Université d'Ottawa University of Ottawa
PRISONERS OF THE HOME FRONT:
A Social Study of the German Internment Camps o f Southero Quebec,
1940-1946
BY
Martin F. Auger
A Tbesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate and Post-Doctoral Studies
in partir1 fulfillment of the requirements for tbe
Master of Arts degree in History
University of Ottawa
8 ZOO0 Martin F. Auger
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ABSTRACT
During the Second World War (1939-1949, five intemment camps were created
on the south shore of the St. Lawrence river for the incarceration of mde individuals of
German descent. They were known as Farnham, Grande Ligne, ile-aux-~oix,Sherbrooke
OJewington) and Sorel. Their goal was to neutrdize my potential threat to the defence of
the Canadian nation. With the entire counûy being mobilized for war, the security of the
homefront was necessary. Any person suspected of sympathizing with the enemy was
perceived as a potential *spy and Saboteur" and was incarcerated in internment camps.
Individuais of Gennan origin were no exception. During the first phase of southern
Quebec's internment operation. 1940-1943, civilians formed the bulk of the inmates while
during the second phase, 1942-1946, it was prisoners of war. This thesis analyzes how the
region's internment operation developed. It deals prirnarily with the issue of life behind
the barbed wires and how psychological strains came to affect inmates. It also looks at
how Canadian authorities attempted to counter such problems by introducinp labour
projects and re-educational propms. This case study of southern Quebec demonstrates
that the internment camp operation in Canada was an integral part of the effort to produce
total war.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to take this opportunity to thank rny M.A. supervisor, Professor
Jeffiey Keshen. for his guidance and valuable comments. Without his precious help. this
thesis would not have been. Thanks are also due to my thesis board
- Professon Peter
Bischoff, Jan Grabowski and Mark Stolarik. I would also like to thank the staff of the
Eastern Townships Research Centre, the National Archives of Canada as well as the
National Library of Canada. 1 am also indebted to my parents. Robert and Yvette Aupr,
as well as my brother Yannick, for their years of support and encouragement. Finally. 1
wish to thank my friends and colleagues, Ludovic Béliveau. Mélanie Brunet. Gaétan
Guilbert. Dorninic Jasmin. Yves Pelletier. Jean-Sébastien Plante, Alain Roy. Matt Snider
and Sara Wallace. for making univenity life and the writing of this manuscript most
pleasurable.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction........................................................................................ -1
Chapter 1: Organizing and Developing Southem Quebec's htemment Operation....... 16
Chapter 2: Li fe Behind Barbed Wires..........................................................55
Chapter 3 : Labour Projects...................................................................... 112
Chapter 4: Educational Programs............................................................... 151
Conclusion.........................................................................................198
Appendix .......................................................................................... 207
Abbreviations ...................................................................................... 213
INTRODUCTION
During the Second World War, sorne 40,000 Germans were detained in
intemment camps located throughout Canada. Arnong these intemees were pnsoners of
war (POW).refugees and Canadian civilians of Gerrnan descent. Inîtiated by the federal
government in 1939. the intemment operation was an integral part of Canada's War
Measares Act. Its goal was to neutralize any potential threat to the defence of the
Canadian nation. With the entire country being mobilized for war, the securie of the
homefront was necessary. As part of these precautionary measures. Canadian authorities
authorized the construction of five internment camps on the south shore of the St.
Lawrence river. The camps in this small rural region were known as Famham. Grande
Ligne, ile-aux-~oix.Sherbrooke (Newington) and Sorel.
The intemment operation in southem Quebec (1940-1946) was divided in two
phases. The first. fiom 1940-1 943. witnessed the incarceration of nurnerous civilians. Any
person suspected of sympathizing with the enemy was perceived as a potential "spy and
saboteur" and was incarcerated in internment camps. Individuals of Geman ongin were
no exception. During this phase, the camps in southem Quebec were used for the
detention of male individuals of German descent, most of whom were civilians who had
been intemed in the United Kingdom and transferred to Canada for security reasons. As
the war progressed, it became evident that these civilian intemees were no threat to the
nation. Consequently, most of them were either trarisferred to other camps or liberated
between 1941 and 1943. However. as more and more German prisoners of war were king
captured by British and Commonwealth soldiers overseas, the Canadian govemment
agreed to ship many of thern to Canada for confimement. It was decided to use the camps
of southem Quebec to incarcerate this new class of captives. The new inrnates began to
arrive in most of southem Quebec's intemment camps in early 1942. The incarceration of
German prisoners of war constituted the second phase of the Canadian intemment
operation in southem Quebec, Iasting fiom 1942 to 1946. The Canadian soi1 became the
home of thousands of such pnsoners.
