mobilization One school of social movementanalysispoints to organizational resourcesas the factorthatgives rise to mobilization.Accordingto this perspective, movementsemergeas a functionof individualdecisionsaboutthe costs and benefits of collectiveactionor as a functionof materialresourcesthatcan be broughtto bear
on organizing.4Factorssuch as money, leadership,and (especially) existing organizational networksfacilitatemobilization.Peoplewho alreadyparticipatein groupscan be
mobilizedaroundotherissues moreeasily thanisolatedindividuals.
networksconstitutea necessarybut not sufficientcause for the emerOrganizational
gence of women'smovements.In all four cases discussedhere, significantnumbersof
women participatedin both formal and informalgroups that could have formed the
of an autonomouswomen'smovement.Manykinds of netorganizationalinfrastructure
workscan serve as cruciblesfor women'sorganizing;no one particulartype of network
is required.In these fourcases households,churches,and unionsgenerallyprovidedthe
foundationon which women's movements could be built. In Latin America political
parties and internationalorganizations also provided mobilizational resources for
women.
In some cases the demandsof domesticworkforcedwomento organizecollectively.
The most explosiveratesof mobilizationin LatinAmericatook place in poor andwork255
ComparativePolitics
April 2003
ing-class neighborhoods,where deep economic crisis promptedwomen to organize
aroundhousehold activities, forming soup kitchens, shopping collectives, and craft
workshops. Many poor and working-classwomen became politicized as a result of
these informal neighborhoodgroups.5Houseworkdid not have the same impact on
womenwho could employdomesticservantsto shop, cook, clean, and carefor children.
Freedomfromthe rigorsof householdlaborgave manywomentime thatcould be spent
on political activities.It changedfor women who went into exile and could no longer
affordto hire maids. Many women became radicalizedas a resultof doing housework
for the firsttime.
In the socialist countriesperforminghouseholdtasks in conditionsof scarcityalso
fostered informal networks among extended family members, trusted friends, and
neighbors.Accountsof the statusof women in Communistcountriesconsistentlypoint
to the "double burden" of formal employment and housework as an obstacle to
autonomousorganizingamong women, yet in many cases it promotedsocial ties.6 For
example,waitingin long lines to buy food was conduciveto makingconnections.
Churchesprovideddissidentgroups with space to meet, funding,and,most important, protectionfrom repression.In LatinAmericancountriesthe Catholicchurchfosteredwomen'sparticipationat the grass-rootslevel throughecclesiasticalbase communities andhumanrightswork.7In Polandthe Catholicchurchsupporteddissidentactivity throughthe Solidaritymovement.In EastGermanyProtestantchurchesplayeda similar role; theirneutralitywith regardto the Communistregime allowedthem to shelter
the opposition.
In LatinAmericaparticipationin politicalpartiesfacilitatedwomen'smobilizationin
two ways. First,it providedwomen with valuableorganizationalskills. Second,it often
broughtthem face to face with sexist attitudesof their male colleagues, which fueled
awarenessof feminist concerns.Aid from internationalorganizationsand foreign governmentshelped incipientwomen'sgroupsbuild supportand become institutionalized.
In the formerSoviet Union and East and CentralEuropedissidentgroupsreceivedfar
less supportfrominternationalorganizationsuntilafter 1989.
In all four countrieswomen were involvedin a varietyof formaland informalnetworks that provided the mobilizationalresources with which a women's movement
could be built.Yetwomen'smovementsdevelopedin only threeof them.Whatprompted womento perceivetheirparticipationin these networksin termsof women'sinequality relativeto men andto organizeseparatelyfrommen?
A second aspect of social movement theory has come to be
Cultural Framing
knownas culturalframing.Frameanalysishighlightsthe role thatideas,beliefs, culture,
and discourseplay in shapingcollective action. This approachfocuses on the way in
which activistsperceivetheir statusand convey their concernsto the public.8The concept of framingsuggeststhatmovementdiscourseis contingentand strategic.The deci256
Lisa Baldez
sion to mobilize as women, for example,representsa decision abouthow to framecollective action.Womencan participatein social movementson the basis of many identities-as workers,students,poorpeople, or environmentalists-butthey will frametheir
actions in terms of gender identityonly if they believe that their concerns stem from
their statusas women and if they perceive some advantageto be gainedby presenting
themselvesas womento the outsideworld.
Manyhavepointedto the diffusionof internationalfeministdiscourseas a key factor
in mobilizing women in LatinAmericantransitions.Accordingto this view, feminist
ideas caughton in partbecause they differentiatedthe democraticoppositionfrom the
authoritarianstatus quo.9Nonetheless, while the discoursearticulatedat international
women'sconferenceswas ostensiblyavailableto women from all countries,it did not
foster mobilizationin all countries.Many women in the formerCommunistcountries
explicitly rejected international feminist perspectives. As Czech feminist Jana
Hradilkovai
put it, "feminismsmells like an ideology,and people have had their fill of
ideology here."'0Communistgovernmentsconsistentlyclaimed to have emancipated
women and to have solved the "womanquestion"by institutingfull employmentfor
women. But these claims rang hollow when participationin the work force did not
resultin genderequalityand did not improvethe qualityof women'slives.
Thus, internationalfeminism fostered women's movements in Latin America but
impeded them in the former Communist countries. However, not all women in
Communist countries rejected feminist discourse. In East Germany women
embraced international feminism; geographic and linguistic proximity to West
Germanygave East Germanwomen access to informationthat allowed them to challenge prevailing views. Moreover,while internationalfeminism inspired women to
take action in Latin America, its impact was not automatic or unequivocal.
Resistance to feminism has proven strong in LatinAmerica, a region also characterized by a traditionalculturethat veneratesthe image of women as mothers.In Latin
America women's acceptance of autonomous organizing emerged from long, often
conflictual discussions and debates, usually initiated by women who learned about
feminism in exile.
Womenaremore likelyto frametheirsituationin termsof theirstatusas women as a
resultof directcontactwith feministmovementsabroad.While manywomenparticipated in dissident organizationsthat includedboth men and women, only those women
who learnedaboutinternationalfeminism firsthandperceivedtheir problemsin terms
of theiridentityas women and consideredthe advantagesof organizingseparatelyfrom
men. Women who did not have this contact tended to maintainnegative stereotypes
about feminism. This argumentshould not be understoodto imply that women in
authoritarian
countrieswere incapableof reachingsuch conclusionson theirown or that
should
have
reachedthem at all. In fact, women broughtfeminist ideas back to
they
their own countriesand served as the main interlocutorsof them. Direct and sustained
257
ComparativePolitics
April 2003
contactwith feministsfrom othercountriespresentedwomen in relativelyclosed societies with a new way to conceiveof theirsituation.
