History Extended Essay
Did the disagreements between Curtin and Churchill during the Pacific War
change Australia‟s foreign policy with regard to Great Britain? Discuss with
reference to the fall of Singapore and the „Cable Wars‟.
Ellen Trevanion, Candidate 000092-033
2011
Abstract: 230 words
Essay: 3961 words
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Table of Contents
Title Page.................................................................................................................. 1
Table of Contents.....................................................................................................
2
Autobiographical Note.............................................................................................
3
Acknowledgements..................................................................................................
4
Abstract....................................................................................................................
5
Introduction..............................................................................................................
6
The Background: Australia‟s Relationship with Britain and the Empire................. 7
The Start of the Second World War to Pearl Harbor...............................................
9
‘Australia looks to America’....................................................................................
11
The Fall of Singapore...............................................................................................
15
The „Cable Wars‟.....................................................................................................
18
The 1944 Imperial Conference and After................................................................. 22
Conclusion................................................................................................................ 24
Bibliography
Secondary Sources............................................................................ 26
Primary Sources................................................................................ 30
Appendices
A: The Task Ahead, 27.12.1941........................................................
35
B: Winston Churchill to John Curtin, 20.2.1942............................... 36
C: John Curtin to Winston Churchill, 22.2.1942...............................
38
D: Winston Churchill to John Curtin, 22.2.1941............................... 41
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Autobiographical Note
I am Ellen Trevanion, a history student at Narrabundah College in Canberra, Australia.
I can‟t remember a time when I wasn‟t interested in history in some shape or form. Almost
every afternoon from the age of seven, I would come home from school and watch BBC
documentaries, particularly Simon Schama‟s A History of Britain (and anything by David
Attenborough I could get my hands on).
Researching this essay gave me a taste of what historians do and a chance to feel that strange
sense of elation you get when you put together a string of cables, reading the words of people
like Winston Churchill and trying to work out how they affected each other and shaped
events.
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Acknowledgements
This essay would not have been possible without the help and support of several people to
whom I owe a great deal of thanks.
Firstly, and above all, the wonderful Hilary Brettell. With her knowledge and her passion for
the subject, she has always made studying history a privilege and a joy. Without her advice
and feedback this would have been a far more difficult task than it was.
Secondly, Anne Glavimans and all the librarians, who have been a source of unceasing
support for everyone in the IB.
Thirdly, my parents and my brother, for putting up with the swings between sheer frustration,
mostly brought about the seeming inability of historians to agree, and the giddiness that
comes from tracking down sources or documents.
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Abstract
This essay considers whether or not the disagreements between John Curtin and Winston
Churchill during the Pacific War, particularly the recriminations over the fall of Singapore
and, later, the „Cable Wars‟ caused a change in Australia‟s foreign policy towards Great
Britain. This is a historically significant issue as World War Two is considered by many
Australian historians to be the point at which Australia asserted its independence from
Britain.
In order to determine if the events of the early Pacific War changed Australian foreign policy,
it was necessary to outline Australia‟s attitude towards Britain prior to that period, with
particular emphasis on Australian defence policy and Australia‟s view of its role in the
British Empire. The effect of John Curtin‟s article, The Task Ahead, the fall of Singapore and
the „Cable Wars‟ in late 1941 and early 1942 on Australia‟s relationship with Britain was
then examined. The long term effect of these disagreements was also considered.
Through this process, the essay reaches the conclusion that Australian foreign policy with
regard to Britain did not change substantially as a result of the Pacific War. Although the
Australian government wanted more influence over Imperial policy, it intended to be part of
the post-war British Empire, rely on renewed system of Imperial defence and John Curtin
stated he believed that Australia was primarily British. This belief was not changed by the
Pacific War.
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Essay
Introduction
On October 7th 1941, John Curtin became Prime Minister of Australia in the midst of the
Second World War. Two months later, that war spread to the Pacific Ocean and then to
Australian shores. The Pacific War brought Curtin into conflict with Winston Churchill, the
British Prime Minister, and the British government. Curtin and Churchill exchanged heated
words over the fall of Singapore and the collapse of Australian defence policy and engaged in
what is now known in Australia as the „Cable Wars‟ over the deployment of Australian
troops in 1942. In Australia, these events are widely regarded as heralding a radical change in
Australia‟s relationship with Great Britain. The evidence, however, shows that this is not the
case. Although Curtin, and the Australian government, wanted more consultation over policy
and strategy, Curtin remained committed to the ideal of an empire bound together by
common interest, policy and an essentially British character.
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
The Background: Australia’s Relationship with Britain and the Empire
Throughout the inter-war years, Australia was subordinate to Britain politically, militarily
and economically1. Part of the foundation of this relationship was the Australian
government‟s selective understanding of the system of imperial defence2 as articulated in the
resolutions of the Imperial Conference in 19233. Australia, despite a clause stating that ‘each
portion of the Empire represented at the Conference... [is primarily responsible] for its own
local defence’4, was heavily reliant on the willingness of the British to provide support if
Australia was threatened.
Australia‟s subordinate relationship with Britain was reinforced by Australia‟s strong social
and economic ties to Britain. Between the World Wars, Britain was Australia‟s largest
trading partner and overseas investor5 and Australia lacked a strong diplomatic service
dedicated to advancing Australian interests overseas, relying instead on the British
government to represent Australia. Indeed, throughout the 1920‟s, the Department of External
Affairs was incorporated into the Prime Minister‟s Department and had only one official
overseas, stationed in London. This relationship between Britain and Australia was not
considered to be a problem by the Australian government, or the Australian people6. During
the inter-war period, successive Australian governments acted to ensure that Australia
