Being True to the Work
Author(s): Lydia Goehr
Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter, 1989), pp. 55-67
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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LYDIA GOEHR
Being Trueto the Work
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the nineteenth century,
E.T.A. Hoffmann issued a novel prescription
for musical practice: musical activities, be they
of composition, performance, reception, evaluation, or analysis, should no longer be guided
by extra-musicalconsiderationsof a religious,
social, or scientific sort. They should now be
guided by the works themselves. To legitimize
this assertion Hoffmanndevelopedthe notionof
being true to the work (Werktreue)and gave it a
prominencewithinthe languageof musicalcriticism it had neverbefore had.'
Hoffmann's understandingof the nature of
musical works corresponds closely to that
acceptedtoday.Thus, a musical work is held to
be a composer'sunique, objectifiedexpression,
a public and permanentlyexisting artifactmade
up of musicalelements (typicallytones, dynamics, rhythms,harmonies,and timbres). A work
is fixed with respect, at least, to the properties
indicated in the score and it is repeatable in
performances. Performances themselves are
transitory sound events intended to present a
work by complying as closely as possible with
the given notationalspecifications. Beethoven's
FifthSymphonyand Schubert'sStringQuintetin
C, Op. i63 are examples of musical works.
Since Hoffmann'stime, and increasingly in
this century, many philosophershave discussed
the nature of musical works and the diverse
implicationsof speakingaboutmusic in termsof
works. My concerns are similarly focused. In
the presentessay, however,I wish to speakabout
musical works for the purpose of making two
claims. Both claims are derived, or so I shall
argue, from a particularhistoricalthesis which
asserts that the concept of a musical work first
fully emergedin classical musicalpracticeat the
end of the eighteenthcenturyandthat, since this
time, it has been used pervasivelyin the worldof
music. The first claim is that the concept of a
musical work is an open concept with paradigmatic and derivative employment. The second
claim, which is dependentupon the first, is that
the counterexamplemethod, used in the traditional search for definitionsof concepts such as
that of a musical work, is underminedin a way
hitherto unseen in the philosophical literature.
In the scope of an article it would be impossible
to fully justify the historicalthesis itself. This I
do elsewhere.2So I shall sayjust enoughaboutit
to give the readerthe informationon which the
two centralclaims are based.
II. THE HISTORICAL
THESIS
Historical inquiry reveals that the beliefs, values, rules, and patternsof behaviorand presentation associated with the concept of a musical
work have regulated classical musical practice
only since the end of the eighteenthcentury.The
concept crystallized as a result of the fusion of
four forces: (I) the articulationof the concepts
of Fine Art andof the autonomousworkof art in
the mid to late eighteenthcenturyand the subsequent inclusion of music under these concepts;
(2) the emancipation of musical sound from
poetry and the religious word, and the subsequent rise of absolute or purely instrumental
music; (3) the specific andhighly complex interplay between Enlightenment, Romantic, and
Idealist thoughtnotably in Germanand French
aesthetictheory;and (4) the emergenceof a new
sort of marketplacefor musical works.3
For most of its history, music was conceived
as a practiceentirely subjectto the constraintsof
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47:1, Winter 1989
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The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism
56
extra-musicaloccasion and functiondetermined
mostly by the church,court, and scientificacademy. The changeswhich took place at the end of
the eighteenthcenturygave rise to a new view of
music as an independentpractice whose concerns were predominantlymusical. This independent practice became a practice geared
towardsproducingenduringproductsinsofaras
it was determinedby the more general concepts
of fine art andthe autonomousworkof art. Only
with the rise of this new view of music did
musicians, critics, and the like begin to think
predominantlyof music in termsof works. Bach
did not thinkcentrallyin these terms;Beethoven
did. Haydnmarksthe transitions
These claims are supportedby a whole series
of historicalconsiderations.Thus, in the romantic period, changes took place not only in aesthetic attitudestoward the status of music and
composers, but also in the meaningsof numerous musical terms. As etymological inquiries
reveal, wordssuch as 'Stuck', 'Werk','Oeuvre',
'composition', and relatedtermssuch as 'repertoire', 'performance', 'rehearsal', 'transcription', and 'improvisation',acquiredtheir modern meanings at the end of the eighteenth
century.5 Each of these terms was reconceptualized with regard to their specific relation
to the central regulative concept-the musical
work.
There were at the same time significant
changes in the activities of composition, performance, and criticism. New oppositions or
new forms of old oppositions quickly became
entrenched. Oppositions arose between: the
music composedandthe music played;the composer and performer; absolute and program
music; compositionandtranscription;and composition and improvisation. These oppositions
were to find institutionalexpression in the formation of the "imaginary musical museum":
the buildingof concert halls which movedmusic
from a backgroundto a foreground object of
appreciation;the preparationof the first program notes; the new conceptionof rehearsalsas
necessary to an adequate performance; dedicated publishing companies; and new laws
investingcopyrightin the composer and associated plagiarism policies. In this same period,
finally, bibliographies, biographies, and histories were written, all of which focused for the
first time on the idea that composers were pro-
ducing permanent and independently unique
works.
Why should all these changes have fostered
the emergenceof the work-concept?Priorto the
nineteenthcentury, musical practice was regulatedby beliefs thatdid not conceptuallyrequire
the idea of a work. This was not true after i8oo.
Certainly before i8oo musicians functioned
with concepts of operas, cantatas, sonatas, and
symphonies.But none of these were understood
in relationto the idea thatthere was a composer
producing full and original scores which reflected and preserved the tonal, rhythmic, and
timbralproperties of his composition. Nor did
these conceptsdependupona composition'ssurviving its performance, being repeated, being
performed without interruption, being presented as a completed and unified product, or
being considered significant in its own right.
Indeed, it was only when the production of
music began to be conceived along these lines
that many traditionalconcepts, such as thatof a
symphony and sonata, acquired their modern
significance-as kinds of musical work.
All these claims are founded upon the idea
that musical practices, holistically conceived,
can be, but need not be, regulatedby the workconcept. It is, at most, historically contingent
which of these two alternatives is realized in
fact. But to say that a given concept arises contingentlyout of a set of historicalcircumstances
does not imply that it is merely ephemeral in
nature. On the contrary,a concept can become
so entrenched within a given practice that it
comes to take on all the airs and graces of
necessity.
III. OBJECTIONS
The thesis that the work-conceptbegan to regulate musical practice at the end of the eighteenth century might seem overly contentious.
Indeed, it can be challenged in a number of
ways. One might challenge my interpretationof
historicaldata or the idea of musical workhood
employed in the above. Although the former
cannotbe furtherdefendedhere, the lattercan.