Political Opportunities
A third aspect of social movementtheory maintainsthat
movementsrise and fall in partin responseto changeswithinthe politicalarena,known
as changes in political opportunities."This approachpoints to the state as the central
interlocutorof collectiveactionin manycases. Recentstudieshave soughtto narrowthe
conceptof politicalopportunitiesin orderto increasethe possibilitiesof generatingpredictionsaboutfutureoutcomes.12This analysisbuilds on them by identifyingthe political opportunitiesthatarerelevantin women'smovementsand explainingwhy they constituteopportunitiesfor womenin particular.
Withincases of transitionin LatinAmerica,scholarsgenerallyconcurthat the suppressionof conventionalforms of politicalactivityundermilitaryrule provideda space
for nontraditionalactorsand nontraditionalforms of participationto emerge.More precisely, repressiondirectedprimarilyagainstmale-dominatedpolitical partiesand trade
unions allowed women to develop new styles of political engagement.These spaces
expandedas militaryregimes liberalizedbut shrankwhen political parties (re)gained
controlwithinthe politicalarena.13
To what extent does this argumentapply to women's movements in the former
Communistcountries?The pervasivepower of Communistparties clearly limited the
space for independentmobilizing,yet the breakdownof these regimesin the 1980s did
not alwaysfosterthe emergenceof women'smovements.The reasonhas to do with the
dynamics within the opposition itself. One point on which almost all accounts of
women'smovementsand democratizationagree is thatwomen in these cases mobilized
rule. Womenprotestedagainstpolitical oppressionand economic
againstauthoritarian
crisis engenderedby the existingregimes.But a closer look at the dynamicsof women's
mobilizationamidtransitionsuggestsa more nuancedversionof this story.Womenalso
mobilizedto protestagainstexclusionwithinthe opposition.In fact, in transitionsaway
from authoritarian
rule women'smovementspeakedat the point at which actorswithin
the democratic opposition formed new alliances with one another.The absence of
women and women'sconcernsfrom the agendasarticulatedby primarilymale opposition leaderspromptedwomen'sorganizationsrepresentingdiverseintereststo unite on
the basis of genderidentity.
To a certainextent,periodsof realignmentprovidedan opportunityfor all organized
groupswithin civil society to press for the incorporationof theirconcernsin the political agenda.Yet in most cases the vast majorityof people involvedin these discussions
were men. Despitewhateverrole they may haveplayedin oppositionactivitiesup to this
point, women suddenlyfound themselves frozen out of the process of negotiatingthe
terms of transition.A close correlation between the timing of coalition formation
among male oppositionleadersand the peak of mobilizationamong women indicates
258
Lisa Baldez
that women mobilized in part to protest their exclusion from the decision-making
process that occurredwithin the democraticoppositionitself. In otherwords,the gendered dynamics of the transitioncatalyzed the peak moment of mobilizationamong
women'sorganizations.The common experienceof exclusionprompteddiversegroups
to join togetherto demanda role in settingthe agenda.Wherewomen were includedin
the process,therewas no catalystfor the formationof a women'smovement.
Brazil
When the Brazilianmilitary seized power in 1964, it sought to restructureBrazilian
society fundamentally,in economic, political, and social terms. The militaryregime's
policies createdthreesets of issues aroundwhich women mobilized:humanrightsviolations,economic subsistence,and women'srights.14Womenmade up a majorityof the
participantsin approximately100,000 Christianbase communitiesorganizedby the
Catholic church.'5Many of these women went on to organize in neighborhoodsto
demand "adequateschools, health centers, runningwater,transportation,electricity,
The governmentdid not suphousing and othernecessities of urbaninfrastructure."'6
press these groups, but the government'slack of responsivenessand refusal to take
women'sconcernsseriouslywas a radicalizingexperience.
Feministframingdid not automaticallytake in Brazil. When U.S. feminist activist
Betty Friedanvisited Brazil in 1971, for example, the press ridiculed her.17Things
beganto changeduringthe periodof liberalizationin the late 1970s as women who had
been exiled beganto returnhome. The experienceof living in exile provedhumblingfor
women who had been activein leftistpolitics.Womensuddenlyfoundthemselveswithoutjobs, withoutthe supportof family and friends,and withoutdomesticservants.For
many the loss of identitywas acute. As one Brazilianwoman lamented:"[Whenwe
were in exile] I was his wife. [My husband]continuedto be a political activist and I
ceasedbeing one."18Once abroad,contactwith feministmovementsthen stronglybrewing in westernEuropeandNorthAmericagave exiled women a languageto make sense
of theirnew status.This languagecenteredon women'sawarenessof genderinequality
andthe value of organizingautonomouslyfrommen.
Returningexiles broughtfeministideasbackwith them when they came home. They
had a tremendousimpacton women'sorganizingin Brazil,particularlyin regardto the
issue of movement autonomy."The exiles literally flooded feminist groups in Sdo
Paulo"and "sharedtheirexperiencesin types of feministactivitiesunheardof in Brazil
before the late 1970s,"one activistobserved.19Womenwho had been in exile in Italy
and France, for example, persuadedothers that it was possible to create a feminist
movementin a predominantlyCatholicculture.20Internationalorganizationsprovided
resourcesto bolsterthese efforts.A 1975 meetingorganizedto markthe UnitedNations
International
Yearof the Womanled to the creationof severalgroupsdedicatedto pro259
ComparativePolitics
April 2003
motingawarenessof the statusof women. Grantsprovidedby the FordFoundationlegitimated research on women's issues and helped institutionalize women's centers.21
Internationaland regionalfeministmeetings had a multipliereffect, providingvenues
for women fromall overthe worldto sharetheirexperiencesand createnetworks.22By
the late 1970s women'sorganizationsflourishedin Brazil.
