Center for Advanced
Defense Studies
Innovation for Peace
Directorate of Research
Defense Concepts Series
June 2006
Violence, Narcotics and Poverty:
A Harmful Cocktail in Afghanistan
CADS Staff
A Troubled Past
Years of violence have taken their toll on all aspects of Afghan society, politics and economy.
Afghanistan has been traversed by countless invasions, foreign rule and bitter infighting: from
Alexander the Great's invasion of the country in 328BC to the 1219 Mongol invasion led by
Genghis Khan to 19th century British rule and subsequent coups. A Soviet withdrawal from the
country in 1989 after a decade-long brutal occupation precipitated a bitter power struggle that
culminated in civil war. Bands of mujahideen (“holy warriors”) financed, armed and trained by
the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China during the Soviet occupation fought a vile
war for political control of the country. The mujahideen split into two loosely-aligned opposing
factions: the Northern Alliance and the Taliban (Afghan Mujahideen). The subsequent victory of
the Taliban ushered in an era of harsh totalitarian rule.
In the aftermath of the Taliban’s rise to power, the Northern Alliance, led by a group of tribal
warlords, fled to northern Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia. The Northern Alliance remained
there until 2001, when the United States intervened to oust the Taliban regime, which harbored
Osama bin Laden—the mastermind of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. In its
war against the Taliban, the US used Afghan militias as proxies, thereby augmenting the power
of tribal warlords throughout Afghanistan and impeding the consolidation of power by a new
central authority. It is in this power vacuum that terrorism and the narcotics trade have flourished
in Afghanistan. [OQ1]
Contemporary Challenges and an Uncertain Future
The country's current democratic leadership, formed in 2004 under President Hamid Karzai,
Afghanistan's first democratically-elected president, has faced a major domestic security
challenge. Despite political change, insurgent violence continued in 2004, reports the US State
Department (2006), led by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and Jaish-al
Muslimeen. These and other rebel groups continue to attack, threaten, rob and kill local villagers,
political activists, NGO workers, government officials and foreign soldiers in the fledgling
democracy. The effect of these terrorist activities on the ability and willingness of much-needed
aid organizations to operate in Afghanistan is of particular concern. After Taliban forces killed
33 NGO workers in 2005, 10 more than in 2004, various United Nations (UN) agencies and
nongovernmental organizations began downscaling or eliminating their programs in the country
due to the lack of security. (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2005)
These attacks intensified in 2005, during which 15 suicide bombings were undertaken, compared
to three in 2004. (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2006) Direct fire combat with
Coalition forces declined, suggesting that insurgents now seek new measures to disrupt military
Copyright © 2006 Center for Advanced Defense Studies. All rights reserved.
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Center for Advanced
Defense Studies
Innovation for Peace
Directorate of Research
Defense Concepts Series
June 2006
and international aid operations. Afghan insurgents have taken cues from their counterparts in
Iraq, relocating when Coalition forces attempt to clear an area then returning after their
departure.
Counterterrorism forces faced increased attacks throughout 2005 previous to the National
Assembly and provincial council elections in September of that year. Despite Taliban threats,
only minor attacks occurred, and the elections boasted a 53% turnout from the 12.5 million
registered voters. Increased foreign troop presence provided for rising tensions between Afghans
and Coalition forces. A May 2006 traffic incident involving US troops promptly escalated into
the most intense rioting since the Taliban’s removal from power.
The known link between insurgent activity and the illicit narcotics trade in Afghanistan is also of
grave concern. While in power, the Taliban made much progress in eradicating the country's
opium production. Following the recommendation of the United Nations Drug Control Program
(UNDCP), the Taliban banned domestic opium production in 2000. The 90% decrease in
production that followed the ban was reversed with the overthrow of the Taliban and the rise of
warlords. During the Hamid Karzai's presidency, opium production has risen 657% from 2001
levels. The UNDCP reported Afghanistan as the leading opium producer in 2005 with a harvest
in excess of 4,100 tons. (UNODC 2005) The resurgence of the opium trade has help fund militias
and warlords who traffic the drug. (The Economist 2004).
Afghanistan is also plagued by a dearth of economic opportunities. Many Afghan citizens are
now engaged in illicit activities in an attempt to overcome their socioeconomic circumstances.
Severe poverty and underdevelopment[OQ2], as characterized by a lack of education, health care,
legitimate employment, infrastructure and social services, has led many Afghans to turn to the
richest parties—mostly warlords and drug lords—for employment and sustenance. In many
cases, the lucrative opium trade presents opportunities to escape from abject poverty. According
to UNODC, the average opium farmer stands to earn ten times more per hectare than a legitimate
cereal and grain farmer. (UNODC 2005) Furthermore, more destitute farmers deprived of access
to sufficiently fertile lands are often forced into sharecropping agreements, which generally
require the cultivation of opium poppies. (National Drug Control Strategy 2006) Much of the
support for militias and insurgencies in Afghanistan thus owes to socioeconomic conditions
rather than ideology, despite a small Muslim Arab minority driven by extreme fundamentalism.
Looking Ahead
The international community must coalesce around the effort to promote human development in
Afghanistan if the fledgling democracy, a potential poster child of democracy for the Middle
East, is to survive. Economic advancement of the Afghan people will foster a greater sense of
respect for the democratically-elected central government. Provided with more opportunities to
support themselves and their families through legal activities, Afghans will be less inclined to
directly or indirectly support insurgents and warlords, who currently exploit the country's
socioeconomic conditions to further their own cause.
Copyright © 2006 Center for Advanced Defense Studies. All rights reserved.
10 G St, NE, Suite 610 :: Washington, DC 20002 :: 202 289 3332 :: www.c4ads.org
Center for Advanced
Defense Studies
Innovation for Peace
Directorate of Research
Defense Concepts Series
June 2006
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Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2005. Afghanistan: Country Reports on Human
Rights Practice. Washington, DC: US State Department.
Center for Advanced Defense Studies. 2005. “One Crop May Hide Another: Poppy Cultivation
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Economist, The. 2004. ”Special Report: Voting in Warlord Country-Afghanistan.” T h e
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Human Rights Watch. May 24, 2005. “Afghanistan: Violence Surges.” New York:
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/05/23/afghan10995.htm >
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. 2006. National Drug Control
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by
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Copyright © 2006 Center for Advanced Defense Studies. All rights reserved.
10 G St, NE, Suite 610 :: Washington, DC 20002 :: 202 289 3332 :: www.c4ads.org