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CHAPTER-VI
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
A country’s defence apparatus can be perfected by reinforcing elements like organisation,
defence research, foreign policy, weapons, strategy and tactics.
Sandy Gordon, in India's Rise to Power
Analysis of Hvnothesis
Testing of Armour and Tactical concepts
Indian Power Projection
Deterrence
Co-ordination and Co-operation
Conclusion
Futuristic Appraisal
Recommendations
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202
214
217
216
227
229
Background
1.
The Indian nation state represents a civilisation entity that is over 5000 years old. Its
ancient experience of war is enshrined in Dhanurveda and the epics and the redoubtable
Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Independent India has taken significant initiatives; Brasstacks was one
such development Preceding chapters have provided an overview of the Brasstacks exercise as a
whole and specifically in the defence and security perspective of India, This was essential for
testing the major premises of the research hypothesis which was proposed in the first chapter.
Analysts have described Brasstacks as a politico-military interface. It relates to military and
t defence preparedness. Security considerations of any nation are based on geopolitical factors.
These, include geography, location, interests, sphere of influence, national aims, and geo-strategic
compulsions. Security imperatives are guided by the threat perceptions. We have seen in chapter
II that national Strategic Thought, culture and attitudes provide general direction to its future
course of action.
2
Defence experts feel that the exercise had the ‘go ahead’ of the Prime Minister and the
Defence Minster. Rajiv Gandhi was a young, dynamic, energetic personality who was keen to
put India on the world map. He hadi a vision of making India a self-reliant, successful, and a
stronger power with western technology, communication and high-tech equipment. The mood of
the nation was upbeat with young leadership of a high profile and thus the temperament was
high. General Sunderji who has been described as a ‘visionary’ soldier, greatly impressed A run
Singh, the then ministry of State for Defence and began to exert quite a considerable influence
on security matters. The Times of India has described Arun Singh the as the man responsible for
forcing military decisions during Rajiv Gandhi regime. Sunderji had enough exposure on how to
manage the ministries and the bureaucracy. He had also been associated with the perspective
189
planning for the defence forces. Sundaiji was perhaps one of the most brilliant and creative
military thinkers the Indian Army has seen. He was almost a ‘carte blanche’ to test his pet
theories.
1 In this chapter, various hypothesis listed in the first chapter have been analysed one
by one.
Test the Armour and Mechanised Forces
3.
Analysts feel that the scenario prior to exercise was that India was at a point of
culmination of military build-up. The country had made significant strides in modernisation of
defence forces. Analysts feel that Brasstacks set out to be an event of the century to provide
sense of direction to the country’s defence and security needs. Brasstacks highlighted the
continued neglect of vital issues of the country such as defence and security. Brasstacks tried to
give proper shape to the mechanism called ‘war machinery’. The exercise, it is felt served the
purpose in bringing out many lessons of tactical and strategic value. Lessons of the exercise tried
to highlight that importance of defence and planning can no way be relegated. The government
should affect cuts in other irrelevant expenditure of the other departments to ensure adequate
allotment for defence.
4.
2
Brasstacks wanted an answer for 1971 kind of decisive victory. It added a new dimension
to strategy with respect to Mechanised warfare in achieving victory in the. The 1971 War was
the most successful war fought in recent times. It put Clausewitz back on the military map and
revived German traditions of Kesselscht on the decisive wars. All previous wars in the
subcontinent have been costly stalemates. Timidity and over-calculation have confined India to
mere capture of posts and territory, which could later be bargained over in the post-war
negotiations. The armed forces became accustomed to thinking small. Bangladesh showed what
can be achieved if, mental horizons are widened and thinking is big. Brasstacks also attempted to
evolve plans for achieving decisive victories.
5.
IDSA study team observed that Brasstacks was a military exercise concerning weapons,
tactics and doctrines. New weapons had been purchased in eighties. These purchases, it was felt
that provided cutting edge to the strike formations. These weapons were required to be tested and
integrated into new organisations. Tactics and battle drills for their employment were also
required to be worked out. The great leaders of war have evolved entirely new tactics thereby
disproving the exiting ones. As the Naval battle is short and decisive, the Naval tactics adopted
by Indian commanders had an edge over Pakistani tactics in both the 1962 and 1971 wars. Indian
commanders matched the Pakistani superiority in weapons and armour by adopting brilliant
tactics. K Subrahmanyam had expressed that, “Indian Army should learn to fight Corps and army
level operations and that calls for strategic concepts and logistic management skills.”
3 IDSA
team observed from Brasstacks that a country’s defence apparatus can be perfected by
190
reinforcing elements like organisation, defence research, foreign policy, weapons, strategy and
tactics. Brasstacks had a direct contribution to the art of warfare for the Indian defence forces. 4
6
Strategic Analysis reported that exercise Brasstacks was conducted to test the armour and
mechanised forces. During the decade before the exercise, India had gone in for modernising the
armed forces. Infact, observers remarked that it was for the first time that tanks and other
equipment were run to their optimum to check their actual performance in battle conditions. The
tactics for mechanised warfare were refined, including the fine-tuning of the supported arms and
the logistics. Kapil Kak describes Brasstacks as the event of complete mobilisation of war-effort
comprising of mass and mobility. Certain new organisations for air space management, Close
Air Support, joint command and control, Reorganised Infantry Divisions for Plains (RAPID) and
Surveillance Centres have been found to be of immense defence and tactical importance. 5
7.
Commenting on the concepts tried out by Brasstacks, analysts write, “In-fact such an
intellectual ferment in military matters was last witnessed in 1930s, the decade preceding the
Second World War, when the theories of ‘Blitzkrieg’ or mechanised warfare were evolved.
During the seventies and the eighties, there was a parallel upsurge of doctrinal thought in the
NATO and erstwhile Warsaw blocks. The Air-Land Battle concept that is an American concept
represents the impact of electronic revolution on combat. In Europe, this upsurge is exemplified
by the sub-concept of ‘Follow-on Forces Attack’, a parallel doctrinal development that seeks to
exploit the new technology for deep attack by employing air power. Jasjit Singh has
recommended that such doctrines with suitable modifications can act as force multipliers for
strike formations of India.
8
6
Kanti Bajpai, commenting on the lessons of the exercise, said that the exercise had
limited consequences, “It served only as limited field exercise once it lost momentum and was
truncated due to the crisis and international pressure. It brought the two nations to an 'eyeball to
eyeball' scenario and had a potential nuclear threat. The Crisis was avoidable.” He also feels that
there was a lack of communication between the Ministry of the External Affairs, MEA and the
ministry of defence, MOD. There was no co-ordination between them. Internal analysis of the
exercise was not carried out. Some analysts feel that Brasstacks prompted arms race in the region
and provided legitimacy for arms acquisition to the regional competitors. As fallout out of
Brasstacks, Rajiv okeyed nuclear option and gave 'go ahead'; and on the Pakistan side, US
sanctioned arms, aircrafts and aid on the pretext of Indian threat. Expenditure incurred by such
massive exercises is huge for a poor country like India. Mobilisation of Indian military might on
such a large scale near the border scared Pakistan which had not forgotten and forgiven its
dismemberment during 1971 war. Brasstacks stretched and run down the equipment that could
191
have lasted a few more years.
Some analysts described the event as an over-enthusiastic
misadventure coupled with a diplomatic failure.
9
7
Immediately on the heels of Brasstacks Pakistan conducted similar exercise called, ‘Zerb-
e- Momin’,
Commenting on the relevance of both these exercises, Indian Defence Review
wrote, “It appears from the current deployment patterns on both sides of the border, that Exercise
Brasstacks is largely out of date. Even 'Zarb-e-Momin' is likely to become irrelevant shortly. The
reasons are not far to seek. The security environment and consequently political aims undergo a
change from time to time. Technology, too, takes quantum jumps and new equipment sometimes
becomes ‘out of date’ on the shelf itself. As for the much-publicised 'Deep thrust' concept of
Brass-Tacks or the so-called'Beg Doctrine of ‘Offensive Defence’, we find nothing new in either
of these. The overall picture remains hazy and inconclusive as neither of the concepts preaches
overall victory and therefore Brasstacks remains a minor exercise in spite of their ’scale and size'.
Some experts see the relevance of mechanised warfare in the Indian subcontinent with suspicion.
They argue whether enough scope to employ mass scale mobile forces is there or not. Tactically,
100 Km per day may not be feasible in the Indian context. Some do not foresee any major
conventional wars in the near future where such strike formation can be employed.
8
Power Projection
10,
Some defence analysts felt that Brasstacks was aimed to demonstrate India's military
strength and that it was an attempt to assess Indian Power and defence preparedness. India, due
to its steady economic growth in the eighties, had acquired military strength and emerged as a
power with strong defence forces. India had reached the culmination of its modernisation
programme and become a power of consequence. The security environment in the subcontinent
was disturbing. Pakistan was providing covert and overt support to extremists and subversive
elements from across the borders. The presence of outside powers in the Indian Ocean region
was not encouraging as well. The exercise, as visualised by many experts, was a power
projection, as India wanted to send a signal to the adversaries, which may act as a deterrent to
any planned aggression on their part.
11
As an institution, the Indian army is amongst the historic armies of the world. Under the
British it had fought with distinction in both the world wars. What is of real consequence,
however, is its growth and maturation of the post independence period. Today, Indian armed
forces are the strong and best being the most battle-tested and well-equipped forces in the world.
The defence forces have proved their apolitical nature and have earned a reputation for their
devotion and professionalism. They have fought four short-duration, high intensity conflicts (one
with China, three with Pakistan) besides recent Kargil conflict. In the 1971 war, the Indian armed
forces dismembered the state of Pakistan and created a new nation with the force of aims. It was
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a classic tri-service campaign that reasserted validity of Clausevitzian thought in this nuclear age.
In the spheres of higher direction of war and management of conflict, the Indian Armed Forces
demonstrated that they had come of age. Brasstacks was seen as the reflection of this confidence.
9
12
According to more radical studies, India has supposedly achieved the status of a regional
power and aspires to super-power hood. India's Military power has been growing in absolute
terms because of its defence security perimeter/ and the technological imperatives. India today
has an Army of 40 divisions, an Air Force of 60 squadrons and a two fleet Navy with 85 capital
ships. In the field of strategic airlift, India has already created the third largest airlift capability in
the whole world. This capability provides the best basis for power projection in the Indian Ocean
region as has been demonstrated by Operation Cactus in the Maldives. Perspective plans of
growth had been drawn up till the next quarter of this century. TIME magazine had conferred
‘mini super power hood’ to India. The Maldives operation (Operation ‘Cactus’) however was a
classic example of how to do it-India has created the third largest airlift capability in the world. It
is this fact which has dramatically enhanced Indian intervention capabilities in the Indian Ocean
region and placed ready and responsive power at the disposal of the Indian State. 10
13.
Before that, however, it would be essential to examine what are the credentials of a
regional power or a mini-superpower? Factors that constitute a power status cannot be based
upon subjective value judgements but must be made the basis of objective parameters to see
whether India in her present state of politico-military growth fulfils these. 11
India has to fulfil
the following five criteria for great power status as outlined by Cohen :•
The capability to manage the domestic process of economic development and
national integration.
