The use of “security” jargon in sustainable
development discourse: evidence from UN
Commission on Sustainable Development
Itay Fischhendler & David Katz
International Environmental
Agreements: Politics, Law and
Economics
ISSN 1567-9764
Volume 13
Number 3
Int Environ Agreements (2013)
13:321-342
DOI 10.1007/s10784-012-9192-z
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Int Environ Agreements (2013) 13:321–342
DOI 10.1007/s10784-012-9192-z
ORIGINAL PAPER
The use of ‘‘security’’ jargon in sustainable development
discourse: evidence from UN Commission on Sustainable
Development
Itay Fischhendler • David Katz
Accepted: 15 September 2012 / Published online: 29 September 2012
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012
Abstract The premise of discourse theory in environmental policy is that realities are
shaped by language. One discourse that is gaining popularity is the concept of environmental security, a discourse that presupposes environmental threats as urgent. The attempt
to cast environmental issues as security issues has resulted in the common use of security
jargon, idioms, and metaphors in policymakers’ and politicians’ statements. Various
analyses attempt to identify why natural resources are discussed in terms and language of
security. However, far fewer studies have attempted to identify differences in the manner
in which different types of resources are incorporated into such a discourse by different
actors and what variables contribute to this process. This study examines the construction
of the security references, security arguments, and language in the statements of the
Commission on Sustainable Development dealing with energy and water. We found that
international organizations and Non-governmental Organizations were somewhat more
likely than state actors to use security references to discuss sustainability issues. The issues
securitized are not the traditional high political ones such as regime stability and conflicts,
but rather issues more associated with human security, such as access to renewable energy,
affordable food, and clean water. The fact that in many statements examined the use of
security references was not associated with any existential threat and hence did not comply
with the conditions of the Copenhagen School raises some doubts as to whether security
language in these statements implies a true securitization move. We also examined whether
the use of the term ‘‘security’’ by states was correlated with greater resource scarcity or
vulnerability. In the case of water-related sessions, the evidence was mixed, depending on
the choice of dependent variable. The results from energy security regressions, however,
were inconsistent with the hypothesis that greater scarcity or vulnerability induces more
use of security language.
I. Fischhendler
Department of Geography, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]
D. Katz (&)
Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]
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Keywords
Water
I. Fischhendler, D. Katz
Climate CSD Energy Food Human security Securitization UN Abbreviations
CSD
Commission for Sustainable Development
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
UN
United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
1 Introduction
A premise of discourse theory in environmental policy is that contrasting knowledge and
realities are shaped by language (Dryzek 1997; Harré et al. 1999; Hajer and Versteeg
2005). For example, the works of Alatout (2006, 2007) on Israeli water policy and of
Mehta (2001) on Indian water policy demonstrate how state actors utilized a discourse
portraying scarcity as natural and inevitable for purposes of promoting state identity and
for justifying support for dams, respectively. Similarly, a study by Rogers-Hayden et al.
(2011) demonstrates how the ‘‘energy security’’ discourse was constructed in order to
support new nuclear power in the United Kingdom. The effect of language has prompted
some to argue for the use of sensational and alarming metaphors regarding environmental
issues such as climate change (Doyle 2007; Ungar 2007), in order to garner media attention
and avoid skeptical counterclaims (Williams 2000). Use of such a language by many
environmentalists is often based on the assumption that they will succeed to influence only
if they establish widespread connections between environmental issues such as climate
change and prominent policy issues such as poverty, housing, health, and national and
international security (e.g., Hale 2010).
The discourse of environmental security, which presupposes environmental threats as
urgent and interrelated to human systems (Graeger 1996; Baldwin 1997), is gaining in
popularity. The term itself has gained much recognition as a contentious but widespread
catchphrase (Graeger 1996; Allenby 2000; Trombetta 2008), with a host of other securitized
language considered part of the environmental security canon. A commonly used term in this
discourse is ‘‘environmental conflict,’’ a catchphrase that has gained prominence through its
association of ecological safekeeping with peace and social justice (Conca 1994). Another
example is the use of the ‘‘oil weapons’’ metaphor to demonstrate how oil embargos operate
as a threat to both national and economic security (Mulligan 2010).
The attempt to cast environmental problems as security issues has resulted in the
common use of security jargon, idioms, and metaphors in policymakers’ and politicians’
statements and reports dealing with environmental policy (Levy 1995). Various analyses
identify why natural resources like energy (Mulligan 2010; Rogers-Hayden et al. 2011),
water (Grey and Sadoff 2007; Cook and Bakker 2012), and climate (Barnett 2001; Detraz
2011) are discussed in terms and language of security. They find that the policy goal is
often to ensure reliable supply of these resources, which is considered important for the
stability of the economy and the political system.
There are, however, far fewer studies that have attempted to identify how such a
discourse is constructed and by whom, and which variables contribute to this process.
Hence, the aim of this study is to identify who is likely to discuss sustainable development
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discourse using security language; and which political, physical, and economic variables
may contribute to the use of security terminology in discussing such issues. An understanding of such uses of terminology will hopefully help clarify the differing meanings
attributed to the jargon and the various motivations for using it. This, in turn, may help
prevent confusion that may result from the increasing use of security language to discuss
policy matters not traditionally considered security related.
This study examines the use of the term ‘‘security’’ within the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), a multilateral forum that includes both state
and non-state actors. The CSD represents a prominent forum in which both types of actors
meet to promote approaches to sustainable development. The following section reviews the
use of security language in the environment discourse with particular emphasis on
attaching the term ‘‘security’’ to natural resources. It then presents a case study consisting
of a content analysis of official statements made in the CSD. The analysis categorized
statements submitted in sessions on energy and climate and on water and sanitation based
on whether or not parties made use of the term security. It then evaluated statistically
which parties most mentioned the term ‘‘security,’’, and what types of security were most
mentioned. Results are followed by a discussion of possible explanations for use of
security terminology and possible implications for policy and resource management. The
final section provides conclusions and offers potential directions for further research.