remained legally and economically connected to Britain. When the Dominions were offered
1
Robertson, J., Australia at War 1939-1945, William Heinemann Australia, Burwood, 1981, p. 8
Imperial Defence was a system in which the Dominions and colonies of the British Empire would aid each
other if one was threatened. It was, however, founded on the assumption that states were primarily responsible
for their own defence and for equipping their own forces.
3
Hasluck, P., The Government and the People 1939-1941, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, p.17
4
ibid, p. 17
5
Beaumont, J., Australia’s War 1939-45, Allan & Unwin, Sydney, 1996, p. 3
6
Hudson, W.J. & Sharp, M.P., Australian Independence: Colony to Reluctant Kingdom, Melbourne University
Press, Melbourne, 1988, p. 87
2
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
the Statute of Westminster7 in 1930, Prime Minister James Scullin, leader of the ALP, did not
enact it, a decision that met with bipartisan approval. The leader of the Opposition stated that
Australia was ‘content to accept Great Britain’s decisions in the sphere of foreign policy’8. In
1937, future Prime Minister Robert Menzies stated that the ‘independent conduct of foreign
policy...would lead to nothing but chaos and disaster’9. This was not a contentious statement.
Throughout the inter-war period, Australia‟s dependence on Britain was widely accepted and
most Australians identified themselves as being essentially British.
7
The Statute of Westminster was a British Act of Parliament granting the Dominions legislative independence
and theoretical equality with Britain within the Commonwealth.
8
Meaher, A., The Road to Singapore: The Myth of British Betrayal, Australian Scholarly Publishing, North
Melbourne, 2010, p. 44
9
Hudson, W.J. & Sharp, M.P., op.cit., 127
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
The Start of the Second World War to Pearl Harbor
The Australian people learned that Australia had entered the Second World War on
September 3rd, when Prime Minister Robert Menzies declared:
‘...Great Britain has declared war upon... [Germany] and...as a result, Australia is
also at war...There can be no doubt that where Great Britain stands there stand the
people of the entire British world’10.
Menzies firmly believed that Australia could not remain neutral while Britain was at war and,
unlike the governments of Canada and South Africa11, moved to support Britain immediately,
announcing that Australia was at war with Germany without consulting Parliament12.
Menzies also believed that standing with Britain was essential for Australia‟s own defence, as
the ‘defeat of Great Britain would...leave us with precarious tenure of our own
independence‟13. Menzies‟ belief that Australia had an obligation to assist „the Motherland‟
was shared by most Australians and was also reinforced by the popular press. The Argus
published an editorial on September 4th, stating that Menzies ‘proclaim[ed] clearly the
instinctive reaction and the considered opinion of the Australian people’14. In 1939,
Australians believed that Australia should follow Britain‟s lead in foreign policy.
Menzies‟ government despatched troops to the Middle East where they participated in
campaigns in Greece, Crete, Libya and Egypt. The use of Australian troops in the 1941
campaigns in Greece and Crete did, however, become a source of resentment within the
10
Menzies Speech: Declaration of War, 2011, [Audio Online], http://aso.gov.au/titles/radio/menzies-speechdeclaration-war/clip1/, Accessed 1/5/2011
11
The Canadian and South African governments both consulted Parliament and voted to declare war.
Historically, both countries had lobbied for greater independence from Britain and were certainly far more
independent than Australia.
12
Day, D., Menzies and Churchill at War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 8
13
Robertson, J., op.cit., p. 6
14
The Call Will Be Answered, Published: The Argus, 4/9/1939, National Library of Australia
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
government15. Although the Australian government publically endorsed Churchill‟s actions,
Menzies believed that the Australian troops had not been given adequate air support and that
the campaign had been based on wishful thinking16. The campaigns in Greece and Crete
played a part in bringing about the downfall of Menzies‟ government17, but Australian
attitudes towards Britain did not change.
On October 7th 1941, John Curtin was sworn in as Prime Minister of Australia following the
collapse of Menzies‟ UAP-Country Party18 coalition government19. Two months later, on
December 7th, Japanese forces attacked and bombed Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, crippling a
significant part of the United States‟ Pacific Fleet. On the 8th, Curtin announced that ‘we are
at war with Japan...because our vital interests are imperilled... We shall hold this country
and keep it as a citadel for the British-speaking race’20. Although Curtin declared war
independently of Great Britain, he never the less made it clear that he regarded Australia
primarily as a British nation, a statement consistent with the sentiments expressed by
Australian governments throughout the inter-war period and upon the outbreak of war in
1939.
15
Horner, D., Strategy and Command in Australia’s Campaigns of 1941, 2001, [Transcript Online],
http://www.awm.gov.au/events/conference/2001/horner.asp, 16/7/2011
16
Freudenberg, G., Churchill and Australia, Macmillan, Sydney, 2008, p. 271
17
Robert Menzies: In Office, [Online], http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/menzies/in-office.aspx,
19/7/2011
18
The United Australia Party (UAP) was the forerunner to the modern Liberal Party in Australia. It had been in
coalition with the Country Party (now known as the National Party of Australia) since 1934.
19
Black, D., Biography of John Curtin, 2010, [Online],
http://john.curtin.edu.au/resources/biography/details.html, Accessed 11/06/2011
20
Curtin Speech: Japan Enters Second World War, 2011, [Audio Online], http://aso.gov.au/titles/radio/curtinjapan-second-world-war/clip1/, Accessed 12/6/2011
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
‘Australia looks to America’
Winston Churchill greeted the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the opening of the Pacific theatre
with jubilation as Japan‟s actions brought the United States into the war as a British ally,
something he had been working to achieve since the beginning of the war21. On December
10th, Japanese forces invaded the Philippines and seized Guam. In the following days,
Japanese forces invaded Burma, Borneo, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Wake Island22.
Meanwhile, Churchill travelled to the United States for the „Arcadia Conference‟ to gain
President Roosevelt‟s backing for his „Beat Hitler First Policy‟23. Curtin, concerned that
Australia‟s interests were not being considered at a major conference that would determine
Allied war policy, cabled both Roosevelt and Churchill on December 23rd calling for
‘air support; [in Malaya] otherwise there will be repetition of Greece and Crete, and
Singapore will be gravely threatened...The reinforcements earmarked by United
Kingdom Government [sic.] for despatch seem to us to be utterly inadequate,
especially in relation to aircraft, particularly fighters’24.
Churchill resented Curtin‟s allusion to the campaign in Greece and Crete and was angered by
Curtin‟s decision to write directly to Roosevelt rather than trust Churchill to consider
Australian views when shaping Imperial policy. His reply, in which he told Curtin ‘you may
count on me doing everything possible to strengthen the whole front from Rangoon to Port
Darwin’25, indicated his irritation at Curtin‟s belief that he was not representing Australian
interests.
21
Freudenberg, G., op.cit., p. 326
Timeline of Events: 1941-1945, 1999, [Online],
