SUBMISSION TO THE
COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION
OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
CONCERNING THE REPUBLIC OF
THE FIJI ISLANDS
Endorsed by three Fiji Non-Government Organisations
AUGUST 2007
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS AND SHORT FORMS .............................................................0
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................2
1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................4
1.1
About the NGO Coalition on Human Rights............................................4
1.2
Purpose and Scope of this Submission ..................................................4
1.3
Impact of Events Surrounding 5 December 2006 ...................................4
1.4
Recent History of Reporting by Fiji Under the Convention......................5
1.5
Issues Addressed in this Submission .....................................................7
2. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF COUP LEADERS AND THE
PROMOTION OF RECONCILIATION, TOLERANCE AND UNITY BILL 2005 .....9
2.1
Preferential Treatment: Identifying a Pattern ........................................10
2.2
Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005 .................12
2.3
State Party's Rationale for Reconciliation, tolerance and unity Bill.…...14
2.3
Conclusions on Preferential Treatment.................................................17
3. FAILURE TO FORM A MULTI-PARTY CABINET IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE CONSTITUTION.........................................................................................18
4. RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ......................................................27
4.1
Introduction...........................................................................................27
4.2
Background to Affirmative Action in Fiji ................................................29
4.3
Overview of Current Programs .............................................................30
4.4
Analysis ................................................................................................31
4.5
Comments on Selected Programs........................................................35
4.6
Conclusions on Affirmative Action ........................................................37
5. UNRESOLVED LAND ISSUES AND THE GROWTH OF SQUATTER
SETTLEMENTS..................................................................................................39
6. RACIALISM IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR...............................................67
6.1
Background ..........................................................................................67
6.2
“Fijian Education Problem” ...................................................................69
6.3
Explaining the Gap Between Indigenous Fijian and Other Students ....73
6.4
Affirmative Action in Education under the Social Justice Act 2001 .......74
6.5
Conclusions on Education ....................................................................77
7. DISPROPORTIONATE EMIGRATION OF INDO-FIJIANS..........................79
7.1
The Facts..............................................................................................79
7.2
Factors Contributing to Emigration from Fiji..........................................81
7.3
Racist Provision in the Immigration Act 2003 .......................................86
8. SUICIDE RATES .........................................................................................88
9. GOVERNMENT’S FAILURE TO PROMOTE A NATIONAL IDENTITY THAT
UNITES INDIGENOUS AND INDO-FIJIANS ......................................................95
9.1
Religious Intolerance as a Manifestation of Racism .............................95
10.
FIJI HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ....................................................107
APPENDIX A: THE RECONCILIATION BILL: A SUMMARY ............................108
APPENDIX B: SECTION 99 OF THE CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT) ACT
1997..................................................................................................................110
APPENDIX C: MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT IN FIJI: A TIMELINE ..............111
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is noted that in response to a request by the Committee on the Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Fiji Government submitted its 2005 and
2006 reports together in one document, on 20 June 2006.
The purpose of this submission is to assess, from the civil society point of view, the quality
and extent of the efforts made by the Government of Fiji since 2002, in order to comply
with its obligations under the CERD Convention. 2002 was the year that the Fiji
Government last made its submission to the Committee.
The initial draft report was prepared for the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF) by a
consultant, Mr Jagjit Singh, a long-time researcher and lecturer in the area of research
methodology, at the University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji.
This report, initiated by the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum, also received input and
endorsement from the Ecumenical Centre for Research, Education and Advocacy
(ECREA), and Women’s Action for Change (WAC), which are two non-government
organisations (NGOs) that work with marginalised groups in Fiji. Further input was sought
from all NGOs that are members of the NGO Coalition on Human Rights (NGOCHR) in
Fiji. However, further input promised by other NGOs were not received in time to be
included in this report. Therefore, this report is endorsed by three NGOs in Fiji, namely:
CCF, ECREA and WAC.
The CCF gratefully acknowledges the funding received from the European Union, which
enabled them to prepare this report.
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
ABBREVIATIONS AND SHORT FORMS
Unless the context indicates otherwise, abbreviations and short forms used in this submission
have the following meanings:
ALTA
AusAID
CCF
Committee
Convention
ECREA
EED
FHRC
FLP
Government
NGO
NLTA
NLTB
NZAID
PRTU Bill
Report
RFMF
SDL
USP
Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (Cap. 270)
Australian Agency for International Development
Citizens’ Constitutional Forum Limited
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
Ecumenical Centre for Research Education and Advocacy
Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst e.V.
Fiji Human Rights Commission
Fiji Labour Party
Government of the Republic of the Fiji Islands
non-government organisation
Native Land Trust Act (Cap. 134)
Native Land Trust Board
New Zealand’s International Aid and Development Agency
Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005
sixteenth and seventeenth periodic reports of the Government of Fiji under
the Convention, submitted in one document
Republic of Fiji Military Forces
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua
University of the South Pacific
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report responds to the concluding remarks of the 2003 Committee, where land were highlighted as
major issues. While these were raised as major issues, they cannot be addressed without specific state
attention to obligations under international conventions such as CERD, CEDAW, CRC; regional
agreements such as the Biketawa Declaration and the Pacific Plan; and the Bill of Rights under Fiji’s
1997 Constitution.
(1) Land & Squatter problems
Race has been a critical factor in the Government policy on land ownership and land use in Fiji. The
colonial government since its formation in 1874 had ensured that land remains in indigenous ownership.
As a result, over 90 per cent of all lands in Fiji are owned communally by the indigenous people.
Additionally, to protect the indigenous culture and traditions, the Colonial Government restricted the use
of the indigenes on European-owned plantations. The ensuing labour shortage on sugar cane and coconut
plantations was resolved with the introduction of indentured labourers (girmityas) from India. As a result,
most Indo-Fijian farmers (descendents of girmityas) remain tenants of indigenous landowners.
The tenancy agreements between the Indo-Fijians and the indigenous landowners are brokered by the
Native Landlord Trust Board (NLTB), an institution created by the Colonial Government in 1940. Some
twenty years later (1966), security of tenure was provided under Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act
(ALTA). Under ALTA, thirty year leases were granted to Indo Fijians on indigenous owned land. Most
of these leases are now expiring with thousands of Indo Fijians facing evictions as a consequence non
renewals. Between the period 1997 to 2028, over 13,100 ALTA leases will expire. The State party under
an indigenous Prime Minister (Lasenia Qarase) had been preoccupied through Talanoa (discussion)
sessions in dealing with increases in land rents and in trying to revert the small amount of Freehold and
Crown land, back to native titles.
Additionally, the State party (Qarase-led Government) was embarking on new land bills that would have
had a devastating effect on Indo-Fijians and other ethnic minority groups in Fiji, such as descendents of
Solomon Islanders, Rabi, Kioa, Chinese, Europeans and Part-Europeans and others. These were the so
called Qoliqoli and Indigenous Tribunal bills. These bills would have placed greater restrictions on nonindigenous people over the ownership and the use of lands and the sea in Fiji. There was a lot of
opposition to these bills from civil society, opposition parliamentarians, the private sector, as well as the
Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF). The Qoliqoli Bill was one of the stated reasons given by the
RFMF for their overthrow of the Qarase Government on December 5, 2006. The current State party with
Commodore Bainimarama as Interim Prime Minister has in effect nullified the controversial Qoliqoli and
indigenous tribunal bills that would have created further tensions in already strained race relations in Fiji.
(2) Suicide & attempted suicides, affirmative action plans, reconciliation tolerance & unity bills, acts of
sacrilege, racially- biased NLTB appointments and communal voting
Similar to previous governments since independence, the Qarase-led Government did not take any
positive action to promote a national identity that could have conceivably united all races. It commenced
its term in 2001 with 29 affirmative action plans under the Blueprint document (justified through the
Social Justice Chapter of the 1997 Constitution), exclusively designed to benefit indigenous people. It
further justified these programs by the argument that majority of disadvantaged people lived in rural
areas, most of whom were indigenous people. The reality of the situation however, is that some of the
poorest and most needy people in the rural and urban areas are Indo-Fijians and other minority ethnic
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
groups. In short, the affirmative action programs of the State party were race - rather than needs - based.
The 10-yearly national population census due to be undertaken in 2006, was postponed by the then
government, which means that programmes could not have been based on current statistical realities.
In 2005, the Qarase-led Government started the process of passing the Promotion of the Reconciliation,
Tolerance and Unity bill, which would have had the powers to grant amnesty to perpetrators of the 2000
coup. The Bill’s sole purpose appeared to be to compensate and free coup perpetrators, with negligible
attention given to the sufferings and losses of the main victims of the coup, majority of whom are IndoFijians.
The race-based attacks on non-Christian places of worship has continued unabated despite claims by the
State that such attacks were for monies and jewellery kept inside the temples and mosques. This however
fails to adequately explain the graffiti and desecration of holy books in these non-Christian places of
worship.
The Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) being an indigenous Fijian institution, does not cater for interests of
other ethnic groups. Similarly, all members of the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) are indigenous
Fijians. This dichotomy in leadership has direct implications as these institutions are responsible for the
administration of over 90 per cent of all lands in Fiji. There is no representation of the majority of the
Indo-Fijian tenants who have been faced with mass-scaled evictions over the past decade.
The GCC nominates the President and 14 of the 32 Senators, as a guarantee of assurance of majority
indigenous representation in the Upper House. Citizens of all other ethnic groups, with no representation
in the GCC, are therefore excluded from the Presidential nomination process, which ideally should be
inclusive of all citizens.
The most disturbing feature of racism in Fiji is the communal voting system inherited from the Colonial
Government. The communal voting is the root cause and symbol of the continuing political instability in
Fiji, as the division of seats along racial lines perpetuates a similar racist party system. This can be
illustrated through the overt racism found in the administration of the 2006 national elections, where most
of the polling stations were supervised by civil servants who are predominantly indigenous Fijians, thus
raising the question of systemic ethnic bias.
‘Hate speeches’ harbouring racist comments were frequently aired under Parliamentary Privilege and
more recently appeared as blogspots on the Internet. The Qarase Government had condoned the ‘hate
speeches’ in the Parliament. The media, by reproducing racist material, has become a party to the
perpetuation of racism in Fiji. The State has been aware of the high suicide and attempted suicide rate
amongst Indo-Fijians; these sharply increased in the first three years after the 2000 coup. This has been
attributed to feelings of helplessness and hopelessness felt by members of the Indo-Fijian community. It
is yet to see how much success has been achieved through the steps taken to prevent suicides and
attempted suicides with the formation of the National Committee for the Prevention of Suicides
(NCOPS).
The consequences of racial discrimination in Fiji are: marginalisation from the mainstream decisionmaking processes, resource dispossession and poverty, increased violence such as home invasions and
sacrilege. These consequences are manifested in migration, suicides and attempted suicides, increased
violence within families and communities, gender-based violence – including violence against women
and the girl child, – child abuse, and resentment, distrust, and cynicism within the marginalised groups in
society, including Indo-Fijians.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1 About the NGO Coalition on Human Rights
The NGO Coalition is a co-ordinating network for non-government organisations engaged in
different aspects of human rights education, advocacy or project work. Its aim is to raise
awareness in the community on human rights and the various human rights instruments. The
Citizens’ Constitutional Forum Limited (the CCF) is a non-government organisation (NGO) that
advocates and educates for constitutional democracy, human rights and multiculturalism in Fiji.
CCF believes the people of Fiji need to re-imagine themselves as citizens of a nation, ahead of
their ethnic interests and categories, and strive to help them to do so. CCF also believes that
organisations such as theirs can help to mobilise civil society and ensure a socially just,
accountable and participatory democracy. The hope is that an active civil society will promote a
better understanding of the diversity of Fiji’s people, foster multiculturalism and strengthen Fiji
as a nation.
The CCF is incorporated under the national laws of Fiji as a not-for-profit company limited by
guarantee. Our funding is largely provided by international donors such as the European Union,
the New Zealand’s International Aid and Development Agency (NZAID), the Evangelischer
Entwicklungsdienst e.V. (EED) or Church Development Service of the German Protestant
Churches, Oxfam Community Aid Abroad – Australia, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Department of State, USA.
CCF has also receive funding and other support from local organisations and individuals in Fiji
and works in partnership with Conciliation Resources, a London-based NGO with expertise in
conflict transformation.
The CCF is not aligned with any political party.
1.2 Purpose and Scope of this Submission
The purpose of this submission is to assess, from the point of view of the NGO Coalition on
Human Rights, the quality and extent of the efforts made by the Government of the Republic of
the Fiji Islands (referred to hereafter as “the Government” or “the State party”) to comply with its
obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (the Convention). This submission focuses on developments since 2002, when
the NGO Coalition on Human Rights last made a submission to the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (the Committee).
1.3 Impact of Events Surrounding 5 December 2006
Work on the present submission began in 2005, in the expectation that the Government would
submit its sixteenth and seventeenth periodic reports under the Convention on or before 10
February 2006, as requested by the Committee. In the event, the Government submitted those
reports, in one document (the Report), on 20 June 2006.
On 5 December 2006, before the Government’s Report had been considered by the Committee,
the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (the RFMF) executed a coup d’etat, ousting the then Prime
Minister and all other Cabinet Ministers from office, and dissolving Parliament. In early January
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
2007, the President swore in the Commander of the RFMF as Interim Prime Minister, along with
15 civilians as Interim Ministers. The stated objective of the military takeover was to “clean up”
alleged corruption in, or condoned by, the pre-coup Government, alleged maladministration
under that Government, and allegedly racist policies pursued by that Government. Some have
suggested less praiseworthy motives. The Commissioner of Police, for example, who was
ousted in the coup, claimed the RFMF Commander had wanted to stop police investigations
into the alleged beating to death of rebel soldiers after the mutiny at Queen Elizabeth Barracks
on 2 November 2000, in which he may have been personally implicated.
This was the fourth coup that Fiji has experienced in the past 20 years, after two military
takeovers in quick succession in 1987 and one civilian-led coup in 2000. As with previous
coups, it seems likely that a mixture of motives was present among the various individuals and
groups involved in planning and executing the military takeover of December 2006. Certainly,
there had been a gradual breakdown in relations between the military commander and the
ousted Prime Minister over the preceding six years, and the NGO Coalition on Human Rights
believes the causes of the conflict date back to Fiji’s previous coup, on 19 May 2000.
The point that may be of greatest interest to the Committee is that this latest coup differs from
the earlier three in that the perpetrators of the 1987 and 2000 coups claimed they were acting to
save indigenous Fijians and their land from subjugation to other ethnic groups, and overthrew
Governments largely supported by Indo-Fijians, while in 2006 the RFMF Commander claimed
to be acting to combat corruption, and overthrew a Government largely supported by the
indigenous population. When the Commander used the word “corruption”, he clearly included
Government policies that unfairly discriminated, in his view, against non-indigenous people. The
2006 coup is therefore the first one to be purportedly justified, not by indigenous Fijian
concerns, but by concern for the interests of other ethnic groups in the country.
At the time of writing, there has not been any indication from the Interim Government as to what
action it might take concerning the Report submitted by the deposed Government.
The present submission has been updated, where possible, to reflect the actions and policies of
both the pre-coup and post-coup Governments.
1.4 Recent History of Reporting by Fiji Under the Convention
It is appropriate to begin with an account of the recent history of reporting by Fiji under the
Convention.
Prior to 2002, no Government of Fiji had submitted a report under the Convention since 25
October 1982. Given this 20-year lapse by the State party in compliance with its obligations, it
was to the credit of the then Government that, in January 2002, an advertisement was placed in
one of Fiji’s newspapers expressing its intention to submit a report to the Committee in that
year, and inviting members of the public to contribute to the report by making submissions to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade. Shortly thereafter, an officer of that Ministry
approached the CCF and personally invited it to make such a submission. The CCF decided to
do so through the NGO Coalition on Human Rights, which made a lengthy submission to Fiji’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade in July 2002. Some members of the coalition also
made individual submissions.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
In the event, the Government did not complete its report in time for the Committee’s sixty-first
session, from 5-23 August 2002, so the NGO Coalition on Human Rights and others decided to
address their submissions directly to the Committee. The Committee then conducted a
preliminary dialogue with representatives of the Government on 8 August 2002, based on the
submissions of NGOs and a draft report prepared belatedly by the State party.1 During that
dialogue, the State party undertook to complete its sixth to fifteenth periodic reports in one
document and submit them to the Committee in time for its sixty-second session from 3-21
March 2003. The Committee also urged the State party, and the State party expressed an
intention, to consult with NGOs in the completion of this document.
However, the Government submitted its sixth to fifteenth periodic reports to the Committee on
15 November 2002, without consulting NGOs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External
Trade then convened a meeting with members of the NGO Coalition on Human Rights to
discuss the reports on 7 February 2003. From the CCF’s point of view, this meeting was
unproductive as Government representatives did not respond to the concerns raised by
representatives of the NGO Coalition. In any case, the meeting was held some months after the
Government’s reports had been submitted to the Committee, and therefore too late to influence
their contents. It is hard to escape the conclusion that this meeting was intended only to enable
the State party to represent to the Committee that it had consulted with NGOs before the
Committee’s sixty-second session.
The concluding observations adopted by the Committee concerning Fiji at its sixty-second
session record its appreciation, on the issue of consultation with NGOs, “that human rights nongovernmental organizations were consulted in the compilation of the [State party’s] report”.2 As
just explained, despite the intention expressed to the Committee by the State party in 2002, no
such consultation in fact took place. The Committee was therefore misled.
Its concluding observations then go on to record “the assurances that the State party would
continue this dialogue in the future”,3 and later in the same document the Committee also
recommended that the Government should “consult with organizations of civil society working to
combat racial discrimination during the preparation of the next periodic report.”4
Fiji’s sixteenth and seventeenth periodic reports under the Convention were due on 10 February
2006. The CCF wrote to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade on 9 November
2005, asking whether there would be any consultation on these reports with NGOs. Although
the CCF did not receive a reply to that letter, a statement released by the Government on 23
November 2005 indicated that a draft of the Report had been presented to Cabinet and was
expected to be submitted to the Committee on schedule.5 The then Government is again to be
commended for seeking to comply with its reporting obligations under the Convention, where
successive previous Governments had failed to do so.
In preparing its Report, the State party also held three consultations with NGOs: on 31 January,
21 February and 14 March 2006. This was a dramatic improvement on its attitude and
1
A record of this dialogue is provided by the concluding observations adopted by the Committee on 19 August 2002:
CERD/A/57/18, paras 471-476.
2
CERD/C/62/CO/3 (2 June 2003), para 7.
3
Ibid.
4
Id, para 30.
5
“ICERD report for submission in 2006”, 23 November 2005, <www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_5836.shtml>.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
performance in 2002, and realised the good intentions expressed by the State party’s
representatives when they met with the Committee in 2002 and 2003. While the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and External Trade declined to release the draft Report for NGOs’ to comment
on, it did ultimately release significant portions of the draft during the consultations. As in 2003,
Government representatives remained largely unresponsive to concerns raised by
representatives of the NGOs. However, the NGO Coalition was nonetheless pleased to see the
Government institute a practice of public consultation on its Report under the Convention, which
we hope will be further developed in the future. We also hope it will be replicated for Fiji’s
reports under other human rights treaties to which it is a party, such as the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child.
Following the consultations, a statement released by the Government on 25 April 2006
indicated that the final version of the Report had been endorsed by Cabinet6 and, as mentioned
earlier, it was submitted to the Committee on 20 June 2006.
It is relevant to note here that the Committee had also recommended at its sixty-second session
that “the State party’s reports [should] be made readily available to the public from the time they
are submitted to the United Nations and that the observations of the Committee on these
reports [should] be similarly publicized.”7 As far as the NGO Coalition on Human Rights is
aware, no Government of Fiji to date has ever made any effort to publicise its periodic reports
under the Convention or any of the Committee’s concluding observations concerning Fiji.
On a more positive note, an Opposition member of Fiji’s Parliament, Dr Ganesh Chand, recently
compiled several submissions and Government reports to the Committee concerning Fiji, along
with the Committee’s concluding observations, the Convention itself and related material, for
publication in a volume entitled, Papers on Racial Discrimination.8 This work was published in
Fiji in 2005, with financial assistance from the Canadian Development Agency. A second
volume published the following year compiles relevant national legislation, Government policies
and a 2006 report of the Fiji Human Rights Commission on affirmative action.9
1.5 Issues Addressed in this Submission
As already stated, the purpose of this submission is to assess, from the CCF’s point of view, the
quality and extent of the efforts made by the Government of Fiji since 2002 to comply with its
obligations under the Convention. In order to make the best use of the limited resources
available to us for this task, we have decided to focus on the concerns raised in the concluding
observations on Fiji adopted by the Committee at its sixty-second session. Where possible, we
have also updated statistical information provided in the submission made by the NGO Coalition
on Human Rights to the Committee in 2002. However, we have not tried to revisit the whole
range of issues raised in that earlier submission. We hope that it is still available to members of
the Committee, should they wish to refer to it for background information.
Accordingly, this submission addresses the following issues:
6 “Cabinet endorses Fiji’s 16th CERD Report”, 25 April 2006, <www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_6605.shtml>.
7 CERD/C/62/CO/3 (2 June 2003), para 32.
8 The full citation is Chand, Ganesh, editor, (2005) Papers on Racial Discrimination: Volume 1: The CERD Papers, Fiji Institute of Applied Studies, Lautoka (Fiji).
9 Chand, Ganesh, editor, (2006) Papers on Racial Discrimination in Fiji: Volume 2: Laws, Regulations, Policies, Fiji Institute of Applied Studies, Lautoka (Fiji).
8
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Preferential Treatment of Coup Offenders and the Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance
and Unity Bill 2005
•
Failure to Form a Multi-Party Cabinet in Accordance with the Constitution
•
Race-Based Affirmative Action
•
Unresolved Land Issues and the Growth of Squatter Settlements
•
Racialism in the Education Sector
•
Disproportionate Emigration of Indo-Fijians
•
Suicide Rates
•
Government’s Failure to Promote a National Identity that Unites Indigenous and Indo-Fijians
•
Fiji Human Rights Commission
We had also planned to examine the under-representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups in
the public service, the police and the military, but we have not been able to obtain useful
statistics on this issue. We understand that the Fiji Public Service Association is preparing a
separate submission to address it.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
2.
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF LEADERS OF THE MAY 2000 COUP
AND THE PRTU BILL
In the concluding observations adopted at its sixty-second session, the Committee underlined
that it had not been provided with “in-depth information relating to the prosecutions of the
authors of such acts, or on the adoption of preventive measures for the future”.10
It will be remembered that George Speight and other leaders of the attempted coup d’état in Fiji
in May 2000 claimed that they were doing it for “the Fijian cause”. This was an emotional appeal
to indigenous Fijians’ feelings of insecurity and fears of loss of cultural identity in the globalised
modern world. The implication was that the indigenous Fijian community must retain political
control of Fiji at all costs, or else be subjugated to other ethnic groups.
Commentators have observed, however, that the coup leaders were in fact a motley crew of
failed businessmen and defeated politicians with much to gain personally from the overthrow of
the multi-racial People’s Coalition Government that had been elected in 1999. The rebel
soldiers who helped to execute the coup were allegedly paid handsomely for their work. While
some who took part in the coup no doubt truly believed in “the Fijian cause”, its most powerful
backers were more probably motivated by opportunism and self-interest. They deliberately
exploited the widespread inter-ethnic prejudices and mistrust that exist in Fiji today, in order to
manipulate popular opinion and gain support among indigenous Fijians.11
By the end of 2005, most of the “front men” of the May 2000 coup had been prosecuted, as had
those who were sworn into George Speight’s illegal Government, along with others who
committed crimes around the country in support of the coup. The coup’s financiers have not
been identified, however, and questions remain over the extent of the conspiracy behind it, and
the possible involvement of other indigenous political leaders, as well as Indo-Fijian
businessmen.
The Fiji Police Force had stated publicly that it hopes to close its investigations relating to the
coup early in 2006.
The investigation and prosecution of coup-related offences between 2000 and the present have
been highly controversial throughout. In this submission, the CCF wishes to bring to the
Committee’s attention a pattern of preferential treatment of coup leaders by the Government,
culminating with its introduction into Parliament on 19 May 2005 of the Promotion of
Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005. This pattern includes several cases in which
prominent indigenous Fijians continued to receive public salaries and other benefits of public
office after being convicted by the courts for their involvement in the coup, and several cases
where coup offenders were released early from prison, often after serving only a fraction of their
sentences.
It should be noted at the outset that several individuals widely suspected of being involved in
the coup were appointed to high public office (such as diplomatic postings) shortly afterwards,
and a number of these have not been prosecuted and remain in office to date. The remainder of
this chapter focuses on those who have been tried and convicted, however.
10
CERD/C/62/CO/3 (2 June 2003), para 23.
See for example, Robertson, R, and Sutherland, W, (2001) Government by the Gun: The Unfinished Business of Fiji’s 2000
Coup, Pluto Press Australia, Sydney.
11
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
The CCF believes the preferential treatment of coup leaders is detrimental to inter-ethnic
relations in Fiji, and also that it is likely to encourage future coups.
2.1 Preferential Treatment: Identifying a Pattern
Seven of the most blatant cases to date are described below, and then tabulated in Table 2.1.
•
On 6 August 2004, five co-accused were convicted for swearing oaths to join George
Speight’s illegal Government. The swearing-in ceremony had been televised nationally
during the hostage crisis. Several of the participants also assumed high public office after
the coup. One of these was Ratu Jope Seniloli, who had purportedly been sworn in as the
President of Fiji under Speight, and at the time of his trial was serving as Vice-President.
The court sentenced Ratu Jope to four years’ imprisonment. He remained in office
throughout the trial and after his conviction and imprisonment. He continued to receive a
public salary and his family continued to reside in Government housing and to drive a
Government vehicle reserved for the Vice-President. Ratu Jope was released from prison on
26 November 2004 under a compulsory supervision order. At that time he had served three
months in prison – approximately 1/16 of his total sentence. The Minister for Justice, who
issued the order for Ratu Jope’s release, justified his actions by reference to Ratu Jope’s
medical condition, but refused to give any details. Ratu Jope then resigned from the office of
Vice-President immediately, raising suspicions that a deal had been made. On resignation,
he began to receive a public pension. The CCF challenged Ratu Jope’s release in the
courts. However, the case kept getting delayed, until finally, the case was abandoned
because in the course of delay, Ratu Jope had completed serving his sentence outside
prison (he served two-thirds of his sentence, one-third normally gets automatically deducted
for good behaviour).
•
Another of these co-accused was the then Deputy Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure. The court sentenced him to six years’
imprisonment for swearing an oath to be Speight’s Attorney-General. Despite a provision in
Fiji’s Constitution (Amendment) Act 199712 that causes members of Parliament to
automatically vacate office if they are serving a term of imprisonment of one year or more,
Ratu Rakuita continued to be paid a public salary until some time in 2005, when the Speaker
of the House finally declared his seat vacant due to failure to attend Parliamentary sittings.
•
A third co-accused tried and convicted along with Ratu Jope and Ratu Rakuita was Viliame
Savu, who had been sworn in as another of Speight’s Cabinet Ministers. Mr Savu received a
sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment, but was released in January 2005 to carry out
community work under an order of extramural punishment.
•
On 24 November 2004, Ratu Inoke Takiveikata, a Senator in the Upper House of Fiji’s
Parliament, was convicted of inciting and aiding in the mutiny at the Queen Elizabeth
Barracks in November 2000. The mutineers themselves were soldiers in the Counter
Revolutionary Warfare Unit, many of whom had also been implicated in the coup. Ratu
Inoke was sentenced to life imprisonment. The CCF’s information is that he purported to
12
Unless otherwise specified, all references in this submission to the Constitution, constitutional provisions, and so on, are
references to the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1997.
11
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
remain in office, and continued to receive a public salary, until October 2005, when the
President of the Senate declared his seat vacant. As with Ratu Rakuita, this was despite the
constitutional provision causing members of Parliament who are imprisoned for a year or
more to vacate office automatically.
•
Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu, the then Minister of Lands and Mineral Resources and a member
of the House of Representatives (MP), was convicted of unlawful assembly on 4 April 2005,
along with Ratu Josefa Dimuri, another Senator. Their offence was leading the takeover of
the Labasa army barracks during the coup. Both men were sentenced to eight months’
imprisonment, and both were released to extramural punishment after spending just 10 days
in prison. Ratu Naiqama resigned from Cabinet shortly after his conviction, but he and Ratu
Josefa retained their seats in Parliament. When the two completed their sentences in
September 2005, the Prime Minister appointed Ratu Naiqama as Minister for Transport and
Civil Aviation.
•
On 27 September 2005, a third Senator, Apisai Tora, was convicted with 11 others on
unlawful assembly for seizing a military checkpoint at Nadi during the coup. Mr Tora was
sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment, but released on November 18 under a
compulsory supervision order, purportedly for health reasons.
12
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Name
TABLE 2.1: Cases of preferential treatment of coup leaders
Offence
Position at
Term of
Retained
Early Release
Time of
Imprisonment
Salary after
Conviction
Conviction
Ratu Jope
Seniloli
Ratu Rakuita
Vakalalabure
illegal oath
Viliame Savu
illegal oath
Ratu Inoke
Takiveikata
inciting and
aiding
mutiny
unlawful
assembly
unlawful
assembly
unlawful
assembly
Ratu Naiqama
Lalabalavu
Ratu Josefa
Dimuri
Apisai Tora
illegal oath
VicePresident
MP and
Deputy
Speaker
Prisoner
4 years
Yes
6 years
Yes
12 months
N/A
Senator
Life
Yes
MP and
Minister
Senator
8 months
Yes
8 months
Yes
Senator
8 months
Yes
Yes
(after 3 months)
Still appealing
conviction
Yes
(after 5 months)
Still appealing
conviction
Yes
(after 10 days)
Yes
(after 10 days)
Yes
(after 2 months)
In order to prove incontrovertibly that the above cases involved racial discrimination, it would be
necessary to gather evidence of comparable cases where members of other ethnic groups were
treated less favourably. The CCF does not have the resources to perform that task. However,
we are not aware of any other case, either in Fiji or abroad, where a member of Parliament or
other high public office holder has retained the salary or other benefits of office after conviction
and imprisonment for an offence. The Government’s justification for this treatment, when it has
given any, has been that the prisoner in question was appealing against his conviction and was
therefore still entitled to the presumption of innocence. This is a basic error of law.
The anecdotal information available to us from prisoners and ex-prisoners in Fiji also suggests
that the Prisons Department tends to be slow in processing applications for early release, and
that it is usually only granted towards the end of the prison term. The CCF has been informed of
a number of cases where prisoners have been denied early release despite medical conditions
that were potentially life-threatening, and in one case of a prisoner who died in custody despite
having sought early release on health and compassionate grounds. The seven cases described
above exhibit a pattern that is in stark contrast to these anecdotes.
2.2 Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005
The Government introduced the Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005 (the
Bill) into Parliament on the fifth anniversary of the May 2000 coup. Copies of the Bill can be
downloaded from the website of the Parliament of Fiji.13 A summary of the main provisions of
the Bill is included as Appendix A to this submission. The complete Bill was referred to a
Parliamentary committee in June 2005 for public consultation after widespread protests from
civil society and legal bodies. CCF and many other organisations and individuals made
submissions. The committee reported back to the Lower House in Fiji’s Parliament in November
2005. The bill was quietly shelved in February 2006, in the lead-up to the May 2006 elections,
but the re-elected SDL government brought it back.