2 Literature review
2.1 Security language in the environment discourse
The theory of securitization entails an issue transformed into a matter of security through
the use of ‘‘speech-acts.’’ Under this constructed process, the actor expressing the statement and the audience affected by the statement legitimize a certain issue as an existential
security threat (Buzan et al. 1998). This process reflects constructivist and poststructuralist
assertions that ‘‘threats are socially-constructed’’ through a ‘‘reflexive and contextualized
process that generates meanings and practices’’ (Trombetta 2008, p. 600).
This process is apparent when looking at some of the discourse commonly associated
with climate change. Use of terms such as ‘‘urgent’’ and ‘‘catastrophic’’ has caused some to
question whether such discourse is alarmist (Risbey 2008). Similarly, use of the term
‘‘tipping point,’’ a metaphor that induces feelings and images of forthcoming, irreversible
danger, alters the perception of the climate from one that gradually changes to one that is
approaching a dangerous threshold (Russill and Nyssa 2009; Risbey 2008).
A common linguistic device for securitizing the environment is ‘‘framing,’’ which
often utilizes metaphors within a particular social and cultural framework (Shmueli
2008). An example of framing climate change as an alarming threat can be seen through
former vice president Al Gore’s statement at the White House Conference on Climate
Action, April 21, 1994. ‘‘All of us here this morning are Paul Reveres of the environmental movement. We too are working as a team. Our enemy is more subtle than a
British fleet. Climate change is the most serious problem that our civilization faces, and it
has caused enormous damage before in human history’’ (ECSP 1995, p. 52). By framing
the complexities of a threatening change in climate into an easily imaginable enemy of
the past, and by grouping his audience into a ‘‘team’’ of patriotic ‘‘Paul Reveres’’, Gore is
able to make use of American folklore to help his audience interpret climate change as a
subtle, yet well-known enemy threatening American well-being. Gore thereby creates a
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security plot consisting of an existential threat, a potential point of no return, and a
possible solution if this ‘‘team’’ acts now.
2.2 The manifold uses of the term ‘‘security’’
Often, both the framing and the metaphors are convened by attaching the term ‘‘security’’
to many resources that society considers to be important and its access to them potentially
under threat. Water is one such resource. The term ‘‘water security’’ has been attached to
water management due to the growing body of evidence predicting the emergence of a
global water crisis and its effect on different facets of our livelihood and economy (Tarlock
and Wouters 2009). It is often unclear, however, what is meant by the term. Cook and
Baker (2012), for example, documented the increasing use of the term ‘‘water security’’
and its different meanings across disciplines including empirical, modeling, conceptual,
and laboratory-based studies.
‘‘Food security’’ is used to refer to hunger that may serve as a factor that fuels conflicts
(Blakeney 2009). However, as opposed to older definitions that described food security in
terms of ensuring reliable food supplies and took the nation-state as the unit of interest,
today the discourse has changed to include questions of personal access and entitlement
(Maxwell 1996). For instance, a commonly cited definition of food security taken from a
World Bank policy study states that ‘‘food security is access by all people at all times to
enough food for an active, healthy life’’ (World Bank 1986).
Perhaps the most obvious example of attaching ‘‘security’’ to a resource is in the
‘‘energy security’’ jargon. While in some cases, the energy discourse refers to energy
resources as a cause for or instrument of war, the term ‘‘energy security’’ is an umbrella
term that is often used to describe many concerns such as a potential threat to standards of
living, economic growth, or political power and stability that may materialize from lack of
access to energy-generating resources (Hughes 2009). As with water and food security,
‘‘energy security’’ has been defined in numerous ways (Kruyt et al. 2009).
Lately, observers have also placed the protection of ecosystems and provision of
ecosystem services in the context of security. Such views are premised on the belief that
disruption of such services would not only impact our quality of life, but, in the long
term, undermine our capacity to exist (Pirages 2005). The connection between energy,
food, and water security and global climate change resulted in the term ‘‘climate security.’’ The underlying assumption behind this term is that climate change has the
potential to disrupt many basic functions of ecological and social systems and thereby
threaten our life support systems (Khagram and Ali 2006; Risbey 2008). As an overarching or meta-issue, ‘‘climate security’’ has been used to describe a wide range of
issues that could potentially be affected by climate change, including, but certainly not
limited to, traditional security issues. Table 1 describes some of the resources securitized, the insecurities at stake, and the policy instruments often suggested to ensure
resource security.
2.3 Motivations and implications of use of security language in sustainable
development
According to Buzan et al. (1998), securitization is about breaking the rules of the normal
political decision-making, placing issues ‘‘beyond normal politics,’’ or ‘‘beyond public
debate’’ (Schmitt 1985; Williams 2003, p. 5). As such, promoting security aspects of
an issue or framing an issue in terms of security is a way to establish priority for issues
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Table 1 Types of natural resources securitized in policy debates
Resources securitized
What is threatened
Non-military instruments to reduce threat
Climate
Ecosystems
Food production
Property
Political stability
Quality of life/standard of living
Water resources
Demand management
Energy efficiency
Renewable energy sources
Technology transfer
Various adaptation measures
Ecosystems
Biodiversity
Ecosystem services
Open spaces
Conservation areas
Legal instruments
Resource efficiency improvements
Energy
Employment
Quality of life/standard of living
Demand management
Development of new energy sources
Energy efficiency
Integration of grids
Renewable energy sources
Technology transfer
Trade liberalization
Food
Food production
Employment
Political stability
Quality of life/standard of living
Crop innovations
Technology development
Subsidies
Trade liberalization/restriction
Water
Ecosystems
Food production
Human right
Political stability
Quality of life/standard of living
Demand management
Development of new water (e.g., desalination)
Improved efficiency
Integrated water resource management
Technology transfer
Virtual water
(e.g., Balzacq 2005; Wæver 1995; Bethurem 2002). Given this effect of security rationales,
many actors, both states and NGOs, have used security jargon in an attempt to portray as
high politics issues normally thought of as low politics. They may do this out of genuine
belief that environmental or development issues are a threat to national security or simply
in order to better market the issues to decision makers. Such a potential marketing agenda
in discussions of sustainable development issues has led some to argue that securitizing the
environment is just a rhetorical device aimed at drumming up greater support for measures
to protect the environment (e.g., Levy 1995) or, as Deudeny (1990) called it, ‘‘rhetorical
attention-getting.’’