http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/pacificwar/timeline.htm, 14/7/2011
23
Freudenberg, G., op.cit., p. 332
24
ibid., p. 335
25
ibid., p. 336
22
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
This episode is indicative of Curtin and Churchill‟s very different ideas of Australia‟s role in
the Pacific. Curtin felt that, as Australia‟s vital interests were at stake and Australia would,
potentially, be used as a base of operations, Australia should be afforded a greater influence
over strategic decisions in the Pacific. Churchill, on the other hand, felt that the Pacific War
was merely an extension of the war he was already fighting and that there was no need for a
change in command or consultation.
On December 24th, Vivian Bowden, the Australian Government Representative in Singapore,
cabled Curtin, stating ‘as things stand at present, fall of Singapore is to my mind only a
matter of weeks [sic.]’26. Three days later, on the 27th, Curtin published an article in The
Herald, a Melbourne newspaper, titled The Task Ahead. In a passage that is popularly
regarded as a turning point in Anglo-Australian relations and has since become a point of
contention among historians, he wrote
‘...we refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a
subordinate segment of the general conflict....
‘The Australian Government, therefore, regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one
in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of
the democracies' fighting plan.
‘Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to
America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United
Kingdom.27
‘We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces...but we know too, that
Australia can go and Britain can still hold on’28.
26
ibid., p. 339
Bold present in the original article as published in The Herald
28
Appendix A: Curtin, J., The Task Ahead, Published: The Herald, 27/12/1941, National Library of Australia
27
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
This passage was published by many newspapers in Britain, and was greeted with fury by
Churchill, who saw it as a blatant, and unwelcome, attempt by the Australian government to
enter the Anglo-American alliance in its own right. It was also a badly timed challenge to his
claim to speak on behalf of the British Empire29. In a cable to Curtin he wrote:
‘such a statement will cause resentment throughout the Empire and had a very poor
reception in high quarters in the United States...I do not understand the reason for
this mood of panic which I am sure is not shared by the people of Australia’30.
Curtin‟s article did not mark the point at which the Australian government traded its ties with
Britain for an American alliance31. On the contrary, two days later Curtin stated:
‘There is no part of the Empire more steadfast in loyalty to the British way of living
and British institutions than Australia. Our loyalty to His Majesty the King goes to the
very core of our national life. It is part of our being...’32.
He stated in private that the phrase ‘without any lessening of the bonds with the United
Kingdom’33 would have been preferable to ‘free of any pangs’34 and, much later, referred to
the furore caused by his statement as a ‘misunderstanding’35.
Curtin‟s reaction to the controversy shows that the article was not a turning point in AngloAustralian relations and did not mark a fundamental shift in the way Australia‟s foreign
policy. It was, however, further evidence of the government‟s growing belief that Australia‟s
needs and interests should be more strongly articulated and given greater weight in London
and Washington.
29
Freudenberg, G., op.cit., p. 344
Letter from Churchill to Curtin, Dated 29/12/1941, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Catalogue
Reference: JCPML00869
31
Curran, J., Curtin’s Empire, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2011, p. 11
32
ibid., p. 14
33
Freudenburg, G., op.cit., p. 343
34
ibid., p. 343
35
Curran, J., op.cit., p. 108
30
13
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
In January and early February 1942, a series of cables from the Australian government to
Churchill in London and Roosevelt in Washington, arguing that Australia should have more
influence over decisions about the direction of the war36, led to the creation of the Pacific
War Council in London37. It was designed to enable greater consultation and discussion
between the countries involved in the war in the Pacific.
Curtin‟s article, and his argument with Churchill in December 1941, did not lead to a
fundamental shift in Australian foreign policy. As subsequent events showed, Curtin wanted
greater influence over British strategic policy, not a completely separate one.
36
321. U.K. Dominions Office to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 7/2/1942, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A2937, A.B.D.A. STRATEGIC AREA,
1941-1942
37
Fact File: Formation of the Pacific War Council, 2005, [Online],
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a1141958.shtml, 20/7/2011
14
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
The Fall of Singapore
The importance of a naval base in Singapore to Australia was established at the Imperial
Conference in 1923. Clause 4. (a) of the resolutions of the conference acknowledged the
‘deep interest of the Commonwealth of Australia...in the provision of a Naval Base at
Singapore, as essential for ensuring...the security of the territories...in...Eastern waters’38.
The understanding that a British fleet would be dispatched to Singapore if Australia was
threatened remained the keystone of Australian defence policy until the start of the war in the
Pacific39.
The failure of this strategy became clear on December 10th when Japanese planes sank the
battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser HMS Repulse, which had been based at
Singapore40. When Curtin cabled London, asking for an urgent reassessment of the situation
in the Pacific, the Dominions Secretary, Lord Cranborne, referred him to the Far East
Appreciation prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff in 194041. This clearly stated that, in the
absence of a fleet in Singapore, ‘we cannot prevent damage to our interests in the Far
East’42. Throughout January 1942, as British forces retreated towards Singapore and it
became clear to Curtin that „Fortress Singapore‟ would not withstand the Japanese43, Curtin
sent a series of heated cables to Churchill, expressing his dismay at the collapse of the
foundation of Australian defence policy. On January 17th, he wrote:
38
Hasluck, P., op.cit., p. 17
Schreuder., D.M. & Ward, S., Australia’s Empire, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 246
40
Freudenberg, G., op.cit., p. 329
41
ibid., p. 330
42
Far East Appreciation, Dated August 1940, The National Archives [Britain], Catalogue Reference:
cab/66/10/33, p. 11
43
Freudenberg, G., op.cit., p. 363
39
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
‘as far back as 1937 the Commonwealth Government received assurances
that...Singapore [would be made] impregnable... [T]he...defence system of Australia
was based on...Singapore and the presence of a capital ship fleet there’44.
Churchill replied by briefly describing and defending his defence policy and offering an
optimistic view of the course the war would take in 1942, concluding ‘we must not be
dismayed or get into recrimination but remain united in true comradeship. Do not doubt my
loyalty to Australia and New Zealand’45. Curtin continued to cable Churchill, warning him
that, in his opinion, a defeat at Singapore would result in the invasion of Australia, an
invasion Australia would not be able repel.
On January 22nd, Sir Earle Page, Special Representative to the United Kingdom, cabled
Curtin, warning that the British were considering evacuating troops from Singapore in order
to reinforce British forces in Burma46. Curtin, furious that his opinion of the importance of