13
<www.parliament.gov.fj/parliament/legislative/bills.aspx?billID=247&viewtype=full&billnav=bill>.
13
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Essentially, the Bill proposed to establish for Fiji a commission modelled on the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with powers to grant compensation to victims and
amnesties to perpetrators of crimes committed in connection with the coup.
The introduction of the Bill provoked a public uproar. The army, the police, the Director of Public
Prosecutions, the Fiji Law Society, the Fiji Institute of Accountants, and many others (including
the CCF) all expressed their opposition to it. The focus of opponents’ discontent is the proposal
to grant amnesties to individuals who committed crimes in connection with the coup.
The Government argues that amnesties are necessary in order to put the coup behind us and
unite the country. It portrays amnesties as a form of State-sponsored forgiveness, and an
essential stage in the journey to national reconciliation. Opponents of the Bill argue that
amnesties are unconstitutional and will undermine the rule of law, including the independence
of the judiciary, police and prosecutors. They maintain that forgiveness is a personal matter for
the victims of crime, not the State, and that Fiji needs rigorous justice, and not selective
impunity, in order to discourage future coups.
For the purposes of the Convention, what the CCF believes is most relevant is that, in practice,
the crimes for which amnesties could be granted under the Bill would be only those committed
by indigenous Fijians in support of the coup. The proposed distribution of amnesties would
therefore be racially discriminatory. The fact is that the May 2000 coup in Fiji, unlike the
apartheid-era conflict in South Africa, was a profoundly one-sided affair. There are no known
cases where Indo-Fijian or other non-indigenous Fijian perpetrators committed politicallymotivated crimes in connection with the coup.14 The following passage from the CCF’s
submission to the Parliamentary committee that conducted public consultations on the Bill may
help to put this issue in context:15
“Much has been made by the Government of supposed parallels between its proposed
Reconciliation and Unity Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South
Africa. But the fact of the matter is that the social, historical, political and legal context of South
Africa in the early 1990s bears no comparison at all to the situation in which Fiji has found itself
since the 2000 coup.
South Africa was emerging from decades of white minority rule, when the indigenous African
majority was denied the vote. By contrast, Fiji has been a democracy for most of the 35 years
since it gained independence from the United Kingdom. Political parties and coalitions dominated
by indigenous Fijians have consistently governed throughout that time.
The apartheid era was characterised by gross inequality and widespread violence and civil
unrest. Human rights abuses were committed both by the government and opposition groups.
With the conspicuous exception of the coups in 1987 and 2000, Fiji has enjoyed relative calm
and peace in the post-independence era. The coups were led by disaffected indigenous Fijians.
The interim Constitution adopted by the South African Government in 1993 called for Parliament
to enact a law that would allow amnesties to be granted, and reparations provided, for crimes
14
In fact, the CCF is not aware of any politically-motivated, violent crime committed by a non-indigenous perpetrator in all of
Fiji’s post-independence history.
15
The entire submission, entitled “Submission to the Sector Standing Committee on Justice, Law and Order Regarding the
Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005” (June 2005), is available on the CCF’s website at
<http://www.ccf.org.fj/confrence.phpl>.
14
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
associated with political objectives that were committed under apartheid. Fiji’s current
Constitution was purportedly abrogated during the May 2000 coup. It certainly did not make any
provision for amnesties or reparations for crimes committed in connection with the coup.
What is it then that Fiji has in common with South Africa? Certainly, both countries have
problems associated with race relations. But beyond that superficial likeness, the nature and
extent of their problems differ widely. Their circumstances could hardly be more different.
The fact that South Africa’s 1993 Constitution specifically contemplated the granting of amnesties
indicates that this had been agreed between the National Party, led by then State President De
Klerk, and Mandela’s African National Congress – being the two major political parties of the day.
The Promotion of National Reconciliation and Unity Act 1995, which established the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, was passed by an overwhelming majority in the new South African
Parliament. It was the ANC Government, representing victims of apartheid, that introduced the
Act.
In Fiji, by contrast, the only political party that might have some claim to represent victims of the
May 2000 coup, the Fiji Labour Party, has boycotted Parliamentary debate on the present Bill
and its consideration by this Committee! The SDL and CAMV coalition cannot claim to represent
victims of the 2000 coup. It was the coup that brought them to power. It must be remembered
that the Fiji Labour Party would be in government today if it were not for the coup. In this sense,
members of the current Government were the main beneficiaries of the coup. In fact, they are
arguably the only people who benefited from it at all.
What does this mean for the comparison with South Africa? It means that there simply is
no comparison.” (emphasis in original)
The CCF believes that the Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005 is a
logical extension of the Government’s preferential treatment of convicted coup leaders to date.
If the Bill is passed (setting aside the possibility of a constitutional challenge), it will enable
these leaders to apply for amnesties and thereby become entitled to immediate release and
erasure of their convictions. More importantly, however, it would be likely to result in the
abandonment by police and prosecutors of all outstanding coup investigations and
prosecutions, because they would have no secure legal basis on which to proceed. In theory,
only those willing to make a full disclosure to the proposed Reconciliation and Unity
Commission could be granted amnesties. However, in practice, the prospect that suspects
might seek amnesties at any time would make investigations and prosecutions unworkable.
This means that backers of the coup who have not yet been convicted may never have to face
justice. The CCF understands this has been the experience of police and prosecutors in South
Africa.
2.3 STATE PARTY’S RATIONALE FOR RECONCILIATION, TOLERANCE AND UNITY BILL
(RTU Bill)
While 2.2 provides some in-depth information of court cases of the perpetrators of the 2000
coup, this section provides some insights into the State party’s rationale for the RTU Bill.
CERD: Concluding observations
15
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
One of the concluding observations of the CERD Report16 was that the Committee was deeply
concerned about the damage to race relations caused by the 1987 and 2000 coups d’etat in Fiji.
It was noted that the Committee encourages the State party to address perceptions that
continues to politicize culture, identity and ethnicity in order to maintain Fijian hegemony.
The State party was of the view that political events of 1987 and 2000 were occasioned by a
widespread belief among the indigenous Fijians that the 1970 and 1997 Constitution were
inadequate to protect and preserve their rights and interests, their values, traditions, customs,
way of life and economic wellbeing. Thus the RTU Bill was aimed at providing amnesty to a
number of convicted Government Ministers, their supporters and those yet to be charged for the
insurrection of May 2000. As a result, the Bill was a gross violation of the human rights of the
victims of the coup.
The State party had not provided any serious rationale for introducing the reconciliation,
tolerance and unity bill (RTU). Therefore any purported claims that it would improve race
relations are far from true. The title of the ‘Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill’ is in itself
misleading.
Like the Qoliqoli and the Native Lands Tribunal, RTU bill was racist in nature and was only
withdrawn with the 2006 coup. However for records, it is worth noting that if anything, the State
party had no intention of promoting a national identity with its land-related and RTU bills.
Reactions of the concerned organizations to the RTU Bill are reported below.
Sanjay Ramesh in the Pacific Islands Report has provided an excellent critique of the Bill. The
preamble of the Bill pre-empts the legal definition of political crimes. It states that the political
events of 1987 and 2000 were occasioned by a widespread belief among the indigenous Fijians
that 1970 and the 1997 constitutions were inadequate in protecting and preserving indigenous
rights. Such a definition pre-empts to a certain extent the legal definition of political crimes.
Thus the racial attacks on Indo-Fijians in rural areas of Dawasamu, Muaniweni, Korovou,
Tailevu and parts of Northern Vanua Levu could be described as political because the hostage
takers created a perception that the Chaudhry Government had ‘failed indigenous Fijians.’17
It was further explained that a serious problem with the RTU Bill was the definition of victim.
Victim was defined as a person who suffered harm as a result of a politically motivated crime.
But in the application for relief section of the Bill, reparation was only payable to victims when
amnesty was granted to a perpetrator. The State party was to use taxpayer’s money to fund
compensation and reparation under Section 20 of the Bill. This meant that the perpetrators of
politically motivated crime could easily shift the burden of compensation and reparation to the
state. This would in fact encourage politically motivated racial crimes in future.
Both the Fiji Labour Party and Fiji Military Forces expressed concern at the discretionary
powers vested in Reconciliation and Unity Commission which would have been appointed by
the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of Opposition. The problem with this
consultative process (given Fiji’s recent history) is that the State party could easily evade
16
Concluding observations of CERD-United Nations Report, 2003
17 O’Brien, M.2002. Recommendations to Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Politics and Human Rights Situation in the Fiji
Islands. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. New Delhi, India. http://www.thecommonwealth.org/dynamics/press_office
16
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
consultations with the Leader of Opposition as it did over the selection of the Multiparty cabinet.
The overall effect would have been that the Bill would further divide the diverse communities in
Fiji.
Additionally, it was noted that the politically appointed Unity Commission could define
restorative justice within the context of indigenous Fijian customary practices. This in effect
could undermine the promotion of reconciliation because the crimes even though politically
motivated (or inspired) were largely racial in nature and the victims were mostly Indo-Fijians. In
short, the procedural framework for setting up the Commission was thus unfair and did not take
into account the ethnic division and racial intolerance prevalent in Fiji.
The outgoing United States Ambassador to Fiji, David Lyons18, commented that the RTU Bill
aimed at providing amnesty to a number of convicted Government Ministers, their supporters
and those yet to be charged for the insurrection of May 2000. As a result, the Bill is a gross
violation of the human rights of the victims of the coup
Commandore Frank Bainimarama observed that the Reconciliation and Unity Bill (RTU) would
create further instability in the country. He observed that RFMF must stop the passing of the bill
or get rid of the government if the bill is passed. The Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) accused
Prime Minister Qarase (of the State party) and Attorney General Bale of playing the race card
deliberately for political reasons. RFMF believed that the chiefs had forgotten wise decisions
and had also forgotten the rest of the multi-racial society within which we live.19
The CCF also opposed the RTU Bill for three main reasons:
- That the State party (Qarase Government) was being highly irresponsible in stating that it was
okay to violently overthrow a democratically-elected (Chaudhry government) for an indigenous
nationalist cause.
- Further, CCF was against the amnesty proposal because it would undermine the rule of law.
It would undermine the hard work of Fiji’s police, prosecutors and courts over the past four
years in bringing the perpetrators of the coup to justice. It would damage the credibility of all
those institutions and weaken their independence in the future. Besides being anti-democratic,
the message of the amnesty proposal is also profoundly disrespectful of the rule of law. It
suggests that the law does not apply equally to everyone and that it is sometimes okay to break
the law. This is totally unacceptable and, again, highly irresponsible.
- CCF was also of the view that the Bill would not promote national reconciliation. In fact, it has
already become a cause of division and dissent. The secrecy surrounding how it was drafted
and the haste with which it was being rushed through Parliament contradicted the
Government’s claims that the Bill was an instrument of reconciliation. In addition, the Bill
misrepresented traditional Fijian practices of restorative justice, and was completely one-sided.
18 Ramesh, S, 2006 RECONCILIATION BILL AN INSULT TO VICTIMS OF FIJI COUP, Pacific Islands Development Program/East-West
Center, University of Hawaii, Honolulu
19 Ramesh, S, 2006 “Military versus Government in Fiji,” Pacific Media Watch
http://www.scoop.co.cz/stories/W00602/s00062.htm
17
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
It has nothing to offer the victims of the coup. It does not provide them with any incentive to
forgive. RTU bill does not require the perpetrators to express contrition or apologise.
Concluding Remarks
Healthy race relations are important for the good of all peoples in a multiracial country. In order
to promote unity it is important that laws and policies are non-discriminatory. The Reconciliation,
Tolerance and Unity Bill was designed to free and compensate the perpetrators of the 2000
coup and as such was unfair to the victims of the coup, most of whom were Indo-Fijians.
2.4 Conclusions on Preferential Treatment
Taken together, the preferential treatment of convicted coup leaders to date and the Bill
constitute a concerted effort by the Government to excuse the backers of the coup from the
ordinary legal consequences of their actions. This effort is racially discriminatory, in that its
benefits are overwhelmingly enjoyed by indigenous Fijians and not the members of other ethnic
groups. Of course, not all indigenous Fijians stand to benefit, but primarily a small group of
wealthy and well-connected elites.
It is important to bear in mind that Fiji’s Government from 2001 to 2006 was a coalition of former
members of the interim civilian government installed by the military after the coup in 2000, who
formed the Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party, and the indigenous supremacist
and pro-coup Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua (CAMV) party. Between them these two
parties won a majority of seats in the 2001 national elections. In fact, George Speight
successfully ran for election as a CAMV candidate while he was awaiting trial for treason. He
was only prevented from assuming his seat because the Prisons Department refused to release
him for the swearing-in ceremony. It should therefore be clear that the current SDL (2001-2006)
Government had very close ties to the coup leaders – and, as described above, several
Government members of Parliament, including Cabinet Ministers, had been convicted for their
involvement in the coup. Essentially, then, the Government’s effort to protect backers of the
coup was an effort to look after its own. The CCF believes this is corrupt and offensive to the
rule of law.
18
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
3.
FAILURE TO FORM A MULTI-PARTY CABINET IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE CONSTITUTION
The concluding observations adopted by the Committee at its sixty-second session included the
statement that:20
“The Committee is deeply concerned that section 99 of the 1997 Constitution, which ensures
power-sharing between ethnic communities through the creation of a multiparty Cabinet, is not
currently being implemented. The Committee welcomes, however, the assurances given by the
State party that it will comply with the Supreme Court ruling to be issued later this year on this
matter.”
Appendix B to this submission sets out the full text of section 99. Essentially, the section calls
for executive power to be shared between the governing political party or coalition and other
major parties in Parliament. This is achieved by requiring the Prime Minister to invite all parties
holding at least 10% of the total membership of the House of Representatives (8 or more seats,
if all 71 seats are occupied) to be represented in the Cabinet. The overall size of Cabinet is left
to the Prime Minister, but parties accepting the invitation to be represented must be offered
Cabinet seats in proportion to their numbers in the House. The Prime Minister may also invite
minor parties that do not fulfil the 10% requirement (such as a coalition partner) to be
represented in his or her Cabinet, but if this is done then the representatives of those parties
are deemed to be representatives of the Prime Minister’s party for the purpose of calculating the
number of Cabinet seats that must be offered to parties that fulfil the 10% requirement.
As the Committee noted in 2003, the purpose of section 99 is to give all major political parties
the opportunity to share executive authority. It is supposed to ensure that both indigenous and
Indo-Fijians are represented in Cabinet, and to encourage political cooperation between them.
However, section 99 did not lead to the formation of a multi-party Cabinet after the national
elections of 1999, and it has not done so in the term of the current Government. The underlying
reason for this is that political parties have been unwilling to compromise in negotiations over
the composition of Cabinet. In 1999, for example, the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT)
party held more than 10% of seats in the House of Representatives, but its purported
acceptance of Mahendra Chaudhry’s invitation to join his Cabinet was so laden down with
conditions that the Supreme Court of Fiji later characterised it as a “declining” of the offer.21
As described in the submission made by the NGO Coalition on Human Rights to the Committee
in 2002, there has been a succession of court cases concerning the interpretation and
application of section 99. The CCF believes that this reflects the preference of current political
leaders to litigate rather than negotiate.
Appendix C to this submission provides a time-line of litigation on the multi-party Cabinet issue
from 1999 to date. Essentially, from the time of his appointment as Prime Minister in 2001, up
until November 2004, Laisenia Qarase was in continuous breach of section 99:
20
CERD/C/62/CO/3 (2 June 2003), para 14.
President of the Republic of Fiji Islands v Kubuabola (Supreme Court of Fiji, Tuivaga P, Lord Cooke, Mason, Brennan and
Toohey JJ, 3 September 1999, Miscellaneous Case No. 1 of 1999), at p 22 of the joint judgment.
21
19
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
•
In September 2001, Mr Qarase advised the President to appoint a Cabinet that excluded the
Fiji Labour Party (the FLP), despite the fact that the FLP held more than 10% of seats in the
House of Representatives and had accepted Mr Qarase’s invitation to join his Cabinet.
•
In February 2002, the Court of Appeal ruled that Mr Qarase’s exclusion of the FLP from his
Cabinet placed him in breach of section 99.
•
In July 2003, the Supreme Court confirmed the Court of Appeal’s ruling.
•
Subsequent negotiations between Mr Qarase and the FLP broke down over the number of
Cabinet seats to which the FLP was entitled. In July 2004, the Supreme Court explained the
formula for determining how many Cabinet seats must be given to the FLP.
•
Negotiations then broke down over which FLP members Mr Qarase would invite into his
Cabinet, which portfolios they would be allocated and the overall size of the proposed
Cabinet. In November 2004, the FLP announced that it had rejected Mr Qarase’s latest offer
and would contest the next national elections from the opposition benches.
The CCF believes that Mr Qarase and the leader of the FLP, Mahendra Chaudhry, must share
the blame for the failure to form a multi-party Cabinet in the 2001 – April 2006 term of the SDL
government. Mr Qarase acted illegally and unreasonably in excluding the FLP from his Cabinet.
He took the view throughout that section 99 was unworkable. This exemplified his
Government’s overall lack of commitment to Fiji’s current Constitution.
Mr Chaudhry, for his part, has pursued the issue of a multi-party Cabinet tirelessly through the
courts, but when Cabinet seats were offered to the FLP in 2003 and 2004, he chose not to
accept them, on the ground that the offers were inadequate. Certainly, this ground of objection
was available. However, another option might have been to accept one of the offers, send FLP
members into Cabinet, and continue to negotiate and/or litigate over the numbers, the names
and the portfolios at the same time.
The CCF of course does not equate Mr Chaudhry’s conduct over the multi-party Cabinet issue
with that of Mr Qarase. The Government clearly bears the primary responsibility and blame.
However, we do not ignore the fact that the FLP chose to “grandstand” on the issue at critical
junctures rather than give a multi-party Cabinet a chance.
Given its troubled history, a growing number of commentators have been arguing that section
99 of the Constitution is a failure and should be amended. Some suggest that “forced” coalitions
cannot work, and that the composition of Cabinet is not an appropriate matter for decision by
the courts. This appears to reflect the Government’s position. However, the CCF believes it is
important to remember that the proposal to introduce multi-party Cabinet provided a critical
point of agreement in negotiations over the text of the 1997 Constitution during its passage
through Parliament. The CCF also believes that, despite weaknesses in its drafting, section 99
still holds out the hope of a new departure from the confrontational, racialised politics that has
characterised all of Fiji’s post-independence Parliaments. With only two brief exceptions in 1987
and 1999-2000, the Government benches have consistently been dominated by indigenous
Fijians, and the Opposition by Indo-Fijians. Changing this dynamic, by whatever means, is vital
to the country’s future peace and prosperity.
20
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Manifestation of Discrimination: Elections, May 2006
CERD: Concluding observations
There were no concluding observations of elements of racism in the general elections of May
2006. However section 18 of the CERD concluding observation expressed concern about the
under-representation of Indo-Fijians and other ethnic minorities in the police, the army and other
public services in general and recommends that special programmes be adopted to ensure
appropriate representation of all ethnic communities in these services.
The credibility (or the lack of it) of any democratic state is in the manner in which elections are
held. There are obviously many ways in which a State party could manipulate the electoral
process to win an election. With respect to Fiji’s last general elections (held in May 2006)
questions are now being raised whether the elections were free and fair. Similar questions were
raised during the 2001 general elections but there was no evidence to support the credibility of
that claim. However a point to note is that most supervisors at the polling booths were
indigenous Fijians. Additionally, the ballot boxes were transported and kept in the custody of
district officers, most of who were indigenous Fijians.22
2001 General elections and aftermath
The 2001 general elections were generally regarded as free and fair. The United Nations Fijian
Electoral Observation Mission (UNFEOM) felt that the election results reflected the will of the
people of Fiji. Some concerns however were expressed by civil society groups about the events
leading up to the elections. In particular, the selective voter education that was provided by the
State party favored the indigenous voters.23
The Commonwealth Observer Group, headed by Sir Henry Forde QC MP, reported however
that the general election had not been perfect in every respect, but the Group was of the view
that the election commanded the confidence of the people of Fiji. The Observer Group went
further to say that conditions ‘did exist for a free expression of will by the electors and that
generally the results of the elections reflected the wishes of the people.’24
While there was no evidence of fraud during the 2001 elections, ethnic and racial prejudice
began to surface in the formation of the cabinet. The State party refused to follow the
Constitution with respect to the formation of the Multiparty Cabinet. The leader of the State
party (Prime Minister: Lasenia Qarase) refused to follow Section 99(5) of the 1997 Constitution
which requires the Prime Minister to invite every political party that secures ten percent or more
seats in Parliament to join the cabinet. The aim of this provision is to ensure that all parties,
irrespective of ethnic background, work together for the common good of the country.
22
Concluding observations of CERD-United Nations Report, 2003
23 O’Brien, M.2002. Recommendations to Common Wealth Ministerial Action Group on the Politics and Human Rights Situation in the Fiji
Islands. Common wealth Human Rights Initiative. New Delhi, India. http://www.thecommonwealth.org/dynamics/press_office
24 29 30 O’Brien, M.2002. Recommendations to Common Wealth Ministerial Action Group on the Politics and Human Rights Situation in the
Fiji Islands. Common wealth Human Rights Initiative. New Delhi, India. http://www.thecommonwealth.org/dynamics/press_office
21
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
In the 2001 elections, the State party (SDL) won 31 seats in the 71-seat parliament while the Fiji
Labour Party (FLP) won 27 seats. As no party won a clear majority, the government had to be
formed by entering into a coalition with other parties. 25
However, on being sworn in as Prime Minister, the leader of the State party (Lasenia Qarase)
refused to allow Mahendra Chaudhry as leader of the Labour Party to join his cabinet. The
leader of State party was of the view that the Multiparty Cabinet provisions of the Constitution
were ‘unworkable.’ Chaudhry expressed his concerns saying that a government which does not
have a representative in the Cabinet from the second largest party in Parliament, was
consigning 44 percent of the population (namely the Indo-Fijian community) to permanent
opposition.
Qarase's failure to adhere to the 1997 Constitution resulted in Chaudhry commencing legal
proceedings seeking a declaration that the government had been formed illegally. The Fiji Court
of Appeal which heard the case declared (15 February 2002) that the cabinet of Prime Minister
Qarase had been formed illegally as it did not include representatives from the Fiji Labour Party
(FLP). In accordance with this court ruling, the State party was required to invite the FLP to join
his cabinet. The State party however continued to deny FLP parliamentarians a place in the
Cabinet until after the May 2006 elections. 26
These actions of the Prime Minister were of grave concern to human rights workers. Even
before the 2001 Parliament had sat, the leader of the State party was willing to disregard the
1997 Constitution and the rule of law when it did not suit their nationalist aspirations to further
consolidate and reinforce indigenous paramountcy. These actions of the State party in
reserving political power or positions to particular ethnic groups were considered a direct
violation of international law. 27
Failure to honour the power sharing provisions of the Constitution meant that the State party did
not meet its obligations under the Harare Declaration. There was also a feeling in some
quarters that because of the actions of the State party, Fiji should remain suspended from the
councils of the Commonwealth until a constitutionally appropriate government is formed. This,
however, did not take place.
2006 General elections (Refer to table1 for results)
It was reported that as Fiji headed towards elections in May 2006, the SDL absorbed the
nationalist CAMV and went to polls with an agenda to divide Indo-Fijians along religious lines. A
large number of SDL’s Indo-Fijian candidates were Muslims while FLP candidates were
predominantly Hindus. It was noted that such religion-based electioneering backfired when SDL
failed to win a single Indo-Fijian communal seat.
Some politicians have alleged that there have been irregularities in voter registrations prior to
the elections. United Peoples Party leader Mick Beddoes alleged in September 2005 that
25 O’Brien, M.2002. Recommendations to Common Wealth Ministerial Action Group on the Politics and Human Rights Situation in the Fiji
Islands. Common wealth Human Rights Initiative. New Delhi, India. http://www.thecommonwealth.org/dynamics/press_office
22
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
persons of multiracial ancestry were being encouraged by electoral officials to register on the
indigenous communal roll, rather than the General Electors roll. While the Constitution
empowers persons of multiple ethnic origins to decide for themselves which roll to choose,
Beddoes claimed that officials were providing prospective voters with registration forms only for
the indigenous and Indo-Fijian rolls, not the General Electors' one.
The Fiji Human Rights Commission (FHRC) was of the view, that the Elections Observer
Groups reports were unreliable, because they were based on limited assessment of the actual
voting process. The majority of the Observer Groups arrived shortly before elections and left
shortly after. FHRC noted that in future, if Fiji is to employ the services of Elections Observer
Groups, their methods of work should be reviewed as a matter of policy.
The 2006 General Election Audit Workshop held by CCF on Saturday 17th June 2006,
concluded, that observers simply do not have enough official information to make final
conclusions. There is no adequate information available on the disbursement of funds and
information on registered voters is not readily available to observers.28 A lot of inconsistency
was reported in the workshop, mainly cited as due to validity of votes being determined by
consensus in the Polling Team. There was a recognition of the high percentage of invalid votes
which could have affected the outcome of the votes. There was a lot of reports of voters
claiming they were registered on the wrong roll, or that they had registered but their names
were not on the roll – many of these complaints were anecdotal and many were official. There
were reports that the enumerators were mainly indigenous Fijians and therefore, this could have
contributed to the high number of wrongful registration of Indo-Fijian, part-European and other
ethnic group voters. However, there is no concrete evidence to prove that people were
deliberately not registered or wrongfully registered, in order to disenfranchise them or to deny
votes to a particular ethnic group. Although reports have claimed otherwise, CCF believes these
claims have yet to be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Concluding Remarks
While in the general election of 2001, there was no concrete evidence of fraud, the State party
(the Coalition Soqosoqo Duavata Lewenivanua (SDL) and the Conservative Alliance
Matanivanua (CAMV)) continued to deny Indo-Fijians their constitutional right to be represented
in the Cabinet. In the May 2006 general election [refer to appendix 3] out of the total 71 seats,
the State party won 36 seats while the Fiji Labor Party (FLP) won 31 seats with the remaining 4
seats shared between the Independents and the United Peoples Party (UPP). This time around,
the State party (after a series of court cases), was compelled to include other parties (with over
10% seats) in the Multiparty Cabinet lineup. Unfortunately, however, the Multiparty Cabinet
arrangement following the 2006 elections was disrupted with the December 5, 2006 coup d’etat.
Perhaps this time around the coup was a ‘blessing in disguise’ because the Qarase
Government may have used the Multiparty Cabinet to achieve two-thirds majority to pass its
three controversial racist bills: Qoliqoli, Indigenous Claims Tribunal and the Reconciliation,
Tolerance and Unity Bill (RTU). These bills would have further marginalized minority groups
especially the Indo-Fijians and Europeans. In the case of Fiji in particular, unless and until the
Constitution is revised and the communal voting is removed, political instability would continue.
28
CCF, 2006, Election Watch III – 2006 General Elections Audit Workshop.
23
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Manifestation of Discrimination: Hate Speeches
CERD: Concluding observations
The concluding observation of the CERD expressed concern that according to some
information, hate speech and assertions of the supremacy of indigenous Fijians regularly occur.
It recommends that the State party adopt all necessary measures to put an end to the
dissemination of doctrines of superiority based on ethnic origin, which are socially unjust and
dangerous, as well as in breach of the Convention.
Despite the foregoing, the Prime Minister indulged in hate speeches and also condoned some
members of his party, SDL, who made hate speech under Parliamentary Privilege, in the Lower
House Parliament. Closer to the 2006 elections, the main political leaders exchanged
accusations of "terrorism." Prime Minister Qarase called Opposition Leader Mahendra
Chaudhry a "terrorist" on 15 February 2006, for allegedly using his travels abroad to discredit
the Qarase government.29
Chaudhry reacted by saying that the Qarase government was full of terrorists. "There are
people in his Government, ministers, who have been convicted of offences relating to the May
2000 coup," he said. He claimed that Qarase had won the 2001 elections by vote-buying and by
hiding from the voters the role that many of his candidates had allegedly played in the 2000
coup. 30
In another incident the leader of the State party referred to Chaudhry as being ‘unstable and
unfit’ to lead the country. He also challenged Chaudhry to produce evidence of his allegations
that there were terrorists serving in his government.31
In spite of the fact that there was a multi-party government after the May 2006 elections, the Fiji
Labour Party on 14 June 2006, was reminded by SDL Parliamentarian Hon I. U. Matairavula,
that,
“I wish to advise the leader of the FLP and his Cabinet Members that in the next five years, they must base their policy decision
mainly at the SDL Manifesto and its values like:
(a) respect for the vanua, cultures and tradition of the indigenous Fijians and Rotumans; and
(b) recognition of the paramountcy of the indigenous and Rotuman interest as proclaimed in the Constitution.
…. I speak as one of the 23 Fijian communal representatives.”
In Parliament on Friday 16 June 2006, SDL MP Hon M. Bulanauca, commented that, “All these
mighty forces (political parties of other racial groups) wanted to destroy the SDL Party, they
wanted to destroy the Fijian interests and aspirations, but were to no avail, they failed miserably.”
PM Qarase, on 16 June 2006, finally admitted in Parliament that, “… because of the ethnic
composition of our society, that style of adversarial politics (parliamentary debate) in Fiji is
inevitably viewed in a racial context. It emphasises the ethnic differences, rivalries and tensions.”
Thus, because political parties were divided on racial lines, parliamentary debate tended to
deteriorate into instances of racist remarks and ethnic attacks.
29 23 24 Concluding observations of CERD-United Nations Report, 2003
24
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Fiji Human Rights Commission director Doctor Shaista Shameem noted that those engaging in
hate speech on blogspots cannot be protected by the freedom of expression provisions of the
Constitution. She said that while freedom of speech was protected by the Constitution, those
freedoms did not include freedom to express hate speech or damage the reputation, dignity,
privacy, or rights and freedoms of other individuals.32
Dr. Shameem observed that hate speech is increasingly, and disturbingly, being expressed in
the blogs. "The commission will not tolerate any hate speech and advises that those expressing
such speeches under the current cloak of anonymity on blogs should face the full brunt of the
law if they are identified," she said. She claimed that only about 10 per cent of messages on the
blogs contained accurate information. She noted that blogspots featured the personal
addresses and telephone numbers of individuals, creating concerns about the personal and
family security. The public should be aware that people disseminating blog messages which
undermined national security or safety could not seek refuge in freedom of expression or
speech because section 30 (2) of the Constitution placed limitations on such civil liberties in the
interests of public safety, security and rights and freedoms of others.33
The Fiji Human Rights Commission had advised senior military and police personnel, as well as
the interim Attorney-General about the constitutional and human rights guidelines to be followed
when investigating blog messages and those suspected of creating them. She said the
commission had also observed the violation of the right to privacy on these blogspots.34
The Citizens’ Constitutional Forum also expressed disappointment and concern over racist
public statements made by members of the State party just prior to the 2006 elections. CCF
was concerned too about the manner in which the police treated dangerous racist remarks in
some instances while Qarase was in power.
32 Shameem, S. 2007. The Assumption of Executive Authority on December 5th 2006 by Commodore J.V. Bainimarama, Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces:
Legal, Constitutional and Human Rights Issues. Fiji Human Rights Commission. Suva, Fiji.
33 Shameem, S. 2007. The Assumption of Executive Authority on December 5th 2006 by Commodore J.V. Bainimarama, Commander of the
Republic of Fiji Military Forces: Legal, Constitutional and Human Rights Issues. Fiji Human Rights Commission. Suva, Fiji.