Indeed, for the sake of the argument,it mustbe.
I am suggesting that the concept of a musical
work is intimately tied to a conception of the
complex relationships obtaining between the
composer, the score, and the performance, as
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Goehr Being Trueto the Work
these are expressed on several levels: within
musical and aestheticliterature;and in terms of
institutionalcodes. These relationshipscame to
be sharply defined at a particulartime against
the background of those theories which first
gave to music its autonomyand, indeed, exalted
position among the arts. Henceforth, I shall
refer to this view as the romanticconceptionof
musical works.6
Objectors might claim that my notion of
workhoodis too closely wedded to a romantic
understandingof musical practice. They might
suggest that there is an ideologically neutral
notionof a work:a workis eithera soundpattern
simpliciter; a work is a sound pattern corresponding to appropriate musical or aesthetic
interest. Regarding the former, however, this
wouldmeanthatany tune or song is also a work,
which is going too far. And regardingthe latter,
as soon as we begin to speak of more complex
patterns, perhaps those indicated in scores or
embodied in performances,we adopt that conception of music first fully formed in the late
eighteenth century. In other words, the very
notions of a score, indication,and performance
employed in this purportedly neutral description are thick with meaning, as, indeed, is the
idea of "appropriatemusical or aesthetic interest." It is, therefore, yet to be shown by those
who object to the thesis presentedhere that the
concept of a musical work regulates musical
practice with something other than a deeply
romantic significance.7
There are two further objections. The first
turnson the claim thateven if circumstancesof a
given sort do not allow at a specific time for
conscious or explicit use of a concept, this does
not mean that what is produced does not fall
under the said concept. The second rests upon
the apparentimplicationof the thesis, that we
can speakof music in termsof worksonly if the
music was producedin the period around i8oo.
If the concept of a musical work is tied to its
moment of origin-which was effectively the
heyday of romanticism-then its application
must similarlybe restrictedand the boundaries
of its extension closed. I shall confine myself in
the proceeding sections to forestalling both of
these objections by discussing the conditions
underwhich we can and do, in fact, speakabout
the music, say of Bach, in termsof works.
To this end, note that the thesis does not
57
commitus to the view thatBachdid not compose
musicalworks. Indeedhe composed some of the
greatest works ever written. It might, in my
terms, be anachronisticbut in musicaltermsit is
not implausibleto date the golden age of absolute music or of musicalworksin the second half
of the eighteenthcentury.WhatI haveclaimedis
only that the musical world within which Bach
lived was not regulated by the idea of a work.
This claim can, at most, be historically inaccurate. The conclusion that he did not compose
worksis not implied.8
Of course, the thesis does commit its proponentto a view of meaningandtruthas dependent
upon the existence of particular conceptual
schemes. Given that we have a concept of a
musical work, Bach composed works. If the
concepthad neveremergedwithinmusicalpractice (or, indeed, within any other relevant or
related practice) we would speak instead of
Bach's music in terms perhaps not only more
familiarto Bach himself, but also still evident in
other existing musical practices which are not
regulatedby the idea of creatingfixed, everlasting musicalproducts.
IV. EXTENDING
THE USE OF A CONCEPT
Nowadays, in fact, there seems to be no form
of musical production excluded from being
packaged in terms of works. Most, if not all,
classical music composed before 1800-for
example, the music of Palestrina, Vivaldi, and
Bach-is packagedin this way, despite the fact
thatthe music in questionwas not so classified at
its momentof origin. We tend, also, to classify
most, if not all, avant-gardeor aleatoric music
as works. We speak of the works of Cage, Neuhaus, and Rzewski regardless of the fact that
these composers do not think of themselves as
composing withinthe romantictradition."It'sa
very deliberatestep of mine," Neuhaus writes,
"not to record the pieces. These pieces are not
musical products; they're meant to be activities."9
Weoften disregardthe conceptualdifferences
between a work and an improvisation or between a work and a transcription.Both improvisation and transcription (and arrangement)
emerged with their modern understandingas
concepts sibling to that of a work. Undoubtedly
they standin a very intimaterelationto the latter
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The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism
58
concept, but it is not one of identity. The relation seems, however, to be indeterminate.
On occasion, we are content to refer to certain
transcriptions as transcriptions. Sometimes,
however, we speak of them as works in their
own right. 0 The same indeterminacyobtains
in the case of improvisations and arrangements.
Those interested in avant-gardenotions of
"found art" might speak of the phenomenaof
naturalmusic-bird songs, for example-if not
as works, then at least as instances of music.
But suppose that recordings were made of the
phenomena on the basis of which scores were
producedwhich in turn made possible their instantiation in performance on suitable instruments. How easy it wouldbe now to talkof these
phenomena not merely in a loose sense as instancesof music but as works. "Theobjettrouve
... unlike the result of an individualproduction
process but a chance find ... is recognized
today,"Burgerargues, "as a 'workof art'. The
objet trouve thus loses its characteras anti-art
and becomes, in the museum, an autonomous
workamongothers.""
When we speak of works we do not think
immediatelyof jazz, folk, or popularmusic, nor
of music serving as an accompanimentto other
art forms, such as film anddancemusic. Nor do
we think immediately of music which is purposefully integratedinto the everydayworldthe music in religious services or other rituals.
Butthis does not exclude the possibilityof thinking about these kinds of music in terms of
works.
With regard to film music we usually speak
only of musical or film scores. But we wouldbe
temptedto call these scores works if and when
they were conceived as productsto be marketed
and evaluated independentlyof the films. We
might be tempted, also, to think of an Indian
raga (or a particularperformancebased on a
given raga) in termsof a performanceof a work
if the music was produced in the Royal Albert
Hall as part of a celebrationof music of other
cultures. Thus, even if we would be hesitantto
say thatthese kindsof music yield paradigmatic
examples of musical works, we could still see
them as yielding borderlineexamples.
It seems, then, that our contemporaryuse of
the work-concept does not confine us to the
music of the romantic period. We are, appar-
ently, tempted to understandmusical practices
of many kinds as involving the production of
works. But if, as I claim, the work-concept
emerged as a result of a specific confluence of
aesthetic, social, and historical conditions, how
have we been able and why have we wanted to
extend the employment of the work-concept
seemingly so pervasively?
V. CONCEPTUAL
IMPERIALISM
A majorpart of the answer to the 'why' in this
question is that the view of the musical world
which romanticismoriginallyprovidedhas continued since i8oo, despite much anti-romantic
theorizing in the interveningperiod, to be the
dominantview. This view is so entrenchedin
contemporary musical thought that its constitutiveconcepts are taken for granted.In fact,
we havebefore us an obvious case of conceptual
imperialism.