The peak of protestfor the Brazilianwomen'smovementoccurredin 1979, in the
midst of conflicts among the oppositionpoliticalleadersthat ended in a majorrealignment of the party system. From 1965 to 1979 the military governmentretainedthe
faqadeof electoraldemocracybut permittedonly two partiesto exist: the progovernment ARENA (Alliance for NationalRenovation)and the oppositionMDB (Brazilian
DemocraticMovement).Growingpopularsupportfor the MDB in the 1970s prompted
the regime to liberalize,althoughthe governmentdid so in the hopes of remainingin
power.To sow dissentwithinthe MDB and weakenthe MDB's chancesfor a victory in
the legislativeelectionsin November1978, the governmentdroppedhintsabouta future
reformof the partysystem.This strategyworked;althoughthe MDB increasedits support in the elections,uncertainsignals aboutthe likelihoodof reintroducingpartycompetition exacerbatedconflicts within the party.In the few months immediatelybefore
and afterthe electionssome MDB politiciansbegan"openlyworkingfor the creationof
otherpoliticalparties,"while othersadvocateda unitedfrontagainstthe government.23
These conflicts within the oppositionand the effortto form new coalitionsduringthis
period(late 1978 to early 1979) constitutethe beginningof a processof realignment.
Women'sgroupscampaignedto put women'sissues on the oppositionagendafor the
November1978 elections,but with little success. "Mostof the organizations[were]too
small to have much impacton their own and [were] often frustratedin trying to make
their demandsheardthroughotherpolitical channelssuch as unions and parties.Even
Exclusion from the
the grass-rootsWorkers'Partyha[d] no women'srepresentation."24
Women'smobilizato
unite.
women
for
the
of
conditions
process realignmentprovided
tion reacheda peak duringthis period.On March8, 1979, InternationalWomen'sDay,
close to one thousandwomen gatheredfor a two-dayWomen'sCongressin Sio Paulo
that includedwomen from tradeunions, neighborhoodgroups, feministorganizations,
professionalassociations,mothers'clubs, black feministgroups,and academicresearch
centers.25The FirstNationalWomen'sConferencetook place in Rio de Janeiroa month
later. These events catalyzed mobilization across an even wider range of women's
groups. Sonia Alvarez emphasizestheir significance in her widely cited study of the
Brazilianwomen's movement."By 1979, women activists had sparkeda burgeoning
political movementthat appearedto span all social classes, races, and ideologies."26
in the early
Thus, while Brazilianwomen began to organizeagainstauthoritarianism
with
coincided
Its
1979.
of
the
the
movement
did
not
until
1970s,
peak
beginning
peak
the emergenceof competingcoalitionswithinthe opposition.
Women'sorganizationscontinuedto proliferatein the 1980s, but the unity evidentat
the FirstWomen'sCongresssoon dissolved.The anticipatedreformof the partysystem
260
Lisa Baldez
came in November1979, when PresidentGeneralJoao BatistaFigueiredodissolvedthe
two partysystem and decreeda law thatpermittedthe formationof new partiesout of
the MDB. Five new oppositionparties formed between 1979 and 1981: the Popular
Party,the BrazilianLaborParty,the Partyof the BrazilianDemocraticMovement,the
DemocraticWorkers'Party,andthe Workers'Party.The militarygovernmenthopedthat
the various factions would compete against one anotherand weaken supportfor the
opposition, but its strategy strengthenedthe links between politicians and the grass
roots.27All of the oppositionpartiesbeganto competefor the supportof women'sorganizations.Realignmentthus furtherspurredpopularsupportfor the women'smovement
because of a convergenceof interestsbetweenthe new partiesand women'sorganizations. As Alvarez writes, "duringabertura[opening],the oppositionactively courted
women'ssupport.And women'smovementorganizationsoverwhelminglysupportedthe
opposition,mobilizing thousandsof women for electoralparticipationand promoting
antiregime mass rallies."28All the new parties included at least some of women's
demandson their agendas.29Yet the realitiesof electoralcompetitionalso fragmented
the movement,as differentgroupsalignedthemselveswith particularparties.
Chile
The militarygovernmentthat seized power on September11, 1973, employeddraconian measuresin its efforts to achieve economic stabilityand political order.It banned
political parties,shut down congress, and engaged in a systematiccampaignof terror
and repressionthat resulted in the torture,death, and disappearanceof thousandsof
people. During the first ten years of military rule under GeneralAugusto Pinochet
fierce repressioncurtailedovertexpressionsof oppositionto the regime.Scoresof organizationsformedclandestinely.Chileanwomen played a prominentrole in this underground opposition. They organizedalong three lines, in a pattern similar to Brazil.
Humanrights groups grew out of women's efforts to supportpolitical prisonersand
locate relativeswho had been detained.Womenin poor and working-classurbanneighborhoodsorganizedeconomic subsistencegroupsto deal with economic crisis and cuts
in social spending.In the late 1970s university-educated
women, many of whom had
been active in SalvadorAllende'sPopularUnity government,organizedsmall, informal
feminist discussion groups to reflect on the changes that living in a dictatorshiphad
wroughton theirlives.30Internationalsupportprovedcriticalin the emergenceand survival of all of these groups.The Catholicchurchprovidedsafe places to meet for many
of them.Religiousmen andwomenhelpedto organizesoup kitchensandwomen'scenters in the shantytownsaroundSantiago.By the early 1980s Chileanwomen had created a dense organizationalnetwork.
Womenwho returnedto Chile afterspendingtime in exile broughtback ideas about
feminismwith them, particularlyfrom countrieswith active feministmovements,such
261
ComparativePolitics
April 2003
as Sweden,Canada,Austria,West Germany,and the U.S. As in Brazil,women living in
exile bore the full responsibilityfor householdchoresand child rearingfor the firsttime
in their lives.31The experienceforced women to confrontthe oppressionof women in
the domesticspherefirsthand.
Ideasaboutfeminismwere not new to Chile. Mediasourcesfromthe periodindicate
awarenessof women'sliberationmovementsin othercountries.Priorto the 1980s, however,Chileanstendedto view feminismeitheras radicalman hatingthatviolatedtraditional gender norms or bourgeois false consciousnessthat betrayedthe prospects for
socialistrevolution.Living in exile providedsome Chileanwomen with a differentcontext in which to interpretfeminist ideas. Feminismgave these women a language to
make sense of theirexperiencesand showedthem the value of identifyingwith women
as women in a way thattranscendednationalboundariesand nationalidentity.Chilean
women did not accept foreign ideas about feminism uncritically,but rather forged
uniquelyChileaninterpretations
througha processof discussionandreflection.
As in Brazil, funding from international organizations, particularly the Ford
Foundation,allowed women academics to conduct researchon the status of women.
Studies publishedby groups such as the Center for Women'sStudies (CEM) raised
awarenessof women's subordinationand helped to build supportfor the movement.32
Chilean sociologist JulietaKirkwoodplayed a criticalrole in the process of "translating" feminist ideas throughher writings and the many workshops she conducted in
Chile.33Participationin regionaland internationalconferencesstrengthenedthe incipient movementandprovideda space for the furtherarticulationof autochthonousunderstandingsof feminism.