•
The capacity of resist outside penetration.
•
The capacity to dominate regional competitors
•
The capacity to deter outside states (especially superpowers) from lending support
to regional competitors.
•
The capacity to achieve autarky in critical weapons systems, or at least be able to
bargain successfully for them in a crisis
14.
Brasstacks should be viewed in the background of security imperatives. Jasjit Singh feels
that Indian strategic and security perspectives are shaped by the geo-strategic imperatives and
geopolitical environment in which it has to operate. India carries out a real-time assessment of
the security imperatives before evolving defence and security measures. India’s geo-strategic
location dictates her security concerns. India is faced with an extensive defence and security
perimeter: over 16,500 kilometres of land borders, 7600 kilometre-long coastline and 2 .5 million
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square kilometre of EEZ to protect, besides over 500 islands; increasing stakes in off-shore
resources of hydrocarbons and trade across the seas. The Indian Ocean, with the presence of
extra-regional military forces and command and control infrastructures in region, is a potential
ground for great power rivalries, competition and tensions.12
15.
On the positive side, Sandy Gordon has noted that India possesses the ‘sources of power’.
Sandy Gordon has elaborated challenges and prospects. Gordon lists Indian capabilities in terms
of human resources, technical manpower, economics and the Indian potential in terms of science
and technology. India is militarily a preponderant power in this region. She has the fourth largest
and one of the best-equipped Armies in the whole world, the fifth largest Air Force and the
seventh strongest Navy. Indian nuclear and missile scientists have already demonstrated Indian
technological capability in this field. Space, nuclear and, information technology is fast catching
up with the western world. India now seeks a place in Security Council. India emerges as a
power with literally enormous potential in the Indian Ocean region. There are many synergisms
in the Indian system as currently constituted.
16
13
Regarding ‘Domestic Capabilities’ Sandy Gordon feels that the Indian democratic system
has acquired considerable stability and has now become more vibrant. The present state has
inherent strength and resilience in the system and ability to play out regional, economic and
ethnic tensions. India has successfully harnessed the political currency of consensus as opposed
to coercion. India's economic progress has been remarkable. She is today an agricultural power
of consequence with an exportable surplus and is the tenth industrialised nation in the world.
Indian infrastructure is slowly gearing up. Her mixed economy has produced tangible results,
even though the impact has been diluted by the exponential growth in population. At the same
time, Gordon has listed the constraints that India will have to overcome to become a power of
some consequence. These include population explosion, corruption, poverty, illiteracy and lack
of basic needs of the people like health, food and shelter.
17.
Moreover, India has a strong foundation in terms of ‘Ideology’, ‘Organisation’ and
‘Structures for Indian Security’ necessary for power development. India can boast of a strong
ideological base that has been India’s biggest strength. India is the world's largest democracy.
The Indian people and the Armed Forces need a basis for motivation. This is provided by the
aggressive commitment to the cause of democracy in the South Asian region and indeed in the
Third World per se. With an electorate of a staggering half a billion people, the size and scope of
the Indian electoral process makes the American system pale by contrast. The non-alignment and
anti-colonialism plank gave India a natural leadership role in the Third World for all these years.
Other values that Indians as a nation cherish, are personal freedom and secularism.
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18.
With regard to ‘Resisting outside penetration’ analysts feel that India has now developed
this capability with ‘sufficient forces in being’. Immediately after independence, India got the
feel of this when it successfully drove out Pakistan backed intruders from Jammu and kashmir in
1947-48. It suffered a serious setback when it faced a humiliating defeat at the hands of Chinese
in 1962. This provided a lesson to restrict Pakistan in 1965 war and later gain an astounding
victory through a superb Masterstroke in 1971. India had not initiated these wars; they were
imposed on her and were fought on Indian soil out of compulsions. Since 1971, India has not
looked back. India also saw long years of peace - the longest unbroken such period in the history
of an independent country.
19.
However, some analysts feel that Indian security concerns are not resolved yet and the
military balance still remains a paradox. Pakistan is India's principal regional competitor (China
is the main extra-regional threat). Since early December 1989, for a variety of reasons, mostly
connected with domestic power struggle, Pakistan has been following a rather aggressive and
antagonistic stance by significantly stepping up abatement and encouragement to secessionist
forces in the Indian border states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. The USA and the Middle
Eastern states have bankrolled the recent growth of military power in Pakistan. The key to
regional domination lies in taming Pakistan's new found truculence in fomenting trouble in two
vital and strategic Indian border provinces cannot be ignored for very long.
20
Analysts have noticed that there is a shift in military balance in the region. At the time
on independence, the military forces were divided between India and Pakistan in the ratio of two:
one. The plain fact is that during the Afghanistan crisis Pakistan had bounced back as an
aggressive regional competitor who refuses to acknowledge Indian predominance in this region.
This was not its state of mind in the wake of the 1971, abject humiliation. The spurts of
democracy in Pakistan had come as a breath of fresh air which lasted for a limited period and at
times, raised hopes of a final Indo-Pak detente. The military bureaucratic dispensations have
proved themselves very much in real control backstage. Requirement of superiority over Pak is
1:2. But, the present ratio is only 1:1.6. In the decade after the exercise, there was hardly any
significant development in this field.
21.
This has led to a reduction of the decisive military edge that India had acquired in the
subcontinent. In terms of the forces sustainable against her from the Tibet region, India has
acquired a credible defensive capability against China. Present forces levels give India only a
'one and a half war' capability. Though India can launch a theatre strategic counter-offensive
against Pakistan, she can only defend herself against China. She lacks the force levels for proper
operational counter-strikes to restore adverse situations on the Sino-Indian border. In the
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meantime, China has embarked upon a major modernisation programme that may erode India's
qualitative lead in conventional military equipment. To achieve full security in a two-front, worst
case scenario; India needs an Army of a minimum 46-48 divisions- that is 6-8 divisions more
than the present force levels. This could be achieved by pruning the logistical tail by having a
Defence Logistics Agency (DLA) that jointly serves the three services. This was proposed by
Arun Singh. Manpower thus free could be utilised to raise upon two to three decisions. India will
have to make a Herculean effort to reach this capability.
22
Cohen has noted, “the term 'great power* in contemporary Asia, implies regional
hegemony or rough equality with a neighbouring great of power. It may be dominance. Although
predominant in South Asia, India’s pre-eminence remains checked by a Pakistan that is still
capable of inflicting significant damage by means of proxy war. While China has, to an extent,
separated itself strategically form Pakistan and acted to reduce border friction with India, the
latent competition between India and China remains a factor in strategic thinking in New Delhi
and China's new accession to power remains troubling. Moreover, as China gains access to more
sophisticated military technologies it will likely pass these on the Pakistan, thus compensating
Islamabad to an extent for loss of US support. Nor has India been able entirely to neutralise the
linkages between Pakistan and the oil-rich states of the gulf and Southwest Asia. India's growing
reliance on gulf oil to fuel its expanding industrial base also leaves it potentially vulnerable.”
23.
Pakistan has also continued with the expansion and up-gradation of its Military forces.
During the past three decades its Army has doubled and navy has tripled its size while its Air
Force has grown to two-and-a half times its earlier size. Profound change in quality of
government was emphasised by its Military leaders when it conducted its biggest ever exercise,
'Zerb-e-Momin', close to the heels of Brasstacks. Over one-third of the surface combat fleet of its
Navy was acquired in just one year, doubling its combat power to bring the surface fleet at par
with that of the Indian Navy although the latter has a ten-times longer coast line to protect
besides the critical energy resources in the offshore installations-a commitment Non-existent for
the Pakistan Navy. Recently, its Naval chief announced that Pakistan is acquiring ‘state of the
art’ technology for its Navy, equipping it with nuclear submarines. With a fleet of four Atlantic,
six P-three C. and eight maritime patrol aircraft, all armed with sea-skimming anti-ship missiles,
Pakistan's Navy will soon have a long-range maritime strike Force larger than any other except
Australia in the Indian Ocean littoral states. The Pakistan Army is updating its task Force. The
main point to note is that Pakistan's Military capability is likely to grow further in the coming
years both qualitatively and quantitatively. (& 0
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Figures: 6.1
Comparative Defence Expenditure
Comparative defence expenditure and militaiy force level
M illio n s o f troops
D efen ce expenditure
C onstant 1988 dollars (b illion s)
China, India and Pakistan
Source : Sandy Gordon, India’s Rise to Power,
St. Martin’s press, Inc, New York, 1995, pp.124
197
24
On the contrary, some analysts believe that Pakistan factor is overemphasised. Pakistan
figures prominently in the Indian security debates. Western think-tanks have imposed a
restrictive mindset which views any military matter within the straitjacket of the Indo-Pak
equation. Pakistan is a rump state and its elevation to such an exalted level of military
significance is not borne out by its combat performance in the 1971 war. Neither do its size;
resources or economic strength generate such awe. This myth was rudely shattered in 1971, yet it
has been allowed it to persist by laying undue stress on it. It is a known fact that the Pakistani
military establishment has been thirsting to avenge the 1971 humiliation. One of their senior
General then remarked, “The womb of the subcontinent is not yet sterile, that there will not be
more independent states.” It is perhaps their greatest desire to back India for the creation of
Bangladesh-in kind. They appear to have adopted the 1971 war as their military model and are in
the quest of staging a repeat performance in retaliation. As of now, Pakistan lacks the military
strength to translate its dream of revenge into reality, it could exploit these low-intensity
conflicts to her advantage. 14
25
RAND in a study on ‘The prospects of stability in south Asia’ carried out strategic
analysis of different possible scenarios in case of conflict in the Indian subcontinent.
15
It has
been observed that Pakistan, obsessed with Kashmir, has neglected domestic challenges.
Pakistan today is confronted with following factors
26
•
Continuing lack of political consensus
•
Simmering national divisions
•
Controversial implementation of economic reforms
•
Feeble improvements in technology base
•
Weakening access to foreign military equipment
•
Deteriorating international political relations
Pakistan has been hurt more than India by the end of Cold War. The elimination of
superpower competition reduced Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance and removed American
incentives to continue supporting it. This has, resulted in the United States cutting Pakistan
adrift, and Islamabad has been unable to compensate for that loss even China, while continuing
to remain a source of nuclear assistance, has turned its back on Pakistan where important issues
like Kashmir are concerned. Pakistan’s valiant efforts to develop lucrative relations with the
Central Asian states have not yet been as successful as hoped for. Pakistan is in many ways a
beleaguered state.
27
16
Similarly, the nuclear debate in the Indian subcontinent does not take into account India's
prime security concern, China. The chief underpinnings of an Indian nuclear policy must
perforce be based upon the threat from China.
Only recently India gathered the courage to
198
openly tell the world after the Pokharan Tests. The world had now slowly started acknowledging
the Indian security concerns and accepting the legitimacy for minimum credible deterrence.