Consider any form of music produced anywhere in the world. Have many musicians,
interested in what is generally referred to as
classical music, not found good reason to interpret all these musics accordingto the romantic
view?I2 Have they not assumed that the closer
all forms of music approximatein their mode of
presentation to those determined by romanticism the more civilized they are? The more
general concept of a work of art is itself often
used as a way of attributinga high value to any
kind of thing. Consider the pleasure a chef
would feel from being told thathis Black Forest
Gateauis a "workof art, " or the satisfactionof a
car manufacturerwho produces a car deemed a
"fine artisticproduct."'3
One obvious result of seeing the world's
musics-including much of classical musicthrough romantic-colored spectacles is that
many have assumed that these musics can be
packagedin terms of works: ways are sought to
assign the 'works' to composers, to represent
them in full notationalform, thereby allowing
them to be regardedas having a fixed structure
with a sharply defined beginning and end,
thereby allowing them to be performed on
numerous occasions as part of a program of
worksin the fine settingof a concert hall.
Apart from the fact that this way of thinking
results in our alienatingmusic from its various
socio-culturalcontexts, and apart from the fact
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59
Goehr Being Trueto the Work
that most of the world's music is not originally
packaged in this way, do we not risk losing
something significant when we so interpretit?
Do we not lose something when we hear the
music of a flamenco or a blues guitarist in a
concert hall?'4 For the conventions associated
with the concerthall determinethatthe audience
should listen with disinterested respect to the
'work' being performed. The audience cannot
even tap its many feet. Do we not lose something-even just an acoustic something-when
we hear eighteenth-centurychambermusic performed, outside of the chamber, in symphonic
concert halls? The critic JonathanKeates, in
thinking specifically about eighteenth-century
operas, is aware of the tendency for romanticism to dominate. "Howevermuch we might
pride ourselves on our understandingof the
eighteenth century," he writes, "the values of
the Gesamtkunstwerkcontinue to be applied
with ingeniousblindness,to appraisingthe overall worthof its art-forms."'5
This conceptual imperialism has not been
one-sided. The beliefs associatedwith the ideal
of Werktreuehave increasingly and sometimes
enthusiastically been adopted by those musicians involved in the production of music of
manydifferentkinds. Thus,jazz musicianshave
sought and indeed found respect from 'serious'
musicians by dispensing with the smoky and
noisy atmosphereof the club and by performing, instead, in tails. Many have willingly
adoptedthe institutionalconventionsassociated
with 'serious' music. A Chinese committee, in
its bid to producewestern-stylemusical works,
acted together as composer to produce, against
all Chinese traditions, the YellowRiver Concerto. Schoenberg,when defendinghis twelvetone method, emphasized that "one uses the
series and then one composes as before as the
great austro-german composers always have
done ... My works are twelve-note compositions, not twelve-notecompositions."'6
That these musicians have justified the productionof their kind of music to their critics by
showingtheirwillingness to conformto the conditionsof Werktreue
is not altogethersurprising.
Thinkof the powerful effect both the distinction
between civilized and uncivilized (primitive,
popular) music and that between artist and
craftsman, has had on a musician'sconception
of his respective practice. Recall that classical
music is still regardedby many as quintessentially civilized.
Imaginehow inferior a Chinese person must
feel on hearing the dismissive words of the
romantic Berlioz: "The Chinese sing the way
dogs bark, or as cats vomit when they've swallowed a fish bone."'7 Or thejazz musicianswho
read in I920 these wordsof a Frenchjazz critic:
Jazzis cynicallythe orchestraof bruteswithnonopposablethumbsandstillprehensiletoes, in theforest
of Voodoo.It is entirelyexcess, andfor thatreason
morethatmonotone:the monkeyis left to his own
devices,withoutmorals,withoutdiscipline,thrown
backto all the grovesof instinct,showinghis meat
stillmoreobscene.Theseslavesmustbe subjugated,
or there will be no more master.Their reign is
8
shameful.Theshameis uglinessanditstriumph.'
As recently as i987, a discussion was devoted
to establishing the claim that Duke Ellington
"utterly fails to conform to the criteria of the
conventional idea of 'the artist', just as his
improvised productions fail to conform to the
conventionalview of the 'work of art'," even
though Ellington saw himself "as an 'artist' in
this sense andtook to composing 'works'for the
concert hall."'9 What, the critic then asks, are
we to makeof the music?
Jascha Heifitz tells us that he occasionally
performed works by contemporarycomposers
for two reasons: first, to discourage the composers from writing any more; second, to
remind himself of how much he appreciated
Beethoven.Here, works producedaround i8oo
serve as the standard. Similarly, this standard
operatesbehindthe facile commentthatVivaldi
wrote the same piece 300 times. With any considerationof the times in which Vivaldi lived-a
time when composers were requiredto produce
music for severalsimilaroccasions each weekthis commentloses its derogatoryforce.2o Consider, finally, how cynical classical musicians
tend to be of popularmusic, on the groundsthat
a given song has a simple form or thatthe music
"doesn't last,?"or that popular music is expressive of infantile emotions. Why should all
music meet the conditionsimposed by romantic
aesthetics? Simplicity of form is required in
much of the world'smusic precisely because of
the music's acknowledged subservience to social, political, and religious functions. Much
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The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism
60
music is not designedto "standthe test of time."
Its value and significancelie elsewhere.21
Despite numerous practical difficulties, the
work-concept with its conceptually dependent
notions of performanceand notationhave been
adoptedby many interpretersand producersof
music of all sorts. Thus, since i8oo, not only
have the most disparate arts, as Walter Pater
once said, "aspiredto the condition of music"
but, also, many of the most disparate musics
haveaspiredto the conditionof musicalworks.
The assimilationof seemingly alien concepts
into a given type of music is not, however, all
bad. First, the migration of concepts among
differentmusics is pretty much inevitablegiven
our conceptual or cultural limitations. We can
only comprehendthe music of culturesto which
we do not belong by employing an already
familiar conceptual framework. Second, apart
from the inevitability of perspectival comprehension, there is sometimes a healthy blurring of the boundaries between different
musics, something which can be fostered by
conceptual migration. Thus, even given (or
despite) imperialisticinfluence, the adoptionof
concepts into foreign musics can lead-and has
led on occasion-to new and interestingmusical
styles.22
Thus far, I have explained why the workconcept has come to be employed-despite its
having emergedwithina particularpracticeat a
very particular time-in settings prima facie
temporallyandspatiallyset apartfrom this original context. Now I mustshow how this has been
possible.