Potest in the Chilean women's movementpeaked in 1983. In May 1983 Chileans
opposedto the regime organizeda mass demonstrationin Santiago.Organizationsrepresentinglabor,students,humanrightsgroups,the poor, and white collarprofessionals
took the streetsto denouncethe regime. The surprisingsuccess of this demonstration
triggereda series of general protests that took place every month for the next three
years, until 1986. The oppositionpoliticalpartiesmoved quicklyto assume leadership
of the protests.Defying the regime'sban on partyactivity,oppositionpoliticiansformed
two separatealliances.Both alliancessoughtto controlthe protestsandpromotedpopular mobilizationas a strategyto unseatthe military,but they disagreedvehementlyon
otherpointsof strategy.
On August7, 1983, the centristChristianDemocraticpartyjoined moderatefactions
of the Socialist Partyand other leftist partiesto form the DemocraticAlliance (AD).
Foremoston their agendawere acceptanceof democraticinstitutions,rejectionof violent tactics, and supportfor capitalism.This center-leftcoalitionrepresenteda significant shift within the oppositionforces;the ChristianDemocratshad initiallysupported
the militarytakeover.34
The DemocraticAlliance initiatednegotiationsaboutthe terms
of transitionwith the Pinochetgovernment,but it soon became clearthat Pinochethad
no intentionof giving controlback to civiliansand thatthe AD had been prematurein
262
Lisa Baldez
its effortsto engage in a dialoguewith the government.In responseto the AD's miscalculation,the radicalleft partiesformedthe PopularDemocraticMovement(MDP).The
MDP coalitionfavoredarmedconfrontationwith the regimeover a negotiatedreturnto
democraticrule.The formationof these two competingcoalitionsconstituteda realignment, the emergenceof viable, coordinatedalternativesto the militaryregime for the
first time since the coup.
Conflictsover strategybetweenthese two coalitionsgalvanizedwomen in the opposition.In November1983 a groupcalledWomenfor Life (Mujerespor la Vida,MPLV)unified womenacrosspartylines.The sixteenwomenwho formedthe grouprepresentedthe
full spectrumof politicalpartieswithinthe opposition.They servedas referentsof various
positionsbut did not representtheirpartiesin an official capacity.Even thoughthey were
partyleaders,they framedtheiractionsin termsof women'sstatusas politicaloutsidersin
orderto highlighttheirexclusionfromthe decision-makingprocess.Womenfor Life saw
the task of inspiringunity withinthe oppositionas one thatwomen were uniquelyqualified to carryout. In the oppositionpaperLa Epoca, on January4, 1988, for example,
Womenfor Life leaderFannyPollaroloclaimedthatthe group'stask was "to inspirethe
spiritnecessaryto unifythe opposition,to overcomethe ineffectivenessof themen."
On December 29, 1983, Women for Life held a massive rally in the Caupolicdn
Theaterin downtownSantiago.This event drew 10,000 women representinga diverse
arrayof issues and interestsfrom all the factionswithinthe opposition,the Democratic
Alliance and the Popular Democratic Movement, and activists from human rights
groups, subsistenceorganizations,and feministcollectives.The rally catalyzedthe formationof a broad-based,multisectorwomen'smovement.Womenhad formedseparate
organizationsprior to this point, and many of them had participatedin the general
protests,but not in a coordinatedway undera singlebanner.35
The success of the Caupolicdnrally got the attentionof partypoliticians.As Maria
ElenaValenzuelanotes: "Womenfor Life becamethe referencepoint for politicalorganizationson women'sissues as well as the most importantarenafor conveningand discussing the social mobilizationof women."36MPLVsent a representativeto the Civic
Assembly,the main forumfor hammeringout an agendafor the transition,andpolitical
partiesacross the political spectrumadoptedwomen'sconcernsonto theirplatforms.37
But the unity expressedat the Caupolicanrally did not last long. Soon afterwards,the
movement split along partisanlines. Ultimately,women in the opposition overcame
these divisions enough to createanotherumbrellagroup, the Coalitionof Womenfor
Democracy, to force the incoming democratic government to adopt some of their
moment.38
demands,but theywere neverable to recapturethe Caupolicain
East Germany
The SocialistUnity Partyof Germany(SED) exerciseda remarkabledegree of control
263
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April 2003
over the lives of East Germancitizens. It forbadeany groupsthat did not supportthe
party.Yet dissidentactivityamong women emergedin the 1980s, primarilyin the universities and under the protection of the Protestantchurch.39The church sheltered
peace, environmental,gay and lesbian,and women'sgroups.It providedphysicalspace
for them to meet, publicizedtheireventsin the churchpress,andheld annualralliesthat
facilitatedregularcontact among dissidents.40The churchsponsoredinformaldiscussion groups for women duringtheir "babyyear,"mandatoryone year maternityleave,
which helpedto raisetheirconsciousnessaboutgenderinequality.41
The most prominentof the East Germanpeace groupswas Womenfor Peace,which
mobilized in oppositionto a 1982 law that allowedwomen to be draftedinto military
service.Womenfor Peace activelysoughtout contactsin the West,particularlyin West
Germanywheresharedlanguagefacilitatedcommunication.They took inspirationfrom
the Greens and the GreenhamCommon Women in England.Access to international
conceptionsof feminismalso came fromEast Germanintellectualsthemselves.Thanks
in partto a liberaltravelpolicy for artists,writerssuch as ChristaWolf "providedthe
languagefor feministsto free themselvesfrom the official value system."42The ruling
partypermittedthe publicationof foreignfeministwritings,althoughit prohibitedthem
from being discussed.43Regularcontactwith westernfeministsand awarenessof feminist ideas changedEast Germanwomen'sperceptionsabouttheir role in the dissident
peace movementand convincedthem of the advantagesof women-onlypeace groups.
The Communistregime'sincreasinglyconservativepolicies towardwomen, known as
"mommypolitics,"furtherenhancedthe appealof feminism.
Internationalattentionshieldedwomen'sgroupsfromrepression.Amazingly,despite
its notoriously pervasive surveillance, the East German security forces (the Stasi)
provedunableto stop Womenfor Peace from holding demonstrations.Women'sstructurelessand leaderlessprotestsstymiedthe Stasi'scustomarystrategyof "roundingup
the ringleaders"of dissidentgroups,at least initially.44
Whenthe Stasi arrestedthe core
leadersof the groupin December1983, the women calledupontheirforeigncontactsto
pressurethe regime for theirrelease.It helped thatone of the five women arrestedwas
BarbaraEinhorn,a feminist scholar from New Zealand.45As one supporterrecalled,
"westernpublicitybecame our best protection"againstrepression.46Nonetheless, the
Stasipreventedthe growthof popularsupportfor the group.47
Women'smobilizationin East Germanypeakedin a climateof politicalrealignment.