China has made tremendous strides in all spheres in the past 5 decades with its pragmatic
policies. China had gone nuclear in 1964. The reverberations of its first bang at Lop Nor have
still not been rationalised fully in India. China is reputed to have a total of 300 warheads
including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. It has a full-fledged triad of delivery means
including the Air Attack, the Missile Arm and the latest Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
(SLBM). China attacked India in 1962, and taught a humiliating lesson. A recent publication of
the General Staff department of the People's Liberation Army has listed India and Vietnam as the
main combat targets, the threat from India being greater. Udai Bhaskar recently disclosed that
China has increased the defence budget by 18 % for the year 2001. This should be a lesson for
India to monitor the development. China is trying to increase its strategic capability - Transborder and trans-continental in terms of firepower and surveillance.
28
17
Thus, it is seen that the regional balance presents an ‘Asymmetric Equation’. Prisoners of
their own peaceful rhetoric and fancy ashimsa theories, Indians have accepted a dangerous
asymmetric situation vis-a-vis China ever since 1964. In the 1971 war we sought treaty insurance
(Treaty of Peace and Friendship) from the Russians to stave off Chinese intervention. It is only
such a treaty insurance that has enabled India and Vietnam to pull off regional military coups in
the face of Chinese opposition (Bangladesh and Kampuchea). Possibly it is this factor that
prevented China from exploiting this asymmetrical nuclear equation vis-a-vis what it confers its
main combat target nations.
29.
In the insecurity scenario, India is also confronted with China - Pak -US nexus. It has
been analysed by RAND that emergence of India into the prominence is against their interest.
India has to guard against this as well. With a Sino-Soviet rapprochement a reality we can no
longer count upon implied/actual Soviet support against Chinese nuclear blackmail. Post coldwar realities offer different strategic equations. We are now quite alive and we should become
alive to this situation as quickly as possible.
30
In the context of ‘Domination of Regional Competitors’ one has to analyse the
developments since independence. In the Nehru era, however, India had mounted a rather
sanctimonious moral pulpit and begun to preach a universal ideology of pacifism and non­
violence. Jawarlal Nehru failed to come to terms with the security imperatives of nationhood. In
Ashoka, we had an archetypal Indian leader who abjured the use of violence after taking India to
the crest of her military power.
In Nehru we had another great visionary and world-class
statesman. He put India on the road to modernity, he nurtured and laid the foundation of a
vibrant democracy.
He abjured violence without any Ashokan experience of its large-scale
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employment. His reliance on personalised diplomacy and pacifist idealism cost the country
dearly. It led to the humiliation of 1962 and came as a great personal blow to this Indian giant. It
left an awkward legacy of peaceful rhetoric that tied India in knots.
31
The regime of Mrs Gandhi however distanced itself from the hollow and facile basis of
this TJniversalist' orientation. Very deliberately and methodically it set about ensuring a regional
power status for India. Mrs Gandhi proved to be a great leader whose ruthless and cold-blooded
pursuit of national interests won her accolades from masters of this art like Henry Kissinger. Mrs
Gandhi (and India's finest hour) came in 1971, when in a ruthless, surgical operation, Pakistan
was dismembered. The birth of Bangladesh brought about in a decisive way asserted India’s
unquestionable predominance in this region. This was done in the teeth of opposition from a
superpower (USA) and a regional great power (China). India had really arrived. Mrs Gandhi was
feared and respected. During her ruthlessness tenure, Zia-Ul-Haq did not dare to arm the Sikh
terrorists with anything more than pistols and revolvers.
32
There was however a curious dichotomy. Rajiv Gandhi's regime continued the Herculean
military build-up programme. In the later stages of its rule, it displayed a reckless and eager
propensity to employ this power in the peripheral oceanic areas Maldives followed in rapid-fire
succession. The Maldives intervention was an unqualified success, but in Sri Lanka, the Indian
forces were committed in indecent haste in the wrong strategic direction and in the wrong kind of
war. The Rajiv regime was keen to project itself as a defender of the existing status quo of the
region. A very moot point that it failed to appreciate was whether the present status quo suited
India or not.
33
India's recent track record fails to bear out the thesis that India has established her
preponderance vis-a-vis Pakistan. Principal security threats are left undeterred from hostile and
aggressive actions with dangerous implications for India security. An important ingredient of
Pakistan's strategy in the past has been to employ illegal forces/infiltrators to lead in their
offensive backed with regular troops. In this manner, it has hoped to increase the prospect of the
offensive succeeding to destabilisation of defence. The very large reserves of Army troops
maintained by Pakistan [reported to the 500000 strong since 1972-73 for an Army of 48000] and
Pakistan's support in the recent past to the secessionist and extremist elements in India's border
States need to be reviewed in this context.
34
One of the prime purposes of Indian military power should be to discourage such
intervention in her domestic affairs. In recent years, Pakistan has significantly stepped up its
efforts to ferment trouble in the valley of Kashmir. Military power that does not deter such
covert interventions is of little use. These are dangerous portents. The other curious factor was
200
India's over-eagerness to seek American clearance/endorsements for her local military
interventions. Such an eagerness to seek American/British testimonials for good conduct is not
exactly in keeping with the desired self-image of great power status. It definitely seemed to
alienate the domestic electorate.
35
Analysing the factor of ‘Deterring Outside States from Supporting Regional Competitors’
experts feel that China has felt free to arm India's principal regional adversary, Pakistan. Of late,
the Chinese have started selling arms to Bangladesh and Nepal also. Indian reoccur in blocking
American arms assistance will soon be in Pakistan's inventory. Kashmir has been described as a
flash point for future conflicts. American has been arming Pakistan as a counter-weight to India
in this region. Moreover, the role-played by the US since the time Pakistan was made a member
of CENTO in 1953 is well known.
36
Despite the decisive 1971 victory, successions of unfortunate events (namely the Afghan
war) have robbed India of her security advantages gained in that war. Jaswant Singh has termed
it as India’s one of the biggest blunders for not playing the cards well on the Afghan issue. India
seems to have ignored the Pakistani provocation and concentrated on establishing her military
sway over the immediate reaches of the Indian Ocean (as evidence by the Sri Lankan and
Maldives intervention). The threat form this direction, however, is more distant, indirect and
long-term. Decisiveness in this peripheral region has been contrasted with hesitation and timidity
vis-a-vis the principal security threats emanating from China and Pakistan. The very
considerable confusion in this arena has stemmed from a failure to evolve and articulate a
coherent security doctrine that spells out the main and peripheral threats. The international
demand for the definition of such a doctrine has elicited some rather quaint official responses
which have laid such heavy emphasis on peace rhetoric that one wonders if the entire Indian
Armed Forces have been raised as some sort of an international peace-keeping force for the UN.
One fails to understand the undue defensiveness and shame-facedness about our legitimate
military built-up. After all, this country has had to fight four major wars in its four decades of
existence. India has made costly errors in judgement
37
Indian military history gives it the sanction for maintaining large, standing Armed Forces.
Cohen feels that the relevant historical legacy of China, India and most recently Japan is that
they were once triumphant states or empires with a continental reach. This is critical to their
emergence as great powers. Without a major ideological reorientation India cannot switch to the
reservist system or to conscription. The Indian nation state has no option but to go in for a huge
standing Army of approximately 45 to 48 divisions. This will give it the ability to field three
counter-strike corps for the Western theatre and two for the Northern. How long can India
maintain such large standing armies? Not very long- hence the crying need to restructure the
201
security environment in the next decade itself. Defence of the country from external invasion
needs not only a 'shield' but also (to quote Clausewitz) 'the flashing sword of retribution'. In plain
terms it implies the ability to mount a theatre-level counteroffensive to rapidly carry the war to
the attacker's territory.18
38
With regards to the next requirement of power, ‘Autarky in critical weapons systems’,
Indian prospects are looking up. India has DRDO which is the only major research organisation
in the country. Its research programme has yielded tangible results. With the test firing of Prithvi
and Agni, it has now entered the missile age with a flourish. The Agni gives us intermediate
range ballistic missile (IRBM) capability. India has the choice of arming this with nuclear or
non-nuclear warheads or with both. India may well need the Agni to ward off possible Chinese
nuclear blackmail or simply deter conflict.
19
Different versions of missiles like NAG, Indra,
Akash and Trishul have been tested successfully. It is a matter of time that they will be inducted
in the defence forces. India developed its own ‘Param’ Super computer and cryogenic engines
once US tried to halt Indian programme though sanctions. Indian Nuclear programme has come
of age. There is a steady progress on satellites field too. Growth rate in the past decade has been
steady and impressive. India can boast of a large trained and skilled manpower. That is why
Abdul Kalam, in ‘Vision 2000’, is very optimistic about Indian potential and capability of
becoming a power. The IITs - Indian institute of Technology, and numerous institutes are
producing high-level skills in mechanical and technical spheres. Above all it is the Information
technology has taken India by storm. It has posted astounding success in this field. If things are
to continue the way they are, India is projected to be a major IT player in the 21st century.
39.
On the
other hand, K Subrahmanyam has been critical, “Management of national
security, involving long-term planning long-term weapon acquisition process and R&D
management is yet to develop adequately in the country.” Performance of the Defence Industry
has been too unimpressive. Defence officers and users are not involved or incorporated in the
production process. There is very little integration of defence industry with civil trade and
industry. Allocation of funds for research is poor. DRDO has been consistently high on promises
but low in delivery. The vital projects like MBT, ALH, LCA have yet to get materialised.
Questionable performance of the defence public service units and ordinance factories must be
probed. India is still miles away from Indigenous production. Science and technology support
seems to be very negligible. Self-reliance as far as defence requirements are concerned even after
five decades of independence has not been achieved.
40.
Jasjit Singh has observed with concern that no re-equipment has taken place during the
past decade. All military equipment and weapon systems have a technical design life which
requires their replacement after a certain amount of time or usage. Regular re-equipment,
202
therefore, is an inescapable requirement unless the goal is only to have a ceremonial military
force. We already have a backlog of equipment that we should have acquired years ago. The
regular re-equipment process also has to be resorted. The Air Force needs 350-400 fighters, 5075 transport aircraft, and 100-150 helicopters during the next 10-15 years. The Navy is already
falling short of combatant ships and the force level will keep coming down during the coming
years, and it is already down to one aircraft carrier which is due for replacement in a few years.
The Army needs heavy self-propelled guns and replacement of 30-year-old main battle tanks.
We have experienced the necessity of large-scale acquisitions in the early 1980s due to deferred
re-equipment of the 1970s and the sudden worsening of security environment in 1980-81 leading
to telescoping of acquisitions creating political and economic difficulties besides raising threat
perceptions in other countries. The question is, how much do the budgets allocate for re­
equipment and modernisation?
41. New procedures and infrastructure with regard to the C3I (Command, Control
Communication and Intelligence) and new weapons also need to be developed which is
essentially a management task. 20 In the stores area, inventory management and procurement
practices leave considerable room for improvement, the stores area, and procurement practices
leave considerable room for improvement. 8xport defence goodsilndia failure, to indigenously
manufacture these, has raised many question regarding Indian capability and research standards.
Even Pakistan has recently rolled down its MBT.
42.
^|
Brahma Chellany has expressed that for a secure India, all the facets of
security
including energy, industrial resources and internal and external security are important and not
only military security. Viewed from all these angles, India’s fundamental problem in respect of
its defence is the development of its industrial strength, based on continuous progress in
scientific research. Any dependence on second-hand science would only mean second-class arms
and equipment, outmoded even before the defence forces have mastered their use. The Indian air
force, however well trained and competent, cannot catch up with the air force of a scientifically
advanced country. This, of courses, is well recognised by its defence planners, who realise that
purchase of planes abroad and even production in the country under licence, can but help to
bridge the gulf between the domestic production based on independent research and total
dependence on others.