34 Hate Speech Authors Liable: Shameem. May 19, 2007. http://www.fijitimes.cm/stroy.aspx?id=62896
25
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Table 3.1: Summary of the 6-13 May 2006 Fiji House of Representatives election results
Parties
Votes
Total
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL)
%
Seats +/-
767,695
100.0 71
342,352 44.59 36 +2
Fiji Labour Party (FLP)
300,797
39.18
31
+4
National Federation Party (NFP)
47,615
6.20
0
-1
National Alliance Party of Fiji (NAPF)
22,504
2.93
0
United Peoples Party (UPP)
6,474
0.84
2
Party of National Unity (PANU)
6,226
0.81
0
Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party (NVTLP)
3,657
0.48
0
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT)
238
0.03
0
National Democratic Party (NDP)
123
0.02
0
Party of Truth (POTT)
51
0.01
0
Social Liberal Multicultural Party (SLM)
49
0.01
0
Coalition of Independent Nationals (COIN)
20
0.00
0
Justice and Freedom Party (JFP)
18
0.00
0
Independents
37,571
4.89
2
Didn't contest
0
New Labour Unity Party
26
+1
-2
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
An analysis of racism and political instability in Fiji: A summary
Political instability in Fiji since 1987 has been very closely linked to racism. It seems that when
a dominant Indo Fijian party forms a government, the indigenous Fijians become insecure and
begin to destabilize the country. The symptoms of Indigenous insecurity takes the form of
marches through the streets of the capital Suva, hate speeches, acts of sacrilege, burning and
the looting of Indo-Fijian shops and homes by indigenous Fijian youths. The unfolding drama
culminates in the storming of the Fiji Parliament and taking the Government hostage at the point
of the gun. The 2000 coup however was also accompanied with non renewal of leases to IndoFijians by the indigenous landowners.
The coup d’etat on December 5, 2006 was different from the coups of 1987 and 2000. This
coup was undertaken by the predominantly Fijian Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) to overthrow
a Government that was predominantly backed by indigenous Fijians. Commodore
Bainimarama, the head of the RFMF in his pronouncements was against the racist policies of
the State party of Prime Minister Lasenia Qarase. Since the beginning of 2007, the Interim
Government conducted its business through a Multiracial Cabinet with the Commodore
Bainimarama as Acting Prime Minister.
Under pressure from governments in New Zealand, Australia and the United States, the Interim
Government has promised to hold general elections by March 2009.
Note
State party in Fiji has been alternating in its composition: democratic government, military rule
and interim government. Following the violent overthrow of the democratic government in 2000,
the army restored law and order and put in place and interim government under Lasenia
Qarase. Elections were held in 2001 and the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party
formed a Coalition Government with Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua (CAMV) with
Qarase as the Prime Minister. In year 2006, elections were held again and SDL formed a
Coalition Government with the Fiji Labour Party (FLP). But this State party lasted for less than
seven months. With a coup on 5 December 2006, there was military rule until January 2007. On
January 5 2007, an interim government was formed with Commodore Bainimarama sworn in as
the Interim Prime Minister. Thus the current State party is very much under the influence of the
Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF). There are plans however to have fresh elections in March
2009 and return Fiji to parliamentary democracy.
27
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
4.
RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
4.1 Introduction
The concluding observations adopted by the Committee at its sixty-second session include the
following statements:35
“The Committee strongly urges the State party to ensure that affirmative action measures it
adopts to pursue the above objectives [of ensuring the social and economic development as well
as the right to cultural identity of the indigenous Fijian community] are necessary in a democratic
society, respect the principle of fairness, and are grounded in a realistic appraisal of the situation
of indigenous Fijians as well as other communities. The Committee further recommends that the
State party guarantee that the special measures adopted to ensure the adequate development
and protection of certain ethnic groups and their members in no case lead to the maintenance of
unequal or separate rights for different ethnic groups after the objectives for which they were
taken have been achieved (article 1, paragraph 4, and article 2, paragraph 2, of the
Convention).”
The fundamental problems that the CCF sees in the affirmative action programs operated by
the current Government are:
•
They are based on race rather than need. With far too few of the programs requiring a
means test for eligibility, they do not target those who are genuinely disadvantaged.
•
The majority of programs and the bulk of funds are targeted at one ethnic group alone –
indigenous Fijians. This offends the principle of fairness.
•
They are not informed by adequate research and analysis.
•
They are not monitored and regularly evaluated for effectiveness and efficiency. This
creates opportunities for abuse.
The existence and perpetuation of these problems leads many to doubt the commitment of the
current Government to genuine affirmative action. There is a suspicion that current programs
are really only intended to maintain the political support of elements within the indigenous Fijian
community.
Review of Social Justice Act
The affirmative action programs have been conceived within the context of the Social Justice
Act. In this section, racist elements of both the Social Justice Act and the affirmative action
programs are reviewed.
CERD: Concluding observations
Item # 16 of the CERD report reads:
35
CERD/C/62/CO/3 (2 June 2003), para 15.
28
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
‘The Committee notes that despite reports that levels of poverty among all Fiji nationals,
including Indo-Fijians and Banabans, have worsened over the years, the State party’s
affirmative action programmes, as adopted under the Social Justice Act of 2001 and the 50/50
by year 2020 Plan, mainly target indigenous Fijians and Rotumans. The Committee strongly
recommends that the State party ensure that its poverty alleviation programmes benefit all poor
Fiji citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin, to avoid undue stress on already strained ethnic
relations. It also recommends that the adoption of any affirmative action programme be
preceded by consultations involving all ethnic communities.’
The Social Justice Act of 2001 has 29 programs of affirmative action in four areas: (a) education
and training (b) land and housing (c) participation in commerce (d) participation in all levels and
branches of the State. Social justice and affirmative action (SJAA) was revised in 2002 and
made into a 20-year development plan (2001-2020) for the ‘enhancement of the Indigenous
Fijians and Rotumans’. In its current form, it focuses on eight broad priorities: education, human
resource development and utilization, commerce and finance, public enterprises, health,
resource based industries, tourism and rural development.36
The State party’s (Qarase Government) principal justification for its affirmative action programs
is that the rural sector is poorer than the urban sector. Thus it is argued that as majority of
indigenous Fijians live in rural areas, this group needs most help. This argument however is
seriously flawed because some of the poorest households in rural areas are those of IndoFijians. The State party continues to defend its affirmative action plans on the grounds that the
average income of indigenous Fijians and Rotumans is below that of Indo-Fijians and other
minority communities. The leader of the State party justified in his Forward in the 50/50 by 2020
Development Plan as follows:
“The 1996 Census showed that 54% of Fiji’s total population are rural-based and
the majority of these are [indigenous] Fijians. The 1997 United Nations Poverty
Report revealed that households with the lowest income were those in rural areas
and the outer islands. Again the majority of these were Fijians. Fijians continue to
lag behind other communities in education, in business and in the professions.”
However, in the absence performance indicators, the effectiveness of the Social justice and
affirmative action (SJAA) programs cannot be monitored. There is also no data that relates to
alleged disparities between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians.
One major problem with the Social Justice Act 2001 and its amended form is that many of the
programs are tailored on the basis of race and not on the needs of all Fiji citizens. As such it
does not comply with the 1997 Constitution of Fiji, section 38(2) and fails to fulfill the
requirements of section 21 of the Human Rights Commission Act.37 The programs amount to
unfair discrimination against Indo-Fijians. Additionally the ‘special measures’ requirements
contained in International Human Rights Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) are violated.
36 Concluding observations of CERD-United Nations Report, 2003
37 Fiji Human Right Commission, 2006. Report on Governments Affirmative Action Programmes, 2020 Plan For Indigenous Fijians and
Rotumans
29
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
CCF believes that Social justice and affirmative action (SJAA) is ill conceived. With emphasis
on assisting indigenous Fijians and Rotumans through its 2020 Development Plan, the State
party discriminates against all other minority communities especially the Indo-Fijians. The main
reasoning behind the programs is that the majority of indigenous Fijians reside in the rural
sector where there are lower income levels and standards of living. Thus the State party
considers the indigenous communities as being the most disadvantaged. This argument lacks
both substance and logic.
Additionally, the CCF believes Social justice and affirmative action (SJAA) policies and
programs are based on outdated ten year old statistics. Some of the poorest people in the rural
Fiji are Indo-Fijians but they have been systematically excluded from the 50/50 Development
Plan. Many in this group are landless and without any gainful employment. A more recent
report (the 2002-2003 Household Income and Expenditure Survey) shows that both the
indigenous Fijians as well as the Indo-Fijians are victims of rural poverty.
In view of the foregoing, CCF further believes that the evolving Social justice and affirmative
action (SJAA) policies and programs would undermine race relations and is not in the long-term
interest of all Fiji citizens. Efforts to create a united Fiji with discriminatory affirmative action
policies will not work as it would not contribute to national unity. Additionally, in its present form,
Social justice and affirmative action (SJAA) policies and programs would be in conflict with
ICERD’s Bill of Rights.
4.2 Background to Affirmative Action in Fiji
Various affirmative action programs have been in place in Fiji since independence in 1970.
They have been overwhelmingly for the benefit of indigenous Fijians, and their main intention
has been to “bridge the gap” with other ethnic groups (especially Indo-Fijians) in education,
commerce and the professions. However, there is no national consensus that indigenous
Fijians as a group are disadvantaged in comparison to others, or that it is only indigenous
Fijians who need affirmative action.
The emphasis on ethnically-based affirmative action in Fiji has its origins in the colonial period,
when the government endorsed racial segregation of the population in employment, education,
housing and politics.38 Such segregation served a number of purposes, including the protection
of British privilege and economic interests, and the preservation of traditional indigenous
lifestyles.
The legacy of racial segregation is still being felt today – largely in negative ways. According to
Fiji academic, Steven Ratuva, the desire to protect and enhance indigenous Fijian rights and
interests has been expressed, both before and after independence, in two contradictory
positions. The first was that indigenous Fijians should be separately governed through the neotraditional institutions of the “Fijian Administration” established during the colonial period, which
sought to preserve indigenous lifestyles, and mediated indigenous Fijian participation in
38
The ethnic division of labour is perhaps the most well-known instance of colonial segregation. One example of social
segregation was the European Reservations Ordinance of 1912, which prohibited non-Europeans from entering residential
districts for Europeans. Non-Europeans were also prevented from attending certain government schools. Political segregation
became institutionalised through ethnically based representation in the Legislative Council. For more on this see White, C,
(2001) “Affirmative Action and Education in Fiji: Legitimation, Contestation and Colonial Discourse”, Harvard Educational
Review, Vol. 71 No. 2, Summer.
30
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
mainstream commerce. The second position was to encourage indigenous Fijians to become
more economically active.39
The maintenance of the Fijian Administration and other colonial legislation and institutions since
1970 has effectively continued a policy of “divide and rule”, and led to the strengthening and
legitimation of a “state-chiefly class alliance”.40 The result has been that indigenous Fijians exist
within an ethnically-defined, restricted political space.41
The Social Justice Act 2001 was passed by Fiji’s Parliament on 21 December 2001 to
implement section 44 of the Constitution, which instructs the Parliament to provide affirmative
action programs “for all groups or categories of persons who are disadvantaged”. Such
programs must be designed to achieve “effective equality of access” to:42
• education and training;
• land and housing; and
• participation in commerce, the public service, the police and the military.
They must be monitored for effectiveness by the “administering department or other agency”
and the responsible Minister is required to report annually to Parliament on the results of such
monitoring.43 Programs that fulfill the requirements of section 44 may discriminate against
individuals or groups in what would otherwise be a contravention of section 38 of the
Constitution (the guarantee of equality before the law and freedom from unfair discrimination).44
4.3 Overview of Current Programs
According to the Government’s first progress report on affirmative action programs under the
Social Justice Act 2001, covering the years 2002 and 2003, the main intention of current
programs is to provide equality of access to opportunities to indigenous Fijians and Rotumans
(the ethnically-distinct indigenous people of the island of Rotuma), because “there are
especially wide disparities generally between Fijians and Rotumans and those from other ethnic
communities.”45 This and similar assertions are justified by reference to the findings of a 1997
UNDP Fiji Poverty Report and the 1996 national census.
The report goes on to argue that the disadvantage of the indigenous Fijian population, relative
to other ethnic groups, requires urgent attention because this disadvantage has contributed to
past “political and economic instability” in Fiji.46 The Government’s second progress report on
affirmative action, for 2004, makes this argument more explicit, by stating that indigenous Fijian
39
Ratuva, S, (2000) “Addressing Inequality” in Haroon Akram-Lodi, A, (ed) Confronting Fiji Futures, Asia Pacific Press,
Canberra, p 229.
40
Since independence, and especially since 1987, a small elite class of indigenous Fijians, including both chiefs and
commoners with close links to the State, has grown increasingly affluent and influential in national affairs.
41
Ratuva (2000), p 229.
42
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1997 s 44(1).
43
Id, s 44(6).
44
Id, s 44(4).
45
Prime Minister’s Office, (2004) For the Good of All: A Progress on the implementation of Affirmative Action Programmes
under the Social Justice Act: 2002-2003, Parliamentary Paper No. 66, Parliament of Fiji, Suva, p.2.
46
Ibid.
31
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
disadvantage was “one of the root causes of the social and political upheaval[s] of 1987 and
2000”.47
The CCF does not accept either that all, or even most, indigenous Fijians are disadvantaged in
comparison to the wider population, or that perceived indigenous Fijian disadvantage was a
cause of the coups.
Of the 29 programs currently in place under the Social Justice Act 2001, 17 are said to be for
the benefit of all ethnic groups, 10 are exclusively for indigenous Fijians and Rotumans, and two
are for groups other than indigenous Fijians and Rotumans. It is not clear to what extent each of
the 17 “open” programs really benefits all ethnic groups. Several of these programs have more
generous eligibility criteria for indigenous Fijians than for members of other ethnic groups, for
example:
The 10 programs exclusively for indigenous Fijians and Rotumans reportedly received $18.97
million (Fiji dollars) in 2003 out of a total budgetary allocation for affirmative action of $58.34
million.48 In 2004, the exclusively indigenous programs received $23.92 million out of a total
allocation of $60.23 million.49
The 2004 progress report also provides a budgetary breakdown of the programs according to
their coverage of the sectors identified in section 44 of the Constitution:
TABLE 4.1: Distribution and Budgetary Allocation of Affirmative Action Programs under the Social
Justice Act 2001
No. of programs
2002 $m
2003 $m
2004 $m
Education and
13
19.479
19.504
19.485
Training
(33.42%)
(33.43%)
(30.81%)
Land and Housing
6
12.490
13.50
13.50
(21.43%)
(23.14%)
(21.35%)
Participation in
7
12.842
10.589
15.487
Commerce and the
(22.03%)
(18.15%)
(24.49%)
State Services
Others: Poverty
3
13.499
14.750
14.761
Alleviation
(23.16%)
(25.28%)
(23.34%)
TOTAL
29
58.27
57.34
60.23
SOURCE: 2004 Report on the Implementation of Affirmative Action Programs under the Social Justice
Act, page 5
4.4 Analysis
Following is an example of why the CCF is concerned that current affirmative action programs
are based on race and not need. Table 4.2, below, was used in the Government’s 2002-2003
progress report to justify affirmative action programs exclusively for indigenous Fijians.
47
Prime Minister’s Office, (2005) 2004 Report on the Implementation of Affirmative Action Programmes under the Social Justice
Act, Parliamentary Paper No. 108 of 2005, Parliament of Fiji, Suva, p 4.
48
See Prime Minister’s Office (2004), p 6.
49
Prime Minister’s Office (2005), Appendix A, p 91.
32
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
TABLE 4.2: Average Weekly Income By Ethnicity, 1990-91
Average Household
Average Per Capita
Income
Income
National
$199.31
$44.68
Indigenous Fijian
$173.65
$33.74
Indo-Fijian
$217.89
$49.50
Others
$271.08
$66.77
SOURCE: 1997 UNDP Fiji Poverty Report
This Table shows that the average weekly household income for indigenous Fijians in 1990-91
was approximately 20% lower than that for Indo-Fijians, 36% lower than that for other ethnic
groups and 12.9% lower than the national average. According to the Government, this means
that indigenous Fijians are disadvantaged.
However, Table 4.2 tells us nothing about the extent of differences in income within ethnic
groups, and therefore does not give a true indication of the earning capacity of individuals. The
truth is that the averages shown in the Table conceal huge differences in the income earned by
individuals in the highest and lowest income brackets within each ethnic group.
A summary of the 1997 UNDP report in fact presents the same data on which Table 4.2 was
based in the very different manner shown below.50
TABLE 4.3: Average Weekly Household Income by Income Group and Ethnicity, 1990-91
Average Household Income
Average per Capita Income
Income Group
Indo-Fijian
Indigenous
Indo-Fijian
Indigenous
Fijian
Fijian
1 (lowest)
32.40
38.10
7.10
8.10
2
60.80
67.60
13.60
13.80
3
81.60
89.50
17.80
17.50
4
101.50
107.90
22.10
21.50
5
124.20
126.70
27.30
25.60
6
152.50
147.80
32.80
30.40
7
186.70
175.30
40.30
36.20
8
240.60
217.60
52.50
44.40
9
327.90
288.50
74.80
60.20
10 (highest)
914.40
537.10
227.60
131.00
SOURCE: Fiji Poverty Report: A Summary (1997)
By contrast to Table 4.2, Table 4.3 reveals that the poorest 10% of Indo-Fijian households were
poorer, on average, than the poorest 10% of indigenous Fijian households. In fact, Indo-Fijian
households in all of the lower five income groups (that is the poorest 50%) were poorer, on
average, than the corresponding Indigenous Fijian households. It was only the richest 10% of
50
United Nations Development Programme and the Government of Fiji (1997), Fiji Poverty Report: A Summary, UNDP and
Government of Fiji, p 5.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Indo-Fijian households that earned significantly more, on average, than the corresponding
income group of indigenous Fijians.
Another Table presented in the summary of the 1997 UNDP report shows the number of
households living below the poverty line by area and ethnicity:
TABLE 4.4: Poverty by Area and Ethnicity, 1990-91
Basic needs
Approx. number of
% of household
Poverty Line
households under
under poverty line
(minimum gross
poverty line
weekly income)
Urban
$100
12,780
24
Rural Settlement
$84
10,960
28
Rural Village
$75
9,950
22
Indigenous Fijian
$93
17,760
28
Indo-Fijian
$97
22,150
33
Other
$93
1,370
26
National
$83
34,600
25
SOURCE: Fiji Poverty Report: A Summary (1997)
Table 4.4, above, shows that there were more Indo-Fijian households living in poverty in 199091 than indigenous Fijian households, both in terms of numbers (22,150 Indo-Fijian households
compared to 17,760 indigenous Fijian households) and as a proportion of the population of
each ethnic group (33% compared to 28%).
The major conclusion of the 1997 UNDP Fiji Poverty Report was that poverty was evident in all
ethnic groups and income inequality was more noteworthy within each ethnic group than
between ethnic groups. This could hardly be a more different conclusion from the one drawn by
the Government in its 2002-2003 progress report on affirmative action!
The CCF does not believe that the kind of statistical analysis exemplified by Table 4.2 is
adequate to justify affirmative action programs such as those currently in place in Fiji, under
either national or international law. Such analysis is not only simplistic and misleading – in that it
suggests inequalities between ethnic groups only by concealing the far more pronounced
inequalities that exist within ethnic groups –it is also too generalised and imprecise to justify any
particular program of affirmative action. Each program, in the CCF’s view, should be referable
to a credible body of research and analysis identifying the specific inequality that the program is
designed to reduce or remove.
It is also important to note that the data used in the 1997 UNDP Fiji Poverty Report was
sourced from a household income and expenditure survey conducted by the Fiji Bureau of
Statistics in 1990-91. This means that affirmative action programs in place in Fiji in 2006 are
purportedly justified by reference to statistical information that is 15 years old. The Fiji Bureau of
Statistics conducted another household income and expenditure survey in 2001-02, but the
results have yet to be published in full.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Compounding the fundamental problem of inadequate research and analysis, is a continuing
failure on the part of the Government to ensure that affirmative action programs are monitored
and regularly evaluated for effectiveness and efficiency. The two progress reports, for 20022003 and 2004 respectively, are clearly intended to meet the requirement of section 44 of the
Constitution for annual reports on such programs. However, such annual reports are supposed
to include the results of monitoring by the administering agency of the “efficacy” of each
program, measured against the “performance indicators for judging the efficacy of the program
in achieving [its] goals”.51
For almost all of the 27 current programs, the two progress reports identify inputs to the
program – including budgetary allocation, funds spent and activities carried out by the
administering agency – but have little or nothing to say about outputs – in the sense of
measurable improvements in the performance of program beneficiaries against relevant
indicators. In the majority of cases, this appears to be because the performance indicators are
immeasurable or otherwise flawed, or because the administering agency has not monitored the
program for efficacy. Often, performance indicators appear to be flawed because the program in
question does not sufficiently identify the intended beneficiaries or the nature and extent of their
disadvantage.
The two progress reports also fail to candidly evaluate the efficiency of implementation of the
affirmative action programs. Recent reports of Fiji’s Auditor-General have identified significant
maladministration and corruption in the administration of some programs. One example of this,
involving alleged misuse of more than $1 million (Fiji dollars) allocated to the Ministry of
Education for its Centres of Excellence program, is described in more detailed in Chapter 6 of
this submission. However, the Government’s progress reports make no mention of this or other
problems.
As a result of these problems of program design and implementation, the Government’s 20022003 and 2004 progress reports do not comply with section 44 of the Constitution, in the CCF’s
view, and there is really no way of knowing whether current affirmative action programs are
making any progress towards reducing inequality.
51
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1997 s 44(2)(c) and (6).
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
4.5 Comments on Selected Programs
Program 1: Fiji Development Bank - Small Business Equity Scheme
The Government’s 2004 progress report states that, of the $2 million allocated for the Small
Business Equity Scheme in 2004, $1.5 million was for indigenous Fijians and Rotumans and
$0.5 million was for other ethnic groups. The report briefly summarises how loans were
intended to be used, but is silent as to whether loan moneys were in fact used as intended and
whether loan recipients were able to service their debts.
Program 2: Ministry of Education – Enhancement of Indigenous Fijian and Rotuman
Education
See Chapter 6 of this submission.
Program 7: Ministry of Commerce, Business Development and Investment – Increase
Indigenous Fijian and Rotuman Participation in Business
This program reserves at least 50% of government contracts, licenses and permits for
businesses owned by indigenous Fijians and Rotumans. There does not seem to be any
monitoring of whether or how these businesses perform their government contracts or what use
they make of licenses and permits issued to them.
Program 9: Public Service Commission – Renting of Indigenous Fijian- and RotumanOwned Premises by Government
Under this program, the Government rents premises owned by Provincial and Tikina (District)
Councils within the Fijian Administration. It is hard to see how this can be regarded as an
affirmative action program when any benefit to disadvantaged indigenous Fijians is entirely
dependent on decisions of the beneficiary councils as to how rent moneys are to be spent.
Program 10: Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources – Loan Grant to Purchase
Ancestral Land Alienated to Freehold
This program assists indigenous Fijian landowning units (mataqali) to buy back freehold land
that once belonged to them, by providing interest-free loans. One criterion for eligibility for
assistance is that the landowning unit must not have sufficient land available for itself. The
progress reports do not indicate how this criterion is applied.
Given that indigenous Fijians own approximately 90% of all land in Fiji under a system of
collective, non-transferable native title, it is highly questionable whether indigenous landowning
units that need more land should receive Government assistance to purchase land from the
remaining 10% that is available to all ethnic groups. The CCF is especially concerned that
similar assistance is not offered to displaced Indo-Fijian cane farmers or landless individuals
from other ethnic groups. Where are the interest-free loans for Fiji’s ballooning squatter
population?
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
It is also disturbing to note that loan recovery under this program is described as
“unsatisfactory”.52
Program 13: Ministry of Multi-Ethnic Affairs – Scholarships
This program provides tertiary scholarships for students from the Indo-Fijian and other minority
communities whose parents combined annual income is less than $10,000. Quotas are
reserved for the very poor and students from the smaller minority communities. The program
may well be justified in itself. The point to note is that the corresponding scholarship program for
indigenous Fijians and Rotumans does not include any income limit or other means test. There
is no reason why students from more wealthy indigenous Fijian and Rotuman families should be
eligible for a scholarship when families with similar incomes from other ethnic groups are not.
Program 15: Ministry of Regional Development – Self Help Projects in relation to Housing
and Other Business Projects
The main objective of this program is to provide access to housing and to encourage incomegenerating projects. The target groups are “Fijians residing in villages and citizens residing in
other community settlements”.53 It is not clear who is meant by “citizens residing in other
community settlements” and neither of the two progress reports to date gives any indication of
how much or what proportion of assistance granted under the program goes to groups other
than indigenous Fijians.
Program 22: Ministry of Tourism – Participation in the Tourism Industry to Ensure
Effective Equality in Access to Commerce
This program aims to increase indigenous Fijian participation in the tourism industry through
commercial operations, employment and share ownership. The difficulty that the CCF sees with
the program is a lack of evidence that indigenous Fijians are disadvantaged in comparison to
other ethnic groups with respect to the tourism industry. Anecdotal evidence in fact suggests
indigenous Fijians are employed in the tourism industry in greater numbers than others.
52 Prime Minister’s Office (2005), p 38.
53 Id, p 48.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
4.6 Conclusions on Affirmative Action
While there are well-known difficulties with data collection right across the Pacific islands, this
cannot be an excuse for affirmative action programs that are largely based on suspicions and
prejudices concerning ethnicity. In the CCF’s view, the current (2001-2006) Government of Fiji
has not made enough effort to inform its programs with research and analysis that identifies
genuine needs.
We believe this failure reflects an underlying confusion between two distinct policy objectives:
• the protection and enhancement of traditional indigenous Fijian rights and interests; and
• the provision of special State assistance to disadvantaged groups.
For many indigenous Fijians, this confusion appears to arise out of a sense that it is they who
have been most hardly done-by in Fiji’s history. Many Indo-Fijians feel the same about
themselves. These parallel and competing feelings of “victim-hood” are another legacy of the
colonial policy of divide and rule. These feelings make it difficult for members of the two largest
ethnic groups to agree who is disadvantaged, whose needs are the greatest and what factors
are relevant in deciding these questions.
The whole structure of Fiji’s Constitution reflects this difficulty in balancing equal rights for all
with the protection of indigenous Fijian culture. Segregation and separate rights are maintained
through:
• the Fijian administration (a system of local, district, provincial and national institutions
exclusively for the governance of indigenous Fijians);
• communal voting in national elections (46 of the 71 seats in Fiji’s House of Representatives
are reserved for members elected by voters of their own ethnicity, on separate electoral
rolls);
• the reservation of 14 out of 32 Senate seats for nominees of the Great Council of Chiefs
(Bose Levu Vakaturaga);
• appointment of the President and Vice-President by the Great Council of Chiefs (the chiefs
have a policy of only appointing chiefs to these offices); and
• last but by no means least, the entrenchment of a system of collective, non-transferable
indigenous Fijian land ownership, applying to approximately 90% of all land in Fiji.
Clearly, these institutions do not sit easily with Fiji’s obligations under the Convention, and this
is why Fiji has always maintained extensive reservations to the Convention. The CCF, for its
part, takes the view that several of these institutions, and the compromise they embody
between equality and the protection of indigenous culture, are still relevant, appropriate and
necessary in Fiji today. However, it is not difficult to see how this compromise confuses the
issue of affirmative action.
The CCF believes that Fiji must move slowly and steadily towards greater equality in rights for
all. Perceptions that there are two tiers of citizenship in the country are damaging and need to
be minimised. Affirmative action can help in this regard, but at present it is making matters
worse.
The only defensible approach is for all affirmative action programs in Fiji to be justified by
reference to specific, expert research and analysis, the results of which are open to public
scrutiny and verification, to be limited to the achievement of specific objectives within a specific
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
period of time, and to be closely monitored for effectiveness and efficiency. This is the only way
that the programs can gain greater popular acceptance and legitimacy – or of course comply
with the Convention.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
5.
UNRESOLVED LAND ISSUES AND THE GROWTH OF SQUATTER
SETTLEMENTS
5.1 Unsolved Land Issues: Executive Summary Draft
Race has been a critical factor in the Government policy on land ownership and land use in Fiji.
The colonial government since its formation in 1874 had ensured that land remains in
indigenous ownership. As a result, over 90 per cent of all lands in Fiji are owned communally by
the indigenous people. Additionally, to protect the indigenous culture and traditions, the Colonial
Government restricted the use of the indigenes on European-owned plantations. The ensuing
labour shortage on sugar cane and coconut plantations was resolved with the introduction of
indentured labourers (girmityas) from India. As a result, most Indo-Fijian farmers (descendents
of girmityas) remain tenants of indigenous landowners.
The tenancy agreements between the Indo Fijians and the indigenous landowners are brokered
by the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB), an institution created by the Colonial Government in
1940. Some twenty years later (1966), security of tenure was provided under the Agricultural
Landlord and Tenants Act (ALTA). Under ALTA, thirty year leases were granted to Indo-Fijians
on indigenous owned land. Most of these leases are now expiring with thousands of IndoFijians facing evictions as a consequence of non-renewals. The State party under an
indigenous Prime Minister (Lasenia Qarase) had been preoccupied through Talanoa
(discussion) sessions in dealing with increases in land rents rather than finding solutions to land
lease problems.
Additionally, the State party (Qarase Government) was embarking on new land bills that would
have had negative effects on non-indigenous people who were landless. These were the so
called qoliqoli and indigenous tribunal bills. These bills would have placed greater restrictions
on non-indigenous people (mainly Indo-Fijians, Europeans, Melanesians, Rabi, Chinese, and
other minority ethnic groups) over the ownership and the use of lands and sea resources in Fiji.
Fortunately, there was a lot of opposition to these bills including from the Royal Fiji Military
Forces (RFMF). The resulting opposition culminated in the overthrow of the State party (the
Qarase Government) by the RFMF on December 5, 2006. The current State party with
Commodore Bainimarama as acting Prime Minister has in effect nullified the qoliqoli and
indigenous tribunal bills.
Unresolved Land Problems
Racial discrimination in Fiji has evolved since the days of the colonial rule. Indigenous Fijians,
Europeans and the Indians very much kept to themselves as a consequence of subtle colonial
regulations. Racial groups had separate schools, places of worship, social clubs and sports
activities among other things. There were also strict rules on land ownership and land use. Land
was owned by indigenous peoples, Europeans and part-Europeans while Indians where either
tenants or farm labourers. Today, a hundred years later, the situation has changed slightly with
about 90% land now owned by the indigenous and the remainder is freehold or state land.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
In this chapter, land problems in Fiji would be reviewed within the context of the concerns and
issues raised at the sixty second session of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination in Fiji (CERD/C/62/CO/3) held in Geneva in March 2003.54
Critical elements in the 2002 CCF Report
The 2002 CCF report55 noted that racial discrimination was evident in the following policies of
the Fiji Government
a) Indigenous Fijians are preferred to replace long-term Indo-Fijian tenants on the farms
where leases have expired with no regards to whether they can continue to produce
sugarcane.
b) No alternative lands have been acquired by the NLTB since 1999 to resettle Indo-Fijian
farmers.
c) State lands are transferred to satisfy the “need” of 1 per cent of the population as against
that of 50 per cent of the population who do not own land
d) Also in terms of Section 38 of the Constitution, the consequences of the legislative
amendments to the Native Land Trust Act (NLTA) and the Native Lands Act to facilitate
the transfer of State Schedule A and Schedule B lands for the benefit of indigenous
Fijian claimants to these lands are discriminatory on grounds of race. They introduced
insecurity of tenure and devaluation of investment on these lands for Indo-Fijian tenants.