In the first few weeks of September1989 four distinctcitizens' movementsemerged,
each offeringa differentset of proposalsfor constructinga new state.New Forum,the
largestof the fourwith morethan200,000 members,called for democraticdialoguebut
did not offer a clear programmaticalternativeto Communistrule. Dissidents loosely
affiliated with the Protestantchurch formed Democracy Now. This group included
approximately4,000 people and supportedthe democraticrenovationof socialism.
Anothergroup of Protestantchurchleaders organizedDemocraticAwakening,which
264
Lisa Baldez
also called for a renewalof socialism.A fourthgroup,UnitedLeft, was moretolerantof
the ruling party and "openly identified itself as a Marxist leftist, socialist group."48
These groups did not constitute formal political parties but ratherproto-partiesthat
articulatedalternativesto the Communistsystem. Their formationmarkedthe public
emergenceof democraticalternativesto the Communistregimeand constituteda period
of realignment.As BrigitteYoungaffirms, "virtuallynone of the citizens' movements
includedwomen'sissues in theirplatforms."49
September 1989 was thus a ripe moment for women's organizationsto coalesce.
Femalepolitical entrepreneurs
respondedpubliclyto the absenceof women'sissues on
the agendas of the new coalitionsjust a few weeks later and "organizedin virtually
every city in the formerGDR"aroundthe goal of participatingin the politicalprocess
as women. The movementquickly gained momentum.On October 11, 1989, a group
called Lila Offensive staged a protest duringa government-sponsored
rally in which
they called for women to participateas equals in society and politics. Their slogans
demanded that women have a place in political decision making. On November 6
prominentfeministsbeganto circulatea public letterthatdemandedwomen'sparticipation in the transitionprocess. On December3, a monthafterthe collapse of the Berlin
Wall,women'sgroupscame togetherto formthe IndependentWomen'sLeague (UFV),
a coalition that representeda wide arrayof organizations,includingradical feminist
groups,lesbians,socialists,groupswith nationalvisibility,and local grass-rootsorganizations.50Twelvehundredwomen attendedthis initialgathering,which took place at the
People'sTheaterin East Berlin. The main slogan of the demonstrationwas "Without
womenthereis no state."51
The UFV rally representedthe peak of women'smobilizationin East Germany,a
pointEinhornaffirms.
Initially,it had seemed as if the UFV would become a mass movement,with considerableinfluence
and a largepresencein the mainstreampolitical process.Therewas a feeling of exhilarationand the
had been, it neverthelessprovideda
hope that, inadequateas the GDR's approachto "emancipation"
basis upon which demandsfor measureswhich they saw as guaranteeingreal equalityof opportunity
for women couldbuild.52
Youngreportsthatparticipantsdescribedthe protestas "themoment of euphoria,"and
she herself describes it in Aristide Zolberg's terms as a "moment of madness.""53
Adherentsof the organizationsaw their main task as "organiz[ing]women's politics
among women's groups independentof political party structures."54
They claimed to
have modeled their agendaon Swedish genderpolicy, furtherdemonstratingthe influence of internationalfactors.55
The UFV won concessions from the oppositionin the short term. Membersof the
grouprepresentedwomen'sissues at the NationalRoundtablein 1989-90 and fielded
candidatesin the 1990 parliamentary
election.Yetnone of the UFV candidateswon, and
265
ComparativePolitics
April 2003
women's influence waned as the issue of reunificationmonopolizedthe agenda.The
movementcontinuesto exist apartfromthe WestGermanfeministmovement,but many
UFV membersremainwryly realistic about its small impact on the democratization
process.UFV memberslaterheld a mock funeralfor the East Germanwomen'smovementunderthe slogan"Yes,withoutwomentherecan be a state."56
Poland
Fromthe Communisttakeoverof 1945 to the emergenceof Solidarityin 1980, dissident
women'sorganizationswere extremelyrarein Poland.Theirraritycan not be explained
as a function of limited mobilizationalresources.57Women participatedin dissident
unions; they made up half the members of Solidarity, for example. Many women
workedin primarilyfemale fields, such as textiles andnursing,but only on a handfulof
occasions did female-dominatedunions engage in oppositionactivitiesthatemphasized
their statusas women.58The high level of mobilizationin Polandin the late 1970s and
early 1980s begs the questionof why a women'smovementdid not emerge in Poland
duringthis period.59
Awarenessof internationalfeminism inhibitedwomen's independentmobilizing in
Poland,exactlythe oppositeeffect thatit had in Brazil,Chile, and East Germany.Poles
were awareof internationalfeministideas, but they associatedthem with the Women's
League, the official women's organization,and thus discreditedthem. The state both
mediatedand monopolized informationfrom abroad,renderingforeign ideas suspect
among ordinaryPoles. Poles traveledabroadfrequentlyin the 1970s, making"fourmillion tripsto Westerncities"duringthe decade,but the staterestrictedinternationaltraveling privilegesto partyloyalists.60Fordissidents,directcontactwith the westernworld
remainedvery limited. These and other privileges extendedto party elites bred deep
antipathyamong ordinaryPoles-and contemptfor the ideas they broughtback with
them from abroad.In this context,women were likely to have associatedwesternfeminist ideas with the partyand thus to have seen them as (another)source of oppression,
ratherthanas a potentialsourceof liberation.61
A conferenceheld by the Women'sLeaguein 1981 providessuggestiveevidencefor
this claim. The slogans thatpartyleadersintonedat this meeting echo the concernsof
westernfeministsand suggestthatPolishpartyofficials were influencedby international events such as the United Nations' Women'sConferences.These slogans included:
"The corset with which they once laced us keeps disablingus,""Whyare we so weak
It is litandhelpless?,"and "Democracyis impossiblewithoutwomen'sinvolvement."62
tle wonderthat Polish women were skepticalof groups whose views elided so neatly
with those of partyofficials.63With very few exceptions,Polish female dissidentssaw
feminismas taintedby associationwith the regime.
The absence of autonomousorganizingby women in Poland stands out in relief
266
Lisa Baldez
againsta cycle of antiregimeproteststhatbrokeout in the late 1970s. The cycle began
in June 1976 when workersstageda protestagainstrecentlyannouncedprice increases.
