Using Law to Create National Identity: The
Course to Democracy in Tajikistan
JILL E. HICKSON††
SUMMARY
I.
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................... 348
II.
NATIONAL IDENTITY ................................................................................................. 350
A. Defining National Identity................................................................................. 350
B. National Identity and the Nation-State.............................................................. 351
C. Creating National Identity in a Nation-State .................................................... 352
III.
THE TAJIKS AND THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN: NATIONAL IDENTITY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE......................................................................................... 354
A. Political History and Identity ............................................................................ 354
B. The Identity of Economic Dependence.............................................................. 356
C. Islam and Identity.............................................................................................. 358
D. Identity Crisis: The Soviet and Post-Civil War Legacy..................................... 360
IV.
CREATING A NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TAJIKISTAN............................................. 360
A. Creating a Memory of a Common Past............................................................. 362
1. Rewriting the Law...................................................................................... 362
a. The Law of Amnesty ............................................................................ 362
b. The Law on Public Holidays............................................................... 363
2. Remodeling Public Space .......................................................................... 363
3. Reviving the Tajik Renaissance ................................................................. 364
B. Establishing a Density of Linguistic and Cultural Ties..................................... 365
1. Linking Language and Tajik Identity......................................................... 366
a. Adopting the Law on Language .......................................................... 366
b. Preserving the Linguistic Rights of Minorities ................................... 367
2. Creating Cultural Ties ................................................................................ 368
a. Controlling the Media......................................................................... 368
b. Rewriting the Law ............................................................................... 369
i. The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Organization of
Religion........................................................................................ 369
ii. The Law on Education................................................................. 369
†† Former Foreign Affairs Legislative Aide to U.S. Senator Paul D. Wellstone, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. B.A., American University, 1992;
M.A., Islamic and Near Eastern Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, 2000; J.D., Washington University in
St. Louis, 2000. I dedicate this article to Paul D. Wellstone. I thank Frances F. Foster, Fatemeh Keshavarz, and
especially Mr. F.T. Tohirov and Mr. Imomqul Buriev of the Department of Philosophy and Law of the Academy of
Sciences, Republic of Tajikistan. Data for this article was collected as part of a six-month research project with the
support of the Academy of Science of the Republic of Tajikistan.
Editor’’s note: Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of foreign materials in this article were completed by
the author and are not available in published form.
347
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c. Reforming Pedagogy........................................................................... 371
C. Creating a Conception of the Equality of All Members
of the Community............................................................................................... 371
1. Rewriting the Law ...................................................................................... 371
a. The General Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation ....................... 372
b. The Law on Political Parties............................................................... 372
2. Nongovernmental Organizations................................................................ 373
a. Domestic.............................................................................................. 373
b. International........................................................................................ 374
V.
BARRIERS TO CREATING A NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TAJIKISTAN ....................... 375
A. Economic Reality............................................................................................... 375
B. Lack of Political Will......................................................................................... 376
VI.
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 378
I.
INTRODUCTION
In the United States in 1803, Justice Marshall established the doctrine of judicial
review.1 According to Marshall, ““It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.””2 Since there is no explicit textual authority for judicial
review, Marshall could not affirm that the Constitution establishes judicial review, only that
it ““confirms and strengthens the principle.””3 The law laid down by Marshall had been
repeatedly expounded by his predecessors and contemporaries: Between the American
Revolution and Marbury v. Madison, state courts exercised the power in at least twenty
cases.4 But from where did the principle derive and why were our forefathers willing to
accept it? How did the principle of judicial review survive to become the linchpin of our
constitutional law,5 the foundation of democracy in the United States? Was judicial review
a concept of the people’’s consciousness that found its way into the Constitution naturally
during the drafting process, or was the Constitution the instrument of choice to imprint
judicial review on the consciousness of the new Republic?
Across the globe and almost two hundred years later, the Republic of Tajikistan is in
the early stages of its transition to democracy. It is working to establish a new democratic
rule of law distinct from its Soviet past. In its drive to establish this new rule of law,
Tajikistan is reforming its legal and political system to conform to its vision of democratic
government. In its reform effort, however, Tajikistan, like the United States before it, is
limited by what its people, or its nation, will accept as legitimate rulemaking. What the
citizens of Tajikistan will accept as legitimate democratic governance, and how they choose
to define ““democracy”” depends on how they choose to identify themselves as a nation.
That choice is being made today.
At issue in Tajikistan is the question of how the principle of national selfdetermination, on which Tajikistan bases its claims to legitimacy, will be reconciled with
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
Id. at 177.
Id. at 180.
NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (3d ed. 1997).
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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USING LAW TO CREATE NATIONAL IDENTITY
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the practice of democratic citizenship, the idea the Tajik Constitution claims is the goal.6
The answer to this question is too expansive for this paper and perhaps unanswerable at this
time. However, creating a new national identity is a prerequisite to this process.
Tajikistan offers a model to other countries, particularly its neighbors in Central Asia
that are now exploring alternative ways of self-identification and alternative means to the
creation of a new identity. It also provides comparative insights into approaches to the
creation and reform of national identity. One goal of this article is to make the Tajik
experiment accessible to other reformers.
This article addresses the theoretical questions: How are the concepts of ““nation”” and
““state”” linked, and how does a government create that linkage? It seeks answers to those
questions through a case study of the Republic of Tajikistan. Part II examines the
theoretical foundation for the invention of national identity: ““Intellectuals can ‘‘invent’’ a
national consciousness only if certain objective preconditions for the formation of a nation
already exist.””7 At a minimum, creating national identity requires: (1) a ““memory”” of some
common past; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties; and (3) a conception of the equality
of all members of the group.8 In short, for national consciousness to arise, there must be
something of which it can become conscious. Typically, in the creation of a nation-state, a
““nation”” must first come into being, after which this nation is forged into a sovereign state.9
Parts III and IV examine the three theoretical prerequisites for creating national
identity through a case study of Tajikistan, a country that began in contrast to this typical
pattern. Tajikistan was a ““state”” before it existed as a ““nation.””10 Its statehood was created
for political purposes by the fledgling Bolshevik regime, and development of a national
Tajik consciousness only came afterward.11
Accordingly, this article emphasizes the transition of Tajik consciousness——and thus
the creation of a new national identity——since Tajikistan’’s independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991. The article bases its examination of this transition on personal interviews
and analysis of Tajik social commentary, legislation, and presidential decrees. These
sources provide insights into the transition as well as Tajikistan’’s evolving legal system as a
whole. They also provide insights into the application of statutory provisions and abstract,
theoretical concepts in the real world.
For the U.S. audience and foreign observer alike, an examination of the creation of a
new Tajik national identity appears at first glance uniquely Tajik and irrelevant. With the
process’’s blending of Tajik religious, cultural, and socialist norms, Tajikistan’’s transition
appears limited to the Central Asian context. However, as Part V concludes, this
examination provides a rare insight into the theory of creating national identity at the
6. SARQONUNI [CONSTITUTION] ch. 1, art. 1 (Taj.). English-speaking countries do not distinguish between
““nationality”” and ““citizenship,”” since nationality in English refers to both a ““legal relationship involving allegiance
on the part of an individual and protection on the part of a state”” as well as ““a people having a common origin,
tradition, and language and capable of forming or actually constituting a nation state.”” RASMA KARKLINS, ETHNIC
RELATIONS IN THE U.S.S.R.: A PERSPECTIVE FROM BELOW 44 n.1 (1986) (citing WEBSTER’’S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1977)).
7. KARKLINS, supra note 6, at 4.
8. Miroslav Hroch, From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in
Europe, 198 NEW LEFT REV. 3, 4––5 (1993).
9. Id.
10. Cf. Gregory Gleason, Uzbekistan: From Statehood to Nationhood?, in NATIONS & POLITICS IN THE
SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES 331, 334 (Ian Bremmer & Ray Taras eds., 1993). Though Gleason’’s discussion is
placed in the context of Uzbekistan, the establishment of Tajikistan was similar.
11. Id.
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earliest stages of statehood and a rare opportunity to see the difficulties in putting theory
into practice. Tajikistan’’s transition brings immediacy to the debates around the globe
about the relationship between law and society, and that relationship’’s role in defining
democracy and a democratic rule of law.
II.
NATIONAL IDENTITY
In the sixteenth century, the philosopher Montesquieu summed up the English
public’’s expectations of its legal system in his Spirit of the Laws: ““In a nation [such as
England] so distempered by the climate as to have a disrelish of everything, nay, even of
life, it is plain that the government most suitable to the inhabitants is that which they cannot
lay their uneasiness to any single person’’s charge . . . .””12 In the United States one might
argue that in his Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln reflected the American nation’’s
expectations of democratic government by proclaiming it ““of the people, by the people, for
the people.”” In either case, it is the people who create the expectations and it is the people
who define them. Thus, the underlying question in the establishment of a government then
becomes: How do you define the people?
A.
Defining National Identity
Hans Kohn states, ““Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of
consciousness.””13 The term ““nation”” reflects a shared genealogical origin.14 It is a large
social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective
relationships (linguistic, ethnic, religious, geographic, historical, or even one based on
civic-mindedness), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness.15
Consciousness is not an eternal category but is the product of a long and complicated
process of historical development.16 In other words, national self-identity is often reflected
in the belief that ““[w]e are as we are because we have been as we were.””17 A nationality is
not the same as an ethnic group, which does not necessarily have a political program of its
own.18 Nationality is political, for its advocates argue for a rearranged social organization
that promotes the primacy of that nationalist group’’s interests to determine the wider
group’’s cultural and organizational direction.19 Nationalism emerges, ““in a word, from
common ethnicity and common culture,””20 but it is a specific form of ordering distinct from
them.21 One scholar writes:
12. CHARLES DE SECONDAT DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 231 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949)
(1748).
13. HANS KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM: A STUDY IN ITS ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND 10 (1944).
Benedict Anderson names Kohn as one of the ““founding fathers”” of the academic study of nationalism. See
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 4
(1991).
14. Thomas M. Franck, Clans and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM.
J. INT’’L L. 359, 362 (1996).
15. Hroch, supra note 8, at 4.
16. Id.
17. Philip Allott, The Nation as Mind Politic, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT’’L L. & POL. 1361, 1374 (1992).
18. See ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS & NATIONALISM 48––49 (1983).
19. See id.
20. ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 143 (1979).
21. See PETER WORSLEY, THE THREE WORLDS: CULTURE AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT 247––48 (1984). But
see HUGH SETON-WATSON, NATIONS AND STATES: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF NATIONS AND THE
POLITICS OF NATIONALISM 5 (1979) (arguing that no scientific definition of a nation is possible and ““[a]ll that
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Self-nationalizing tends to take either a genetic or a generic form. In the genetic
form, the nation sees the source of its identity in a story that may extend back
into a mythico-religious realm (as in the case of Egypt and Israel). In the
generic form . . . the nation sees the source of its identity in its idea of the
special character of its land, its people, its institutions, its values, its traditions.
Those features have formed a national identity which is also a national character
and which is handed on from mind to mind, from generation to generation.22
The generic source of identity confers a particular identity not only in its reflection of
self but also because it stands in stark contrast to the nature and behavior of other nations.23
In this sense, national identity can be explained as ““we are who we are because, fortunately,
we are not as other peoples are.””24 At this point it should be clarified that while a nation is
not an ethnic group, it is also not a state.25 A state can exist without a nation, or with
several nations among its subjects, just as a nation can be co-terminus with the population
of one state, be included together with other nations within one state, or even be divided
between several states.26
B.
National Identity and the Nation-State
Nations can have a long history before they form themselves into states.27 Selfidentification as a nation, however, leads to a new form of social ordering.28 It calls forth
particular social structures, functions, and values.29 A nation is not a state in that a ““state””
reflects different social values, such as a desire to associate for protection and security.30
Yet to defend the national identity often suggests that the identity itself is a primary interest
of the nation.31 Defense of the nation can be an axiomatic basis for the derivation of
legislation and executive action (government).32
A state can be defined as the ““force exercised ‘‘in the name of law.’’””33 The laws
themselves are created by man.34 Thus, ““the force of the State in reality carries a two-fold
qualification: that it is qualified by the law, and also by a ‘‘value’’ which is inherent in the
State and expressed in the law.””35 The notion of a state is closely associated with the idea
of a power exercised in accordance with known rules.36
[one] can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider
themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one””); WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM: THE
QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING 3 (1994) (arguing that a ““nation”” can be defined only in psychological terms).
22. Allott, supra note 17, at 1374.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1375.
25. See SETON-WATSON, supra note 21, at 4––5.
26. See id.
27. See G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 447 (John Sibree trans., 1890) (1840––1844).
28. Allott, supra note 17, at 1375.
29. Id.
30. See SETON-WATSON, supra note 21, at 403.
31. Allott, supra note 17, at 1375.
32. Id.
33. ALEXANDER PASSERIN D’’ENTRÈVES, THE NOTION OF STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL THEORY
3 (1967).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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The mere statement of the existence of laws and of means to enforce them does
not necessarily entail any pronouncement on the duty of obeying them . . . .
Those, for example, who maintain that the obligatoriness of the State’’s
commands is due to the fact that these commands can, if necessary, be imposed
by force, are in fact doing nothing else than attributing to force itself a
paramount value.37
If ““laws are the expression of a value”” and ““it is the presence of such value that makes
obedience to the laws a duty,””38 then the state must attribute value to those characteristics
inherent in the nation that it wishes to reinforce and create those that are lacking.39 In this
sense, the new nation-state ““provides a term of reference for these obligations . . . [by]
refer[ring] not merely to a force which exists in actual fact, . . . but to an authority which is
recognized as warranted and justified in practice.””40 Without a value, expressed in the form
of a national consciousness, reform aimed towards establishing a new rule of law will be
hard-pressed to take root, since the state will not necessarily be recognized as authorized to
perform the reform, nor will such action necessarily be viewed as warranted.