43.
22
However, some analysts have reservations on this issue. Prof. Dilip Mohite feels that
unless India becomes an economic power, it cannot claim to be a power. Power does not
comprise of military strength alone. Technology plays an important role for military
modernisation and power development of a country. It is the combination of military, economic,
and political and diplomatic strengths. Indian military power to be really cost-effective must
203
therefore deter not only overt aggression but also dissuade a regional adversary from undertaking
such low cost, low intensity conflict to destabilise the country. 23 Though India possesses the
sources of power, these have to be canalised properly overcoming the limitations. In the age of
information revolution, India has achieved considerable success. Prof. Dilip Mohite feels that
technological edge can lead the defence forces to the required status of power. The problem lies
in ignoring this aspect and resultant distorted perceptions of Indian national power primarily in
terms of military power and that too in a narrow subcontinent framework”. While India
continues to be overshadowed by dhina and Japan as an Asia-pacific power, its position in the
vast region that lies between the Middle East and the newly prosperous nations of East Asia will
become increasingly prominent. 24
44
‘Economic evaluation of power’ has to take into account various factors. These factors
include the growth pattern, defence expenditure, industrial development, science & technology,
domestic research, DRDO progress, modernisation and development in weapons and tactics.
Indian dilemma of ‘Guns verses Butter’ has been a prominent constraint in the development of
militaiy power. It was predicted that should the opportunity again arise in terms of renewed
economic growth, it seems likely that the process of military modernisation will again pick up
pace in India. Modernisation will likely concentrate rather more on quality that quantity. The
structure of defence cuts to date does not indicate any substantial reassessment of India’s
strategic circumstances, such that military modernisation has been taken off the agenda. Indian
Defence exports are marginal compared to world figures. Given the extent of the decline in
defence spending in real terms, the cuts are neither substantial nor deep. A strategy for achieving
v.
modernisation that relies on force multipliers and retrofitting happens to suit the current Indian
inventory and force structure. It also suits the stage India has reached in its own productive
capabilities. The very fact that India’s large fighting forces are currently inefficient by western
standards provides the basis for an effective expansion of capability at a minimum cost. Because
India has a number of relatively, under-equipped, relatively modem platforms, it can achieve
significant gains by means of weapons and sensor refits, refits that it will be increasingly able to
accomplish through indigenous technology. 25
45
It is most unlikely that modernisation would again entail the kind of overall growth
witnessed in the 1980s. Financial pressures imposed by modemisation-especially given the everrising cost of sophisticated military equipment-could could entail a reduction in force levels in
the air force and stagnation in the navy. Rather India may tend to 'fill the gaps' in the current
force structure and achieve force multiplication. Efforts are likely to focus on area such as
achieving enhanced C3I capabilities, aerial refuelling placement of more sophisticated weaponsparticularly home-built missiles-on existing platforms, greater mobility generally, further
computerisation of management and training, better service integration and training, further
204
development of war-fighting doctrine, an improved EW capability, and so on. In all of these
processes, the new relationship with the Western powers especially with the US and Israel, are
likely to prove increasingly important. A third factor that will continue to drive military
modernisation is that, at base, India does not believe that its geopolitical circumstances have
become more benign or are likely to become so over the short-to-medium-term. Reportedly
considerable good work was done in the Sundarji era on this aspect. However, the Sri Lanka
venture has caused an apparent setback to these plans and disrupted the modernisation schedules.
As skilled manpower in India also becomes an increasingly expensive resource (it already
consumes 60 per cent of the Army budget) it dictates an upper limit to the right kind of talent
that has to be attracted from the job market. The Armed Forces need their fair share of the higher
ability levels, especially as the technological complexity of the equipment rises exponentially.
Deterrence
46.
Coming to the analysis of next hypothesis regarding ‘Deterrence’ the study would not be
complete without a discussion on the doctrine of ‘coercive diplomacy’ or the ‘use of force
without war’. It has to be seen in the background of national security doctrine. Centuries ago Sun
Tzu has written, 'To fight and win all your battles is not the acme of excellence. Supreme
•yr
excellence lies in subduing your enemy without fighting.'
Kautilya's Arthshastra is a
veritable treasure house that outlines a whole series of national options short of war which can
help in subduing an enemy. It was in the fitness of things that the Indian strategic think-tank (the
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses) adopted the doctrine of the use of force without war.
It correctly analysed the post -second World War trend where actual use of force was rather
limited. This has been replaced by the threat of the use of force, by what is called coercive
diplomacy that acts in accordance with national interests. It uses force not as an instrument of
destruction but as a visible instrument of coercion.
47
27
Sundarji was a great advocate of the^use of force without war'theory. With the blessings
of Arun Singh he orchestrated the now famous Exercise Brasstacks. It was a gigantic exercise
that at its peak involved almost 2000 tanks and over 150,000 troops. It was to be a classic
instance of the use of force without war. If just the right amount of ambivalence was inbuilt into
the exercise, it would spread waves of alarm in Pakistan. She possibly could be coerced into
calling off her support to the Punjab terrorists.
48
28
Defence analysts felt that one of the aims of Brasstacks was to act as deterrence by
mobilising the forces on its western border. This was supposed to send a warning signal for
Pakistan to desist from interfering with Indian internal matters. The eminent Indian military
analyst, Ravi Rikhye felt Brasstacks was a gigantic deception exercise. The real aim was a short
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205
, difficult to guess the accuracy of this thesis but what is plain and obvious in the coercive element
inbuilt into this major military exercise. The massing of Indian strike power opposite Sind did
not unnerve them as it was supposed to. Sind is not the centre of gravity of Pakistan. Punjab and
Karachi are deemed to be the core areas where most of the population and industry is
concentrated.| Pakistan therefore accepted the concentration of Indian strike power opposite
Sind with a fair degree of equanimity.
49
K Subrahmanyam, the brilliant doyen of India’s strategic thinkers, was the chief
proponent of this theory of ‘Use of Force without War’^ in India. It was in keeping with the trend
of the civilisation of conflict that emerged in the post-war era. The basic input was derived
possibly from a Rand Corporation Note entitled 'Military Implications of a possible World Order
Crisis in the 1980s1. 29 Guy J Pauker, observed in this note, “The cost of modem conventional
warfare is so great as to raise serious questions as to the cost effectiveness of using military force
for anything other than defence against direct attacks on the territory and population./ He
advocated that a reasonable balance must be struck between the material and human costs of
intended military operations and the human and materiel benefits expected from their success.”
The doctrine of coercive diplomacy was bom out of this perception. The Brookings Institution
concluded, “Demonstrative use of armed forces can sometimes be an effective way, at least in
the short term, of securing us objectives and preventing foreign situations inimical to a country’s
interests. A credible capacity requirement can be profitable”.
50
The political costs of the use of military force can also be very high especially to a great
power. If the use of its military power is not effective, its credibility suffers both with its friends
and allies and with its potential enemies. Brasstacks fiasco highlighted the fatal weakness in the
Indian character, a lack of will or the'killer instinct'to go the whole hog. The Pakistanis easily
saw through the charade. They calculated quite rationally that the Indian political leadership
simply lacked the will to launch an all-out war. Analysts have also noted that Brasstacks did not
act as deterrence; rather since 1989, Pakistan has stepped up its abatement and encouragement to
secessionist forces in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.30
51
A Third World nation that wishes to safeguard its national security from threat of nuclear
attack or blackmail would need to emulate the Chinese model. An optimal size of 300 warheads
is sufficient to deter any superpower or smaller nuclear weapons power from resorting to this
option of ‘Nuclear Deterrence’. Critics will acclaim that nuclear deterrence has held the peace in
Europe for the past over 40 years. 31
Similarly it is assumed that Pakistan, too, already has a
few bombs in the basement. In the F-16 and possibly the Mirage III C and Mig-19 it already has
a delivery system. It has now added the HATF short-range missiles. 32
206
52
Strongly advocating ‘deterrence’ Jasjit Singh feels, “This calls for the development and
propagation of an aggressive national security doctrine which makes the Indian determination to
react decisively to such provocations explicit and apparent If any superpower wishes to
destabilise India through some regional proxy, it must be starkly aware of the serious
consequences for its regional surrogate. India should make no compromises on its national
security. This implies a determination to deter not only overt acts of aggression but also the more
prevalent forms of covert destabilisation as being waged in Punjab and Kashmir today. There is
simply no reason for India to adopt a purely defensive or reactive posture in the face of such lowintensity threats of a long-term nature.”
53
33
Very lately, India has started talking in terms of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’. This
has necessitated more after the explosion at Pokhran. India's concern for its security was voiced
in no uncertain terms by the Prime Minister, Atai Bihari Vajpayee and the Foreign Minister,
Jaswant Singh. The former Defence Minster, George Fernandes was more vocal in categorically
naming China as the prime enemy. India has made serious efforts reflecting a sense of realism to
convince the world of the same. Canada, in Mar 2001, has decided to lift the sanctions imposed
after the Pokharan blasts stating that India has a responsible democracy. History has taught
Indians this unfortunate lesson in the basics of deterrence and prompted it to close this
technological vulnerability gap. Experts feel that India must clearly exhibit the 'will to power' if
it is to graduate from a middle-level power into a full-fledged world-class power. As an ancient
civilisational entity that encompasses one seventh of the human race, India owes it to hefself.
She must strike to restructure the international power paradigms- so that she takes her rightful
place in the comity of nations.34
54
Strategic thought of India has had a profound impact on its policies. India had ancient
imperial tradition. India is a civilisational entity that has shown remarkable resilience and
survivability. At 5000 years it is the oldest living civilisation on the face of this planet. Rodney
Jones describes ideology, democracy, tolerance, reactive, restraint and pessimism as
characteristics of Indian culture. He has expressed that that Indian strategic though was
characterised by Role of Technology, Economic self-reliance and Post World War changes. He
feels that the future provides a great challenge to India’s emerging strategists.
55
35
George Tanham has described Geography, Culture, and Rediscovery of Indian History
and Influences of British Raj as four important factors. RAND Corp perception has been that
India will not permit foreign influence in neighbouring region.36 He has noted following facets
of Indian Strategic thought: •
Sub Continent is the key to strategic defence
•
Dearth of Strategy
207
56
•
India is always on strategic defensive
•
Non aggression tradition .
•
India’s - Land - Oriented strategy
•
India’s Naval outlook
•
Self reliance and Non Dependence, Non aligned
. Total security has been rarely been possible even for the most powerful of nations. The
basic dilemma of defence policy- how to achieve maximum security with minimum expenditure
on the armed forces-has never allowed a simple solution. The essence of a sound national
security policy is for the government to define the national’s vital interests and to develop
sufficient power, alone or in contact with others, to secure those interests.
37
Another
important aspect is about the national defence planning. Formulation of a national security
doctrine is truly an Indian imperative of the first order. India is said to be following a D^midian
Defence Strategy and gives an impression of adhoc and reactive measures. 38
J aswant Singh
stresses on identification of national goals and means to accomplish these goals. These form the
essential factors of foreign policy Policies are then framed and efforts continue, review and
reassessment periodically.
