Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
Applied Short Sea Container Models
in the Baltic Sea Region
Project:
TransBaltic Extension
Work Package:
3
Status Quo:
Final, July 2014
Responsible partner:
Port of Hamburg Marketing, PP2
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
Agenda
1.
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 4
2.
The Baltic Sea Region – a growing maritime market ................................................................. 5
3.
4.
5.
2.1
The potential of the Baltic Sea region .......................................................................... 5
2.2
The importance of logistics in the Baltic Sea Region ......................................................... 6
2.3
Main actors in the Baltic Sea SSS market ...................................................................... 10
The importance of Short Sea Shipping for the achievement of European transport goals .................... 12
3.1
SSS in European transport policies .............................................................................. 12
3.2
The IMO sulphur directive – risk of a modal backshift ....................................................... 13
3.3
The ISL SECA “Shift scenario” ................................................................................... 14
The competitiveness of SSS in the BSR ............................................................................... 16
4.1
Strengths of SSS ................................................................................................... 16
4.2
Weaknesses of SSS ................................................................................................ 19
4.3
Factors influencing the choice of transport mode............................................................ 20
4.4
Short Sea and feeder handling in ports – example Port of Hamburg ....................................... 22
4.5
The idea of 45’ containers ....................................................................................... 25
Outlook.................................................................................................................... 26
Figures
Figure 1: GDP development by country of the BSR (Eurostat 2014) ...................................................... 5
Figure 2: Main trading partners of Baltic Sea countries ................................................................... 6
Figure 3: Top Fifteen Container-handling Ports (Baltic Container Yearbook 2013) .................................... 7
Figure 4: Effective maritime trading partners in “Lo-Lo” container traffic of major Amber Coast Ports 2011 .... 9
Figure 5: Baltic Sea Container Feeder Network and Main operators .................................................... 10
Figure 6: Container Shipping Lines BSR (Baltic Container Handbook 2013) ............................................ 11
Figure 7: Uncertain or unkown factors predicting the future cost of transport ....................................... 14
Figure 8: Comparison of transport modes (TEU) ........................................................................... 17
Figure 9: Major Strengths of Short Sea Shipping ........................................................................... 18
Figure 10: Major weaknesses of Short Sea Shipping ....................................................................... 20
Figure 11: Competition of transport modes in the BSR ................................................................... 21
Figure 12: Basic factors for the choice of transport mode ............................................................... 22
Figure 13: Port of Hamburg - Modal Split 2011 (Container) .............................................................. 23
Figure 14: 45' standard vs. 45' pallet wide containers .................................................................... 25
2
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
Abbreviations
BSR
Baltic Sea Region
EW
East West
FLZ
Feeder Logistik Zentrale
HHLA
Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG
km
kilometer
MTAP
Marcoregional Transport Action Plan
NS
North South
t
ton(s)
TB EXT
TransBaltic Extension project
TEU
twenty-foot equivalent unit
THC
terminal handling charge
WP
work package
45’
45-feet (containers)
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Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
1. Introduction
The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region names TransBaltic among the initiatives that produced
valuable results regarding the establishment of green transport solutions. They are summarised in the
Macroregional Transport Action Plan (MTAP), a policy support instrument which translates outcomes of
demonstration actions carried out together by public and private stakeholders to specific policy measures.
The policy action No. 1 in the MTAP calls for improved interfaces between national networks and transitional
corridors for better TEN-T implementation. In specification of focus areas it names North-South road and rail
links, which connect the South Baltic ports with the Mediterranean, Adriatic and Black Sea areas, and which
may become an alternative option for transporting goods to and from the BSR following the modal backshift
from sea to road presumably caused by the IMO Sulphur Directive. The documents warn that in case of no
action the sea transport may become less competitive as compared with the road and rail haulage.
The IMO Sulphur Directive will introduce low-sulphur fuel limits in the SECA seas (incl. the Baltic Sea) from
2015. These are predicted to increase maritime transport cost on the Baltic Sea by 30 to 40% because of the
need to develop and introduce new and sustainable fuels (e.g. LNG) and propulsion systems (e.g. scrubbers). In
effect, a modal backshift may be triggered, with cargo moved from environmental friendly sea transport to
land transport (road and rail haulage). As analyzed by TransBaltic, the largest loss of cargo may be expected in
case of short sea services of trailers on the routes between ports in the NE and SW parts of the BSR.
The strategic layer (WP3) of TransBaltic Extension, also called strategic preparedness measure is discussing
ways to investigate a possibility to mitigate the negative consequences of the IMO Sulphur Directive on the
transport patterns in the BSR through the wider use of short sea shipping and of short sea containers in the
logistics chains. Short sea containers having a length of 45 feet; offer more or less the same capacity as road
trailers. They enable carrying and increased cargo volume (eight pallets more) in comparison to standard
(deep-sea) 40 feet long containers. The optimized load factor reduces transport costs as well as emissions
(CO2), which at the same time lead to a more environmental friendly footprint. Their wider use throughout the
Baltic Sea Region may contribute to reduced transport costs and emissions, boost co-modality in transport
corridors, and may help mitigate the modal backshift.
The third work package of the TransBaltic Extension is led by Port of Hamburg Marketing, targeting to
stimulate the use of short sea shipping and 45’ containers. SSS encompasses maritime transport between the
ports of a nation as well as between a nation’s ports and the ports of adjacent countries that does not transit
an ocean. It is developing within the context of national and international transportation systems; primarily as
a non-deep sea complementary segment to truck and rail transport. Feeder volumes are excluded in the
statistics for SSS, as they can be defined being transhipment volumes resulting from the hub and spoke systems
used by deep-sea shipping operators.
The aim of the paper on hand is to deliver a first overview on the feeder and short sea market and the handling
of short sea containers. It is a working document, collecting knowledge from recent studies and results from
previous and ongoing research projects. It is a collection of ideas and topics, not a comprehensive report.
Together with a study on the existing and potential freight volumes of short sea shipping in the Baltic, carried
out by the ISL Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics, and discussions with stakeholders and TB EXT
supporters, it should help at a later stage to deliver valuable input to the MTAP.
TB EXT is part financed by the INTERREG IVB Baltic Sea Region programme. Lahti Region Development LADEC
Ltd from Finland acts as the Lead Partner of the project. Further information on the project is available on the
project website www.transbalticext.fi.
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Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
2. The Baltic Sea Region – a growing maritime market
2.1
The potential of the Baltic Sea region
In the Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 (GCR 2014) which is regularly published by the World Economic
Forum, the countries Germany, Sweden and Finland are declared to belong to the world’s top ten most
competitive countries. The companies operating within the BSR not only have access to the described 60
million inhabitants directly bordering the Baltic Sea, but can also access other countries such as Belarus and
Russia, which together comprise of 640 million inhabitants.
