Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)
Research Report 2
Civilian Control and Democratic
Transition: Pakistan’s Unequal
Equation
Siegfried O. Wolf
18th May 2012
About the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)
The Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) was established in the Department of Peace Studies
at the University of Bradford, UK, in March 2007. It serves as an independent portal and neutral
platform for interdisciplinary research on all aspects of Pakistani security, dealing with Pakistan's
impact on regional and global security, internal security issues within Pakistan, and the interplay
of the two. PSRU provides information about, and critical analysis of, Pakistani security with
particular emphasis on extremism/terrorism, nuclear weapons issues, and the internal stability and
cohesion of the state. PSRU is intended as a resource for anyone interested in the security of
Pakistan and provides:
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Briefing papers;
Reports;
Datasets;
Consultancy;
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An open space for those working for positive change in Pakistan and for those currently
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PSRU welcomes collaboration from individuals, groups and organisations, which share our broad
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Other PSRU Publications
The following papers are freely available through the Pakistan Security Research Unit
(PSRU):
 Report Number 1. The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni
Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir
 Brief Number 57. Socio Economic Cost of Terrorism: A case study of Pakistan
 Brief Number 58. Islamic Militancy getting worse, not better: The recent attacks on
the Ahmadi mosques in Lahore
 Brief Number 59. An Analysis of Obama’s AfPak Goal and First Objective: Setting
the Baseline and Prospects for Success
 Brief Number 60. Domestic Politics and Systemic Constraints in Pakistan’s India
Policy
 Brief Number 61. The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan’s Battlefield Use of
Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large Scale Indian Conventional Attack
 Brief Number 62. Getting Afghanistan Right
 Brief Number 63. Why Karachi is a Major Source of Instability in Pakistan?
 Brief Number 64. The arrest of Brig. Gen. Ali Khan and the influence of Hizb-utTahrir in Pakistan
All these papers are freely available from:
http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru/Home
2
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ 4
About the Author .................................................................................................................... 4
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ 4
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 5
2. Analytical Framework ........................................................................................................ 6
3. Emergence of Military Dominance .................................................................................. 12
3.1 Civil-Military Relations after Democratization (1988-1997): Failed Civilian Control . 15
3.2. Civil-Military Relations between 1997-1999: Semblance of Civilian Control ............. 20
3.3 Restoration of Military Dominance under Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007) ................... 22
3.4 After Musharraf: Civilian Control at the Edge ............................................................... 23
4. Civil-Military Relations and Democracy ......................................................................... 25
5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 27
Bibliography: ........................................................................................................................ 29
List of interviews .................................................................................................................. 35
3
Executive Summary
Civilian control of the armed forces is a sine qua non for democratic consolidation. In
Pakistan, since its existence, the military played an eminent role in all spheres of socioeconomic and political life. In this context it is stated by several analysts that the soldiers are
mainly responsible for the country’s setbacks on its path to democratic consolidation. The
main argument made is that the military top brass, through either formal or informal
interventions, were able to avoid the institutionalization of civilian control. Civilian control is
understood as the distribution of decision-making power between civilians and the armed
forces. This report sheds light on the successes and failures in the efforts of civilian
governments to establish supremacy over the country’s armed forces in order to consolidate
democratic rule. The analysis derives from a conceptualization of civilian control that
distinguishes five areas of political decision-making: elite-recruitment, public policy, internal
security, national defence, and internal security. In order to establish control in these various
areas civilians have a choice between different strategies for which they need certain
resources. In this context, the study shows that civil-military relations in Pakistan have tended
to be affected by historical legacies, leading to the emergence of military dominance which
undermined the civilian supremacy and affected the quality of democracy.
About the Author
Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf is lecturer at the South Asia Institute (SAI) and a former research
fellow at the Institute of Political Science (IPW), both at Heidelberg University. His research
interests focus on democratization, civil–military relations, political parties, social
movements, identity constructions and conflicts in South Asia. He is co-author of A Political
and Economic Dictionary of South Asia (London: Routledge, 2006), and Deputy Editor of the
Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics (HPSACP). Additionally, he is
Director of Research, South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF), a Brussels based think tank.
Acknowledgements
This article contains results from the research project “Democratic Transformation and Civilian
Control of the Military: Comparing New Democracies in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia”
conducted from 2008 to 2011 at Heidelberg University with funding by the German Research
Foundation (DFG). The author wishes to thank Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Philip Voelkel and
Paul Chambers as well as the editors for their helpful comments.
4
Civilian Control and Democratic Transition: Pakistan’s Unequal Equation
Siegfried O. Wolf
1. Introduction
Pakistan, as an example of the case of failed civilian control over the armed forces, does not
fit into the story of global triumph of democratization. This is because the military was able to
establish itself as the most dominant actor in politics and civilians have never succeeded in
achieving any effective and sustainable amount of civilian supremacy. This limited not only
the effective power to govern of (elected) civilian administrations, but also created deviancies
regarding the electoral regime, political liberties, political participation and horizontal
accountability. Therefore, Pakistan must be classified as a ‘defective democracy’, which is
only partly free (Freedom House, 2011). These defects are deeply rooted in the history of
civil-military relations in Pakistan and determined by two trends:
First, as the army grew in strength and size over time, the development of the political
system became characterised by a lack of institutionalization and chronic instability (Nawaz,
2008, xxviii). This created an imbalance of power, favoring the armed forces and,
simultaneously, further weakened civilian power in the political decision-making process.
Second, there has been a tendency for the military to institutionalize its political role
(especially under Zia ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf) featured by three criteria: (1) the
abandonment of former personalized forms of exercising political influence (Ayub Khan and
partly Yahya Khan); (2) the (informal) induction of broader sections of the armed forces into
the political system to run the affairs of state; and (3) the constitutional entrenchment of a
political role for the armed forces, e.g. the introduction of the 8th Amendment.
These developments led to the emergence of a phenomenon in Pakistan’s political
decision-making which is commonly described as the ‘rule of the Troika’ (Rizvi, 2003;
Kukreja, 2003). Generally this term is supposed to illustrate the system of power-sharing
between civilians and military, embodied through the three most significant agents in the
political system of Pakistan: The chief of army staff (COAS), the president and the prime
minister. Due to exogenous and endogenous factors producing a high degree of volatility in
the balance of power between these three agents, the main feature of this sometimes
constitutional, sometimes extra-constitutional arrangement has been a persistent struggle for
power between civilians and the military. This clash limited the access to resources for
civilians to establish civilian control over the military since Pakistan come into existence.
From British colonial rule until 1971, Pakistan has witnessed the evolution of a strong
military within an alliance with the country’s bureaucracy. As a result of numerous internal
and external threats and challenges, the bureaucrats became sidelined over the time. Under
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977), though there was some civilian power, all of this was again
just another form of power-sharing between civilians (this time elected ones) and the armed
forces. The succeeding regime of Zia ul-Haq seemed to symbolize the ultimate and
institutionalized dominance of the military in politics. The aforementioned can be seen in the
fact that the unconventional transition to civilian rule between 1988 and 1999 (the longest in
Pakistan’s history), led to a situation in which civilians seemed to only barely survive in
office amidst immense military power. However, at the end of this period, it seemed that
civilians under Nawaz Sharif were able to change the rules of the game. But ultimately, the
5
military carried out a putsch and remained in power from 1999 until 2008. Today the country
appears to again be witnessing the rise of civilian rule while the military is maintaining crucial
influence in all political decision-making areas, especially those perceived as essential for the
country`s internal and external security, like foreign policy regarding India and Afghanistan,
the Kashmir issue, and nuclear policy, as well as such issues which are closely identified with
its own corporate interests like defence budget, procurements, and business activities
(Siddiqa, 2009).
In this context, this chapter argues that the term ‘Troika’ is misleading to describe the
real distribution of decision-making power in Pakistan’s political system. Within this
triangular relationship the president has ostensibly appeared (at least temporarily) as the
strongest civilian constituent. Yet the president does not act as an independent civilian, but is
rather a ‘political proxy’ or ‘point man’ of the armed forces. Indeed it is a reciprocal
relationship: the military needs the president to influence the political decision-making
process and offer camouflage to the military’s role in politics while the president needs the
military to exercise power.
2. Analytical Framework
Basically this study refers to “a consensus in democratization literature that civilian control of
the military is a sine-qua-none condition for democratic consolidation” (cf.
Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010, 950). “Only if democratically elected political
leaders and their appointed officials control the armed forces can democratic rules and
processes persist”1 (Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010, 950). In line with this argument that without civilian control no democracy will be possible- civil-military relations are here
understood as the distribution of decision-making power between civilians, defined as
democratically elected representatives of the people as supreme power, and the armed forces
(Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010, 950).
In this concept, civilian control marks one pole of a decision-making power continuum,
the situation in which ‘civilians make all the rules and can change them at any time’ 2. Aurel
Croissant et al. (2010, 2011) define civilian control as that the continuous distribution of
decision-making power in which civilians alone have the authority to decide on national
political issues, politics as well as their implementation. Under civilian control, civilians can
freely choose to delegate decision-making power and the implementation of certain policies to
the military while the military has no autonomous decision-making power outside those areas
specifically defined by civilians. In this context, only civilians determine which respective
policies, or certain policy dimensions, the military implements, and civilians alone define the
boundaries between policy-making and policy-implementation. In addition, civilian
authorities control sanctioning power vis-à-vis the military, and they can—in principle—
revise their delegations at any time3 (Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010, 955; 2011).
On the other pole of the continuum is the military regime, in which the military controls
all decisions concerning political structures, processes, and policies and the civilians do not
possess any autonomous political decision-making power. In this sense, civilian control is a
relative condition, i.e., it is possible to distinguish different degrees of civilian control (e.g.,
strong or weak, encompassing or limited). Challenges to civilian decision-making power can
1
See also Dahl (1989).