57
39
It is not enough to have military power. One must know how to use it to further its
interests. The case for an Indian security doctrine therefore is unexceptionable. There is a need to
hammer this out by wide-ranging debate. Such a debate by itself serves to educate the Indian
public on security issues. Today this is a glaring void. Nature of efforts has been adhoc. India
therefore needs to look beyond South Asian. Threat perceptions should be based on national
interests and not moralistic. Some analysts feel that Indian foreign policy posture is reactive. 40
58
It has been analysed by RAND that India’s current ‘Passivity’ pays rich dividends as
under:-
59
•
It Dampens Escalation, Demonises Pakistan
•
Concentrate on economic restructuring, not on security competition
•
Combat insurgencies by reactive means
•
Promote international isolation of Pakistan
•
Encourage U.S. to penalise Islamabad.
41
In view of the security perceptions, India needs to evolve a doctrine to meet the threats.
The Policy and Diplomacy has to be based on the threat assessment. This would dictate what
type of relations should India have with her neighbours and with other powers. Experts observe
that strategic inadequacies need to be overcome. India has to develop her nuclear capabilities,
modernise the army, and concentrate on technological developments. 42
208
Co-ordination
60
The exercise was aimed at testing co-ordination between three wings of armed forces and
with different logistic services and other Government and civil agencies. Previous wars had
highlighted certain deficiencies in this vital field, which required to be overcome. Rajiv Gandhi
wanted to assess the reaction and co-ordination level of various agencies involved. The greatest
good fortune of India in the 1971 war was the excellent chemistry between its three service
chiefs during that time. Despite this, it was felt that ‘Inter-Services Harmonisation’ needed
refining. Inter services co-operation however cannot be left to good luck. It has to be formalised
in the organisational philosophy and structures. Experts feel that to that extent, Arun Singh's
proposal of a joint Defence Planning Staff is excellent. The modest beginnings already made
have not been consolidated. Arun Singh has very aptly pointed out that the Defence Ministry is
supposed to provide an alternative civilian viewpoint and provide a system of checks and
balances. The tendency, as he has pointed out, however, has been to lay stress only on 'checks'
and forget the 'balances' entirely. This can, at times, amount to a purely obstructionist stand.
61
Control Structures have to bee refined to achieve better harmonisation of politico-military
interface. The erstwhile Army Chief, General Sundaiji, in his article entitled National Security:
An Agenda for the Future, has highlighted some aspects of our higher defence organisations that
need restructuring. Arun Singh has suggested the establishment of a National Defence
Committee headed by the Defence Minister and comprising the three service chiefs. It should
also comprise the Defence Security; the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister and the
Foreign Secretary should attend these to have a better interface between foreign policy and
security planning. Arun Singh, India's erstwhile Minister of State for Defence, in a very
significant paper on 'The Management of Defence’ had made some very worthwhile suggestions
about restructuring of the Indian Military organisation.. 43
62
' K Subrahmanyam has highlighted the need to create military appendages to the Ministry
of Defence or Cabinet Secretariat which would provide independent professional advice to the
political leadership. If that is so, it only highlights the need and importance of the joint Defence
Planning Staff. There is just no getting away from a Chief of Defence Staff, however much the
civilian may be allergic to such a military supremo. The only problem is that in trying to
marginalise the role of the military in national security matters the civilian component should not
adopt a doctrine whose basic premise rules out the possibility of shooting war forever.
63.
44
The 1971 war with Pakistan is a good example of the orchestration of effort by the
political and military leadership. The British strategy for the recovery of the Falkland Islands
from Argentina is another such example. All the organs of the British government were
209
orchestrated towards achieving the national aim-to recover the islands and to restore British
prestige lost in the aftermath of the Second World War. 45 India, too, exhibited this attribute in
the Kargil Conflict when all wings of the government, the defence forces and the people swung
into action to achieve success. Co-ordination is also necessary in ‘Decision making’ area which
came under sever criticism. It was noted, “During the Brasstacks crisis, there were decision­
making failures. They were quite substantial on the Indian side”. 46
64
To achieve better inter-services harmonisation at the functional level, Aran Singh's
suggestion of a Defence Intelligence Agency, a Defence Logistics and a Defence
Communications Agency is a must and should be implemented at the earliest A beginning must
be made right away with the Defence Communications Agency. The failure of the Iran hostages
rescue mission of the Americans is as classic example of the dangers of a lack of interoperability
of communications between the three services. Such inter-services agencies will eliminate waste
and duplication and further the process of inter-services integration. Communication is perhaps
the most crucial field in the modem tried of C & I facilities. Commonality of signal equipment
will be first vital step towards a free flow of communications. The establishment of a unified
Defence Logistics Agency will be the single most crucial step towards reducing tail and flab and
possibly spare enough manpower to raise one to two divisions.
65
Brasstacks had co-opted Air Force and the Navy at all levels to achieve co-ordination.
Air power will play a crucial role in ensuring the success of the Indian theatre strategic offensive.
It was the Air Force alone that made the 1971 victory possible. The Air Force therefore should
be given a decisive technological edge over the China-Pakistan combine. India already has the
fifth largest Air force in the world. It has frontline aircraft from the East and West in its
inventory to include MiG-29 Fulcrum, Mirage 2000, Jaguars, MiG-23, 25,27 and the MIG 21
series. India needs to acquire the force multiplier provided by the AWACS. For the twenty-first
century it will need to mass-produce its LCA (Light Combat Aircraft). Quantity generates its
own quality is a very sensible dictum.
66
Indian Navy, realising its importance, is seeking Blue Water Navy status. Indian Navy
today has been shaped to deter any superpower intervention of the 1971 Enterprise variety. It has
naval power of middle-rung nations like France or Great Britain. The Indian Navy's strike on the
Karachi home base of the Pakistani fleet could serve as such a model. In the absence of such an
opportunity, the Indian Navy's prime contribution would be to deter superpower involvement in
such a conflict and prevent reinforcements from the Middle East from entering the land war on
the subcontinent. In conjunction with the Indian Air Force, the Navy can seriously raise the cost
of intervention by any superpower.
210
67
Mobilisation of all resources human and material and the constant improvement of the
human being could make India one of the strongest in the region. But the major fallacy in the
context of past history is that ‘peace can be maintained through the renunciation of force’ and the
complacency that emerges through this. This has to be contradicted. There can be no
complacency, and peace can only be maintained through strength. In this way India can take its
place in the comity of nations with confidence and with that assurance that its words will be
heeded and respected. Without strength words are merely empty declarations. India has to
remember that to survive is to struggle and that this is never ending.
68.
Co-ordination of Logistic elements is vital in Mobilisation and planning of war effort.
India had no Army Headquarter Reserves and a marginal shortage generated restriction on firing
of certain categories of weapons. This situation had an adverse impact especially on the L/70
guns. This proves that appreciation of logistic capability of the enemy and the logistic
management of own army ■'during short wars was lacking. More sophisticated logistic
management system would have arranged for redistribution even as the war was going on.
However, he feels that the attention was paid since the sixties and a logistics and management
aspect in the Armed Forces has improved significantly. This fact was proved during the 1971
war.
Inventory management of the defence forces came up for severe criticism by CAG of
defence. In one case, it was pointed out that certain depot were holing stores worth lakhs and did
not even know its use
!
69
Analysts feel that politicians and bureaucrats have more say in the environment of
national security management this could. When military professional advice is downplayed on
the plea that war is too serious a business to be left to soldiers alone, it still makes sense.
However, when such a conclusion stems from a doctrine that feels that war itself is outdated and
so civilians with little training in such matters can easily swing around a few brigades or
divisions on their own (for playacting or coercion) it can spell national disaster. War
unfortunately is not outdated. It will be safer for Indians not to take their own peace rhetoric too
seriously
70
There is a need for far greater interaction between the military educational institutions
and the academic circles. The Armed Forces need to tap the talent and knowledge available in
our civilian sector and vice versa. Armed Forces officers must therefore be seconded to civilian
institutions. India should think about establishing a National Defence University whose chief aim
should be to encourage and institutionalise such interaction between the military and academic
spheres. It could be built up on the nucleus provided by the United Services Institution (USI) or
even the Institute for Defence Studies and analyses or by a merger of the two. It is about time
that the Indian Armed Forces emerged form their colonial cocoon of secrecy. In fact, it is a major
211
stumbling block to the growth and dissemination of military knowledge. Security issues must be
widely debated in participate forums. The Government must make a conscious effort to educate
the public on security issues. An awareness of these issues in itself will be the first basic step
towards their promotion and safeguarding. 47
71
General Sinha and other senior defence officers have asked for a direct interface between
the political elite and the Armed Forces. This does come about in times of war. It was highly
evident in 1971. However, in peacetime a civilian bureaucracy as an interface cannot be
dispensed with. The best solution would be for it to have a cadre that has total specialisation.
They should be given a wide exposure to the services functioning by attachment (for at least one
year) at the brigade or divisional level. The Defence Service Staff College^Higher Command and
National Defence College courses must be made compulsory for this cadre. It can then contribute
in a more meaningful way to security planning. Service officers must also be taken on deputation
to the Ministry of Defence.48
72
With all this rich and varied combat experience behind it one would have thought that
India would have emerged as a leading centre of militaiy thought and study: that we would at
least have enunciated an Indian military doctrine and founded a genuinely Indian school of war.
We should have become an independent centre of research and development of new military
weapon systems and set the pace in tactical and technological innovations based upon recent
combat experience. Unfortunately, nothing of this sort has happened. A misplaced and
anarchistic emphasis on peaceful rhetoric has stifled all National debates on security matters. 49
ILLUSTRATION 6.1
Co-ordination
Decision Making
Army
Defence production
Navy
Air force
intelligence agencies
civil traded industry
CONCLUSION
73.
In the final analysis, one comes to the conclusion that Brasstacks was a mega event with
multifaceted objectives. Unlike routine military exercises, this was given a shape of politico-
212
military event. The exercise it is felt, served the purpose in bringing out many lessons of tactical
and strategic value. 50
It was ah important milestone and an attempt to provide sense of
direction towards highlighting the importance of country’s defence and security needs. Analysis
of various hypothesis discussed above has been summarised in the succeeding paragraphs.
Test the Armour and Mechanised Forces
74
Above stated analysis justifies the major premises of the research hypothesis. Brasstacks
provided the opportunity to test the integration of the new equipment and the validation of
tactics. From the above deliberation we can conclude that the exercise was a unique multifaceted
politico-military interface event. It differed other routine exercise in its grandeur scale, timings,
objectives pro-active approach and apparently the hidden motives presumed by some analysts.
75.
The country had procured, thanks to its steady economic growth, large number of Tanks,
Guns and ‘state of the art’ equipment and armament. This equipment had been purchased "Off
the shelf! incurring huge costs. Never had the country required the defence management in such
a short time of over a decade. The equipment was required to be tested in the Indian sub
continental environment. India has different terrain and climatic conditions. The equipment
must be able to withstand the performance durability and efficiency parameters as quoted by the
manufacturer. Brasstacks provided the testing environment on large no. of parameters including
the logistic parameters.