1
2
The BSR is accounting for approximately 11 % of the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) . Within this calculation
the Scandinavian countries contribute 62 %, the northern parts of Germany and North-western Russia 13 %
each, all Baltic States combined (Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia) seven percent and the northern part of Poland
five percent. The overall value adds up to 1.3 billion Euros. The GDP shows that the BSR evolved over the last
10 years into an important European growth region with growth rates between seven percent and 10 % in 2007.
In comparison, the growth rate in the Scandinavian countries and Germany was only between one and six
percent. The crisis had a very large impact on the BSR economies. This can be seen in the following
illustration.
Figure 1: GDP development by country of the BSR (Eurostat 2014)
1
World Economic Forum 2011, The Global Competitiveness Report 2013 – 2014,
http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2013-2014, accessed 3 February 2014.
2
Kersten, W., Schröder, M., Carolin S. and Max F. (2012) C.A.S.H. – Risk Management in Logistic – Empirical
Results from the Baltic Sea Region from 2010 until 2012, University of Turku: Finland.
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Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
The Baltic Sea Region (BSR) has shown a particularly fast economic growth during recent years with the
exception of the global economic crisis in 2008/2009 that hit the region especially hard. However, a slowdown
of growth was assumed for 2012 which most likely improved slightly in 2013. The short-term forecast for 2014
predicts an average growth of 2.9 to 3.1 % for the region which is still below an average regional growth
potential of about 4 % p.a.
“Naturally, the significance of the Baltic Sea region as a market and partner varies from country to country.
For small and medium-size countries the Baltic Sea region is the most important market, whereas for big
powers it is not so important. The majority of the foreign trade of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is carried out
in this area. Also the economies of Poland, Denmark, Finland and Sweden are to great extent dependent on the
Baltic Sea region. […] The importance of the Baltic Sea region becomes also evident from the fact that for all
the countries, except Germany and Russia, the biggest trading partner is from this area.” 3 The following figures
show the biggest trading partners of all Baltic Sea region countries for the year 2011.
Baltic Sea region
country
Denmark
Estonia
Main trading partner
in 2011
Germany
Finland
Finland
Germany
Latvia
Lithuania
Norway
Poland
Russia
France
Lithuania
Russia
Sweden
Germany
Russia
Sweden
China
Germany
Figure 2: Main trading partners of Baltic Sea countries
Source: Amber Coast Logistics, Finnish Customs, The Observatory of economic complexity 4
2.2
The importance of logistics in the Baltic Sea Region
Due to the close geographical location of the BSR states and their economical dynamics, logistics is one of the
major points-of-interest for the BSR. The transports within the BSR take place through all common transport
modes including road, rail, sea, inland water shipping, air freight and pipelines. The largest importance in the
intra-European freight transport has still the road transport mode (49 %) followed by the Short Sea Shipping
mode (40 %) and the rail mode (11 %). 5
3
University of Turku, Center for maritime studies, Pekka Sundberg (2006): Shortsea shipping on the Baltic Sea –
prospects and challenges, Presentations of the international conference held in Pori, Finland, 7th-8th June 2006,
p. 22.
4
Amber Coast Logistics (www.ambercoastlogistics.eu), Finnish customs (http://www.tulli.fi/fi), Statistics
Norway (http://www.ssb.no/en/muh/mu2011/), 23 January 2014. The Observatory of economic complexity
(http://atlas.media.mit.edu/country/swe/), 24 January 2014.
5
EU(2013) EU transport in figures – Statistical Pocketbook 2013, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the
European Union.
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Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
The importance of shipping within this region is significant based on the geographical conditions of the Baltic
Sea, which connects all sates with each other offering a potential for fast and reliable shipping lines. It also
provides a link to the important economic regions worldwide. This can, in particular, be seen by the container
cargo handled in the Port of Hamburg, which is used as a hub for intercontinental incoming and outgoing
freight. According to the Baltic Container Handbook (2013) Hamburg is the most frequently used transhipment
point for the BSR with 55 fixed services (June 2013). Hamburg is followed by Bremerhaven (41 fixed services),
Rotterdam (37) and Antwerp (11). Therefore the hub role of the Port of Hamburg for the BSR is dominant and it
is likely that it will continue to increase further. In the beginning of 2012 Rotterdam was strongly rivalling with
Bremerhaven for the position of the second port of choice with 46-47 single rotations, but according to the
Baltic Transport Journal (2013) the German ports were able to maintain their position. Container turnover was
again rising in 2012 with nearly 9.5 million TEU handled. 6
One third of the total amount handled in the Baltic Sea ports (Hamburg is not a Baltic Sea port) was handled in
three Russian ports. Also a large step forward was made by Poland with 1.7 million TEU in their three ports.
The new role of Gdansk as a transhipment hub for Russia also needs to be considered in this context. Most ports
and terminals have exceeded their handling peaks from 2011 and are already past the results from years before
the crisis. 7
The following figure illustrates the top fifteen container ports within the Baltic Sea Region (including Norway),
whereas Hamburg as the most important transhipment hub was included with all TEU handled for the BSR:
Top 15 Container ports of BSR (TEU - 2012)
0
St. Petersburg (Russia)
Hamburg (Germany)
Gdansk (Poland)
Gothenburg (Sweden)
Gdynia (Poland)
Hamina (Finland)
Helsinki (Finland)
Aarhus (Denmark)
Klaipeda (Lithuania)
Kaliningrad (Russia)
Riga (Latvia)
Rauma (Finland)
Tallin (Estonia)
Oslo (Norway)
Helsingborg (Sweden)
500.000
1.000.000
1.500.000
2.000.000
2.500.000
2.524.592
2.103.258
928.905
921.772
676.152
631.040
404.055
404.000
381.278
370.905
362.297
238.953
227.809
202.791
177.044
Figure 3: Top Fifteen Container-handling Ports (Baltic Container Yearbook 2013) 8
The major container growth of the region had taken place in the ports of St. Petersburg (+ 160 thousand TEU),
Gdansk (+240 thousand TEU), Gdynia (+60 thousand TEU), Riga (+59 thousand TEU), Kaliningrad (+45 thousand
6
Baltic Container Handbook 2012/2013, Shipping Lines, Baltic sp. z.o.o: Gdynia (Poland)
Baltic Container Handbook 2012/2013, Shipping Lines, Baltic sp. z.o.o: Gdynia (Poland)
8
Data ”Hamburg” from internal statistics (Port of Hamburg Marketing). Hamburg is a North Range and not a
Baltic Sea port. It is included here as main transshipment port for the Baltic Sea with high volumes to and from
this region.
7
7
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
TEU) and Tallinn (+30 thousand TEU). The Baltic Container Yearbook (2013) states that the established
Scandinavian ports, for example the ports in Finland, only grew on a moderate level. The sum of 9.5 million
TEU handled in 2012 within the BSR (excluding Hamburg) is divided in 9.2 million container boxes handled by
Lo-Lo and 240 thousand TEU transported by Ro-Ro/Con-Ro, conventional or Lo-Lo-tramping. The latter market
is dominated by the port of Lübeck (D), Hanko (FIN) and Kiel (D) which handled together 214,000 TEU.