See also Kohn (1997, 142).
3
See also Kemp und Hudlin (1992); Pion-Berlin (1992); Kohn (1997); Bland (2001); Feaver (1996; 1999);
Welch (1976).
2
6
take two analytically distinct shapes: formally institutionalized prerogatives and informal
contestation. Institutionalized prerogatives describe formal rights by which the military is able
‘to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military
areas within the state-apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and
political or social society’ 4 ” (Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010, 956;
Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2011, 140).
The continuum between civilian and military dominance over decision-making
authority can be analyzed in five areas: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security,
national defense, and military organization.
Figure 1: Decision-making areas of civil-military relations
Source: Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Voekel/Wolf (2011, 78).
The area of elite recruitment refers to the core defining aspects of the political regime,
namely the rules, criteria and processes of recruiting, selecting and legitimizing the holders of
political office. Any actor who controls this area thus is able to define “who rules and who
decides who rules” 5 . Civilian control over elite recruitment means that the military is
proscribed from establishing an alternative channel for access to political office, and,
simultaneously, the processes of elite selection in terms of the formation, working, and end of
political leadership are not subject to the explicit consent or implicit acquiescence of the
military (Chambers, 2010). “Civilian control over rules of competition is undermined when
public offices are excluded from open competition and if the military influences electoral
procedures. Civilian control over the rules of participation is constrained if active military
personnel are eligible for public office and soldiers influence the formation and dissolution of
government” (Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010, 957; 2011, 139-140).
Table 1: Dimensions and indicators of civilian control in the area of elite recruitment
4
5
See also Stepan (1988, 93).
See also Taylor (2003, 7).
7
Dimension
Indicator
Degree of civilian control
High
Competition
for public
office
Political
participation
Low
Reserved representation for
military personnel
No formal or informal
guarantees for military
representation in political
bodies
Majority of decisive
political positions are
reserved for the military
Military influence on the rules of
political competition
Military influence on the
rules of political
competition
Military dominates rule
setting, process and
outcomes of elite selection
Eligibility of active duty military
officer
Non-eligibility of active
duty military officers
(legally and de facto)
Eligibility of military
officers or rules of noneligibility are regularly
ignored
Military veto power over
formation/dissolution of
governments
No military influence on
the making and breaking
of governments
Formal regulations establish
military as veto actor or
military systematically
demands a tutelary role
Source: Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf (2010, 957), table is modified by the author. In the
original table there is a third degree of civilian control – Medium – included.
Meanwhile, the area of public policy focuses upon all policy fields except the narrowly
understood aspects of security and defense policy. This includes (1) all phases of the political
decision-making processes, including the identification of political problems to be addressed
and their transfer into the political system (agenda-setting); the definition of policy goals and
the elaboration of alternative policies to address these problems (policy formulation), and the
selection of a concrete policy out of these alternatives (policy adoption’)(Parsons 2005); and
(2) the implementation of these decisions by the administrative agencies of the state
bureaucracy. “Civilian control over this area means that civilians alone decide on the contents,
scope, and duration of policy decisions and possess effective means to control and supervise
the administrative implementation of these decisions” (Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf,
2010, 957). However, “while all policy issues are important to gauge the degree of civilian
control over this area, it is particularly relevant if the military has any influence, formal or
informal, on the national budget” (Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2011, 140).
Table 2: Dimensions and Indicators of civilian control in the area of Public Policy
Dimension
Indicator
Degree of civilian control
High
Policy-making
Policy
Low
Military influence on state
budget
Neither institutionalized nor
contestational participation in
the allocation of state
expenditure (including
defense/military)
Military dominance
over budgetary
process
Military influence on public
policymaking (except defense
and security policy)
No institutionalized
prerogatives or informal
intervention
Systematic exclusion
of civilians from at
least one policy field
Military authority over public
No military dominated state-in-
Civilian
8
implementation
administration
state structures and no military
oversight of civilian
administrative authorities
administrative
authorities are under
military oversight
(legally, or de facto),
or significant
militarized parallel
structures
Source: Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf (2010, 972-975), table is modified by the author. In
the original table there is a third degree of civilian control – Medium – included.
Internal security constitutes a third area of civil-military relations and can be defined in
terms of two elements. First, it has a geographic element, focusing on the threats originating
within the realm of one’s states own territory; and second, there is a second element which
derives from the role and the duties of the various state agencies. (Chambers, 2010). In other
words, it involves the use of armed forces in a purely domestic environment, which includes
public order in emergency situations (including disaster relief), preparation for
counterinsurgency warfare and terrorism, domestic intelligence gathering, daily policing and
border controlling6. “These activities are compatible with civilian control only if civilians
have the right to make the decisions on the range, duration and frequency of all internal
military operations as well as the civilian institutions, and are able to monitor their
implementation” (Chambers, 2010; Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010, 958; 2011, 140).
Table 3: Dimensions and Indicators of civilian control in the area of Internal Security
Dimension
Indicator
Degree of civilian control
High
Low
Policymaking
Military influence in internal
security policymaking
No institutionalized prerogatives or
informal intervention
Systematic exclusion of
civilians from at least one
policy field
Control over
security
agents
Separation of police/other
security agents and military
Strict separation; no military
command over internal security
agents except clearly defined (by
civilians) emergencies
Police or other security
agents subordinate to
military command or no
separate police
Civilian oversight of
military internal security
operations
Institutional framework in place for
comprehensive monitor and punish
military operations; military accepts
civilian oversight
No civilian effective
oversight or sanctioning;
military de facto
autonomous in the
conduct of operations
Source: Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf (2010, 972-975), table is modified by the author. In
the original table there is a third degree of civilian control – Medium – included.
National Defense remains the core function of any military and includes all aspects of
defense policy, ranging from the development of security doctrines to the deployment of
troops abroad and conduct of war (Alagappa, 2001; Trinkunas, 2005). Soldiers, as experts in
security matters, are often involved in the formulation and implementation of national defense
policies, even in established democracies. Since such policies, especially their
6
See also Collier (1999); Trinkunas (2005).
9
implementation, can determine the security of the nation, it is crucial that they remain under
civilian jurisdiction and oversight. Furthermore, all national defense activities can only be
compatible with civilian supremacy where civilians control the range, duration and frequency
of these missions and related activities. Additionally, the civilian institutions must be able to
effectively oversee the armed forces’ implementation of national defense and security policies
and to monitor the military’s external security missions (Chamber, 2010;
Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010, 958-959; 2011, 140).
Table 4: Dimensions and Indicators of civilian control in the area of National Defense
Dimension
Indicator
Degree of civilian control
High
Low
Policy-making
Civilian influence
on defense policing
Institutionalized civilian dominance over
defense policy and active day-to-day
participation of civilians in defense
policy-making; military accepts civilian’s
policy prerogative
Civilians are
systematically excluded
from decision-making
Policy
implementation
Civilian oversight of
military defense
activities
Civilians of all branches of government
are able to monitor military activities
Military is not subject to
civilian monitoring and
sanctioning
Source: Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf (2010, 972-975), table is modified by the author. In
the original table there is a third degree of civilian control – Medium – included.
Finally, the area of military organization comprises decisions on all organizational
aspects of the military as an institution, which can be organized into two dimensions7. The
first dimension refers to the material aspects or “hardware” of military organization: force,
size and structure, procurement and production of military equipment, as well as other
institutional, financial and technological resources of the military. The second dimension
(“software”), includes the ideational aspects of military organization (e.g. doctrine and
education); and decisions on personnel selection such as recruitment, appointment and
retirement (Chambers, 2010; Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010, 958-959; 2011, 140).
Measures of the level of civilian control over this area are the extent of civilians’ power to
decide on the ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ of armed forces organisation, and the extent to which
civilians can set the boundaries of military autonomy in deciding on these armed forcesinternal affairs” (Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010, 959-960; 2011, 140).
Table 5: Dimensions and Indicators of civilian control in the area of Military Organization
Dimension
Indicator
Degree of civilian control
High
‘Hardware’ of
military
organization
Civilian influence in
decisions on military
‘hardware’
Civilians have full authority about
decisions of military organization; the
military implements civilian decisions
7
Low
Military hardware is
under military control;
military draws the line
between civilian and
military decision-making
authority
See also Alagappa (2001); Bland (1999; 2001); Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster (2002); Lambert (2009, 279296); Pion-Berlin (1992); Stepan (1988).
10
‘Software’ of
military
organization
Civilian influence
on military
‘software’
Civilians set the rules of conduct, the
limits of military autonomy and provide
the guidelines for ‘corporate identity’ of
the armed forces
Military defines the limits
of military autonomy and
ignores civilian
guidelines; the corporate
culture is distinct from
the civilian society and
the military aims to
preserve its
distinctiveness
Source: Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf (2010, 972-975), table is modified by the author. In
the original table there is a third degree of civilian control – Medium – included.
Having this five dimensional framework in mind, one can state that establishing
civilian control of the military is a significant challenge for many new democracies in which it
remains contested. In this context this study argues, “that establishing civilian control during
processes of democratic transition and consolidation implies a change in the institutional
setup which governs civil-military relations” (Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Voekel/Wolf, 2011,
77). Such an “institutional change and entrenchment of civilian control can only be achieved
if civilians (change agents) are capable of neutralizing and reversing the mechanisms which
keep the existing institutional structure stable (Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Voekel/Wolf,
2011, 85). To do so, they can choose between following strategies which some of them are
more robust (coercive) than others which are weaker and less intrusive:
Table 6: Mechanisms and strategies of civil-military change
Robust
Weak
Sanctioning
Ascriptive Selection
Appeasement
Counterbalancing
Political Socialization
Acquiescence
Monitoring
Appreciation
Source: Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Voekel/Wolf (2011, 85). The table is modified by the
author. The original table contents a categorization of the strategies according three
mechanism of change – compensation (weak strategies), legitimization and power (robust
strategies).