The purpose of this study is to examine the development of the internent camps
in southem Quebec. This research intends to evaluate the importance of the war camp
operation and how it developed on the south shore of the St. Lawrence River. The choice
of this area is of great significance because half of the internment camps in Quebec were
located in this region. This thesis will analyze how these camps functioned and how the
region's intemment operation developed. Also addressed will be life widiin the barbed
wires and how psychological strains came to affect inmates. Since most of these camps
operated work projects. the study will also observe how the intemment enterprise
conuibuted to the war effort. The introduction of educational progmms will be analyzed
as well. This case study of southem Quebec should demonstrate that the internrnent camp
operation in Canada was an i n t e p l part of the effort to produce total war.
Before undertaking an analysis of internrnent camps. a proper definition of what is
meant by such facilities must be given as well as a histoncal background. internment
operations consisted of a cornplex network of prisoner of war camps and concentration
establishments. Prisoners of war camps are detention facilities for enemy military
personnel captured on the field of battle. According to The New Encyclopaedia
Britannica. a prisoner of war is a "person capnired or interned by a belligerent power
during war. in the strictest sense it is applied only to members of regularly organized
armed forces, but by broader definition it has also included guerillas. civilians who take
up amis against an enemy openly, or noncombattants associated with a military force."'
Although pnsoners of war have been a d i t - of warfare for thousands of years.
the creation of pnsoner of war camps is a modem phenomenon. The rise of such
installations coincided with the development of a sense of awareness by moa western
powers that prisoners of war needed to be adequately aeated. This new mentality emerged
after numerous eighteenth century philosophers, notably Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Emerich de Vattel, developed the "quarantine theory for the disposition of
prisoners." It stipulated that a "captive was no longer to be treated as a piece of property
to be disposed of at the whim of the victor but was merely to be removed fiom the fight."
Now that a d e h i t e body of principles for the treatment of prisoners of war was
recognized in the western world, captives were not to be enslaved, exchanged for
ransoms, tortureci or executed but were to be protected and cared for by their captoa until
the end of hostilities.
'
Prisoners of war camps began to emerge by the middle of nineteen c e n w .
However, they were inadequate and faced great problems in terms of handling and
sustaining large nurnber of prisoners. For instance, during the 1861- 1865 American Civil
War, the men captured by each side were forced to endure temble hardships in such
facilities. Overcrowding. unsanitary conditions, lack of heat, diseases, stawation, thirst
and death were ail realities of life in American Civil War camps. Perhaps the most famous
of these facilities was the Confederacy's Andersonville prison camp in Georgia, where
some 13.000 Union inmates died between 1864 and l 8 6 ~ . ~
What was needed was a set of regulations which would address the issue of
treatment of prisonen of war. A first attempt occurred in 1863 when Columbia University
jurist Francis Lieber formulated a document now known as the Lieber Code, whose
provisions dealt exclusively with the protection of war prisoners. Although innovative.
this document. which only guaranteed very basic human rights, was never ratified? As for
the Genevo Convention, which had been signed by most world powers in 1864 to improve
the effects of war on soldiers and civilians. none of its clauses addressed prisoners of war.
However, what this convention did was prove that it was possible to create an
international set of rules regarding warfàre.'
The appalling treatment of prisoners of war in late nineteen century m e d
c o d i c t s notably during the Franco-Prussian War (1 870-187 l), caused great concem in
the western world and led to numerous attempts to improve conditions for captives.
Despite the endeavors of the 1874 Brussels Declarations, which reiterated most of the
articles of the Lieber Code, it was not untii the 1899 and 1907 The Hague (Netherlands)
international conferences that most world powea agreed to create d e s of conduct
r e g d i n g the treatment of war prisoners6 The Hague Rules stipuiated that a captive was
the responsibility of the detaining power and '*must be protected by his captors from
violence, insuits, and public curiosity." It also mentioned that a prisoner's "permanent
place of captivity m u t not be in a district which is unhealthy, nor in an area where he
will be exposed to the fire of the fighting zone." Furthemiore, the mles indicated that an
inmate was to be fed, clothed and accommodated on the sarne footing as the troops of the
govemment which captured him and "forbade the killing of enemy soldiers who had
surrendered and who were defenceless. having laid down their arms."'