Maritime transportation plays an important role in the Baltic Sea Region. However, it has to be categorized into
intercontinental trade combined with transshipment and feeder transportation on the one hand and intraEuropean trade via Short Sea Shipping on another hand. While feeder volumes can be defined being
transshipment volumes resulting from the hub and spoke systems used by deep-sea shipping operators, short
sea shipping encompasses maritime transport between the ports of a nation as well as between a nation’s ports
and the ports of adjacent countries that does not transit an ocean. Short sea shipping is developing within the
context of national and international transportation systems; primarily as a non-deep sea complementary
segment to truck and rail transport.
According to a study carried out by the ISL within the frame of the Interreg IV B project Amber Coast Logistics 9,
the total turnover of the major Baltic Sea ports was about 3.4 million TEU handled in 2011. 10 However,
effective “intra Baltic” trade in ISO containers can only be found in the German Baltic Sea ports (0.18 million
TEU) and Poland (0.08 million TEU). The study concludes that the container ports being analysed perform a
vital function for linking the Amber Coast economies with the global trade, whereas Baltic intra-regional trade
in manufactures and semi-manufactures is taking place mostly on the RoRo-markets.
9
The so-called “Amber ports” include, Aalborg (DK), Aarhus (DK), Fredericia (DK), Copenhagen (DK), Kiel (DE),
Lübeck (DE), Szczecin (PL), Gdynia (PL), Gdansk (PL), Kaliningrad, Klaipeda (LT), Riga (LV), Tallin (EST).
10
See ISL, Amber Coast Logistics, Macro-economic development and multi-modal cargo flows of the SouthEastern Baltic Sea region/Belarus, Dec. 2012.
8
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
Figure 4: Effective maritime trading partners in “Lo-Lo” container traffic of major Amber Coast Ports 2011
Source: Institute of shipping economics and Logistics, ISL North European Container traffic model, ISL port
Data base, Eurostat. Danish port include Aalborg, Aarhus, Fredericia, Kobenhavns Havn, German ports
include Kiel, Lübeck.
For seaborne transport, whether it is intercontinental or intra-European trade, transshipment moves are a
major cost factor. Transshipment moves in the west European ports are particularly costly due to high handling
costs and port dues, but intra-Baltic transshipment such as in Gdansk also increases the total seaborne costs
compared with direct connections. 11
Thus the relatively small intra Baltic container trade may be explained partially by the very well developed
ferry network, linking the Baltic Sea economies almost on a daily basis on most routes. Compared to the
standardized truck transport, the container here often has disadvantages in both pricing and quality of
transport. 12
11
Amber Coast Logistics, Institute of shipping economics and Logistics, Macro-economic development and
multi-modal cargo flows of the South-Eastern Baltic Sea region/Belarus, p. 8.
12
Amber Coast Logistics, Institute of shipping economics and Logistics, Macro-economic development and
multi-modal cargo flows of the South-Eastern Baltic Sea region/Belarus, p. 14.
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Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
2.3
Main actors in the Baltic Sea SSS market
Amongst the main operators (in terms of cargo volume shipped) of feeder and short sea shipping in the Baltic
Sea region are Unifeeder, OOCL, Team Lines, Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM and Transatlantic. The following figure
gives an overview on the liner services in 2011.
Figure 5: Baltic Sea Container Feeder Network and Main operators
Source: Baltic Transport Outlook, based on Baltic Transport Maps13
The container shipping market within the Baltic Sea is characterized by a high density of container shipping
companies, which employed a total number of 149 container ships in 2013. The following table is listing the
container shipping lines operating within the Baltic Sea and their total TEU capacity.
13
Baltic Transport Outlook, Helena Kyster-Hansen, Peter W. Cardebring, Olaf Meyer-Rühle, Presentation at
final conference, 2 December 2011, Slide 8,
http://www.baltictransportoutlook.eu/files/BTO_FinalConference_HKH.pdf, 23 January 2014.
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Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
No. of
Total TEU capacity
Ships
(in BSR)
MSC
18
2
Unifeeder
3
No.
Operator
Ships average TEU
Market Share
1
31.854
1770
20,17%
30
31.661
1055
20,05%
Seago Line
13
17.587
1353
11,13%
4
CMA CGM
16
15.501
969
9,81%
5
Team Lines
10
8.884
888
5,62%
6
Hapag-Lloyd
6
7.497
1250
4,75%
7
Containerships
8
7.005
876
4,44%
8
00CL
5
5.970
1194
3,78%
9
TransAtlantic
9
4.420
491
2,80%
10
Green Alliance
3
3.393
1131
2,15%
11
Eimskip
2
2.930
1465
1,86%
12
Sea Connect
4
2.650
663
1,68%
13
Delta Shipping Line
3
2.604
868
1,65%
14
X-Press Feeders
3
2.561
854
1,62%
15
SCA Logistics
2
2.072
1036
1,31%
16
Mann Lines
3
1.974
658
1,25%
17
MacAndrews
3
1.896
632
1,20%
18
Samskip
2
1.816
908
1,15%
19
K-Line
2
1.387
694
0,88%
20
Tschudi Lines
2
1.016
508
0,64%
21
Green Feeder
2
1.016
508
0,64%
22
APL
1
1.008
1008
0,64%
23
Swan Container Line
1
868
868
0,55%
24
Hackling Seatrans
1
374
374
0,24%
Sum
149
157.944
1060
100%
Figure 6: Container Shipping Lines BSR (Baltic Container Handbook 2013)
Although MSC is offering the highest capacity within the market, the biggest fleet of container ships is
controlled by Unifeeder with 30 ships. They are followed by MSC (18) and CMA CGM (16). The market share of
each company is calculated from the percentage of the companies TEU capacity on the Total TEU capacity.
This was done under the assumption that market power can be defined over TEU capacity instead of by
employed number of ships.
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Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
3. The importance of Short Sea Shipping for the achievement of
European transport goals
3.1
SSS in European transport policies
Even when the topic of Short Sea shipping has so far not been directly included in the MTAP, its importance has
been recognized by the European Commission in order to reach the target for transport “to reduce GHG
emissions to around 20 % below their 2008 level” 14 by 2030.
In its White Paper on transport 15 from 2011, the European Commission, Directorate-General for Mobility and
Transport, claims the “abolition of barriers to short sea shipping” 16. More generally speaking, it fosters the
optimization of “the performance of multimodal logistic chains, including by making greater use of inherently
more resource-efficient modes” 17.
Also in its “Progress report on the EU’s integrated Maritime Policy” (COM(2009)540) the Commission states that
“the EU will also have to promote maritime transport in order to foster co-modality, to implement the concept
of Motorways of the Sea, and to improve the EU programme for short sea shipping” 18.