VI. PARADIGM
AND DERIVATIVE EXAMPLES
The concept of a musical work, I have suggested, emerged and found its regulativefunction within musical practice as a result of a
specific crystallization of ideas about the
nature, purpose, and relationshipbetween the
composer,the score, andthe performance.This
crystallizationserved effectively to shape what
is now our standardinterpretationof the concept
of a work and of the musical practice it regulates. It also has come to serve as the basis for
our classificationof examplesof musicalworks.
It is to this last function that our attentionmust
now turn.
When we use the concept of a musical work
we use it with an understandingrevealedin our
beliefs, ideals, assumptions, expectations, and
actions. We can, however, use the concept in
differentways. At least two of these ways serve
to ground a distinction between paradigmand
derivativeexamples.
Paradigm examples, sometimes more usefully called original examples, are those produceddirectlyand explicitly underthe guidance
of the relevantconcept. We classify examplesas
derivative, by contrast, when we classify them
as being of a certain kind even though these
objects were not broughtinto existence with the
relevantkind in mind or within the appropriate
practice. Whether an example is paradigm or
derivative is not, however, something that is
decided independentlyof how we use the concept. Thus, strictly speaking, we should speak
of a given concept as having a paradigm and
derivativearenaof employmentandonly thenof
its extension in terms of paradigmand derivative examples.
The paradigm use of a concept, as defined
above, tells a familiar story about conceptual
use. Derivative use, however, is more complicated. There are in fact different aspects to the
derivative use of a concept. Consider the concept of a musical work. We may look first at the
extent to which the activities of non-romantic
musicianshaveapproximatedto the conditionof
romanticmusic. We may look at how concepts
associated with romanticmusic have gradually
been taken over and thus the extent to which
these musicians have begun to speak of their
productionin termsof works.
When non-romantic musicians borrow romantic concepts they adopt an understanding
sufficient to sustain the functioning of these
concepts. In romantic eyes, they more or less
successfully impose the appropriatecategories
upontheirpractice. They act in whatthe romantic considers to be the right way and in a way
they themselves presumablynow find satisfactory. The concepts come to be employed in a
non-romanticsetting in much the same way as
natives incorporate into their understanding
concepts introduced to them by foreigners.
Without exposure to foreign concepts, native
musiciansremainoblivious to them. It is on this
assumptionthat we say that the use of the concepts is foreign to the native'sown practiceand,
thus, if the conceptsare used at all, they are used
derivatively.
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61
Goehr Being Trueto the Work
We can, in addition, look at how musicians
steeped in the romantic view interpret nonromanticmusics accordingto their own conceptualframework.This wouldbe morelike persons
who, entering into a foreign cultural context,
makeuse of theirnativelinguisticor social apparatus in order to acquire what is for them a
sufficient grasp of unfamiliarcustoms. Romantic musicians can effectively choose to regard
any piece of music as a musical work if they
believe they can, with the relevantunderstanding, act successfully or usefully in relation to
thatthing.
Hence, it is possible for romanticmusicians
to look at a non-romanticpractice, say, one in
which the music of Bach or Palestrinawas produced, and to classify the music derivativelyin
terms of works. This is possible because the
romantic musicians can identify a composer,
represent the music in an adequate notation,
specify a fixed set of instrumentalspecifications, and so on. This process is seen clearly in
the way in which composers in the early nineteenth century began not only to rewrite the
history of music in terms of works, but also to
give to composersand music of earliercenturies
what they never had-precise notations, multiple performances,and the possibility of eternal
fame. Recall Mendelssohn's introduction of
Bach's St. MatthewPassion as a musical work.
Mendelssohn, to put the point crudely, took
Bach's music away from the church and put it
into the concert hall. In the same manner,again,
it is possible for romanticmusiciansto identify
composers and sound-structureswhen listening
to transcriptionsor improvisationsor the music
of an originalblues guitaristand to talk of these
in terms of works. The use in all these cases of
the terminologyof worksis derivative.
The assimilation of romantic concepts into
differentkindsof music shouldnot be thoughtof
as uniform. It varies from case to case. Some
kinds of music stand in closer conceptualproximity to romantic music than do others: the
eighteenthcentury sonata stands in closer conceptual proximity than the Indian raga. Some
kinds of music will be associated with ideals
which conflict with those associated with the
work-concept:the improvisatorynatureof jazz
is an obvious example. It is likely, finally, that
derivative works, precisely because they are
derivative,will fail to comply perfectly with the
beliefs and expectationsassociatedwith the concept of a musical work: notations, if existing at
all, might not be as precise as Beethovenwould
haveliked.
When, however, we are faced with a derivative example which does not comply perfectly
with the conditionsof the work-concept,we do
not exclude it from falling under that concept.
To do so woulddefeatthe whole idea of its being
a derivativeexample. The point can be put this
way: when an example falls undera concept it is
less a matterof its having the appropriateproperties than its being brought to fall under the
conceptby a user of thatconcept. If the relevant
propertiesare lackingin the first place, they can
be assigned to the example so that it can be
regardedin the right way. If this is not possible,
the attemptfails. Only then do we exclude the
examplefrom falling underthe concept.23
This procedureis made possible in virtue of
the connection holding between the paradigm
andthe derivativeuse of a concept. This connection is a conceptual dependency of the latter
upon the former which has to be understoodin
terms of the aims and beliefs of musical agents.
To use a concept derivatively one attempts to
matchthe paradigmor originalunderstandingof
the conceptwith a 'foreign' example. The match
can be more or less successful. Often the match
is triggeredby a desire thatcertain productions
replicateor be like those originallyfalling under
the concept. Often it has to do with a wish to
continueor broadena tradition.The conceptual
dependencyof derivative use on paradigmuse
can vary in character and complexity. But it
always has to do with the particular understandingimplicit in our involvementin musical
practice, rendering the search for formalized
understandingof the connection misguided.
Although the derivative examples of works
are dependenton the paradigmexamples in the
way described, it is nonethelesspossible for the
formerto effect our understandingof the latter.
A derivative example might bring something
new to the understandingof the concept under
which it falls. When this occurs we can respond
in differentways. One useful way is to expandor
modify the meaningof the concept itself. When
we chose to do this our choice of paradigmand
derivative examples might change. But this is
not problematic.On the contrary,it is precisely
this possibilityof expansionand modificationof
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The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism
62
conceptual meaning (seen here in terms of the
interplay of paradigmand derivative use) that
confirms the desired open nature of that
concept.24
A conceptwhich is treatedas an open concept
can undergo expansion and modification in
meaning when its associated understandingis
affected by extraneous influences. This is an
inevitableconsequenceof conceptualmigration
and social change. It is also a consequenceof the
everpresentattemptto overthrowtraditionor to
change or modify a style. Sometimes, however,
the influence of derivativeuse is not powerful
enough to expand or modify a concept'smeaning. In this case the meaningremainsthe same.