It is important to note, that in order for civilians to be able to successfully implement
specific strategies of control over the armed forces, they must have sufficient resources: more
robust strategies are more demanding in terms of available resources than less robust (weaker)
strategies. Furthermore, civilians deploy ‘resources’ and modify their behavior in response to
changing situations and access of resources. Simultaneously, civilian choices and strategies,
by affecting the status quo in civil-military relations, may also change structures, thereby
creating new resources, improving or wasting available resources and transforming the
repertoire of strategies for future action by the same or following generations of agents
(actors).
In line with Aurel Croissant`s et. Al. (2011, 2010, 2009) conceptual and theoretical
framework (see figure 2), this paper “delineate three sets of factors that provide resources for
civilian action and which either enable or limit the use of certain strategies: (1) macrostructural factors, including levels of socioeconomic modernization, the internal ‘threat
environment,’ and structures of international politics. The establishment of civilian control is
11
more likely when democracy has achieved broad and deep legitimacy among both the mass
public and civilian elite, favoring social and economic conditions and the absence of internal
threats, unrest which is threatening the integrity of state and nation. (2) cultural
variables/factors, especially (1) the military’s self-identity and (2) political culture. “They
shape the understanding of civilians and soldiers regarding what is legitimate and acceptable
behavior; provide a resource for civilians to legitimize their approach to gain control over the
military; or enable the military to justify its political role and influence. (3) institutional
factors, e.g. the cohesiveness of civilian and military actors affects the ability of civilians to
change the status quo of civil-military relations”.
Figure 2: Conceptual and theoretical framework for change
Source: Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Voekel/Wolf (2011, 91)
To sum up, when democratically elected civilians want to establish control over the
armed forces, they can choose from a menu of different control strategies. Their success, in
other words the degree of achieved institutional change, depends on the adequacy of the
chosen set of robust and/or weak strategies in the context of the availability of necessary,
sufficient resources. However, no key actor in civil-military relations in a historical or social
vacuum (Bacevich 1998, 452), therefore the choices and strategies of the civilians depend on
concrete contextual circumstances that condition and influence the possibilities for action (cf.
Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Voekel/Wolf, 2011, 94).
3. Emergence of Military Dominance
After independence in 1947, Pakistan’s civil-military relations were predominantly
determined by the partition of British India and the aftermath. In the following two decades or
so the “colonial notion of civilian supremacy over the military and the military‘s aloofness
from politics” (Rizvi, 2007) changed significantly. As a consequence of the troubling
combination of external threats, i.e. territorial dispute over Kashmir with India and a
contested border with Afghanistan claiming parts of Pakistan’s territory, socio-economic
problems, an under-institutionalized political society 8 , over-bureaucratization of state and
politics and unstable civilian governments, the military became involved in various forms of
nation-building activities (Cheema, 2002, 122) and handling law and order situations. This
8
There was no constitution until 1956 and general elections did not occur until 1970.
12
increased the armed forces’ prestige and created the notion that the military is the sole
guarantor of an insecure state. In result, the armed forces gained significant influence in
national defence and internal security and acted autonomously in military organization
(Siddiqa, 2009, 71). For example, then C-in-C9 Ayub Khan, in 1953, visited the US on his
own initiative and without any approval from the cabinet to build an alignment as an ally
against communism in order to seek military aid (cf. Shafqat, 1998, 31).
After a period of unsuccessful cooperation with the bureaucracy to deal with the
country’s challenges, under cover of the ‘doctrine of necessity’ (Beg, 2007; Azfar, 2006) the
military decided to take over direct power in 1958. But Ayub Khan, who staged the coup, did
not institutionalize military hegemony in the country’s politics. He preferred to establish
personal control over state institutions and run the state with help from bureaucrats, but he
“did not bring the entire armed forces into the political structure” (Burki, 1999, 65). This
started to change under his successor Yahya Khan, who inducted not only more military
personnel into the political process but also relied on support from all three services (Ayub
had only relied on the Army) (Burki, 1999, 67). Yahya transformed Ayub’s personal system
into an institutionalized one with the military as the supreme and sole authority in all
decision-making areas. As such, the armed forces, under Yahya, became even more
entrenched as it succeeded in centralizing power in Pakistan by abandoning Ayub’s politicaladministrative system of ‘basic democracies’ at the local level. However, after another
military debacle which resulted in the lost of Pakistan’s eastern wing (today Bangladesh) and
the loss of the military reputation as guard of the nation, Yahya was forced to resign, handing
power over in 1971, to the elected civilian leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Rizvi, 2007).
Being President and Chief-Martial-Law-Administrator (CMLA), provided with an
electoral mandate, Bhutto was the first civilian leader who made concerted efforts to
institutionalize civilian control and confine the function of the military to defense and security
affairs while imposing constitutional constraints on a political role for the armed forces
(Shafqat, 1997, 167-178). To strengthen and operationalize his power vis-á-vis the military,
several measures were used. First, the chiefs of the three services were put under the direct
control of the Prime Minister. Second, their tenure was reduced from four to three years.
Third, to dilute the individual autonomy of each service, a permanent post of Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) for matters of planning, coordination and review
between the three services was established (Rizvi, 2003, 144-145). Fourth, to streamline the
decision-making structure for defence and security, a White Paper on Higher Defence
Organization in May 1976 was issued. By restructuring the command system, this paper
aimed to ensure that national defence and security would be the responsibility of the elected
civilians (Siddiqa, 2003, 37; Nawaz, 2008, 343; Rizvi, 2003, 145). Fifth, he took the portfolio
of defence (Shafqat, 1997, 177).
However, Bhutto developed an autocratic style of government. In consequence, he lost
support from among most of the civilian groups and he came increasingly in conflict with the
military. Furthermore, his ‘socialist approach’ in public policy, especially his nationalization
program, was seen by a large section of officers (being middle class who were benefitting
from the economic policies under former military ruler Ayub Khan) as contrary to their own
interests as well as un-Islamic and as such against the “Ideology of Pakistan” (Burki/Baxter,
1991, 6-7). To sum up, the most crucial outcome of Bhutto’s rule was that the institution of an
elected prime minister was put into the civil-military equation to challenge militarybureaucratic dominance in the decision-making process. But either the use of robust
9
Commander-in-Chief, later COAS (Chief-of-Army-Staff).
13
strategies, e.g. counterbalancing the army with the creation of Bhutto’s own Federal Security
Force (FSF) or weaker strategies in the form of appeasement (e.g. taking care of the military’s
corporate interests) did not help to break the dominance of the military in politics and to gain
sustainable civilian control (Shafquat, 1997, 166-167; Niaz, 2010, 157; Cloughley, 2006, 230;
Pattanaik, 2000). The major reason for this was that the most crucial resources which
provided Bhutto with sufficient power at the beginning of his tenure to initiate reforms turned
against him. He lost the trust of the electorate, the army was able to regain its reputation as
saviour of the nation (which had been destroyed after the lost 1971 Indo-Pakistan war), and
Bhutto’s public policy was not effective in removing the socio-economic inequalities
produced by his military predecessors. Subsequently, in 1977 COAS General Zia ul-Haq
removed Bhutto; declared martial law, assumed office as CMLA, and dissolved the
parliament.
Zia’s rule was characterised, besides its search for legitimacy and legal impunity, by
following features: First, in confining political participation of the Pakistan Armed Forces Zia
primarily relied on the army (like Ayub). Second, he expanded the role of the army in politics,
in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. The military should be not only responsible for
defending the country in physical-territorial terms but also act as “guardian of the ideological
frontiers” (Rizvi, 2003, 181). Furthermore, he increased tremendously the amount of officers
which were inducted into politics and administration than in the two military regimes before
(Jones, 1985, 75). Third, Zia continued the policy of Yahya and institutionalized rather than
individualized the army’s political involvement (Burki, 1999, 67). Therefore, he utilized the
command structure of the army as a whole instead of empowering individual officers or a
certain group of the officer’s corps. Most significant was Zia’s practice of consulting the
corps commanders. Their conferences (or corps commanders’ meetings) turned into the
central advisory and decision-making body (Burki, 1999, 68). This ensured loyalty and full
support of the senior army officers for Zia’s rule while also generating cohesiveness among
them. No major decisions (e.g. execution of Z.A. Bhutto) were made without consulting the
corps commanders (Rizvi, 2003, 181).
Fourth, Zia enforced a process of constitutional engineering which started with the
suspension of the 1973 constitution and found its peak in the introduction of the 8th
amendment. The amendment’s basic notion was that the constitution should enable “the
military to share decision-making power with the political elite and that the military should be
given power to assume governance in times of national emergency” (Rizvi, 2003, 181).
Therefore, the 8th amendment transformed the political system primarily into a presidential
form with the president, apparently, as the fulcrum of power and a prime minister subservient
to the president (H. Khan, 2010, 374-376).
This produced the constitutional framework for a political decision-making system
which became later commonly known as Troika or the Triangle of Power (Rizvi, 2003, 1-2;
1998, 98; Nawaz, 2008, 11; Burki, 1999, 70). The term Troika—consisting of the president,
prime minister, and army chief of staff—is used to describe the (informal) grouping that
dominated Pakistan’s political decision-making process after the death of General Zia ul-Haq
(Burki, 1999, 70). However, since Troika implies that Pakistan politics are determined by
three power-brokers, it remains as a misnomer.
Here one has to note that, in cases of direct military rule all commander-in-chief (C-inC , later renamed in COAS) at that time preferred to hold the office of president. In
10
10
Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia ul-Haq.