Further Short Sea Shipping is a key topic of the Hellenic Presidency of the Council of the European Union. In
the Athens Declaration from 7 May 2014 “Mid-Term Review of the EU’s Maritime Transport Policy until 2018 and
Outlook 2020” the ministers responsible for the Maritime Transport of the European Union and the European
Economic Area declare “[…] Short Sea Shipping needs to play a stronger role in the EU to ensure the necessary
accessibility and trade flows, including between the mainland and islands, and to shift long-distance transport
away from roads in order to address capacity, energy and climate challenges while noting, in this context, the
goals defined in the White Paper on transport policy published by the Commission in 2011” 19. Further they
highlight “the important role of the European Shortsea Network (ESN) and its members Shortsea Promotion
Centres (SPCs) to that regard”.
In addition to these, Short Sea Shipping is a key element of the Blue Belt concept: “The Blue Belt is an area
where vessels can operate freely within the EU internal market with a minimum of administrative burden while
safety, security, environmental protection and customs and tax revenues are ensured by the use of maritime
transport monitoring capabilities (processes, procedures and information systems).
The Blue Belt concept put forward in 2010 under the Belgian EU Presidency and endorsed through the Council
14
European Commission, DG MOVE, White Paper on Transport, p. 5.
You can find the White Paper on transport via the following link:
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/strategies/doc/2011_white_paper/white-paper-illustratedbrochure_en.pdf.
16
European Commission, DG MOVE, White Paper on Transport, p. 7.
17
European Commission, DG MOVE, White Paper on Transport, p. 7
18
Commission of the European Communities, Progress Report on the EU’s integrated maritime policy,
COM(2009)540 final, October 2009, p.2.
15
19
Hellenic Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Athens Declaration of 7 May 2014, p.3. The
declaration is available on http://www.gr2014.eu/sites/default/files/ATHENS%20DECLARATION_FINAL.pdf.
12
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
Conclusions on the "Full integration of waterborne transport into the EU transport and logistics chains", is
proposing the use of maritime transport monitoring capabilities to further simplify the administrative
procedures applicable to intra-EU maritime trade, thus promoting ShortSeaShipping (SSS).”
3.2
20
The IMO sulphur directive – risk of a modal backshift
The IMO considers the Baltic Sea as a “Particularly Sensitive Sea Area” which needs special protection due to
“[...] its significance for recognized ecological or socio-economic or scientific reasons and which may be
vulnerable to damage by international maritime activities.” 21 The so-called IMO sulphur directive was agreed
on by the International Maritime Organization in 2008. In regulates the limits on sulphur oxide (SOX) and
nitrogen oxide (NOX) emissions from ships in the Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECA) including the BSR.
While the limit for the BSR was lowered from 1.5 to 1.0 % in July 2010, in 2015 it will be 0.1 %.
The main reason for the sulphur directive is an environmental one: “Emissions from shipping due to the
combustion of marine fuels with high sulphur content contribute to air pollution in the form of sulphur dioxide
and particulate matter, which harm human health and the environment and contribute to acid deposition.
Without the measures set on tin this Directive, emissions from shipping would soon have been higher than
emissions from all land-based sources.” 22
Remarkable is the concentration of the Directive on fuel the ships are using. When implementing this
legislation, the EU was aware of the effects which might occur, such as scarcity of high quality fuel resources,
higher prices for this fuel and the competitive situation with other transport modes. Therefore the Directive
also considered technical emission abatement methods such as some types of scrubbers which clean the
exhaust of the ships. The directive emphasizes that these methods can provide the same effect as by using the
low sulphur fuel. Furthermore the Directive suggests the usage of alternative fuels, for example liquefied
natural gas (LNG) or bio fuels. Finally the Directive is aware of the fact that it is, in a way, building obstacles
for the transport mode “sea” and is trying to mitigate the risk of a modal shift to the street by suggesting the
possibility of State aid from the member states.
The new regulation presents great challenges to the maritime shipping sector in the region, as an adaption to
the new limits can be associated with very high cost.
The BSR project North East Cargo Link II, dealing with scenarios for the mid Nordic region regarding the sulphur
regulation in the Baltic Sea, predicts an increase of “the total cost of sea transports by between 25-50 %” 23 and
a modal-backshift to road and rail transportation. While the project describes the possible scenarios in socalled “paradoxes” in its report, it can be summarized that “there are many reasons to be careful when trying
to foresee the future, since there are many unknown factors and complex connections. However, the obvious
20
European Commission, Blue Belt Communication, 04/2013, http://ec.europa.eu/smartregulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2013_move_005_blue_belt_en.pdf, accessed 8 July 2014.
21
International Maritime Organization (2014), Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA),
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/PSSAs/Pages/Default.aspx, accessed
1 April 2014]
22
European Parliament, SEC(2011) 918 final: COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER, IMPACT ASSESSMENT –
Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending
Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the sulphur content of marine fuels (COM(2011)0439), 2012.
23
North East Cargo Link II (2013): Sulphur regulation in the Baltic Sea – scenarios for the mid nordic region –
threats and opportunities, p. 5.
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Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
environmental paradox is that sea transport is by far the most environmental friendly mode of transport,
counted per tonne, and should therefore be the preferred mode of transport. If shipping is not enough
competitive in the SECA area after 2015 and large volumes of cargo instead are transported on roads, emissions
of greenhouse gases will increase” 24.
Thus the environmental topic is becoming more and more an economical one. However, no one knows what is
really going to happen and on how the shipping companies will react in order to fulfill the limits. In the
relevant technical literature and recent studies, several scenarios and options shipping companies might take
are stated; however there still is no clear picture.
Regarding the factor “cost” the, North East Cargo Link II summarized some examples on impacts in their latest
report (see the following figure). This should be an exemplary demonstration on difficult it is to predicts the
future and to highlight the complexity of this issue in general.
Factor
The general price level of oil
The increase of price of certain
types of oil as a results of
increasing demand
Dollar and Euro currency rate
Availability
and
demand
of
alternative fuels
Port infrastructures and other
technology
Capacity of rail, road and terminal
infrastructure
Relevance
Determines the cost of different
fuels and influences the cost of
sea and road transports.
The price level of low sulphur fuels
such as diesel is sensitive to
shortage of these fuels.
Cost of fuels
Profitability in industry
Price sensitivity for industry
Determines what options shippers
have and the cost of the options.
Determines what options shippers
have and the cost of the options.
Determines the possibility/risk for
modal back-shift and the cost of
other modes of transport.
Determinants
E.g. politics, regional conflicts,
wars, general economic situation.
Demand
Refineries production
Economic situation in Europe and
the rest of the world.
Politics
Incentives for investments and
innovation
Incentives for investment and
innovation
Infrastructure investments,
incentives for sea transports,
internalization of environmental
costs.