C.
Creating National Identity in a Nation-State
At the outset, leaders must determine the type of nation-state they wish to create. If
the state is understood as a state of and for a particular nation, how is the nation in question
defined?41 Is it understood as a civic nation, defined and delimited by the legal and
political status of citizenship and consisting of the sum of the citizens of the state?42 Or is it
understood as an ethno-cultural nation, defined independently of the state and not
necessarily co-existing with citizenry?43 Once this question is answered, leaders can set
about creating a national identity.
The criteria for defining a nation ““are themselves fuzzy, shifting and
ambiguous . . . as cloud-shapes are compared to landmarks.””44 This makes it convenient
for authority to use nationality for a variety of purposes, including to define a future state.45
Indeed, traditionally, the creation of the national identity has always been the responsibility
of the ruling class. Whereas one part, the clergy or artisans of some description, has been
tasked with the expansion or retention of nationalism through education, the other half, the
governmental and administrative organs, have had as their work the actual preservation or
defense of the national idea.46
37. Id. at 3––4.
38. Id. at 2.
39. PASSERIN D’’ENTRÈVES, supra note 33, at 4.
40. Id. at 2.
41. Rogers Brubaker, Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia:
An Institutional Account, in CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: FROM COLONIALISM TO GLOBALISM 85, 103
(T.K. Oommen ed., 1997). See also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW
NATIONALISM 6––8 (1994) (further refining the question and describing a choice between what he calls ““civic
nationalism and ethnic nationalism””).
42. Brubaker, supra note 41, at 87.
43. Id.
44. E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALITY 6 (1991).
45. Hobsbawm also notes that the amorphous nature of nationality also enables authorities to use it for
propagandist and programmatic purposes of all sorts. Id.
46. Allott, supra note 17, at 1375.
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As mentioned earlier, a nation develops a particular identity not only from its selfreflection, but also from its stark contrast to the nature and behavior of other nations.47 For
example, Benedict Anderson argues that during the Enlightenment, ““native,”” or uncivilized
identities, were created by the ““mode of imagining of the ‘‘colonial’’ [or civilized] state.””48
One purpose of this exercise was to strengthen the colonial identity by differentiating that
identity from the native one. In particular, he highlights the ““identity categories””49 that
were employed in colonial censuses and related technologies of population management.50
He argues that the new demographic topography put down deep social and institutional
roots while the colonial state multiplied its size and functions.51 The state, guided by an
imagined map, organized the new educational, juridical, immigration, and other
bureaucracies on the principle of ethno-racial hierarchies.52 The flow of subject
populations through the mesh of these institutions created ““traffic habits,”” which in time
gave real social life to the state’’s earlier fantasies.53
““The result [of this process] is that not merely the daily lives of the nationals but their
actual personal identities as individual human beings would become caught up in the
overwhelming process of national self-identification.””54 Their own psychology is displayed
through the art of self-justifying self-promotion by the state.55 Through this process of
census, map, and museum,56 the state works to build a nation in the collective ““mind,””
rather than in the individual minds of its citizenry.57
A politically organized society is a manifestation of mind, rather than minds.58 It is a
unique manifestation of universal social forms.59 The uniqueness of a given society,
however, explains the existence of that society and is not merely part of a more or less ab
extra account of its nature and customs.60 The new ““nation”” is thus ““always conceived as a
deep, horizontal comradeship.””61 It is not enough for the state to seek to manipulate nations
through policies of assimilation62 or tolerance.63 In the end, the foundation of a nationstate’’s legitimacy is fundamentally individual and voluntary.64 This idea can be summed up
in the statement, ““I am who I am because we are who we are.””65
47. Id. at 1374.
48. ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 166.
49. Id. at 164 (citing with approval Charles Hirschman, The Meaning and Measurement of Ethnicity in
Malaysia: An Analysis of Census Classifications, 46 J. ASIAN STUD. 552 (1987); Charles Hirschman, The Making
of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial Ideology, 1 SOC. F. 330 (1986)).
50. ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 169.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Allott, supra note 17, at 1375.
55. See id.
56. ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 163.
57. See Allott, supra note 17, at 1382.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 1384.
60. See id.
61. ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 4––7.
62. See Roman Szporluk, The Imperial Legacy and the Soviet Nationalities Problem, in THE NATIONALITIES
FACTOR IN SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY 17 (Lubomyr Hajda & Mark Beissinger eds., 1990).
63. Ignatieff explains that tolerance existed in early Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, but ethnic
groups did not consider themselves as part of a larger ““nation.”” He argues that this transition occurred in the 18th
century revolutions in France and the United States when there was a shift among the population from a vertical to
a horizontal loyalty.
64. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE 47––48 (1990).
65. Allott, supra note 17, at 1375.
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At the outset, relying on Hroch’’s analysis, I defined a nation as a large social group
integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of relationships and their
subjective reflection in collective consciousness.66 Some of these relationships play an
important role and others play a minor one in the nation-state building process; some, if not
many, could be substituted or denied altogether.67 Yet to achieve the structure of a nationstate described above, three relationships stand out as irreplaceable: ““(1) a ‘‘memory’’ of
some common past, treated as a ‘‘destiny’’ of the group——or at least of the group’’s core
constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social
communication within the group than beyond it; and (3) a conception of the equality of all
members of the group organized as a civil society.””68
III.
THE TAJIKS AND THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN: NATIONAL IDENTITY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
National identity is never created in a vacuum. It is well documented that a Tajik
people has existed in Central Asia for hundreds——if not thousands——of years.69 Yet the
development of an independent Tajik nation and this nation’’s linkage to a larger state
identity did not take place until the establishment of the Tajik autonomous region of the
Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan in 1925.70 Thus, although a Tajik consciousness
existed prior to Russian expansion into Central Asia, the substance of modern nationhood
in Tajikistan owes much to the historical influence of Marxist ideology. It is important to
understand this historical development of Tajik national identity since it is from this
Marxist political, economic, and cultural influence that a new Tajik national identity will
emerge.
A.
Political History and Identity
Although a Tajik-speaking people can be placed in the territory of contemporary
Tajikistan as early as the second century B.C.,71 modern Tajiks have chosen to find the
origins of their history in the Samanid Dynasty, and particularly in its ninth-century
founder, the Tajik ruler Ismaili Somoni.72
After the collapse of the Safavid Dynasty in the late ninth century, Ismaili Somoni
emerged as the ruler of an area centered around what is now Bukhara in central
66.
67.
68.
69.
Hroch, supra note 8, at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
STEPHEN K. BATALDEN & SANDRA L. BATALDEN, THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES OF EURASIA:
HANDBOOK OF FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS 146, 149 (1993) [hereinafter EURASIA 1st Edition]. A full political
history of Tajikistan and the Tajik people is beyond the scope of this paper. For a thorough history of the Tajik
people, see GAFIROV, TOJIKON [TAJIKS] (1983). The history of Central Asia is, in part, a history of small tribal
groups of Turkic- and Persian-speaking settlers and nomads. The word ““Tajik”” means ““crown”” in the Tajik
language and traditionally has been used to designate these Persian-speakers, as opposed to the Turkic-speaking
populations in neighboring Central Asian lands. EURASIA 1st edition, supra, at 149.
70. See generally Gleason, supra note 10.
71. EURASIA 1st edition, supra note 69, at 149.
72. GIAMPAOLO R. CAPISANI, Tajikistan, in THE HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL ASIA: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY
OF THE NEW REPUBLICS 162 (2000) [hereinafter Tajikistan] (noting the calls by numerous nationalist groups in the
immediate post-independence period to reclaim the history of the Samanid era in a way similar to how the Baltic
nations were re-emphasizing their historical progenitors).
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Uzbekistan.73 Tajiks view this dynasty as the first Tajik state.74 The Samanid Dynasty
collapsed at the end of the tenth century, and between the eleventh and eighteenth
centuries, Tajiks lived under the rule of other large Turkic-based dynasties.75
By the late nineteenth century, Tajik identity had become more intertwined with
Russian politics.76 Russian czarist influence had come to dominate local affairs in Central
Asia, and the Tajiks lived under czarist rule.77 As czarist rule broke down in the wake of
the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, some former provinces declared their total independence
from czarist Russia; however, the Tajiks empowered local Soviets to govern.78 Within the
new province, there were some resistance efforts to the Russian conquest, most notably by
a loosely organized anti-communist group led by conservative Muslim forces and called the
Qorbashi, or Basmachi.79 The Qorbashi resented Bolshevik interference in Muslim
religious affairs and began what was essentially a guerilla war against the Bolsheviks.80
Although the Bolsheviks made great efforts to gain the support of the community
through policies respecting local languages and traditions,81 in 1924 Lenin’’s nationality
policy would lead to a breakup of the Central Asian region into ““ethnic”” republics.82
During this process Tajiks were not granted independent ethnic republic status but were
placed within the administrative borders of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan.83
It was not until 1929 that Tajiks were officially granted republic status and the Tajik Soviet
Socialist Republic was officially incorporated into the Soviet Union.84 It remained a Soviet
Republic until its declaration of independence on September 9, 1991.85
From mid-1992 to 1997, Tajikistan was embroiled in a civil war between the
government, primarily the ruling Democratic People’’s Party, and several opposition parties.
73. N. Hotamov, Bukhara: The Capital of the Samanid’’s State, in ANCIENT CIVILIZATION AND ITS ROLE IN
FORMATION AND DEVELOPING OF CENTRAL ASIAN CULTURE OF SAMANIDES EPOCH 120, 121 (Askarali Rajabov et
al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter ANCIENT CIVILIZATION].
74. See generally A. Juraev, The Role of the Samanid State in Shaping the Tajik Culture, in ANCIENT
CIVILIZATION, supra note 73, at 150; THE SAMANIDS AND THE REVIVAL OF THE CIVILIZATION OF IRANIAN
PEOPLES (Iraj Bashiri ed., 1998). The dedication to the volume above congratulates Tajiks on their 1180th
anniversary of national government, a date measured from the first Samanid dynasty. See id. at 29.
75. Niyazi notes that ““Tajiks lived in the states of the Tahirids and Samanids from the tenth through the
thirteenth centuries; in the states of the Gaznivids, Karakhanids, and Khorezm from the thirteenth through the
sixteenth centuries; in the state of the Timurids from the fifteenth century; in the Bukhara Khanate (later in the
Bukhara Emirate); and in a number of small, feudal domains.”” Aziz Niyazi, Tajikistan, in CENTRAL ASIA AND THE
CAUCASUS AFTER THE SOVIET UNION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS 164, 164––65 (Mohiaddin
Mesbahi ed., 1994).
76. See generally id.
77. Niyazi notes that in 1868 the northern contemporary Tajikistan joined the Russian Empire. Id. at 165.
78. Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland also established complete independence at this time. Urs W. Saxer,
The Transformation of the Soviet Union: From a Socialist Federation to a Commonwealth of Independent States,
14 LOY. L.A. INT’’L & COMP. L. REV. 581, 609 (1992).
79. See, e.g., Abdujabar Abduvakhitov, Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan, in RUSSIA’’S MUSLIM FRONTIERS:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN CROSS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS 79, 80 (Dale E. Eickelman ed., 1993) [hereinafter
Abduvakhitov, Revival]; Tajikistan, supra note 72, at 189––90.
80. Abduvakhitov, Revival, supra note 79, at 80.
81. Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia: The Reformers Challenge a Traditional Society, in THE
NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY, supra note 62, at 253, 255.
82. Olcott notes that Moscow decided to increase ethnic differentiation to suppress the views of pan-Turkic
and pan-Islamic reformers who dreamed of a single independent Central Asian state which suited the elite of the
various ethnic groups who viewed themselves as part of a distinct national community. Id.
83. Iraj Bashiri, Part Three: From the Manghits to a Democratic State, in THE SAMANIDS AND THE REVIVAL
OF THE CIVILIZATION OF IRANIAN PEOPLES, supra note 74, at 273.
84. Id. at 277.
85. EURASIA 1st edition, supra note 69, at 146 (giving various vital statistics for Tajikistan).
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The war was a fight for the literal right to determine the future national identity of
Tajikistan. The war was based on conflicting visions of who should rule——and thus
determine Tajikistan’’s future identity——and on how much of the old system should be
preserved.86 The war also had strong ethnic, regional, and nationalist undertones.87 In June
1997, a cease-fire was established with the final signing of the General Agreement on the
Establishment of Peace and National Accord.88 The General Agreement was signed by
Tajikistan’’s President Imomali Rakhmonov and Sayeed Abdullo Nuri,89 who by 1997 had
brought most of the opposition under the umbrella of his United Tajik Opposition (UTO)
party.
The Samanid period (A.D. 850––1000) provides the historical symbols that link a past
Tajik consciousness to the modern Tajik nation-state. The geo-political reality of
Tajikistan, however, limits Tajikistan’’s ability to fully distance itself from its Soviet past
and embrace this historical link. Tajikistan’’s declaration of independence in 1991 left
power mainly in the hands of those who had it previously, simply transferring power from
the Communist Party to the renamed People’’s Party. Also, as the former Communists were
the decisive victors in the civil war, Soviet influence lasts until this day. Several thousand
Russian troops remain in Tajikistan to keep the peace and monitor Tajikistan’’s border with
Afghanistan.90 These troops and the current government are a living legacy to Tajikistan’’s
Soviet past.
B.