These types of uses of securitization of sustainable development issues can be a doubleedged sword. While the intent of some may be to elevate the profile of environmental
issues, the ultimate effect may be that we drain the term security of any meaning (Deudeny
1990; Stern and Öjendal 2010; Ciută 2010). Widening the scope of security may undercut
the ability to conduct traditional missions that counter explicitly military threats, and may
distract from more proximate causes of violent conflict (Katz 2011). In addition, using the
jargon of security to generate attention may also adversely affect the environment, as it can
obscure precise calculation of environmental threats and discourage critical thinking about
which environmental problems are serious and which are trivial (Brock 1997; Katz 2011).
Finally, securitization of sustainable development discourse may reduce policymakers’
ability to prioritize among competing issues. If everything is a matter of security, then how
does one choose in cases demanding trade-offs? This can lead to a freezing of policy
debates (Balzacq 2005), which, in turn, can lead to less collaboration and cooperation, and
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finally to a halt in the discourse on the securitized topics (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1995).
Such outcomes are particularly associated with security issues which, in contrast to economic ones, are inherently more conflictual and their equilibria less stable (Lipson 1984).
The next section presents a case study that analyzes which actors most make use of
security terminology in environmental discourse, and attempts to identify which variables
might encourage these actors to do so.
3 Methodology
3.1 Choice of case study: the Commission on Sustainable Development
In order to assess which actors most utilize the jargon of securitization in the context of the
environment, this study undertook an analysis of statements made at sessions of the United
Nations Commission on Sustainable Development. The CSD was established in 1992, following the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also
known as ‘‘the Earth Summit,’’ in which leaders of states introduced and promulgated the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21, intended as blueprints
for achievement of sustainable development. The central role of the CSD is to review the
progress of the implementation of this sustainable development mandate, to set policy
guidance, and to promote dialogue and build partnerships between the different actors. Each
year, the CSD serves as an open forum in which states, international organizations, and
NGOs address issues considered crucial to promoting sustainable development.
Declarations within the framework of the CSD were chosen for this case study because
the CSD serves as the primary regularly meeting international forum explicitly designated
for promoting sustainable development. Furthermore, the structure of the organization, in
which formal statements are presented by state and non-state member parties, provides us
with an unambiguous unit of analysis: submitted declarations.
3.2 Choice of indicators
Because water and energy are among the most prominent examples put forth of resources
with security implications, we evaluated all publicly available statements submitted during
the twelfth through the fifteenth annual sessions (CSD-12, CSD-13, CSD-14, and CSD-15),
which took place between 2004 and 2007. These sessions focused either on water and
sanitation (CSD-12 and CSD-13), or on energy and climate (CSD-14 and CSD-15). The
screen used to filter the statements was a very simple and broad one: all statements
containing the word ‘‘security’’ (or the Spanish or French equivalents). Use of the term
‘‘security’’ as an indicator of discourse framing is a crude measure, but is easily identified
and measured. There is precedence for use of this indicator, for instance, Cook and Baker
(2012), as well as Detraz and Betsill (2009), who used the term ‘‘security’’ as an indicator
of discourse in UN Security Council debates. Along the same lines, Chester (2010) also
identifies the multiple aspects of the term ‘‘energy security’’ as it appears in the energy
literature.
We categorized the references to security according to what resource was ostensibly
under threat (e.g., food, water, energy, etc.). In addition, given the range of definitions of
and views on security, and recent approaches that emphasize human security (e.g., Axworthy 2001; King and Murray 2001; Paris 2001; MacLean et al. 2006; Tadjbakhsh and
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Chenoy 2007; Chandler 2008), we indicated whether the focus of the security reference
was state-centered or individual-/human-centered.1
In order to begin addressing the question of who is most using security jargon in the
sustainable development dialogue, we first compared state and non-state actors. Non-state
actors included both international organizations such as United Nations agencies, as well as
NGOs representing a variety of stakeholders, including farmers, indigenous peoples, and
other social and economic causes.
3.3 Hypotheses and statistical tests
The first hypothesis we tested was the thesis that resource scarcity contributes to increased
use of security jargon. Taking only the statements of state actors, we performed regressions
to test whether how often a state referenced security correlated with various national
indicators of water stress or access to energy supplies. Three different measures of use of
security references were used as dependent variables in separate regressions, as detailed in
Eqs. (1–3) provided in the ‘‘Appendix’’ below. Separate regressions were run for waterfocused sessions (CSD12 and CSD13) and for energy- and climate-focused sessions
(CSD14 and CSD15).