This does not, however,implythatthe conceptis
being treated as closed. To treat a concept as
open leaves open the possibility of change.
Change does not actually have to occur. This is
the case with the conceptof a musicalwork. The
imperialistic attitude which has accompanied
the use of this concept has served as a matterof
fact but not as a matterof necessity to prevent
significantchangein our understandingof musical practice."5
The view of the concept of a musical workas
describedhere leaves open three importantpossibilities. First, it is possible that a musician in
i8io and one in i988 mightboth be regulatedby
the work-concept, but because of a possible
modificationof meaningthey mightbe working
with a differentunderstandingandwith a different range of paradigmand derivativeexamples.
There is, however, a dynamic and diachronic
relationlinkingtogetherthe successive stages of
a concept and serving to preserve its identity
over time.
Second, to talk of paradigm and derivative
examples falling undera given conceptdoes not
imply that this is the only way to classify the
given instances. It is possible to interpretand
perform, say, Beethoven's Spring Sonata, in
accordance with the ideals implicit in a rain
dance. We would then be obliged-in the context of the correspondingpractices-to describe
the music not as a paradigmexample of a work
but as a derivative instance of a rain dance.
Consider the reconception (and adoption of
appropriateevaluativecriteria) involved in our
listening to originally classical works which
havebeenjazzed up, used in films, or even made
into popularhits.
Third, it is possible to speak of pieces of
music as falling originally or derivativelyunder
more than one concept. Here, musicians might
deliberately produce music which fails to fall
neatly under a single concept. Many musicians-especially those of the avant-gardehave recognized the limitations of producing
music solely underthe dictateof romanticideals
and have chosen insteadto employ notions typical of othermusics. Towhat extent, if at all, the
work-concept-or the ideal of Werktreue-has
remainedcentralto theirmusicalproductionhas
differedfrom case to case.
Thus far, I have explainedwhy-in historical
terms-and how-in philosophical terms-the
concept of a musical work has been used so
extensively in the musical world. It remains to
be shown what effect all this has on the philosopher's traditional use of the counterexample
method.
VII. COUNTEREXAMPLES
In recentphilosophicalliterature,the conceptof
a musical work has been treatedless in terms of
its genealogy than in its role as an ontological
category. Accordingly, it has been described in
relationto two traditionalontological concerns:
a concern to describe the mode of existence of
differentkinds of objects in terms of categories
like universals,types, and classes and a concern
to determinethe essentialpropertiesor the identity conditions for these objects. The idea has
been to describe the concept by describing the
kindof object a musical workis. 26
Within these accounts there has usually been
an assumption that the concept of a musical
work is the sort of concept whose meaning can
be given in terms of an unalterabledescription
of its defining characteristics.The objectionhas
then been forwardedthat, for any definition of
"musicalwork" formulatedin these terms, it is
always possible to find an example of what we
would in practicecall a workwhich fails to meet
these conditions.27
Withthe tensionarising from this assumption
andthe relatedobjectiona crucialambiguityhas
surfaced concerning the range of examples
intendedto fall underthe conceptbeing defined.
This ambiguityhas surfacedin the absence of a
decisive answer to the question as to whether
a definition of "musical work" is designed to
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63
Goehr Being Trueto the Work
determinejust the paradigmaticapplicationof
the concept of a musical workor the boundaries
of its entire extension. It has remainedunclear,
in otherwords, whetherthe conceptof a musical
workis being treatedas open (in which case one
cannot close its borders)or as closed (in which
case one can).
Theorists have taken different routes. Some
have explicitly confined their theories to paradigm examples, thereby engaging in something
similar to what was once called monster barring-the exclusion of 'difficult' examples.
Others have continued to see their theories as
accounting for all examples of musical works.
The justification for either modusoperandihas
not, however,been made explicit.
Theorists, furthermore,have apparentlyhad
no qualmsin using certainexamplesas paradigm
examples of musical works. Their theoriesalmostwithoutexception-have been formulated
on the basis of examples drawn from the repertoire of the early I8oos. Their inquiries always
begin with the question: "Whatsort of thing is
Beethoven'sFifth Symphony?"This should no
longer surprise us. But what are we to make of
the fact that examples drawn from early
pre-I8oos andavant-gardemusic and sometimes
from folk, jazz, and popular music, but never
from the 1800s repertoire,havebeen appealedto
when and only when there was an intentionto
challengea given theory or part thereof?28"It
appears that Ingarden's elitism has a serious
consequence for his analysis of the musical
work," Czerniawskiwrites. "By ignoring popularworks, he fails to realize thatthe ontic status
of a musical work is variable, since at the popular end ... its identity is uncomplicated by any
score/performancerelationship."29
The success of a challenge using these kinds
of examples-the success of the counterexample
method as so employed-depends entirely on
whetherthe examplesare bonafide examplesof
works. The challenge rests on the assumption
that the work-conceptcan be employed when
speakingabout musics other than that of music
producedaround I8oo. But even if it is a worthy
assumptionit is a big assumption. Yet the fact
that this assumption has been made has had
almost no recognition, let alone adequateexplanation. We shouldnot simply take itfor granted
thatany kind of music can be packagedin terms
of works.30 If, however, we do accept that all
kindsof music yield examplesof musicalworks,
thenthose who would wantto reject a purported
definition of the work-conceptwill have before
them an extremely broad range of possible
counterexamples.Herein lies the problem.
If theorists adopt a traditional essentialist
approachto definition, they will likely assume
that all examples of works-past, present and
future-are such in virtue of their having certain essential properties. Either an object of a
certain kind has these properties or it does not
(in which case it is an objectof anotherkind). As
long as this is assumedthe additionaldistinction
betweenparadigmand borderlineexamples and
then a confinement of one's definition to the
formerare unnecessary.All that mattershere is
that one looks to see if a given object has the
properties associated with the kind in question
to see if it is an example of thatkind. If it is, it is
immediatelyentitledto serve as a counterexample to a definition which excludes it. The counterexamplemethodclearlyoperateson this view
of things.