The Identity of Economic Dependence
Until the seventeenth century, the Tajik nation was part of a flourishing trade route
that linked East and West.91 In the sixteenth century, the advanced agriculture and
extensive trade in the region declined as European merchants turned their attention to the
New World, and oceans became the preferred mode of transporting goods.92 By the
nineteenth century, however, the local rulers who gained power in the region after the fall
of the Ottoman Empire began to expand trade with Russia.93 Growth in the marketing and
trading of cotton boomed due to the industrial revolution and its sharply rising demand for
cotton to be used in textile manufacturing.94
86. Muriel Atkin, Tajikistan’’s Civil War, CURR. HIST., Oct. 1997, at 336 [hereinafter Atkin, Civil War]. For
a more detailed discussion of the Civil War in Tajikistan, see generally TAJIKISTAN: THE TRIALS OF
INDEPENDENCE (Mohammad-Reza Djalili et al. eds., 1998).
87. See generally Atkin, Civil War, supra note 86.
88. U.N. Doc. A/52/219S/1997/510 (1997) [hereinafter General Agreement].
89. Id.
90. See generally Karim Khodjibaev, Russian Troops and the Conflict in Central Asia, PERSP. CENT. ASIA
(Center for Political and Strategic Studies), Nov. 1997. Russian troops were needed to help provide the stability
necessary to reach and implement a peace agreement after the 1992––1997 Civil War. This ongoing reliance has
forced the Tajik leadership to maintain a strong partnership with the Russian Federation. The Russian Army’’s
201st Motorized Rifle Division remains in Tajikistan. Russia views Tajikistan as a buffer to Afghanistan in the
south. Tajikistan acknowledges the Russian presence as necessary to patrol the border and help maintain the postcivil war peace in Tajikistan. Id.
91. Cf. STEVEN K. BATALDEN & SANDRA L. BATALDEN, THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES OF EURASIA:
HANDBOOK OF FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS 188 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter EURASIA 2nd edition] (noting the
decline of the pan-Arabic trade routes of which the Tajiks were a part).
92. NANCY LUBIN, LABOUR AND NATIONALITY IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: AN UNEASY COMPROMISE 1
(1984).
93. EURASIA 2nd edition, supra note 91, at 188.
94. Id.
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Following the establishment of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic in 1929, there was
a period of economic growth and industrialization.95 Collective farms were established,
land and water reforms initiated,96 and investment policies97 developed based on the
principle of the socialist division of labor. Tajikistan was required to deliver quotas of raw
materials, primarily cotton, set by central planners in Moscow at prices set by the same
central planners.98 In the absence of its own manufacturing industry, Tajikistan was forced
to buy manufactured goods from other parts of the Soviet Union, mainly Russia, also at
prices set by the central planners.99
Tajik industrial labor was limited to its use in the primary processing of cotton and
other raw materials, and Tajiks remained overwhelmingly concentrated in agricultural, nonindustrial, and non-technical sectors and occupations.100 By the time of Tajikistan’’s
independence in 1991, it was left with an economy dominated by a disproportionate
dependence on cotton, rural poverty, and organized corruption.101
During the 1992––1997 Civil War, the Tajik government allocated funds mostly for
defense, sending the economy into a further tailspin.102 Since the signing of the General
Agreement in 1997 and with the help of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank economic reform packages, the government has allocated resources to increase
production in agriculture, cotton, and aluminum; reconstruct its infrastructure; privatize
state enterprises; strengthen the banking system; and secure the social safety net.103
Despite independence in 1991, the Tajik economy remains dependent on the outside
world for goods. Tajikistan has been unable to develop its own local economic base.104
This economic dependence has contributed to its inability to fully distance itself from its
Soviet past and to implement the necessary reforms for the establishment of a new national
identity.
95. RAYMOND ARTHUR DAVIES & ANDREW J. STEIGER, SOVIET ASIA: DEMOCRACY’’S FIRST LINE OF
DEFENSE 158––61 (1942). ““In 1938 the government appropriated $20,000,000 for the construction of a textile mill,
a cement works, two cotton gin factories . . ., a meat-packing plant and a number of hydroelectric stations.”” The
authors note that ““[b]y 1939 the number of large enterprises rose to 92, and Tajikistan’’s industrial production was
195 times greater than it was in 1913.”” Id. at 160.
96. EURASIA 1st edition, supra note 69, at 166––67.
97. Gregory Gleason, The Political Economy of Dependency Under Socialism: The Asian Republics in the
USSR, 24 STUD. COMP. COMMUNISM 335, 348 (1991).
98. Id. at 343––44.
99. See EURASIA 2nd edition, supra note 91, at 171 (discussing Soviet colonial exploitation of the Tajik
economy).
100. See LUBIN, supra note 92, at 15 (discussing labor development generally in Central Asia, Lubin notes
that between 1939 and 1940, 85 percent of the additions to the industrial labor force of Uzbekistan came from
outside Central Asia). Soviet development policy was to promote education, but by 1984, the Central Asian labor
force was still concentrated in agriculture and the non-industrial sectors, illustrating a duality in the modernization
process which could lead to tensions in national politics. Id. at 15––16.
101. EURASIA 2nd edition, supra note 91, at 167 (describing the current economic straits of Tajikistan as
oscillating between dependence on inefficient cotton production and spiralling rural unemployment).
102. See id. at 173 (discussing the weakness of government military given the threatened pull-out of Russian
troops).
103. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, 1998 TAJIKISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 24 (discussing post-war
privatizations, austerity programs, and work in the direction of eradicating poverty).
104. EURASIA 2nd edition, supra note 91, at 166 (stating ““Tajikistan is [currently] the poorest country in
Central Asia”” and ““one of the features of Tajikistan’’s poverty is its weak infrastructure””).
358
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Islam and Identity
Tajik identity is historically an Islamic identity. Islam first came to the territory of
what was then Turkestan in the seventh century.105 Since this time, Islam has played a
significant role in how Tajiks define themselves and how outsiders define the Tajik people.
During the seventh century, Arab conquerors imposed Islam on the Tajiks.106
However, between the ninth and thirteenth centuries, Islam expanded peacefully along
important trade routes.107 Between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, Islamic influence
in Turkestan waned due to the anti-Islamic character of the Mongol forces that came to
dominate the area.108 It survived, however, as a result of active Muslim brotherhoods who
eventually succeeded in converting the Mongol sovereigns.109
Islamic scholarship reached its greatest height at the end of the sixteenth century.
During this period, European explorers and traders developed water routes to Asia and
Africa that eclipsed the caravan routes that had previously passed through the region. The
decline of economic prosperity left the territory in relative isolation.110 This isolation led to
the growth of prestigious centers of Islamic learning precisely because their remoteness
kept them from exposure to Western influence.111 It was during this time that the holy city
of Bukhara, with its many mosques and religious schools, gained its reputation as one of
the most sacred cities of Islam.112 Although today Bukhara is located in Uzbekistan, it
remains and is used by the Tajik government as an important cultural symbol that links
Tajik consciousness to modern Tajikistan.113
The Russian conquest of Central Asia in the late nineteenth century played a
significant role in Islam’’s shaping of Tajik identity. The conquest reopened the region not
only to economic and technological innovations, but also to social changes, particularly the
tide of reforms sweeping over other Muslim peoples in the region and abroad in the form of
an Islamic renewal movement.114 The movement, known as Jadidism from the Arabic word
jadid (modern, or new), was made up of mostly Muslim intellectuals who believed that
only by modernizing could Muslims hold their own in competition with Russians.115 When
105. Introduction, in THE SAMANIDS AND THE REVIVAL OF THE CIVILIZATION OF IRANIAN PEOPLES, supra
note 74, at xi.
106. Id.
107. ALEXANDRE BENNIGSEN & S. ENDERS WIMBUSH, MUSLIMS OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE: A GUIDE 5 (1986).
108. Id. at 7.
109. Id.
110. EDWARD ALLWORTH, THE MODERN UZBEKS: FROM THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT: A
CULTURAL HISTORY 79––89 (1990).
111. See id. at 68––70.
112. FED. RES. DIV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, KAZAKSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
AND UZBEKISTAN: COUNTRY STUDIES 208 (Glenn E. Curtis ed., 1997).
113. Cf. EURASIA 2nd edition, supra note 91, at 169 (describing the glasnost-era political rhetoric in both
Uzbekistan and particularly Tajikistan over historical claims to each other’’s territory). The Tajik assertions of up
to twenty percent of Uzbekistan’’s territory in the historical Tajik centers of Bukhara and Samarkand have
continued, in muted form, up until the present day. Id.
114. Edward J. Lazzerini, Beyond Renewal: The Jadid Response to Pressure for Change in a Modern Age, in
MUSLIMS IN CENTRAL ASIA: EXPRESSIONS OF IDENTITY AND CHANGE 151––52 (Jo-Ann Gross ed., 1992). See also
Hélène Carrère d’’Encausse, Social and Political Reform, in CENTRAL ASIA: 130 YEARS OF RUSSIAN DOMINANCE,
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 189––206 (Edward Allworth ed., 1994).
115. See Lazzerini, supra note 114, at 152. The Jadids sought to transform the exclusively religious base of
Muslim education by introducing secular subjects, while at the same time calling for democracy and the selfdetermination of Central Asia, or Turkestan. See also Abduvakhitov, Revival, supra note 79, at 80 (discussing
particular reformers such as Tolegan Khojani Arov Tavallah, who wrote a book of poems called The Wealth of
Islam, in which he emphasized the need to study European experiences with secular education).
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the Bolshevik Revolution reached Turkestan, however, the Jadid movement was co-opted
most notably by Lenin’’s policies aimed at enlisting the local support of Jadid reformers
through tolerance of traditional religious practices and creation of artificial republics based
on ethnicity.116
Stalin’’s First Five-Year Plan (1928––1935), which was to become the vehicle for
achievement of socialism in all spheres of Soviet life, including the cultural sphere,
changed the shape of Islam in Central Asia.117 Under Stalin, Islam was removed from daily
life most notably through the closing of mosques, the denial of access to Islamic literary
traditions, and the undermining of Muslim family and marriage relations.118 Throughout
the Soviet period, religious activity was channeled through government-controlled
mechanisms and religious policies linked to larger Soviet nationality policies.119
The Civil War in Tajikistan from 1992––1997 shows that the struggle to determine the
future national identity of Tajikistan, including its religious identity, is a process not limited
to the academics. With the signing of the General Agreement in 1997, Islam has played an
even more public role in this process. Islam continues to play an important part in the selfdefinition of the Tajik people, and like the Tajik reformers of the past, the current
leadership uses Islam to help shape the identity of the Tajik nation.120
116. Many reformers trusted that the Bolshevik platform of Lenin was a means of achieving their goal of
modern orientation and national self-determination, even if not for a larger Turkestan, then for separate republics.
In addition, since the Jadids were mainly an elite group, they found creation of the new Tajik republic in their best
interest since they were sure to assume leadership positions. Carrère d’’Encausse notes, however, that during this
time there was simultaneous resistance in Central Asia, prominently featuring the Qorbashi revolt, Russian
counter-revolutionary drives, and foreign intervention. See generally Carrère d’’Encausse, supra note 114; see also
MICHAEL RYWKIN, MOSCOW’’S MUSLIM CHALLENGE: SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA 33––34 (1990) (discussing the
Qorbashi movement, also referred to as ““Basmachi,”” a more activist group of Muslims within the Jadid
movement); Abduvakhitov, Revival, supra note 79, at 80 (discussing the Qorbashi’’s decline); ALLWORTH, supra
note 110, at 175 (discussing the fact that Soviets felt so threatened by the memory of the Qorbashi movement, that
until recently the word Qorbashi used to describe themselves, mujahid, was deleted from dictionaries); BENNIGSEN
& WIMBUSH, supra note 107, at 85 (referring to the Qorbashi movement using the term Basmachi, or ““bandit,”” a
term coined by the movement’’s Soviet detractors). This terminology is common among western scholars. For a
detailed discussion of specific Sufi brotherhood resistance to the Soviet regime, see Alexandre Bennigsen, Muslim
Conservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime: The Sufi Brotherhoods in the North Caucusus, in SOVIET
NATIONALITY POLICIES AND PRACTICES 334 (Jeremy R. Azrael ed., 1978).
117. MEHRDAD HAGHAYEGHI, ISLAM AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA 23 (1995); see generally GERHARD
SIMON, NATIONALISM AND POLICY TOWARD THE NATIONALITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION: FROM TOTALITARIAN
DICTATORSHIP TO POST-STALINIST SOCIETY 138 (Karen Forster & Oswald Forster trans., 1991).
118. The author notes that mosques were closed, the property of waqfs (Muslim religious foundations)
confiscated, the Muslim clergy decimated by arrests and executions, and women forced to remove their veils. By
1942 the number of mosques in Central Asia had been reduced to 1312, down from a pre-revolutionary number of
26,279. The number of clergy was reduced from 45,339 to a mere 8872. HAGHAYEGHI, supra note 117, at 23;
RYWKIN, supra note 116, at 92 (discussing the denial of Islamic literary traditions through changes of alphabet,
first from Arabic to Latin, and then from Latin to Cyrillic).
119. A thorough investigation of the dynamic Soviet religious policy is beyond the scope of this paper. For a
comprehensive overview of Soviet religious policy, see generally Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, Nationalities and Soviet
Religious Policies, in THE NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY, supra note 62, at 148;
Muriel Atkin, Religious, National, and Other Identities in Central Asia, in MUSLIMS IN CENTRAL ASIA:
EXPRESSIONS OF IDENTITY AND CHANGE, supra note 114, at 46 (discussing how Soviet policies resulted in
religious and national identification becoming inextricably linked for the peoples of Soviet Central Asia).