These constitute ‘preference based on race” (Article 1 CERD) and “unfair discrimination”
base on “race and ethnic origin” (Section 38 Bill of Rights)
e) The Former Government’s plan to exempt 86 per cent of the land (i.e. native land) from
the provision of the ALTA legislation will adversely affect the tenants, most of whom are
not indigenous Fijians and is therefore racially discriminatory.
The 2002 CCF Report 56 was also critical of the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB). It was noted
that NLTB had not demonstrated a professional capacity in dealing efficiently and urgently with
programs for landless evicted tenants and farm labourers that have been improvised. The
complaint about the gross inefficiency of the NLTB is common not just from Indo Fijian tenants
but also from indigenous landowners. It is further reported that NLTB does not have the
administrative, professional and technical capacity to administer leases in an efficient and
commercial manner, let alone take effective measures to assist the landowners in projects for
commercial development of their land.
It was noted that the CERD Committee reminded the Government of Fiji to observe article 2 of
ICERD which obligates a State Party “to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination
(1(a)) and further not to defend discrimination (1(b)). It went further to suggest that the State
party take effective measures on governmental policies and laws that perpetuate racial
discrimination with respect to its land policies. In view of the foregoing, the concluding
observations adopted by the Committee at its 62nd meeting held in March 2003 noted:
54 CERD/C/62/CO/3 (2 June 2003), para 19.
55 37 Citizen Constitutional Forum and NGO Coalition on Human Rights, 2002. ‘The Submission of the CCF and NGO Coalition on Human
Rights, Fiji.’ Suva, www.ccf.org.fj
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
“The Committee is concerned that the expiry of many leases of Native land has allegedly led to
the ‘eviction’ of numerous farmers, mainly Indo-Fijians, and that the resettlement programme of
the State party appears to be insufficient. The Committee underlines the State’s responsibility
to provide assistance to ‘exited tenants’, and recommends that it increase its efforts to
compensate and resettle affected families.
The Committee urged the State party to develop measures of conciliation between indigenous
Fijians and Indo-Fijians over the land issue, with a view to obtaining a solution acceptable to
both communities.”57
Additionally, the Committee wished for more detailed information (in the next periodic report)
about the exact number of ‘exited’, resettled and compensated persons, disaggregated by
ethnicity as well on the ways the State party planned to respond to the expected expiry of many
more leases.58
LITERATURE REVIEW
Following a series of coup d’etats, land tenure and land use in Fiji has been the subject of
debate inside and outside of Fiji. Numerous reports, including from the academics have been
written on the subject. Some of these writings are reviewed here.
Boydell59 explores the philosophy of land as an asset within the conflicting paradigms of
communalism and capitalism in Fiji. He observes that land problems in Fiji are constrained by
myth and fear, suggesting that education is the ‘key to reconciling the myths and abating the
fear.’ In short, he suggests that land problems in Fiji need to be approached in a culturally
sensitive and non-provocative way to facilitate growth of the economy. In another article,
Boydell60 examines the Fijian perception of land ownership and questions the appropriateness
of supplanted western/colonial ideals, democracy and land tenure within a Third World
framework of communal ownership, respect and chiefly systems. In this paper, he explores the
potential threats to freehold and leaseholds in the context of four issues: destabilization of
democratic order, arguments in favour of restoring feudal aristocracies, ‘sub-revolutions of
contemporary nouveaux riche new millennia chiefs...without the benefit of chiefly blood.’ and
lastly ‘a people reaction at grassroots level.’ Additionally, Boydell provides a preliminary
overview of the opportunities for modelling land tenure conflict as a tool for transformation. He
outlines an analytical methodology for modelling land tenure conflict, grounded in conflict
scenarios in Fiji. The conflict is analysed using a dual concern model and a stake & power-vrelationships model over an eighteen-month time horizon.
One of the major land problems currently facing Fiji is the non renewal of land leases by the
indigenous land owners. Naidu and Reddy61 explored tenant farmers’ views and perceptions
57 CERD/C/62/CO/3 (2 June 2003), para 19
58 Chand, G (Ed) 2005. ‘Papers on Racial Discrimination : The CERD Papers.’ Fiji Institute of Applied Studies, Lautoka
59 Boydell, S. 2001 Philosophical Perceptions of Pacific Property – Land as a Communal Asset in Fiji, paper presented at Pacific Rim Real
Estate Society Annual Conference. 21-24 January, 2001 Adelaide
60 Boydell, S. 2002. Modeling Land Tenure Conflict Transformation – a preliminary analysis, paper presented at Pacific Rim Real Estate
Society 7th Annual Conference, 20-23 January, 2002 in Christchurch, New Zealand
61 Naidu, V., & Reddy, M. 2002. ALTA and Expiring Land Leases: Fijian Farmers’ Perception of their Future. A Ford Foundation Funded
Project, June 2002
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
about their future. Yabaki et al62 explored issues relating to the ownership, lease, and the use of
native lands in Fiji. More specifically, this study evaluated how ethnic relations and politics harm
the rights and interests of both indigenous landowners and the tenant communities through
distortion. On a somewhat similar theme, Singh63 has discussed the connection between land
ownership and ethnic and internal tension in the South Pacific. She has looked at the cases in
the Solomon Islands and Fiji. In the case of Fiji, she notes: ‘Ethnic tensions have long been
simmering between ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians. The 2000 coup rebels exploited this by
pointing to the land leases held by Indo-Fijians as a sign of major economic clout’.
Rakai et al64 have discussed developmental problems associated with traditional land tenure
systems. The disparity in wealth between settler (Indo-Fijians) and the indigenous communities
(taukei) has been attributed to a number of factors. The settlers have access to development
funds while the taukei do not have this privilege. It is observed that the Fijians could not secure
loans on the communal lands and therefore were unable to progress economically relative to
other races. Further, the custom of sharing inherent in communal traditions, and associated
non-materialistic values and attitudes were greatly encouraged and propagated by the adopted
Christian religion and the colonial Government. Finally, they note that unless the economic
disparity is overcome, Fiji’s social, economic and political stability will always be threatened.
Davies65 discussed the current land problems in Fiji. He argues that the current problems
surrounding the tenure and use of native land have at their heart a single primary problem - the
failure of leasing contracts under Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act (ALTA) to be mutually
beneficial to both landowner and the tenant. He notes that while tenants have benefited, the
landowners have not. Consequently, as ALTA leases expire, many Fijian land owning units
(mataqali) are refusing to renew them preferring instead to cultivate their own land, or else not
renewing them under ALTA conditions.
Another paper66 identified national interest regarding agricultural land as being served by the
creation of an institutional mechanism that will enable leasing transactions to be based on the
informed consent of both landowner and tenant. It is suggested that national interest requires
the identification of a rental structure that simultaneously provides the maximum incentives to
both the landowners and the tenants.
Gounder and Nithiyanandam67 have observed that income earning capacity, land property
rights and the capacity to contribute to individuals and nation’s well-being have become a racial
issue. They noted that Government is considered a key player and are required to be attentive
to how development strategies affect the nation.
62 Yabaki, A. et al. Land Conflict and Ethnic Relations in Fiji: a Civic Perspective,
http://www.sidesnet.org/mir/pacific/usp/landingmt/SYMOPSIUM/Abstracts.htm
63 Singh, D.2000. Land Disputes Sow Seeds of Unrest, http://www.atimes.com/oceania/BJ03Ah01.html
64 Rakai, M & Williamsom, I.1995. Implementing LISGIS from a Customary Land Tenure Perspective – The Fiji
Experience.http://www.sli.unimelb.edu.au/research/publications/IPW/RakaiLISFiji.htm
65 Davies, J.1999. Reforming the Leasing and the Use of agricultural Land in Fiji: an Economic
Incentive Approach
http://plato.acadiau.ca/courses/econ/Davies/ladsept15.pdf
66 Anon, 2007. ‘High Return for Land Leases.’ The Fiji Times. July 5, 2007 p.5.
67 Gounder, R., E & Nithiyanandam, V.2002. Equals in Markets: Land Property Rights and Ethnicity in Fiji and Sri Lanka, paper presented at
the 13th World Congress of the International economic History Association, 22-26 July, 2002 in Buenos Aires
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
The contemporary writing on land problems in Fiji have largely been on land policy, non renewal
of leases with little on ethnicity, land ownership and land use. However there were some classic
ethnographic works undertaken by Belshaw68, Crocombe69, Nayacakalou70 and Ward71. These
studies have largely dealt with land and population issues in the context of modernization.
Discriminatory principles adopted by Gordon have survived the colonial era and are very much
in existence today on matters regulating the use and proprietorship of land in Fiji. These
regulations and the new ones conceived by the Qarase Government (2001- 2006) and the
Interim Government (2006-2007) are discussed within the context of CERD in below.
COLONIAL POLICY ON LANDS IN FIJI
A brief review of the colonial policies of the late nineteenth century is crucial to an
understanding of the contemporary land use practices in Fiji. Fiji was annexed by Great Britain
in 1874. Reasons given for annexation included, among other things, the protection of Fijian
customs, traditions and land. A landmark document in the history of Fiji is the Deed of Cession
signed by the first Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson, and several of the high-ranking chiefs of
Fiji. This document has been referred by some as the ‘charter of the land’. Important features
of the document include clauses pertaining to ‘unconditional surrender’ of lands in Fiji, in return
for which the Queen of Great Britain (Queen Victoria) assured protection of the peoples of Fiji.
However, the subsequent interpretation and acts of the colonial governors, especially Sir Arthur
Gordon was contrary to the terms of ‘unconditional surrender’ on land policies. In fact Gordon’s
policies on the protection of customs, traditions, and land of the Fijians continue to affect the
land use patterns in Fiji. These policies merit discussion here, particularly his perceptions of
problems in Fiji and, his approach to solving them.
Gordon is noted for his paternalistic policies aimed at protecting the Fijians. On his arrival in Fiji
he was beset with numerous problems. He found, for example, that the Fijian population was
being decimated by an epidemic of measles; European settlers claimed the best lands and
there was little capital following the collapse of the Fiji cotton industry after the post-Civil War
American industry recovered. He expressed the immediate needs and associated problems in
the following words: ‘We want capital invested in the colony, we want a cheap, abundant and
certain supply of labour; we want means of communication; we want justice to be readily and
speedily administered; we want facilities for education; and lastly we want revenue’.72
The problem of insufficient capital was exacerbated by the colonial office’s directive that the
colony should be self-supporting.73 The problem of insufficient finance was to some degree
overcome with investments by the Australia-based Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR).
The operations of this Company greatly influenced the land use practices in a number of
different ways. First, it introduced a mono-crop agricultural system with its concentration on
sugar cane. Second, to overcome the labour shortage problem, it divided its large plantation
68 Belshaw, C.S.1964. Under the Ivi Tree: Society and Economic Growth in Rural Fiji. Routledge& Kegan, London
69 Crocombe, R. 1999. Land Tenure in the Pacific. Oxford University Press, Melbourne
70 Nayacakalou, R.N, Fiji: Manipulating the system pp.206-226 in RG Crocombe (ed), Land Tenure in the Pacific. Oxford University Press,
Melbourne
71 Ward, R.G. 1960. A Geography Study of Population and Land Use in Fiji. University of Auckland, Auckland
72 53 54 55 Lal, V.B. 1992 Broken Waves: A History of the Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu
44
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
estates into 10-14 acre lots and leased them to individual farmers who wished to remain in Fiji
without renewing their labour contracts.
In his efforts to protect the Fijian culture and traditions, Gordon introduced a system of ‘indirect
rule’ that was first practiced by Lord Lugard in East Africa. In adopting this system of
administration, he hoped to ‘seize the spirit in which native institutions had been framed, and
develop to the utmost extent the capacities of the people of the management of their own
affairs, without exciting their suspicions or destroying their self-respect.’74
The indirect system of administration affected the contemporary land use in a number of
different ways. It laid the foundation of the Great Council of Chiefs whose function was to advise
the Governor on matters relating to native regulations. Another important policy of the early
colonial rule was the Native Labour Ordinance (1883) which restricted the use of Fijians for
wage labour on plantations. Fijians were to continue their subsistence life style, cultivating
staple crops within the confines of their villages. Their movement in and out of the village was
carefully monitored by the village headman (buli).
As well as protecting Fijian customs, traditions and land, the new colony had to be selfsupporting in line with the Foreign Office directive on this matter. Overseas investment was
required to maintain the welfare of the Fijians but such investment was only possible with an
abundant supply of cheap labour. Gordon opposed the use of Fijians on plantations fearing that
if the ‘Fijian population is ever permitted to sink from its present condition into that of a
collection of migratory bands of hired labourers, all hope, not only of the improvement but the
preservation of the race, must inevitably be abandoned’75 He therefore sought to contract
labour from India.
Indo-Fijians were first introduced to Fiji in 1879 under an indenture system to work as labourers
on sugar, copra and banana plantations. By the end of the indenture system in 1917, 60,639
Indo-Fijians had been introduced to Fiji.76 The Indo-Fijians with their methods of cultivation and
new spice crops had a major influence on land use patterns in Fiji. Under the indentured labour
scheme, a person was required to work for five years, after which he could return to India at his
own expense. Alternatively, he could renew his contract for another 5 years and get a free
passage back to India. Of the 60,639 Indo-Fijians that were recruited, 36,000 elected to remain
in the colony. Most of the indentured Indo-Fijians were employed on cane plantations owned by
the CSR Company. Later, the Company provided the independent farmer with credit for
agricultural implements, provided information on methods of cultivation and purchased his
entire crop for a fixed price. In return, the Company imposed rules on land use - crops other
than sugarcane were not to be grown, a fixed method of planting was to be followed and land
holdings were to be laid out in such a manner as to facilitate large scale harvesting in
combination with the neighbouring farmers. About half the land was leased from the Fijian
mataqalis and these tended to vary in size from 2.5 acres to 12 acres.
By far, the most important policy affecting land use was that on land tenure. While in the Deed
of Cession there were explicit clauses on ‘unconditional surrender’, Gordon’s paternalistic
approach to protecting the Fijian customs, traditions and land had the opposite effects. In his
efforts to keep the land ownership in the hands of Fijians he sought from the chiefs, not their
56 57 Lal, V.B. 1992 Broken Waves: A History of the Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu
45
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
views as to the best way to administer their land for the future, but a clear statement of how it
had been controlled in the past so that the customary order might be preserved.77
In short, Gordon’s policies during the early years of colonial rule has resulted in creating rigid
proprietary structure resulting in two separate registration systems – the Torrens system and a
Native Land Register. The Torrens Register contained a record of all leases and lands in fee
simple, including Crown lands while the customary lands were recorded in the Native Land
Register. As over 86% of the land in Fiji is customary land, it would be appropriate to briefly
explain how it is organized. On this matter, reference is made to the classic work of
Nayacakalou.78 He noted that Fijian land is registered in terms of matrilineal organized social
units. The unit of the widest span is the yavusa the members of which trace their ancestry to vu.
Genealogical segments of the yavusa are called mataqali while smaller segments of the
mataqali are called itokatoka. Most Fijian land is registered by mataqali while some are
registered in the name of itokatoka or yavusa.
LAND ISSUES AND PROBLEMS SINCE THE LAST CERD REPORT IN MARCH 2003
Between 1997 and 2006, the number of ALTA cane leases that had expired numbered 7,016.79
The largest number expired in 1999 and in 2000 being 1594 and 1955 respectively. It would
seem that a relatively high number of expiring leases coincided with political instability in Fiji.
The Appendix 3 shows ALTA leases with contracts on Native land (inclusive of 20 year
extensions). It is reported that of 22,000 cane contracts, 53.3 per cent are on Native Land while
the remainder (46.5 per cent) are on either State or Freehold.
Chaudhry,80 the Leader of the Fiji Labour Party, in 2004 reported that 90% of all land in Fiji
belongs to the indigenous Fijians and is non-alienable. Yet the State party under the Social
Justice Act was allocating special interest free loans to the indigenous people to buy back
freehold land which they consider to be their ancestral land. He felt that this was particularly
unjust at a time when thousands of Indo-Fijian tenant farmers have been made homeless and
destitute overnight due to the non-renewal of their native leases. Land has been a volatile issue
in Fiji politics, with indigenous politicians using the threat of non-renewal of land leases to
subdue Indo-Fijian demands for political and other civil rights by the State party. He concluded
saying that uncertainty on land matters continues and confidence will only return once a
satisfactory settlement on leasing of native land is reached at the political level.
Similar sentiments were expressed by the US State Department in their 2005 Country Report
on Human Rights Practices in Fiji.81 It was noted that land tenure was a highly sensitive and
politicized issue. Ethnic Fijians communally held more than 80 percent of all land, the
government held another 8 percent while the remainder was freehold which private individuals
or companies may hold. Virtually all Indo-Fijian farmers were obliged to lease land from ethnic
78 Nayacakalou, R.N, Fiji: Manipulating the system pp.206-226 in RG Crocombe (ed), Land Tenure in the Pacific. Oxford University Press,
Melbourne
79 Fiji Ministry of Primary Industries, 2007. Evictions and resettlement Statistics, Nabua
80 Chaudhry, M. 2004. An Update on the Situation Regarding Violation of the Rights of Fiji Indians, GOPIO Conference, St John’s University,
New York.
81 Native Land Trust Board, 2006, Frequent Questions Asked, http://www.nltb.com.fj/land_ownership.html
46
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Fijian landlords. Many Indo-Fijians believed that their very limited ability to own land and their
subsequent dependency on leased land from indigenous Fijians constituted de facto
discrimination against them. Refusal by ethnic Fijian landowners to renew expiring leases has
resulted in evictions of Indo-Fijians from their farms and their displacement to squatter
settlements. Many indigenous Fijian landowners in turn believed that the rental formulas in the
Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act (ALTA) discriminated against them. Changes to the Bill
were introduced but was defeated in the Fiji Parliament in 2005. A point worthy of note here is
that while most of the lessees on native land are Indo-Fijians, they have been systematically
excluded from NLTB Board membership and employment in the offices of the Native Land Trust
Board.
In order to assist evicted farmers, SVT Government bought freehold lands to resettle farmers.
This however was not done by the State party (Qarase Government). Instead it compromised
by having numerous Talanoa sessions (traditional informal meetings to resolve differences) to
resolve the expiring leases and the resettlement of Indo-Fijians tenants. The State party
(Qarase Government) at these sessions was adamant in protecting the welfare of the
indigenous Fijians. Additionally, the State party embarked on introducing more racist land bills
similar to the earlier ones that transferred State Land (Schedule A and B) to Native land. The
two controversial Bills are discussed below.
NEW LAND BILLS
Qoliqoli bill
Rather than resolving the lease renewal problem, the State party was preparing another racist
Bill, the so called Qoliqoli Bill82. The intent of the Qoliqoli Bill 2006 was to transfer the
proprietary ownership of qoliqoli areas from state to the qoliqoli owners (as did the Schedule A
and B lands). It planned on the establishment of the qoliqoli commission with powers and
functions for the regulation and management of fisheries resources (and related matters) within
qoliqoli areas. In the Bill, ‘commercial operation’ meant any fisheries or non-fisheries activity
within qoliqoli areas that were undertaken for commercial purposes.
Additionally proprietary rights and interests meant all legal interests and rights which would be
conferred upon the owners of native land under the Native Lands Act and the Native Land Trust
Act. As such, Clause 20 of the Bill prohibits the undertaking of any non-fisheries commercial
operation within qoliqoli areas without prior approval of the NLTB. NLTB approvals were to be
given after consultations with the Qoliqoli Commission and the qoliqoli owners. This clause also
clarifies that ownership of any lease or fee simple of any land abutting any qoliqoli area does
not confer any rights to such owners except as may be authorized under this legislation. Qoliqoli
owners may waive their usage rights as owners through conditions agreed with the commercial
operators.
Prime Minister Lasenia Qarase noted that the Qoliqoli Bill was not conceived or plucked out of
the air by the SDL party, adding: “It was on the agenda of the Alliance Party and the SVT and
even the Chaudhry government in 1999.”83 The Finance Ministry defended the Bill stating that
82 Qoliqoli Bill 2006. http://www.parliament.gov.fj/legislative/index.aspx
83 64 65 66 67Qoliqoli Bill 2006.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qoliqoli_Bill
47
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
more ethnic Fijian participation in the eco-tourism sector would boost rural development. It said
that for the Native Lands Trust Board’s tourism policy, the proposed Qoliqoli Bill was critical. It
would ensure sustainability of the tourism industry with resource owner participation.
Further, the State party (Qarase Government) defended the Bill on historical grounds. The
Minister for Fijian Affairs, Lands and Provincial Development (Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu)84 said
that expectations by the Fijian chiefs over their traditional customary qoliqoli rights (fishing and
forest rights) has been there since Cession in 1874. He noted that the Bill would provide for
establishing a mutually agreed framework between commercial operators (including hoteliers)
and qoliqoli owners. Additionally, it was noted that the Bill would bring financial benefits to the
qoliqoli owners.
Chaudhry observed85 that demarcation of all off-shore rights to the indigenous community as
their special fishing ground would create problems for other ethnic communities. Other
communities wishing to access the ocean for fishing, water sports etc. will require special
permission which maybe granted on payment of prescribed levies. Thus it would curtail the
freedom of movement of people who wanted to enjoy the rivers and the ocean for recreational
purposes.
Fiji’s deputy opposition leader Bernadette Rounds Ganilau86 said the bill was a joke because a
large mass of land was lying idle in the country while Fiji continues to import food valued at over
180-million US dollars. She added that thousands upon thousands of vacant and re-possessed
land was not being used, making Fiji the world’s largest producer of weeds and grass. She said
the Qoliqoli Bill was a joke because Fiji imports over 13-million US dollars worth of prawns
every year and most of it is from Kerala in India. The country imports 46 per cent of its tuna
which is then processed and exported as Fiji tuna.
The Fiji Law Society87 also made a submission to the joint committee in which they stated that
the bill is unconstitutional, in that it infringes on the Native Land Trust Act. Further it has the
potential to create conflict between and among qoliqoli owners because the ownership
boundaries were not clear. It was noted that individual Fijians had already begun intercepting
Indo-Fijian fishermen and foreign tourists at sea demanding money. The RFMF also did not
agree with the Qoliqoli bill. It was claimed that Commodore Bainimarama’s dismissal of the
Qarase government was justified by two key pieces of legislation: a bill that included provisions
for amnesty for the perpetrators of the 2000 coup and mutiny and the proposed Qoliqoli bill that
would have transferred rights of coastal waters from the government to indigenous Fijians.
Bainimarama believed that the two proposed legislation were not in the best interests of Fiji.
The Commodore’s views found support from within the tourism industry.
Views of stakeholders on Qoliqoli Bill
As most of the Qoliqoli owners are indigenous Fijians, the Bill as conceptualized would have
had an adverse affect on the non-indigenous peoples, mostly Indo-Fijians and Europeans. It
would have indirectly affected tourists using the beach and the foreshore within the Qoliqoli
areas and hoteliers most of whom are Europeans. Thus the Bill would have been a disaster to
48
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
the tourist industry of Fiji. Even prior to the Parliamentary debates on the Bill, the indigenes had
commenced intimidating hoteliers with claims. Some of newspaper accounts are reported below
to highlight the gravity of the problem.
Ms Korovavala, the indigenous Chief Executive Officer of the Fiji Islands Hotels and Tourism
Association (FIHTA) claims that qoliqoli claims is adversely affecting the hoteliers. She noted
that qoliqoli owners have often confronted hotel owners demanding money without evidence
that they are the rightful owners of the qoliqoli in question. The hoteliers are forced to pay
because they want to maintain peace with the indigenes. She illustrated the qoliqoli sagas in the
following way:
‘A group of qoliqoli owners will turn up at the hotel on any given day and demand money. The
very next day, another lot will turn up with the same demands for the same area – all in
exchange for money’.
FIHTA claimed that this was ongoing in most resorts across the country and were of the view
that it was caused by the Government’s (Qarase) inconsistent policies88. There was also some
opposition from indigenous persons to the Qoliqoli Bill. This group explained that collecting
money by ransom was an illegal act.
The hoteliers warned that they would leave and set their operations in another country if they
were made unwelcome with the passage of the Qoliqoli bill. The hoteliers also stressed that the
bill will cause serious damage to Fiji’s image as a tourist destination. It would enable individuals
to try to stake their claims on the qoliqoli and upset hotel operations and visitors.89
The indigenous lobby group Viti Landowners and Resource Association (V.L.R.A.) led by high
chief Ratu Osea Gavidi also expressed reservation on the ability of the Native Lands Trust
Board to act in the best interest of Qoliqoli owners.90
Professor Ron Duncan of the University of the South Pacific supported the concerns of
resource owners and called on the government to look at returning the management of leasing
customary land to the landowners with the right to negotiate lease terms, rentals, and renewals
directly with their respective tenants. A more pressing problem however is balancing the rights
of indigenous resource owners with those of hoteliers and the hotel industry in general and also
assuring foreign investors that there will not be any hiccups following the purchase of freehold
land.91
Sukhdev Shah92 a lecturer in Economics with the University of the South Pacific wrote: “In
short, the Qoliqoli Bill and its companion, the Lands Tribunal threatens the livelihoods of half of
Fiji’s wage-earning and salaried work force, whereas there are very few options for creating
substitute employment.”
Another commentator wrote:
88 Elbourne, F. 2006. ‘Hotel Say Attacks Hurt.’ The Fiji Times, November 2006. p.1
89 Fiji Village News Sept 4
90 71 72 . Fiji Parliament: Bill No 11, 2006,’Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
“Investors warn that misinformation, inadequate consultation and resource provisions in the
qoliqoli bill could cripple tourism, Fiji’s greatest money-maker. “Villagers misunderstanding of
their fishing rights and the bill have already harmed the industry, they claim. “In November
2004, villagers claiming fishing rights and ownership over Narara Reef area in the Yasawa
Islands in western Fiji, a prime cruising and resort location, intimidated two tourists and stole
their diving equipment”93
The Qarase Government with its regulations and bills has also been adversely affecting the
non-indigenous fishermen. The State party (Qarase Government) had through its bureaucracy
legitimized the fishing grounds or qoliqolis. Permission was required from qoliqoli owners prior
to the issuance of the mandatory annual fishing license by the Fisheries Department. Receipts
from the qoliqoli owners were required in the fishing license applications. It was claimed by
some fishermen that the qoliqoli owners generally demanded a thousand dollar annual fee
which occasionally was reduced to five hundred dollars if proper Fijian etiquette was followed.94
Some fishermen claimed that they were harassed despite having a fishing license and
approvals from the qoliqoli owners. The problem here arose from confusion over qoliqoli
boundaries. Non-indigenous fishermen were often victims of harassment in situations where the
contiguous qoliqolis were difficult to demarcate. In Ba Province for example, there are three
large qoliqolis: Nailaga, Votua and Varoka. Of these, the largest one is Votua. It was claimed by
some Indo-Fijian fishermen that qoliqoli boundary disputes were frequent in the ‘commons’
especially in stormy weather conditions.95 In conflict situations, boats are generally seized by
indigenes and all catch confiscated together with boats, engines and fishing equipment. In such
circumstances the fishermen were generally chased away. The Qoliqoli Bill would also have
affected real estate and overall investments in the country.96 The bill would have adversely
affected the value of beach properties because all coastal area would have come under the
Qoliqoli Commission and the purported qoliqoli owners. In the absence of clear qoliqoli
boundaries, qoliqoli legislation would have also generated conflicts among the indigenous
Fijians similar to the conflicts generated by the transfer of Schedule A and B lands from State to
Native ownership.97
Indigenous Claims Tribunal
Closely related to the Qoliqoli bill is the Indigenous Claims Tribunal bill No. 11 (2006).98 This bill
if it were to pass would allow indigenous Fijians to establish historical claims for loss of right or
legal interest of any nature relating to any Qoliqoli area or to the occupation, use, or enjoyment
of the ancestral land of a mataqali (landowning unit), resulting from any land sale, acquisition,
73 74 Qoliqoli Bill 2006.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qoliqoli_Bill
75 76 Singh, J. 2005. Foreign Assistance and Land Conflicts in Fiji, paper presented at Woodrow Wilson Foundation, December 28, 2005,
Washington, D.C
77 Singh, J. 2005 Indo-Fijian fishing village of Votua, Ba: A socioeconomic Survey, paper presented at PIM XXX1 Conference 27-30 July, 2005
in Townsville
97 Singh, J 2004. Race, Land and Politics in Fiji, paper presented at the Pan Pacific Business Association, July 28, 2004
98 Fiji Parliament: Bill No 11, 2006,’Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
bequest, exchange, transfer, or assignment by any person or the state prior to the coming into
force of the Native Land Trust Act in 1940. Like the Qoliqoli bill, the Indigenous Claims Tribunal
would determine restitution or compensation.
If the Tribunal was satisfied that a claim was well-founded, it could recommend to the
government any remedial action to be taken, including compensation for loss of right of any
nature for the occupation, use, or enjoyment of ancestral lands. Former prime minister and
former coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka said that government should nationalize all indigenous
resources. His calls were supported by some in the indigenous community who argued that
there will be very few claimants for ancestral land and in most cases; their claims will fail
because of the complexity surrounding native land alienation prior to the Second World War.
The Fiji Labour Party (FLP)99 has criticized the government for instilling confusion in the minds
of freehold investors. At the beginning of 2006, the Fiji's military objected to both bills (Qoliqoli
and Claims Tribunal) stating that it would have a devastating impact on investment, which was
already low. More than 25 percent of GDP was needed to cushion rising unemployment, which
in turn is fuelling crime.
On reflection, Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill (2006) was yet another discriminatory legislation
proposed by the State party (Qarase Government). In the proposed legislation, historical
indigenous claim means a claim for loss of right or legal interest of any nature relating to any
qoliqoli area or to the occupation, use or enjoyment of the ancestral land of a mataqali, as a
result of any land sale, acquisition, bequest, exchange, transfer or assignment by any person or
the State prior to the coming into force of the Native Land Trust Act. The effect of this legislation
would have been grossly unjust to persons with freehold properties, most of whom are nonindigenous.
The claimants were defined as ‘only a native land or Qoliqoli owning unit, and not an individual
member thereof, duly registered under the Native Land Register or Register of Qoliqoli Owners
has the right to lodge a claim under this Act. Section 21 of the Indigenous Claims Tribunal notes
that in the exercise of its jurisdiction and powers under this Act, the Tribunal shall have regard
to the principles and the spirit of relevant provisions of the official versions of the Deed of
Cession. Seen from this perspective, the proposed Bill would have contradicted aspects of the
Deed of Cession.100
Deed of Cession was unconditional, it read: “AND WHEREAS in order to the establishment of
British government within the said islands and said Tui Viti and other the several high chiefs
thereof for themselves and their respective tribes have agreed to cede the possession of and
the dominion and sovereignty over the whole of the said islands and over inhabitants thereof
and have requested Her said Majesty to accept such cession - which cession the said Tui Viti
and other high chiefs, relying upon the justice and generosity of Her said Majesty, have
determined to tender unconditional.”101
With respect to land ownership, Section 4 of the Cession reads: “THAT the absolute
proprietorship of all lands not shown to be now alienated so as to have become bona fide the
99 Peters, C. 2007. ‘Land Unused Land, Minister Tells Fijians.’ The Fiji Sun, June 30, 2007. p.2
100 . Fiji Parliament: Bill No 11, 2006,’Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill
101 Fiji Parliament: Bill No 11, 2006,’Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
property of Europeans or other foreigners or not now in the actual use or occupation of some
chief or tribe or not actually required for the probable future support and maintenance of some
chief or tribe shall be and is hereby declared to be vested in Her Majesty her heirs and
successors.”