Figure 7: Uncertain or unkown factors predicting the future cost of transport
Source: North East Cargo Link II
In the following paragraph one example on how the new regulations might shift the market is described. It is
taken from a study carried out in the project Amber Coast Logistics, led by Port of Hamburg Marketing.
3.3
The ISL SECA “Shift scenario”
The ISL conducted an Amber Coast countries container handling demand forecast of 8.9 million TEU by the year
2030. 25 This forecast is based on the assumption that all observed trade flows through the Amber Coast
economies will grow in line with the potential forecast by IHS Global. Further a scenario had been developed
24
North East Cargo Link II (2013): Sulphur regulation in the Baltic Sea – scenarios for the mid nordic region –
threats and opportunities, p. 17.
25
The complete study can be downloaded at
http://ambercoastlogistics.eu/sites/default/files/cargo_flows_of_the_southeastern_baltic_sea_region_belarus.pdf.
14
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
that takes into account possible future changes to the flow of containers through the Amber Coast ports. The
“shift scenario” reflects the development which is mostly driven by expected market forces, including the
implementation of the new SECA-rules from 2015 onwards. Even when not all Baltic Sea ports are included in
the Amber Coast research, this scenario highlights the key challenges to be faced by the whole region in the
future.
The “shift scenario” that was evaluated is based on the most likely developments that will occur without
political intervention and resulting mostly from market developments. The scenario was based on the following
assumptions:
•
•
The implementation of the new SECA (Sulphur Emission Control Areas)-rules from 2015 onwards causes
some market share losses in the hinterland traffic segment of the Amber Coast ports at the benefit of
the hinterland traffic of the north range ports. This mostly applies to traffic with Poland and Denmark
though. The results are based on an ISL-Study conducted in 2010, analyzing the impact of the new
SECA-rules. For defensive purposes, only modest shifts have been assumed here. The feeder traffic
from the North Range ports to most of the Amber Coast ports and direct calls of deepsea vessels are
expected to be virtually unaffected by these rules. 26
Modal split gravitation-effect: as a result of the forecast demand growth, the higher container
hinterland volumes tend to result in a higher share of rail traffic, since economical break-even
thresholds for more train connections are met in the long run. At the same time, the frequency on the
existing tracks can be increased, which in turn improves the quality of the rail transport and is
expected to generate additional demand as well. An additional effect built into the scenario is that
the expected increase in energy prices is set to hit the truck traffic comparatively harder since the
consumption per TEU-km is highest for road traffic which hence becomes relatively less desirable in
the long run.
The shift scenario in terms of handled containers predicts a reduced demand basically for Danish and Polish
cargoes in the Amber Coast ports, since it is expected that the land routes in the hinterland of the North Range
ports will gain market shares versus to the current operation method of feedering containers from the North
range ports to Danish and Polish Amber Coast ports or shipping intra-European shortsea trade on these routes.
This effect is mainly driven by the implementation of the new SECA-rules coming into effect in 2015 and
reducing the competitive advantage of the feeder and shortsea transport on short distances. Previous ISL
calculations suggest however, that this development threat for intra-European container traffic is mostly
restricted to the short routes between the German North Sea ports and Danish and Polish ports. The longer the
distances become, the more offsetting become the scale effects of the container vessels in terms of fuel
consumption and particularly for traffic between the North Range ports and Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and
Russia, hinterland traffic will not be a economically (or even practically) viable option for the foreseeable
future.
The other changes in this scenario become evident in the estimated emissions of hinterland transport of the
Amber Coast ports: generally, emissions in the hinterland transport of the Amber Coast ports decline wherever
handling volumes are lost to the North Range ports. Other declines can be observed where train connections
gain market share versus the road traffic. Compared to the status quo of 2011, the CO2-emissions for every
26
According to Maersk, the E-class ships currently in use on the service calling in Gdansk are already prepared
to comply with stricter SECA regulations with a separate fuel system for low-sulphur fuel. According to ISL’s
calculations, the current capacity of the secondary fuel system would even be sufficient as it is today to sail on
the current string without any adjustments.
15
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
1,000 TEU transported in the hinterland of the Amber Coast ports decline to 180.8 t (compared to 182.8). The
total CO2-emissions are also smaller (1.19 million tons) compared to the status quo forecast (1.27 million tons).
4. The competitiveness of SSS in the BSR
In the following strengths and weaknesses are described, mainly based on recent literature. The statements
will be consolidated with the industries points of view for the WP 3 final report. Further factors influencing the
choice of transport mode are described as well as the handling of feeder and short sea in ports, based on the
example of the Port of Hamburg.
4.1
Strengths of SSS
As a major strength favouring the SSS, the geographical environment of the EU can be considered: the facile
accessibility of ports 27 combined with the long total EU coastline, exceeding 67,000 km 28, builds a good
competitive situation for SSS. Additionally 60 % to 70 % of all industrial and production centres of the EU are
located within 150 to 200 km of the coastline. 29
Another big strength of SSS is the possibility to carry higher volumes than other modes and thus resulting in a
better use of economies of scale. The economies of scale allow SSS to offer services at lower freight rates and
therefore exploit an underused available capacity without incurring high capacity-related investment costs.
Based on the fact that SSS an extremely capital-intensive industry is, the market has higher entry barriers than
for example the road transport. This gives players already in the market the advantage to develop transport
systems/networks where the most capital intensive mode is already present. 30
Further the sea is having an unlimited capacity. While there is an era of congestion on landside modes, the
capacity of the sea is virtually unlimited and the demand of infrastructural maintenance or extension is by far
lower. SSS does not require sea lanes but only superstructure along the coast that may contribute to safety of
navigation. As a result the investment in infrastructure can also be seen as an investment in the attractiveness
of SSS, for example a vessel traffic management information system which helps to guard the effect of the
broken transport chain. Considering the timetable restrictions of driving hours in some countries of the EU the
sea offers a seven day-a-week transport possibility. New tax schemes for road transport, such as Eurovignette
in which a function of distance travelled and number of days remaining in a country defines the amount to pay,
are also favouring the maritime transport mode.
Paixao and Marlow (2002) continue that consequently the cost of port maintenance and port investments is low
compared to all land transport modes, especially by considering the external costs such as congestion and
pollution. The only external cost necessary for an SSS business and might be carried by “not directly involved
participants” is an adequate port infrastructure which needs to handle entry and exit of goods by avoiding
congestion. This however has to be organized on a mutual base with the involvement among different players
to prevent the existence of bottlenecks in transport chains. According to Paixao and Marlow (2002) this
27
Islam et al. 2011 Islam, S., Leinberg, P. and Nahar, R. (2011) Sustainable Aspects of Short Sea Shipping: A
Case Study of Europe, Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research Business, Vol. 2, Nr.9, pp. 428-445.
28,25,26
Paixao and Marlow 2002 Paixao, A.C. and Marlow, P.B. (2002) Strength and weaknesses of short sea
shipping, Marine Policy 26, pp. 167-178.