120. See HAGHAYEGHI, supra note 117, at 71––73 (discussing Soviet Muslim Spiritual Directorates and
theological training).
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Identity Crisis: The Soviet and Post-Civil War Legacy
In short, the Soviet era left Tajikistan with three major legacies: (1) a monopoly of
political power in the hands of the former centralized Communist party; (2) extreme
economic dependency due to insufficient investment policies and development of a cotton
monoculture; and (3) a culture in which all cultural aspects, including Islam, are linked to
nationalism and are often still filtered through Marxist ideology.121 First, the seven-year
Civil War resulted in a limited broadening of voices in the government, even with the
addition of the United Tajik Opposition to key government ministries.122 Today, the
majority of power is still concentrated in the hands of former Soviet officials who were in
power at the time of Tajik independence. These policymakers today are responsible for
defining Tajik national identity. In addition, a fragile economy contributes to Tajikistan’’s
inability to transform its identity. Last, Islam continues to be an important medium used by
the Tajik leadership to implement identity reform; however, the Civil War left Tajiks with a
post-conflict mentality in which stability and familiarity often takes precedence over the
push for institutional change.123
IV. CREATING A NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TAJIKISTAN
The substance of modern nationhood in Tajikistan owes much to the historical
influence of Marxist ideology.124 Distancing itself from this influence will not be an easy
task.125 Lenin’’s desire to grant national groups autonomy within what became the Soviet
Union enabled him to attract the support of nationalist groups.126 In Central Asia, however,
neither nationalist groups nor a working class existed.127 Thus, in an effort to make the
Central Asian environment128 conform to the principles of the ideology, nations were
created.129
The legacy of the Soviet Union is one of a thorough state-sponsored codification and
institutionalization of nationhood and nationality ““exclusively on a sub-state, rather than a
state-wide, level.””130 The Soviet Union organized society into multiple nations and
nationalities, which existed as distinct social categories separate from statehood and
citizenship. In the case of Central Asia, it successfully invented national identities
exclusively at the sub-state level, disregarding the link between nationhood and the Soviet
121. Economics plays a major role in this link. There is little money for publishing new books and thus,
sources typically used by the intelligentsia are those that they have always used. Also, Tajikistan’’s use of the
Cyrillic script isolates the country in its ability to use historical Islamic sources, which are written in the Arabic
script, or even to use modern works from its neighbors Iran and Afghanistan.
122. This was a mandate of the General Agreement, supra note 88.
123. See HAROLD H. SAUNDERS, A PUBLIC PEACE PROCESS: SUSTAINED DIALOGUE TO TRANSFORM RACIAL
AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS 147––170 (1999).
124. See Gleason, supra note 10, at 334 (noting the influence of Communist ideology throughout the Central
Asian states).
125. ““It was right to struggle against the old school, but reforming it was not so simple as it seemed. The
problem was not one of a model curricula but of men, and not just of the men who are actually teachers themselves
but of the entire social complex which they express.”” ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON
NOTEBOOKS 25 (Quintin Hoare ed. & trans., 1971).
126. Gleason, supra note 10, at 334––36.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 335 (describing the time as one in which the area was dominated by Khanates, Koranic thinking,
and peasants loyal to various tribes).
129. In 1924 the Turkestan Autonomous Republic was dissolved, and five new Soviet Republics were
established. Id. at 336.
130. Brubaker, supra note 41, at 88.
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state as a whole. While extremely successful, the Soviet system’’s pervasive method of
institutionalizing nationhood in this manner (politically, economically, and culturally)
makes restructuring society more difficult. The legacy of the Soviet Union is for
Tajikistan, like most other Soviet Republics, a legacy of ““deeply structured and powerfully
conflicting expectations of belonging.””131 Prior to 1991, defining oneself as a Tajik went
hand in hand with belonging to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Tajikistan is a state comprised of all the major Central Asian peoples: Tajik, Uzbek,
Tatar, Kyrgyz, and Russian.132 The crudest measure of national identification——propensity
towards nationalist-inspired violence——makes clear that in some respects national identity
in Tajikistan in recent years has been strong.133 Of the five newly independent states of
Central Asia, Tajikistan is the only state that became embroiled in a post-independence
civil war. Tajikistan is unique, however, in that national identification and the propensity
towards nationalist violence manifest themselves in smaller regional groups within the
Tajik nation itself, rather than among the many nations.
While acknowledging a deep sense of Tajik culture reaching back over a thousand
years to Persian roots, these smaller groups have long based their identity on their region
rather than on a central Tajik authority.134 This dual-identity system and regionalism
played a major role in the 1992––1997 Civil War.135 Since nationality is not an essential
quality of a group, like ethnicity, but rather a type of coalition behavior where the group is
held together by a common purpose or goal,136 Tajik authorities must develop a common
purpose that can incorporate Tajikistan’’s distinct regional identities into the new national
identity.
The sense of belonging to this nationality can be influenced by something as simple as
a common expectation of the future or a common past treated as the ““destiny”” of the
group.137 The Tajik Constitution has, at least on paper, chosen to convey this duty through
stating that the State is ““responsible and duty bound to past, present, and future
generations.””138 However, the legacy of the Soviet Union and Civil War, as well as current
events in the region, will have a profound impact on the ability of the Tajik government to
institutionalize a new national identity incorporating the distinct regional identities based
on these principles. Creating this identity requires, at a minimum, three things: creating a
““memory”” of a common past, treated as a ““destiny”” of the group; establishing a density of
linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the
131. Id. at 112.
132. According to the 1989 census, the ethnic composition of Tajikistan is as follows: 62.3% Tajik, 23.5%
Uzbek, 7.6% Russian, 1.4% Tatar, and 1.3% Kyrgyz. EURASIA 1st edition, supra note 69, at 146 (providing
numerous vital statistics and demographic breakdowns from the final Soviet Census in 1989).
133. Describing national identification in Uzbekistan, Gleason notes the violent results of ethnic riots in the
Fergana Valley in 1989 that took 112 lives. Gleason, supra note 10, at 333.
134. In his insightful essay, Stéphane Dudoignon recounts how the Civil War had essentially a regional basis
to it, as clans from the Garm region quarrelled with those from Kulyab and Khojand, all in what the author calls an
explosive ““permanence of localism”” after seventy years of Soviet rule. See Stéphane Dudoignon, Political Parties
and Forces in Tajikistan: 1989––1993, in TAJIKISTAN: THE TRIALS OF INDEPENDENCE 69––78 (Mohammad-Reza
Djalili et al. eds., 1998). The Parmiri Tajiks are particularly emblematic of the regional identity that all Tajiks
ascribe to. These so-called ““Mountain Tajiks”” possess unique cultural traditions related to the inaccessibility of the
mountain geography of the mountainous eastern region of the country. Tajikistan, supra note 72, at 199.
135. See Dudoignon, supra note 134, at 69––78.
136. See GELLNER, supra note 18, at 48––49 (discussing how nationality is not an essential quality of a group,
but a type of coalition behavior where the group is held together by a common purpose or goal).
137. See Hroch, supra note 8, at 5.
138. SORQONUNI [CONSTITUTION] pmbl. (Taj.).
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group than beyond it; and establishing a sense of equality among all members of the
community.139
A.
Creating a Memory of a Common Past
Today the Tajik leadership has set out to create a memory of a common past by
rewriting its official history. During this process, it is using memory as a tool of its own
power.140 Power and memory are most intimately embraced in the representations of
official histories, which are central to the production and reproduction of authority.141 As
the originator or author of the new Tajik history, the Tajik leadership is giving itself
authority to govern the nation-state, and thus to create the new identity.142 Thus, the Tajik
leadership’’s primary goal during this revision is not only to foster a sense of historical
continuity in Tajik identity during the creation of a new one, but also to legitimize its own
authority. It has targeted three areas: law, public space, and historical perception in
Tajikistan today.
1.
Rewriting the Law
The two primary laws the government has used to foster a memory of a common past
are the Law of Amnesty and the Law on Public Holidays.
a.
The Law of Amnesty
The Tajik leadership has consciously employed the law of amnesty several times.143
The law’’s purpose is to induce ““forgetting”” of special historical events, such as national
traumas. The most prominent use of the amnesty law is the 1997 ““Law of Amnesty”” passed
by Parliament as part of the General Agreement after Tajikistan’’s Civil War.144 This
amnesty law gives amnesty to all opposition fighters who participated in the Civil War
139. Hroch, supra note 8, at 5.
140. See PATRICK J. GEARY, PHANTOMS OF REMEMBRANCE: MEMORY AND OBLIVION AT THE END OF THE
FIRST MILLENNIUM 26 (1991); see, e.g., HEGEL, supra note 27, at 61 (““Only in a State cognizant of Laws, can
distinct transactions take place, accompanied by such a clear consciousness of them as supplies the ability and
suggests the necessity of an enduring record.””).
141. Ana Maria Alonso, The Effects of Truth: Re-Presentations of the Past and Imagining of Community, 1 J.
HIST. SOC. 33, 50 (1988).
142. Cf. ELIZABETH TONKIN, NARRATING OUR PASTS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ORAL HISTORY 39
(1992). Tonkin notes that the link between power and story-telling is connected at the level of language, for the
words ““authority”” and ““author”” have a common etymology. Id.
143. See, e.g., Dar borai afv [Law of Amnesty], Law No. 242, Issue No. 18, Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii
Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the Republic of Tajikistan] 395 (1991); Dar borai afv [Law of Amnesty], Law
No. 280, Issue No. 12, Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the Republic of
Tajikistan] (1994); Dar borai afv umumi ba munosibati 50-solagii Galaba dar Jangi buzurgi Vatanii colhoi 1941––
1945 [Law of Amnesty on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II], Law No. 64, Issue No. 7––8,
Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the Republic of Tajikistan] 55 (1995) (granting
public amnesty to veterans of World War II).
144. Qarori Majlisi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston: Dar borai afvi ishtirokkunandagoni muqovimati siyosi va
nizomi dar Jumurii Tojikiston [Parliamentary Decree: On the Amnesty for Participants of Opposition Politics and
Military], Law No. 258, Issue No. 15––16, Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the
Republic of Tajikistan] 485 (1997).
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from 1992 up to the date of passage145 and all those who participated in opposition politics
during the same time.146
b.
The Law on Public Holidays
The Tajik leadership is not only recreating a new past but linking this new past to the
present. In January 1992, it passed the ““Law on Public Holidays,”” which established a new
set of public holidays.147 The most significant holiday additions are Independence Day
(September 9), Tajik Language Day (July 22), and the Day of Peace (June 27).148 Equally
significant, however, is the fact that Soviet holidays such as Victory Day (May 9) and
Labor Day (May 1) are still officially recognized holidays on the Tajik calendar.149
2.
Remodeling Public Space
Since 1991, many new monuments have been constructed and many prominent public
spaces have been renamed. In 1991, Lenin Square, a prominent park in the center of
Dushanbe, was renamed Freedom Square, although the large statue of Vladimir Lenin was
not removed.150 The very prominent Putovskii Street was renamed Ismaili Somoni Street
after the tenth century Tajik ruler Ismoli Somoni,151 and on Independence Day of 1999, the
national government unveiled a multi-million dollar monument to Ismaili Somoni directly
across from the structurally unchanged Parliament.152 These changes took place all over
the country in many forms: The city of Leninobod in the northern province of the same
name officially changed its name back to Khojand,153 and the National Institute of Teaching
145. Id. cl. 1.
146. Id.
147. Dar borai idu marosimho [Law on Public Holidays], Law No. 80, Issue No. 5, Akhbori Shuroi Olii
Jumhurii Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the Republic of Tajikistan] 534 (1992).
148. Id. The Day of Peace was added to commemorate the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace
and National Accord. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 103, at 18.
149. Law on Public Holidays, supra note 147. It should be noted, however, that people continue to work on
Labor Day, thereby suggesting a lowering of its stature since the great public festivals held during the Soviet era.
150. Dar borai ivaz kardani nomi maidoni ba nomi V.I. Lenini shahri Dushanbe [Law on the Changing of the
Name of V.I. Lenin Square in the City of Dushanbe], Law No. 231, Issue No. 18, Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii
Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the Republic of Tajikistan] 384 (1991). The new ““Freedom Square”” is a
prominent park in the center of the city.
151. Dar borai tagiir dodani nomi khiyoboni ba nomi Putovskii shahri Dushanbe [Law on the Changing of
the Name of Putovskii Street in the City of Dushanbe], Law No. 232, Issue No. 18, Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii
Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the Republic of Tajikistan] 385 (1991).
152. For a photograph of the impressive Ismoni Somoni monument complete with gleaming golden crown,
see MICHAEL CRAIG HILLMANN, TAJIKI vi (2000). It is interesting to note that this monument is opposite the
National Parliament, which is still covered in Soviet imagery, and another large Soviet monument to World War II.
While the Tajiks are consistently adding Tajik imagery to public spaces, they are not removing Soviet imagery.
Many Tajiks feel Soviet history is as much a part of their history as ancient Persian civilization. Another
interesting example of public building is the construction of a monument to the famous Tajik historian B.G.
Gafirov in his hometown just outside the northern city of Khojand. Gafirov is known as the father of Tajik history
and it is his work that is most often cited by those seeking to re-create a common Tajik identity and past.
153. Dar borai ba shahri Khojand tabdil dodani nomi shahri Leninobodi viloyati Leninobod [Law on the
Adjusting of the Name of the City of Leninobodi in the Province of Leninobod to the Name of Khojand], Law No.