In terms of explanatory variables, we used both aggregate and disaggregated indicators
of water poverty and energy security. Aggregate or composite indices of water and energy
security attempt to offer integrated, holistic, and concise measures; however, the components of such composites and their relative weighting in determining the aggregate value
are often controversial (Kruyt et al. 2009; Cho et al. 2010). Therefore, in addition to the
composite indices, we also ran separate regressions using the same dependent variables,
but using a range of explanatory variables. These included indicators specifically related to
energy or water security (e.g., net energy imports or internal renewable water resources as
a percentage of overall water resources), as well as indicators intended to capture potential
exposure or vulnerability to scarcity (e.g., whether the country was an island (as island
countries, especially small island countries are potentially more exposed to sea-level rise),
and the contribution of agriculture to the national economy and the percent of population
directly dependent on agriculture [as the agricultural sector tends to be the primary consumer of water in most countries (FAO 2011)]. In addition, for both sets of regressions, we
included control variables such as GDP per capita, as an indicator of economic capacity to
deal with resource scarcity, and a general measure of political stability and absence of
violence. A full list and description of the variables used are provided in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
The second hypothesis tested was whether non-state actors use security jargon more
than state actors do. Non-state actors, be they intergovernmental organizations or NGOs,
often have a particular mandate to promote a given development issue and thus are likely
to have priorities that differ from state governments. This is true even for UN agencies,
notwithstanding the fact that the UN is a body made up of member states. For this reason,
1
While there are debates as to the distinction (and even the veracity and utility of such a distinction
between state and human security (Chandler 2008)), in this study state-centered references were defined as
those directly referencing either the state or state agencies as the primary object of analysis and/or beneficiary or party at risk. Human-centered references were those that primarily referenced individual or
community welfare as its central concern, without reference to the integrity of state mechanisms or territory.
Thus, for example, references to regional balance of power or critical national infrastructure were considered state-centered, while those advocating for increases in access to clean water or electrification of
villages were considered human-centered. For more on this distinction in environmental discourse analysis,
see Detraz and Betsill (2009).
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we group both intergovernmental bodies and NGOs together as non-state actors. Non-state
actors would have a greater incentive to use the language of securitization than state actors
if they believe that security is viewed as a high-level issue in policy circles, whereas their
development or environmental issues typically are not. To test the hypothesis that non-state
actors referenced security proportionately more often than their state counterparts, we
conducted simple chi-square tests. In addition, we identified what type of issue (e.g.,
energy, water, food, climate) was the focus of the use of the term security and whether the
focus was state security or human security. We then evaluated whether state and non-state
actors focus on different ‘‘types’’ of security. Given the pioneering role of international
organizations in using the term human security (e.g., UNDP 1994), and the stated policy
agendas of both intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, we also evaluate whether
state and non-state actors differ in terms of emphasis on state security versus human
security.
4 Results
The water and energy CSD sessions were evaluated separately; however, there were
several similarities between the two samples. In terms of number of statements submitted,
states outnumbered non-state actors by slightly over a 2:1 ratio in both cases (Table 2).
Furthermore, the percentage of statements that referenced the word security was roughly
19 % in both cases, with states accounting for 59 % of all statements in the case of the
water sessions and 57 % in the case of energy (Fig. 1a, b).
Summary statistics for regressions testing the correlation between use of security terminology and various measures of water and energy scarcity are reported in Table 5 in the
‘‘Appendix’’. Values for independent variables are given for observations used in
the logistic regressions. As a first cut, we ran single-variate logistic regressions using the
composite indices for water poverty (Lawrence et al. 2002) and energy security (World
Energy Council 2009) as independent variables. Results of the regressions are presented in
Table 6 in the ‘‘Appendix’’. Results from the water session statements indicate that the
correlation between likelihood of referring to security and water scarcity was actually
negative (a lower score in the water poverty index indicates greater scarcity). That is,
countries facing fewer constraints on water resources were actually more likely to make
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
CSD12 & CSD13
Water
CSD14 & CSD15
Energy
Number of
observations
% of
total
Number of
observations
% of
total
Parties submitting official statements to
CSD sessions
150
100.0
159
100.0
States submitting statements
102
68.0
108
67.9
48
32.0
51
32.1
Statements
366
100.0
696
100.0
Statements submitted by states
233
63.7
430
61.8
Statements submitted by non-state actors
133
36.3
266
38.2
70
19.1
130
18.5
Non-state actors submitting statements
Statements referencing security
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Fig. 1 Proportion of statements submitted to CSD by all parties that contain security references. a Water
session statements (CSD12 & CSD13). b Energy session statements (CSD14 & CSD15)
use of security terminology. Results from the energy and climate sessions tell a similar
story. States with a higher energy security score are more likely to have issued a statement
referencing security.
The composite energy security index was more concentrated on factors addressing
supply-related issues, such as diversity of supplies and import ratios, than was the water
poverty index, which included additional issues such as water quality and human development measures, and thus was perhaps a more well-rounded or multifaceted composite.
For the water sessions, not only were those facing less scarcity more likely to reference
security, they did so proportionately more often (see Table 7 in the ‘‘Appendix’’). In the
case of the energy security index, there was no statistically significant difference in the
frequency of security references.
For regressions using disaggregated explanatory variables, results portrayed a somewhat
different picture. In this case, several variables related to water scarcity were statistically
correlated with increased use of the term security, including a higher ratio of withdrawals
to resources, a greater dependence on other countries for water supplies, and a higher
proportion of population dependent on agriculture (Table 7 in the ‘‘Appendix’’). These
results seem to contradict those finding a negative relationship when using a composite
water scarcity index. Higher per capita GDP was positively correlated with increased use
of the term security, despite the fact that increased relative wealth would seem to indicate
increased capacity to address scarcity issues.
The signs on the fuel-related explanatory variables in the energy security regression
remained inconsistent with the theory that greater scarcity induces more use of security
jargon, however, none of the variables were statistically significant at the 10 % level or
below, and so little can be concluded one way or the other on this matter. The only variable
that was statistically significant using disaggregated measures of energy security was
average annual population growth. However, the sign on the coefficient was negative,
indicating that states with greater rates of population growth (and thus, presumably greater
future energy needs) are actually less likely to reference security than states with more
modest growth. Islands were more likely to reference security, but the result was not
statistically significant. This may be due to the small number of island countries in the
sample.
Despite the literature indicating a relationship between traditional notions of national
security and environmental security, neither in the water or in energy regression was the
index of political stability and absence of violence (a more traditional security measure)
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Fig. 2 Share of references to human- and state-centered security in statements submitted to CSD sessions.
a Water session statements (CSD12 & CSD13). b Energy session statements (CSD14 & CSD15)
statistically significant at any meaningful level. Regressions run without this variable
produced nearly identical results to those provided herein.