76.
The mechanised warfare was comparatively a new concept, not tried before in the Indian
subcontinent. However, the terrain on our western borders lends itself employment of large scale
armoured and mechanised formations.
The Indian Mechanised formation comprising of
Armoured Tank and (Infantry combat vehicles (ICV) based Mechanised Infantry involve a large
number of aspects that need coordination, integration of command and control structure and
communication. Moreover, handling of such large-scale operations beyond the "Corps Level" in
a single theatre of operation was a novel experience. This was 'Thinking big' and broadening of
'Vision' in the Indian security environment which attempted to revolutionalise the concepts and
doctrines. No more, Indian field commanders now needed to restrict themselves with stereo
typed limitation and constraints in their goals. The tanks and the machines were run to their
optimum capacity and then tested for their performance. Indian Navy had already started its
quest for 'Blue Water Navy' status. Air Force and the Army saw the modernisation process
gather momentum. Brasstacks, a joint Army, Naval and Air Force provided a platform for testing
and rehearsing the procedures for inter service cooperation.
77
The exercise was meaningful and purposeful due to a variety of reasons. The conduct of
such a ‘man-machine mix’ experiment was methodical and reflected professional approach.
213
There was a clear understanding between the political, bureaucratic and the defence forces. The
rich experience gained is of immense military value. Important concepts and doctrines were tried
out especially in relation to the Mechanised warfare. Newly purchased Tanks and equipment
were tried out in simulated operational environment. Indian Army learnt to fight Corps and
Army level operations and refined logistic management skills.”
51
Brasstacks reflected pro­
active doctrine. The exercise was set with the background of gearing up the defence forces and
the country to face any threat or crisis. India was justified in conducting such an exercise due to
the prevailing security environment during the period especially when Pakistan was openly
aiding separatist and subversive forces. However, proper crisis management and confidence
building measures could have avoided the crisis due to Pakistan’s misperception. It was also
proved that large exercises with multi-faceted objectives such as Brasstacks the inherent
advantages which routine exercise can never match.
Power Projection
78.
, The hypothesis gets disproved in that India did not achieve power projection by
conducting Brasstacks. The analysts feel that the exercise was a demonstration of Indian power.
Eighties, was a period when India started seeing itself as a regional player.
Sri Lankan
intervention in later eighteen and India's swift reaction to reach out to Male was seen as an
indication of Indian efforts to such a suitable place in the regional arena. India had already
demonstrated its strong will to meet the Chinese face to face in the Sam Drong Chu when it
mobilised all its resources in the Eastern theatre. Indian power got some credibility due to these
events and thexe was appeared shift in Indian 'non-interference' posture. It also gave an
impression that India had stated flexing its muscles. An objective evaluation of India's present
power status therefore presents a curious paradox. There has been a Herculean military built-up
in recent years, which has made her a great military power. Paradoxically however, the
geopolitical environs of the country have been adversely affected as a result of American support
to Pakistan. The regional predominance India gained in 1971 has been greatly eroded by
Pakistan's success in using extra administration followed a bizarre and highly complex policy
that laid stress on seeking peace and accommodation with the principal security threats to India
(China and Pakistan) but at the same time wasted enormous military effort and resources in
dominating the Indian Ocean littoral states. Mrs Gandhi was ruthless and demonstrated an iron
will that broke Pakistan. She was genuinely feared and respected in the neighbourhood. Despite
its accretion of so much military hardware, the Rajiv era in real terms saw a dangerous
degradation of the Indian security environment.52
79.
. China and Pakistan are India’s main regional adversaries. With both these states, the
Rajiv regime tried to seek detente through personalised diplomacy. These are the chief politicomilitary challenges to the Indian State. The Indian military interventions in the Indian Ocean
214
region were basically in the wrong strategic direction. Science and Technology integration has
not materialised effectively. Thus, it is seen that the regional balance presents an Asymmetric
Equation.
80.
Besides its large economy, it has also progressed from a “nuclear threshold state” to
“Nuclear power state”. It is now capable of producing sophisticated computers missiles and
nuclear devices The caste, class, language and nationality divisions also sap India’s national
cohesiveness. That status will elude India unless the nuclear weapons are backed by appropriate
all round economic- industrial technological civilisation development that radically transforms
the general level of life for the better. We can think of peace, not war for quite sometime. There
is a need for strong damage-control measures, new foreign-policy initiative backed by
appropriate diplomatic moves to counter the emerging Pakistan-China-US nexus. This has to be
countered through realistic negotiated accommodation on Kashmir and Aksai Chin. A realistic
accommodation with Pakistan can save many a headache. Industrial civilisation (the title of a
book by John U Nef has to permeate the Indian society in general) dedicated work, love and
respect for works alone can give India the coveted world power status. Her greatness should
subsume military and it has to be remembered that a sensible foreign policy saves millions that
are otherwise spent on defence sector. For this purpose, all the elements of nation power listed
above have to be developed systematically. On the eve of the next millennium, India is going
through a process of transition in deferent walks of national life. Globalisation along with
liberalisation of economy is an integral part of the on going process, which according to some
economists will be completed by the year 2020.
81.
There have been numerous drags in Indian power development. Inconsistency, incoherent
policies, lack of harmonisation of national goals and politico-military objectives, reactive
policies, unstable governments, indecision, poverty, lack basic needs, lack of political will to
firmly control population explosion and corruption, lack of will to power have all contributed to
the present messy state of affairs despite tremendous potential. A strong defence mechanism
backed by modem defence forces is required based on the security imperatives. India needs to
consciously cultivate this 'will to power'. She can achieve great power status only then.
82
53
In final analysis, the hypothesis gets disproved in that ‘Power does not comprise of
military strength’ alone. It is the combination of military, economic, and political and diplomatic
strengths. Demonstrative use of armed forces can sometimes be an effective way, at least in the
short term, of securing the objectives and preventing foreign situations inimical to a country’s
interests. Brasstacks was meant to send a signal to its adversaries. A credible capacity
requirement can be profitable”. Indian military powers to be really cost-effective must, therefore,
deter not only overt aggression but also dissuade a regional adversary from undertaking such low
215
cost, low intensity conflict to destabilise the country. Though India has made significant strides
in almost all spheres of modernisation to science and technology, India still has to overcome a
large number of the limitations and meet the challenges before it can seek a place for power. A
strategy for achieving modernisation that relies on force multipliers and retrofitting happens to
suit the current Indian inventory and force structure. It also suits the stage India has reached in its
own productive capabilities. India must close technological gap with the western world. The
growth during first 25 years was greater; but during the last few years, the rate of growth has
been lower than that of Pakistan or China.
Deterrence
83.
In respect to deterrence the hypothesis gets disproved. India failed to deter the potential
enemies or send the warning signal. The doctrine of the use of force without war was well
thought out and reflected the reality of political restraint on open warfare in the nuclear age. The
basic problem is that the political restraints on conventional war have eroded at an alarming
pace. The Indian problem has been the evergreens of its analysts to dismiss the actual use the
force as a viable option. Ruthlessly successful military operations can also be costly politically to
a democratic government, which has to be responsive to public option. The Indian problem has
been that since no war has been fought for 30 years, the 1962 pacifist, peacekeeping mindset is
again surfacing in our corridors of power. It negates all the accretion in our armed strength
because it brings into question our basic will to engage in war or local conflict. Without this
ultimate threat, coercion loses its sting. Our coercive diplomacy will frighten no one but our own
media-men.
84.
The exercise was meant to update the security doctrine and give an assessment of the
defence capability. The failure of Indian power to deter a regional neighbour from such
interventions does not redound to the credit of the Indian State. It needs to define the limits of its
tolerance and make them plain to all local adversaries and even the superpowers. Sadly, India
has failed in this crucial field due to a faulty application or non-application of the considerable
military power at her disposal. Such military power can be rendered to back legitimate security
concerns. This stems from a conspicuous lack of a coherent security doctrine that identifies these
concerns. Identification of national goals and means to accomplish these goals form the essential
factors of foreign policy Policies. These are subject to review and reassessment. All the
structures and organisation for security stem from a clearly perceived national aim. 54
Co-ordination
85.
Above analysis also leads us to one of the important deductions that the exercise was
aimed at testing co-ordination between three wings of armed forces and with different arms and
logistic services and other Government and civil agencies. Previous wars had highlighted certain
216
deficiencies which were required to be overcome. Brasstacks did provide the right opportunity to
critically analyse these earlier deficiencies and find methods to overcome them at every level. It
has been proved time and again that proper level of mutual understanding, cooperation and
coordination between intelligence agencies, government departments and three wings of defence
forces, civil trade and industry alone can lead a nation or the military to success. Brasstacks also
started a trend on seeking cooperation of civil/public assets like the Railways IOC, FCI, NDDF,
State Federations and Hired Transport, CHT. The most important of all is the coordination of
national goals and objectives which reflect in the overall coordinated efforts in diplomatic and
Foreign Policy initiatives as well as efforts of defence, trade, industry, all organs and resources at
the disposal of a nation.
86.
Findings
•
Exercise Brasstacks was conducted to test the weapons and revalidate the
concepts.
«
The exercise was not aimed at power projection. It was rather meant to
assess India’s defence preparedness and potential.
•
India is not a power yet; its military strength alone does not make it a
power. India has the ‘sources’ to power but it has first to be an economic
power and overcome the constraints.
•
Brasstacks did not serve the purpose of Deterrence. Instead, it alarmed
Pakistan which led to the crisis. Pakistan realised it was no match to India in
conventional warfare and changed its tactics to low intensity conflict and
proxy war which India has not been able to counter effectively.
. •
Brasstacks was able to provide a platform to improve coordination and
cooperation aspects amongst three wings of defence, government agencies,
civil and trade. It highlighted the importance of harmonisation of politicomilitary goals.
87.
Other Important Findings
•
Exercise was conducted at a time when Indian subcontinent was passing through a
difficult phase. Brasstacks was an indication of proactive attempt, visionary and
progressive approach.
•
India's strategic culture has been absorptive, defensive and inward looking rather
than aggressive, directed or expansionist India is a civilisational entity that has
shown remarkable resilience and survivability. India’s Strategic thought has had
a bearing on the way policies and decisions, reflection in the characteristic nature.
•
Sunderji acclaimed as a visionary soldier had a great contribution to Brasstacks.
Leadership can make a great difference to the future course of action.
217
•
Follow up the lessons learnt during Brasstacks on part of the Government was
missing. There was degeneration in the defence preparedness during the decade
that followed due to political instability, financial bankruptcy, inconsistency,
incoherent approach, scams and bureaucratic hurdles,
FUTURISTIC APPRAISAL
88.
Having analysed the scenario relating the Brasstacks and years that have gone by till the
recent exercise Pooma Vijay, one important thought that comes to anyone’s mind is that what
future holds for India. Abdul Kalam is very optimistic in this regard.
Future is looking up for
this country. India has self-sufficient economy and a large skilled and technical manpower. It is
amongst a very elite club of countries in the world in the field of Nuclear, Space and Missiles
development. India has one of the largest and the most battle tested, dedicated, apolitical military
in the world.