14
consequence, the institution of the president became the spearhead of military influence in
politics and “an extra-constitutional arrangement for civilian-military consensus-building”
(Rizvi, 1998, 98). In such a scenario, the power of the president came to depend heavily on
the support of the army which was best assured if the president was simultaneously the COAS
(‘dual office’). Despite the de jure presidential power, the president had no real de facto
power to enforce his/her constitutional rights which is essential in the weakly institutionalized
political system of Pakistan. Thus, the president relied exclusively on other state agents,
especially the military as the strongest institution in the country. Nevertheless, it is generally
understood that the so called ‘Troika’ gained particularly momentum as an institutionalized
form to exercise political influence for the military and that the effectiveness of the ‘Troika’
depended on the degree of its constitutional entrenchment of presidential powers. To sum up,
with the beginning of the democratization period in 1988, only one potential civilian change
agent regarding the establishment of control over the military can be identified, the prime
minister. The president remained as a military-dominated status quo agent, following the
directives of the COAS. In this context, the notion emerged that if elected governments want
to establish civilian control they have to enhance the power of the prime minister and to
abolish the constitutional powers of the president.
However, Zia and key figures of his regime died in an airplane crash. This brought the
third period of direct military rule to an end, allowing civilians back into the political center,
and made a new power arrangement possible. Nevertheless, three points have to be
emphasized:
First, the transition from military to civilian rule during the 1988 election was not the result of
civilian efforts but rather occurred following military consultations with civilians. Second, the
1988 election did not lead to civilian supremacy over the armed forces. Third, despite the fact
that civilians returned to formally control decision-making, the president ensured that the
military’s influence remained entrenched.
3.1 Civil-Military Relations after Democratization (1988-1997): Failed Civilian Control
After Zia’s death the military decided to hand over power to civilians (Shafqat, 1997, 225).
However, due to the institutional imbalance inherited from the authoritarian era, the prime
minister remained much weaker than the military-backed president who was entrusted with
vast constitutional authority. Therefore, the power shift within civil-military relations was
only formal in nature. This imposed limitations in decision-making on civilian governments
during the period from 1988 to 199711. Subsequently, the top brass were still maintaining an
informal political role in all (significant) policy fields. However, having influence over the
presidency gave the military influence especially over elite recruitment. For example, during
the entire period the military tried to influence the electoral outcome as well as acting
governments, especially through the military Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). By law, the ISI
must act on the orders of the prime minister. But when tensions arose between the prime
minister and the COAS and/or the President, the ISI tended to seek directives from the
military which was considered as “their neutral patron” (Grare, 2009, 4). Its major aim was to
avoid civilian control by instrumentalizing and enforcing dissent between the two major
political parties. Therefore, the ISI worked to build up political alternatives to civilian
governments as well as hampering the success of certain political parties during electoral
campaigns. Most significant were measures against Benazir Bhutto and her PPP which was
11
Comprising three administrations: (1) Benazir Bhutto First-Tenure, 1988-1990; (2) Nawaz Sharif, First
Tenure, 1990-1993; (3) Benazir Bhutto’s, Second Tenure, 1993-1996.
15
identified by vast sections of the general public as the democratic alternative to any former
and future military or quasi-military rule (Hippler, 2008, 80, Haqqani, 2005, 201). With the
help of the ISI, alliances at the national (e.g. Islamist Parties (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad/IJI or
Islamic Democratic Alliance/ against Benazir) as well as on the provincial level (e.g. between
PML(N) and MQM) were formed (Haqqani, 2005, 219). Furthermore, the ISI was alleged to
have both supported the IJI with financial and other resources (Nawaz, 2005, 433-435) and
attempted to dissolve Benazir’s government via the enforcement of a manipulated vote of
confidence (‘Operation Midnight Jackal’). Besides the ISI, the second most significant
instrument for the armed forces to exercise influence was the respective interim governments.
These administrations were used not only for vote rigging (Nawaz, 2005, 436) but also to
instrumentalize the “bureaucratic machinery and state patronage” for partisan purposes to
support the political rivals of Benazir (Rizvi, 2003, 2009). In order to be able to do so, the
military entrenched themselves into the administrative and political structures, including the
induction of more military personnel in the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB).
Only in non-security related public policy issues did civilians gain some control.
Governments were able to introduce significant economic reforms, like (re-) privatising state
companies as well as opening up several sectors for foreign investments. Governments also
instituted a number of populist measures to address poverty and social inequality and initiated
major development projects (Shafqat, 1997, 237-238; Talbot, 1998, 319). However, to ensure
that civilians stayed within the benchmarks regarding public policy as defined by the senior
brass, the military sought to induct civilians deemed loyal to military interests to key civilian
positions (Rais, 1988, 204-206; Burki, 1999, 79)12. Regarding foreign policy, civilians were
able to maintain control as long as the civilian orientations remained within the scope of
military goals. However, one has to state that all major foreign policy decisions were made by
the military, especially regarding Kashmir, India and Afghanistan. For example, then COAS
Beg promoted his own notions for the country’s foreign policy, e.g. ‘strategic depth’ and
‘strategic defiance’ (Abbas, 2005, 143), which was in contrast to the civilian stance. As soon
as governments attempted to act autonomous of the senior brass, they came into serious
conflict with the military.
The area of national defence was de facto in the hand of the military, especially
regarding the country’s nuclear policy. Even if formally administered by the prime minister
and her/his cabinet, it was informally controlled by the president subservient to the COAS
(Waseem, 2004, 43). For example, the decision to go for a further enrichment of the nuclear
weapon program was clearly made by the military top echelon. In contrast, civilians were
made responsible only to find a diplomatic solution for the consequences (international
sanctions) (Kukreja, 2003, 237). Another example in this context is the definition of the threat
perception of India. Each civilian attempt towards a rapprochement towards India or a
challenge to the notion that India is the primarily threat to Pakistan, was viewed as a threat by
the military and got subsequently undermined (Rizvi, 2003, 211-212).
At the same time, internal security was only partly under civilian control. For example,
the military interventions in Sindh (Operation Clean-up, 28 May 1992 to 30 November 1994)
against rural armed gangs (‘dacoits’) and in its provincial capital Karachi to restore law and
order, were decided by civilians but the extent and duration autonomously by the military, e.g.
the top brass made the decision to end the intervention against the civilian order to extent the
operations for another 6 month period. Furthermore, most problematic was the reluctance of
12
E.g. Shahbzada Yaqub Khan as foreign minister and Vaseem Jaffrey as economic advisor during Benazirs first
tenure, 1988-1990 (Rais, 1988, 204-206; cf. Burki 1999, 79).
16
the ISI to be controlled by civilians. For example, the government’s decision to arrest terrorist
groups (Haqqani, 2005, 236) operating in Kashmir were not implemented since they were
seen as allies but also as useful instruments for the military’s own political agenda (Haqqani,
2005, 234, 237). Therefore, civilians were only able to make decisions when it was basically
in line with military interests.
Also, civilian decision-making power in the area of military organization remained
minuscule. Beside the appointments of senior officers, civilians did not attempt to interfere
into matters of military organisation. Therefore, one can state that the question of establishing
civilian control was narrowed down to the struggle over who has the right to select and
appoint the chiefs of the armed forces and other senior officers (Shafqat, 1997, 238). But most
of the time the president claimed his constitutional right to appoint the military top brass and
appointed them after consultation with the armed forces. Therefore, the prime minister
became totally sidelined in all military internal affairs (Nawaz, 2008, 481-482). The fact that
civilians did not reduce the defence budget and service conditions (Rizvi, 2003, 205) of
military business activities (Siddiqa, 2009) is an indication of military dominance in that area.
However, there were some occasions in which civilians tried to challenge the exclusive
position of the military to broaden their scope of action. There were, for example, attempted
changes in the armed forces command structure and the transfer of jurisdiction over the ISI
from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Interior. But the military opposed such
attempts immediately and these measures failed. As a result, the armed forces maintained
their preferred chain of command as well as their influence over the ISI and their
interventions in the political arena continued regardless of civilian attempts to rein them in
(Grare, 2009, 37-38).
Ultimately, civilian attempts to rein in the military remained stillborn. First, to amend
the constitution to reduce presidential powers, civilians sought to abolish Article 58.2 (b). In
addition, civilians sought to co-opt the presidency to install a trusted person as president
(Burki, 1999, 88). But the civilian governments failed in both directions. They were neither
able to win a two-third majority in the national elections which is necessary to amend the
constitution nor to gain informal influence over the presidency. In other words, they failed to
create an environment in which the military could not instrumentalize the president as
political proxy. Only once were civilians able to install apparently a trustworthy president 13
resulting in the inclusion of the prime minister in the decision-making process. Subsequently,
decisions were made in all areas by cordial, mutual consultations between the prime minister,
president and COAS. However, since relations between the president and prime minister
became over time again constrained, it was only a short-lived political liaison and did not lead
to any substantial improvement of civilian control. The president and the COAS continued to
keep the prime minister out of decision-making, impeding the institutionalization of civilian
control in all five areas. Thus, all three civilian governments were dismissed by the president.
Meanwhile, civilians tried to convince the military to withdraw its support for the
president. Actually, civilians had two opportunities during this period to achieve this, as the
country possessed two, basically apolitical COASs (Asif Nawaz and Abdul Waheed Kakar)
(Haqqani, 2005, 225; Cloughley, 2008, 285, 294). In the end, civilians were able to assert
temporarily more power vis-a-vis the president. Nevertheless, civilians still remained
dependent on the ‘good will’ of the army. However, due to poor governance, the prime
ministers lost the confidence of the military which led to a manifestation of the imbalance in
13
Benazir Bhutto was able to replaced Ghulam Ishaq Khan with Farooq Leghari as new president, a close
associate of her (Burki, 1999, pp.87-88)
17
decision-making power not only between the prime minister and president but also between
civilians and military in general. Ultimately, during this period one can state that the military
controlled all levers of power.