The governmentrespondedto these strikespromptly-it eliminatedthe price increases
and brutallysuppressedthe workers-but its actions set off explosive levels of popular
mobilizationthatlastedseveralyears.64A visit fromthe newly electedPolishpope, John
Paul II, in June 1979 furtherbolsteredthe strengthof the opposition.By 1980 the economic situation had deteriorated,resulting in widespread food shortages. Another
attemptto impose price increasesin June 1980 promptedthe Gdanskshipyardworkers
to go on strike,triggeringa wave of strikesthatquicklyspreadthroughoutthe country.
Theireffortsbroughtthe governmentto the negotiatingtablein August 1980 andresulted in a series of concessionsto workersknown as the GdanskAgreements.The emergence of Solidarityconstitutesa realignment:the formationof a new coalitionwithin
the antiauthoritarian
opposition.
The success of the Solidaritymovementsparkedwhat political scientist Grzegorz
Ekiertcalls a "civic fever"thathe claims "spreadto all social groups,cities andvillages
in the country,and to all organizationsand institutionsof the Polish party-state."65
Nonetheless,this fever did not spreadto women. Dissidentstook overunions and other
party-dominatedgroups, but the Women'sLeague remainedimmune to pressuresto
democratize.66
Why did women'sgroupsnot formduringthis periodof realignment?
The mainreasonis thatwomen did not considerthemselvesto be excludedfromthis
process. The strikeleadersexplicitlyaddressedwomen's issues duringthe Roundtable
discussions between Solidarity and the Gierek regime. The Interfactory Strike
Committeewon severalconcessionsthat women stronglysupported:a three-yearpaid
maternityleave, guaranteedday care slots for workingwomen, and, for nurses,higher
wages and housing.67 Women made up a minority of the delegates to the 1981
SolidarityCongress(only 8 percent),andmanywomenwere consciousof the degreeto
which men dominatedthe Solidarity leadership.68But the vast majority of women
raisedlittleobjection.69
A very small group of women took action to contest women's exclusion from
Solidarity'sleadership.The womenwho organizedseparatelyto challengewomen'sstatus within the movementmade up a tiny fractionof Solidaritymembers-forty to fifty
women out of five million.70The Polish FeministAssociationgrew out of a series of
seminarsthatPolish sociologistRenataSiemienskaheld at the Universityof Warsawin
the late 1970s. The group organized"consciousness-raisinggroups, held lecturesand
debateson women'sissues and deliveredleaflets roundfactoriesand schools"in order
to raise awarenessabout women's status.71Commentsfrom Beata Ficzer, one of the
group'sfounders,pointto the influenceof internationalfeminism.
When I was a studentat the sociology departmentI saw a notice abouta meeting on feministmovements in the world.Then I realizedthat I knew a lot about varioussocial movementsbut very little
about feminism.All I knew was aboutbra-burningand so on....[thismeeting made me awareofJ my
267
ComparativePolitics
April 2003
need, then subconscious,to think about myself as a woman. Duringthis meeting I met other young
womenwho hadthe sameneed andwere farmoreadvancedin theirsearchthanI was.72
The imposition of martial law in 1981 pushed these groups underground,impeding
effortsto build support.
The climate for women'sorganizingin Polandchangedin 1989, when the proposal
of an antiabortionlaw in the Sejm in June 1989 "activated"the women'smovement.73
Thirtywomen'sgroupsemergedduringthe abortiondebate,but they were "dramatically fragmentedand reluctantto enteralliancesor to createa unitedfront,in partfor fear
Womencreateda formalseparatedivision
of being associatedwith the communists."74
within Solidarityin fall 1989, but demandsfor the inclusionof women did not enjoy
popularsupport.Opportunitiesand issues aroundwhich women could mobilize exist,
but feministorganizationsremain"tinyminoritygroups,"a far cry from the explosive
levels of mobilizationthatoccurredin Brazil,Chile,andEastGermany.75
Conclusion
Threevariablesare significantin explainingwomen'smobilizationduringdemocratization. Formal and informal networks in which women were involved constitutedthe
to buildwomen'smovements.Directcontactwith the interorganizationalinfrastructure
nationalfeministcommunitypromptedwomento frametheirsituationin terms of their
status as women and to organize separatelyfrom men. Finally, exclusion from the
process of realignmentwithin the democraticoppositioncatalyzedthe formationof a
formalcoalitionamongdiversewomen'sorganizations.
When womenmobilizedagainstauthoritarian
regimes,they did so aroundmany differentinterests,includinghumanrights,peace, feminism,sexual orientation,andpoverty. Even within single countries,women held differentvisions of what the fall of the
authoritarian
regimewould bring:justice for victims of humanrightsviolations,a new
of
way doing politics, an end to economic crisis, a covetedspot in the new government,
or the freedomnot to work.Yet the sharedexperienceof exclusion transcendedother
substantivedifferencesamong women'sgroups.Findingthemselvessuddenlyrendered
voiceless as theirmale comradesin arms constructedthe new polity,women who had
supporteddistinctagendasdiscovereda sharedset of concerns.Exclusionfrom critical
decisions aboutthe shape of the new polity triggereda peak protestamong a groupof
alreadyhighly mobilized women. Poland demonstratesthat, when the credibility of
feminismis underminedand when male oppositionleadersaddresswomen'sconcerns,
the impetusfor women'smobilizationdiminishes.
Nevertheless,women'smovementshavea seeminglyinevitabletendencyto fragment
in the posttransitionperiod.Peaksof protestprovedephemeral.In most cases moments
of unityamongwomen dissipatedalmostas soon as they occurred.These momentsgar268
Lisa Baldez
neredthe attentionof male politicalelites and forcedthem to put women'sissues on the
agenda.Once the oppositionpartiesincorporatedwomen'sdemandsonto theiragendas,
the initial impetusfor uniting on the basis of gender,women'sexclusion,became less
salient. Cross-sectorunity among women proveddifficultto sustainonce women had
won even limitedaccess to the decision-makingprocess.
NOTES
I would like to thankGardinerBovingdon,JohnCarey,ChristianDavenport,FrancesHenderson,Mala Htun,
PadraicKenney,MatthewKrain,AndrewMertha,Celeste Montoya,Andrew Rehfeld,Meg Rincker,Rachel
Roth, ValerieSperling,and four anonymousreviewersfor theirvery helpfulcommentsand suggestions,and
Shelby Wolff for her researchassistance.An earlierversion of this paperwas presentedat the 2001 Annual
Meetingof theAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociationin San Francisco.