58, Issue No. 5, Vedomosthoi Sovetii Olii Respublikai Sovetii Sotsialistii Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the
Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan] (1991). The name of this journal officially changed from Vedomosthoi
Sovetii Olii Respubliikai Sovetii Sotsialistii Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the Soviet Socialist Republic of
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in Dushanbe officially changed its name from one honoring the Ukrainian Taras
Shevchenko to one honoring the Tajik J.K. Sharifovich.154
3.
Reviving the Tajik Renaissance
Today Tajiks perceive their historical identity as extending from the tenth century,
with the establishment of the Samanid Dynasty, through the Soviet period to independence.
As the above changes in the law and public space indicate, the Tajik government has
chosen to create a common history and new national identity informed by this Soviet past.
It has rewritten its Soviet history by adding accounts to it, rather than dismissing that
history altogether. Unlike its neighbor Uzbekistan, which is quickly and significantly
revising the accounts of Russian territorial conquest in the region,155 Tajikistan has deemed
the Soviet conquest vital to the establishment of an independent Tajikistan.156 It has also
characterized negatively the revolts that tried to stop it: ““The continuation [of the Basmachi
movement] proved to be detrimental to the well-being and growth of the Tajiks as a people
and of Tajikistan as a nation.””157
The Tajik leadership has chosen, however, to begin fostering a deeper connection to
Tajikistan’’s pre-Soviet past by identifying Tajiks as the heirs of the tenth century Tajik
ruler Ismaili Somoni. Ismaili Somoni is represented as the founder of the Samanid
Dynasty, which is now characterized as the first Tajik state. The Samanid Dynasty is also
characterized as the period of the Tajik renaissance ““during which the Tajiks as a people
became conscious of their own national identity.””158 This consciousness is reflected in the
Tajikistan] to Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the Republic of Tajikistan] in Issue
No. 18, dated August, 1991.
154. Dar borai digar kardani nomi donishkadai davlatii omuzgorii Dushanbe ba nomi T.G. Shevchenko [Law
on the Changing of the Name of the Shevchenko National Institute of Teaching], Law No. 233, Issue No. 18,
Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the Republic of Tajikistan] 386 (1991).
Shevchenko and Sharifovich were prominent twentieth century writers and scholars, from Ukraine and Tajikistan,
respectively.
155. ““Throughout the Soviet period it was assumed that Russian territorial acquisitions were ‘‘progressive’’
acts, in which local peoples were liberated from the tyrannical hold of ruthless and inefficient feudal khans. In the
Stalinist period, such acquisitions were even characterized as ‘‘voluntary’’ ceding of territory by the indigenous
population.”” Today in certain Central Asian states ““the Russian conquest is revealed as a period of opposition by
local people and leaders to the Russian military advance.”” EURASIA 2nd edition, supra note 91, at 189, 190.
156. Iraj Bashiri, Conclusion, in THE SAMANIDS AND THE REVIVAL OF THE CIVILIZATION OF IRANIAN
PEOPLES, supra note 74, at 303 (““Russia . . . nurtured [the Tajiks] through the Manghit times, guided them through
national-administrative divisions, propelled them into the modern times, and safeguarded their security during the
1992––93 hard times . . . . And that is where matters stand in 1997.””).
157. Id. at 273. Bashiri notes:
[A]s long as the Basmachi resistance was not defeated, i.e., as long as the Basmachi were not either
brought within the fold or forced into exile to join their supporters in Afghanistan, there would be no
opportunity for implementation of progressive measures in the region . . . . The Basmachi movement,
however, continued for much longer than the Soviets had imagined. The continuation proved to be
detrimental to the well-being and growth of the Tajiks as a people and of Tajikistan as a nation . . . .
[D]ue to its restive nature, Tajikistan was deprived of its right of nationhood. During the 1924
national-administrative divisions, rather than being granted independence, the Tajiks were placed
under the auspices of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan.
Id.
158. Tajiks see the renaissance as the period between the ninth and tenth centuries, however, they see ““the
Revival of the Tajiks encompass[ing] a long beginning, early in the fifth century, and end[ing] in the eleventh.
This was a continuous period of development, except for the interruption by the Arab invasion and the temporary
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literary and scientific works of the Tajik Renaissance, such as those by Ibn Sina and
Firdowsi.159 These works are used as tools to educate the public of this earlier
consciousness and to link it to the Tajikistan of today.
In addition to the substance of the Tajik Renaissance, the period itself has become
significant in Tajikistan’’s historical memory. Today the establishment of the tenth-century
Tajik Dynasty is viewed as synonymous with the recently gained independence of the Tajik
nation and the establishment of an independent state. One of the most important
connections in this context is the connection between the ““reorganization of education to
reflect the progressive nature of society,””160 that was undertaken by the Samanids, and the
recent changes in Tajik pedagogy.161 This is clearly reflected in the ““Law on Education””
passed by parliament in 1993.162 This law establishes the strategy and goals of education in
Tajikistan, which are to educate society in order to function in a democratic, law-governed,
and secular state.163
Another important connection is the dynasty’’s establishment of central Tajik authority
under the Tajik leader Ismaili Somoni and the establishment of an independent Tajikistan
under the leadership of President Imomali Rakhmanov. This connection is often reflected
at the highest levels in the public speeches of the President. President Rakhmanov often
links the rebirth of modern Tajik society to the strong rulers of the earlier Tajik
Renaissance, thereby connecting Tajikistan to this period as well as equating himself with
those rulers.164
B.
Establishing a Density of Linguistic and Cultural Ties
Today the Tajik leadership has begun to link language and identity by establishing
Tajik as the official language, while preserving the linguistic rights of the non-Tajik
introduction of the Islamic faith.”” N. Ne’’matov, The Samanid State: A Unique Phenomena of History, in THE
SAMANIDS AND THE REVIVAL OF THE CIVILIZATION OF IRANIAN PEOPLES, supra note 74, at 37.
159. Ibn Sina (b. 980––d. 1037) is often known by his Latin name of Avicenna. He was a prominent scholar
and scientist, particularly in the field of medicine. His two most famous works are THE BOOK OF HEALING and
THE CANON OF MEDICINE. Firdowsi was born between A.D. 932 and 941 in modern day Iran. He is regarded as
one of the major poets of Persian literature and is the author of the classic epic SHAH NAMAH [BOOK OF KINGS].
See, e.g., HILLMANN, supra note 152, at 2. Scholars have written on a variety of topics regarding the Samanid
state. See, e.g., D. Dovudi, Trade in Samanid State, in ANCIENT CIVILIZATION, supra note 73, at 28 (trade in the
Samanid state); S. Sulaymonov, Ibn Sina: Cultural and Linguistic Phenomenon of the Samanid’’s State, in
ANCIENT CIVILIZATION, supra note 73, at 62 (language in the Samanid state); M. Ruzadorov, The Role of Ismaili
Somoni’’s Personality in the Formation of Tajik, in ANCIENT CIVILIZATION, supra note 73, at 159 (political and
cultural figures of the Samanid state).
160. Ne’’matov, supra note 158, at 39.
161. See generally A. AFZALOV & B. RAHIMOV, TA’’RIKHI PEDAGOGIKAI HALKI TOJIK [THE HISTORY OF
TAJIK PEDAGOGY] (1994).
162. Dar borai maorif [Law on Education], Law No. 30, Issue No. 1, Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston
[Parliamentary News of the Republic of Tajikistan] 899 (1993).
163. See id. pmbl. But see id. ch. 1, art. 6, cls. 1––3. The Law on Education, however, retains Marxist
traditions: It guarantees citizens free choice in their language of educational instruction while at the same time
mandating the learning of the Tajik language. This unique structure shows a conscious effort on the part of the
Tajik government to maintain links to its recent Soviet past while simultaneously creating new ones to its preSoviet history.
164. See President Imomali Rakhmanov, Bo Rohi Vahdat va Bunyodkoriho [Law on the Path to Unity and
Creation], Speech before the Parliament on the Fifth Anniversary of Tajikistan’’s Independence (Sept. 8, 1996).
Rakhmanov specifically commends the historic leaders Ismaili Somoni and Timur as understanding the connection
between man and national consciousness. Id. at 6.
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minority. Its primary tool in this process is the ““Law on Language.”” The government has
also begun to create a similar linkage between culture and identity by employing a strategy
to reconcile Islamic and Tajik culture. Again, the primary goal of the Tajik leadership
during this process is to foster a sense of historical continuity in Tajik identity during the
creation of a new one.
1.
Linking Language and Tajik Identity
In the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan, being Soviet and becoming
literate went hand in hand. When the Tajik autonomous region was established in 1925
only 3.7% of the population could read and write.165 This tremendous leap in literacy is a
direct result of Soviet educational policies. Today ninety-eight percent of the population in
Tajikistan is literate.166 Thus one of the most significant achievements of Soviet colonial
rule may be its success in colonizing the minds and consciousness of the people through
education in their respective national and the Russian languages.167 The Tajik leadership
has begun a similar task by adopting the Law on Language.
a.
Adopting the Law on Language
On July 22, 1989, the Tajik S.S.R. adopted the ““Tajik S.S.R. Law on Language.””168
This law established Tajik as the official language of the Republic.169 The selection of the
Tajik language over Russian ensures a linkage of Tajikistan to its pre-Soviet past without
dismissing its Soviet heritage. Although the language law establishes Tajik as the official
language, the text of the law includes the word ““Persian”” in parentheses next to the word
Tajik.170 Historically, Tajik and Persian have been viewed as the same language.171
165. In 1926 only 3.8% of the population was literate, but by 1939 this number had jumped to 82.8%. The
use of students’’ mother tongues in the classroom and the employment of native non-Russian teachers was an
important condition for this rapid development. SIMON, supra note 117, at 49.
166. EURASIA 2nd edition, supra note 91, at 162.
167. See Eden Naby, The Emerging Central Asia: Ethnic and Religious Factions, in CENTRAL ASIA AND THE
CAUCASUS AFTER THE SOVIET UNION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS supra note 75, at 34, 47
(discussing how Stalin’’s imposition of the Cyrillic alphabet enforces a closeness with the Russian language that
many Tajiks still resent); Barbara A. Anderson & Brian D. Silver, Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic
Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian?, in THE NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET
POLITICS AND SOCIETY, supra note 62, at 95, 108––10 (discussing the evolution of Soviet policy toward the use of
non-Russian languages in schools). Soviet education policies took several shapes and went through many phases.
Lenin’’s initial policy of ““national in shape, socialist in content”” was transformed by Stalin into a phase of national
assimilation or ““merger of nations”” policy. The unexpected consequences of nation-building, the nations’’
increasing efforts to attain autonomy, and the resistance the nations had offered to the ““revolution from above,””
convinced Stalin that the Russians and Russification were more reliable means of establishing the central
dictatorship than the national elites. One of the arguments Stalin used to justify the necessity of learning Russian
was the establishment of universal compulsory military service, the completion of which depended on sufficient
proficiency in Russian. See SIMON, supra note 117, at 148––53.
168. Qonuni Zaboni Respublikai Sovetii Sotsialistii Tojikiston [Language Law of the Soviet Socialist
Republic of Tajikistan], Law No. 102, Issue No. 102, Vedomosthoi Sovetii Olii Respublikai Sovetii Sotsialistii
Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan] 150 (July 22, 1989) [hereinafter
Language Law].
169. Id. ch. 1, art. 1.
170. Id.
171. All of the works of the Tajik Renaissance are originally in the Arabic script. See id. ch. 6, art. 27
(providing that instruction in the Arabic script is to be made available for the purposes of learning Tajik literature).
This could open the door to a future change in the Tajik alphabet from Cyrillic to Arabic script.
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However, today the Persian language uses the Arabic script while Tajik has changed to
Cyrillic. This change was a direct result of the Tajik Republic’’s incorporation into the
Soviet Union. Establishing the Cyrillic Tajik as the national language but including the
word Persian in parentheses represents a compromise in the language law and suggests a
decision by the government to embrace its pre-Soviet linguistic heritage without denying its
recent Soviet history.172 This compromise alleviates the problem of bifurcating Tajik
history and contributes to the establishment of an identity that is uniquely Tajik.
b.
Preserving the Linguistic Rights of Minorities
The 1989 language law ensures a national identity in Tajikistan linked to its preSoviet past but conscious of its Soviet political heritage. Although the law establishes
Tajik as the official language of the Republic, it provides fundamental language protections
to minorities that are of the Marxist tradition.173 First and foremost, the law guarantees the
freedom of all those living in Tajikistan to communicate in their national languages.174 It
also guarantees that people are free to receive an education in their own national
language.175
The guarantees in the language law help to ensure that ethnic minorities will not be
left out of the nation-making process. Although government agencies are required to
conduct their sessions in Tajik, the availability of translators for those who do not know the
Tajik language is guaranteed.176 Regions where the majority is non-ethnic Tajik can
conduct their business in their mother tongue; however, organs of the national government
are required to publish official state documents in the Tajik, Russian, and Uzbek
languages.177
172. In the debate over the selection of a national language, those advocating Farsi argued that only with the
Persian language could the Tajiks truly discover their cultural heritage, since this would provide access to ancient
Persian texts. They also argued that proclaiming Tajik the national language would confer official recognition that
Tajik history began in 1924 when a Tajik nation was first recognized, in effect creating a new national identity
based solely on accomplishments during the Soviet period. Those advocating the Tajik language argued that the
selection of Farsi over Tajik would neglect all of the accomplishments of the Tajik people since 1924. They also
argued that such a choice would contribute to an identity more closely aligned with its neighbors, the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Afghanistan, which use the Arabic script. Interview with Abdulbashir Rashidov, First Deputy
Minister of Education, Ministry of Education of the Republic of Tajikistan, in Dushanbe (Nov. 30, 1999) (on file
with author).