Currently over 90 per cent of the lands are native owned and fraught with conflicting claims and
mismanagement. It would seem prudent that the six per cent of freehold lands be maintained in
fee simple in order to attract investments and create jobs. Litigation by indigenous members of
the legal fraternity is further destabilizing the economy by discouraging capital investments on
freehold lands.
Views of the Military
Commandore Bainimarama described both bills as ‘racist, unconstitutional and damaging to
tourism. Had it become law, resort operators could have faced enormous payments to tribes in
exchange for the right to access their beaches and reefs.’
Views of CCF
The Constitutional Forum (CCF) noted that the qoliqoli bill could further damage inter-ethnic
relations by fuelling resentment among non-indigenous people to whom it offers no benefits.
The bill could potentially be a disappointment to the qoliqoli owners too with raised expectations
of windfalls. CCF is of the view that this form of racism practiced by the Ministry of Fijian Affairs
should be stopped forthwith.102
Efforts of the Bainimarama’s Interim Government to resolve the non-renewal of leases
The current Interim Government is claiming they will resolve land problems in Fiji. It has
dropped the qoliqoli and the Indigenous Land Claims proposals. With respect to non-renewal of
leases, the Interim Government is trying to make rental payments to landowners relatively more
attractive. It has, for example, endorsed increases in the value of all land outside of the
Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act (ALTA) to market value.103 Additionally, the Fiji
Independent Commission against Corruption (FICAC) is also looking into the Native Lands Act,
Native Land Tenant Act and ways to improve land registration. These moves, hopefully, would
entice landowners to lease unused land. It was reported that returning land left idle to it’s once
productive status (before the expiring of land leases) is ‘the new intention of the interim
administration’104. The purported actions of the Interim Government thus far are not racially
motivated as was the case of the Qarase Government. In its utterances, the interim ministers
have expressed a sincere interest in the welfare of all Fiji citizens irrespective of race.
Concluding Remarks
102 Citizen Constitutional Forum and NGO Coalition on Human Rights, 2002. ‘The Submission of the CCF and NGO Coalition on Human
Rights, Fiji.’ Suva, www.ccf.org.fj
103 US State Department, 2006 Fiji Country Report on Human Rights
104 Native Land Trust Board, 2006, Frequent Questions Asked, http://www.nltb.com.fj/land_ownership.html
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Land ownership in Fiji since the colonial times has been the source of much racial
discrimination. Through legislation, the early English Governors to Fiji vehemently forbade the
alienation of native lands. European claims of land sales prior to Cession (in 1874) were
legitimized by the Native Lands Commission in 1880 and have, since been referred to as
freeholds. Those lands that were unclaimed by the indigenes were vested in the Crown and
today are referred to as State land. Schedule A and Schedule B lands were also part of State
land but the Qarase Government has transferred it to Native land. (See Note 2) The Indian
labourers who were introduced to Fiji since 1879 have been virtually landless and relegated
only as the users and not the owners of the land. This form of racial discrimination with its
origins in the colonial times has persisted to this day. The situation has recently deteriorated
with the non-renewal of leases and evictions of thousands of Indo-Fijian tenant farmers.
The Mara regime was the architect of the Agricultural Landlord & Tenants Act (1967) that
provided thirty year leases to Indo-Fijian tenants on native lands. The provision for extension for
another thirty years depended on the wishes of the indigenous land owners. These extensions
however are closely linked to the whims of the State party. The State party under Qarase had
not satisfactorily resolved the leasing of the native lands but was making land problems worse
with the qoliqoli bill and the indigenous land claims tribunal. In fact these racially biased bills
contributed to the overthrow of the Qarase Government on December 5, 2006 by the Royal Fiji
Military Forces (RFMF).
Note 1
State party in Fiji has been alternating in its composition: democratic government, military rule
and interim government. Following the violent overthrow of the democratic government in 2000,
the army restored law and order and put in place an interim government under Lasenia Qarase.
Elections were held in 2001 and the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party formed a
Coalition Government with Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua (CAMV) with Qarase as the
Prime Minister. In year 2006, elections were held again and SDL formed a Coalition
Government with Fiji Labour Party (FLP). But this State party lasted for less than seven months.
With a coup in December 2006, there was military rule until the end of 2006. In January 2007,
an interim government was formed with Commodore Bainimarama as the Interim Prime
Minister. Thus the current State party is very much under the influence of the Royal Fiji Military
Forces (RFMF). There are plans however to have fresh elections in March 2009 and return Fiji
to parliamentary democracy.
Note 2:
The State holds these two types of land in trust for the indigenous landowner. Schedule A is
land that once belonged to a landowning unit that has become extinct. Schedule B is land that
was not claimed during the initial sittings of the Native Land Commission in the early part of the
1900s. Under s.18 of the Native Land Trust Act, the Reserves Commissioner is empowered to
allocate these types of state owned land to indigenous landowners who genuinely need more
land. The recognition by government and legislation to the reversionary rights of the indigenous
53
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
landowner to these types of state land is evidence of government’s trusteeship role in holding
such land for the indigenous owner.105
105 Native Land Trust Board, 2006, Frequent Questions Asked, http://www.nltb.com.fj/land_ownership.html
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Appendix 1: Effects of Government Policy on Land Use
Government
Policy
Objectives
Deed of
Cession
(1874)
Annex Fiji to protect
indigenous customs,
traditions & land
Protection
of Fijian
Customs,
Traditions &
Lands
Welfare of Fijian
people
Established the Great Council
of Chiefs (1875) to advise the
colonial Governors on
regulations affecting Fijians.
'Buli' system (1874).
Established Native
magistrates appointed to
ensure that the Fijian
customs were followed.
Consolidation of subsistence agriculture.
The Fijian custom of 'creeker’ justified in
exchange of goods but not land
The practice of 'kerekere'
made it difficult for Fijian
'galala' farmers to get
involved in cash
economy
Land
Ownership
Land ownership to
remain with Fijians for
their maintenance &
support
Native lands Ordinance
(1880)
Extensive tracks of land (83%) in Fijian
ownership
Inequitable land
distribution/large number
of tenant farmers
Use of Land
To be made available
for economic
development
Agricultural landlord &Tenant
Act
(ALTA, 1967)
Discouraged long term investment for
maximum productivity
Some Fijian 'mataqalis'
are today reluctant to
renew leases to Indians
Labour
•
Fijian
Restrict the use of
Fijians on plantations
Labor Ordinance (1883)
Fijians encouraged to practice subsistence
agriculture
Relatively few Fijians in
commercial agriculture
today
Labour
•
Indentured
Indians
To protect indigenous
customs and
traditions.
Indenture system (18791916)
60,639 Indians were recruited to work on
plantations. With abolition of indenture in
1916; Indians were permitted to own
(lease) & cultivate 10-12 acre farms
Rapid increase in Indian
population; surpassed
Fijian population in 1945
Capital
Colony to be selfsupporting
To attract venture capital
•
Colonial
Sugar Refining Co. (CSR) to
invest in Fiji (1880-1973)
Large tracts of cane plantations
established on the coastal plains of large
islands
Monopoly created with
CSR running the whole
operation from planting
to milling & marketing of
sugar & molasses
ALTA
30 year leases on
Native Land
Transfer from State to
Native lands
Security of tenure 30 years
Non renewal of leases
Schedule A
and B of all
lands in Fiji
Enabling Legislation
Effects on Land Use
Unintended
Consequences
Created a rigid &
complex land
proprietorship
•
•
Increased native land ownership
from 83 to over 88 percent of all
lands in Fiji.
Increased conflict amongst
Fijian mataqalis over ownership
claims.
•
•
Decline in cane
production
Increased
native
ownership from
83 to over 88
per conflicting
ownership
claims
Source: Singh, J 2004. Race, Land and Politics in Fiji, paper presented at the Pan Pacific Business
Association, July 28, 2004.
55
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Appendix 2: Resettlement of Ex ALTA Farmers As At March 2007
Location
Total Lots Available
Total Lots Issued
Batinikia/Busa S/D
Navua
36
35
Balance Lots To Be
Allocated
1
Raiwaqa S/D
Stage DP 8038
Navua
Raiwaqa S/D
Stage II DP 9070
Navua
Navovo S/D
Nadroga,
Navosa
Navudi
Stage I
Navudi Stage II
& III
Dreketi
Macuata
Vunicibicibi
Dreketi
Macuata
TOTAL LOTS
23
23
0
16
15
1
51
16
35
18
14
4
42
26
16
32
4
28
218
133
85
Source: Ministry of Primary Industries, Land Resource Planning & Development, 2007
56
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Appendix 3: ALTA Statistics on Evicted Farmers in Fiji Islands.
Expiry
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
TOTAL
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
TOTAL
Central &
Eastern
11
22
259
104
74
108
46
624
56
21
32
152
30
40
118
68
69
40
43
29
43
27
22
29
18
9
13
10
12
19
11
13
23
947
North
Western
30
85
413
912
141
231
101
1,913
97
152
136
185
100
88
203
117
159
195
125
437
67
18
49
47
18
39
17
18
14
25
10
3
18
2,337
Northern
30
54
371
497
133
185
225
1,495
114
113
228
330
155
128
51
109
65
76
69
154
110
67
64
89
61
43
49
56
35
13
19
23
18
2,239
South
Western
29
53
511
463
125
158
135
1,474
86
69
97
145
71
70
81
75
85
137
90
97
79
22
54
30
16
9
23
23
4
22
18
14
22
1,439
Total
100
214
1,554
1,976
473
682
507
5,506
353
355
493
812
356
326
453
369
378
448
327
717
299
134
189
195
113
100
102
107
65
79
58
53
81
6,962
Source: Ministry of Primary Industries, Land Resource Planning & Development, 2007
57
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
GLOSSARY
buli
-
village headman, a native officer in charge of a
tikina
a taro plant, (colcasia esculenta) traditional Fijian
staple crops
dalo
-
galala
-
exempt (as from duty or tax) independent Fijian
farmers that are not bound to their mataqalis
ivi
-
the native chestnut tree, (inocarpus fagferus)
mataqali
-
the primary social division in Fiji, larger than
tokatoka and smaller than yavusa customary land
Source: Capell, A. 2003. The Fijian Dictionary.
.
.
57
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
5.2 The growth of squatter settlements: Race, Squatters and expiring
leases
The growing squatter settlements are closely associated with the non-renewal of
native leases resulting in mass evictions of Indo-Fijian farmers. On this issue the
CERD report had noted:
‘The Committee is concerned that the expiry of many leases of Native land has
allegedly led to the ‘eviction’ of numerous farmers, mainly Indo-Fijians, and that
the resettlement programme of the State party appears to be insufficient. The
Committee underlines the State’s responsibility to provide assistance to ‘exited
tenants’, and recommends that it increase its efforts to compensate and resettle
affected families. The Committee urges the State party to develop measures of
conciliation between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians over the land issue with
a view of obtaining a solution acceptable to both communities. Further the CERD
Committee wished to receive more detailed information, about the exact number
of ‘exited’, resettled and compensated persons, disaggregated by ethnic
membership, as well as on the way the State party plans to respond to the expiry
of many more leases in due course.106
In response to the CERD queries, the State party in its submissions in 2006 had
provided provisional estimates of the number of leases that were to expire by the
year 2006. It was noted that the current status of Farming Assistance Scheme
(FAS) has also been provided. With respect to disbursement of funds, for
example, it was noted that in 2004, majority of the FAS recipients were ‘replaced’
indigenous farmers (1,551) who were replacing the dispersed Indo-Fijian
farmers. With respect to farmer resettlement, 95 Indo-Fijian farmers were
resettled and 10 indigenous Fijian farmers were resettled.107
Additionally, the Fiji Government 2006 Report had failed to show that one of the
main reasons for the increase in squatter settlements was the non-renewal of
agricultural leases. One widely referenced research on squatters in Fiji was
undertaken by Father Kevin Barr (2007) of ECREA. In this report it is noted that
apart from the rural/urban drift and the increasing cost of urban rents, much of
the new squatters can be attributed to the expiry of agricultural land leases. In
the six years from 1999 to 2004, the number of squatters has almost doubled.
This increase is not surprising when we learn that from 1999 to 2004; about
5,545 leases expired affecting about 27,725 households. It is further noted that
while some of the expiring leases may be renewed, many may not be
renewed.108
106 Chand, G (Ed) 2005. ‘Papers on Racial Discrimination.’ Vol 1. The CERD Papers. Fiji Institute of Applied Studies,
Lautoka
107 Chand, G (Ed) 2005. ‘Papers on Racial Discrimination.’ Vol 1. The CERD Papers. Fiji Institute of Applied Studies,
Lautoka
108 Barr, K.J 2007. Squatters in Fiji - The Need for an Attitudinal Change. CCF Housing and Social Exclusion Policy
Paper 1
58
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Current squatter situation
A June 2003 survey showed a very high percentage of squatters about one in ten
Fiji citizens. An estimated 82,350 people in 13,725 households lived in 182
squatter settlements with Suva and Nausori the worst affected areas. Urban
migration, unemployment, and the breakdown of nuclear and extended families
were cited as factors contributing to this trend. The report projected that the
population of squatters could increase to 90,000 in Suva-Nausori corridor by
2006. This would be a further strain on infrastructure - water supplies, electricity,
and sewage and road services. The State party through its Prime Minister
(Lasenia Qarase) said that the squatter problem had become so serious that the
State party was contemplating seeking funds from abroad.
Similar accounts of squatters are provided by Walsh. He noted that in 2004, 10%
of Fiji’s populations were squatters with 82,350 people living in 182 squatter
settlements. This represented a 14% increase since January 2001 and a 73%
increase since the 1996 census. Further, he observed that currently (2007) about
12.5% of Fiji’s population is living in over 182 squatter settlements around the
country. The largest number about 8,908 households or 50,508 people are
concentrated in the Lami-Suva-Nausori corridor. In 2004, Walsh estimated that at
least 16.4% of the greater Suva populations were ‘squatters’.109
Land tenure in Fiji as a cause of increasing squatters
The native land which comprises over 88 per cent of all lands in Fiji is not easily
available. The leader of the State party (Qarase) conceded that there is a need
for all stakeholders to be more proactive, emphasizing that the transition period
from the outgoing tenant farmer (generally an evicted Indo-Fijian) to that when
the replacement farmer (in most cases an indigenous Fijian) moves in, takes
years because of the slow lease processing for replacement farmers by the Land
Owning Units. This in effect adversely affects the entire economy. This is
especially true with the loss of sugar cane crop resulting from the high cost of
rehabilitating the ratoon crop and the leased farm land taken over from evicted
farmers.110
According to NLTB statistics111, of the 5,506 leases which expired between 1997
and 2003, 987 were renewed to the sitting tenant. Of these 771 were cane
leases, 148 for residential leases and 68 for other leases. The remaining 2,639
were leased to new tenants – either going back to the original Fijian landowner or
109 Peters, W. 2006. Fiji aid to focus on squatter settlements http://www.beehive.govt.nz
110 Chand, G (Ed) 2005. ‘Papers on Racial Discrimination.’ Vol 1. The CERD Papers. Fiji Institute of Applied Studies,
Lautoka, page 320
111 NLTB Report 2007
59
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
to third parties. Of these 1,925 were cane leases, 580 for residential leases and
134 for other leases.
The National Advisory Council Cabinet Sub-Committee Report on poverty (2002)
entitled Poverty in Indo-Fijian and Minority Communities stated;
‘Displaced farmers and those dependent on them, like cane cutters, are
converging on the outskirts of town, overcrowding already overpopulated
squatter areas, occupying marginal land (mangroves, swampy land, dumping
areas), thus posing dangerous health and ecological problems, aggravating
health related problems in poorly serviced squatter settlements.’112
Speaking of the effects of the expiry of land leases and forced evictions on IndoFijian families, the report had noted (2002):
“The human costs are immense: break-up of family and community, social
and cultural impoverishment, stress and emotional anguish and economic
hardship. Hence suicides, family feuds, abuse of women and children are
linked to internal displacement.
Forced evictions are even more traumatic. Forceful occupation of homes has
taken place when disagreement occurred between NLTB and landowners.
Violations such as these traumatize women and children. There is a sense of
powerlessness and loss of faith in the legal and political system. Children
who are witness to evictions can become a generation filled with resentment
for the establishment.
Where homes and land have been taken over, the farmers are left without
assets to begin a new life. Some are taken in by friends and relatives, thus
increasing all-round impoverishment.”113
Ethnic composition of squatters
Father Barr quotes Walsh to reinforce his point that since 1978, there were more
Indo-Fijian than indigenous Fijians in squatter settlements. The report notes that
the expiry of many land leases in recent years has probably increased the
percentage of Indo-Fijians in squatter settlements.
112 Barr, K.J 2007. Squatters in Fiji - The Need for an Attitudinal Change. CCF Housing and Social Exclusion Policy
Paper 1, page 18
113 Barr, K.J 2007. Squatters in Fiji - The Need for an Attitudinal Change. CCF Housing and Social Exclusion Policy
Paper 1, page 18
60
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
The ethnic make-up of the squatter settlements is shown in Table 5.1.
Ethnicity
Fijians
Indians
Others
TOTAL
Table 5.1: Squatter population by ethnicity
1978 1983
1991
1994
2001
3204 3384
3808
5000
4657
4390 5483
4175
5200
6570
254
315
198
178
53
7848 9137
8181 10378 11280
2003
6309
7348
68
13725
Source: ‘Squatters in Fiji – The Need for an Attitudinal Change’ By Father Kevin
Barr (2007, p.7).
It can be seen from the above table 5.1 that the highest number of squatters was
Indo-Fijians. Further, there was a significant increase of Indo-Fijian squatters
from 1994. This may have been in anticipation of non-renewal of leases and
harassment by landowners prior to the expiry of the leases which began to take
effect from 1997. The non-renewal of leases has contributed to an increased
number of displaced people (especially Indo-Fijians) who had relocated in
squatter settlements in search of alternative livelihoods. An Asian Development
Bank Report (2003) shows that highest squatter growth occurred among IndoFijians in the sugar belt of Western and Northern Fiji. It was anticipated that
3,500 farming families with a total population of approximately 18,000 will be
displaced and seek resettlement in the next few years.114
Aside from the non-renewal of leases, the State party also failed to regulate the
price of land, housing and rents, which has escalated in urban areas. This has
also contributed to the rise in the number of squatters. The Barr report advocates
that the State party’s negative and insensitive attitudes need to change. It is
noted that some people in government and city councils are propagating myths
about squatters and blaming them for the predicament they are in. It was further
claimed that most of the squatter settlers are not poor and do not need to live
there. The Barr115 study claimed however that only a small percentage (about 5
per cent) of squatters may fall in this category. The report cites an example of the
State Minister for Housing Adi Asenaca Caucau (the Minister for Social Welfare,
Poverty Alleviation and Women in 2003) who said “squatters were like thieves
114 Lingam, D (2002) “The Squatter Situation in Fiji” in National Consultation on Evictions , Squatters Settlements and
Housing Rights. Suva Citizens Constitution Forum.
115 Barr, K.J 2007. Squatters in Fiji - The Need for an Attitudinal Change. CCF Housing and Social Exclusion Policy Paper 1,
page 18
61
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
because they took other people’s land and used it for themselves.”116 She
suggested that the squatters should be driven out of the settlements by the
police. In his election speech in 2005, the Lord Mayor of Suva Ratu Peni
Volavola said squatters were a bane in any society as they brought lawlessness,
unsanitary conditions; health risks and exerted a strain on the city’s meagre
resources. Although he later apologized, the squatters he was referring to were
more likely Indo-Fijians.
Life of squatters: Case studies
In a Housing and social exclusion Policy Dialogue Paper No. 2 published by CCF
(2007) the struggles and tribulations of the squatters are recounted. Some of
these are presented below:
A Fijian woman gave her account of assisting at election time for the State party
in the promise to get secure land tenure for all people living in the settlement.
She claims however that the promises were never fulfilled and today she is still a
squatter. It was noted: ‘It was the same with the SVT (or Rabuka) and SDL (or
Qarase) governments where promises were made at election time to attract the
votes of the people in the settlement but the promises were never fulfilled. They
only raised false hopes and bitter disappointment among the people. The big
change in her life came however with the support of ECREA. 117
An Indo-Fijian couple in their late 70’s receive an income of only $35 per month
through the Social Welfare Family Assistance Scheme. This they used to buy
groceries, pay medical expenses, travel expenses and pay water bills. This
person was a cane cutter with little income. With no saving for old age the couple
at times goes without food. He recalled that once, when his wife became very ill,
he had to go scavenging in order to feed his wife. The couple consider
themselves lucky to get even one meal a day. Every single day is a challenge as
they fight against sickness and poverty to go on living. They still hope that they
will some day get help from the government. Living in such misery, they
sometimes prayed to God to let them die.118
Indigenous Fijians are also suffering living in squatter settlements. The question
arises as to why they leave their villages to live in a squatter settlement. Of the
many reasons given, one indigenous squatter explained that it was difficult for
them to live in the village because they were discriminated against by their own
fellow villagers for not taking part fully in the vanua and lotu obligations. It was
116 Barr, K.J 2007. Squatters in Fiji. - The Need for an Attitudinal Change. CCF Housing and Social Exclusion Policy Paper 1,
page 18
117 Barr, K.J. et al. 2007. Poverty in Paradise-No way to live: Stories of squatter families and those working among them.
CCF Housing and Social Exclusion Policy Paper No. 2. page 15
118 Barr, K.J. et al. 2007. Poverty in Paradise-No way to live: Stories of squatter families and those working among them.
CCF Housing and Social Exclusion Policy Paper No. 2, page 7
62
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
explained that their inability to meet the vanua and lotu obligations was in fact a
consequence of their poverty.
Thus it might be concluded that in the case of Indigenous Fijian squatters, there
was a choice of either remaining in the village or beginning a new life on a
squatter settlement. In the case of Indo-Fijians, however, with forceful evictions,
there was no choice but to compromise with a new life style in a squatter
settlement.
Concluding remarks
It seems that the State party under Qarase had little to offer to disadvantaged
peoples especially the Indo-Fijians. The State party’s attempt to resolve the
expiring land leases had failed, resulting in many Indo-Fijians to leave their farms
and relocate in squatter settlements.
Its racist policies was instrumental in the political instability caused by December
5, 2006 coup. Thus at the center of the current social, economic and political
problems of Fiji is racism. The current contracting economy is affecting all
communities in Fiji and contributing to the rise of squatter settlements. But this
then raises questions of good governance of the State party. It seems that the
State party was too preoccupied with racial policies rather than the well being of
all Fiji citizens through good governance. Further, it seems that the State party
was no longer interested in the concerns of all taxpayers of Fiji but only a few
nationalist indigenous causes as acquiring rights over coastal waters with its
qoliqoli bill.
Additionally, the State party had negative attitudes towards the increasing
number of squatters who they said were making money from someone else’s
land. But in some credible reports (Father Kevin Barr, 2007) it is reported that
only 5% of the squatters would fall in this category. Many of the Indo-Fijian
squatters had no choice after their forceful evictions but to relocate in squatter
settlements. Further, the State party did little to regulate the property market,
forcing many to live on informal arrangements (vakavanua) with landowners.
Note1: Reasons for squatting
Father Kevin Barr has provided six major reasons why people in Fiji are living in
squatter settlements. These are:
(a) Rural-urban migration - the push and pull factors associated with
urbanization - people are looking for employment and better education and
health care for their children;
(b) Because governments, over the years, have not provided an adequate
supply of affordable low cost housing;
63
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
(c) Because of poverty, unemployment and low wages; governments have not
established a minimum wage and have allowed too many workers to be paid
wages well below the poverty line;
(d) Because too many people have lost land leases and been forced to find
some sort of informal housing for themselves and their families;
(e) Because of the difficulty of obtaining land through the proper channels;
(f) Because of the rapid escalation in the price of land, housing and rents in
urban areas.
Source: Barr, K.J 2007. ‘Squatters in Fiji - Thieves or victims?’, CCF Housing
and Social Exclusion Policy Dialogue Paper 1, page 13.
Note 2:
This in fact has had a negative effect on the Indo-Fijians. There are four
categories of land tenure in Fiji. These are: Freehold land (7.9%), State land
(3.9%), and Native land (87.9%). In terms of tenure, the freeholds and the State
land are perceived to be the best. However, as native land is the most abundant
and conducive to farming, the farmers have little choice but to aspire to obtain a
lease on native lands through Native Land Trust Board (NLTB). But it takes 2-3
years to get a lease on Native land. The costs can be quite high and beyond the
reach of many evicted tenants.
In such situations the only alternative is to squat on State land or to make an
informal arrangement with the landowning unit and obtain vakavanua tenancy.
This tenancy involves goodwill payments to landowners without a signed lease.
As a result, the landowning unit can terminate the arrangement at will. Despite
the undesirable nature of this arrangement, many evicted Indo-Fijian farmers
have no other option but to build a makeshift house.
Note 3: Poverty on squatter settlements
A study undertaken by ECREA between June to August 2005 of 199 households
in three squatter settlements around Suva (Jittu Estate, Muanivatu and Veidogo
and Wailoku) produced the following results:
Table 5.2: Research on informal sector
Income Level
Households earning below $25 a week
$50 “
$75
$100
$125
64
Number of
Families
32
28
33
45
20
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
$150
Households earning between $150-$250
Households earning between $250-$300
Households earning between $300-$400
13
19
3
6
Source: Barr, K.J 2007. ‘Squatters in Fiji – The Need for an Attitudinal Change’ CCF Housing
and Social Exclusion Policy Dialogue Paper 1, page 44
It was concluded that if the poverty line was around $130 a week, then 158
households (or 79%) were living in poverty. Only 41 households (or 21%) were
earning incomes above the property line. One household which earned close to
$400 was supporting 11 dependents in various educational establishments,
including FIT and USP.
The table 5.2 above shows that a relatively high percentage of Indo-Fijians in
both rural and urban areas of Fiji live in poverty. In general, 80% of the squatter
households earn less than F$90 per week.
The 2002-2003 Housing, Income and Expenditure Survey has also reported a
high degree of poverty in the nation in both urban and rural areas as shown in
the Table below:
Table 5.3: Percentage of population living in poverty in rural and urban areas
% of the population
In poverty in rural
Areas
% of the population
In poverty in urban
Areas
Fijians
Indians
Others
38.0
43.1
41.3
27.2
29.1
17.3
Source: Ahlburg,S 1996. The Extent of poverty in Fiji. P. 32.
Ahlburg (1995)119 has discussed different aspects of Fijian and Indo-Fijian
household poverty. He has also shown the percentage of households with
unacceptable housing characteristics. His findings are shown in table 5.3 below:
Table 5.3: Subjective assessments of minimum cash incomes
Use of pit
toilet
Use wood for
cooking fuel
Use kerosene
light
119 http://www.undp.org.fj/_resources/main/files/fijipovertyreports/ch3.pdf
65
No electricity
No safe
source of
water
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Fijian
34.9
IndoFijian
54.5
65.1
49.7
52.5
62.1
11.5
16.0
29.2
21.6
Source: Ahlburg,S 1996. The Extent of poverty in Fiji. P. 37.
Another interesting report by Ahlburg summarizes poverty by ethnicity (19901991)
Table 5.4: Poverty by area and ethnicity 1990 to 1991
Basic needs
poverty
((Minimum
Approx. number of
HH under poverty line
Per cent of households
17,700
22,150
1,370
34,800
28
33
2?
25
under poverty line
gross weekly
income)
Fijian
Indo Fijian
Other
Total
$93
$97
$93
$83
Source: Ahlburg,S 1996. The Extent of poverty in Fiji. P. 34
66
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
6.
RACIALISM IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR
Besides the comments already referred to concerning affirmative action, the
Committee’s concluding observations from its sixty-second session included a
request for updated statistics on education in Fiji and State support for multiracial
and other schools.120 The CCF has attempted in this Chapter to introduce the
Committee to the “Fijian education problem”, and to analyse the Government’s
response to it.
6.1 Background
The provision of education in Fiji was very uneven when the country gained its
independence in 1970. Non-government organisations and community groups
owned and managed the majority of schools. This unfortunately meant that rural
schools were often poorer and less well-equipped than their urban counterparts,
because rural communities had fewer resources to support them.
Today, Fiji has a well established system of schools, but the pattern of school
ownership is largely unchanged and the disparity in the quality of education
between rural and urban schools remains a problem. This disparity leads to
inequalities in students’ later life. Statistics published in the Fiji Islands Education
Commission Learning Together report of 2000 show that schools controlled by
committees and religious organisations dominate both the primary and
secondary sectors. Government is only a minor player, with control over two
primary schools and 12 secondary schools out of 715 and 154, respectively.121
Another important feature of the school system in Fiji is that many schools are
identified with one or the other of the two major ethnic groups, and/or with a
religious group. This identification is usually obvious from the school’s name – so
for example the Ratu Sukuna Memorial School in Suva is identified with the
indigenous Fijian community. An ethnic identification usually means that the
school’s management committee is dominated by members of the identified
ethnic group and that the school culture is dominated by the religious and other
traditions of that group. It often also means that the student body is exclusively or
predominantly made up of students from the identified ethnic group. However,
this is now less common in Indo-Fijian schools, which may be related to
demographic changes. It is notable that the majority of Government-controlled
schools are indigenous Fijian in identification.
Unfortunately, the CCF has been unable to obtain comprehensive statistics on
ethnically-identified schools in Fiji for the purpose of this submission. Presented
below in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are statistics provided by the Fiji Teachers Union
120
CERD/C/62/CO/3 (2 June 2003), paras 18 and 26.
Fiji Islands Education Commission/Panel (2000), Learning Together: Directors for Education in the Fiji
Islands, Government Printer, Suva, pp 27-28.
121
67
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
showing the ethnic breakdown of students attending selected Indo-Fijian
managed schools in the Central Division, and the numbers of indigenous Fijian
students attending indigenous Fijian and other secondary schools in the Western
Division, in 2004.