Strategies
Generally, civilian governments during this period were cautious in asserting at least a
minimum level of power in decision-making and primarily relied on weaker strategies,
especially acquiescence combined with appeasement and appreciation. In order not to alienate
the soldiers, only on few occasions were robust tactics applied. For example, civilians used
the strategy of monitoring to overview the political activities of the armed forces and the ISI
(Rizvi, 2003, 224). Therefore, they successfully instrumentalized the IB. Most noteworthy
was the detection of Operation Night Jackal through the IB which helped to undermine a
political plot against Benazir Bhutto carried out by the military. Civilian governments also
tried to use sanctioning by successfully removing some top ranking officers (e.g. DG ISI
Hamid Gul through Benazir) (Burki, 1999, 79-80). However, such moves created each time
serious tensions in civil-military relations. Further attempts to tamper with
retirement/extensions in order to constrain unwilling segments in the officer’s corps were
rejected by the military (e.g. planned dismissal of Admiral Sirohey) (Nawaz, 2008, 415-416,
425-427, 430).
Nevertheless, the most significant strategy was acquiescence. Despite several
disagreements on crucial political issues like Pakistan’s relationship with India, the country’s
nuclear weapon program or its involvement in Afghanistan, civilians accepted the military’s
autonomy over entire policy fields such as security and foreign policies (Haqqani, 2005, 236).
Furthermore, civilians did not intrude in military business activities which formed the
country`s greatest economic conglomerate. This, in fact led to a further sidelining of the
Ministry of Defence which had, until then, at least some control over the land purchases of the
armed forces (Nawaz, 2008, 446). Not to provoke the military, the civilians did not try to
forcefully intervene significantly in military internal affairs, beside an unsuccessful
interference regarding the management of the ISI. Most of the time, the
appointment/retirement process of senior commanders were carried out in the interests of the
military (Kukreja, 2003, 244; Shafqat, 1997, 241).
In addition, all civilian governments appreciated the military by emphasizing publicly its
role in the restoration of democracy and their service for the country (Rizvi, 2003, 206).
Furthermore in maintaining a cordial relationship with the soldiers civilians defended publicly
the political legacies of the former military rulers, especially Zia ul-Haq (Shafqat, 1997, 236).
To appease the military, civilian governments spent substantial efforts to protect the
corporate interests of the military. The defence budget skyrocketed, salaries of military
personnel were raised, and individual senior commanders received ‘substantial material
rewards’ (Rizvi, 2003, 212, 220). Furthermore, civilians campaigned extensively to procure
arms from different sources, especially from the US. The most significant achievement of this
strategy was the US Brown Amendment leading to the renewal of military aid under Benazir
(Kukreja, 2003, 244). To gain the loyalty of officers, the governments inducted active-duty
and retired military personnel to lucrative civilian positions, e.g. during 1995-6, three out of
four provincial governors were retired senior officers.
Resources
18
The prevailing political culture seriously hampered civilian decision making power. The
following features were most important: First, political parties lacked internal structures and
experienced politicians. Second, the parties were characterised by a lack of internal
democracy as well as clientelism and a personalised, autocratic style of leadership. This
alienated large segments of the bureaucracy and the social base of the respective ruling
parties. Third, the emergence of the rivalry between leading politicians hindered any civilian
cohesiveness. Instead of building up a cordial working relationship between government and
opposition, political parties found themselves time and again in an unrestrained struggle to
undermine the political opponent (Shafqat, 1997, 240-241). Consequently, civilians were not
able to find a consensus to keep the army out of politics, e.g. by creating a parliamentary
majority to abolish the constitutional powers of the president. Even more, the volatility of this
conflict opened an avenue for soldiers to assert political power. Additionally, governments
lost their ability to ensure support from the general public as well as to portray them as
alternative to military rule. This seriously weakened the stability of the governments and
made them vulnerable to military influence.
Furthermore, macro-structural factors placed constraints on the governments. Initially
they supported the change towards civilian rule since the pre-1988 military governments were
only partly successful in providing economic benefits for certain social groups, e.g. the
middle class under Zia-ul-Haq. But the general public was not able to participate in these
improvements which led to widespread support for civilians. However, this was changing. To
face economic problems, civilians had to make sure that foreign assistance continued to flow
(Burki, 1991, 79). Therefore, they were forced to follow the policies of their military
predecessors, e.g. regarding Afghanistan, which was basically matching the interests of major
donors. In this context one has to note that international actors, especially the US, preferred to
maintain closer relationships with the military then with civilian governments. This not only
undermined the authority of civilians in decision-making but also hampered the
institutionalization of civilian control. Due to the fact that the military was identified as the
only institution which could ensure the protection of its interests, the US was not keen on any
institutional change which would weaken its major partner in a politically unstable
environment (Haqqani, 2005, 224; Talbot, 1998, 317). Consequently, there was no incentive
for the military to respect civilian supremacy or to support processes of democratization. In
this context, the failure of civilians to cope with upcoming economic crisis situations
combined with endemic corruption was used as a justification for military interventions into
politics. Concerned with the overall deterioration of the country’s economy and sociopolitical stability, the armed forces pressured the presidents of this period to dismiss their
prime ministers (Rizvi, 2003, 220, 224; Siddiqa, 2009, 95).
The civilian governments were also challenged by several internal security situations in
all provinces. Militant groups were confronting the state in rural and urban areas of Sindh,
creating political unrests in Baluchistan or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP), and Shia
and Sunnis were increasingly engaged in armed conflicts in Punjab (Rizvi, 2003, 222). Due to
this internal threat situation the civilians relied extensively on the military in order to maintain
law and order and the territorial integrity of the country, reducing their decision-making
power. This tendency gained even more momentum, since the threat of another confrontation
with ‘arch-enemy India’ was used by the military to legitimise its supremacy in defining
exclusively the country’s external threat perception.
19
3.2. Civil-Military Relations between 1997-1999: Semblance of Civilian Control
The second civilian administration of Nawaz Sharif can be identified as the most powerful
one since 1988 (Talbot, 1998, 363). Being endowed with a two-third majority Prime Minister
Sharif immediately repealed the 8th amendment (Kukreja, 2003, 251). Furthermore, to reduce
the option for the military to weaken his parliamentary position, he passed the 14 th
amendment taking away the rights of the members of the assemblies to vote with whichever
political party they wanted (anti-defection or horse-trading) (Talbot, 1998, 361). It appeared
that Sharif changed the political structures favouring an army-backed president and
disadvantaged the civilian government. The fact that the prime minister was able to remove a
president, a chief justice and a COAS seemed to indicate this and marked a significant power
shift within civil-military relations in Pakistan.
Generally, decision-making in this period was influenced by two events affecting most
policy fields: First, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998. Second, the 1999 Kargil
conflict, an armed confrontation with India in Kashmir. In both cases, the prime minister did
not get sidelined by the military and was included in the decision-making process (Abbas,
2005, 162; Mazari, 2003, 57-58). For example, beside the fact that the government’s decision
to make Pakistan an overt nuclear weapons power was implemented on the recommendation
of the top commanders (Rizvi, 2003, 228), the prime minister was able to insist that the final
decision should be (formally) with the cabinet.
To sum up, it appeared that civilians were able to assert substantial power in decisionmaking. But this was only possible because the military under the leadership of COAS
Jehangir Karamat remained neutral in the conflict between president and prime minister
(Hippler, 2008, 90-91). Subsequently, presidential power was removed and the 14th
amendment introduced, and civilians were able to gain formal control over elite recruitment.
Rizvi notes, “without the army’s support, the president could neither avoid impeachment nor
remove the prime minister. All previous government dismissals had been implemented
through the Army” (Rizvi, 2003, 230). Nevertheless, the informal role of the armed forces in
all decision-making areas remained and it was dependent on the ‘military’s goodwill’ to
which extent they exercised their influence. Indeed, as decisions were now primarily made in
mutual consultation between prime minister and senior commanders, and not between the
senior brass and president, did not significantly reduce the role of the military in the country’s
politics.
Strategies
In order to mollify the armed forces, Sharif’s government continued the strategy of his
predecessors to induct military personnel into the civil services and other significant posts
(e.g. police, IB) (Rizvi, 2003, 228). Another element of appeasement was the civilian
acceptance of the army’s proposal „to allow the army chief to hold simultaneously the post of
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff“ (Pattanaik, 2000).
To gain control over the military, the prime minister used ascriptive selection by
choosing Musharraf as new COAS. He was convinced that Musharraf as an ethnic Mohajir
and superseding two senior officers would not have the full support from the Pakthun and
Punjabi-dominated officers corps (Rizvi, 2003, 232) and would thus disturb the military
coherence. However, this did not work out since the senior officers remained loyal to
Musharraf, resulting in the successful 1999 military takeover (Ziring, 2005, 257).
Also, civilians tried to sanction the senior commanders as soon as they were not in line
with his decision-making. For example, when General Karamat criticised the policies of the
20
government, Sharif dismissed the COAS and the latter subsequently left office – an incident
which happened for the first time in Pakistani history.