Regarding the hypothesis that proportionately non-state actors were more likely to
reference security in their statements than were state actors, evidence was weakly supporting. Both jointly and when looking at the water and energy sessions separately, nonstate actors were proportionately more likely both to reference security2 and to issue
statements referencing security3; they also used the term ‘‘security’’ more often4 than their
state counterparts. For instance, overall for both water and energy sessions, 36 % of state
actors made use of the term security compared with 43 % of non-state actors.5 The higher
percentage for non-state actors support the hypothesis; however, chi-square tests found the
difference to be statistically significant at the 5 % level or lower only for the differences in
total number of references to security. Moreover, the finding was driven by the water
sessions. In the case of the energy sessions, none of the differences were statistically
significant.
In terms of the focus of CSD security references, we saw differences both between state
and non-state actors and between the water and the energy and climate sessions. For water
session statements, nearly half of references to security (48 %) focused on human security,
as opposed to only 22 % that focused on national security (Fig. 2a). Non-state actors
focused more on human security proportionately than did state actors. For energy and
climate session statements, of those referring to security, nearly 60 % of references did not
specify whether the focus of their use of the term was human security or national security
(Fig. 2b). This result was similar whether the statement was made by a state or a non-state
actor. In both cases, state-centered references outnumbered those that were human-security-centered. Non-state actors, however, referred to human security proportionately much
2
As measured by a binary variable indicating whether or not the party used the term ‘‘security’’ at least
once.
3
As measured by the number of statements issued that used the term ‘‘security’’ at least once, normalized
by number of statements issued.
4
As measured by the total number of references to the term ‘‘security,’’ normalized by percentage of
statements issued.
5
The respective percentages for water sessions were 42 and 49 %, respectively, while for the energy
sessions they were 29 and 38 %.
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more than did states, which referenced general human security issues in only 5 % of their
security references.
In the water sessions, the most common type issue associated with a security reference
was threats to food security, accounting for 23 % of all references (Fig. 3a). The second
most common use of the term security was in the context of threats to property rights and
land tenure. Threats to water supply, including both water quantity and quality, accounted
for only 14 % of the security references. Threats relating to economic development, project
finance, and affordability of resources accounted for another 14 %. References relating to
environmental issues such as protection of ecosystems and ecosystem services accounted
for only 12 % of the total. Roughly 13 % of references spoke of security in general terms,
without indicating a specific aspect that is under threat.
In the case of energy, however, over a third (38 %) of the security references were
general and did not offer a context or definition of the term or what is under threat
(Fig. 3b). A third (34 %) referred to secure routes of supply. This represented over half of
all references that specified what they meant by using of the term security. Concern for
food security was also an important topic in energy and climate discussions, representing
nearly a fifth (19 %) of all references. These included discussions of the impacts of climate
change on food supplies, for instance, and the role of bio-fuels in providing renewable
energy sources.
5 Discussion
The use of references to the term ‘‘security’’ in one international forum as an indication for
‘‘securitization’’ language is an admittedly blunt indicator and should be viewed as simply
a first cut at a complex issue. Still, despite this obvious limitation, several interesting
observations can be made given the results of this case study. Firstly, the use of the term
security in this case study did not, by and large, refer to traditional security issues, such as
risk of violent conflicts or political instability. References in CSD statements to the
potential for violent conflict were extremely rare, and the limited cases tended not to be by
countries that are particularly susceptible to scarcity-induced violence. Potential for water
wars, for instance, much discussed in academic and policy circles, was barely mentioned in
CSD statements. For instance, one of the only specific references to traditional security
issues was made by Germany in regard to scarce water resources, a problem from which
Germany itself does not directly suffer. The statement was a general one asserting that
Fig. 3 Subject of ‘‘security’’ references in statements submitted to CSD. a Water session statements
(CSD12 & CSD13). b Energy session statements (CSD14 & CSD15)
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Table 3 Insecurities expressed, idioms and language used, and recommended strategies
Resource
at stake
Insecurities
expressed
Idioms and language used
Recommended strategies
Climate
Hunger, disease,
flooding,
migration,
biodiversity loss
Vulnerability, urgent,
catastrophic forecasts,
disasters, devastation,
destruction, misery
Mitigation and adaption finance,
emergency disaster response
development
Energy
Economic
destabilization,
poverty, lack of
development
Concerns, undermining,
terrorism
Trade liberalization, financial support,
military assurances of open trade
zones, development of renewable
sources, technology transfer
Food
Development,
health, hunger,
poverty
Urgent, utmost priorities
Technological support, financial
support
Land
Poverty, rights
Water
War, disease,
economic
hardship, poverty
Looming crisis,
grim prospects
Financial support for infrastructure,
trade support
Property rights, institutional reform
‘‘[p]ressure on freshwater reserves will increase—through population growth, increasing
urbanization, rising industrial production and more consumption. It is becoming a threat to
peace and security.’’6
Rather, use of the term security was, by and large, relegated to broader definitions of
security—those dealing with economic welfare and development. For example, Fiji, a
country with one of the world’s highest rates of renewable water resources per capita,
referenced water security, but in the context of petitioning for reduced trade barriers that
currently restrict its exporting of water and virtual water.7
That being said, the terminology used to describe these security issues was a mix of dire
warnings and exhortations and run of the mill mundane policy jargon, calling for noncontroversial measures such as increased efficiency, sharing of information, or transfer of
technology to developing nations. Thus, for instance, Indonesia called for promotion of
global energy security based on increased energy efficiency and use of renewable resources
to be achieved by means of ‘‘increased capacity building, technology transfer and
financing’’8, while Antigua and Barbuda commented that best practices would be insufficient to achieve water security in small island countries and suggested that richer
countries contribute toward ‘‘the establishment of a Disaster Relief Fund to assist small UN
member states.’’9 The solutions offered to avoid potentially ‘‘catastrophic’’ consequences,
however, had little traditional security characteristics and tended to be civilian instruments
common in development discourse.