TABLE 6.1: Ethnic Composition of Selected Indo-Fijian Schools in the Central Division in
2004
School
Indo-Fijian
% Indo-Fijian
30.7
Indigenous
Fijian
366
% Indigenous
Fijian
69.3
DAV Girls
162
Suva Sangam
Shreedhar
College
Saraswati
College
Ahmadiya
Muslim College
Vunimono High
School
Indian College
176
28.1
450
71.9
32
12.1
233
87.9
295
55.5
237
44.5
135
30
315
70.0
490
48.3
525
51.7
356
41.6
500
58.4
Nausori High
122
49.0
127
51.0
Nakasi High
School
TOTAL
112
43.75
144
56.25
1,880
39.4
2,897
60.6
SOURCE: Fiji Teachers Union
TABLE 6.2: Indigenous Fijian Students in Indigenous Fijian and Other Secondary
Schools in the Western Division in 2004
District
Total Roll
%
Indigenous
Fijian
1,915
Indigenous
Fijians in
Indigenous
Fijian Schools
800
%
Indigenous
Fijian
41
Indigenous
Fijians in
Other
Schools
1,115
Nadroga/
Navosa
Lautoka/Na
dI/Yasawa
Ba/Tavua
5,186
1,775
34
3,411
66
2,201
505
23
1,696
77
Ra
1,289
848
66
441
34
TOTAL
10,591
3,928
37
6,663
63
59
SOURCE: Fiji Teachers Union
Table 6.3 below, shows primary and secondary school enrolments in Fiji by
ethnicity at five-yearly intervals from 1970 to 2000. According to these statistics,
the total primary school roll increased by 18% from 1970 to 2000, while the total
secondary school roll grew 327% over the same period. Besides these overall
trends, there have also been significant changes in the ethnic breakdown of
enrolments. In 1970, there were more Indo-Fijian than indigenous Fijian students
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
in both primary and secondary schools, but by 1999 this situation had reversed.
This appears to have been due to the emigration of many Indo-Fijian families
since the coups of 1987 and a lower birth rate among Indo-Fijians.122
TABLE 6.3: Enrolments in Schools in Fiji by Ethnicity, 1970-2000
Year
Primary School Enrolments
Secondary School Enrolments
Indigenous
Fijian
IndoFijian
Others
Total
Indigenous
Fijian
IndoFijian
Others
Total
1970
49,102
65,004
7,268
121,374
4,820
9,642
1,503
15,965
1975
58,368
69,525
7,078
134,971
9,330
16,827
1,915
28,072
1980
56,682
67,517
6,873
131,072
11,345
20,461
2,328
34,134
1985
59,540
61,813
5,933
127,286
16,694
21,588
2,953
41,505
1990
63,581
66,008
6,336
135,925
21,758
27,689
3,788
53,235
1995
74,934
63,379
6,834
145,147
31,060
33,392
3,826
68,278
1999
82,238
55,507
6,539
144,284
33,017
31,969
3,253
68,229
2000
*
*
*
142,621
33,104
32,180
3,565
68,129
* Statistics not available.
SOURCE: Fiji Islands Education Commission report 2000, page 18.
The May 2000 coup had a very negative impact on Fiji’s education system.
During and after the hostage crisis, most schools were closed for extended
periods and a number of schools in Suva temporarily relocated their students to
other schools outside the capital. The visiting and resident students at these
schools then typically received lessons for half of each day, sharing the available
facilities for several weeks.
6.2 “Fijian Education Problem”
Education is a major challenge for Fiji and for indigenous Fijians in particular.
There have been improvements in access to education and participation since
independence but there is still a significant gap in academic performance
between indigenous Fijian and other students.
By 1970, ethnically based labour recruitment and other colonial policies had
produced a well-established urban ethnic division of labour, corresponding to the
rural ethnic division of labour, where indigenous Fijians were mainly subsistence
or cash crop farmers and Indo-Fijians worked on sugarcane farms. Indo-Fijians
and indigenous Fijians had equal representation in low to mid-level government
positions, but in senior positions Indo-Fijians were dominant. Indo-Fijians also
dominated in the education, business and other professions. The negotiations
over arrangements for Fiji’s independence brought issues of group inequality to
122
Tavola, H, (2000) “Status Report” in Fiji Islands Education Report 2000, Government Printer, Suva, p 18.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
the fore. Many indigenous Fijians viewed with apprehension Indo-Fijian
domination of the private sector and the prospect that they might soon overtake
indigenous Fijians as the largest ethnic group in the country. Many indigenous
Fijian leaders saw indigenous political control as an essential counter-balance,
and wanted a constitution that would put the rights and interests of indigenous
Fijians ahead of other groups. This came to be known as the “paramountcy of
Fijian interests”.123
The disparity in educational achievement between indigenous Fijian and other
students was singled out for attention in the independence negotiations and
came to be known as the “Fijian education problem”. Some reasons for the Fijian
education problem were identified in a 1969 Education Commission report. They
included rural poverty, geographic spread and isolation of rural indigenous Fijian
schools, student weariness due to daily long distance travel, cultural discontinuity
between home and school and home conditions that were not conducive to
study.124 The report recommended increases in funding, development and
expansion of secondary schools in rural areas, establishment of junior secondary
schools in strategic locations and the reservation of 50% of government
university scholarships for indigenous Fijians.125
It can thus be seen that affirmative action in education has a long history in this
country. In fact, the main goal of Fiji’s Development Plan 6 (1971-5) was to
“achieve a marked improvement in indigenous Fijian education” and to rectify the
inequality in the educational achievement of indigenous Fijians.126 A scholarship
plan was developed and implemented in 1975 that set the minimum qualifying
score in entrance examinations for the University of the South Pacific (USP) at
216 points for indigenous Fijians and 264 for others.
Table 6.4 below, follows the progress of a group of students who enrolled in
Class 1 (for ages 5-6 years) in 1988. It can be seen that in 1988 there were more
indigenous Fijians than Indo-Fijians in the group. By the time the group reached
Class 6 (for ages 10-11), in 1993, the number of students from the two main
ethnic groups had evened out. By Class 8 (ages 12-13), in 1995, indigenous
Fijian students were out-numbered by Indo-Fijian students and this trend
continued through to Form 7 (ages 17-18) in 2000.
123
White, C, (2001) “Affirmative Action and Education in Fiji: Legitimation, Contestation, and Colonial
Discourse”, Harvard Educational Review, Vol 71 No 2, summer, p 248.
124
Lasaqa, I, (1984) The Fijian People Before and After Independence: 1959-1977, ANU Press, Canberra,
pp 86-7.
125
Id, p 89. Lasaqa notes that the idea of reserving 50% of government scholarships did not go down well
among other ethnic groups: id, p 91.
126
White (2001), p 249.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
TABLE 6.4: Progress of the 1988 Class 1 Cohort for 13 Years
Year
Class
Roll
Fijian
Indo-Fijian
Others
Male
Female
Total
1988
Class 1
11,117
9,738
1,055
11,449
10,461
21,910
1989
Class 2
*
*
*
*
*
20,717
1990
Class 3
*
*
*
*
*
20,403
1991
Class 4
9,324
9,311
957
10,189
9,404
19,593
1992
Class 5
9,619
9,566
749
10,101
9,833
19,934
1993
Class 6
9,084
9,079
877
9,606
9,434
19,040
1994
Class 7
8,994
8,966
990
9,449
9,501
18,950
1995
Class 8
8,223
9,189
906
9,248
9,070
18,318
1996
Form 3
7,399
8,262
787
7,909
8,539
16,448
1997
Form 4
6,906
7,539
636
7,222
7,859
15,081
1998
Form 5
5,811
5,922
666
5,937
6,462
12,399
1999
Form 6
5,733
6,012
586
5,697
6,612
12,309
2000
Form 7
1,247
2,604
250
1,915
2,146
4,061
* Statistics not available.
SOURCE: Fiji Islands Education Commission report 2000, page 30.
Table 6.4 shows that, despite steady improvements in enrolments and the
introduction of tuition fee-free education shortly after independence, the number
of indigenous Fijian students who drop out of school prematurely has continued
to be a problem. Of the 11,117 indigenous Fijian students who enrolled in Class
1 in 1988, only 5,811 reached Form 5 in 1998 (52.3%) and only 1,247 of them
reached Form 7 (11.2%) in 2000. By comparison, of the 9,738 Indo-Fijian
students enrolled in Class 1 in 1988, 5,922 (60.8%) reached Form 5 in 1998 and
2,604 students (26.7%) reached Form 7 in 2000. Nearly half of the indigenous
Fijian students entering Class 1 in 1988 dropped out of school before they
reached Form 5 (for ages 15-16 years) in 1998.
The 2000 Education Commission report also identified some reasons for the
disproportionate drop-out rate among indigenous Fijians. One major factor was
the national examinations conducted in Class 6, Class 8, Form 4 and Form 6.
Other factors were financial problems, family pressures, lack of parental
guidance and support, violence in schools, school admission policies and peer
pressure.127 The report also went on to discuss some wider factors that appeared
to be having an impact on indigenous Fijian education. Factors internal to Fiji
included provincialism, influence of the church, lack of economic and political
security of the country, and lack of strong leadership and resources. External
factors were the proliferation of democracy and globalisation, multiculturalism,
127
Fiji Islands Education Commission/Panel (2000), p 182.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
the information and communication revolution and growing demand for a better
quality of life.128
TABLE 6.5: Fiji School Leaving Examinations, 1989-1997
Number of Candidates and Passes
Year
Indigenous Fijians
Others
% Diff.
Sat
Passed
% Pass
Sat
Passed
% Pass
1989
2,987
12,477
41.7
4,010
2,179
54.3
12.6
1990
3,366
1,420
42.2
4,006
2,263
56.5
14.3
1991
3,844
1,595
41.5
4,603
2,618
56.9
15.4
1992
4,317
1,516
35.1
4,894
3,006
61.4
26.3
1993
4,750
1,806
38.0
5,280
3,217
60.9
22.9
1994
5,012
1,899
37.9
5,340
3,287
61.5
23.6
1995
5,274
2,062
39.1
5,720
3,454
60.4
21.3
1996
5,489
2,126
38.7
6,029
3,556
59.0
20.3
1997
5,376
2,102
39.1
6,248
3,695
59.1
20.0
SOURCE: Fiji Islands Education Commission report 2000, page 181.
Table 6.5, above, shows the number of indigenous Fijian and other students who
sat for, and passed, the Fiji School Leaving Certificate Examinations (FSLC) from
1989 to 1997. In that period, indigenous Fijians had an average pass rate of
39.3% and others had an average pass rate of 58.9% in the FSLC.
Table 6.6, below, shows the number of indigenous Fijian students who sat for,
and passed, secondary school examinations each year from 1995 to 1999. It can
be seen that the number of indigenous Fijian students reaching Form 7 (Year 13)
was alarmingly low. Perhaps the most distressing statistic is that a huge number
of indigenous Fijian students chose not to remain in school after completing their
Fiji Junior Certificate Examination in Form 4 (Year 10).
128
Id, pp 182-3.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
TABLE 6.6: Indigenous Fijian Examination Candidature and Results, 1995-1999
Exam Candidature and Results
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Total
Fiji Junior Certificate (FJC), Year 10
No. of candidates
6,405
6,253
6,390
6,605
6,477
32,130
No. Passed
5,217
5,123
5,289
5,477
5,448
26,554
% Passed
81.45
81.93
82.77
82.92
84.11
84.65
Fiji School Leaving Certificate (FSLC), Year 12
No. of candidates
5,274
5,489
5,376
5,402
5,202
26,743
No. Passed
2,062
2,126
2,102
2,076
2,309
10,675
% Passed
39.1
38.73
39.1
38.43
44.39
39.92
Fiji Seventh Form Examination (FSFE), Year 13
No. of candidates
871
934
968
998
963
4,734
No. Passed
387
460
644
627
502
2,620
% Passed
44.4
49.25
66.53
62.83
52.13
55.34
SOURCE: Fiji Islands Education Commission report 2000, page 188.
6.3 Explaining the Gap Between Indigenous Fijian and Other Students
One explanation for the discrepancy between indigenous Fijian and other
students in academic performance and drop out rates, consistent with some of
the reasons given in the 2000 Education Commission report, is that indigenous
Fijian families tend to give greater priority than others to social, cultural and
religious responsibilities, and this comes at the expense of their children’s
educational needs. Prominent Fiji economist Wadan Narsey has stated that
“indigenous Fijian students are often expected to have a wider focus on sports,
culture, dance and song (which turns them into well-rounded persons) while
Indo-Fijian students are preoccupied with academic success, to the detriment of
other important objectives in life.”129 Narsey suggests that it has become a
tendency for the public to vent its disappointment over the poor performance of
indigenous Fijian students in education. While the Ministry of Education has been
trying to solve the Fijian education problem for decades now, there is “no
mechanism”, argues Narsey, to compel indigenous Fijian schools, principals,
teachers and students to start out on the difficult learning curve that they must
follow if there is to be a real improvement in indigenous Fijian education over
time.130 Study after study has been carried out on the problems. There are
predictable factors such as lack of library and laboratory resources, qualifications
and experience of teachers, home environments for indigenous Fijian students
not conducive to study, schools being too far away, and student-to-teacher ratios.
However, there are also factors such as performance of teachers and principals,
129
130
Narsey, W, (2002) “Fijian Education: the good news”, Fiji Times, September 10.
Ibid.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
parent and student motivation and indigenous Fijian cultural obligations, which
present special difficulty for political reasons.131
A study conducted by Narsey in 1995 of a group of indigenous Fijian students in
Form 7 who attended multi-ethnic and indigenous Fijian schools showed
remarkable results. Schools such as Natabua and Labasa Secondary and Adi
Cakobau School (ACS, for indigenous Fijian girls) were the top performing
schools in Fiji. Indigenous Fijian schools with a significant minority of nonindigenous Fijian students performed better than the elite indigenous Fijian boys
schools of Queen Victoria School (QVS) and Ratu Kadavulevu School (RKS)
(which performed dismally). The performance of indigenous Fijian students in
multi-ethnic schools was much better than in indigenous Fijian schools. In multiethnic schools, the average marks for indigenous Fijian students were nearly
equal to the average marks for other students. Narsey suggested that greater
(inter-ethnic) competition, positive peer pressure and the influence of principals
and teachers may have resulted in the impressive performance of these
indigenous Fijian students. The 1996 FJC (Form 4), FSLC (Form 6), and FSFE
(Form 7) examinations showed comparable trends at all levels. Narsey also
noted that, while QVS and RKS have always been among the most wellresourced indigenous Fijian schools in the country, and have attracted the best
indigenous Fijian students, their academic performance was in fact disappointing.
The impressive performance of indigenous Fijian students in multi-ethnic schools
such as Natabua and Labasa College, as found by Narsey’s 1995 study,
suggests that the school environment, including principals, teachers and multiethnic student peer groups, are major contributing factors. The performance of
the elite indigenous Fijian girls school, ACS, suggests that the gender of the
student population can also be a contributor.
6.4 Affirmative Action in Education under the Social Justice Act 2001
Like its predecessors, the current Government has affirmative action programs in
place to enhance indigenous Fijian education. These include the creation of
Centres of Excellence (upgrading facilities such as school buildings, building new
classrooms and staff quarters and purchasing new library books), the upgrade of
boarding facilities, the provision of textbooks to indigenous Fijian schools
(including textbooks in the Fijian language) and community awareness projects
for indigenous Fijian parents and students. One of the more recent and
controversial programs was to provide scholarships to “all indigenous Fijian
students in Form 7 in 2005 regardless of parental income.”132 This met with fierce
opposition from the Fiji Teachers Union and other non-government organisations,
including the CCF. The program was discriminatory in the sense that assistance
was provided on the basis of race and not need. There was no means test. Even
131
132
Ibid.
Fiji Teachers Union, (2005) “Press Release: Government’s Affirmative Action Plan”, February 10.
74
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
worse, despite the fact that nearly 40% of indigenous Fijian students attend IndoFijian managed schools,133 scholarships were only given to those in indigenous
Fijian schools. By penalising indigenous Fijian students in non-indigenous Fijian
schools, the free Form 7 program promoted racial segregation.
The Fiji Teachers Union has advised that the free Form 7 affirmative action
program was applied in 2005 but not in the current school year (2006). The CCF
hopes it has been quietly terminated.
However, racial segregation appeared to be an objective of another education
policy of the 2001-2006 Government. The 2004 Corporate Plan of the Ministry of
Education outlined a proposal to establish a new Form 7 college exclusively for
indigenous Fijian students. In light of Narsey’s finding in 1995 that indigenous
Fijian students in multi-ethnic schools tended to outperform indigenous Fijian
students in indigenous Fijian schools, it is highly questionable whether a new
college, exclusively for indigenous Fijians, would be of benefit to the students or
the wider community.
There have also been reports of misuse of funds provided for under affirmative
action programs. Of the $2 million (Fiji dollars) that was approved under the
affirmative action program for the creation of Centres of Excellence, for example,
more than $1 million was allegedly misused.134 As a result, the three schools
benefiting from the program in 2002 were dropped, and new “Centres of
Excellence” were selected from 2003 onwards. According to the Auditor-General,
schools dropped from the program had made advance payments for building
materials, held unaudited bank accounts, failed to record payments and made
excessive payments for casual labour. One secondary school principal was
criticised for wrongly authorising local purchase orders and payments. A school
board was advised by Baba Forests Company, a company owned by the national
secretary of the governing SDL party, to purchase building supplies that were
then not used. In a third case, funds earmarked for the improvement of school
infrastructure were used to buy uniforms for a provincial rugby team and local
chiefs who supported the team.135
The reservation of 50% of government scholarships for indigenous Fijians since
the mid-1970’s is another program that has achieved disappointing results.
Table 6.7, below, provides statistics on the number of indigenous Fijian students
who received scholarships from the Ministry of Fijian Affairs to attend tertiary
institutions between 1984 and 1999. A total of 6,252 tertiary scholarships were
awarded to indigenous Fijian students during this period, but only 2,466 students
(39.4%) graduated. Approximately $60 million was spent on these scholarships
133
The Fiji Teachers Union gave this statistic in a letter of complaint sent to the Fiji Human Rights
Commission concerning the “Free Form 7” policy, dated 6 October 2003.
134
Wilson, C, (2005) “$1m Lost in School Plan”, Fiji Sun, 6 December, p 1.
135
Auditor-General of Fiji, (2005) Special Investigations Report of the Auditor General of the Republic of Fiji
Islands, November 2005, Section 02.
75
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
over the 16 years in question. Despite being so clearly ineffective, the program
continues to date without change. A non-indigenous Fijian student is eligible for
a tertiary scholarship if his or her parents’ annual family income does not exceed
$10,000 (Fiji dollars), while for indigenous Fijian and Rotuman students there is
no income limit or other means test. Besides undermining the effectiveness of
the policy in targeting disadvantage, the lack of any means test creates
opportunities for abuse by administrators.
TABLE 6.7: Ministry of Fijian Affairs Tertiary Scholarships, 1984-1999
Institution
Scholarships
Graduates
% Graduating
526
319
60.7
3,133
774
24.7
2,369
1,220
51.5
Fiji School Of Medicine
66
43
65.2
Fiji College of Agriculture
67
50
74.6
Corpus Christi Teachers’
College
Fiji College of Advanced
Education
Fulton College
20
12
60.0
2
2
100.0
14
10
71.4
Pilot Training
55
36
65.5
6,252
2,466
39.4
Overseas
University of the South
Pacific
Fiji Institute of Technology
TOTAL
SOURCE: Fiji Islands Education Commission report, page 200.
As the programs described above demonstrate, affirmative action in indigenous
Fijian education has not been sufficiently grounded in research and analysis, and
the policies themselves have not been targeted to assist those genuinely in need.
It is notable that the 2000 Education Commission report recommended the
application of a means test to indigenous Fijian scholarships so that only those
students whose parents cannot afford tertiary education for their children are
eligible. The report also suggested that a study be undertaken to identify the
factors that play a role in the poor performance of indigenous Fijian students in
tertiary institutions. As far as the CCF is aware, neither of these
recommendations has been implemented to date.
In 1995, Wadan Narsey conducted a study on indigenous Fijian students’
performance at the University of the South Pacific (USP), in which he found that
the low quality of subject passes on entry into USP (that is, lower university
entrance scores) contributed directly to poor performance of students at
university.136 Narsey suggested that more attention should be given to try to
improve the quality of subject passes if indigenous Fijian students are to do well
at university. He argued that, from the very start, indigenous Fijian university
136
Narsey, W, (1995) “Fijian Academic Performance at the USP: Where are the Problems?”, unpublished
paper.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
students are disadvantaged and they lag behind others who were required to
achieve higher entrance scores.
6.5 Conclusions on Education
It is undeniable that indigenous Fijian students continue to lag behind students
from other communities in Fiji’s education system, and affirmative action is
needed to reduce this gap. However, the CCF believes that affirmative action
programs in the education sector must change to be based on detailed and
reliable information that identifies genuine needs, not suspicions and prejudices
concerning ethnicity. As discussed in Chapter 4 of this submission, on affirmative
action, there is also an urgent need for all affirmative action programs to be
monitored and regularly evaluated.
The Government’s current affirmative action programs in the education sector
are fundamentally flawed. Its free Form 7 program for indigenous Fijian students
who attended indigenous Fijian schools in 2005 was racist and divisive. The lack
of any means test in this and other programs renders them ineffective and open
to abuse. The proposal to establish a Form 7 college exclusively for indigenous
Fijians would promote racial segregation. Some of the programs arguably reward
inferior performance rather than encouraging improvement.
The tertiary scholarship program for indigenous Fijian students clearly does not
provide good value for taxpayers’ money and needs to be redesigned. From
Table 6.7, above, it can be seen that nearly half (3,133) of all scholarship awards
between 1984 and 1999 were to indigenous students who attended USP. Only
24.7% (774) of these students graduated. This means that, on average, 48
indigenous Fijians graduated annually out of 196 who received scholarships. One
of the problems here is that, as Narsey’s 1995 study on the performance of USP
students confirmed, lower university entrance requirements lead to a higher rate
of failure. Indigenous Fijians at university are competing with a wider student
body that was required to achieve significantly higher entrance scores. It may be
that the indigenous Fijian scholarship program would be more effective if it were
means tested and the university entrance requirements were equalised.
There is a strong argument for programs that intervene earlier to encourage
better academic performance and reduce school drop outs. Rather than
providing tuition-free Form 7 for indigenous Fijians, for example, more resources
could be put into keeping students in the school system after the Fiji Junior
Certificate Examination in Form 4.
If the Government is genuinely committed to improving indigenous Fijian
education, the CCF believes it should put more effort into promoting multi-ethnic
schools. Further research will no doubt confirm the benefits of this approach,
which is already supported by the results of Narsey’s study on secondary school
77
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
student performance, and multi-ethnic schools offer the added advantage of
promoting multiculturalism and inter-ethnic harmony.
Poorly designed and unmonitored affirmative action programs benefiting only
indigenous Fijian students reinforce ethnic divisions in the minds of Fiji’s youth.
They are a source of resentment among other ethnic groups and contribute to
the sense that there are two classes of citizenship in Fiji. A higher priority needs
to be given to problems of performance and drop outs in other ethnic groups. The
“Fijian education problem” should not be allowed to eclipse the plight of
disadvantaged children and young people from all communities.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
7.
DISPROPORTIONATE EMIGRATION OF INDO-FIJIANS
The Committee’s concluding observations from it sixty-second session did not
specifically address the issue of emigration from Fiji. This is a very serious issue
for the national economy, and our society as a whole. The CCF believes it is also
an important indicator of the state of inter-ethnic relations in the country.
7.1 The Facts
One of the major problems faced by Pacific island countries such as Fiji is
emigration of their citizens to developed countries, especially Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and the USA. With this emigration, the Pacific island countries lose
valuable human capital. It is well-known that migration is an important factor in
socio-economic development the world over.137 In the larger Asian countries,
where there is a surplus of labour, emigration of skilled and professional citizens
is sometimes seen as contributing positively to economic development. However,
in the Pacific islands, with their much smaller populations, the supply of labour –
and especially that of skilled labour – is very limited and the demand for it is high,
so emigration is harmful to the development of their small, vulnerable economies.
In our region, the flight of skilled labour is popularly referred to as “brain drain”.
Table 7.1, on the next page, provides annual statistics on emigration from Fiji by
ethnicity from 1978 to 2003. This shows that the country has experienced a
massive outflow of its skilled citizens over the past 25 years, and especially since
the coups of 1987 and 2000. According to the Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics,
more than 87,000 people left Fiji between 1987 and 2003, at an average rate of
over 5,100 people per year. This compares to an average of approximately 2,300
emigrants in the years 1978 to 1986. 87.5% (94,430) of all emigrants from 1978
to 2003 were Indo-Fijians, 6.8% (7,283) were indigenous Fijians and 5.7%
(6,156) were people from other ethnic groups.138
137
Reddy, M, Mohanty, M, and Naidu, V, (2002)”Economic Cost of Human Capital Loss from Fiji:
Implications for Sustainable Development”, paper presented at the 5th International Conference of the Asia
Pacific Migration Research Network (APMRN), September 24-26, at Naviti Resort, Coral Coast, Fiji, p 3.
138
Some commentators have suggested the official statistics understate emigration by non-Indo-Fijians.
79
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
TABLE 7.1: Emigration by Ethnicity, 1978-2003
Year
Indigenous
Fijians
% Indigenous
Fijians
Indo-Fijians
% Indo-Fijians
Others
% Others
Total
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total
78
70
131
161
162
196
179
217
178
351
263
249
307
280
248
268
252
285
319
324
362
418
468
511
421
585
7,283
4.2
4.4
7.2
6.3
6.5
7.6
8.0
7.8
6.2
6.8
4.8
4.5
5.4
5.2
5.4
6.5
6.0
5.8
6.3
7.2
7.5
8.7
8.9
8.1
7.7
10.2
6.6
1,592
1,377
1,487
2,146
2,086
2,152
1,849
2,307
2,362
4,294
4,808
4,921
5,020
4,911
4,184
3,707
3,748
4,463
4,527
3,999
4,273
4,244
4,568
5,550
4,831
4,964
94,430
85.8
85.6
82.8
84.0
83.6
83.4
82.6
83.1
81.6
84.0
87.5
90.4
88.9
90.4
90.5
90.3
89.8
90.5
90.0
89.0
88.5
87.7
86.6
87.9
88.1
86.0
87.5
186
162
177
247
248
232
210
252
354
473
425
280
323
241
189
132
175
183
184
170
194
175
239
255
228
222
6,156
10.0
10.0
9.7
9.7
9.9
9.0
9.4
9.1
12.2
9.2
7.7
5.1
5.7
4.4
4.1
3.2
4.2
3.7
3.7
3.8
4.0
3.6
4.5
4.0
4.2
3.8
5.7
1,856
1,609
1,795
2,554
2,496
2,580
2,238
2,776
2,894
5,118
5,496
5,510
5,650
5,432
4,621
4,107
4,175
4,931
5,030
4,493
4,829
4,837
5,275
6,316
5,480
5,771
107,869
SOURCE: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics
80
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
TABLE 7.2: Emigration of Professional and Technical Category, 1987-1999
Category
Total loss 1987% loss
Annual average 19871999
1999
Architects
1,439
20.9
110.7
Accountants
1,065
15.5
81.9
Teachers
2,125
30.9
163.5
Medical Workers
893
13.0
68.7
Others
1,347
19.0
103.6
TOTAL
6,869
100.0
528.0
SOURCE: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics
Table 7.2, above, shows the number of Fiji citizens in the professional and
technical category who emigrated in the period 1987 to 1999. It can be seen from
these statistics that an average of 528 skilled migrants left Fiji annually from 1987
to 1999. According to Reddy, Mohanty and Naidu, this figure increased to nearly
1,000 per year in 2000 and 2001 – demonstrating the emigration spike that
followed the May 2000 coup.139
The education and health sectors in Fiji have been the most drastically affected
by brain drain since the 1987 coups and again since 2000. Teachers were the
largest single professional group to emigrate between 1987 and 1999,
accounting for nearly 31% (2,125) of the entire professional and technical
category, followed by architects and related professions at 21% (1,439).
7.2 Factors Contributing to Emigration from Fiji
Commentators often explain trends in emigration in terms of “pull factors” and
“push factors”. Pull factors are characterised as those career and life
opportunities available in another country that attract people to emigrate there.
They are typically economic in nature, and include better job prospects, higher
wages and a generally higher standard of living (including education, health care
and so on). Push factors are characterised as the threats or challenges of life in
the country of birth that drive people to leave. These are typically political, social
or environmental in nature.
Many indigenous Fijian leaders appear to deny that there are any push factors
contributing to emigration from Fiji. Members of the 2001-2006 Government
seemed oblivious to the issue. However, the statistics show a clear link between
emigration and the three coups. From Table 7.1 (on the previous page), for
example, it can be seen that, in 1987, the year in which Fiji experienced its first
two coups, the number of emigrants was almost double what it had been the year
139
831 and 977 professional, technical and related workers left Fiji in 2000 and 2001, respectively, giving a
total of nearly 9,000 for the fifteen year period from 1987 to 2001: Reddy, Mohanty, Naidu (2002), p 5.
81
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
before. This dramatic increase was sustained – at an average of 5,500 emigrants
per year – until 1992, when the first elections were held under a new constitution
introduced by the Government of coup leader, Sitiveni Rabuka. By 1997,
emigration had stabilised at approximately 4,500 emigrants per year. However,
when the May 2000 coup intervened, the number of people leaving Fiji peaked at
a new high of 6,316 in 2001, and sustained its post-1987 average of 5,500 for the
years 2000 to 2003. Figure 1, on the next page, plots these numbers on a graph
in order to display visually how the coups of 1987 and 2000 drove people to
leave Fiji in unprecedented numbers.
82
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Figure 7.1: Emigration by Ethnicity, 1978-2003
7000
No. of People Emigrating
6000
5000
4000
3000
INDIGENOUS FIJIANS
INDO-FIJIANS
2000
OTHERS
TOTAL
1000
0
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
83
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Aside from the dramatic effect of the coups, the most striking feature of this
Figure is the huge disparity in emigration between Indo-Fijians and other ethnic
groups. Between 1978 and 2003, the overall ratio of Indo-Fijian emigrants to
indigenous Fijians and others was more than 7:1. The ratio of Indo-Fijians to
indigenous Fijians alone was nearly 13:1. Given that the populations of
indigenous and Indo-Fijians living in Fiji were approximately equal during this
period,140 this disparity is astounding.
Several factors appear to contribute to it. One is undoubtedly that Indo-Fijians as
a group have tended to perform better than indigenous Fijians in education and
employment (as to education, see Chapter 6 of this submission). As a
consequence, there are more Indo-Fijians with the kinds of qualifications and
work experience that make them attractive as employees to overseas businesses
and qualify them for the developed countries’ skilled migrant programs.
Secondly, it has been suggested that Indo-Fijians are disproportionately
represented among emigrants because Fiji’s land laws effectively deny many of
them the opportunity to own land, by reserving approximately 90% of all land for
collective indigenous Fijian ownership.141 Indo-Fijians have traditionally been
tenant farmers, and this has left them vulnerable to intimidation and lawful or
unlawful expulsion by indigenous Fijian landowners (especially during periods of
political instability).
A third factor, and perhaps the most troubling, is that Indo-Fijians were the
primary victims of the coups. One of the distinguishing features of the two
Governments that were overthrown in 1987 and 2000 was that they had each
been elected with the support of an overwhelming majority of Indo-Fijian voters.