16
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
situation implies that SSS does not need innovation in the form of new investments in infrastructure, but the
performance can be easily increased by the cooperation of SSS and business related players. The
implementation of a new philosophy would increase the flexibility, creativity, integrity, leadership and
openness to learning, which will help to handle market uncertainties and new logistical challenges like Just-inTime (JIT). Related to the capital intensity, which gives the players of the SSS business a competitive edge,
there is also the skill and knowledge level of the players acting as a high entrance barrier (Paixao and Marlow
2002). Based on the major implications of accidents on sea, e.g. the EXXON Valdez, the level of legislation on a
national and international level is very high. Therefore the knowledge and skills of SSS actors are more difficult
to be imitated than those of their competitors from the land modes.
Shipping is the most environmentally friendly mode of transport. An average feeder ship can handle about
1,500 TEU (in 2009 the biggest feeder vessel in the BSR had a capacity of 1,400 TEU), a train 75 TEU and a
truck 1.6 TEU in average. That means that one feeder vessel can carry the same amount of TEU like, 20 trains
or 937 trucks (ref. figure below). This is also reflected in the emission of CO2 per container.
Figure 8: Comparison of transport modes (TEU)
Islam et al. (2011) mention much lower CO2 emission per ton-km as one of the big strengths of SSS. Thus the
external cost can also be extended to the smallest emission of CO2 which SSS have on all transport modes. The
following illustration shows that the respective percentage of CO2 emission, combined with the rail mode, are
the lowest (SSS included in navigation):
17
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
Table 1: EU-28 Greenhouse gas emission from transport in million tons (Eurostat 2013)
This low emission standard helps countries to reach the carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrocarbon (HC) targets
established by the Kyoto protocol (Paixao and Marlow 2002). The CO CO2 emission (g/ ton-km) is highest for the
truck, 0.063, compared to container vessels with 0.037 and Ro-Ro vessels 0.053 (Hjelle and Fridell 2010).
Additionally advantages of SSS are the higher safety levels of dangerous goods, based on the long distance of
this cargo to humans, which would not be the case when using road transports. Furthermore SSS is capable of
carrying large indivisible heavy unit loads which would be a problem for other transport modes. Finally SSS is
one of two underused transport modes which leave space for a higher and intense capacity usage (the other
one is the rail mode).
In conclusion the advantages of SSS can be summed up to seven main points (Paixao and Marlow 2002):
Figure 9: Major Strengths of Short Sea Shipping
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Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
4.2
Weaknesses of SSS
One major weakness of SSS is the incapability to offer door-to-door transport service, with the exception for
liquid and dry cargos which can be directly delivered to dedicated and private terminals. This problem arises
based on the fact that SSS is a part of a broken transport chain. Consequently SSS is depending on the
collaboration with other land sided modes in order to provide a door-to-door service. Also contributing is the
lack of cooperation between seaborne and landside modes with respect to interconnectivity, interoperability,
or the availability of broad information technology/information system (IT/IS) which support the whole
transport chain in terms of flexibility. 31 Road transport is, in terms of flexibility, the benchmark for all logistic
strategies based on their frequent departures and delivery possibilities, whereas SSS is far behind this
benchmark. 32
Port operators are in charge of carefully planning the development of a port layout so that the operations can
be carried out smoothly. Medda and Trujillo (2010) observe that the port infrastructures itself is often not
prepared for SSS and is not favouring this type of business. As an example, quay lengths or numbers of berths
can be named as well as gantry cranes designed for ocean going vessels. These often cause queues of ships,
especially from SSS, which sometimes are disadvantaged in front of deep sea carrier. Additionally there can be
a lack of adequate cargo equipment or downtime of this equipment which creates inefficiency within the port
environment. This results in lower handling rates and associated cost increase, which is further emphasizing
the lack of transparency of port charges.
Another weakness of SSS is the administrative burden SSS cargo handling requires. The paper work, which is
connected to the road transport, is by far lower than the one for SSS. It can be shown that SSS is the transport
mode within the EU with the highest rate of bureaucracy in regard to cargo handling.33 These documentation
requirements can be divided into five groups: navigation control, cargo operations, reporting in and clearance
outwards, checks on ship safety and reporting for custom clearance. 34 The most interesting point hereby is the
necessity for custom clearance documents, even though, in most cases the cargo origin is within Europe. A
truck from Barcelona to Hamburg is free from customs procedures while a shipper is facing customs procedures
even though the origin and destiny is the same.35 The effects are the time variable as well as the cost
variable, due to the required effort from the shipper for fulfilling these procedures. The before mentioned Blue
Belt Concept from the European Commission is aiming at counter measuring this administrative burden.
Flexibility is another weakness. Further reliability of the transport mode SSS in terms of departure and arrival
times is rather low due to many unpredictable factors such as weather and sea conditions.
The benefits for shippers in terms of economies of scale and distance offered by this mode only arises when the
critical mass is reached, which compared to other modes is much higher in SSS. Rail and road use small mobile
units and therefore can diminish the economy of scale. Paixao and Marlow (2002) explain the phenomenon by
31
Paixao, A.C. and Marlow, P.B. (2002), Strength and weaknesses of short sea shipping, Marine Policy 26, pp.
167-178.
32
Medda, F. and Trujillo, L. (2010), Short-sea shipping: an analysis of its determinants, Maritime Policy
Management, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 285-303.
33
Psaraftis (2011), The role of ports in Short Sea Shipping, Marine Technology and Engineering, Nr. 7, pp. 14291437.
34
EU (1999) The Development of Short Sea Shipping in Europe: A Dynamic Alternative in a Sustainable
Transport Chain, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/sss/doc/com_99_317_en_final.pdf,
accessed: 03.04.2014
35
Psaraftis (2011), The role of ports in Short Sea Shipping, Marine Technology and Engineering, Nr. 7, pp. 14291437.
19
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
naming the critical mass for an average truck as 40 tonnes and the one for the train, depending on the size
from 1,000 to 3,000 tonnes. Additionally SSS uses, compared to other transport modes, a very expensive cargo
handling infrastructure such as seaports and dry ports which increase the cargo handling costs as a result of
cargo transfer operations, whose performance is critical for the success or failure of the mode integration.
The time variable becomes extremely important in the choice of transport because of the related inventory
cost for the shipper. One factor negatively affecting the time variable of the transport is the length of time
ships stay within the port or related water ways. Under certain circumstances, for example when the port is an
inland/river port, additional supplementary safety navigational procedures need to be considered.