6
Statement submitted by Germany, April 28, 2004, to the CSD12. One of the only other references to
violent conflict over scarce resources was another very general statement made by a representative of
International Federation of Agricultural Producers, who also gave a general warning claiming that [w]ater
security in some parts could lead to conflicts and water wars’’ Statement submitted on behalf of the Farmers
Group on 3 May 2006 to CSD14.
7
Statement submitted by Fiji to the United Nations April 30, 2004, to the CSD12.
8
Statement submitted by Indonesia on May 1, 2007, to CSD15.
9
Statement submitted by Antigua and Barbuda on April 20, 2005, to CSD13.
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Much of the security rhetoric in our case study is consistent with the alarming rhetoric
in the climate discourse (Risbey 2008). The security framework was often used in order to
communicate a sense of urgency by making statements with language like ‘‘catastrophic,’’
‘‘disasters,’’ ‘‘devastation,’’ ‘‘destruction,’’ and ‘‘misery.’’ For instance, a representative of
the World Meteorological Organization commented that ‘‘Soil health is crucial to food
security and poverty alleviation, but erosion, deforestation and acidification are causing
catastrophic soil damage.’’10 The effectiveness of such language in promoting action
toward solutions, however, is debatable (Malnes 2008).11 A list of the types of insecurities
expressed, with examples of idioms and language used to describe them, and recommended strategies for achieving each are offered in Table 3.
As hypothesized, non-state actors made proportionately greater use of security jargon,
as is in line with the literature that suggests that both international organizations and NGOs
may have greater incentives than states to utilize security jargon to capture the attention of
policymakers and the media in order to advance their causes. Human security was much
more likely to be the focus of use of security references in the water sessions than in the
energy ones. This difference can perhaps be attributed to the difference between the nature
of the resources. For instance, in many places water is considered a local resource, and
hence, its exploitation is largely done at the local or community level (Lansing 1991),
while in the case of energy, there is often a need for national or regional efforts to exploit
resources. Furthermore, it may be related to the perception of water as a human right,
whereas energy resources are rarely portrayed in this way. Not surprisingly, non-governmental actors were more likely to focus on human rather than national security (Fig. 2).
The large percentage of references to security that we were unable to classify as either
human or state-centered security, however, is further evidence of the claims by many that
such a distinction is often unclear (see, for example, Chandler 2008).
Reliability of supply was the most prominent rationale for security language in the
energy sessions, while in the water sessions it was food production and property rights.
A possible explanation for this may relate to nature of the resources: Energy sources are
traded internationally and hence can be disrupted or facilitated by a range of international
actors. Water, in contrast, as mentioned, is still largely considered a local or community
resource. Thus, the risk is not so much external disruption to supply, but to food production
and property rights, the conditions for which are often more locally determined.
In the case of water, there is mixed evidence regarding the hypothesis that scarcity will
lead to increased references to security, depending on the independent variables examined.
Little evidence was found to support such a claim in the case of energy regardless of the
variables used. The discrepancy between regression results using composite versus individual measures of scarcity as dependent variables, in the case of water sessions, highlights
the capriciousness of using any individual measure and the risks of drawing conclusions
based on such. This is in line with much of the current literature that is critical of specific
water security measures (e.g., Cook and Bakker 2012; Lautze and Manthrithilake 2012). The
different elements or variables that go into making such composite indices may have different and even opposing impacts on the tendencies to use security jargon, and each merits
evaluation, but not in isolation, but rather within a broad context that paints a fuller picture.
The positive correlation between per capita GDP and likelihood to reference security,
for both the water and energy sessions (although statistically significant only for the water
sessions), is perhaps surprising, given that higher wealth generally indicates higher
10
Statement submitted by the World Meteorological Organization on May 11, 2006, to CSD14.
11
Evaluation of the effectiveness of such types of statements is beyond the scope of this study.
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adaptive capacity. However, richer countries often used security terms to highlight problems
of other countries, rather than their own. For instance, several OECD countries mentioned
the need for poverty eradication in the context of food security (see, for example, Norway’s
warning of the potential for global warming to ‘‘wipe out efforts to fight poverty and improve
health and food security’’ in Africa12). Thus, countries securitized issues even when they
were not directly at risk. We can only speculate at the motivations for doing so. Genuine
concern for ‘‘universal’’ issues is a possible and straightforward explanation, but other
possible explanations include a concern over destabilization of areas in which natural
resources are found or concern over immigration or other spillover effects that may stem
from resource scarcity-induced instability. For instance, Austria warned of the potential for
global warming to bring about the ‘‘increase of natural disasters, rising of the sea level,
vanishing of glaciers, severe security impacts through mass migrations.’’ Testing the veracity
of such possible explanations, however, is beyond the scope of this work.
5.1 Does reference to ‘‘security’’ imply securitization?
When an issue is turned into a matter of security, the issue is said to be ‘‘securitized,’’ a term
most often associated with the Copenhagen School of international relations. Securitization is a
social process ‘‘constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a
saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’’ (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 25; Wæver
1995). Securitization in other words presents something as an existential threat—even if no
immediate, objective threat exists—thereby legitimizing taking emergency actions. Securitization therefore breaks the rules of normal decision-making processes (Pirages 2005) since it
‘‘entails a specific logic or rationality, independent of the context or the intentions of the
speakers’’ (Trombetta 2008, p. 588). In order for securitization to successfully occur, ‘‘facilitating conditions’’ must be met. These are the conditions that the Copenhagen School calls
‘‘the internal, linguistic-grammatical’’ and ‘‘the external, contextual and social’’. The former
relates to the grammatical structure of security, whereby a security plot within the language of
a particular sector (such as the environment) is constructed, including an ‘‘existential threat’’
and ‘‘point of no return’’; the latter pertains to the required authoritative position of the actor
initiating the securitizing process and the audience showing signs of accepting this ‘‘position of
authority’’ and viewing the alleged threat as real (Buzan et al. 1998).