The counterexample method is called into
serious question, however, as soon as we embrace a more complicated account of what it
meansfor somethingto countas an exampleof a
given kind or what it means for an example to
fall undera given concept. Such an accountwas
embraced above when I argued that a given
concept is open and thus does not have its borders closed; when a distinction was drawn
betweenparadigmand derivativeexamples;and
when it was suggested that somethingcounts as
an example of a kind not directly because it
exhibits the appropriateproperties but directly
becauseit is broughtto fall underthe conceptby
users of that concept within the context of a
practice. On this view, what can count as a
counterexampleturns out to be a complicated
matterbecause a derivative or what otherwise
we havecalled a borderlineexamplecannotanymore be used as a counterexample.31
Recall the conceptualdependencythat derivative examples have on paradigm examples.
Objectscome to count as derivativeexamples in
virtue of the relation in which they stand to
paradigm examples. Without paradigm examples serving as the standardthere could be no
conception of the non-standard.In my terms,
derivative instances can only be counted as
works if the original instances of works have
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The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism
64
alreadybeen acknowledgedas such. Giventhis,
it makes no sense to think that a derivative
example could be used as a counterexampleto
challenge either a definition confined to paradigm examples or one accommodating,say, all
currentlyexisting works. Toadapta Hanslickian
principle: no musical practice which is not
guided originally by the work-conceptcan give
the lie to a practicewhich is so guided.32
Consider, now, the case of the latest avantgarde work which is broughtforwardas a paradigm exampleof a work; it is producedwith the
work-conceptin mind. Nonetheless its creator
desires to challenge the traditionalnotion of a
work. Could this example be used as a counterexample?I do not believe so. To see this we
need to clarify the difference between using
counterexamplesto challengephilosophicaldefinitions and using examples-be they paradigm
or derivative-to challengethe traditionalmeaning of a given concept. Whenone counts X as an
example of a workone accepts a given meaning
of the concept, a meaning which regulates at
least its paradigmaticuse. If one subsequently
wantsX to challengethis meaning,one becomes
involvedin trying to expandor modify the concept's present meaning. To engage in this process one first acknowledgesthe presentmeaning
and only then provides a rationale for its suggested expansionor modification.This is not at
all the same thing as using X to challenge a
philosophicaldefinitionof the given concept. It
is, rather, an indication of one's real engagement in the dynamictraditionin which the concept functions.
Thus, when, for example, an avant-garde
composer produces something which is designed to challenge the romanticconception of
the work of music and in turn is designed to
expand or modify this conception, there is no
suggestion on the part of this composer that
Beethoven thereby did not compose musical
works. He just composed undera conceptionof
musical practice which is now thought by the
composerto be perhapsaestheticallyor ideologically unsound.The avant-gardecomposerat no
point thinks that the traditional meaning was
'definitionally'incorrect.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The way in which a concept functions regulatively within a practice is a complex matter
revealed more directly to those philosophers
with an historical eye than to those with an
ahistoricaleye. The differentuses andthe dependencies obtaining between them reveal special
complicationsfor those who would like to see all
examples of musical works classified on the
same terms. These complications reveal the
methodological basis of the counterexample
method and its limited use. This has been the
substanceof my argument.
Of course this argumentis not only applicable
to the conceptof a musicalwork, for the manner
in which this concept has been treated in the
philosophicalliteratureis sharedby many other
concepts, be they artistic, aesthetic, legal, or
ethical. Whathas been said here of the open and
extended use of the concept of a musical work
can thus be said also of these other concepts,
although,clearly,theirhistoricalemergenceand
the empirical and historical conditions of their
use will differ from case to case.
There are many lessons to be learned from
analyzingconcepts with a historical eye. I have
pinpointedonly one: that to be true to music is
not necessarily the same thing as being true to
the musical work. This lesson, by itself, is of
substantial musical and philosophical significance.33
LYDIA GOEHR
Departmentof Philosophy
Boston University
Boston, MA 02215
i. E.T.A. Hoffmann, "Beethovens Instrumentalmusik"
in Musikalische Novellen und Aufsatze, Band I (Regensburg: GustavBosse, n.d.), p. 69: "Der echte Kunstlerlebt
nur in dem Werke, das er in dem Sinne des Meisters
aufgefasst hat und nun vortragt. Er verschmaht es, auf
irgendeine Weise seine Personlichkeitgeltend zu machen,
und all sein Dichten und Trachtengeht nur dahin, alle die
herrlichen, holdseligen Bilder und Erscheinungen,die der
Meister mit magischer Gewalt in sein Werk verschloss,
tausendfarbigglanzendins rege Lebenzu rufen, dass sie den
Menschen in lichten, funkelnden Kreisen umfangen und
seine Fantasie, sein innerstes Gemut entzundend, ihn raschen Fluges in das ferne Geisterreichtragen." For discussion of the associationbetween Hoffmannand the notion of
Werktreue,see Friedrich Blume, Classic and Romantic
Music: A ComprehensiveSurvey,trans. M.D. Herter Norton (London: Faber and Faber, 1979), p. 112. See also
Alfred Brendel, "Werktreue-AnAfterthought"in Musical
Thoughtsand Afterthoughts,Princeton Essays on the Arts
(PrincetonUniversityPress, 1977): 26-37.
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65
Goehr Being Trueto the Work
2. The thesis is fully defended in my The Workof Music
(forthcoming, Oxford University Press). For other discussions of the emergenceof the conceptof a musicalwork, see
Carl Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music (CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1982), chapter 2; WalterWiora, Das Musikalische
Kunstwerk(Tutzing:Hans Schneider,I983); Cheryl Seltzer,
ed., Musicology and the Musical Composition, Current
Musicology 5-7 (I967-68):
49-126; Gudrun Hennenberg,
Idee und Begriff des MusikalischenKunstwerks(Tutzing:
Hans Schneider, 1983).
3. Notions central to our understandingof the Fine
Arts-those of "art for art's sake," disinterestedattention,
the museum, and the distinctionbetweenart and craft-are
discussed in ImmanuelKant'sCritiqueof Judgment;Andre
Malraux, Museum WithoutWalls, from La Musee Imaginaire, trans. by StuartGilbert and Francis Price (London:
Secker and Warburg, I967); Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The
ModernSystemof the Arts," Journalof the Historyof Ideas
12 (1951): 496-527 & 13 (1952): 17-46; Peter LeHurayand
JamesDay, eds., Musicand Aestheticsin the Eighteenthand
early Nineteenth Centuries, (CambridgeUniversity Press,
1981). See also EduardHanslick, On the MusicallyBeautiful
(Indianapolis:Hackett, I987) for discussionof the 'musical'
as opposedto the 'extra-musical'.Fordiscussionof the idea
of absolute music see Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophy of
Modern Music (London: Sheed and Ward, 1973); Jacques
Attali, Noise: The Political Economyof Music, trans. Brian
Massumi (University of Minnesota Press, I985); Bellamy
Hosler, ChangingAesthetic Viewsof InstrumentalMusic in
Eighteenth CenturyGermany(Ann Arbor: UMI Research
Press, i98i) and John Neubauer, The Emancipation of
Music from Language: Departurefrom Mimesis in Eighteenth-CenturyAesthetics(YaleUniversityPress, i986).