In the end Paixao and Marlow (2002) name a list of other barriers SSS is facing as an obstacle for success. The
first point is the time restrictions for labour within the terminals. These are sometimes affecting the stay of
the ships in the port and therefore resulting in extra costs and delays. Finally, a list of shortcoming can be
named such as insufficient traffic coordination, managerial problems, delays caused by locks and bridges, and
lack of adequate storage facilities. Additional, from the managerial point-of-view, SSS is suffering from weak
coordination links between the shippers and the customers and a limited internal willingness for innovations
connected to the lack of an externally-orientated information system which would improve the relationship to
the customer and to other transport modes. 36
In summary the weaknesses of Short SSS can be divided into following main groups as illustrated below:
Figure 10: Major weaknesses of Short Sea Shipping
4.3
Factors influencing the choice of transport mode
Even when shipping is the most environmental friendly mode of transport, the choice of transport mode is in
most cases an economically one. Thus, ways have to be developed in order to make SSS more competitive and
to promote its use.
At the final conference of ACL, 27 February 2014 in Hamburg, Mr Leif Pedersen, wwner and managing director
of ICT Logistics, a Danish company specialised in Eastern European transport, drew attention to the exorbitant
waiting times at the outer EU borders in Eastern Europe. ICT carries out 11,000 haulages to and from countries
outside the EU. “The average waiting time on the borders to the East is 1.5 days, towards the West it takes
three days”, says Pedersen. “For our business that adds up to 49,500 days per year – which translates to
137 years.” Even if the expenses are calculated at only 250 EUR per day, this waste of time on the borders
36
Medda, F. and Trujillo, L. (2010) Short-sea shipping: an analysis of its determinants, Maritime Policy
Management, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 285-303.
20
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
costs ICT Logistics 12.4 million EUR per year, money that ultimately has to be paid for by the contractees and
their clients in East and West. Pedersen fears that the situation on the borders will worsen in 2015, when the
implementation of the EU sulphur directive takes place and costs for sailing are increased, causing a shift from
“Sea to Road or Rail”. “The dialogue between Finance and Politics on this topic has not been held
professionally enough” he criticises. The forwarding agent and haulier demands thinking outside the EU-box.
Decisions on transport projects in the Baltic Sea region should also be made in close dialogue with Russia.
Generally speaking, competition increases when the distance is getting smaller. This is due to the increasing
number of companies and transport modes serving one and the same (short) route.
Further, the competitive position of the Baltic Sea ports vis-à-vis its competitors depends on the costs of the
transport chains, which in turn depend on the costs of seaborne transport, the port costs (handling and port
dues), and the hinterland costs. For the latter, the distance and the availability of intermodal connections are
key factors.
The longer the distances become, the more offsetting become the scale effects of the container vessels in
terms of fuel consumption and particularly for traffic between the North Range ports and Estonia, Lithuania,
Latvia and Russia, hinterland traffic will not be a economically (or even practically) viable option for the
foreseeable future.
However, during the TransBaltic Extension WP3 Inception Seminar, 26 November 2013 in Hamburg, the ISL
stated that the SECA regulations may influence these criteria by changes in the relative costadvantage/disadvantage of land transport through price changes in sea-transport. This will lead to cargo
volumes shifting from sea to land transport.
Figure 11: Competition of transport modes in the BSR
21
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
Source: ISL, M. Tasto, TransBaltic EXT inception seminar, 26 November 2013, Hamburg.
Finally, a wide range of aspects has to be considered when thinking about shifting cargo on a specific relation.
Among these are the volume to be transported and the regularity of shipments. Then the goods category is of
importance too: is containerized or trailer traffic possible or are the goods high and heavy. Further the
distance of the origin and destination to the rail network and the overall distance between origin and
destination play a role as well as the number of transshipments (subdivided transports) and flexibility.
Swahn 37 conducted a survey in which transport buyers where asked which criterion is most decisive for their
choice of transporter or transport mode. The following figure summarizes the results of the study:
Figure 12: Basic factors for the choice of transport mode
Source: Magnus Swahn (2006), Decoupling för att minska transportlogistikens negative miljöpaverken –
Fran teori till verklighet.
4.4 Short Sea and feeder handling in ports – example Port of
Hamburg
The Port of Hamburg is located 120 km from the open sea, yet its port can be accessed by any vessel. This
makes Hamburg a natural junction, providing the perfect geopolitical hub for cargoes being shipped to or from
Germany, Central- and, most importantly, Eastern Europe.
In 2013, the port achieved a total turnover of 9.3 million TEU. The container traffic between the Port of
Hamburg and the Baltic Sea ports is increasing steadily. In 2013, the container traffic grew about 10.1% to in
total 2.23 million TEU.
37
Swahn, M. (2006): Decoupling för att minska transportlogistikens negativa miljöpåverken - Från teori till
verklighet, NATURVÅRDSVERKET, Sustainable Logistics Management.
22
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
Regular feeder vessels carry goods from Hamburg on to the Baltic Sea ports of Scandinavia, Russia and the
Baltic states on a daily basis. In the same way, cargo from the Baltic Sea region is exported to Hamburg. In
November 2013 there were 40 services, running between 60 and 80 departures per week to in total 160
destinations in the Baltic.
Figure 13: Port of Hamburg - Modal Split 2011 (Container)
More than 90 % of all handled feeder containers via the Port of Hamburg are related to the Baltic and North Sea
Region. Hamburg has four container terminals. Every container terminal acts as a cargo source or sinks for
feeder and short sea ships. Usually, feeder and short sea ships cannot generate enough volume at one terminal
which, leading to movements between different terminals in ports. This process is called feeder hopping. A
typical feeder ship has a carrying capacity between 800 and 1,500 TEU depending on the operator and region.
Feeder ships had to launch terminals three times per call on average in recent years. Finally, they have to call
at all terminals where their customers are berthing.
As a result of different dues (e.g. berth dues, boatmen) that have to be paid by launching different terminals,
costs rise and feeder hopping becomes uneconomic. The same is valid for time matters as feeder ships have to
wait in between the different terminal operations.
Additionally, a typical feeder ship has about the same port lay time as a ship of 7,000 to 8,000 TEU. However,
the handled container volume of a feeder ship reaches only 10 % of the ship’s volume. This is mainly caused by
the need to call multiple terminals in the port.
Being responsible for the overall traffic, port operators strive for a smooth traffic flow both on the landside
and on waterways. By comparing the added average gross berth time of a feeder ship to its average port lay
time, this goal seems to be not entirely fulfilled in the Port of Hamburg. Statistics show an average time gap of
about 15 hours between the two measurement categories. This implies that a feeder ship sails within the port
area for about 15 hours on average per port call. Pilot demand and traffic density within the waterway system
are heavily influenced by this condition.
23
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
A study of the Port of Hamburg Marketing, carried out in the Interreg IV B NSRP Stratmos project, showed that
feeder and short sea ships have the highest infrastructure utilization in comparison to the container turnover.
The following effects were monitored:
•
•
•
•
•
Ships by the size of 0 to 1,500 TEU show the longest specific berth time.
Ships by the size of 0 to 1,500 TEU occupy more than 40 % of the terminals quay walls.
The overall port lay time of feeder and short sea ships is nearly the same as for a 8,000 TEU ship.