For many statements examined, in all sessions, the use of security references was not
associated with any existential threat and hence did not comply with the linguistic-grammatical
conditions of the Copenhagen School. This raises some doubt as to whether security language
in these statements actually implies securitization. Moreover, the finding in our study of use of
civilian objectives and often commonplace means to address security concerns stands in
contrast to many of the policy tools of securitization imposed in traditional security cases,
which use exceptional means to attain their objectives. For example, in the fight against
terrorism tools such as visa procedures, intelligence polices, border security checkpoints, and
passenger name data records have been utilized in an attempt to deliver security (Balzacq
2008). This raises further doubt as to whether the security references identified require using
exceptional, urgent measures as required (by the Copenhagen School) in order to be considered
as genuine securitization,13 or they simply signal traditional policy dressed in security terms.
12
Statement of Norway submitted February 28, 2007, to CSD 15.
13
The Copenhagen School identifies ‘‘a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an
existential threat to a referent object’’ as a securitizing move, which becomes completely ‘‘securitized only if
and when the audience accepts it as such’’ (Buzan et al. 1998).
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The findings of this case study seem to support the argument that security language is
often used as a rhetorical device aimed at drumming up greater support for achieving
national goals, as was suggested by Deudeny (1990) and Levy (1995), rather than an
example of genuine securitization, as defined by the Copenhagen School conditions. Given
the nature of CSD discourse, in which each participant reads a statement with no discussion
that follows, we are, however, unable to fully examine whether the security language used
complies with the other external, contextual, and social facilitating conditions of the
Copenhagen School. The broad nature of the use of the term ‘‘security’’ does seem to
support the contention of Haas (2002, p. 1) that environmental security terminology is
‘‘selectively invoked by policy makers… in order to justify preexisting state goals.’’ This
observation, however, does not seem to be limited to policymakers and state goals, but
rather can be applied more generally to those seeking to influence policy and their organization’s goals.
6 Conclusions
The use of the term ‘‘security’’ in policy discourse is increasingly broad. It has it been
expanded beyond military and hostile threats to include broader threats to quality of life
and other values, and beyond focusing exclusively on the nation-state, to include broader
measures of human welfare. Motivation to use security jargon to describe sustainable
development issues may stem from a desire to raise the profile of such issues in policy
debates; however, doing so risks diluting the jargon to the point where policymakers
cannot utilize it to prioritize among competing interests.
Such use of security jargon could have a profound effect on willingness to cooperate, to
sacrifice, and even to negotiate and debate (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1995). This is of
particular concern in the context of environmental change, which depends on transnational
and even global collaboration (e.g., Kates et al. 2005; Keohane and Victor 2010). As such,
it is important to be able to predict what resources are to be discussed in security language,
by whom and what variables contribute to this process. For this reason, we examined the
construction of the security references, arguments, and language in a high-level international forum dedicated to sustainable development.
The CSD served as a good forum in which to evaluate the various levels of securitization of sustainable development jargon between actors and between types of environmental and resource issues. The issues discussed in security language are not the traditional
high political ones such as regime stability and potential for violent conflicts that are
essential for state territorial integrity, but rather issues generally considered to be ‘‘low
politics,’’ such as reliable supply of fuel, food provision, and access to clean water. In the
case of energy, securing reliable supplies is often associated with ensuring economic
growth, while in the case of water, food security is often associated with alleviating
poverty and supporting rural livelihoods. In neither case did it appear that genuine fear of
political instability and violence contributed to the use of securitization language, as might
be predicted by the environmental security literature that emphasizes resource scarcity as
triggers for conflicts.
These results can contribute to the limited attention devoted to examining how security
discourse is constructed in the environmental and sustainable development realm (Grove
2010). This study also contributes to the scant work analyzing the activities of CSD, an
important venue for international discourse and agenda building relating to sustainable
development policy.
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This study clearly has limitations, the most obvious of which is the narrow scope taken
by examining only statements that use the actual word ‘‘security.’’ Yet, this highly
restrictive approach allowed us to establish clear and objective boundaries necessary to
obtain samples for statistical analysis. The results presented, however, leave several
questions open: Is the use of security jargon by state representatives a reaction to the CSD
challenging state sovereignty? Did uncertainty in states’ behavior and in physical conditions intensify the use of this security jargon? Finally, as actors increasingly harness the
security horse to pull the environmental wagon, does the power of this security jargon
inspire people to take action or, alternatively, does it lead to gridlocking the negotiations in
the CSD and similar venues? The answer to these questions, and to questions regarding the
impact and/or effectiveness of using security jargon to highlight particular development
issues, is left for future research.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to convey their appreciation to the EU Seventh Framework
Programme that funded the Climate Change, Hydro-conflicts and Human Security (CLICO) project that
made this project possible. We would like also to thank Daniel Natan for research assistance and for
exposing us to some of the securitization literature discussed in this article.
Appendix
Regression equations
Securityi ¼ a þ Xi b þ e
ð1Þ
Securitynumberi ¼ a þ Xi b þ e
ð2Þ
Securityavgi ¼ a þ Xi b þ e
ð3Þ
where
Security = a binary variable, measuring whether or not the state referenced security in
its statement
Securitynumber = a limited ordered categorical dependent variable, the categories of
which represent the number of security references per state. The four categories used
were 0, 1, 2–3, 4, or more.
Securitavg = the average number of security references per statement per state.
X = A vector of various indicators frequently used by researchers to evaluate water and
energy security. They include both resource specific variables (e.g., resource reserves)
and variables that are meant to evaluate other possible measures of adaptive capacity
(e.g., per capita income). The specific indicators used differed between models. A full
list of the variables used is provided in Table 4 below.
a and b = parameters to be measured
e = error term
The subscript i refers to the state used as the unit of observation
Logistic regressions were performed with Eq. (1). Ordered logistic regressions were performed with Eq. (2). And Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions were performed with
Eq. (3). The independent explanatory variables used for the water and energy regressions
are given in Table 4 in the Appendix.