Resources
The following factors were essential to allowing Sharif to exercise a somewhat higher level of
civilian strategies relative to his predecessors. However, certain factors eventually worked to
the detriment of his continued rule. First, the 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999 Kargil military
adventurism had a strong impact on the government. After the tests the US imposed sanctions
on Pakistan which led to a serious economic crisis (Mahmood, 2002, 311) and after Kargil,
the country experienced total diplomatic isolation. These had effects on the government in
two directions. First, it portrayed the prime minister as unable to assuage the international
community and his policies about the nature Pakistan’s ambitions. Therefore it led to a loss of
his former support base, the Islamist and right wing sections of the society and strengthened
the reputation of the army despite the fact that Kargil was a military debacle. On the other
hand, the increasing US demands to withdraw troops from Kashmir as well as the reluctance
of China (which had seemed as a close friend/ally) to support Pakistan on the Kashmir issue
can be seen as a resource for Sharif to make the decision to end the Kargil operation (Mazari
2003, 59-62). Being aware of the worsening US-Pakistan relationship after the nuclear tests
and the consequent sanctions (especially regarding military aid) compelled the army to accept
the prime minister’s decision. However, the fact that civilians withdrew the troops from
Kargil without consulting the top brass alienated the senior officers (Rizvi 2003, 232). Both
can be seen as crucial factors leading to the 1999 coup which ouster Sharif out of office.
Second, a major challenge for Sharif was the continuing ethnic and sectarian strife in
various parts of the country which led to a serious increase in the internal threat perception
(Kukreja 2003, 254). These conflicts were turning increasingly violent and could not anymore
be controlled without support from the armed forces (Mahmood, 2002, 403). Furthermore, to
maintain socio-economic and political stability, the government relied heavily on the army
especially to improve administrative efficiency and economic management capacities. To do
so, Sharif handed over several civilian institutions to the military and a large number of
soldiers were deployed in civilian duties. Consequently, the country experienced the highest
induction of military personnel into civilian posts in its history (Rizvi 2003, 232).
Third, a factor which entrusted Sharif with significant power was the fact that he had an
outstanding popular (electoral) mandate and that he was able to create alliances with religious
as well as secular minor political partners at the beginning of its tenure. However, due to his
consequent unrestricted and unscrupulous search for absolute power, he weakened existing
political institutions, especially the judiciary. Sharif, with his narrowly-based and
personalized decision-making style, alienated most of his civilian allies in the provinces,
leading to regional political destabilisation and violent conflicts. Both made his government
more dependent on support from the armed forces which subsequently gained more political
influence.
Fourth, the fact that in 1998 the Hindu-Nationalists asserted power in New Delhi led to
India becoming a greater threat towards Islamic Pakistan. This gave more importance to the
army as guardian of nation and religion. Consequently Sharif’s decision- making became
constrained, e.g. he was not able to remove necessary funds from defence to development and
the military’s position regarding the definition of security policy was strengthened.
21
3.3 Restoration of Military Dominance under Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007)
As a consequence of the government’s attempt to establish civilian control over the
appointment process of the COAS, the armed forces asserted direct power in 1999. To ensure
control over elite recruitment, the prime minister and his government were dismissed, all
assemblies dissolved and the then COAS Pervez Musharraf assumed office as head of a newly
appointed executive. In order to further stabilize its regime and gain legitimacy, the military
carried out several measures to institutionalize its role in the remaining areas of political
decision-making. Therefore, Musharraf introduced several constitutional amendments to
make the president again the supreme decision-making authority—the power of the prime
minister was once more reduced and presidential powers through the abolished 8th amendment
were restored (Siddiqa, 2009, 106; Talbot, 2002, 311). Furthermore, the federal cabinet
became subordinate under a newly established National Security Council (NSC), responsible
for all major decisions, which was chaired by the president and not by the prime minister
(Pattanaik, 2000). Musharraf also established the National Command Authority (NCA),
responsible for policy formulation on nuclear issues (Pattanaik, 2000). Both the NSC and
NAC created an institutional framework for the military’s formal authority in all security
related fields (El-Khawas, 2009, 99; Zaidi, 2005, 5176). In this context one has to note, that
Musharraf’s claim that decisions would be made jointly by civilians and soldiers was only
symbolic in nature since he exercised absolute power as president (Nawaz, 2008, 557).
In his search for legitimacy, Musharraf gave great significance to elections (Shah, 2003,
26). In April 2002, he decided to hold a referendum, in which the people had to elect him for
five years. This was followed by parliamentary elections in October 2002 in order to
civilianise his regime (Waseem, 2006, ix). The elections were criticised as being manipulated
by the military. Therefore, Musharraf did not only facilitate the creation of his own ‘kings
party’, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid/PML-Q (Musharraf, 2006, 165-167), but also
enacted several extra-legal measures to hamper the success of rival political parties, e.g.
restrictions for party registration and the duration of electoral campaigns.
Resources
The following factors were influencing civil-military relations during this period. First, the
military takeover did not face much public opposition (Rashid, 2009, 31) and was appreciated
among broad sections of society as a step to bring a corrupt and ineffective government to an
end. But this perception changed as Musharraf’s regime continued. Second, the impact of
‘9/11’ affected Musharraf’s regime. Since the Pakistan Armed Forces decided to join the USled war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, they earned international legitimacy and
received substantial aid (Nawaz, 2008, 547). This helped to stabilize the military government.
However, Musharraf’s close alliance with the US also destabilised his rule, since the military
campaign against the Taliban was greatly criticized by the general public and extremist
groups. Therefore, one can state that Musharraf’s pro-US policy eroded the domestic
popularity and legitimacy of the military (Khakwani, 2003, 17).
Furthermore, officers became concerned that this would disturb the internal
cohesiveness which had been a major resource to establish military dominance in politics. But
Musharraf moved immediately against senior officers who resisted his pro-US policy: they
were transferred to insignificant posts or forced into retirement. Nevertheless, this was only
partly successful and can be seen as an indicator of “friction or tension concerning the
organizational integrity of the army—something never exposed before in such clear terms“
(Khakwani, 2003, 17). Such organizational disunity was gaining momentum after Musharraf
was forced to give up his ‘dual office’ as president and COAS. Witnessing the continuing
increase of domestic and international pressure on Musharraf, the new COAS Kayani was no
22
longer willing to support the ‘civilianised’ ex-COAS president. Thus, Musharraf had to
withdraw from politics and handed over power to Kayani, who held free and fair general
elections in 2008 (Jetly, 2008).
To sum up, during Musharraf’s rule, it become most obvious that the so-called ‘rule of
the Troika’, suggesting that political decision-making is dominated by the interaction of three
power-brokers, was becoming in fact a bipolar structure with the prime minister on one side
and the ‘dual office of President/COAS’ on the other. It proves also, that during both regime
types –civilian and military- the president was dependent on the support of the military to
exercise power (Burki/Baxter, 1991, 16). In this context, one can identify a new trend in the
country’s civil-military relations. In order to avoid a formal role for the military in governing,
civilians began to insist on the separation of offices from the COAS and president. Therefore,
one can argue, that the successful agitation of civilian forces against Musharraf’s holding of
both offices simultaneously was one of the most successful moves towards the restoration of
civilian rule.
3.4 After Musharraf: Civilian Control at the Edge
Current civil-military relations are characterized by a tendency toward growing power of
civilians but an imbalance still remains which is favouring the military in decision-making.
According to Rizvi (2010), “it is a mixed model where in certain areas the military has a free
hand, in others there is a shared decision-making and in some areas the civilian government is
free to make decisions about a number of domestic issues that do not impinge upon the
interests of the military” 14 . The fact that civilians were able to remove the constitutional
elements introduced by the military to build up the president as an efficient political proxy can
be seen as an indication that they are in the process of regaining control over elite recruitment.
Most important was the restoration of the parliamentary powers usurped by the last military
rule (Burki, 2010, 4). This included the removal of the right which has empowered the
president to dismiss the prime minister though the latter re-asserted the authority to appoint
the service chiefs. In this context, the government was also able to define each effort to
dislodge a duly constituted (elected) government as high treason (Burki, 2010, 11). Since the
military in its search for legitimacy are trying to act within a constitutional framework, even if
it is purposely amended therefore, this can be seen as an effective barrier against future
military takeovers. Additionally, to avoid undue interference into the electoral process, the
election commission was strengthened by granting it more autonomy. But the military still
plays a role in leadership selection, despite the announcement of the COAS that the armed
forces will stay politically neutral15. For example, the military became active in brokering a
rapprochement between the two conflicting major political parties (Fair, 2011, 100; Pattanaik,
2009).
In non-security-related fields of public policy that do not concern the military, it has not
interfered. In such cases, the civilians were able to make major decisions like enact the 18 th
amendment, the 7th national finance award or the so called Baluchistan package. However, all
of these decisions are linked with the overall aim of civilians to push for decentralisation
(Wolf, 2010). This can be understood as a reduction of the military’s significance (Siddiqa,
2011, 15) going beyond the areas of public policy.
Despite the fact that the defence committee of the federal cabinet is the highest
consultative body for national defence today--like in internal security and public policy-14
E-Mail interview with Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 26. Mai 2010.
COAS Kayani also carried out some measures to separate the military from the civilian sphere, e.g. officers
were recalled from civilian duties and any political activities for active soldiers got forbidden (Ahmed, 2009, 5).
15
23
significant decisions are made jointly in consultation between the prime minister, president
and the COAS. Nevertheless, “the military makes the principal contribution to defence policymaking“16. For example, in the context of the country’s struggle against domestic terrorism,
the major operations in the Swat valley or in South Waziristan was initiated by the civilians
but decisions regarding its implementation and duration as well as the developments in the
respective post-conflict scenarios are made by the military.
Regarding military organisation, civilians successfully moved the nuclear command
authority (NCA) under the control of the prime minister, weakening the formal authority of
the president. However, “the military does not want any civilian interference in [its] internal
and organizational matters” 17 . Nevertheless, there has been some progress regarding the
defense budget which was never discussed by elected civilians before (Ahmed, 2009, 3).
However, in 2008, the army offered its first budget proposal for discussion (Ali, 2008).
Despite this fact, it is widely interpreted as a purely symbolic gesture that the military is
willing to be more subject to civilian oversight (Fair, 2009, 77).