Singapore to Australia was not taken into account, wrote to Churchill, stating:
‘After all the assurances we have been given, the evacuation of Singapore would be
regarded here and elsewhere as an inexcusable betrayal’47.
The British, and Australian, forces in Singapore surrendered to the Japanese on February 15th
after a siege lasting fifteen days48.
44
278. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Winston Churchill, U.K. Prime Minister, Dated 17/1/1942,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942,
0.1701
45
281. Mr Winston Churchill, U.K. Prime Minister, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 19/1/1942,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A3195, 1942,
1.2352
46
292. Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister,
Dated 22/1/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference:
AA:A2937, A.B.D.A. STRATEGIC AREA, 1941-1942
47
294. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Winston Churchill, U.K. Prime Minister, Dated 23/1/1942,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A981, WAR 33,
ATTACHMENT B
48
Coulthard-Clark, C., Remembering 1942: The Fall of Singapore, 15 February 1942, 2002, [Transcript
Online], http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/remembering1942/singapore/transcript.asp, 18/7/2011
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
The fall of Singapore did not, in itself, result in a change in the Australian government‟s
attitude towards Britain, but it did cause resentment which would spill over in the „Cable
Wars‟ and, to Curtin‟s mind, emphasised the need for greater consultation between the
British government and Australia.
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
The ‘Cable Wars’
Even before Singapore was taken by the Japanese, the defence of Burma, and the Burmese
Road used to supply China, was regarded as an issue of vital importance by the Americans
and, as a result, by the British.49 On the February 17th, two days after the surrender at
Singapore, Curtin cabled Churchill to request that the Australian 6th and 7th Divisions in
North Africa be returned to Australia, rather than Java as the British High Command
originally intended50. Archibald Wavell, the British commander in Java, also cabled
Churchill, advising that any reinforcements would come too late to make a difference and
recommending they be sent to Burma, which was under threat, or to Australia51.
Late in the evening on the 17th, Australian time, Richard Casey, the Australian Ambassador
to the United States, asked if the diversion of ‘two Australian divisions from Middle East...to
India or Burma’52 would be possible. Very early the following morning, Page cabled Curtin,
informing him that the Pacific War Council in London had concluded that the 7th Australian
Division, already embarked, should be sent to Burma ‘until other troops are available from
elsewhere’53, provided the Australian government agreed. He immediately followed this
cable with another stating that, since
‘the road for supplies to China must be kept open at all costs...[and] Australian
troops...[are] the only body of troops that could possibly get to Burma in time...I
49
Freudenberg, G., op.cit., p. 373
ibid., p. 376
51
ibid., p. 376
52
340. Mr. R.G. Casey, Minister to the United States, to Department of External Affairs, Dated 17/2/1942,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A981, WAR 33,
ATTACHMENT B
53
341. Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister,
Dated 18/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference:
AA:A816, 52/302/142
50
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
stated that I would strongly recommend...that you should concur in this
arrangement...’54
Stanley Bruce, Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, also advised Curtin to
agree to the proposal, partly on the grounds that it would give Australia greater claim to
similar assistance if it became necessary55.
On February 19th, Curtin cabled London to inform Page that the Australian government did
not consent to the planned diversion56. He sent another on the 20th, irritated by Page‟s, and
Lord Cranborne‟s, attempts to dissuade him and suspicious that Page had not informed the
British of his decision. It would later emerge that this was indeed the case.
In response, Churchill, who had not yet appealed directly to Curtin, wrote:
‘I suppose you realise that your leading division...is the only force that can reach
Rangoon in time... you said that the evacuation of Singapore would be 'an inexcusable
betrayal’... we therefore [put] the 18th Division and other important reinforcements
into Singapore...57. They were lost...
‘Your greatest support in this hour of peril must be drawn from the United States... if
you refuse to allow [the diversion]...a very grave effect will be produced upon the
54
342. Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister,
Dated 18/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference:
AA:A816, 52/302/142
55
344. Mr S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated
18/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816,
52/302/142
56
345. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the United Kingdom,
Dated 19/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference:
AA:A3196, 1942, 0.5088
57
As Curtin pointed out in his response, the timeline of events shows this was not the case and Churchill himself
stated later that the Australian government‟s cable had no influence on that particular decision.
19
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
President...on whom you are so largely dependent. See especially the inclination of
the United States to move major naval forces from Hawaii into the Anzac area’58.
The cable was a clear attempt to coerce Curtin and the Australian government. Churchill
blatantly stated that a refusal to divert the 7th Division to Burma could result in the
withdrawal of American support for Australia. It also reveals the strain the fall of Singapore
put on the relationship between Britain and Australia and, on a more personal level, the
relationship between Churchill and Curtin.
Although Churchill had demanded an immediate answer, Curtin did not reply until the 22nd of
February, two days after the receipt of Churchill‟s ‘strongly worded request’59. He reiterated
his refusal, arguing that sending Australian troops to Burma would expose them to undue
danger and that they were needed in Australia to repel a Japanese invasion60. At 3:00pm that
day, Curtin received a cable from Churchill, informing him:
‘We could not contemplate that you would refuse our request and that of the President
of the United States for the diversion...We therefore decided that the convoy should be
temporarily diverted... [to Burma. There are]...a few days for the situation to develop
and for you to review the position should you wish to do so...61
Bruce, who saw a copy of the cable in London, was furious that the troops had been diverted
in spite of the Australian government‟s wishes, but counselled restraint, acknowledging that
they were on the brink of ‘a crisis in the relations between Australia and the United
58
Appendix B: 352. Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime
Minister, Dated 20/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue
Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142
59
Appendix C: 357. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs, Dated 22/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications,
Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.5403
60
ibid.
61
Appendix D: 362 Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime
Minister, Dated 22/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue
Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142
20
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Kingdom...a first-class row’62. Curtin replied, restating his main arguments and demanding