4. I cannot refer the readerhere to any specific words of
these three composers as proof of my claim. The most I can
do is ask the readerto consider the kinds of conditionsand
constraintsunderwhich these composer'slived andthe kinds
of concerns they had. For evidence of the latter there are
numerouspublishedlettersand biographies.
5. Until late in the eighteenthcentury,there was no standard or generic way of referring to works as such. An
instrumentalcomposition when considered independently
of, say, a cantataof which it was part would be referredto
perhapsas "le morceau ddtachd,""la piece de musique,"
"die Solo" [Sonata], "die Musik," or "das musikalische
Stuck" [the musical bit-an introductionor an interlude].
None but the last has modernusage. See entries relatingto
the composition and performance of music in James
Grassineau, A Musical Dictionary (New York: Broude
Brothers,a facsimileof the 1740 LondonEdition);Sebastien
de Brossard, Dictionaire de Musique (Paris: Christophe
Ballard, 1703) andJohannGottfriedWalther,Musikalisches
Lexicon(Leipzig: WolffgangDeer, 1732).
6. To referto the romanticconceptionof musicalworksis
not to refer straightforwardlyto what we call romantic
music. The formerconcerns a way of conceiving of musical
practice, the latterconcerns a style of musical composition
more closely associatedwith Schumannand Liszt thanwith
Beethoven.However,given certainhistoricalreasonshaving
to do with how Beethovenconceivedof his musicalactivity,I
will adopt what was in fact E.T.A. Hoffmann'sposition.
Hoffmann saw Beethoven as the paradigmatic romantic
composer.
7. I am reactinghere to those theoristswho in treatingthe
"musicalwork" as a name for an ontological category have
treatedit as if it were free from any influence of ideological
or aesthetictheory. For bibliographicalreferences, see note
26 below.
8. The philosophicalargumentto follow, althoughnot its
impact, functionsindependentlyof the idea thatthe concept
of a workfully emergedat the end of the eighteenthcentury.
We could shift the date back 50 or ioo years or even to the
sixteenthcentury-although obviously I thinkthis is inaccurate. In the early part of the sixteenth century Nikolaus
Listeniusused the idea of opus absolutumetperfectumin his
Musica (Nurnberg:Johan. Petreius, 1549). This is understood by many as indicationof the presence of the idea of a
work. See Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music; Nicholas Wolterstorff "The Workof Making a Workof Music" in Whatis
Music? An Introductionto the Philosophy of Music, ed.
Philip Alperson (New York: Haven Publications, i987):
101-129. This understanding,I believe, is misleading. The
notion can be understood in Aristotelian terms-as an
action/performancecompletedandproducedin the best way
the performer knows how. (Consider the utterance "You
have completedyour work" meaning "Youhave completed
your assigned task.") Nothing is mentionedin the Listenius
text of a performanceof a work or of a preconceivedwork
existing independentlyof and priorto its performances.
9. John Rockwell, All AmericanMusic (New York:Vintage Books, I983), p. 146. For useful discussion of avant-
garde attitudes towards the notion of a work, see Peter
Burger, Theory of the Avant-Garde,trans. Michael Shaw
(University of Minnesota Press, I984): 55-59 and ChristopherBallantine, "Towardsan Aesthetics of Experimental
Music," Musical Quarterly63 (0977): 224-246.
IO. Consider the transcriptions, etc., by Beethoven,
Liszt, Ravel, Schoenberg, and Kreisler which have been
notatedor recordedandhavecome to be appreciatedin their
own right. Whatwoulddeterminewhethera given transcription could be regarded as a work in its own right would
depend upon whether it was sufficiently different from the
original work for us to decide that it independentlymet the
conditionsof being a work. See Philip Alperson, "Musical
Improvisation,"Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism43
(i984): 17-30 andJerroldLevinson, "Whata Musical Work
is," Journalof Philosophy 77 (1980), p. 128. In the latterit
is argued, in contrastto my point, that a transcriptionof a
musical work in all cases yields an ontologically distinct
work.
ii. Burger, Theoryof the AvantGarde, p. 57.
12. The very idea of classical music was formedin contradistinction to that of romantic music in the early I800s.
Althoughit was intendedto signify music writtenbefore the
romantic era, it came quickly to take on a much wider
connotation.This was partially due to the fact that, with a
romantic conception of music in mind, theorists came to
regardthe eighteenthcentury as having producedthe most
perfect masterpiecesof absolute music despite the fact that
the idea of absolutemusic was foreign to eighteenthcentury
composers. As Dahlhauswrites in his Foundationsof Music
History,trans.J.B. Robbinson(CambridgeUniversityPress,
I983), p. 28: "The idea of absolute music was formed,
paradoxically,on the basis of works that first had to be
reconstrued before they could even suit this category, a
categorywhose full significancewas, in turn, revealedto the
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The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism
66
nineteenth century only by these very works." Blume in
Classic and RomanticMusic, p. 67 makes a similar point:
"It is a widely held but erroneous idea that the Classic era
was 'the age of instrumentalmusic'; that, in reality,was the
Romanticera."
13. The phrase "musical work" can be used both in an
evaluativeand in a classificatorysense. Whatwe see here is
an imperialistic conflation (contamination) of the two
senses.
I4. At a concert of flamenco guitar music played by
Carlos Montoya, it soon became clear that the 'endings'of
his 'works' were artificial. He simply stoppedplaying at a
certainpointandthe audienceapplauded.He thencontinued
with what was clearly an extended improvisationaround
various flamencomelodies.
I5. From his review of Reinhard Strohm's Essays on
Handel and Italian Opera, TimesLiterarySupplement(January 3I, i986), p. I i8. The use of the term Gesamtkunstwerk
here is not antitheticalto my use of the concept of a work.
Recall that the reconception of instrumentalmusic in the
early i8oos was applied not only to instrumentalworks but
also to operas, cantatas, masses, etc. Opera, for example,
was originally a form of popularentertainmentor in some
countries a cultivatedform of drama. Like other eighteenth
century musical forms, priority was given to the word over
the sound. Thus, in I711, we hear Alison ridiculingoperas
written in a foreign language. With the emancipationof
instrumentalmusic, however,there emerged a new view of
opera amply illustratedin the anecdotereportedin i848 by
George Hogarthin his MusicHistory,Biography,and Criticism (New York:Da Capo Press, i969), p. 78: "The operose characterof Mozart's accompanimentswas long made
an objectionto his dramaticmusic. The EmperorNapoleon
once inquiredof the celebrated Gretry, what was the difference between Mozartand Cimerosa. 'Sire', repliedGretry, 'Cimerosa places the statue on the stage, and the pedestal in the orchestra:while Mozart puts the statue in the
orchestraand the pedestalon the stage'."