173. See Language Law, supra note 168, ch. 3, art. 8.
174. Id. pmbl. See also id. ch. 1, art. 3 (giving special status to the Pamiri languages of the Autonomous
Region of Badakhshon). For an excellent discussion of the Soviet doctrine concerning the equality principle in the
use of non-Russian languages during the Soviet period, see ANDERSON & SILVER, supra note 167, at 102––04. The
authors note that Article 36 of the 1977 Constitution of the U.S.S.R. ““assures citizens ‘‘the opportunity to use the
mother tongue and languages of other peoples of the USSR.’’”” Id. at 98.
175. See Language Law, supra note 168, ch. 6, art. 21 (stating that all public schools are required to teach in
both Tajik and Russian). But see id. ch. 6, art. 27 (guaranteeing the availability of instruction in the Arabic script,
for the purposes of learning Tajik literature); ANDERSON & SILVER, supra note 167, at 98 (noting that Article 121
of the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union ““guaranteed citizens the right to school instruction in their own
language””). The translation of official films, television programs, and videos into the Tajik language is also
guaranteed. Language Law, supra note 168, ch. 6, art. 28.
176. Language Law, supra note 168, ch. 3, art. 8.
177. See id. (requiring organs of the provincial governments to publish only in Russian, Uzbek, and Tajik,
but requiring publication in Tajik and the majority language in regions where the majority is of another
nationality).
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Creating Cultural Ties
The religious foundation of Tajik culture is Islam,178 and national identification as a
Tajik goes hand in hand with being Muslim. Almost ninety percent of the Tajik population
is Muslim,179 and many do not differentiate between being Muslim and being Tajik.180 In
Tajikistan, even people who are not religious in a spiritual sense participate in Islamic
rituals because these are seen as expressions of being Tajik.181 Thus, during the creation of
a new national identity, the Tajik leadership must determine not how to reestablish this
Islamic culture, but how to redefine and limit the form of Islam that exists there today. The
Tajik leadership has effected this change by employing a strategy that commingles Islamic
culture and Tajik culture and then defines Tajik culture as a secular culture. It has done so
by using three primary tools: media, law, and educational reform.
a.
Controlling the Media
The Tajik leadership uses the media to promote a Tajik cultural consciousness that
incorporates but is not limited to Islam. Nonetheless, although there are many pamphlets
on different aspects of Islam, most notably the role of women and zakat,182 circulating the
bazaars of Dushanbe,183 the government uses the media to ensure that a true public Islam
comes only from one source.
A major resource on Islamic culture is the newspaper Charkhi Gardun published
every Thursday. It contains basic articles on Muslims around the world, such as Muslims in
Finland,184 or the general struggles of man in relationship to religion, such as The Devil is
Always Battling Man.185 Most of its stories, however, are dedicated to the lives of Tajik
cultural icons today, like musicians and writers,186 with very little space given to
newsworthy current events.
Tajik Radio and Television (TRT) programming is dedicated to elevating the Tajik
cultural identity without excluding the Russian minority. Morning programming begins
around 7:00 A.M. with Tajik men, women, and children dressed in traditional Tajik
178. See generally Atkin, supra note 119 (discussing the role of Islam in Central Asia).
179. The remainder is mostly Russian Orthodox with small non-Orthodox Christian and Jewish groups. FED.
RES. DIV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 198.
180. See Atkin, supra note 119, at 46 (discussing the conflation of religious and political identity for Central
Asians); RYWKIN, supra note 116, at 85.
181. ““The most important thing which a king needs is sound faith, because kingship and religion are like two
brothers; whenever disturbance breaks out in the country religion suffers too; heretics and evil doers appear; and
whenever religious affairs are in disorder, there is confusion in the country; evil doers gain power and render the
king impotent and despondent; heresy grows rife and rebels make themselves felt.”” NIZAM AL-MULK, THE BOOK
OF GOVERNMENT 60 (Hubert Darke trans., 1978). See also BENNIGSEN & WIMBUSH, supra note 107, at 21 (noting
that ironically, by trying to eradicate Islam, the Soviets actually supported its ability to be maintained in a modern
form). The authors discuss the growth of a ““parallel”” Islam outside the ““official”” state-sponsored Islam.
182. ““Zakat”” is the amount of money that every adult, mentally stable, free, and financially able Muslim,
must pay to support the poor and needy. Zakat means both ““purification”” and ““growth”” in Arabic and is
commonly known as a form of Islamic obligatory alms.
183. E.g., KITOBI ZAKOT [BOOK OF ZAKAT] (1999) (unofficial pamphlet purchased at the Green Bazaar,
Dushanbe, Tajikistan) (on file with author).
184. Islom Dar Finlandiya [Islam in Finland], CHARKHI GARDUN [THE HEAVENS], July 29, 1999, at 6.
185. Fathulloi Azamatullo, Shaiton Hamesha Bo Inson Dar Nabard Ast [The Devil is Always Battling Man],
CHARKHI GARDUN [THE HEAVENS], July 29, 1999, at 7.
186. Sahna Mehrobi Man Ast [My Performances Face Mecca: Interview with Tajik Musician Jurabeki
Murod], CHARKHI GARDUN [THE HEAVENS], July 29, 1999, at 8––9.
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clothing and singing Tajik songs,187 but there is little programming in the afternoon. In the
evening, there is a set news cycle with the news at 6:00 P.M. in Russian, followed by the
same news again at 6:30 P.M. in Tajik. This cycle repeats itself at 7:00 P.M. and 7:30
P.M.188
The news in Tajikistan is usually coverage of a cultural symposium or seminar, a new
factory opening, a situation in an outlying province, or the Parliament or President.189
Presidential speeches are often dedicated to topics of cultural interest, such as President
Rakhmanov’’s speech proclaiming national unity, not Islam, as the Republic’’s foundation190
and his announcement asking the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) to proclaim the year 1999 in honor of the tenth-century Tajik
ruler and cultural icon Ismaili Somoni.191
b.
Rewriting the Law
The Tajik leadership uses the law to reinforce that Tajik culture is a secular culture.
The primary law in this area is the Constitution itself which states clearly that Tajikistan is
a ““sovereign, democratic, law-governed, secular, and unitary state.””192 The Tajik
leadership relies primarily on two additional laws to facilitate this: the ““Law on Freedom of
Conscience and Organization of Religion”” and the ““Law on Education.””
i.
The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Organization of Religion
Tajikistan’’s secular cultural identity is reinforced by the ““Law on Freedom of
Conscience Organization of Religion”” passed in December 1990.193 This law was amended
in 1991194 and 1992,195 and again in 1994, which is the final version.196 The law states that
all persons have the right to freely determine their religion, and to profess religion
individually or together with others. People also have the right to profess no religion and
187. Subh [Morning Program] (Tajik Radio and Television (TRT) broadcast).
188. Akhbori [News Program] (Tajik Radio and Television (TRT) broadcast).
189. For an interesting discussion of the role of the media in the Tajik civil war, see generally Moukhabbat
Khodjibaeva, Television and the Tajik Conflict, 1 CENT. ASIA MON. 11 (1999).
190. See generally President Imomali Rakhmanov, Vahdati Milli Maromi Most (Sukhanroni dar Bokhuri bo
Ziyonyon) [National Unity is Our Objective (Speech on Illumination and the Intelligensia)], at Dushanbe,
Tajikistan (Mar. 19, 1997).
191. Id.
192. SARQONUNI [Constitution] ch. 1, art. 1 (Taj.).
193. Dar borai ozodii vijdon va tashkilothoi dini [Law on Freedom of Conscience and Organization of
Religion], Law No. 418, Issue No. 24, Vedomosthoi Sovetii Olii Respublikai Sovetii Sotsialistii Tojikiston
[Parliamentary News of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan] 193 (1990).
194. Dar borai ozodii vijdon va tashkilothoi dini [Law on Freedom of Conscience and Organization of
Religion], Law No. 297, Issue No. 1, Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the
Republic of Tajikistan] (1991).
195. Dar borai ozodii vijdon va tashkilothoi dini [Law on Freedom of Conscience and Organization of
Religion], Law No. 203, Issue No. 22, Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the
Republic of Tajikistan] (1992).
196. Dar borai ozodii vijdon va tashkilothoi dini [Implementation of the Law on Freedom of Conscience and
Organization of Religion], Law No. 452, Issue No. 23––24, Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston [Parliamentary
News of the Republic of Tajikistan] 1096 (1994).
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not to take part in religious customs and ceremonies.197 The law states that all religions are
equal in their relationship to the law198 and acknowledges the right of religious
organizations to have equal access to media.199 It reiterates that Tajikistan has a secular
system of public education200 but officially recognizes citizens’’ rights to receive religious
education.201 All persons who wish to teach religion, however, are required to get
permission from the government committee on religion.202
ii.
The Law on Education
The Tajik leadership recognizes that education is crucial to the development of a
secular cultural identity and has made a strong commitment to it.203 This identity is
reinforced by the ““Law on Education”” passed by Parliament in December 1993.204 It states
that public education is to be free from ideological instruction, the decisions of political
parties, ideological and social movements, and religious institutions.205 All citizens are
guaranteed access to education, regardless of sex, language, nationality, social standing,
place of birth, or religious belief.206 Language of instruction is subject to the ““Law on
Language,”” and citizens are guaranteed free choice in their language of instruction.
However, learning the Tajik language is mandatory.207 The language law allows for public
and private government educational establishments, which can be free or charge costs.208
In order to classify these educational establishments as a lyceum, institute, or academy, a
special committee is charged with investigating their activities.209 It is worth noting that the
law also gives an opportunity to individuals, large enterprises, and religious and social
organizations to create educational establishments.210
197. Id. ch. 1, art. 3. This mirrors almost exactly the Constitution of Tajikistan. See SARQONUNI
[Constitution] ch. 2, art. 26 (Taj.).
198. Implementation of the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Organization of Religion, supra note 196,
ch. 5, para. 1.
199. Id. ch. 5, para. 6.
200. Id. ch. 6, para. 1.
201. Id. ch. 6, paras. 1––2.
202. Id. ch. 6, para. 5.
203. SARQONUNI [Constitution] ch. 1, art. 1 (Taj.). A general commitment to education is reflected in Article
41 of the Constitution: ““Every person has the right to education. Basic general education is compulsory. The state
guarantees access to free general and vocational education, and to general specialized and higher education in state
establishments according to abilities based on competition. Other forms of acquiring education are defined by
law.”” Id. ch. 2, art. 41.
204. Dar borai maorif [Law on Education], Law No. 30, Issue No. 1, Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston
[Parliamentary News of the Republic of Tajikistan] 899 (1993).
205. Id. ch. 1, art. 4, cl. 7.
206. Id. ch. 1, art. 5, cl. 1; see also id. ch. 1, art. 6, cls. 1––3 (stating that all language of instruction is subject
to the ““Law on Language””); id. ch. 2, art. 3 (stating that although citizens are guaranteed free choice in their
language of instruction, learning of the Tajik language is mandatory); id. at ch. 2, art. 8, cl. 7 (allowing for public
and private government educational establishments which can be free or charge costs); id. at ch. 2, art. 9 (charging
a special committee with investigating the activities of educational establishments in order to classify them as
either a lyceum, institute or academy).
207. Law on Education, supra note 204, ch. 1, art. 6, cls. 1––3.
208. Id. ch. 2, art. 8, cl. 3.
209. Id. ch. 2, art. 8, cl. 7.
210. Id. ch. 2, art. 9.
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Reforming Pedagogy
To complement the ““Law on Education,”” the Tajik government has distributed new
teaching guidelines to reinforce a Tajik cultural consciousness.211 This consciousness is
separate from Islam and is reflected in the development of new pedagogical styles. Several
Tajik scholars are working to implement a new vision of integrative education that
incorporates a secular Tajik cultural identity.212 Central to this process is reforming the
way in which the teachers unite language and culture during the teaching of core subjects,
such as grammar, at the elementary school level.213
C.
Creating a Conception of the Equality of All Members of the Community
Creating a conception of equality in Tajikistan is the most difficult task of the Tajik
leadership. Unlike rewriting history or establishing linguistic and cultural ties, which
require choices between conflicting visions, a tradition of civic equality does not exist.214
The lack of equality in the political process is a result of the institutionalized expectations
of ““ownership”” that Tajik elites inherited from the Soviet nationality regime.215 This
lingering result contributed to the 1992––1997 Civil War in Tajikistan as opposition was left
out of the political process and fought to bring its vision of Tajik national identity into the
nation-making process.
Today political power remains mainly in the hands of those who have had it since the
Communist era. Nonetheless, the Tajik leadership claims to promote the creation of civic
equality in the public sphere, through writing new laws, and the private sphere, through
promotion of domestic nongovernmental organizations and support for international ones.
These efforts, however, are subject to outside influences such as the perception of Tajiks
abroad.
1.
Rewriting the Law
Two primary laws represent the efforts of the Tajik leadership to create civic equality
in Tajikistan: the ““General Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation”” and the ““Law on
Political Parties.””
211. Interview with Rashidov, supra note 172.
212. See FAIZULLO SHARIFOV, TA’’LIMI HAMTIRO: PROBLEMA, TAHKIK BA ANDESHAHO [INTEGRATIVE
EDUCATION: PROBLEMS, RESEARCH AND THOUGHTS] pt. I (1999).