1. AmritaBasu, ed., TheChallengeofLocal Feminisms(Boulder:WestviewPress, 1995).
2. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba,Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress, 1994).
3. See Karen Beckwith, "Beyond Compare? Women's Movements in Comparative Perspective,"
European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 431-68; Valerie Sperling, Organizing Womenin
ContemporaryRussia (New York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1999); LorraineBayardde Volo, Mothersof
Heroes and Martyrs (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Lee Ann Banaszak,Karen
Beckwith et al., eds., Women
's MovementsFacing the ReconfiguredState (New York:CambridgeUniversity
Press, forthcoming);Jill M. Bystydzienskiand Joti Sekhon, eds., Democratizationand Womens Grassroots
Movements(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress, 1999); KarenKampwirthand VictoriaGonzalez, eds.,
Radical Womenin LatinAmerica: Right and Left (University Park:PennsylvaniaState University Press,
2001); Temma Kaplan, Crazyfor Democracy (New York:Routledge, 1997); Jane S. Jaquette,ed., The
Women's Movementin Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Jane S. Jaquetteand Sharon L.
Wolchik,eds., Womenand Democracy(Baltimore:The JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 1998);JoanWallach
Scott et al., eds., Transitions,Environments,Translations(New York:Routledge,1997);LynnStephen,Women
and Social Movements in Latin America (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997); Monica Threlfall,
Mapping the Women's Movement(London: Verso, 1996); Georgina Waylen, "Women'sMovements and
Democratization in Latin America," Third WorldQuarterly 14 (1993); Georgina Waylen, "Womenand
Democratization,"WorldPolitics,43 (1994).
4. John D. McCarthyand Mayer N. Zald, The Trendof Social Movementsin America (Morristown:
GeneralLearningPress, 1973).
5. PhilipOxhorn,OrganizingCivilSociety(UniversityPark:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress, 1995);
CathyLisa Schneider,ShantytownProtestin Pinochets Chile(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress, 1995).
6. KatherineVerdery,WhatWasSocialism, and WhatComes Next? (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1996).
7. PamelaLowden,Moral Oppositionto AuthoritarianRule in Chile, 1973-90 (New York:Macmillan,
1996). In Argentinathe churchplayed a more ambiguousrole. See Alison Brysk, The Politics of Human
Rights in Argentina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Rita Arditti, Searchingfor Life: The
Grandmothersof the Plaza de Mayo and the Disappeared Childrenof Argentina(Berkeley:Universityof
CaliforniaPress, 1999); MarysaNavarro,"The PersonalIs Political:Las Madresde la Plaza de Mayo,"in
Susan Eckstein,ed., Power and PopularProtest (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1989); Anthony
JamesGill, Renderingunto Caesar(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, 1998).
8. Lee Ann Banaszak, WhyMovementsSucceed or Fail (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1996);
269
ComparativePolitics
April 2003
David E. Snow,"MasterFramesandCycles of Protest,"in Aldon D. Morrisand CarolMcClurgMueller,eds.,
Frontiersin Social MovementTheory(New Haven:YaleUniversityPress, 1992); David E. Snow and Robert
Benford,"Ideology,FrameResonance,and ParticipantMobilization,"in Bert Klandermanset al., eds., From
Structureto Action(Greenwich:JAIPress, 1988);Ann Swidler,"Culturein Action: Symbolsand Strategies,"
AmericanSociologicalReview,51 (1986).
9. Jaquette,ed., Womenand Democracy,p. 7.
10. BarbaraEinhorn,CinderellaGoes to Market(London:Verso,1993),p. 188.
11. MaryFainsodKatzensteinand CarolMueller,eds., The Women
's Movementsof the UnitedStates and
WesternEurope (Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress, 1987); Doug McAdam,Political Process and the
Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Herbert
Kitschelt, "PoliticalOpportunityStructuresand Political Protest,"BritishJournal of Political Science, 16
(1986); Joyce Gelb,Feminismand Politics(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1989);Anne N. Costain,
Inviting Women's Rebellion (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); CharlesTilly, From
Mobilizationto Revolution(Reading:Addison-Wesley,1978); Sidney G. Tarrow,Power in Movement(New
York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1994).
12. Doug McAdamet al., Dynamicsof Contention(New York:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001).
13. ElisabethJ. Friedman,UnfinishedTransitions:Womenand the GenderedDevelopmentof Democracy
in Venezuela,1936-1996 (UniversityPark:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,2000).
14. See Sonia E. Alvarez, Engendering Democracy in Brazil (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press,
1990); MarianneSchmink, "Womenin Brazilian 'Abertura'Politics,"Signs, 7 (1981); Vera Soares et al.,
"BrazilianFeminismand Women'sMovements,"in Basu, ed.; June EdithHahner,Emancipatingthe Female
Sex (Durham:Duke UniversityPress, 1990);FannyTabak,"Womenin the Strugglefor Democracyand Equal
Rights in Brazil,"in BarbaraNelson and Najma Chowdhury,eds, Womenand Politics Worldwide(New
Haven:YaleUniversityPress, 1994).
15. Alvarez,p. 70.
16. Soareset al., p. 311.
17. Hahner,pp. 188-191, 195.
18. Angela Neves-Xaiverde Brito, "BrazilianWomenin Exile,"LatinAmericanPerspectives,13 (1986),
64.
19. Alvarez,pp. 118-19.
20. SoniaAlvarez,"ThePoliticsof Genderin LatinAmerica"(Ph.D.diss.,YaleUniversity,1988), p. 355.
21. Schmink.
22. Nancy SaportaSternbach,Marysa Navarro-Aranguren
et al., "Feminismsin Latin America: From
Bogotato Taxco,"Signs, 17 (1992).
23. MariaKinzo, Legal OppositionPolitics underAuthoritarianRule in Brazil (New York:St. Martin's
Press, 1988), p. 206.
24. Schmink,p. 124.
25. Alvarez,EngenderingDemocracyin Brazil,p. 113.
26. Ibid.
27. Scott Mainwaring,RethinkingPartySystemsin the ThirdWaveofDemocratization(Stanford:Stanford
UniversityPress, 1999).