At all other times in Fiji’s post-independence history, the political parties
supported by the Indo-Fijian community have been in opposition. When defeated
politicians and extreme nationalists in the indigenous Fijian community
demonised the Governments elected in 1987 and 1999 for being “Indian
dominated”, they were not only referring to those Governments’ parliamentary
membership, but also to their popular support base. It was, in effect, the political
leaders of the Indo-Fijian community who were thrown out of office (although this
is not to say that many indigenous Fijians did not vote for them as well). Similarly,
it was Indo-Fijians who felt most personally threatened during and after the
coups, and it was their businesses that were primarily targeted by looters and
vandals. As a consequence of being victimised in this way, Indo-Fijians
experienced feelings of dispossession and insecurity concerning their future in
Fiji. This is borne out statistically by the fact that, while emigration by indigenous
Fijians and other ethnic groups rose by approximately 47% between the pre-coup
140
In fact, a lower birth rate among Indo-Fijians and disproportionate emigration have meant that the
indigenous Fijian population has grown relatively larger since the mid-1990s. The 2007 Census by the Fiji
Bureau of Statistics reveals the indigenous Fijian population is 473,983 (57% of the total), Indo-Fijians at
311,591 (38%) and balance made up by others at 42,326 (8%), <www.statsfiji.gov.fj>. The total population
was said to be 827,900.
141
Reddy, Mohanty, Naidu (2002), p 6.
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NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
period of 1983 to 1986 and the immediate post-coup years of 1987 to 1990,
emigration by Indo-Fijians leapt by 120%.142
A fourth possible factor in Indo-Fijian emigration suggested by a few indigenous
Fijian commentators is that Indo-Fijians do not feel the same sense of loyalty to
Fiji as indigenous Fijians. This may be just a pejorative way of explaining that
Indo-Fijians feel victimised by the coups and the Governments that have been
installed as a result of them.
To sum up then, the factors contributing to emigration from Fiji appear to fall into
two groups: socio-economic (pull) factors and political (push) factors.
The prospect of earning higher wages is probably the single greatest pull factor
attracting skilled Fiji citizens to emigrate to countries such as Australia, New
Zealand, Canada and the USA. This combines with all the advantages of larger
and more developed employment markets, and generally higher standards of
living.
The obvious push factor is political instability and the insecurity and economic
problems that have been brought about by the coups of 1987 and 2000. It is
notable that a study by Ghani and Ward in 1995 on the migration of professionals
from Fiji to New Zealand suggested that political instability in Fiji was a greater
factor than the demand for labour in New Zealand.143 Uneven distribution of land
ownership, insecurity of tenancies and ethnic tensions are probably other
contributors to emigration. For example, the late 1990s and early 2000s also saw
the expiry and non-renewal of unprecedented numbers of 30-year agricultural
leases, with expelled tenants being overwhelmingly Indo-Fijian.
Indo-Fijians have been over-represented in emigration from Fiji throughout the
independence period, and this appears to be largely due to their relatively better
performance in education and employment. However, the extent of this overrepresentation rose alarmingly after the 1987 coups and has only begun to
reduce since the mid-1990s through a gradual increase in emigration by
indigenous Fijians. This indicates that, besides exacerbating the overall problem
of brain drain, Fiji’s recent history of political instability has also disproportionately
driven away Indo-Fijians. As mentioned above, the current Government has
taken no specific action to address this issue.
One effort by the Government to encourage indigenous Fijian emigrants, but not
those from other ethnic groups, to return to Fiji is discussed below.
7.3 Racist Provision in the Immigration Act 2003
142
These calculations are based on the statistics in Table 1.
Ghani, A, and Ward, BD, (1995) “Migration of Professionals from Fiji to New Zealand: A Reduced Form
of Supply-Demand Model”, World Development, Vol 23(9), pp 1,663-37.
143
85
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
On 1 March 2004, during its sixty-fourth session, the Committee held a thematic
discussion on non-citizens and racial discrimination. In the course of that
discussion a representative of London-based NGO, Minority Rights Group
International, by the name of Mr Baldwin, made a statement at the CCF’s request
concerning new immigration legislation that had been introduced by the
Government of Fiji in 2003. According to the record of the discussion, Mr Baldwin
said that a new Act of Parliament had “come into force in November 2003, which
had led to discrimination against certain unregistered groups and Indo-Fijians.
There was no legitimate objective for such discrimination, and it was wholly
inconsistent with the Fijian Bill of Rights.”144
One detail of this statement was inaccurate: the Act was passed into law in 2003,
but it did not “come into force”. To date, the Act remains on the statute books, but
the Government has not taken the final step necessary to bring it into effect
(namely, to publish a notice of the Act’s commencement in the Gazette).
Aside from this detail, the CCF stands by the statement of the Minority Rights
Group International. The offending provision is section 8(1)(g) of the Immigration
Act 2003. It provides that non-citizens of Fiji who are registered in the Vola ni
Kawabula (VKB) or Register of Native Lands may enter, reside and work in Fiji
without a permit. In effect, individuals to whom section 8(1)(g) applies will have
the same immigration status as citizens. The other classes of non-citizens to
whom this privilege is extended are children of Fiji citizens, foreign diplomats,
authorised military personnel and employees of the Government.145
The problem with section 8(1)(g) is that only indigenous Fijians may be
registered in the VKB, because only indigenous Fijians may own native land in
Fiji. This means the provision will apply only to former citizens who are
indigenous Fijians and any of their children who become registered in the VKB.
As a result, it discriminates against former citizens who are not indigenous, and
the children of non-indigenous former citizens, on the ground of ethnicity. It may
also discriminate against indigenous Fijians who are not registered in the VKB
and minority indigenous groups. In the CCF’s view, section 8(1)(g) is therefore
inconsistent with Fiji’s Constitution, as well as the Convention.
We put our objection to section 8(1)(g) to both the Prime Minister and the
Minister for Immigration in October 2004, but have not yet received any
response. The Fiji Human Rights Commission has advised us that it agrees
section 8(1)(g) is unconstitutional, and that it has raised the matter with the
Attorney-General. This may be one reason why the Government has delayed
bringing the Immigration Act 2003 into effect.
144
145
CERD/C/SR.1624 (5 March 2004), para 54.
Immigration Act 2003 s 8(1)(b)-(f).
86
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Besides being unconstitutional, the CCF also believes that section 8(1)(g) is
economically counter-productive in that it is likely to discourage non-indigenous
former citizens and their children from returning to Fiji. Like other developing
countries, Fiji receives an enormous amount of funds in the form of remittances,
or monetary gifts sent to citizens by their family members living abroad. These
family members are generally working in more developed countries, and many
are skilled tradespeople and professionals. The CCF believes that Fiji should be
opening its doors to these people when they wish to return to the country of their
birth or family, because they are likely to bring with them skills and savings that
the country sorely needs.
87
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
8.
SUICIDE RATES
In the concluding observations from its sixty-second session, the Committee took
note of statistics presented to it by the NGO Coalition on Human Rights
concerning the alarmingly high rate of suicide among Indo-Fijians. The
Committee recommended that the Government “conduct research into the
causes of this phenomenon and keep the Committee informed.”
The CCF is not aware of any action the Government has taken in response to
this recommendation. However, we present in Table 8.1 on the next page
updated statistics on reported suicides146 provided by the Fiji Police Force. The
statistics cover the period from 2000 to 2004 and include a breakdown by ethnic
group.
The statistics presented in the submission of the NGO Coalition on Human
Rights in 2002 were sourced from the Ministry of Health and included an ethnic
breakdown of suicides and attempted suicides for 1999 and 2000. These
statistics showed 10 suicides and 7 attempted suicides by indigenous Fijians, 75
suicides and 84 attempted suicides by Indo-Fijians, and 3 suicides and 0
attempted suicides by members of other ethnic groups in 1999. When these
numbers are compared with those shown in Table 8.1 for the following year, it is
notable that there was a significant rise in Indo-Fijian suicides and attempted
suicides (from 159 to 202 total cases) between 1999 and 2000, but no rise
among indigenous Fijians and others. Early 2000 was of course, the time when
Fiji suffered its latest coup.
The CCF’s purpose in presenting these updated statistics is simply to reiterate
the point made by the NGO Coalition on Human Rights in 2002, that the
disproportionate rate of Indo-Fijian suicides is extremely disturbing and warrants
urgent attention by the Government.
As mentioned in the previous Chapter of this submission, on emigration, the
latest figures published by the Fiji Bureau of Statistics estimate that the IndoFijian community made up 38% of the total population at the end of 2004.147
indigenous Fijian population at 456,207 (54% of the total), Indo-Fijians at
320,659 (38%) and others at 63,335 (8%), as of 31 December 2004: see
<www.statsfiji.gov.fj>. In other words, approximately 38% of the population
accounted for 86% of all suicides and attempted suicides in the five years from
2000 to 2004.
146
For the purpose of these statistics, suicide is defined as death due to self-inflicted injury committed with
the intent of causing death.
147
Indigenous Fijians made up an estimated 54% of the total, and others the remaining 8%:
<www.statsfiji.gov.fj>. The total population was said to be 840,201. These estimates appear to be forward
projections from the 1996 national census.
88
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
TABLE 8.1: Suicides and Attempted Suicides by Ethnicity, 2000-2004
Indigenous Fijians
Indo-Fijians
Year
Suicides Attempted
Suicides
Total
Suicides Attempted
Suicides
Total
Other ethnic groups
Suicides Attempted
Suicides
Totals
Total
Suicides Attempted
Suicides
Total
2000
12
5
17
92
110
202
1
3
4
105
118
223
2001
14
13
27
101
112
213
2
1
3
117
126
243
2002
18
12
30
90
107
197
1
2
3
109
121
230
2003
21
12
33
79
80
159
2
1
3
102
93
195
2004
16
10
26
75
94
169
2
1
3
93
105
198
Total
81
52
133
437
503
940
8
8
16
526
563
1089
SOURCE: Fiji Police Crimes Statistics Department, Nabua
89
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Another way of describing the statistics is to say that the average annual rate of
suicide in Fiji for the period 2000 to 2004 was approximately 12.5 deaths per
100,000 people. Of these deaths, Indo-Fijians made up 10.4, indigenous Fijians
1.9 and others 0.2. This is more than double the representation of Indo-Fijians
that you would expect if the suicide rate were uniform across the three ethnic
categories.
Wadan Narsey has attempted to explain the Indo-Fijian suicide rate by reference
to “intense feelings of helplessness and hopelessness” brought on by the 1987
and 2000 coups, systematic discrimination by the Government, messages of
hopelessness preached by Indo-Fijian politicians, and the breakdown of IndoFijian communities caused by massive emigration from Fiji combined with
urbanisation within the country. He also blames Hindu religious organisations for
failing to speak out against suicide, and the influence of a traditional story of two
Hindu deities, Rama and Sita, told in the Ramayana, which appears to condone
suicide as a means of proving a woman’s honour. Narsey also suggests that
poor treatment of women in rural areas may contribute to suicides.148
Table 8.2, below, shows a breakdown of the suicide statistics for 2000 to 2004 by
gender. Unfortunately, a combined breakdown by gender and ethnicity was not
available.
TABLE 8.2: Suicides and Attempted Suicides by Gender, 2000-2004
Year
Males
Females
Suicide
2000
61
Attempted
Suicide
44
Total
Suicide
Total
44
Attempted
Suicide
74
105
2001
68
42
110
49
84
133
2002
64
39
103
45
82
127
2003
45
47
92
57
46
103
2004
57
45
102
36
60
96
Total
295
217
512
231
346
577
118
SOURCE: Fiji Police Crimes Statistics Department, Nabua
It can be seen from this Table that more males committed suicide than females
during the five year period for which statistics are available. However, if
attempted suicides are taken into account then the female numbers are higher.
148
Narsey, W, (2002) “Politics, Religion and Suicide: Strange Silences”, Fiji Times, September 5.
90
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
The statistics from the Fiji Police Force also identify the method of suicide used.
Of these, hanging was the most common method for all ethnic groups and for
females as well as males. Injestion of paraquat (a weed killer) and other
chemicals was the next most commonly used method of suicide. A significant
number of females, but not males, also committed or attempted suicide by
burning themselves.
In conclusion, the CCF believes that the high rate of suicide among Indo-Fijians
is partly explained by cultural factors, but we are concerned that this may not be
the whole story. As Narsey has suggested, community breakdown and feelings
of helplessness and hopelessness, associated with systematic racial
discrimination and State neglect, as described elsewhere in this submission,
could also be contributors. It seems plausible that suicides in Fiji may be
influenced by the same “push factors” as emigration, but operating on a more
disadvantaged section of the community. As with emigration, the 2001-2006
Government appeared to have done nothing to address the issue.
91
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
CERD: Concluding observations
Item #24 of the CERD report on Fiji took a note of the growing rate of suicide
among Indo-Fijians, and recommended that the State party conduct research into
the causes of this phenomenon, and keep the CERD Committee informed.
TABLE 8.3: Suicide and attempted suicide by ethnicity
Ethnicity
Fijian
Indo-Fijian
Total
2000-2003
107 (12.2%)
772 (87.8%)
879 (100%)
2004-2006
77(14.7%)
446 (85.3%)
523 (100%)
Total
184 (13.1%)
1218 (86.9%)
1402 (100%)
SOURCE: Fiji Police Crimes Statistics Department, Nabua, July 2007.
It can be seen from the Table 8.3 there is a significant difference in the suicide
rates of the indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians. It might be noted that the suicide
and attempted suicide for indigenous Fijians from 2000-2006 was 184 while for
the Indo-Fijians, the figure for the same period was 1,218. The highest number
(86.9%) of suicide and attempted suicide for the Indo-Fijians was during the first
three years after the 2000 coup. During the period 2004-2006, there was a
significant decline in suicides and attempted suicides for both indigenous Fijians
and Indo-Fijians. The decline in percentage points for indigenous Fijians and
Indo-Fijians was 16 and 26 (points) respectively.
With respect to suicide and attempted suicide it might be noted that there has
been a significant decline in suicide and attempted suicide rates of Indo-Fijians
since 2000. The mean point of suicide and attempted suicide rates for IndoFijians between the years 2000-2003 was 271. The figure however had dropped
to 148 over the next three years (2004-2006).
It might be reasonable to suggest that the relatively high suicide rate among the
Indo-Fijians during the first three years of 2000 may have been caused by the
2000 coup d’etat. This may be due to their feelings of helplessness and
hopelessness resulting from 2000 coup. Data disaggregated by race and gender
was not available to make inferences of mistreatment of Indo-Fijian females (at
the height of 2000 coup in places like Dreketi and Muaniweni). High suicide and
attempted suicides among the Indo-Fijian may also be due to cultural reasons as
was suggested by academics like Wadan Narsey149. He blamed Hindu religious
organizations for failing to speak out against suicide, and the influence of
traditional stories of Hindu deities which tended to condone suicide as a way of
proving a woman’s honour. Additionally, he suggests that poor treatment of
women in rural areas could also contribute to suicides.
149 Narsey, W. 2002. Politics, Religion and suicide: Strange Silence. Fiji Times, September 5, 2002
92
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Fiji Government’s views on suicides in 2006 report to CERD
The State party (Qarase Government) was responsible for the formation of the
National Committee for the Prevention of Suicides (NCOPS) in 2001 to prevent
suicides. The three major goals of NCOPS are:
1. Coordinating National Activities on Suicide Prevention,
2. To adopt effective preventive strategies to the local setting /promoting
awareness and training of relevant personnel,
3. Improving data collection and promoting research on suicide prevention.
It had taken steps to reduce suicide rates across races through networking with
NGOs, community leaders through NCOPS and attempted operating out of the
Ministry of Health. It could be quite possible that strategies currently undertaken
by NCOPS have effectively reduced the suicide rates of all races.
No clear statement has been made to date by the Bainimarama regime on the
high suicide rate of the Indo-Fijians. The regime has only been in existence since
December 5, 2006 and has yet to make a statement on suicide and attempted
suicide rates of any particular ethnic group.
The State party’s (Qarase Government) initiative at suicide prevention through
the Ministry of Health appears to be a step in the right direction in improving the
quality of life of all Fiji citizens irrespective of race.
93
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Table 8.4: SUICIDE & ATT SUICIDE REPORT ANALYSIS 2000-2006
Year & Race
Fijian
2000
Indian
Others
Suicide
12
92
1
Total
Fijian
Indian
Others
105
14
101
2
118
13
112
1
223
27
214
3
Total
Fijian
Indian
Others
Total
Fijian
Indian
Others
Total
Fijian
Indian
Others
Total
Fijian
Indian
Others
Total
Fijian
Indian
Others
117
18
90
1
109
21
79
2
102
16
75
2
93
16
59
2
77
14
53
0
126
12
107
2
121
12
80
1
93
10
94
1
105
11
89
2
102
10
76
1
243
30
197
3
230
33
159
3
195
26
169
3
196
27
148
4
179
24
129
1
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Attempted Suicide
5
110
3
Source: Fiji Police Crimes Statistics Department, Nabua, July 2007-08-09
94
Total
17
202
4
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
9.
GOVERNMENT’S FAILURE TO PROMOTE A NATIONAL
IDENTITY THAT UNITES INDIGENOUS AND INDO-FIJIANS
Great Council of Chiefs (GGC): Manifestation of Discrimination
CERD: Concluding observations
Item #17notes:
The Committee is concerned about current perceptions amongst some Fijians
that the State party is not paying enough attention to the issue of reconciling the
different population groups in Fiji. It encourages the State party to explicitly
promote a national identity that unites rather than divides indigenous and IndoFijians, as well as other communities, and to include this objective in its
development plans.150
Evidence of racism
The GCC while seemingly a non-political body may be considered political
because it is responsible for the appointment of the President and Senators. Up
until now, only the Fijian chiefs could be its members. But there are views from
some quarters that it should have representatives from Fijian ‘commoner’ as well
[10]. It was noted that the challenge for the Fijian chiefly leadership is to
recognize that commoner Fijians can make enormous contributions to the GCC
and be humble and brave enough to reform their institutions accordingly. While it
is agreed that common Fijians be included in the membership of the GCC, it is
also recommended that Indo-Fijian and other races be considered for its
membership. This is suggested because GCC is an important institution which is
actively involved in the selection of the President and the Senate and the NLTB
Board members. Additionally, NLTB is the guardian of over 90 per cent of the
resources including land in Fiji.
9.1 Religious Intolerance as a Manifestation of Racism
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Fiji and other Pacific island
countries received significant numbers of Christian missionaries, and the
overwhelming majority of indigenous Fijians today are Christians. Indo-Fijians, by
contrast, have largely retained the Hindu and Muslim faiths their ancestors
brought with them from the Indian sub-continent. In the 1996 national census:
•
58% (449,482) of Fiji’s citizens151 identified themselves as Christian. Of these,
150 Chand, G (Eds) 2005. ‘Papers on Racial Discrimination.’ Vol 1. The CERD Papers. Fiji Institute of Applied
Studies,page 328, Lautoka
151 The census gave a total population of 775,077. Further details can be found in the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum,
(2001) Ethnicity, National Identity and Church Unity: A Study on Fiji 2001, CCF, Suva, pp 42-3.
95
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
87% (390,380) were indigenous Fijians, 4.6% (20,713) were Indo-Fijian and
8.5% (38,383) were of another ethnicity;
•
34% (264,173) of the total population identified as Hindu. Of these, 99%
(262,851) were Indo-Fijians; and
•
7% (54,323) identified as Muslim. 99% (53,753) of these were Indo-Fijian.
The remaining 1% who did not identify themselves in the census as Christian,
Hindu or Muslim included Sikhs, Confucians, people of the Bahai faith and those
who gave no religion.152
Fiji’s 1997 Constitution affirms religious diversity, guarantees freedom of religion
as a human right, and prohibits unfair discrimination on the ground of opinions or
beliefs. However, these impressive legal statements do not always reflect the
realities of daily life. While the Committee is of course primarily concerned with
racial discrimination, religion in Fiji largely coincides with ethnicity. As can be
seen above, this is especially true of Hinduism and Islam. Accordingly, one of the
forms in which racism manifests itself is through intolerance or disrespect for
religions primarily practiced by the members of other ethnic groups.
The CCF believes that expressions of religious intolerance have become more
common in Fiji since the 1987 coups. There have been reports of attacks on
places of worship and desecration of holy books and statues of deities in both
rural and urban areas around the country. For the purpose of this submission, the
CCF has obtained statistics from the Fiji Police Force on reports of crimes
committed against places of worship in the period 2001-June 2005. Table 9.1, on
the next page, shows the number of such reports in each year from 2001 to
2004, and in the six months from January to June 2005, along with the estimated
cost of the crimes, taking into account both stolen items and property damage.
152
It is worth noting that considerable diversity exists within the Christian and Hindu communities. The
census identified 14 different Christian denominations or categories, for example. The Methodist Church
was by far the largest of these, with 280,628 people (36% of the total population) and 66.5% (261,972) of all
indigenous Fijians: ibid.
96
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
TABLE 9.1: Crimes Against Places of Worship in Fiji, 2001-June 2005
YEAR
CHURCH
%
MOSQUE
%
VALUE
VALUE
$
$
CHURCH
MOSQUE
2001
2002
2003
2004
January
-June
2005
TOTAL
TEMPLE
%
TOTAL
TOTAL
TEMPLE
VALUE
$
OFFENCES
VALUE
5
9
7
15
3
17.2
42.8
19.4
31.9
11.1
4,340
5,291
3,148
13,757
3,924
4
1
2
2
4
13.8
4.8
5.6
4.3
14.8
1,370
210
1,780
920
655
20
11
27
30
20
69.0
52.4
75.0
68.9
74.1
10,341
3,901
7,638
17,336
10,256
29
21
36
47
27
$
16,051
9,402
12,566
32,013
14,835
39
24.4
30,460
13
8.1
4,395
108
67.5
49,471
160
84,866
SOURCE: Fiji Police Crime Statistics Department, Nabua.
97
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
It can be seen from Table 9.1 that crimes against places of worship during the
2001-June 2005 period did not exclusively target any one religion. However, it is
alarming that the number of attacks on Hindu temples outnumbered the
combined number of attacks on Christian churches and Islamic mosques by a
ratio of more than 2:1. Hindu temples were targeted in 108 of the total 160
reported attacks. That is 67.5%, which is radically disproportionate to the
representation of Hindus in the total population – 34% according to the 1996
census. Obviously this is an imperfect comparison, but the CCF believes it
should not be ignored.
The same comparison for the Islamic faith suggests that the number of attacks
on mosques – 13 or approximately 8% of the total – was roughly in proportion to
the size of the 1996 Muslim population (7% of the total). However, churches were
only targeted in 39 cases, or 24% of the total, which is a surprisingly small
number when you consider that Christians made up 54% of the total population
in 1996.
These statistics say little about the ethnicity or religion of the perpetrators of the
reported crimes. For that information the CCF has only anecdotal evidence.
Media reports and personal communications indicate that the offenders in these
cases are overwhelmingly young indigenous Fijian males. This suggests that
non-Christian places of worship are targeted disproportionately because these
perpetrators do not feel an appropriate sense of respect or reverence for temples
and mosques.
It is important to acknowledge another possible explanation. Hindus often leave
money as offerings to their Gods and dress up their religious statues with
jewellery, and the presence of these items in temples is likely to be attractive to
thieves. However, two factors suggest that this is not a complete answer. First,
Table 9.1 shows that the monetary value of the crimes against temples, which we
understand includes the estimated combined cost of stolen items and property
damage, was lower, on average, than that of the crimes against churches. This
suggests that those who stole from temples generally did not get away with more
valuables than those who stole from churches. Secondly, crimes against places
of worship often involve not only theft but also the desecration of holy books and
statues. This can only be seen as a deliberate or reckless insult to the targeted
religion and religious community. It appears, then, that while the possible
presence of money and jewels in Hindu temples may be an added inducement,
those who attack them are also motivated by a disregard or contempt for the
Hindu faith and its Indo-Fijian adherents.
To give an example, in 1997, a young indigenous Fijian male fire-bombed a
Hindu temple, and when the magistrate before whom he was tried asked why he
committed the offence, he reportedly replied that he did it “in the name of Fijians
98
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
and Jesus,” and against inferior and false religions.153 Sadly, this view reflects
the teachings of some ministers of the Methodist Church and some minority
Christian churches in Fiji.
Some ministries in Fiji have even tried to use the Bible to justify the coups and
the overthrow of democratically-elected Governments. Reverend Manasa
Lasaro, after himself staging a coup within the Methodist Church in Fiji in 1987,
helped to raise indigenous Fijian support for the first military coup of that year by
publicly declaring that it was the “will of God” and that it would “free indigenous
Fijians from bondage” and from the “heathen races”.154 Too many Christian
congregations in Fiji are told that non-Christians are heathen and the “divine”
enemies of the indigenous Fijian people. The CCF believes this is hate speech.
Such congregations have even heard that, if the leaders of Fiji were to be nonChristian, the indigenous Fijian race would become extinct.155
During the 2000 coup, some church leaders supported “the Fijian cause” on the
basis that it was consistent with the “Christian doctrine” of fighting for the
neglected. In effect, they used the Bible to justify a political power play. This kind
of radical preaching was also linked with other violent and illegal activities such
as the invasion of a mosque on the island of Vanua Levu by members of a
Christian church, who drove out the Muslim worshippers and later used the
mosque for their own religious activities.156
The CCF’s concern in all this is that a trend is clearly observable, in which young
males from the majority indigenous Fijian community, who are overwhelmingly
Christian, attack the places of worship of the minority Indo-Fijian community, who
are overwhelmingly Hindu and Muslim. However, in the face of this trend, there
has been little or no response from the leaders of the Christian churches in Fiji,
or from indigenous Fijian chiefs – and the Christian-dominated Government
appears to be ignoring the problem.
The CCF believes that religious leaders of all faiths have a duty to promote
respect and reverence for other faiths among their followers. This is especially
important in a nation of such rich ethnic and religious diversity as Fiji.
Sadly, the statistics presented in Table 9.1 show that crimes against places of
worship have increased in the last two years. This adds urgency to the need for
church and other leaders within the Christian community especially – which of
course means predominantly indigenous Fijian leaders – to take remedial action.
153
Fiji Times, 17 July 1997.
Citizens’ Constitutional Forum, (2001) Ethnicity, National Identity and Church Unity: A Study on Fiji 2001,
CCF, Suva, p 47. This message was repeated frequently over the radio in the Fijian language in 1987.
155
Id, pp 47-8.
156
Id, p 56.
154
99
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Religious intolerance as a manifestation of racism
This is a supplement to section 9.3 discussed earlier. The focus here is on the
rationale for Christian intolerance of other religious beliefs as well the coping
strategies of the victims of sacrilege acts.
CERD: Concluding observations
The Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination at its sixty second session (CERD/C/62/CO/3) had noted in
paragraph 23 that the Committee is concerned about information relating to racist
attacks and acts of religious intolerance against Indo-Fijians, in particular during
the 1987 and 2000 coups. It underlines that no in-depth information relating to
the prosecution of the authors of such acts, or on the adoption of preventive
measures for the future, has been provided. The Committee therefore requested
that such information be provided in the next periodic report.
Table 1 shows a number of sacrilege offences over a six year period (2001-2006)
by types of divine worship. The value represents the value of property stolen or
damaged. It can be seen that Hindu temples were vandalized most (68%),
churches (25%) and mosques (7%) out of 222 acts of sacrileges. In terms of
value of the properties stolen per offence, it was found that churches on the
average lost $688, Hindu temples lost $461 and mosques lost the least with $341
per break-in.
Table 9.2: Crime against Places of Worship in Fiji, 2001-2007 (Refer To
appendix for other tables)
YEAR
CHURCH
VALUE
MOSQUE
VALUE
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
5
9
7
15
10
9
5
$4,340
$5,291
$3,148
$13,757
$9488
$2933
$2330
4
1
2
2
4
2
0
$1,370
$210
$1,780
$920
$540
$299
$0
TEMPL
E
20
11
27
30
36
28
1
VALUE
$10,341
$3,900
$7,637
$17,336
$14,011
$9,644
$7,615
TOTAL
OFFENCES
29
21
36
47
50
39
6
TOTAL
VALUE
$16,051
$9,401
$12,565
$32,013
$24,039
$12,876
$9,945
Source: Fiji Police Crimes Statistics Department, Nabua, July 2007-08-09
State party’s (Qarase Government) 2006 Report to CERT on religious
intolerance
100
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
In response to item 23 of CERD Concluding Observations, the Fiji Government’s
Report to CERD, 2006157 noted ‘even though there are complaints that such acts
are a result of racial discrimination, the State party takes such offence seriously
and offenders are treated in the extreme of the law’. It is not too clear whether
the State party is accepting that acts of sacrilege are the result of racial
discrimination especially in light of its defensive stance that ‘most of the offenders
of sacrilege break into temples and places of worship not because of hatred of
religion but with the intent to steal and get away with money and other valuables
to buy alcohol and cigarettes. The Fiji report to CERD (2006) continued that there
was a general perception that this offence was racially motivated, but it is not.
The Christian places of worship have also been broken into by offenders in the
past. The Fiji Government in its defence cited aspects of Fiji’s Penal Code that
any person who breaks and enters any place of divine worship or breaks out of
any place of worship is guilty of the felony referred to as sacrilege, and is liable to
imprisonment for fourteen years.
It seems that the fourteen year deterrent is not working because acts of sacrilege
still continue and the sentences given are well below the fourteen year
benchmark to be an effective deterrent.
Fiji is a multi-ethnic nation with many races and religious beliefs. The indigenous
Fijians are mostly Christians while the descendents of peoples of Indian
Subcontinent are either Muslims or Hindus. There is a general feeling among the
indigenous people that they have a superior religion. In times of political
instability with a standoff between the Indo-Fijians and the indigenous Fijians, the
feelings of superiority manifests itself in the burning of temples and mosques, the
desecration of holy books of Hinduism and Islam.
Gregory Baum (1975) has noted that the Christian message has divided the
world into ‘we’ and ‘they’ thus generating a rhetoric of exclusion. Neil Darragh
(1995:77) has also acknowledged the arrogance of many Christians in face of
other religions: There is a temptation for Christians to think that they have a
monopoly on goodness or that God is us rather than anyone else.’ ECREA report
(2005) notes that Christianity has always claimed unique access to divine
revelation over and above that available through other faiths, a superior claim
based on the understanding that the coming of Christ on earth supersedes God’s
self-disclosure in other religions. However increasing numbers of Christians
perceive this to be a form of Christian imperialism that begets sectarian
exclusiveness and oppressive religious dogmatism.
Baum notes that non-Christians are not inferior beings and suggests (1975:20)158
Christian theologians must ask themselves to what extent the exclusivist form of
Christian preaching and the consciousness it created are responsible for the
suspicions, injustice, and cruelty Christians have often shown towards outsiders.
157
Concluding observations of CERD-United Nations Report, 2003
158 Narsey, W. 2002. Politics, Religion and suicide: Strange Silence. Fiji Times, September 5, 2002
101
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Reaction of Indo-Fijians
A mosque and a Hindu temple located opposite each other at Nasole, Nasinu,
were broken into and vandalized on July 25, 2007.159
Kamlesh Arya, president of Arya Pratinidhi Sabha of Fiji, after raids on Shiri Sath
Prakash Mandir in Nasinu, said that the attack was perpetrated by people who
are trying to create unnecessary social problems. Taking advantage of the
political situation, social elements are at work desecrating places of worship. On
the same evening, a mosque located across from the Hindu mandir was also
vandalized. The mosque had ‘Osama Bin Laden’ and other graffiti written on its
walls. One Muslim resident of the neighbourhood reacted saying: ‘We are not
terrorists, we are only following our religion. Terrorists. That’s their problem, not
ours.’ 160
CCF Views
The CCF believes that expressions of religious intolerance have become more
common in Fiji since the 1987 coup. There have been reports of attacks on
places of worship and desecration of holy books and statues of deities in both
rural and urban areas around the country. It can be seen from Appendix 1 that
crimes against places of worship during 2001-June 2007 did not target one
religion. This was a point highlighted by the Fiji Government’s Report to CERD in
2006. However, it is alarming that the number of attacks on Hindu temples
outnumbered the combined number of attacks on Christian churches and Islamic
mosques by a ratio of approximately 2:1. Hindu temples were targeted in 153 of
the total 228 reported attacks since 2001 to date.