213. For example, a story is given about the founder of the Samanid Dynasty, Ismaili Somoni. The students
must read and analyze the story. The goal of selecting this story is to make the student proud of his national
heritage. The teacher prepares the children for the stories by giving some historical context. The teacher may tell
the stories of some ordinary people who died laying the foundation for Ismaili Somoni so that he could create the
Samanid state. The children are asked, ““Why do we honor the great Somoni?”” and then are required to analyze
and make comparisons of Somoni to the people who came before him. Children are also told the stories of Tajik
culture figures such as the poet Firdowsi and the scholar Ibn Sina. They are then asked questions such as, ““Are
there any things today that connect us to these people?”” The children answer, ““Yes, we have a Firdowsi library
and our medical school is named after Ibn Sina.”” Id. at 7––9.
214. See Brubaker, supra note 41, at 102––07.
215. Id. at 106.
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The General Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation
Until June 1997, Tajikistan had been a state whose national political identity was an
extension of the ethno-cultural nation as defined by the national political elite left over from
the Soviet period.216 That year’’s signing of the ““General Agreement on Peace and
Reconciliation”” by President Rakhmonov and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition,
Sayeed Abdullo Nuri, and the establishment of the Commission for National Reconciliation
were necessary first steps toward bringing more voices into the political landscape.
b.
The Law on Political Parties
The Tajik leadership has also committed itself on paper to broadening the action of
citizens in political life. The most recent law on political organization is the ““Law on
Political Parties”” passed by Parliament in November 1998.217 This law provides the
theoretical foundation for the inclusion of new voices in the Tajik government. It
acknowledges the right of persons to organize themselves into political parties based on
belief,218 and due to a recent constitutional amendment, parties of a religious nature are no
longer prohibited.219 It declares that only political parties of a national character——as
opposed to a regional——can be established220 and that the establishment of political parties
is open to all citizens of Tajikistan. Parties must gain approval from a national committee
that will be established to regulate political parties.221 In order to be officially registered, a
group must have no less than one thousand citizen advocates, a majority of whom represent
the various regions of Tajikistan.222 From the day of becoming officially registered, a
political party has legal personality; however, after becoming officially registered, a
political party has three months to establish representation throughout Tajikistan.223 A
decision on the status of a political party application must be given no later than one month
after all documentation has been turned in.224
Political parties whose aims are to overthrow the Constitution, organize armed
groups, or encourage a racial, national, regional, social or religious persuasion, are
prohibited.225 Political parties and their members do not have the right to exploit religion in
their political activities.226 Employees of the Ministries of the Interior, Security, Customs,
and Justice, tax officers, other civil administrators, and foreign citizens and residents
216. See Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, Ethnonationalism and Political Instability: The Soviet Case, in THE
SOVIET NATIONALITY READER: THE DISINTEGRATION IN CONTEXT 417, 427 (Rachel Denber ed., 1992)
(discussing Soviet cadres and their access to positions of political power).
217. Dar borai hizbhoi siyosi [Law on Political Parties], Law No. 300, Issue No. 22, Akhbori Shuroi Olii
Jumhurii Tojikiston [Parliamentary News of the Republic of Tajikistan] 680 (1998).
218. Id. ch.1, art. 1.
219. A referendum on the Constitution called upon voters to approve or reject a package of three
constitutional amendments. The first amendment replaced the one-chamber parliament with a two-chamber
legislature, the second extended the presidential term from five to seven years, and the third legalized political
parties that have a religious component. The final provision was negotiated in the 1997 General Accord between
President Rakhmanov and Sayeed Abdullo Nuri.
220. Law on Political Parties, supra note 217, ch.1, art. 1, cl. 3 (1998).
221. Id. ch.1, art. 2, cl. 3.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. ch.1, art. 2, cl. 4.
225. Id. ch.2, art. 4, cl. 2.
226. Law on Political Parties, supra note 217, ch.2, art. 4, cl. 2.
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without citizenship cannot become members of political parties.227 Political parties can
only have registered members, and any citizen who has reached eighteen years of age can
become a member of a political party.228
2.
Nongovernmental Organizations
The Tajik leadership aims to establish civic equality in Tajikistan by promoting
domestic nongovernmental organizations and supporting international ones.
a.
Domestic
Political movements, such as nongovernmental organizations that ““promote the
dissemination of the knowledge of democratic and judicial principles and
practices . . . [and] the knowledge of market economy and nongovernmental sector[s]
among the population””229 are classified under the same legal definition as political parties.
They are also subject to the same conditions.230 They are often beholden to donors and
foreign organizations to fund their projects231 and work closely with government
ministries.232 Projects to increase the understanding of democracy and civil society are few,
and their administration is closely watched by the government.233
227. Id. ch. 2, art. 5, cl. 2.
228. Id.; U.S. DEP’’T OF STATE, 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: TAJIKISTAN
(2000), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/364.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2003). Only the
People’’s Democratic Party, the Communist Party, and the Islamic Revival Party are represented in the parliament.
There are currently eight political parties and three political movements officially recognized by the government:
the People’’s Democratic Party, the Communist Party, the Islamic Revival Party, the Democratic Party, the Party of
Justice, the Socialist Party, the Civil Patriotic Party, the Party of the People’’s Union, the Movement of National
Unity and Revival, the Congress of National Unity, and the Public Political and National Movement. U.N. DEV.
PROGRAMME, supra note 103, at 25––26.
229. RIGHT AND PROSPERITY, INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLET (1999).
Right and Prosperity is a
nongovernmental organization operating in Tajikistan.
230. This includes being subject to the same fee scale for registration. NGOs are beholden to donors and
foreign organizations for their funding. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 103, at 25.
231. Some of these projects include ““Examination of the Legislation of Tajikistan on the Children’’s Rights””
sponsored by ““Save the Children/UK”” in 1999; ““Examination of the Legislation of Tajikistan Concerning the
Violence on Women”” sponsored by the World Health Organization in 1998; ““Juridical Trainings for Jamoats and
Hukumats Staff on Civic, Pension, and Family Law”” sponsored by AED (USAID) in 1999; and ““Trainings on
Children’’s Rights for the Khatlon Region Police”” sponsored by UNHCR in 1999. RIGHT AND PROSPERITY, supra
note 229.
232. Interview with Elena Shtratnikova, Director of the NGO, Right and Prosperity, in Dushanbe (Dec. 1,
1999) (on file with author). Ms. Shtratnikova noted that her NGO’’s mission is the elimination of poverty in
Tajikistan through economic and judicial defense and education. In doing so, the NGO has worked with the
Ministry of Education, Ministry of Social Defense, Drugs Control Agency (under the office of the President of
Tajikistan), the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the High Economic Court, and the Ministry of Justice. When asked if
the NGO (Right and Prosperity) worked to educate the population about election laws and voting rights, she
answered that those goals are not in its mandate. Id.
233. While the government has supported educating voters about the referendum, this education was to
educate them to vote ““Yes,”” or to vote in favor of the government’’s position. Interviews with United Nations
Employees doing Civic Education Projects Prior to Constitutional Referendum, in Dushanbe (July––Aug. 1999) (on
file with author).
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International
Two important civil society projects underway in Tajikistan are sponsored by the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and administered by the Counterpart
Consortium and the Aga Khan Foundation. The UNDP project consists of a series of
seminars, each covering a different topic, such as the meaning of citizenship,
communication, or conflict resolution.234
The seminars on citizenship bring together a cross-section of Tajik society. A
particular seminar might require participants to work together in small groups to come up
with possible new laws, to distinguish between a ““citizen”” and ““resident,”” and to
distinguish between personal (or human rights), political, and economic laws.235
The Aga Khan Foundation believes critical thinking is essential to understanding
equality, and its project aims first to create critical thinking through curriculum reform.236
The Aga Khan project brings together academics from throughout the region and teaches
them new teaching methodologies. Seminars are conducted in Russian and focus on
creating ““social context”” and differentiating between repetition and interpretation, and
between responsibility and duty in the context of the moral obligations of society and
community.237
234. Interview by Alisher Rakhmonberguev, at a Counterpart Consortium ““Seminar on Citizenship,”” at The
Learning Center, 140 Rudaki St., Dushanbe (Dec. 26, 1999) (on file with author). The seminar consisted of
females between the ages of sixteen to twenty-five who were from throughout Tajikistan, including the regions of
Kulyab, Khojand, Dushanbe, and Khorog. Participants included a bread-maker, fruit-seller, shopkeeper, and
university student, among others. Id.
235. For example, the facilitator asked the participants: ““If you were President and could write five new laws,
what would they be?”” He then placed the participants into groups of three and asked them to come to a consensus
on five laws from the fifteen. The groups were then asked to pick a spokesperson to give the outcome. After this
workshop the facilitator asked: ““What was difficult about this process?”” The participants noted that the process
was difficult because everyone had different ideas, to which the facilitator replied, ““Yes, because there were not
only five different ideas for each of you but then three different group views after each group had come to a
consensus.”” It is interesting to note the phrasing of the question, ““If you were President and could write five new
laws what would they be?”” reiterates a historical emphasis on presidential power. Moreover, note the answers that
were given: More than half the participants responded that they would write a labor law ensuring everyone the
right to work.
The concepts of citizen and resident were contrasted to show the citizen as the foundation of societal unity.
The participants noted that a citizen is concerned about his society and community and works for change through
legal means. The facilitator noted that a citizen ““looks out for his neighbors and tries to steer him right when he
goes off track.”” In this workshop the facilitator distributed a general Declaration of Rights. He then distributed to
each participant a different piece to three different puzzles. The participants were required to roam the room and
match up the puzzle, thus forming themselves into three groups. These groups were then asked to go through the
Declaration and put the rights under the headings: personal (human rights), economic, or political. The facilitator
then made a reference to ““free speech,”” asking if it was a personal or political right. At the end of this workshop,
the discussion was placed in the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and participants were
asked, ““Given these personal, political and economic laws, if you became President in the next election, which
would you implement first?”” Common answers among participants were ““open the factories”” and ““harvest the
cotton and trade it outside the country.””
At the end of the seminar, a question and answer session was held with the author during which the participants
asked several questions regarding equality between men and women in the United States. Some participants noted
that although the law in Tajikistan proclaims equal rights before the law, in practice men and women are not
treated equally. During this session a debate took place regarding how equality is established, with one camp
arguing that men and women form friendships which then lead to equal treatment and the other arguing that men
and women must treat each other equally, after which friendship is established. Id.
236. Interview with Pulat Shozimov, Curriculum Development Specialist, Aga Khan Humanities Project for
Central Asia, in Dushanbe (Nov. 29, 1999) (on file with author).
237. The process is as follows: The participants are given a problem to solve. For example, two friends
approach each other after having been separated for ten years. Ten years ago, one friend had helped the other, and
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V. BARRIERS TO CREATING A NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TAJIKISTAN
A.
Economic Reality
Creating a memory of a common past and establishing a density of linguistic and
cultural ties has proved difficult due to the weakness of the Tajik economy. Although the
Ministry of Education has developed a policy for curriculum reform, the reality of the
economic situation makes it difficult for teachers to implement such reforms.
In history and literature classes at the elementary school level, students do not have
textbooks.238 At the intermediate level, teachers and administrators complain that they have
received the curriculum guidelines but no instruction on how to implement them.239 They
also suggest that even if given instruction on how to pursue such methodology it would be
impossible, because the only textbooks available are the Marxist-based textbooks provided
by Moscow in the 1980s.240 At the university level, there is the same problem: The only
available textbooks filter Tajik history and culture through Marxism.241 International
organizations working in Tajikistan consistently relay to Tajik authorities the demand for
textbooks and offer the means for publication as well as for the development of new
now the other friend is in need. The first friend is very powerful and owns a business enterprise with a current job
opening. The question asked of the participants is, should this friend give the job to the old friend or to a person
who is skilled in the work? A typical answer of the participants is to give the friend money but not the job, to
which other participants often respond, ““What happens when the money runs out?””
The goal of this workshop is to find a balanced solution and to help the participants see that this is a question
of ““social context,”” and not moral obligations or beliefs. The project specialist noted that before the seminars, the
participants focused on repetition——simply repeating age-old beliefs in a modern context. But by the end of the
seminar, the participants have moved toward interpreting rights and responsibilities in the modern context. In
response to the question, ““Why does the Aga Khan Foundation believe this project is necessary now?,”” the project
specialist stated that it is important to help create a social and historical context for Islamic societies in the modern
world. He hopes the project will help to find this context without conflict. Id.
238. Interviews with Students and Faculty at Public School No. 48, Grades 1––11, Dushanbe (Sept. 15, 1999)
(on file with author). Students simply stand and recite Tajik poetry or historical myths. While the classrooms have
signs declaring: ““Keep our mother tongue pure!,”” the students do not understand the context of the debate. In a
roundtable discussion with administrators, elementary school teachers noted the special concern they have for
minority Uzbek students. Whereas prior to independence, Uzbek students received education in Uzbek with books
delivered from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, since the break up of the Soviet Union, these shipments have ceased. The
consequence is that elementary-level Uzbek students do not receive the educational training that they previously
received. These students do not speak Tajik well and now have no means to study their mother tongue.
Administrators noted that this situation would be a large problem in the future, since the Uzbek students currently
use books written in the Cyrillic script. The government of Uzbekistan, however, has officially changed its
alphabet to the Latin script. In the future, these children will not be able to communicate in writing with Uzbeks in
Uzbekistan. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.; Interviews with Employees of International NGOs and Organizations, in Dushanbe (July 1999––Jan.
2000) [hereinafter Employees of International NGOs] (on file with author). Tajik authorities are unwilling to have
the international community provide resources for cultural and historical textbooks because then they will not have
control over how Tajik identity is recreated. Id.