On average, feeder and short sea ships call more than three different terminals during one port visit.
Besides the long berth times, feeder and short sea ships spend about 15 hours waiting within the port
area on average.
Concluding, feeder and short sea ships have the lowest operation efficiency of all sea going vessels in the Port
of Hamburg. Operating parties, terminals and ship operators, have enormous potential of optimization if the
port and handling procedures could be enhanced. Moreover, infrastructural bottlenecks could be eliminated if
the port procedures for feeder and short sea ships were more efficient.
Operational optimization can help to overcome the structural lower efficiency. An example of good
cooperation is the Feeder Coordination office (see information box below), which has been put into operation
in 2009.
In autumn 2013 Unifeeder was bundling its full short sea business e.g. at the EUROGATE container terminal.
EUROGATE also highlighted this development at the TB EXT inception seminar, 26 November in Hamburg.
Feeder Logistik Zentrale (Feeder Coordination Office)
With 45 feeder services, Hamburg has still the densest and most powerful feeder and distribution network in
Northern Europe. The port posts up to 160 feedership sailings per week. Despite its losses to Rotterdam,
Hamburg is still the leading feeder hub in Northern Europe for the entire Baltic Sea Region. Feeder services
are of tremendous importance for the port and requiring sophisticated port logistics. On average, a deep sea
container vessel supplies between 40 and 60 feederships with containers.
HHLA and Eurogate have teamed up to jointly coordinate and improve the feedership calls in the Port of
Hamburg. Last year the two terminal operators founded a joint company in which HHLA holds a 67 % stake
and Eurogate 33 %. The new 'Feeder Logistik Zentrale' (FLZ) has been set up to increase the efficiency of
feedership operation in Hamburg.
FLZ aims at boosting Hamburg’s transhipment qualities by optimising and speeding up feedership clearance in
order to reduce costs for shipping lines and terminals. Based at HHLA's CTT, the FLZ with its staff of eight is
in continuous contact with the HHLA’s three large container terminals, CTA, CTB and CTT, Eurogate's CTH and
four additional minor facilities in Hamburg. It operates 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.
As a neutral coordination point and service facility, the FLZ organizes the optimal terminal rotation by
notifying berths and investigating possible alterations in rotation depending on the actual berth and cargo
availability. FLZ is the central data platform for feedership clearance and ship planning. Meanwhile, it has
been revealed that the coordination by FLZ can reduce the typical port stay of a feeder vessel of up to two
days by up to 30 %.
After its successful launch with Unifeeder as its first customer, FLZ intends to gain additional clients. It is
currently in negotiations with inland navigation operators aiming to improve their link with the Port of
Hamburg. So far, FLZ is setting benchmarks in the North Range and is even unique on a worldwide scale.
At present, the FLZ is still not entitled to decide whether the feeder vessels call directly at a terminal or the
boxes are being trucked. This decision remains still with the feeder carrier as they have their individual
contracts with the road hauliers. It is envisaged that this competence might be granted to the FLZ only at a
later stage. Hence, the FLZ can still not contribute to a reduction of the number of terminal calls per vessel.
At a later stage even the operation of the port feeder barge could be ideally coordinated with the FLZ.
24
Source: Port of Hamburg Marketing, Optimising Feeder and Shortsea in Port,
Final Report, StratMoS DB 3b, p. 75
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
4.5 The idea of 45’ containers
As already stated in the introduction, short sea containers having a length of 45 feet, offer more or less the
same capacity as road trailers. They enable carrying and increased cargo volume (eight pallets more) in
comparison to standard (deep-sea) 40 feet long containers. The optimized load factor reduces transport costs
as well as emissions (CO2), which at the same time lead to a more environmental friendly footprint.
There exist two types of 45’ containers: 45’ standard containers and 45’ pallet wide containers. While the
standard containers having a width (inside) of about 2.352 m encompass 27 pallets, the pallet wide containers
may take 33 pallets having a width (inside) of 2.444 m (ref. figure 14).
Figure 14: 45' standard vs. 45' pallet wide containers
In order to benefit from the use of 45’ boxes in comparison to 40’ boxes, the term “45’ containers” is
designated to pallet wide containers. Their wider use throughout the Baltic Sea Region may contribute to
reduced transport costs and emissions compared to standard equipment as more pallets fit into it, boost comodality in transport corridors, and may help mitigate the modal backshift. However, this potential solution
has so far not gained a high policy and media attention, in contrast to the technological innovations aimed to
meet the low-sulphur fuel limits.
25
Towards an integrated transport system in the Baltic Sea Region
A high and mainly constant volume of 45’ containers would be needed in order to make the business profitable
for operators. However regarding the new sulphur directive, ships carrying 45’ containers would face the same
difficulties than the one with 40’ containers. If the 45’ containers should be implemented, harmonization and
standardization would be needed in the whole chain (IT, communication and cooperation) as well as a better
promotion.
For the route Finland-Germany, the biggest chance is in the forest industry. However in order to change
transport patterns, a complete change of systems and operators would be needed – most unlikely to be
expected. Further Finland is more importing then exporting. Sea freight for an empty trailer is much cheaper
than for an empty 45’ container. The further promotion on 45’ containers is generally interesting, but rather
very long term perspective. The promotion of short sea shipping should have priority.
The statistics of 45’ containers are so far quite poor. In Hamburg e.g. 45’ containers are lumped into one with
40’ boxes. However this will change in the very near future as the need of an appropriate recording of data of
45’ has been recognized.
5. Outlook
The competitiveness of 45’ containers in comparison with trailers is influenced by many external and internal
factors. If the 45’ container is to compete with road haulage, it should be as easy, as flexible and as cheap as
possible in order to offset the time aspect. Further EU-wide harmonized conditions in working hours, emissions
treatment, logistic framework (e.g. pilotage) and customs will help to foster the use of short sea shipping and
the corresponding 45’ containers. Ports are recommended to foster co-operation: the port should be treated
and seen as one system. Actors have to be brought together and they have to exchange information (e.g. FLZ).
Only then the high potential of Short Sea shipping can be exploited.
The TransBaltic Extension partners will foster this cooperation and bring actors together. They will promote
the idea and steadily improve the theoretical basis for discussions. In this respect short sea shipping events will
be organized, conferences will be visited and individual meetings with stakeholders will be scheduled. Based on
the outcomes of the industries feedback and the results from the TB EXT WP 3 study, input to the MTAP will be
provided.
________________________________________________________________________________________________
This document is a collection of information on Short Sea Shipping in the BSR. It is a working document, to be
regularly updated during the project’s lifetime. It highlights the viewpoints and main aspects influencing the
WP 3 work as a basis for discussion. Thus is does not claim to be exhausted or to represent a holistic and allembracing view.
Any feedback or additional information is highly welcome: [email protected]
For further information regarding the TransBaltic Extension project, please visit www.transbalticext.fi.
26