Statistics say little about the ethnicity or the religion of the perpetrators. For this
information CCF has only anecdotal evidence. Media reports and personal
communications indicate that the offenders in these cases are overwhelmingly
young indigenous Fijian males. This suggests that non-Christian places of
worship are targeted disproportionately because these perpetrators do not have
the same respect for temples and mosques as they have for their own places of
worship.
To give an example in 1997, a young indigenous Fijian male fired-bombed a
Hindu temple, and when the magistrate whom he was tried asked why he
committed the offence, he reportedly replied that he did it “in the name of Fijians
and Jesus,” and against inferior and false religions. Sadly, this view reflects the
teachings of some ministers of the Methodist Church and some minority Christian
churches in Fiji. It might be noted that the Methodist Church in Fiji is very much
159 131 Fiji Times, 2007. Temple, Mosque Target Raids’ . July 28, 2007 p.15
102
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
influenced by the Methodist Church of the United Kingdom. Recently, Lord
Griffith [9] said that it was alright for Methodists to get involved in politics much
like the Hindus in the House of Lords. But this would contradict Section 11 of the
CCF Charter which reads:
‘We affirm the separation of religion and state and we proclaim respect for all
religions and freedom of belief and practice.’
In summary, it might be noted that most acts of desecration are undertaken by
Fijian males and is in most situations a reflection of hate towards non-indigenous
people. The State party’s claim that the motive is money and material things is
unconvincing. In the examples above, why are the break-ins accompanied with
graffiti statements and abusive acts on holy rituals? This only is seen as a
deliberate or reckless insult to the targeted religion and religious community. It
appears, then, that while the possible presences of money and jewels in Hindu
temples may be an added inducement, those who attack them are also motivated
by a disregard or contempt for the Hindu faith as being inferior to the Christian
faith.
Current Interim Government’s action (2006 to present)
The state party’s legal machinery has not been effective in acting as a deterrent,
resulting in acts of sacrilege to continue unabated. Hindus and Muslims are now
putting up their own protective measures.161 On this matter, Mr. Arya noted that
the incidents should compel temple authorities and other places of worship to
invest more in securing property and possessions.
Concluding Remarks
The State party’s Penal Code of 14 year jail sentences is not an effective
deterrent against sacrilege crimes. Additionally, the State party’s claim that these
acts are undertaken to get away with money and other valuables is questionable
on the basis of existing information.
Note
State party in Fiji has been alternating in its composition: democratic
government, military rule and interim government. Following the violent
overthrow of the democratic government in 2000, the army restored law and
order and put in place an interim government under Lasenia Qarase. Elections
were held in 2001 and the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party
formed a Coalition Government with the Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua
(CAMV) with Qarase as the Prime Minister. In the year 2006, elections were held
again and SDL formed a Coalition Government with the Fiji Labour Party (FLP).
But this State party lasted for less than seven months. With a coup in December
161
Fiji Times, 2007. Temple, Mosque Target Raids’ . July 28, 2007 p.15
103
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
2006, there was military rule until the end of 2006. In January 2007, an interim
government was formed with Commodore Bainimarama as the Interim Prime
Minister. Thus the current State party is very much under the influence of the
Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF). There are plans however to have fresh
elections in March 2009 and return Fiji to parliamentary democracy.
Appendix 1: Sacrilege cases from 2001 to 15th July 2007
Sacrilege Cases 2001
Division
Church
Values
Mosque
Value
Temple
Value
Southern
Eastern
Western
Northern
Total
3
1
0
1
5
$3,505.00
$800.00
$0
$35,00
$4,340
0
1
2
1
4
$0
$65
$1,200.00
$105.00
$1,370.00
4
2
12
2
20
$5,722.00
$890.00
$3,599.00
$130.00
$10,341.00
Total
offences
7
4
14
4
29
Total
Value
$9,227.00
$1,755.00
$4,799.00
$270.00
$16,051.00
Sacrilege Cases 2002
Division
Church
Values
Mosque
Value
Temple
Value
Southern
Eastern
Western
Northern
Total
6
0
3
0
9
$5,109.00
$0
$182.00
$0
$5,291.00
0
0
1
0
1
$0
$0
$210.00
$0
$210.00
1
1
3
6
11
$2,326.00
$300.00
$480.00
$794.70
$3,900.70
Total
offences
7
1
7
6
21
Total Value
$7,435.00
$300.00
$872.00
$794.70
$9,401.70
Sacrilege Cases 2003
Division
Church
Values
Mosque
Value
Temple
Value
Southern
Eastern
Western
Northern
Total
2
2
2
1
7
$1,300.00
$1,248.00
$600.00
$0
$3,148.00
0
0
1
1
2
$0
$0
$1,500.00
$280.00
$1,780.00
1
3
13
10
27
$16.50
$278.00
$3,400.00
$3,942.00
$7,637.50
Total
offences
3
5
16
12
36
Total Value
Total
offences
18
3
25
1
47
Total Value
$1,316.50
$1.526.00
$5,502.00
$4,222.00
$12,565.50
Sacrilege Cases 2004
Division
Church
Values
Mosque
Value
Temple
Value
Southern
Eastern
Western
Northern
Total
7
2
6
0
15
$6,992.00
$3,200.00
$3,565.00
$0
$13,757.00
0
0
2
0
2
$0
$0
$920.00
$0
$920.00
11
1
17
1
30
$11,188.00
$12.00
$5,786.00
$350.00
$17,336.00
104
$18,180.00
$3,212.00
$10,271.00
$350.00
$32,013.00
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
Sacrilege Cases 2005
Division
Church
Values
Mosque
Value
Temple
Value
Southern
Eastern
Western
Northern
Total
5
2
3
0
10
$4,580.00
$758.00
$4,150.00
$0
$9,488.00
1
0
3
0
4
$135.00
$0
$405.00
$0
$540.00
10
5
19
2
36
$3,524.00
$7,525.00
$2,812.00
$150.86
$14,011.86
Total
offences
16
7
25
2
50
Total Value
$8, 239.00
$8,283.00
$7,367.00
$150.86
$24,039.86
Sacrilege Cases 2006
Division
Church
Values
Mosque
Value
Temple
Value
Southern
Eastern
Western
Northern
Total
5
1
2
1
9
$893.00
$10.00
$2030.00
$0
$2,933.00
2
0
0
0
2
$299.00
$0
$0
$0
$299.00
7
9
10
2
28
$2,162.00
$5,106.00
$673.00
$1,703.00
$9,644.00
Total
offences
14
10
12
3
39
Total Value
$3,354.00
$5,116.00
$2,703.00
$1,703.00
$12,876.00
Sacrilege Cases 2007*
Division
Church
Values
Mosque
Southern
Eastern
Western
Northern
Total
2
1
2
0
5
$1,450.00
$300.00
$580.00
$0
$2330.00
0
0
0
0
0
Value
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Temple
Value
0
1
0
0
1
$0
$7,615.00
$0
$0
$7,615.00
*Note: Table 7 accounts for the data up to 15th of July, 2007.
Source: Fiji Police Crimes Statistics Department, Nabua, July 2007-08-09
105
Total
offences
2
2
2
0
6
Total
Value
$1,450.00
$7,915.00
$580.00
$0
$9,945.00
NGOs Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination concerning Fiji
10. FIJI HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
In its 2003 concluding observations, the Committee requested more information
on “the results of the activities of the [Fiji] Human Rights Commission”, and on
“the practical implications” of section 27, paragraphs (h) and (i), of the Human
Rights Commission Act 1999.162 Section 27(h) and (i) enable the Commission to
decline to investigate a complaint if “the Commission has before it matters more
worthy of its attention” or “the resources of the Commission are insufficient for
adequate investigation”, respectively.
The CCF enjoys a good working relationship with the Fiji Human Rights
Commission (the Commission), and we invited it to contribute any information it
might wish to this submission. The Commission responded on the issue of
section 27(h) and (i) of the Human Rights Commission Act 1999, indicating as
follows:163
“The Commission wishes it be brought to the attention of the CERD Committee
that it has no concerns about the quoted phrases, and that they have caused no
practical difficulties for the Commission. All national human rights institutions
have to prioritise their work – few, if any, are in a position to address every
human rights issue, large or small, that arise in their countries [sic]. Most have
processes for determining the most urgent matters and prioritising issues that are
having the greatest effect on the largest number of people. In the case of the
FHRC, one of its functions is to advise on any human rights matter referred to it
by Government, having regard to the available resources and priorities of the
Commission. It is theoretically possible that so many matters might be referred to
the Commission that it would become overburdened. Hence the need for
discretion not to give attention to matters which, while not trivial, are so minor as
not to warrant the allocation of resources that may be urgently required for more
important issues. The quoted phrases from section 27 merely give the
Commission the ability to avoid becoming overwhelmed by its workload.”
The Commission then noted that it had never actually needed to use section
27(h) or (i). The CCF, for its part, does not have any concerns regarding these
paragraphs. In our experience, the Commission acts independently of the
Government and we are not aware of any instance of improper declining of a
complaint.
162
163
CERD/C/62/CO/3 (2 June 2003), para 25.
Letter from the Director of the Fiji Human Rights Commission to the CCF, dated 16 January 2006.
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APPENDIX A: THE RECONCILIATION BILL: A SUMMARY
WHAT IS IN
THE RECONCILIATION BILL?
(THIS SUMMARY WAS PREPARED BY ‘CONCERNED CITIZENS AGAINST THE BILL’)
The Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005 is a Government
Bill that proposes to establish two new bodies:
• a Reconciliation and Unity Commission; and
• a National Council on Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity.
National Council on Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity
The main function of the Council would be to develop a national policy on
reconciliation, to be approved by Cabinet. Once the national policy has been
approved, the Council would be responsible for coordinating its implementation.
The Council would have a wide membership, including representatives of the
Fijian and Indo-Fijian communities and the three major religions. It would work
independently but must comply with any direction given by the Government
Minister responsible for its activities.
Reconciliation and Unity Commission
The Commission would have three main functions:
• to advise the President on the granting of amnesties to individuals who
committed crimes or other acts or omissions that were associated with a
political objective, during the period, 19 May 2000 to 15 March 2001;
• to award compensation to victims of gross human rights violations committed
during this period; and
• to investigate and report on the events of the May 2000 coup and its
aftermath and make recommendations to the Government designed to
prevent coups in the future.
The Commission would work independently of the government. It would comprise
three to five Commissioners appointed by the President on the advice of the
Prime Minister, after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. The
Commissioners would not be required to hold any particular legal or other
qualifications.
The Commission would be required to establish two committees:
• an Amnesty Committee; and
• a Victims and Reparation Committee.
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These committees would assist the Commission in the performance of its
functions with respect to amnesties and compensation. In either case, however, it
would the Commission that makes the final decision whether to advise the
granting of an amnesty or award compensation.
Each of the committees would comprise three members appointed by the
Commission with the approval of the responsible Minister. It appears that the
Commission may appoint its own members to the committees, although this is
not required, and that the same person may serve on both committees. The chair
of each committee must be a retired judge or an experienced legal practitioner.
Other committee members would not be required to hold any particular
qualifications.
What is an amnesty and who could get one?
The effect of an amnesty under the Bill would be to remove any civil or criminal
liability attaching to the acts or omissions for which it was granted. If those acts
or omissions constituted a crime, the person who committed the crime could not
be prosecuted for it. If the person had already been prosecuted and was serving
a sentence of imprisonment for the crime, he or she would have to be released
from prison immediately.
If the acts or omissions for which an amnesty was granted constituted a civil
wrong, the person could not be sued for damages (compensation) for that wrong.
The provisions of the Bill dealing with who could get an amnesty are hard to
understand. It appears that anyone who took part in the May 2000 coup or
committed acts or omissions in support of the coup could get one, provided they
are willing to cooperate with the Reconciliation and Unity Commission and make
a full disclosure of what they did.
Who could get compensation and how much?
The provisions of the Bill dealing with who could get compensation are also hard
to understand. It appears that only victims of gross human rights violations
committed between 19 May 2000 and 15 March 2001 would be eligible for
compensation. Victims of gross human rights violations would probably include
anyone who was killed, severely injured, tortured, raped or held hostage. It would
not include those who were merely hurt, threatened or made to live in fear. It
would not include those whose property was damaged, who lost their jobs or who
had to close their business.
Compensation awarded by the Reconciliation and Unity Commission would have
to be paid by the government. It would be limited to the maximum amount
payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. That maximum is currently
$24,000 in cases of death and $32,000 in cases of permanent total incapacity.
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APPENDIX B: SECTION
(AMENDMENT) ACT 1997
99
OF
THE
CONSTITUTION
Appointment of other Ministers
99. (1)
The President appoints and dismisses other Ministers on the advice of
the Prime Minister.
(2)
To be eligible for appointment, a Minister must be a member of the
House of Representatives or the Senate.
(3)
The Prime Minister must establish a multi-party Cabinet in the way set
out in this section comprising such number of Ministers as he or she
determines.
(4)
Subject to this section, the composition of the Cabinet should, as far as
possible, fairly represent the parties represented in the House of
Representatives.
(5)
In establishing the Cabinet, the Prime Minister must invite all parties
whose membership in the House of Representatives comprises at least
10% of the total membership of the House to be represented in the
Cabinet in proportion to their numbers in the House.
(6)
If the Prime Minister selects for appointment to the Cabinet a person
from a party whose membership in the House of Representatives is less
than 10% of the total membership of the House, that selection is
deemed, for the purposes of this section, to be a selection of a person
from the Prime Minister's own party.
(7)
If a party declines an invitation from the Prime Minister to be represented
in the Cabinet, the Prime Minister must allocate the Cabinet positions to
which that party would have been entitled amongst the other parties
(including the Prime Minister's party) in proportion, as far as possible, to
their respective entitlements under subsection (5).
(8)
If all parties (apart from the Prime Minister's party and the party (if any)
with which it is in coalition) decline an invitation from the Prime Minister
to be represented in the Cabinet, the Prime Minister may look to his or
her own party or coalition of parties to fill the places in the Cabinet.
(9)
In selecting persons from parties other than his or her own party for
appointment as Ministers, the Prime Minister must consult with the
leaders of those parties.
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APPENDIX C: MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT IN FIJI: A TIMELINE
MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT IN FIJI: A TIMELINE
Prepared by the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum in July 2005
25 July 1997
The Constitution (Amendment) Act 1997 (‘the Constitution’) is passed by
Parliament.
Section 99 calls for executive power to be shared between the governing
political party or coalition and other major parties in Parliament. This is
achieved by requiring the Prime Minister to invite all parties holding at least 10%
of the total membership of the House of Representatives (8 or more seats, if all 71
seats are occupied) to be represented in the Cabinet. The overall size of Cabinet
is left to the Prime Minister, but parties accepting the invitation to be represented
must be offered Cabinet seats in proportion to their numbers in the House. The
Prime Minister may also invite minor parties that do not fulfil the 10% requirement
(such as a coalition partner) to be represented in his or her Cabinet, but if this is
done then the representatives of those parties are deemed to be representatives
of the Prime Minister’s party for the purpose of calculating the number of Cabinet
seats that must be offered to parties that fulfil the 10% requirement.
Section 64 of the Constitution then uses the formula from section 99 to
determine the entitlement of parties holding seats in the House of
Representatives to nominate Senators. 8 out of the total of 32 Senators are to
be appointed on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition from among
nominations made by the leaders of parties holding at least 10% of the total
membership of the House of Representatives (that is, parties entitled to be offered
Cabinet seats under section 99). The Leader of the Opposition must ensure that
these 8 Senators comprise such number nominated by each entitled party as is
proportionate to the size of their membership in the House.
27 July 1998
The Constitution comes into force.
8-15 May 1999
National elections are held to elect 71 members of the House of
Representatives in accordance with the new Constitution.
The President is later advised of the results as follows: The Fiji Labour Party
(FLP) wins 37 seats. The Fijian Association Party (FAP) wins 10 seats. The
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) wins 8 seats. The Party of National
Unity wins 4 seats. The Christian Democratic Unity Party, the United General
Party and the Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo win 2 seats each. The remaining 5
seats are won by independents. The High Court, sitting as the Court of Disputed
Returns, later revokes the election of one of the Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo
candidates and declares a FAP candidate to be the winner of that seat.
19 May 1999
The President appoints the Leader of the Fiji Labour Party, Mahendra Chaudhry,
as Prime Minister. Mr Chaudhry writes to the Leader of the SVT, Sitiveni Rabuka,
inviting the SVT to be represented in a multi-party Cabinet in accordance with
section 99 of the Constitution.
20 May 1999
Mr Rabuka replies to Mr Chaudhry’s letter with a list of conditions on which the
SVT would be willing to accept the invitation to join a multi-party Cabinet. The
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conditions include that Mr Rabuka be made Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
for Fijian Affairs, that three other portfolios be allocated to named SVT members,
that three of the nine Senators to be appointed by the Prime Minister be
nominated by the SVT, and that all ambassadors, high commissioners, and board
members of statutory and state-owned enterprises appointed by the SVT be
allowed to complete their terms of office. Mr Chaudhry replies to Mr Rabuka’s
letter, rejecting these conditions.
21 May 1999
The President, acting on Mr Chaudhry’s advice, appoints 18 Ministers and 5
Assistant Ministers. None are from the SVT. The President summons Parliament
to meet on 14 June 1999.
24 May 1999
The President appoints the Deputy Leader of the SVT, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, as
Leader of the Opposition.
7-11 June 1999
Correspondence is exchanged between Ratu Inoke and the President regarding
the 8 Senators to be appointed on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition
under section 64 of the Constitution. There are conflicting interpretations of the
formula for calculating the number of Senate seats that must be offered to each
political party holding at least 10% of the total membership of the House of
Representatives.
12 June 1999
The President writes to Ratu Inoke and Mr Chaudhry, advising that he intends to
ask Cabinet to advise him to refer the question of how many Senate seats must
be offered to each party under section 64 to the Supreme Court for an advisory
opinion.
15 June 1999
Mr Chaudhry replies to the President that Cabinet has agreed to advise him to
make a reference to the Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of section 64.
The President formally opens the new Parliamentary session at a joint sitting of
both Houses.
16 June 1999
Ratu Inoke commences legal action in the High Court to contest the opening of
Parliament before all disputes concerning the elections have been resolved and
all Senators appointed.
21 June 1999
The Speaker of the House of Representatives declares the seat of SVT Leader,
Sitiveni Rabuka, vacant following his resignation and election as Chairman of the
Bose Levu Vakaturaga (Great Council of Chiefs).
24 June 1999
A Presidential reference is filed in the Supreme Court concerning the
interpretation of section 64.
6 July 1999
Ratu Inoke commences legal action in the High Court to contest the exclusion of
the SVT from Cabinet.
The President’s reference to the Supreme Court is enlarged to include issues
raised in Ratu Inoke’s legal actions.
24 August 1999
3 September
1999
The Supreme Court delivers its opinion on the enlarged President’s
reference (President of the Republic of Fiji Islands v Kubuabola (Tuivaga P,
Lord Cooke, Mason, Brennan and Toohey JJ, Miscellaneous Case No. 1 of
1999)).
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It holds that power sharing is a “central purpose” of the 1997 Constitution.
Sections 64 and 99 of the Constitution modify the traditional Westminster pattern
so that political power is “divided among a number of groups, persons and parties”
and “the share of each is in some way limited”. Under section 64, the Prime
Minister is entitled to nominate 9 Senators only. The Prime Minister’s party is not
entitled to be offered additional Senate seats from among the 8 to be filled on the
advice of the Leader of the Opposition. However, parties in coalition with the
Prime Minister’s party are not to be regarded as members of the Prime Minister’s
party for the purposes of sections 64 and 99. Accordingly, if such parties hold at
least 10% of the total membership of the House of Representatives, they will have
a separate entitlement to be offered seats in the Senate and in Cabinet. The time
for calculating the number of Senators that each party is entitled to nominate is
the date when the Leader of the Opposition advises the President of the
nominations. This has not yet occurred at the date of the Court’s judgment. There
is one vacancy in the House of Representatives, leaving a total membership of
70. Besides the FLP, only the FAP (with 11 seats) and the SVT (with 7) hold at
least 10% of this total. As a result, of the 8 Senators to be appointed on the advice
of the Leader of the Opposition, the Court rules that 5 must be offered to the FAP
and 3 to the SVT. Since the President must summon Parliament to meet no later
than 30 days after the last day of polling in national elections (section 68 of the
Constitution), this cannot be dependent on the receipt of advice from the Leader
of the Opposition on Senate appointments. Accordingly, the Parliamentary
session may begin before all Senate seats are filled.
In relation to section 99, the Court holds that Prime Minister may only withdraw
the invitation to other parties to join the Cabinet after a reasonable time has
passed for accepting or rejecting it. The Court rules that Sitiveni Rabuka’s
response of 20 May 1999 to Mahendra Chaudhry’s invitation to the SVT included
conditions that Mr Chaudhry was not bound to accept. Mr Rabuka’s conditional
acceptance of the invitation therefore amounted to a rejection.
27 August – 1
September
2001
Following the May 2000 coup and the ruling of the Court of Appeal on 1
March 2001 that the 1997 Constitution remains in force, national elections
are held to elect a new Parliament.
10 September
2001
The results are as follows: The Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) Party
wins 32 seats. The Fiji Labour Party (FLP) wins 27 seats. The Conservative
Alliance/Matanitu Vanua (CAMV) wins 6 seats. The New Labour Unity Party
(NLUP) wins 2 seats. The National Federation Party (NFP) and the United
General Party (UGP) win 1 seat each and the remaining 2 seats are won by
independents. The High Court, sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns, later
revokes the election of the NFP candidate and declares a FLP candidate to be the
winner of that seat.
The President appoints the Leader of the SDL Party, Laisenia Qarase, as Prime
Minister. Mr Qarase writes to the Leader of the FLP, Mahendra Chaudhry, inviting
the FLP to join in a multi-party Cabinet in accordance with section 99 of the
Constitution. The letter states that the policies of Mr Qarase’s Cabinet would “be
based fundamentally on the policy manifesto of the [SDL]” and that “it is simply
inconceivable that we should allow a situation where we become the minority
group in [Cabinet]”. Mr Chaudhry replies that the FLP accepts the invitation but its
participation “in Cabinet and in government” would be in accordance with the
Korolevu Declaration, and that “Cabinet decision making … should be on a
consensus seeking basis” and “consensus seeking mechanisms in Cabinet
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should include the formulation of a broadly acceptable policy framework”.
12 September
2001
Mr Qarase replies to Mr Chaudhry’s letter, stating that the conditions on which the
FLP purported to accept his invitation to join Cabinet are unacceptable.
18 September
2001
The President, acting on Mr Qarase’s advice, appoints Ministers from the SDL
Party, the CAMV and the NLUP. An independent and a Senator are also
appointed to be Ministers. The FLP is excluded.
25 September
2001
Mr Chaudhry commences legal action in the High Court claiming that the FLP is
entitled to be represented in Mr Qarase’s Cabinet.
2 October 2001
The President formally opens the new Parliamentary session at a joint sitting of
both Houses.
19 October
2001
Acting on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, Prem Singh, the President
appoints 4 FLP nominees and 1 each from the CAMV, NFP, NLUP and UGP as
Senators. This is done despite a difference of opinion between Mr Singh and Mr
Chaudhry as to the FLP’s entitlement to be offered seats in the Senate. Mr
Chaudhry has earlier declined the President’s offer to appoint him as Leader of
the Opposition.
29 November
2001
The High Court poses a series of legal questions arising from Mr Chaudhry’s
claim that the FLP is entitled to be represented in Cabinet, in the form of a Case
Stated for decision by the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal decides the Case Stated (Chaudhry v Qarase
(Eichelbaum, Ward, Handley, Smellie and Keith JJA, Miscellaneous No.
1/2001)).
15 February
2002
It holds that section 99 of the Constitution does not enable the Prime Minister to
impose any conditions on the offer of Cabinet seats to parties holding at least
10% of the total membership of the House of Representatives. The invitation to
join Cabinet must be unconditional. The Court rules that Mr Qarase’s letter to Mr
Chaudhry of 10 September 2001 did contain an invitation in accordance with
section 99, and the inclusion of information as to how he intended the affairs of
Cabinet to be conducted did not amount to a condition. Mr Chaudhry’s response
of the same day accepted this invitation, and the inclusion of information
concerning how the FLP would participate likewise did not amount to a condition.
Accordingly, while Mr Qarase retains a discretion as to the overall size of Cabinet,
he is required to advise the President to appoint a Cabinet in which the FLP is
represented in proportion to its numbers in the House of Representatives. In
selecting members of the FLP to become Ministers, Mr Qarase must consult Mr
Chaudhry. The Court concludes that, in failing to appoint any FLP Ministers, Mr
Qarase has breached, and is presently in breach, of a constitutional duty.
15 March 2002
The Supreme Court decides a Presidential reference dated 6 February 2002,
concerning the appointment of Senators under section 64 of the
Constitution (In the matter of section 123 of the Constitution Amendment
Act 1997 (Tuivaga P, Tikaram, Eichelbaum, Amet and Sapolu JJ,
Miscellaneous Case No. 1 of 2002S)).
The issue in dispute is the distribution of the 8 Senate appointments made on the
advice of the Leader of the Opposition. The Court holds that only parties holding
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at least 10% of the total membership of the House of Representatives, other than
the Prime Minister’s party, are entitled to nominate Senators to fill these 8 seats.
Nominations are made by the leaders of entitled parties, but the nominees need
not be members of those parties. It is clear from the Supreme Court’s opinion on
the 1999 Kubuabola reference that each entitled party must be offered that
number of Senate seats from among the 8 which bears the same proportion to the
total as the number of seats in the House of Representatives held by that party
bears to the total number of seats in the House held by all entitled parties. This
may be expressed mathematically as:
SEP
HREP
=
8
HRAEP
where “SEP” means Senate seats that must be offered to each entitled party,
“HREP” means seats in the House of Representatives held by that entitled party
and “HRAEP” means the total number of seats in the House held by all entitled
parties. Following the 2001 national elections, only one party, namely the FLP, is
entitled to be offered Senate seats from among the 8 to be appointed on the
advice of the Leader of the Opposition. Upholding its earlier opinion, the Court
rules that, where there is only one entitled party, that party must be offered all 8
Senate seats. Accordingly, the FLP is entitled to nominate 8 Senators. In addition,
the Court suggests that the President should decline to act on advice which he or
she considers is not in accordance with the Constitution. The President may
obtain independent legal advice on such matters.
24 April 2002
The High Court makes a declaration giving effect to the Court of Appeal’s decision
on 15 February 2002 in the Case Stated.
24 May 2002
The Court of Appeal dismisses an appeal by Mr Qarase against the High Court’s
declaration, but grants leave for an appeal to the Supreme Court.
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18 July 2003
The Supreme Court decides Mr Qarase’s appeal (Qarase v Chaudhry (Fatiaki
P, Spigelman, Gault, Mason and French JJ, Civil Appeal No. CBV 0004 of
2002S)).
It holds that section 99 requires the Prime Minister to establish a multi-party
Cabinet. This represents a modification of the traditional Westminster model, and
may require some corresponding modification of Cabinet conventions. However,
multi-party Cabinet can be achieved consistently with other requirements of the
Constitution, including collective responsibility of the Cabinet to Parliament
(section 102 of the Constitution) and the doctrine of Cabinet solidarity, which
collective responsibility implies. “It is not to be expected, at this early stage of the
implementation of the 1997 Constitution, that there will be settled conventions to
cover all contingencies or difficulties”. Likewise, a multi-party Cabinet is not to be
rejected as unworkable only because it may be more difficult to manage than a
Cabinet whose members belong to the same party or a coalition that has worked
out some consensus before its formation. There will no doubt need to be
negotiations as to which members of parties other than the Prime Minister’s own
will be appointed as Ministers, and which portfolios will be allocated to them. While
the Prime Minister retains the authority to decide these questions, he or she must
conduct the negotiations in good faith. It may even be necessary for such
negotiations to take place during the formation of coalitions, before the Prime
Minister is appointed. The Court also holds that “the obligation to establish a multiparty Cabinet carries with it an obligation to maintain a multi-party Cabinet. This
latter obligation may arise in connection with ministerial resignations, by-elections
or changes in the size of the Cabinet.” Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and
Mr Qarase is ordered to pay Mr Chaudhry’s costs.
9 July 2004
After unsuccessful negotiations between Mr Qarase and Mr Chaudhry
concerning the number of Cabinet seats that should be offered to the FLP,
the Supreme Court decides a Presidential reference on the question (In the
matter of section 123 of the Constitution Amendment Act 1997 (Fatiaki P,
Gault, Mason, French and Weinberg JJ, Miscellaneous Case No. 1 of 2003)).
Upholding its opinions on the 1999 and 2002 references, the Court holds that
parties entitled to be offered Cabinet seats under section 99 of the Constitution
are to be identified by dividing the number of seats in the House of
Representatives which each party holds by the total membership of the House. If
the result is equal to or greater than 10% then the party in question is entitled to
be offered Cabinet seats. While the Prime Minister is free to choose the overall
size of his or her Cabinet, entitled parties must be offered proportionate
representation in it. The Court holds that each entitled party must be offered a
number of Cabinet seats which bears the same proportion to the number to be
held by the Prime Minister’s party as the number of seats in the House of
Representatives held by the entitled party bears to the number of seats in the
House held by the Prime Minister’s party. This may be expressed mathematically
as:
CEP
HREP
=
CG
HRG
where “CEP” means Cabinet seats that must be offered to each entitled party,
“HREP” means seats in the House of Representatives held by that entitled party,
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“CG” means Cabinet seats to be held by the Prime Minister’s party and “HRG”
means seats in the House of Representatives held by the Prime Minister’s party.
So, for example, in the present case, the SDL Party holds 32 seats in the House
of Representatives and the FLP holds 28. The number of Cabinet seats to be
offered to the FLP must therefore be equal to 28/32 or seven-eighths of the
number to be held by the SDL. If the Prime Minister chooses to invite a coalition
partner that does not hold at least 10% of the total membership of the House of
Representatives to join the Cabinet, then any seats to be held by that non-entitled
party will be counted as being held by the Prime Minister’s party. The proportion of
Cabinet seats to which all parties are entitled must be re-calculated from time to
time as the composition of the House of Representatives changes.
However, section 99 is silent on the appointment as Cabinet Ministers of members
of the House of Representatives who are independent of any political party or of
Senators who are not members of a party represented in the House. The Court
holds (with Gault J dissenting on this point) that the Prime Minister may appoint
such independents or Senators to the Cabinet at his or her discretion, and any
seats filled by them will not be counted in calculating the number of seats that
must be offered to entitled parties. Accordingly, Cabinet seats to be held by such
independents or Senators will be in addition to the entitlement of the Prime
Minister’s party under section 99.
24 November
2004
After further negotiations with Mr Qarase concerning which FLP members would
be appointed as Ministers and which portfolios would be allocated to them, Mr
Chaudhry announces in Parliament that the FLP has decided to reject Mr
Qarase’s offer to join his Cabinet and that it will instead assume the Opposition
benches.
7 October 2006
This is the last date when the writ for the next national elections may be
issued.
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