TABLE 6.1
Economic Growth Projections
1994
2015
* India’s GNP
$1.2 trillion
$ 3.7 trillion
* % of Japan’s GNP
46%
82%
* % of China’s GNP
24%
27%
* India’s total
$ 79 billion
$333 billion
* % of Japan’s stock
79%
204%
* % of China’s stock
39%
79%
34 divisions
<34 divisions
Economic growth
Military capital stock
Force structure
* Army
* Air force
S 55 squadrons
^ 110 ships
* Navy
89.
<55 squadrons
<.110 ships
Present economic survey predicts good health of Indian economy. The growth rate is
high and consistent. Inflation was the lowest in last fifty years. Lord Desai of the London
School Of Economics is optimistic about Indian capability to achieve sustained growth rate of
above 6-9 %.56 World Bank has projected that Indian economy will be the fourth largest in the
world, next to US, Japan and China, by 2020. 57
90.
According to a longer-term perspective, India is clearly the power of the future in the
Indian Ocean region. It is only power with the size, technological capability, industrial depth and
potential strategic reach to fulfil this role. 58
India has made great achievements in the 20th
218
century. As the largest democracy of the world, India completed unification of 562 states and
has shown resilience and making of nation sustaining a democratic and secular set up.
59 India
has been successful in abolition of famine by gaining self sufficiency in food, eradication of
killer diseases such as small pox and plague, setting up of educational base and building an
industrial infrastructure and catching up with technologies.60
91.
At the down of the new millenniuln, India is going through a process of transition in
deferent walks of national life. 61
Globalisation along with liberalisation of economy is an
integral part of the on going process, which according to some economists will be completed by
the year 2020. 62 Indian budgets provide fresh impulse in the reforms, manage fiscal balance,
and accelerate the development of infrastructure, energy, electricity, and taxation. The
emergence of India as a world power has almost become a certainty after Pokharan II and III.
The country may have to face some temporary setbacks on the field of commerce and economy.
63 Resources crunch has restrained India from becoming a power or to maintain a decisive edge
over its adversaries and regional competitors. China has taken a decisive lead over India in all
fields. Instability, indecisiveness, dilemmas, reactive approach has been the mainstay of Indian
strategic scene. Economy is still rather weak, and India is poor compared to many developed
countries.
92.
However, the situation seems to be very much under control and it seems to be improving
day by day. Kargil Review Committee and Group of Ministers, GOM submitted the reports in
record time. The recommendations concerning intelligence, border management, defence
restructure and reforms have been accepted. India is opening up defence sector for exports and is
seeking Indian industry’s participation. Realism seems to have dawned and India is out to make
bold, pragmatic steps. Presently, the country seems to well poised for rapid growth and real
reduction in poverty.
93.
Frank Wisner, former Ambassador to India, feels that India is emerging as a major
economic power. US is vying for India as investment destination. There is convergence of
national interests between the US and India as with a responsibility for maintaining peace and
security in Asia. There is predominant shift in the US policy. India has been successful in
mustering the world opinion relating to its security concerns. 64
94.
The western media often describes India as a sleeping tiger or a sleeping giant. The time
has now come that the tiger awakes roars and also pounces upon as and when necessary. The
nuclear tests have already won half the battle for India. The countrymen should now collectively
try hard towards human development, which can serve as the main pillar of India’s strength in
the international arena. 65 India has to be secure in the new millennium.
219
RECOMMENDATIONS
95.
The purpose of the dissertation can be fruitful only if some concrete recommendations
are made based on the research. Brasstacks attempted to bring in realism towards continues
neglect of vital issues of the country such as defence security, give it proper shape towards the
mechanism called war machinery. It is not the defence ministry alone but the co-ordinated
collective responsibility of all the ministries. The defence preparations are required not when the
threat develops but as a gradual, deliberate continuous process, importance no way relegated,
resources should be at the back and call, never strangulated, to budgetary constrains cut in other
irrelevant expenditure of the other departments to ensure adequate allotment for defence. This
was the largest military exercise in the history of the independent India.
96.
India is a large country with a vast potential. India has suffered four wars in the post
independent era. The country is still bleeding regularly. There has to be better deal to the security
aspect in the new millennium. It has to harness the natural and human resources to become
economically stronger. It has to bring in new technology, research and modernisation in every
field, it has to set its own house in order. Bureaucracy has to be more efficient, accountable and
responsive. There has to be integration of defence and trade. Defence forces need a better deal.
Doctrines should culminate in logical conclusion in case the enemy attempts any misadventures
like Kargil. The guard can never be lowered.indai cannot afford to be complecent. Lessons must
be put in to practice and executed. Media need to play a greater role in security debates. India has
to have a futuristic vision and defence forces be geared up for the modem battlefield
environment.
97.
The exercise Brasstacks was a pro-active doctrine and in tune with the prevailing
situation in the subcontinent. It provided guidelines to improve defence capability by
reorganisation, re-orientation of doctrines and concepts, sharpen the tactics and improve
efficiency, confidence and morale of the forces. Important lessons in employability of modem
weapons and equipment ware learnt. Mechanised forces are suited for plains and in semi­
plains/deserts. How can they be employed in context of Pak or for other strategic task? Logistics
need restructuring and made more efficient. Co-ordination is equally important. Big exercises are
relevant. Leadership plays an important role in any operation. The exercise has to be analysed on
the basis of the contribution it has for the country. It was a unique experiment by India which can
be termed as a rare pro-active feet during the peacetime. Showing of the concern for the
country’s defence by none other than the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his defence minister
Arum Singh has been hailed as a positive step towards national security. Over the years the
political and bureaucratic masters rarely had the acumen for understanding the defence
requirements and will to give the due importance. There is a need for a security Doctrine. It has
220
to be a totally professional approach. It has to be formulated keeping in view the interests of the
nation and the geo-strategic considerations. Policy of ‘Panchsheel' cannot be applied unilaterally
if other nations mean exactly the opposite. Power status is important which cannot be achieved
by military strength alone. India needs a strong defence forces with credible deterrence.
Whenever lessons are not leamt from the past, the country has suffered. The latest example was
the Kargil conflict. India cannot afford to lower its guard. It has to be backed by a strong
economy. Institutionalisation of decision-making body like NSC is must. Doctrine should lead to
decisive victories.
98.
Professional Approach . The matter s relating to defence and security have to be dealt
through professional approach. All adhoc methods should be done away with.
Requirement of
a sound decision process. There should be full integration and institutionalisation of this process.
Reorientation of Doctrine is very important. The evolution of a National security Doctrine. India
should adopt pro-active doctrine. Cooperation and Co-ordination at all levels need streamlining
and permanent institutionalised methods need to be evolved. Role of Air Force is vital. No
decisive results have been achieved by India without participation of the Air Force. It was
evident in 1962, 1965, and 1971 and during Kargil conflict. A sufficient enough Defence to
secure aggression. Intelligence is one of the most vital areas of diplomacy and warfare. Logistics
play an important role in any war. Defence Infrastructure needs improvement.
Modernisation
99.
The country has to keep up the pace of modernisation. Defence forces, immediately after
Brasstacks instead of accelerating the process of modernisation, were asked to live with the
resource crunch and budgetary cuts. This adversely affected the training and maintenance.
Recommendations of the exercise remained in the cold storage. Army’s annual plans remained
unfulfilled year after year. Bureaucracy must share the blame and be held accountable for, most
of he shortcomings. There has been a lack of political will and lack of transparency in involving
the people in security debates in the name of false sense of ‘secrecy’. There is no pursuing of
projects, sense of urgency or speedy expediting. The progress of the public undertakings and
DRDO/Ordinance factories is dismal. They smack of lethargy, mismanagement and
complacency. Therefore there is hardly any progress in modernising the forces. There is a need
to fix accountability responsibility for non-materialisation of targets. India needs strong defence
machinery; a force to reckon with not only in strength but also in quality, efficient well-oiled
machinery backed up by suitable strategies and policies. Defence forces forces must be governed
by institutionalised and well-organised decision-making bodies without red- tapism and undue
interference, with sufficient freedom of action.
221
Canalisation of Resources
100.
India has to achieve a self-generating industrial growth and bid for scientific progress of
technological advancement of national effort, then the problem of her defence would ease out.
The awareness of this fact is the greatest security for India’s defence. Appropriate all round
economic-industrial chronological development that radically transforms the general level of life
for the better. Reforms, restructuring and modernisation process must be accelerated. Policies
have to be more pragmatic. India has to fight the constrints. India has the world’s largest number
of illiterates and is one of the poorest countries in the world as per per capita income. 66
Overpopulation, minimal infrastructure, corruption and crippling bureaucracy, religion, caste and
regional discrimination are the challnges for India in the new millennium. 67
Self Reliance and Self Sufficiency
101.
Since the next century is going to be far more competitive than present one, there is a
need to develop a strong sense of nationalism, which can easily become the guiding principal in
our endeavour to mark India, a world power. Over and above its regional responsibility role in
the equilibrium of Asia, India, a global power, exercises responsibilities on a worldwide scale.
What we require most is a proactive diplomacy and a sound foreign policy in order to join the
community of great power.
68
For a country to become a power to reckon with, the quality
of government counts as much as other factors, much of the cynicism in the country is the result
of deep erosion in the people’s trust and confidence in the government machinery and the
political executive to be good. Unless this is restored the country cannot move fast enough to
join the community of great powers. Development of missiles of different ranges capability to
launch indigenously mode satellites to needs the needs of communication and the acquisition
nuclear capability has given tremendous confidence to the armed forces as well as the people of
the country. The last fifty years might not have been very fruitful but the author is happy to note
that India is finally coming out of its deep slumber. If the politicians reform themselves and lead
the nation in proper directions, India is sure to regain its past glory and become a world power.
Progress in any country would be palpable only when the material prosperity goes ahead of the
population growth. Indian must stop looking to more and more foreign aid for every possible
sector World Bank or the international monitory fund (IMF). 69
102.
Government and the military and civilian services must attach due importance in
maintaining records of past wars so that these could serve to instruct successive generations of
officials and result in the prevention of recurrence of past mistakes.
70
Some of the mistakes
committed in the past that hold valuable lessons for the present and future must be highlighted.
1971 war is one such example. It was different from previous ware. Firm and confident political
handling of a problem by Mrs Indira Gandhi was matched by her government by sophisticated
management, direction and leadership of Indian Armed Forces. It was an example of clear
222
political aim and of speed, ferocity and flexibility with sufficient intelligence, and mobility
manipulating balance of force on both the fronts.
71
Central Government Expenditure
103.
C Udai Bhaskar advocates striling a balance bateween guns and butter and recommends
synergising the two for security.72
Many defence areas offer scope to generate great, bang for
the buck, with increasing recurring expenditure it is becoming difficult to induct relevant
technology into the army. Private sector participation can improve productivity in ordinance
factories.
73 ‘A strong fence makes better neighbours’. The money spent on defence can no
longer be considered a non-productive investment. Rather, it is the insurance premium for
necessary security. Part of this investment also acts as an instrument for improving our human
resources and research and development of around 4% to 5% of GDP in necessary for a healthy
long-term defence build-up for a nation like Indian. 74 Kapik Kak, stressing the need for better
management and rationalisation and laying the correct priorities feels that problem is not how
much' but how’to spent the money. 75
104.