Strategies
Basically the current government relies on weak strategies of appreciation, acquiescence and
appeasement. Civilians publicly appreciate army efforts in carrying out internal security
operations and aid for civilian power missions (e.g. natural catastrophes such as the Hunza
lake incident or the 2010 monsoon flooding). Civilians have also taken part in major military
exercises in order to appreciate military efforts to defend the country against conventional
threats. Subsequently, they have confirmed the military’s threat perception of India as an
‘arch-enemy’. Furthermore, civilians are also using acquiescence by not intruding into
internal military affairs, especially in the appointment process of the military’s top echelon.
They are also not intervening in the implementation of internal security operations. To
appease the military, civilians have granted senior commanders extensions of their tenures.
For example, civilians, for the first time in the country’s history, granted a full-term extension
for the current COAS. (Shah 2010; Nawaz, 2010). Furthermore, civilians continue to take care
of the military’s corporate interests by allowing them to persist in their business activities as
well as to facilitate foreign and domestic resources for defence capabilities.
Resources
The following factors have influenced the decision-making power of the civilians.
First, it appears that the unrestricted struggle among civilians is ‘frozen’ (at least
temporarily), favouring their ability to build political consensus. A tendency which started in
2006, with the Charter of Democracy, an agreement between the two major political parties to
cooperate in order to achieve control over the armed forces.18
Second, political parties have started to build major coalitions in order to assert more
power, especially vis-a-vis the military. This will help to make civilian supremacy more
likely19. It is important to emphasize that this phenomenon includes also the broad sections of
the ‘civil society‘, e.g. the lawyers movement. Despite the fact that there are serious
disaffections among the electorate regarding the performance of the government, the new
consensus that military rule should be avoided remains unchallenged. This constitutes a shift
in the people’s mindset which has provided a valuable resource for change towards civilian
supremacy. Second, there is a growing sense of constitutional culture and power (Wolf,
16
E-Mail interview with Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 26. Mai 2010.
E-Mail interview with Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 26. Mai 2010.
18
It raises nine crucial issues concerning civil-military relations (Rizvi, 2006).
19
Personal interview with Saed Shafqat, 17.05.2010, Lahore.
17
24
2010). This is due to a colonially-inherited belief in the constitution as the sole source of
political legitimacy and the fact that the initial 1973 Constitution is the only document of
national consensus. This created a form of ‘constitutional loyalty’ within the military.
Therefore, the constitution restricts the army and will contribute to the establishment of
civilian control. 20 Here the armed forces must experience that they cannot exercise power
outside the bounds of the constitution. The ability to introduce the 18th amendment is an
indication of this.21 However, this constitutional legacy could not avoid military takeovers
until now.
Third, the international community, e.g. US, Democratic Friends of Pakistan, has
increasingly supported civil-military cooperation,22 creating the awareness that they are not in
favour of any form of military rule. The fact that further US aid (the Kerry-Lugar bill) will
only be granted if civilian control becomes established (Pattanaik 2009; Borchgrave, 2010)
will strengthen the position of the government vis-a-vis the military.
Fourth, there was the rising significance of the economic factor. Generally, Pakistan’s
policy-making has been dominated by the security paradigm. The recent internal economic
crises and the increasing economic imbalance with India has convinced the military that it
must reduce its threat perception in order to promote economic cooperation. Furthermore,
senior commanders are aware that the revenues are just enough to cover the expenditures of
the government administration including defence budget.23 This will give civilians more room
to manoeuvre in foreign policy and regarding a reallocation of funds for the military.
Fifth, steps towards more civilian control were made possible because the military
separated themselves from politics. The major reason for this was to regain its reputation,
which was lost during Musharraf’s rule. Sixth, the deteriorating internal security situation
made the Armed Forces indispensable for the government to maintain law and order, and
Pakistan’s territorial integrity. All of these factors contributed to a weak collection of strategy
choices.
4. Civil-Military Relations and Democracy
Democracy in Pakistan is not consolidated. This is because the entire process of
democratization in the country is non-linear (Khakwani, 2003, 23). There is no clear-cut
juncture marking the transition from a definite end of an authoritarian area towards the
beginning of an uninterrupted, linear process of stabilization and consolidation of democracy.
The political development instead is characterised by a persistent sequence of transitions
between democratic and military or semi-military regime types. After an initial phase of
bureaucracy-military domination (1947-1972), the country witnessed three attempts towards
democratization. However, all three democratization phases can be seen as a response to
military rule, producing not only national elected leaders (e.g. Z.A. Bhutto) but also political
parties (e.g. PPP or religious political parties) (cf. Shafqat, 1997, 256). The paradox is that on
one side the democratic transitions were caused and facilitated by political interventions of the
armed forces, but on the other side, the democratization phases were conditioned and
truncated by the military. The major reason therefore is that the civilians (the non-elected
during the initial years as well as the later elected ones) were not able to institutionalize
20
Personal interview with Mohammad Waseem, 18.05.2010, Lahore.
Personal interview with Mohammad Waseem, 18.05.2010, Lahore.
22
Personal interview with Jehangir Karamat, 20.05.2010, Lahore.
23
Personal interview with Jehangir Karamat, 20.05.2010, Lahore.
21
25
civilian control over the armed forces. This is a fact which inhibits the quality of democracy
during the democratic phases in various dimensions.
This lack of civilian control especially affected the electoral regime. With the help of
the intelligence services, elections prior of 2008 got seriously manipulated to produce an
electoral outcome which ensures a subsequent political role of the armed forces. In order to
prevail the polls, political parties were seriously hampered by manipulating party rifts,
creating new parties, pressuring individual candidates to withdraw in elections, placing
restrictions on electoral campaigning or acting in favour of certain political parties (cf. Fair,
2009, 78). Even elected governments got undermined in several ways, e.g. through facilitating
votes of confidence by vote buying (horse trading) and were ousted of power. In result, the
development of a functioning party system was inhibited. The policy of creating tension
(‘divide and rule’) between the different political leaders and their respective parties did not
only lead to increased factionalism which paralysed the parliamentary process and avoided
the evolution of a constructive relationship between opposition and government. However, the
(self-imposed) neutrality of the armed forces in the latest 2008 elections, which not only
helped to develop a sense of civilian control over leadership selections but also made it
possible to carry out free and fair elections with Pakistan’s first grand coalition including the
two main civilian rivals PPP and PML-N. Furthermore, it created a certain degree of
institutional effectiveness of the legislative branch by producing major political outcome in
example the 18th amendment. Another notable measure towards civilian oversight was the
first debate on the defence budget.
During martial law regimes, the press was discouraged, restricted and forced not to
publish dissenting views. With the downfall of Musharraf the media became increasingly
vibrant. Despite still existing constrains (Freedom House, 2010b) on investigative reporting
regarding security and military related affairs, the manipulation of the media is becoming
more difficult (Bertelsmann, 2010). For example, there are more reports on “disappeared
people” under the last military rule. However, the media is still not possible to monitor the
internal security operations of the army, like in Swat, Malakand or FATA or is rarely
reporting (Human Rights Watch, 2011). In doing so “putting reporters at high risk” (BTI,
2010; cf. Freedom House, 2010a). Regarding several human rights organisations, the military
was alleged of several abuses regarding human rights violations, arbitrary detention, property
destructions, killing of non-combatants as well as extra-judicial executions (Freedom House,
2010a; Human Rights Watch, 2011). Nevertheless, the media got active in supporting the
judiciary in their attempt to gain independence from the government and the armed forces,
promoting transparency and checks and balances. Despite the fact that the government is
operating with limited transparency and accountability, Freedom House (2010a) states that
“this has improved somewhat with the resumption of civilian rule”.
To sum up, it is important to note that certain policies introduced by military rulers got
adopted by civilian governments. For example the freedom of association is occasionally
being restricted in order to suppress public gatherings against the government “with excessive
force, and use preventative arrest to forestall planned demonstrations” (Freedom House,
2010a). Furthermore, there is also the tendency of civilians to rely on coercion to deal with
political challenges (cf. Shafqat, 1997, 259). They created either own security forces or used
existing ones to harass the political opposition. Also, systems of patronage and distribution of
rewards in order to ensure cooperation and loyalty during military regimes were consequently
adopted by civilians and the political parties, damaging the reputation of the party system. (cf.
Shafqat, 1997, 258).
26
5. Conclusion
Civil-Military relations in Pakistan did not undergo significant changes towards the
institutionalization of civilian control since the country came to existence in 1947. Due to
domestic political turmoil and an extraordinary external threat perception in the initial years, a
lack of (elected) civilian leadership, and an alliance with the country’s ruling (civilian)
bureaucracy, the armed forces were able to establish themselves as the major agent in all
decision-making areas. Furthermore, the military was not only able to maintain this status quo
during the first two democratisation periods (1972-1977 and 1988-1999) but also able to
change its political role from a primarily personalised form as it appeared in the initial years
into a institutionalized form during the two military interregnums/rules (1977-1988 and 19992008). Due to international and domestic pressure, during the third, ongoing period of
democratization, the armed forces did not try to inhibit the constitutional removal of its
institutionalized role in politics as well as the classification of an extra-constitutional removal
of an elected government as high treason. However, this led only to the acceptance of a form
of civilian dominance in elite recruitment. Despite the fact that today’s decision-making
happens in form of mutual consultation, indicating some degree of power-sharing within the
troika of president, prime minister and COAS, the supreme authority in policy formulation
concerning internal security and national defence is the military. Furthermore, the armed
forces remain fully autonomous in military organisation. Public policy as far as it is not
related with the corporate interests of the soldiers, is the second area which witnesses growing
civilian control. The following conclusions can be drawn:
First, the strong political role of the military is influenced primarily by two legacies
from the initial years: On one side, there is the military’s perception that civilians are neither
able to form a sustainable, functioning government nor capable of running the affairs of the
state. This created a self-identity which constitutes the military as the sole saviour of the
nation and the ‘doctrine of necessity’ to intervene in politics, especially regarding leadership
selection and internal as well as external security issues. To carry out this task, the soldiers
developed a ‘help-yourself’ attitude starting to create reserved domains in public policies, e.g.
own business activities (MILBUS, see Siddiqa, 2009) or a foreign policy independent and
separate from civilians by building up its own relationship with the US. As a side-effect, the
soldiers gained autonomy over its own organisational affairs. On the other side, they realised
that they cannot rule the country permanently, but they want to continue to influence the
decision-making process. Here, the choice of the (non-elected) civilian leadership to start the
state-building process by continuing the colonial governmental system of diarchy
(bureaucracy and military as the main building blocks) did not only draw the military in
politics but also laid the foundation of the succeeding so called ‘Troika-system’ as a powersharing arrangement between soldiers and civilians. This foundation got entrenched into
Pakistan politics by the following military rulers after 1972.