16. Mentioned respectively in Lewis Rowell, Thinking
about Music: An Introductionto the Philosophy of Music,
(Universityof MassachusettsPress, i983), p. 2i8 and Paul
Griffiths, A Concise History of Avant-GardeMusic: From
Debussy to Boulez (OxfordUniversityPress, I978), p. 8i.
17. Alain Danieloy, TheSituationof Musicand Musicians
in Countriesof the Orient (Florence: L.S. Olschki, I971),
p. 2I.
18. Quotedin Attali, Noise, p. I04.
i9. From E.J. Hobsbawm review of Duke Ellington by
James Lincoln Collier, in New YorkReviewof Books (Nov.
i9, i987): 3-7. Think also of George Gershwin's"classical
compositions"in this context.
20. It has been suggested to me that even if Vivaldi was
not partof a romanticcult, his music was nonethelessvalued
for its originality.This I agree with. But one can be original
without producing works. Further, I am speaking about a
cliched and I think unjustifiedcriticism showing that the
critic looks down upon Vivaldi's music because he sees it as
failing to meet the conditionsof productioncharacteristicof
the romanticcult. The fact that Vivaldi's Four Seasons, in
particular is one (or four?)of our classics is testimonyto the
fact thatVivaldi did not write the same work300 times.
2I. I am arguing here neither for radical relativism or
nihilismwith regardto musicaljudgment,nor thatthe influ-
ence of romanticismis justified. I am claiming only that the
latterexists andthatthis has interestingconsequences.
22. For a discussion of racial purity and impurity in
musical styles, see Bela Bart6k, "Race Purity in Music,"
Modem Music I9 (1942): I53-55.
23. The way in which a musical work exhibits properties
is complex since the object is not physical in any straightforwardsense. It is, however,appropriateto speakof a workas
havingsuch andsuch propertiesif it is suitablypackaged.If,
for example, an adequatescore is written for the music, the
music takes on a set of essential properties determinedby
that score. Contrastthis with the practice of improvisation
where musicians speak of a basic tune or rhythm as an
essential, individuatingprinciple. If a given improvisationis
recorded and notated, one, so to speak, increases the
number of essential properties. Only too soon the
improvisationacquires the status of a work and the work
takes on the property of being composed. The improviserjazz musicianduly acquiresthe statusof jazz composer.
24. I will makeno mentionhere of the discussion of open
conceptsinfluencedby Wittgensteinfor two reasons. First, I
do not want my discussion to be furthercomplicatedby the
already existing and mutually conflicting views of open
concepts. Second, my argumentalthoughsimilar in conclusion is structuredaroundpremises of a sort not to be found
in previous discussions. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1958), sections 67-88.
25. This is not to say that no musical concepts have
changed. The concept of musical sound, for example, has
undergonequite extensive changes in the last ioo years. But
this concept is distinctfrom thatof a musicalwork.
26. See the following descriptionsof a musical work: as
an abstractparticular,William Webster, "A Theory of the
CompositionalWorkof Music," Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism33 (1974): 59-66; Haig Katchadourian,Music,
Film and Art (London: Gordon and Breach, I985); as an
initiatedtype, Levinson, "What a Musical Work is"; as a
culturallyemergent entity and as a type, Joseph Margolis,
"Works of Art as Physically Embodied and Culturally
EmergentEntities," BritishJournalof Aesthetics I4 (1974):
i87-96; as a norm kind, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Worksand
Worldsof Art (Oxford: ClarendonPress, i980); as a kind,
Peter Kivy, "Platonismin Music," Grazer Philosophische
Studien i9 (i984): I09-29; as a class of performancescompliant with a score written in a notationalsystem, Nelson
Goodman,Languagesof Art: An Approachto the Theoryof
Symbols (Indianapolis:Hackett, I976); as an interpreted
type, R.A. Sharpe, "Type, Token, Interpretationand Performance," Mind 9i (1979): II2-II4; as a generic entity,
RichardWollheim,Art and Its Objects (New York:Harper
and Row, i968); as the pattern indicated in a score and
exhibited in a performance,Kendall L. Walton, "The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns," in Human
Agency: Language, Duty, and Value,eds. JonathanDancy,
J.E.M. Moravscik,andC.C.W. Taylor(StanfordUniversity
Press, i988): 237-302.
27. See Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration
of the Commonplace (HarvardUniversity Press, i98i), p. vii. Danto
actually speaks of traditional definitions of 'art' but the
same issue is at stake.
28. Nelson Goodman, for example, who finds that much
aleatoricmusic does not meet the conditionsof his notational
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Goehr Being Trueto the Work
system is willing to say thatwe havebefore us no works.See
his Of Mind and OtherMatters(HarvardUniversity Press,
i984), p. I39. For other examples see Levinson "What a
Musical Work is"; Peter Kivy, "Platonism in Music";
RomanIngarden,The Workof Music and TheProblemof Its
Identity, trans. A. Czerniawski (University of California
Press, i986); Alan Tormey,"Indeterminacyand Identityin
Art," Monist 58 (1974): 203-2I5; and Paul Ziff, Review of
Goodman's Languages of Art, Philosophical Review 67
(1971): 509-I5.
29. Ingarden, The Workof Music and
The Problemof Its
Identity,p. xiv.
30. Wollheimcapturesthe same kind of assumptionperfectly in Art and Its Objects. His book opens with the lines:
"'What is art?' 'Art is the sum of or totalityof worksof art'.
'Whatis a workof art?'"
67
31. Whetherone could use paradigmexamples as counterexamples would depend upon whether one adopted an
essentialist view of these examples. I have tried to offer a
non-essentialistview which if successful wouldenable me to
dispense with the counterexamplemethodas a methodcentralto philosophicalanalysis.
32. Hanslick, On the MusicallyBeautiful,p. 20: "Wesee
that vocal music, whose theory can never determine the
essence of music, is moreoverin practicenot in a positionto
give the lie to principlesderived from the concept of instrumentalmusic."
33. I am very grateful to BernardElevitch, Steven Gerrard, Benjamin Kaplan, Jerrold Levinson, Barry Smith,
KendallL. Walton,Anna Wessely, and to anonymousreaders for helpful commentson earlierdraftsof this paper.
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