In financial year. 2000-01, the budgetary provision of 58,587 crore, which excludes
pensioneiy bill of Rs. 12000 crores, will come to a modest 70,000 crores for the overall
infrastructure. It works out to be 2.6 % of GDP revenue expenditure. Recurring expenditure on
manpower cannot be reduced thus, very little is left for restructure, up-gradation, acquisition, upgradation. In the stores area, inventory management and procurement practices leave
considerable room for improvement. Defence spending needs hard look. It had dipped
dramatically from 3.59 to 2.31 %1987-89 to 99-2000, a figure similar to that prior to 1962 Sino >
India war. After the Kargil war, it was raised by 20 %, an action that was prompted. 76
India,
besides spending on defence forces, has to spend enormous amount on internal security budget
under home ministry.
77 Defence budget is based on threats, capabilities, intentions, its geo­
start location and the role the country seeks to play. India is surrounded by an unstable
neighbourhood and is faced with sustained insurgency in J&K and the north-east which has been
sapping up about 30 % of the army at tremendous human and financial cost.
Management of Defence
105. , K Subrahmanyam also notes crucial deficiencies are in long-term planning and R&D
There is a vital need to focus attention on national security and defence management and to
familiarise our senior Armed Forces and civilian officers with these management techniques.
The first step that is required in this direction is some ‘giasnosf in our Services. These is a
compelling need to develop in this country, a National Defence University (NDU) on the US
model, to generate professional literature for use in the Colleges of Combat, Naval Warfare, Air
223
Warfare, Defence Management and the National Defence College.” Co-ordination and Co<10
operation is yet to be achieved between various agencies and departments in the true sense.
106.
The first step required in this direction is the’glasnost’ in defence Services. It would also
be advisable for the Department of Defence Production to have a higher level training institution
and for the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to set up an institution for
R&D management. All these institutions can be brought under the umbrella of NDU. Besides
the generation of high quality instructional material, the NDU should also conduct short studies
and seminars for senior level officers, and organise politico-strategic games. It could have a
strategic studies centre to provide valuable inputs to the various higher level training institutions
as well as Defence Planning Staff. Needless to say it should be autonomous and not be
dominated either by the Defence Minister or the Defence Services. There is a need to restructure
higher defence, integration of intelligence services, proper institutionalisation and making of
NSC functional. Constant review of policies and the assessment of Progress made over past few
years is required to be done. One of the notable features of Bush administration is that those who
have served in the defence office earlier hold the entire important portfolio in foreign policy.
107.
Control Structures. The erstwhile Army Chief, General Sundarji, in his article entitled
National Security: An Agenda for the Future has highlighted some aspects of our higher defence
organisations that need restructuring. Both he and Arun Singh have pointed out the need for
formalising the prevailing system of the Defence Minister's Monday morning conferences with
the three service chiefs. Arun Singh has suggested the establishment of a National Defence
Committee headed by the Defence Minister and comprising the three service chiefs. It should
also comprise the Defence Security; the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister and the
Foreign Secretary should attend these to have a better interface between foreign policy and
security planning. General Sundaiji has highlighted the inadequacy of the existing 'Core Group'
of Secretaries meeting. Those are informal and adhoc bodies with little accountability, continuity
or secretarial support. Accountability must be in-built into such decision-making structures.
108.
K Subrahmanyam has highlighted the need to create military appendages to the Ministry
of Defence or Cabinet Secretariat that would provide independent professional advice to the
political leadership. Advice now emanating from the services tends to be unilinear and reflects
the strong personal biases of the service chiefs. If that is so, it only highlights the need and
importance of the joint Defence Planning Staff. There is just no getting away from a Chief of
Defence Staff, however much the civilian may be allergic to such a military supremo. The only
problem is that in trying to marginalise the role of the military in national security matters the
civilian component should not adopt a doctrine whose basic premise rules out the possibility of
shooting war forever.
79
224
109.
India is unique in higher direction and management of defence, in that, military
leadership continues to function outside the government framework. Political leadership has little
exposure to defence issues. The bureaucratic system lacks continuity. It can neither assess the
threat scenario or the capabilities of the adversaries correctly, nor can it decide what steps need
to be taken. The political leadership has to take a decision on the vexing question of the higher
defence organisation. Control structures for National Defence and Regional Security need to be
reviewed. Crucial deficiencies are in long-term planning need to be overcome. There is a need
for glasnost in Defence Services. There is a need for well orchestration of efforts. Bureaucracy
needs prevamping and it should stop undue interference in defencematters. Inventory
Management needs drastic improvement. Management of Defence and organisation for higher
defence have to be restructured for better eficiency.
Strategy
110.
Critical evaluation and Assessment of defence and security perspective has the
assessment of threat perception has to be made correctly. There is a constant need of critical
examination of defence and security, putting to test the defence machinery/mechanism. There is
a need of restructuring the defence forces. Coordination between Army, Navy and the Air Force
besides coordination between civil and government agencies, defence production, trade and
industry is important. A country must have a defence organisation sufficient enough to protect its
interests and ensure security against its enemies. There is a need for a strong will to pursue
national goals ruthlessly. A country has to constantly review and reassess its threat perceptions,
concepts and doctrines and carry out restructure and modernisation.
111.
A strategic policy is needed to make India a World Power. For India to emerge as the
fourth powerful country in the world, it needs to follow a sound, calculating and pragmatic
strategic policy. The policy should be formulated by anticipating all the ills presently afflicting
India. The strategic policy other than economic policy will make India realise its cherished
dream. 80 Intelligence is one of the most vital areas of diplomacy and warfare. Kargil conflict
proved this point. Indian policies must be consistant and coherent. There should not be knee jerk
or halfhearted attempts. Integration of intelligence agencies and timely analysis for real time
intelligence is a must. Logistics play an important role in any war. Defence Infrastructure needs
improvement. Weapons development and prchase should be competible and must be integrated.
More reliance has to be on own research and development and self-reliance.
112.
It is now quite clear that strategy in modem time is changeable. It depends mostly on the
pattern and modern warfare or on the nature of operation and policy of nation. Therefore, the
defence strategy of India should be strong enough, if she is to defend her precious freedom in
225
this modern flexible world politics The defence strategy is deeply related with all aspects of the
governmental activities like politics, diplomacy and development of trade and economy. Further,
Indian soldiers are as good as the best in the world and the army would beat back any aggression
against our national sovereignty. Therefore, India with her gigantic population and national
resources should utilise this time to strengthen herself in various directions by mobilising and
modernising her defence and economic affairs so that in respect for India in the comity of nations
may increase and she may occupy a position of equality with the leading nations in the world.
Only then we shall be able to hold our head high, and our voice will begin to be heard. Only then
shall we attain a bargaining position on the chessboard of international politics.
113.
81
Indian approach and Indian policies have to be sacrosanct with the national security
imperatives. Brasstacks was one such attempt to meet the security need of India. India must work
out possible strategy after systematically evaluating threats and in consideration of the strengths
and weaknesses of the nation and its adversaries. Indian strength and weaknesses and doctrines
need constant reassessment in security perspective. The existence of the nation depends on the
factors like centralised control and direction of defence policy, defusing of internal stresses
through political adjustments, maintaining
sufficient “forces in being” to deter aggression and
constant vigilance.
ILLUSTRATION 6.2
ROAD TO SUCCESS
DEFENCE + MODERNISATION +
114.
STRATEGY =
VICTORY
Important deduction drawn go a long way why to highlight the importance of having a
material doctrine after carrying out threat analysis. National goals are required to be formulated
and spelt out as in case of US. India’s needs a power projection with a large standing army. It
can only be achieved by economic line-up, reorganise reconstruction. The debilitating factors
like intelligence will have to be overcome to make India stronger nation.
Synthesis and
synergies have to be worked out. The 1971 war with Pakistan is a good example of theorchestration of effort by the political and military leadership. All organs of the government were
orchestrated towards achieving the national aim. There is a need to integrate army and defence
services in the decision making process.
Diplomacy
115.
India must therefore strive diplomatically to break the Sino-Pakistan nexus. She may
have to but peace with China so that the threat of low-intensity conflict being sponsored by
Pakistan can be adequately managed. The present numerical edge of the Indian Armed Force has
226
evidentially proved inadequate to deter Pakistan from such adventures against India in Punjab
and Kashmir. Similarity the nationals aim for Indian security must be well defined. Formulation
of policies and doctrines should be based on security imperatives.
116.
Civilian academic must increasingly be co-opted on the instructional staffs of our military
training institutions We should also encourage the growth of non-governmental think tanks
comprising retired service personnel and civilian analysis that can be given specific projects to
work on. There is a need to tap a much wider cross-section of national talent in this crucial field.
The civilian elite in turn needs to enhance their knowledge about the nature and application of
military power. In the modem era it is archaic and irrelevant.
117.
There is a need for much greater interaction between our military and foreign policy
establishments. To quote General Sundarji, "Apart from crisis management we have to develop a
methodology for crisis anticipation and contingency planning to meet these." India strategic
policy needs to be backed by a well-conceived diplomatic posture for the future. It will be a
prudent policy for India to cultivate cordial relations with countries.
118.
The services in turn must interact more with the academic world and civil institutions.
Civil experts in histoiy, economics, technology, political science and international relations must
be included on the staff of military training institutions. More symbiotic relationships must be
developed between civil and military training institutions and universities. The colonial
exclusivity of the Armed Forces is an anachronism that needs to be shed at the earliest. It is
becoming a shield for obscurantism and mediocrity in security issues.
119.
A wholly misplaced emphasis on ‘security’ has hindered the growth of military literature
in India. Toady, our political and bureaucratic elite, as well as the Indian public at large, is
painfully ill informed on security matters. Media debates on defence related issues are puerile
and solely confined to the size of the defence budget.
227
RECOMMENDATIONS .
•
INDIA HAS TO BE SECURE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
•
GUARD CANOT BE LOWERED, CREDIBLE DETERENCE IS MUST
•
LESSONS MUST BE INPLEMENTED
•
PROFESSIONAL APPROACH TO SECUIRY, PUBLIC DEBTES
•
BURAEUCRATIC SET UP NEED REVAMPING
•
STRONG NATIONAL WILL AND CHARACTER
•
INCREASE DEFENCE EXPENDITURE,
•
BUILD ECONOMY- CUT GOVT EXPENDITURE, IMPROVE EFFICIENCY
•
MODERNISATION AND TECHNOLOGY UPGRADATION
•
FUTURISTIC VISION, PLAN FOR DECISIVE VICTORIES
ILLUSTARTION 6.3
THE ROAD TO ‘VICTORY’
Synergies
Intelligence
Higher Defence budget
Integration
status, conditions ofservice
weapons, strategy and tactics
Resources, Economic development
Policies
Defence and civil industry, technology
Doctrines
Restructure, co-ordination defence research
Public debate
Goals
228
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71
Ibid, pp. 150.
72
C Udai Bhaskar, The Times of India, New Delhi, Guns and Butter, 19 Feb 2001.
73
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Dinesh Kumar, Defence Spending needs Hard Look, The Times of India, New
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77
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80
Sandy Gordon, op.cit. No. 10, pp. 32.
81
Ibid.