Second, the possibility to dissolve the Troika-system in order to institutionalize civilian
control was until the ongoing period of democratization only possible two times: under Z.A.
Bhutto (first democratization period), and during Nawaz Sharif’s second administration (end
of second democratization period). In both cases the civilians had sufficient resources as well
as the political will to establish control over the armed forces (both were lacking during the
initial years). However, Z.A. Bhutto’s and Sharif’s autocratic style of governance, combined
with mismanagement and corruption, created a situation in which they lost public support and
the army was able to regain its reputation. In consequence, resources which were favouring
civilian control turned against it. In this context, the application of robust strategies to control
the armed forces proved to be most harmful to civilian rule. Attempts to entrench civilian
control were not perceived as a process to enforce democratisation but to enhance personal
27
power in order to undermine existing political institutions and opponents. In this context,
civilians had to realise that robust strategies to gain control over the military did not pay off,
e.g. the appointment of the military top brass in order to sanction and/or to divide them. All
the coup-leaders were selected and appointed by the civilian leadership ignoring internal
military hierarchies and procedures.
Third, in assessing the current democratization period one can state that when civilians
are able to build a consensus, e.g. in form of an alliance between the leading political parties,
they are basically able to avoid or remove a institutionalized/formal role of the military in
politics, as it happens in the case of the resignation of Pervez Musharraf or the enacting of the
18th amendment. Therefore it was necessary that further factors, which were favouring the
military’s role in politics, like the relationship with the US, turned towards supporting civilian
control. But to be able to use them, the civilians had to switch from robust to weaker
strategies in order to not provoke any military backslashes.
Nevertheless, one has to be aware that until today the lack of institutionalized civilian
control made it impossible to consolidate democracy since no elected government was able to
finish its tenure due to military influence. The current phase of democratization was only
possible because of a voluntary withdrawal from a formal involvement in politics by COAS
Kayani. The institutionalized form of the ‘Troika’ might today be removed and President
Zardari is increasingly losing his political grip favouring the decision-making power of Prime
Minister Gilani. To conclude, Pakistan’s triangle power-sharing arrangement is still
dominated by the military.
28
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List of interviews
Dr. Qalbi Abid, Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Chairman of History
& Pakistan Studies Department and Director of the Research Society of Pakistan at the
University of Punjab, Lahore, 17 Mai 2010.
Aasiya Riaz, Joint Director, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency,
Islamabad, 10 May 2010.
Khanum Gauhar Aijaz Khan, Former Minister Social Welfare, Karachi, 21. April 2010.
Shahnaz Wazir Ali, The Honorable Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, Islamabad, 12
May 2010.
Cyril Almeida, Assistant Editor and Columnist, Dawn Newspaper, Islamabad, 7 May 2010.
Dr. Martin Axmann, Resident Representative, Hans Seidel Foundation, Islamabad, 10 May
2010.
Brig. Gen. (ret.) Kamal Aziz, Former Pakistan Defence Attaché in Germany, Islamabad, 12
May 2010.
Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director, Center for Research & Security Studies, Islamabad, 13 May
2010.
Dr. Ross Masood Husain, Political Analyst, Founder and Former Director General, Institute
of Strategic Analysis, Islamabad, 27 May 2010.
Dr. Syed Bashir Hussain, Professor at National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan, 6
May 2010.
Gulmina Bilal, Political Analyst and Director of Individualland, Islamabad, 7 May 2010.
Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema, Dean, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence
University National Defence University, Islamabad, 29 April 2010.
Ardeshir Cowasjee, Political Analyst Columnist, Dawn Newspaper, Karachi, 19 April 2010.
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Azad Durrani, Former Director General ISI; Former Ambassador to
Germany; General Manager, NADRA Pakistan, 13 Mai 2010.
35
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Tariq Waseem Ghazi, Former Corpscommander of Karachi and Former
Federal Defence Secretary, Karachi, 26 April 2010.
Dr. A. Z. Hilali, Professor at National Defence University, Islamabad, 6 May 2010.
Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Professor at Quiad-I-Azam University, Islamabad, 1 May 2010.
Dr. Ayesha Jalal, Professor at Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of
Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, Lahore University of Management Sciences
(LUMS), Lahore, 19 May 2010.
Shahida Jamil, Former Federal Minister for Law, Justice & Human Rights; Former Federal
Minister for Environment, Local Government & Rural Development; Former Caretaker
Federal Minister for Woman’s Development, Social Welfare & Special Education,
Professor at Sindh Muslim Government Law College, Karachi, 23 April 2010.
Saima Jasam, Head of Programs, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Lahore, 18 May 2010.
Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Professor at School of Politics and International Relations, QuaidI-Azam University, Islamabad, 31 May 2010.
Gen. (ret.) Jehangir Karamat, Former Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Army and
Former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Lahore, 20 May 2010.
Hasnain Kazim, Journalist, South Asia Correspondent, Spiegel Online, Islamabad, 1 Mai
2010.
Dr. Babak Khalatbari, Resident Representative, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Islamabad,
25 Mai 2010.
Col. Lt. Dr. Muhammad Khan, Lecturer at the National Defence University, Islamabad, 6
May 2010.
Dr. Aziz A. Khan, Political Analyst, Karachi, 20 April 2010.
Brig. Gen. (ret.) M. Akram Khan, Former Commandant, Mountain Warfare School,
Islamabad, 5 May 2010.
Col. Maj. (ret.) Sher Khan, Former Commandant, Mountain Warfare School, Islamabad, 2
May 2010.
36
Dr. Tanvir Ahmed Khan, Former Foreign Secretary, Minister of Information and
Broadcasting, and Director General at Institute of Strategic Studies (ISSI), Islamabad, 5
May 2010.
Masod Sharif Khan Khattak, Former Director General Intelligence Bureau; Former
Member, Central Executive Committee, PPP; Former Vice President PPP, Islamabad, 28
May 2010.
Asma Shakir Khawaja, Professor at Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Faculty of
Contemporary Studies of National Defence University, Islamabad, 13 May 2010.
Dr. Michael Koch, Ambassador, Embassy of The Federal Republic of Germany, Islamabad,
27 May 2010.
Salma Malik, Professor at Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam
University, Islamabad, 31 May 2010.
Lt. General (ret.) Talat Masood, Political Analyst, Islamabad, 12 May 2010.
Anja Minnaert, Resident Representative, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Islamabad, 6 May
2010.
Abdul Qadir, Program Coordinator & Scientific Advisor; Coordinator and Member of the
FES working group on civil-military relations, Islamabad, 6 May 2010.
Mian Raza Rabbani, Senator, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on National
Security; Chairman of the 18th Constitutional Amendment Implementation Commission;
Former Advisor to the Prime Minister on Inter-Provincial Coordination, Islamabad, 26 May
2010.
Stephan Röken, Minister Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of The Federal
Republic of Germany, Islamabad, 29 April 2010.
Dr. Noman O. Sattar, Professor at National Defence University, Islamabad, 6 May 2010.
Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Professor at Department of Political Science, Lahore University of
Management Sciences (LUMS), Lahore, 18 May 2010.
Dr. Hassan Askari Rizvi, Professor Emeritus at University of Punjab, Lahore, 26 May 2010.
37
Ahmed Sadik, Secretary/Advisor of Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto; Former State
Secretary, Punjab, Lahore, 18 May 2010.
Muhammad Ali Saif, Advocate & Legal Consultant at the High Court and Federal Shariat
Court; Former Additional Deputy Prosecutor Central/Special Prosecutor, National
Accountability Bureau, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 11 Mai 2010.
Qadir H. Sayeed, Former Deputy Attorney General of Pakistan, Karachi, 26 April 2010
Dr. Saeed Shafqat, Professor and Director of the Centre for Public Policy & Governance,
Lahore, 17 Mai 2010.
Brig. Gen. (ret.) A. R. Siddiqi, Security Analyst, Karachi, 23 April 2010.
Justice (ret.) Shaiq Usmani, Former Chief Justice of Sindh High Court, Karachi, 21 April
2010.
Dr. Mohammad Waseem, Professor at the Department of Political Science, Lahore
University of Management Sciences (LUMS), Lahore, 18 May 2010.
Lt. Col. Klaus Wolf, Defence Attaché, Embassy of The Federal Republic of Germany,
Islamabad, 29 April 2010.
Mariam Yazdani, Director Programmes, Center for Research & Security Studies, Islamabad,
13 May 2010.
Akram Zaki, Former Secretary-General/Minister of State and Foreign Affairs; Former
Ambassador to China, USA, Nigeria and Philippines; Former Senator and Chairman,
Foreign Affairs Committee of Pakistan Senate, Islamabad, 27 May 2010.
38