the convoy be sent to Australia63. Churchill backed down. A month later, Curtin allowed part
of the 6th Division to garrison Colombo in Sri Lanka, which, following the loss of Burma,
was under threat64.
The „Cable Wars‟ were a remarkable episode in Anglo-Australian relations but their
importance should not be overstated. They did not prompt serious discussions about the
merits of separation or distancing from Britain65. In April 1942, barely two months after his
dispute with Churchill, Curtin stated, ‘Australia is a British land of one race and one
tongue’66 and, on a separate occasion, ‘Australia is a great bastion of Empire...Australia is
proud of its sonship to the Motherland’67. The dispute also had no effect on Australian
foreign policy. In 1943, he stated that Australia had to have ‘the advantage of concerted
Empire policy’68 in its future foreign policy and he appointed the Duke of Gloucester, the
King‟s brother, to the post of Governor-General of Australia. This appointment met with
widespread public approval but caused outrage in Labor circles69. The „Cable Wars‟ did not
change Curtin‟s belief that Australia was British, or that Britain should continue to play an
integral part in shaping Australian foreign policy. It did, however, reinforce his conviction
that Australian opinions should be sought and considered by the British, a position he had
held since the outbreak of the Pacific War.
62
364. Mr S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated
23/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:M100,
FEBRUARY 1942
63
366. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs,
Dated 23/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference:
AA:A3196, 1942, 0.5424
64
Freudenberg, G., op.cit., p. 390
65
Curran, J., op.cit., p. 86
66
ibid., p. 84
67
ibid., p. 87
68
Curran, J., op.cit., p. 90
69
ibid., p. 92
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
The 1944 Imperial Conference and After
In 1944, Curtin travelled to London for an Imperial Conference, advocating, as he had done
since December 1941, greater consultation between Australia, Britain and the other
Dominions70. On May 4th he stated in a speech:
‘what I am seeking is better machinery for the discharge of the consultations that are
inevitable in closer and more frequent collaboration...I am not afraid of being
misjudged when I say that I am a supporter of, and believer in, the British
Empire...’71.
More strikingly, he reflected that the war had ‘heartened...our association, has
strengthened...that association [the British Empire]...the greatest confraternity of
governmental relations the world has yet witnessed’72, making it quite clear that, in his
opinion, the Pacific War had not weakened Australia‟s relationship with Britain. At the
conference in London, he proposed that there should be ‘machinery...to provide for full and
continuous consultation’73. The idea was not accepted, particularly by the Prime Ministers of
Canada and South Africa74, neither of whom had any intention of following common Empire
policy75.
70
Mr Curtin’s Report to the Australian Parliament of the Prime Minister’s Meeting, Dated 9/9/1944, The
National Archives [Britain], Catalogue Reference: cab/66/55/10, p. 8
71
Black, D., In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings, Paradigm Books Curtin University,
Bentley, 1995, p. 241
72
ibid., p.242
73
Mr Curtin’s Report to the Australian Parliament of the Prime Minister’s Meeting, op.cit., p. 8
74
Curran, J., op.cit., p. 112-3
75
The governments of South Africa and Canada had both campaigned for greater freedom from Britain. The
Statute of Westminster, which Australia did not accept, was a response to demands from Canada and South
Africa. Both governments assumed that Curtin‟s proposals for a permanent Imperial council would result in the
development of a common policy they would have to accept. The Canadian government was also concerned that
the United States would react badly to the formation of a British power bloc.
22
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
This rejection did nothing to weaken Curtin‟s commitment to the idea of a united British
Empire. It is indicative that when Curtin gave his opinion on future foreign policy in a postconference report to the Australian War Cabinet, he did not mention Australian foreign
policy, describing instead the policy of the British Commonwealth as a whole76. This clearly
shows that Curtin believed Australia should be seen internationally as part of the British
Empire.
Equally significant is his statement that ‘the security of any part of the British Empire in the
future will rest on...the system of collective security... [and] bilateral or multilateral
planning’77. This is clear evidence of his belief that, despite the events of 1941-2 and the fall
of Singapore, the system of Imperial defence would remain a key part of Australian defence
policy. Sir Ronald Cross, the British High Commissioner in Australia, cabled that he
‘confidently...expect[ed] that cooperation in the future will be smoother, more sympathetic
and pliant’78, adding that members of the press gallery had told him they considered Curtin
‘as British as Churchill’79 and that Curtin‟s
‘first act on resuming the reigns of office was to...give them [the press gallery] a good
drubbing on the ground that their papers gave insufficient publicity to the British
share on the Western Front and gave too much space to the USA’80.
The Imperial Conference, and subsequent events, clearly demonstrated that the disagreements
between Churchill and Curtin in 1941 and 1942 did not cause a profound shift in Australia‟s
relationship with Britain. On the contrary, Curtin believed that Australia should be
internationally regarded as part of the British Empire, albeit with a greater influence over
76
Mr Curtin’s Report to the Australian Parliament of the Prime Minister’s Meeting, op.cit., p. 5
ibid., p. 10
78
Curran, J., op.cit., p. 115
79
ibid., p. 115
80
ibid., p. 115
77
23
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Imperial policy, and that the system of Imperial defence should be the foundation of post-war
Australian defence.
24
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Conclusion
In the years between the First and Second World Wars, Australians, and the Australian
government, saw themselves as a loyal part of the British Empire. Australia‟s economy was
dominated by Britain, the government followed British foreign policy and Australia‟s
military planning was based on the doctrine of Imperial defence. In late 1941 and early 1942,
the Pacific War brought Prime Minister John Curtin into conflict with the British government
of Winston Churchill. The sinking of British ships in the Pacific and the success of the
Japanese led Curtin to appeal to the United States in an article which has been interpreted as a
profound change in Australian policy, although Curtin stated that his belief in the Empire was
undimmed and that the article had been misinterpreted. The Japanese attack on Singapore
resulted in a heated exchange between Curtin and Churchill and led to the „Cable Wars‟ that
followed the British government‟s decision to send Australian troops to Burma rather than
returning them to Australia. Although it has been argued that these events were a turning
point in Australia‟s foreign policy with regard to Britain, they merely convinced Curtin that
Australia should be consulted by, and not separated from, Britain and the Empire. In 1944, he
stated that Imperial defence should be the foundation of Australian military planning in the
post-war world and that Australia would be, first and foremost, part of the British
Commonwealth. Above all, he believed that Australia was essentially British, a belief that,
like Australia‟s relationship with Britain, was unchanged by the Pacific War.
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Bibliography
Annotations have been made where a source has been of particular importance.
Secondary Sources:
Books:

Beaumont, J., Australia’s War 1939-45, Allan & Unwin, Sydney, 1996

Black, D., In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings, Paradigm Books
Curtin University, Bentley, 1995

Curran, J., Curtin’s Empire, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2011
A fascinating study in Curtin‟s attitude towards Britain, it is disappointingly short and passes
over the period from 1941 to 1944. As a consequence, it does not consider the effect of the
Pacific War on Australia. It does, however, provide a thorough analysis of the course and
implications of the Imperial Conference in 1944.

Day, D., Menzies and Churchill at War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993

Freudenberg, G., Churchill and Australia, Macmillan, Sydney, 2008
Although Freudenberg is primarily concerned with Churchill‟s relationship to Australia, the
section dealing with 1941-45 is detailed and contains a fascinating examination of AngloAustralian relations during that period. As a long standing supporter of the Labor Party and a
self-confessed admirer of John Curtin, he paints a complementary picture of Curtin as Prime
Minister and is very critical of Churchill‟s account of events. Despite this, there is little sense
of the obvious bias that is present in works by many other historians dealing with the period.
26
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033

Hasluck, P., The Government and the People 1939-1941, Australian War Memorial,
Canberra, 1952

Hudson, W.J. & Sharp, M.P., Australian Independence: Colony to Reluctant
Kingdom, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988
Although mostly concerned with the legalities of the Australian relationship with Britain and
the evolution of the Australian constitution, it also contains interesting information about the
politics of the relationship.

Meaher, A., The Road to Singapore: The Myth of British Betrayal, Australian
Scholarly Publishing, North Melbourne, 2010
Repudiating the theory advocated most prominently by David Day (that Britain cynically
betrayed Australia‟s trust in Imperial defence), Meaher argues that Australia was remiss in its
own obligations and that the Australian government was warned repeatedly throughout the
interwar period that Britain would not be able to send a fleet to Singapore. It is an interesting
study, but, like Curran‟s Curtin’s Empire, is disappointingly short and does not directly
consider the effect of the Pacific War on Australia‟s relationship with Britain. It is also
unfortunate that Meaher dismisses the theories of many other historians as being founded on
a faulty understanding, without explaining their opinion of the particular issue or why it is
incorrect.

Robertson, J., Australia at War 1939-1945, William Heinemann Australia, Burwood,
1981
27
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Websites:
With author 
Black, D., Biography of John Curtin, 2010, [Online],
http://john.curtin.edu.au/resources/biography/details.html, Accessed 11/06/2011

Coulthard-Clark, C., Remembering 1942: The Fall of Singapore, 15 February 1942,
2002, [Transcript Online],
http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/remembering1942/singapore/transcript.asp, 18/7/2011

Horner, D., Strategy and Command in Australia’s Campaigns of 1941, 2001,
[Transcript Online], http://www.awm.gov.au/events/conference/2001/horner.asp,
16/7/2011
Without author 
Fact File: Formation of the Pacific War Council, 2005, [Online],
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a1141958.shtml,
Date Accessed: 20/7/2011
Although the website does not attribute the article to a particular author, the BBC is a
reputable source and the facts presented in the article are consistent with those in other
sources.