123
Energy variables
Water variables
Table 4 Variables
Annual renewable water resources per capita
Internal renewable water resources per capita
Water withdrawn as share of total IRWR
Share of IRWR originating in other countries
Population in the agricultural sector
Agricultural value added as share of overall Gross
Domestic Product
Gross Domestic Product per capita
Annual population growth
World Governance Indicators (WGI) index of political
stability and absence of violence published by the World
Bank (2010). Values represent 2003 data. Higher values
indicate increased stability and lack of violence.
ARWR
IRWR
Withdrawals
Waterdependence
Agrpop
Agrgdp
GDPcap
Popgrowth
Politicalstability
Resource
endowment and
use variables
Fossil fuel energy use as share of total energy use
Net energy imports as share of total energy use
Fuel exports as share of total merchandise exports
Fuelexports
Fossil fuel reserves per capita
Fossilreservescap
Energyimports
Fossil fuel energy use per capita
Energyusecap
Resource
endowment and
use variables
Fossilusepercent
Aggregate measure of energy security published by the
World Energy Council (2009), in which higher values
represent increasing security. Among the index
components were measures of diversity of supply, energy
investment, reserve capacity.
WECSEC
Composite
Socio-economic
and political
variables
Aggregate water poverty index developed by Sullivan
(2002) and Lawrence et al. (2002), in which 0 is most
‘‘water poor’’ and 100 is most water rich. Among the
index components were measures of water supply
endowments, access, water quality, and sanitation
Variable description
WPI
Variable name
Composite
Variable type
%
%
%
kg of oil equivalent
kg of oil equivalent
Composite index with values
ranging from 3.8 to 8.4
Index ranging from -2.5 to
2.5
%
2000 US$
%
%
%
%
m3/cap/year
m3/cap/year
Composite index with
theoretical values ranging
from 0 to 100
Units of measurement
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123
123
Politicalstability
World Governance Indicators (WGI) index of political
stability and absence of violence published by the World
Bank (2010). Values represent 2005 data. Higher values
indicate increased stability and lack of violence.
2000 US $
Average annual population
growth
Gross Domestic Product per capita
Popgrowth
GDPcap
%
Index ranging from -2.5 to
2.5
Metric tons of CO2
equivalent
Fuel exports as share of total merchandise imports
Greenhouse gas (carbon) emissions per capita
CO2cap
Units of measurement
Fuelimports
Variable description
Variable name
%
Unless otherwise indicated, all water variable values were obtained from UN Food and Agricultural Organization’s Aquastat online database, accessed March 1, 2011. Values
represented the average values for the years 2000–2005
Socio-economic
political and
geographic
variables
Variable type
Table 4 continued
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Table 5 Summary statistics
CSD12 & CSD13
Water database
CSD14 & CSD15
Energy & climate
database
Variable
No. of
observations
Mean
SD
Min
Max
WPI
90
58.6
10.1
35
78
569,528.6
ARWR
87
24,939.7
71,719.4
94.2
IRWR
87
19,895.8
65,532.2
23.7
569,528.6
Withdrawals
87
100.5
450.3
0
3,794.4
Waterdependence
87
21.8
28.8
0
97
Agrpop
87
0.12
0.11
0.007
0.441
Agrgdp
87
11.6
11.5
0.67
51.6
GDPcap
87
7,429.6
10,270.7
104
38,807.8
3.56
Popgrowth
87
1.41
0.98
-0.98
Politicalstability
87
-0.04
1.01
-2.14
1.68
WECSEC
63
6.1
1.12
3.8
8.4
Energyusecap
76
2,949.2
3,011.3
247.4
18,515.1
Fossilreservescap
76
0.0006
0.003
0
0.028
Fossilusepercent
76
71.80
24.7
10.1
100
Energyimports
76
-22.6
150.3
695.1
100
Fuelexports
76
20.2
28.3
0
98.1
Fuelimports
76
13.3
7.55
0.23
35.7
CO2cap
76
6.82
7.772
0.13
52.715
GDPcap
76
10,753.7
12,116.2
290.4
40,617.8
Popgrowth
76
1.24
1.45
-0.62
10.52
Politicalstability
76
0.033
0.93
-2.46
1.62
Island
76
0.13
0.34
0
1
Table 6 Single-variate logistic regressions
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Security
Water Poverty Index
N = 90
Energy Security Index
N = 63
WPI
Constant
0.066**
-4.814***
Security-number
0.075***
n.a.
Securityavg
0.007**
-0.258
Pseudo R2 or R2
0.064
0.060
0.051
WECSEC
0.452*
0.215
-0.063
Constant
-3.148**
Pseudo R2 or R2
0.043
n.a.
0.652
0.011
0.013
* p\0.10, ** p\0.05, *** p\0.01
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Table 7 Multi-variate logistic regressions
Water
Energy & climate
Dependent variable: security
N = 87
Dependent variable: security
N = 76
Independent variable
Coefficient
Independent variable
Coefficient
ARWR
-3.34E-06
Energyusecap
-0.0003
IRWR
1.65E-06
Fossilreservescap
62.151
Withdrawals
0.005*
Fossilusepercent
-0.0174
Waterdependence
0.029***
Agrpop
10.693***
Agrgdp
-0.055
Energyimports
Fuelexports
0.001
-0.01
Fuelimports
0.0317
CO2cap
0.151
GDPcap
0.0001***
GDPcap
Popgrowth
0.100
Popgrowth
-0.726**
Politicalstability
0.175
Politicalstability
-0.056
Island
Constant
Pseudo R2
-3.471
0.29
0.00007
0.826
Constant
0.39
Pseudo R2
0.121
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