28. Alvarez,EngenderingDemocracyin Brazil,p. 11.
29. Ibid.,p. 161.
30. See Ann Matear,"Desde la Protestaa la Propuesta,"Democratization,3 (1996); Veronica Schild,
"New Subjectsof Rights?,"in Sonia Alvarez et al., eds., Politics of Culture,Culturesof Politics (Boulder:
WestviewPress, 1998); MariaElena Valenzuela,"The Evolving Roles of WomenunderMilitaryRule,"in
Paul W Drakeand Ivan Jaksic,eds., TheStrugglefor Democracyin Chile (Lincoln:Universityof Nebraska
Press, 1995); MariaElena Valenzuela,"Womenand the DemocratizationProcess in Chile,"in Jaquetteand
Wolchik, eds.; MarjorieAgosin, Tapestriesof Hope, Threadsof Love (Albuquerque:University of New
270
Lisa Baldez
Mexico Press, 1996); Patricia Chuchryk, "From Dictatorship to Democracy," in Jaquette, ed.; Alicia
FrohmannandTeresaVald6s,"Democracyin the Countryand in the Home,"in Basu, ed.; JulietaKirkwood,
Serpolitica en Chile (Santiago:FLACSO,1986); TeresaVald6sand MarisaWeinstein,Mujeresque suenian
(Santiago:FLACSO,1993).
31. Diana Kay, Chileans in Exile (Houndmills:Macmillan,1987); Thomas C. Wrightand Rody Ofiate,
Flightfrom Chile (Albuquerque:Universityof New Mexico Press, 1998).
32. Centrode Estudiosde la Mujer,Mundode mujer(Santiago:EdicionesCEM, 1988).
33. Kirkwood.
34. To be more precise, the conservativefaction of the ChristianDemocrats,which controlledthe party
leadershipat the time, supportedthe coup.
35. Chuchryk.
36. Valenzuela,"TheEvolvingRoles of WomenunderMilitaryRule,"p. 172.
37. Ibid,pp. 177-82.
38. Lisa Baldez, "CoalitionPoliticsandthe Limitsof StateFeminism,"Womenand Politics,22 (2001).
39. See HildegardMariaNickel, "Womenin the GermanDemocraticRepublicand in the New Federal
States," in Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller, eds, Gender Politics and Post-Communism(New York:
Routledge, 1993), p. 144; BrigitteYoung, Triumphof the Fatherland(Ann Arbor:Universityof Michigan
Press, 1999);MyraMarxFerree,"TheRise and Fallof 'MommyPolitics',"FeministStudies, 19 (1993); Lynn
Kamenitsa,"EastGermanFeministsin the New Democracy,"Womenand Politics, 17 (1997); Eva MaleckLewy,"TheEast GermanWomen'sMovementafterUnification,"in Scott et al., eds.
40. ChristinaSchenk,"LesbiansandTheirEmancipationin the FormerGermanDemocraticRepublic,"in
Funk and Mueller,eds.; ChristianJoppke,East GermanDissidents and the Revolutionof 1989 (New York:
NewYorkUniversityPress, 1995).
41. Anne Hampele, "The OrganizedWomen's Movement in the Collapse of the GDR," in Funk and
Mueller,eds., p. 181.
42. Young,p. 70.
43. Ibid.,p. 72.
44. BarbaraEinhorn,"WhereHave All the WomenGone? Womenand the Women'sMovementin East
CentralEurope,"FeministReview(1991), 26.
45. Einhorn,CinderellaGoes to Market,p. 207.
46. Joppke,p. 93.
47. Einhom,CinderellaGoes to Market,pp. 207-8.
48. Young,p. 84.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.,pp. 82-84.
52. Einhorn,CinderellaGoes to Market,p. 204.
53. Young,p. 87.
54. Ibid.,p. 89.
55. TatianaBohm, "TheWomen'sQuestionas a DemocraticQuestion,"in FunkandMueller,eds., p. 153.
56. SabineLang,"TheNGOizationof Feminism,"in Scottet al., eds., p. 108.
57. GrzegorzEkiertand Jan Kubik,"ContentiousPolitics in New Democracies:East Germany,Hungary,
Poland,and Slovakia,"WorldPolitics,50 (1998), arguethatPolandwas resourcerich in this regard.
58. PadraicKenney,"TheGenderof Resistancein CommunistPoland,"AmericanHistoricalReview, 104
(1999).
59. See Ewa Hauseret al., "Feminismin the Intersticesof Politics and Culture,"in Nanette Funk and
MagdaMueller,eds., Political Changein Poland (New York:Routledge,1993);Kenney;RenataSiemienska,
"Consequencesof Economic and Political Changes for Women in Poland,"in Jaquetteand Wolchik,eds.;
Anna Titkow,"PoliticalChange in Poland:Cause, Modifier or Barrierto Gender Equality?,"in Funk and
271
ComparativePolitics
April 2003
JoannaRegulska,"Transitionto Local Democracy:Do
Mueller,eds., GenderPolitics and Post-Communism;
Polish Women Have a Chance?,"in Marilyn Rueschemeyer,ed., Womenin the Politics of Postcommunist
Eastern Europe (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); Judy Root Aulette, "New Roads to Resistance," in
Bystydzienskiand Sekhon,eds.
60. GrzegorzEkiert,TheStateagainstSociety(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1996), p. 220.
61. Membersof the GreenhamCommonWomeneventuallyvisited Polandas well, but not until later,in
1983. PadraicKenney,A CarnivalofRevolution(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2002), p. 100.
62. MalgorzataFuszara,"Women'sMovementsin Poland,"in Scott et al. eds., p. 133.
63. CompareVaclav Havel'sviews about Italianfeminist peace activistswho visited Czechoslovakiain
"Anatomyof Reticence"in Viclav Havel and JanVladislav,VdclavHavel: Living in Truth(London:Faber
and Faber,1989).
64. Ekiert,p. 232.
65. Ibid.,p. 242.
66. Jean Robinson, "The Liga Kobiet in Poland,"in DorothyMcBride Stetson and Amy Mazur,eds.,
ComparativeStateFeminism(ThousandOaks:Sage, 1995),p. 204.
67. Renata Siemienska,"Dialogue:Polish Women and Polish Politics since WorldWar II,"Journal of
History,3 (1991).
Women's
68. KristiS. Long, WeAll Foughtfor Freedom(Boulder:WestviewPress, 1996), p. 168.
69. Hauseret al., p. 263.
70. Ibid.,p. 258.
71. AnnaReading,Polish Women,Solidarityand Feminism(Houndmills:Macmillan,1992), p. 201.
72. Ibid.,p. 202.
73. Fuszara,p. 134.
74. Hauseret al., p. 258.
75. Einhorn,CinderellaGoes to Market.
272