Robert Menzies: In Office, [Online],
http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/menzies/in-office.aspx, Date
Accessed: 19/7/2011
28
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
As this source is from the National Australian Archives, I felt justified in using it, even
though no author is listed.

Timeline of Events: 1941-1945, 1999, [Online],
http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/pacificwar/timeline.htm, Date Accessed:
14/7/2011
29
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Primary Sources:
Articles:

The Call Will Be Answered, Published: The Argus, 4/9/1939, National Library of
Australia
This article was a response to Menzies‟ address to the Australian public on the declaration of
war in Europe. It provides a fascinating insight into the way this event was portrayed in the
media, particularly the conservative media (The Argus was generally considered a rightleaning paper).

Curtin, J., The Task Ahead, Published: The Herald, 27/12/1941, National Library of
Australia
This contained Curtin‟s ‘Australia looks to America’ statement and is regarded, in Australia
at least, as one of the most important documents in Australian political history. It is quite
controversial and is used as evidence to support a wide range of views and theories.
The problem with the article lies in the ambiguity of the statement ‘free of any pangs as to
our traditional links...’. Many historians have interpreted this as marking the point at which
those traditional ties were severed. As I have shown in my essay, Curtin meant the opposite,
stating that a move towards an American alliance was not a turn from Britain.
Those historians who subscribe to the former interpretation almost all attempt to cast Curtin
as the first champion of Australian nationalism and The Task Ahead as the defining moment
at which Australia cast off the shackles of “British Imperialism” and became aware of its
“national identity”. Perhaps the most prominent exponent of this idea is David Day, who
30
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
theorised that the Pacific War was the point at which the Australian government started to
aggressively pursue its national interest regardless of British opinion and turned to the United
States.
Cables & Letters:

278. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Winston Churchill, U.K. Prime Minister,
Dated 17/1/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications,
Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.1701

281. Mr Winston Churchill, U.K. Prime Minister, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister,
Dated 19/1/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications,
Catalogue Reference: AA:A3195, 1942, 1.2352

292. Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the United Kingdom, to Mr John
Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 22/1/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A2937, A.B.D.A. STRATEGIC
AREA, 1941-1942

294. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Winston Churchill, U.K. Prime Minister,
Dated 23/1/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications,
Catalogue Reference: AA:A981, WAR 33, ATTACHMENT B

321. U.K. Dominions Office to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 7/2/1942,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue
Reference: AA:A2937, A.B.D.A. STRATEGIC AREA, 1941-1942
31
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033

340. Mr. R.G. Casey, Minister to the United States, to Department of External Affairs,
Dated 17/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications,
Catalogue Reference: AA:A981, WAR 33, ATTACHMENT B

341. Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the United Kingdom, to Mr John
Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 18/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142

342. Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the United Kingdom, to Mr John
Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 18/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142

344. Mr S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin,
Prime Minister, Dated 18/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142

345. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the
United Kingdom, Dated 19/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.5088

352. Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John
Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 20/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142

357. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State
for Dominion Affairs, Dated 22/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.5403
32
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033

362. Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John
Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 22/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142

364. Mr S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin,
Prime Minister, Dated 23/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:M100, FEBRUARY 1942

366. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State
for Dominion Affairs, Dated 23/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.5424

Letter from Churchill to Curtin, Dated 29/12/1941, John Curtin Prime Ministerial
Library, Catalogue Reference: JCPML00869
Documents & Reports:

Far East Appreciation, Dated August 1940, The National Archives [Britain],
Catalogue Reference: cab/66/10/33

Mr Curtin’s Report to the Australian Parliament of the Prime Minister’s Meeting,
Dated 9/9/1944, The National Archives [Britain], Catalogue Reference: cab/66/55/10
33
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Audio:

Curtin Speech: Japan Enters Second World War, 2011, [Audio Online],
http://aso.gov.au/titles/radio/curtin-japan-second-world-war/clip1/, Accessed
12/6/2011