241. Interview with Mr. A. Kholikov, Department of Theory and History of Law, Faculty of Law, at Tajik
State University (Nov. 23, 1999) (on file with author). Professor Kholikov also noted that a lack of books and
other research materials has changed the way in which professors structure their classes. Whereas before
independence, a class would have been structured as two days of lecture with three days of seminar discussion,
professors are now forced to rely heavily on lecturing because students do not have the necessary textbooks. Also,
students are now asked to write papers in the hopes that these papers will one day be published to use as teaching
and research tools. Id. Professor Imomov noted that he wants his students to simply write in the hopes of future
publication. Interview with Mr. A. Imomov, Department Chair, Department of Constitutional Law, Faculty of
Law, at Tajik State University (Nov. 24, 1999) (on file with author).
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education programs. However, the government finds the publication of new textbooks a
highly sensitive area and will not allow it.
The economy is also impacting education, as it is quickly moving toward a preBolshevik Revolution situation similar to feudalism in which large kolkhozes (““collective
farms””) dominate the economic and political landscape. These collective farms are no
longer run by the state but by a single owner, and local populations rely on the kolkhoz for
everything from economic and political security to education. This change has limited the
ability of the national government to expose the largest number of children to cultural,
linguistic, and other reforms. Many children now work longer hours on the farm and spend
less time in school. Girls, in particular, withdraw from school altogether at a much earlier
age in order to marry and form the familial bonds that will ensure their financial security.
B.
Lack of Political Will
The present government is unwilling to support a fully open society and create a
conception of political equality of all members of Tajik society. The voice of the citizenry
has yet to impact power structures because political parties and movements,
nongovernmental organizations, and trade unions are unable to protect citizens’’ interests
fully.242 Kolkhozes devolved from the hands of the state to those individuals who managed
them at independence, mirroring the transfer of political power from the Communist Party
to the People’’s Democratic Party.
Previously, the Soviet regime created a sense of the ethno-cultural group’’s
empowerment through national republics. Yet, simultaneously it put effective constraints
on that same ownership.243 The difference, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, is
that the superficial ownership right has matured into full ownership.244 The current
leadership finds politically profitable the policies of nationalization oriented to the ethnocultural Tajik nation, particularly toward its regional and politically loyal base, rather than
one representative of the total citizenry of the state.
These policies have contributed to regional separatism and Tajikistan’’s significant
rural-urban divide. Although the 1997 General Agreement accorded thirty percent of the
government positions to members of the United Tajik Opposition, in practice President
Rakhmanov’’s government is full of loyal former communists,245 many of whom are from
his regional home, Kulyab. Regional patronage and corruption have contributed to an
increase in government expenditure in the Kulyab region and larger cities, adding to an
already significant divide between rural and urban areas.246 Economic disparity between
242. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 103, at 25.
243. See Brubaker, supra note 41, at 106.
244. Id.
245. President Rakhmanov appointed Akil Akilov, a former Communist Party functionary from 1976––1992,
as Prime Minister on December 20, 1999. Mr. Akilov had been serving as deputy governor of the Leninobod
oblast. Prior to the 1992––1997 Civil War, the ruling elite had come from the northern Leninobod region.
Appointing Mr. Akilov signified a need by the President to solidify support based on political ideology rather than
regional loyalty. New Tajik Minister Appointed (Radio Free Europe/Liberty, Transcaucasia & Central Asia radio
broadcast, Dec. 20, 1999).
246. Some significant disparities between the city and the country include higher birth rates, lower
productivity and less access to markets, less access to social services, and less access to cash liquidity in rural
areas. These disparities are due to the fact that income from agricultural sales is lower than the sale of goods,
which occurs primarily in urban areas. The post-conflict situation in rural areas and the deterioration of
transportation infrastructure has further isolated rural areas from urban ones. The combination of these factors
makes for more severe poverty in rural areas compared to poverty in urban areas. See Tajikistan to Ration
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urban and rural areas contributes to a divergence between urban and rural political,
ideological, and cultural life. Newspapers and other media have had some effect on easing
this divide between the urban and rural Tajik people, but the effect has been minimal.247
While President Rakhmanov’’s People’’s Democratic Party has put laws on the books
to promote political participation, it maintains control of the government through restricting
the right to political participation in practice and exercising strict control over organizations
and activities of a political nature.248 Three major ways in which the government limits
political participation are through (1) the outright banning of political parties and
movements, (2) the implementation of cumbersome registration requirements,249 and (3) the
limiting of access to media.250 For example, although the ““Law on Political Parties”” claims
that everyone has the right to take part in the political life of society, it places restrictions
on party membership.
Even if the government was fully committed to establishing civic equality, outside
influences impact their ability to do so. The treatment of Tajiks abroad, as well as the
treatment of other ethnic groups in neighboring countries, limits the ability of the
government to have full control over what it means to be a civic equal in Tajikistan. As of
the 1990s, thirty-four percent of the population in Tajikistan was non-ethnic Tajik,251 yet
minority voices in the political process are few.252 In fact, one could argue that the
consolidation of the ““Tajik voice”” has led to a stronger national identity based on a national
ethnic identity rather than a civic one.253 The interaction with neighbors at all levels——
Electricity (Radio Free Europe/Liberty, Transcaucasia & Central Asia radio broadcast, Mar. 13, 2000) (At an
emergency session of Rakhmanov’’s cabinet on March 9, 2000, the cabinet decided to reduce electricity supplies to
domestic consumers in rural areas outside the capital city of Dushanbe to three hours a day until early April.).
247. Eden Naby, supra note 167, at 45––47.
248. U.S. DEP’’T OF STATE, supra note 228.
249. Id. The Party of Popular Unity was banned in December 1998. The Agrarian Party was banned in April
1998 after the Government had refused its request to register in October. The Party of Economic and Political
Renewal of Tajikistan was banned in March 1999 due to insufficient membership. Several months after lifting the
ban on the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (Almaty platform), the Government banned the Democratic Party
(Tehran platform), ostensibly on the grounds of insufficient membership. In the November presidential election,
candidates were required to obtain large numbers of signatures during a short period of time. Only President
Rakhmanov, who could rely on his established political apparatus throughout the country, was able to do so by the
deadline.
Opposition parties also report threats and harassment of party members by authorities. In some cases, members
of banned political parties have been unable to find employment, while others have been fired or demoted for
refusing to join the People’’s Democratic Party. Id.
250. Id. The government exercises overt control over the media through legislation. See generally Dar borai
Murojiatnomai Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston ba Vositahoi Akhbori Omma [On the Official Parliamentary News
and Agents of the Public News], Law No. 290, Issue No. 22, Akhbori Shuroi Olii Jumhurii Tojikiston
[Parliamentary News of the Republic of Tajikistan] (1991) (defining the goals of the Official Parliamentary News
publication and other public news publications). Control of the media is exercised less obviously through such
mechanisms as ““friendly advice”” to reporters on what news should not be covered and licensing fees. Since the
government controls printing presses, restricts the supply of newsprint and broadcasting facilities, and subsidizes
virtually all publications and productions, editors fearful of reprisals exercise careful self-censorship. Opposition
parties are unable to publish, and the establishment of independent radio and television stations requires
government licensing to operate. At every stage of the licensing process there are high official and unofficial fees.
See U.S. DEP’’T OF STATE, supra note 228.
251. The ethnic breakdown is 64.9% Tajik, 25.0% Uzbek, 3.5% Russian, and 6.6% other. EURASIA 2nd
edition, supra note 91, at 162.
252. The government actively has sought to keep ethnic Uzbek leaders, such as Colonel Mahmud
Khudoverdiev, out of political life. U.S. DEP’’T OF STATE, supra note 228.
253. The Iranian scholar Alivaf recounts the decision of the Turkish rulers of the Emirate of Bukhara to keep
Tajik as the national language and contrasts this decision with the effect of the Uzbek government’’s policies in
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academic, economic, and governmental, among others——will continue to have a profound
impact on the Tajiks’’ conception of themselves. Since Tajiks look to Samarkand and
Bukhara in Uzbekistan to find their historical roots, the treatment of Tajiks there will
continue to impact the meaning of civic equality within Tajikistan itself. If Tajiks in
Tajikistan believe Tajiks in Uzbekistan are threatened by Uzbek nationalism,254 ethnic
nationalism in Tajikistan could increase, causing further limitations on political and other
freedoms and further limiting the chances for civic equality among all ethnic groups. Only
when the Tajik government works truly to incorporate a sense of equality into its identitymaking process will civil society change.
VI. CONCLUSION
Creating a new democratic national identity in Tajikistan will be a long and difficult
process. At a minimum, creating this identity requires (1) a ““memory”” of some common
past, (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties, and (3) a conception of the equality of all
members of the group. Although it appears that the government is aware of the reforms
Bukhara. He argues that the Emirate of Bukhara recognized the majority Tajik population in Bukhara and the
courage of the Tajik people in their fight against earlier Turkish and Arab conquerors to free their language and
literature. Alivaf claims that earlier governments chose to embrace Tajik rather than face a revolt and that,
regardless of the surrounding pressure of the Turks and Arabs, the Tajik language survived for thousands of years.
He also reports that the number of people in Bukhara who speak Uzbek is very small and that in the bazaars of
Bukhara one is more likely to hear the Tajik language than the Uzbek language.
Alivaf argues that, in Bukhara, those in positions of local responsibility continue to speak Tajik in their homes
rather than Uzbek and that those who want to speak Uzbek are looked upon with disfavor. He recounts an
interview with a woman who wanted to go to a public school in Bukhara:
He asked: ““What nationality are you?””
She replied: ““Uzbek.””
He asked in Uzbek: ““How old are you?””
She replied in Tajik: ““Twenty years old.””
He asked: ““Why do you not speak Uzbek?””
She replied: ““I do not know Uzbek.””
He asked: ““You do not know Uzbek, so why do you call yourself Uzbek?””
She replied with conviction: ““Because I live in Uzbekistan, because of that I am Uzbek.””
In interviews with teachers, Alivaf learned that mothers and fathers claimed that Uzbek schools were not strict
enough and even they had no interest in teaching Uzbek. Alivaf acknowledges the ability of the Tajik language to
survive in Uzbekistan and comes to two major conclusions: (1) the common and widely used Tajik language in
Bukhara is of no significance to the Tajik people there and (2) because these Tajik speakers identify themselves as
Uzbek, they have come to differentiate themselves in another way. Today, Tajik means a member of the Shi’’a sect
of Islam, while Sunni denotes Uzbek. Alivaf argues that this form of self-identification of the Tajik population in
Bukhara is reminiscent of the earlier Emirate of Bukhara, thus making a strong historical link to the past and
playing into the hands of the current Uzbek leadership. Because the Shi’’a in Bukhara are not part of the majority,
they have been given the title Tajik as they were in the past. Alivaf claims that even the educational system in
Bukhara contributes to this identification of Shi’’ism with Tajik and that only practitioners of Shi’’ism in Bukhara
are known as Tajiks. Abbas Alivaf, Daghoye az Hagigat [In Defence of the Truth], in TAJIKAN DAR MASIR TARIK
[TAJIKISTAN IN THE COURSE OF HISTORY] 366––67 (Mirza Shakurzade ed., 1999). Niyazi notes that when the Tajik
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was founded on November 10, 1924 as part of the Uzbek S.S.R., its borders
embraced mainly former Eastern Bukhara. There were 2.1 million Tajiks at that the time, but only 739,503 were
among the population of the national republic. Two thirds of the Tajiks remained outside the borders of the Tajik
S.S.R., mainly in the cities of Samarkand, Bukhara, and Khojand. Niyazi, supra note 75, at 165.
254. Oostad calls on Tajiks in Tajikistan to stop living the Uzbek lie: ““Brothers and Sisters! We are not
nationalists and have no hatred towards our Uzbek brothers, but we cannot allow it to continue that in our
identifying documents the Uzbek lie is written and in this way the Tajiks disappear.”” Adesh Oostad, Kitobe be
Tajikon Samarqand va Bukhoro [Lectures on Samarqandi and Bukhari Tajiks], in TAJIKAN DAR MASIR TARIK
[TAJIKISTAN IN THE COURSE OF HISTORY], supra note 253, at 423––28.
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USING LAW TO CREATE NATIONAL IDENTITY
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that must take place, in some areas it has not found a way to carry them out, and in others it
is simply unwilling to do so.
The Tajik government has undertaken the rewriting of Tajik history and the instituting
of linguistic and cultural reforms. Implementing these reforms has proved difficult,
however, due to the weakness of the Tajik economy. A lack of textbooks and a return to
collective farming outside state control has limited the ability of the government to
distribute its message of reform through the educational system.
Unlike its efforts at instituting linguistic and cultural reforms, which are undermined
by a lack of resources, Tajik authorities appear unwilling to support a fully open society
and to do what it takes to create a conception of political equality among all members of
Tajik society. They have put laws on the books to encourage political participation but in
practice continue to undermine that participation and instead encourage regional and
political patronage.
There is no reason to believe, however, that in Tajikistan a fully open society would
foster the civic equality necessary for the creation of a democratic identity more effectively
than the current government. Nor is there any reason to believe that any one person has a
better understanding of civic equality than any other, including President Rakhmonov.255
Only time will tell how committed Tajik society is to democracy and the laws that have
been created in quest of it.
255. In his discussion of the First Amendment, Emerson suggests that the rationale behind the First
Amendment is that ““an open society will be the stronger and more cohesive one.”” However, he identifies two
limitations to this theory: (1) ““[S]ociety must be committed to democratic procedures or rather in the process of
committing itself,”” and (2) ““[M]en [must] have learned to function within the law.”” Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 884 (1963). See also Frances Foster, Izvestiia as a
Mirror of Russian Legal Reform: Press, Law, and Crisis in the Post-Soviet Era, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’’L L. 675,
743 (1993) (discussing Emerson’’s theory in the context of Russian legal reform).
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