Menzies Speech: Declaration of War, 2011, [Audio Online],
http://aso.gov.au/titles/radio/menzies-speech-declaration-war/clip1/, Accessed
1/5/2011
34
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Appendices
Appendix A: The Task Ahead, by John Curtin, 27th December 1941
35
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Appendix B: Winston Churchill‟s Cable to John Curtin on the 20th February 1942
352
Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime
Minister
Cablegram 233 LONDON, 20 February 1942, 9.13 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET
Following for the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister. (Begins):
I suppose you realise that your leading division, the head of which is sailing south of
Colombo to N.E.I. at this moment in our scanty British and American shipping [(MOUNT
VERNON)], is the only force that can reach Rangoon in time to prevent its loss and the
severance of communication with China. It can begin to disembark at Rangoon about 26th or
27th. There is nothing else in the world that can fill the gap.
2. We are all entirely in favour of all Australian troops returning home to defend their
native soil, and we shall help their transportation in every way. But a vital war emergency
cannot be ignored, and troops en route to other destinations must be ready to turn aside and
take part in a battle. Every effort would be made to relieve this division at the earliest
moment and send them on to Australia. I do not endorse the United States' request that you
should send your other two divisions to Burma. They will return home as fast as possible but
this one is needed now, and is the only one that can possibly save the situation.
36
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
3. Pray read again your message No. JOHCU 21 in which you said that the evacuation
of Singapore would be 'an inexcusable betrayal'. Agreeably with your point of view we
therefore [put] the 18th Division and other important reinforcements into Singapore instead
of diverting them to Burma and ordered them to fight it out to the end. They were lost at
Singapore and did not save it, whereas they could almost certainly have saved Rangoon. I
take full responsibility with my colleagues on the Defence Committee for this decision; but
you also bear a heavy share on account of your telegram No. JOHCU 21.
4. Your greatest support in this hour of peril must be drawn from the United States.
They alone can bring into Australia the necessary troops and air forces and they appear ready
to do so. As you know, the President attaches supreme importance to keeping open the
connection with China without which his bombing offensive against Japan cannot be started
and also most grievous results may follow in Asia if China is cut off from all allied help.
5. I am quite sure that if you refuse to allow your troops to stop this gap who are
actually passing and if in consequence the above [evils] affecting the whole course of the war
follow, a very grave effect will be produced upon the President and the Washington circle on
whom you are so largely dependent. See especially the inclination of the United States to
move major naval forces from Hawaii into the Anzac area.
6. We must have an answer immediately, as the leading ships of the convoy will soon
be steaming in the opposite direction from Rangoon and every day is a day lost. I trust
therefore that for the sake of all interests, and above all your own interests, you will give
most careful consideration to the case I have set before you. (Ends).
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Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Appendix C: John Curtin‟s Cable to Winston Churchill on the 22nd of February 1942
357
Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs
Cablegram 136 CANBERRA, 22 February 1942
MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET
For the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister.
Reference your 233 and 235 .
I have received your rather strongly worded request at this late stage, though our wishes in
regard to the disposition of the A.I.F. in the Pacific theatre have long been known to you and
carried even further by your statement in the House of Commons. Furthermore, Page was
furnished with lengthy statements on our viewpoint on 15th February (repeated to Dominions
Office in No. 123), 17th February (repeated to Dominions Office in No. 127) and 19th
February (two cablegrams).
2. The proposal for additional military assistance for Burma comes from the Supreme
Commander of the A.B.D.A. Area. Malaya, Singapore and Timor have been lost and the
whole of the Netherlands East Indies will apparently be occupied shortly by the Japanese.
The enemy, with superior sea and air power, has commenced raiding our territory in the
north-west and also in the north-east from Rabaul. The Government made the maximum
contribution of which it was capable in reinforcement of the A.B.D.A. Area. It originally sent
a division less a brigade to Malaya with certain ancillary troops. A machine gun battalion and
substantial reinforcements were later despatched. It also despatched forces to Ambon, Java
38
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
and Dutch and Portuguese Timor. Six squadrons of the Air Force were also sent to this area,
together with two cruisers from the Royal Australian Navy.
3. It was suggested by you that two Australian divisions be transferred to the Pacific
theatre and this suggestion was later publicly expanded by you with the statement that no
obstacle would be placed in the way of the A.I.F. returning to defend their homeland. We
agreed to the two divisions being located in Sumatra and Java and it was pointed out to Page
in the cablegram of 15th February that should fortune still favour the Japanese this
disposition would give a line of withdrawal to Australia for our forces.
4. With the situation having deteriorated to such an extent in the theatre of the
A.B.D.A. Area with which we are closely associated and the Japanese also making a
southward advance in the Anzac Area, the Government, in the light of the advice of its Chiefs
of Staff as to the forces necessary to repel an attack on Australia, finds it most difficult to
understand that it should be called upon to make a further contribution of forces to be located
in the most distant part of the A.B.D.A. Area. Notwithstanding your statement that you do not
agree with the request to send the other two divisions of the A.I.F. Corps to Burma, our
advisers are concerned with Wavell's request for the Corps and Dill's statement that the
destination of the 6th and 9th Australian Divisions should be left open, as more troops might
be badly needed in Burma. Once one division became engaged it could not be left
unsupported, and the indications are that the whole of
the Corps might become committed to this region or there might be a recurrence of the
experiences of the Greek and Malayan campaigns. Finally, in view of superior Japanese sea
power and air power, it would appear to be a matter of some doubt as to whether this division
can be landed in Burma and a matter for greater doubt whether it can be brought out as
promised. With the fall of Singapore, Penang and Martaban, the Bay of Bengal is now
39
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
vulnerable to what must be considered the superior sea and air power of Japan in that area.
The movement of our forces to this theatre therefore is not considered a reasonable hazard of
war, having regard to what has gone before, and its adverse results would have the gravest
consequences on the morale of the Australian people. The Government therefore must adhere
to its decision.
5. In regard to your statement that the 18th Division was diverted from Burma to
Singapore because of message No. Johcu 21, it is pointed out that the date of the latter was
23rd January, whereas in Winch No. 8 of 14th January you informed me that one brigade of
this division was due on 13th January and the remainder on 27th January.
6. We feel therefore, in view of the foregoing and the services the A.I.F. have
rendered in the Middle East, that we have every right to expect them to be returned as soon as
possible with adequate escorts to ensure their safe arrival.
7. We assure you, and desire you to so inform the President, who knows fully what
we have done to help the common cause, that, if it were possible to divert our troops to
Burma and India without imperilling our security in the judgment of our advisers, we should
be pleased to agree to the diversion.
CURTIN
40
Ellen Trevanion, History Extended Essay, 2011, Candidate Number: 000092-033
Appendix D: Winston Churchill‟s cable to John Curtin on the 22nd of February 1942
362
Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime
Minister
Cablegram 241 LONDON, 22 February 1942, 3 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET
Following from the Prime Minister [1] for the Prime Minister. (Begins):-
We could not contemplate that you would refuse our request and that of the President of the
United States for the diversion of the leading division to save the situation in Burma. We
knew that if our ships proceeded on their course to Australia while we were waiting for your
formal approval they would either arrive too late at Rangoon or even be without enough fuel
to go there at all. We therefore decided that the convoy should be temporarily diverted to the
northward. The convoy is now too far north for some of the ships in it to reach Australia
without refuelling. These physical considerations give a few days for the situation to develop
and for you to review the position should you wish to do so. Otherwise the leading Australian
Division will be returned to Australia as quickly as possible in accordance with your wishes.
(Ends).
41