When the First World War began in 1914, all belligerents had signed The Hague
treaties and complied as best they could with their clauses. Although The Hague Rules
were "restricted to the m e d forces of the belligerents, and stipulated that ordinary
citizens of the contendhg States must be treated leniently and must not be deprived of
their lives or liberty," it excluded those who took up m s against enemy forces. This
exclusion gave carte blanche to al1 belligerents to act with great ferocity against certain
civiiian populations during the First World War. For example. when the invading
Germans came into conflict with insurgents in Belgium in 1914. they responded by
shooting several hundred Belgian t o w n ~ ~ e o ~This
l e . situation
~
was not rectified until The
Hague Rules were integrated to the Geneva Convention in 1 9 ~ 9 . ~
As for concentration camps. they were created for the incarceration of civilian
pnsoners in time of war. According to The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. a concentration
camp is an "internent centre for political prisoners and mernbers of national or minority
groups who are confined for reasons of state security, exploitation, or punishment, usually
by executive decree or military order." Further. the definition indicates that "Persons are
placed in such camps oAen on the basis of identification with a particular ethnic or
political group rather than as individuals and without benefit of either indictment of fair
ha1...Civilians have k e n concentrated in camps to prevent them from engaging in
guemlla warfare, from providing aid to enemy forces, or simply as a means of terrorizing
the populace into submission." l0
Concentration camps were fim used during the Boer War (1899-1902) in South
Afiica. When the Boer Kommmdos tumed to guenlla warfhre in 1900, using the support
of the rural populace and utilizing local villages as bases of operations British authorities
decided to cany their attacks to the South A
h countryside. ~doptingscorchedsarib
policies, the British began to bum famis, destroy crops and steel livestock. The
inhabitants. mostly women and children, who were captured by the British during such
operations were sent to concentration camps. Some 120,000 Boers were sent to such
facilities since the a h was to clear the countryside and undermine civilian support upon
which Boer guemllas depended." The problem with these early camps was that they were
set up in haste and were ill-regulated and poorly managed. Indifferent care evennially led
to some 20.000 deaths fiom disease and hunger. As a result, international opinion began
to believe that "the Bntish were seeking not merely to conquer an enemy but to
exterminate a race.""
Nevertheless, the concentration system became reality and by the First World War
rnost military powers resorted to such policies to intern civilians of "enemy blood." The
development of concentration camps added a new dimension to internment policies. By
the early twentieth c e n t . . internment operations came to include both prisoner of war
camps and concentration establishments. As a result. though their status as captives were
different. prisoners of war and civilians saw their fate administered by the s m e
authorities. This was a new histoncal phenomenon which illustrated how modem warfare
now affected both civilians and combatants.
The first tests for internment operations involving both civilians of "enemy blood
and pnsonen of war came during the Fim World War. It was during this conflict that
belligerents incarcerated for the first time both types of intemees in similar intemment
facilities. Canada was among the fvst to adopt such measures and its policies. therefore,
arguably represents the best example of how internment operations were organized during
the war by al1 belligerents. It began when Great Britain declared war on Germany on
behalf of the British Empire on August 49 1914. With the entire empire at war against
Germany and its allies, intemment facilities were created in al1 British colonies for the
detention of civilians of "enemy descent" and the incarceration of prisoners of war. The
belief was that "enemy subjects" could become threats to the security of the entire British
Empire. The assumption was that 'b man who owes his first allegiance to the land of his
birth could endanger the British war effort." As a result, Great Britain and the dominions
.
of Austrdia, India, New Zealand, South a c a , and Canada, detained thousands of
civilians and prisoners of war of AustrÎan. Bulgarian, German and Turkish descent.13
In Cana&, the process began with the introduction of the War Memures Act on
August 22, 1914. This emergency legislation "enabled the Govemor-in-Council to do
whatever was deemed necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and
welfare of Canada...during war, invasion or in~urrection."~~
It gave the Canadian
govenunent "extraordinary powers with which to meet the emergency" created by the
war. Among those extraordinary powers was the right to "arrest, detain, exclude and
deport" al1 individuals believed to be "enemy aliens." It is important to note at this point
that The New Encyclopaedia Britannica defmes an "alien" as king "a foreign-bom
resident who is not a citizen by vimie of parentage or naturdization and who is still a
citizen or subject of another country." Nevertheless, though the governrnent initially
maintained a policy of tolerance towards civiiians of "enemy blood," this situation soon
changed.15 Keeping in step with British policy and anti-German sentiments in Canada,
Ottawa issued Order-in-Council PC 1721 on October 28. 1914. authonzing the
appointment of civilian registrars in major urban centres. Al1 "enemy aliens" who bad no?
yet been naturalized as Canadian citizens were obliged to report to the nearest registrar
and were forbidden to leave the country. If a registm so decided. a suspected "enemy
alien" could be intemed. In those early days, individuals ordered for intemment were kept
in temporary detention centres such as in Montreal's immigration Building. Ali were
transferred to intemment camps as of November 6, 19 11. when the Canadian governrnent
finally authorized the creation of intemment facilities for both "enemy aliens" and
prisoners of w u .
''
Coordinating and administrating intemment operations was the Department of
Militia and Defence (19 14- 1915) and the Department of Justice (1915- 1920), with Major
General Su William Dillon m e r placed in charge." Of the 85,000 "enerny aliens" who
had been registered by April 1915,8,579 were intemed, including 1,192 Germans. In fact,
the bulk
of the civiiian intemees consisted of Ukrainians who haci been born in the
Austro-Hungarian controlled province of Galicia. Al1 were incarcerated because they were
considered to be either dangerous or potential burdens to the local welfare system as they
were unemployed. However, since most of these internees proved to be no threat to the
security of Canada, most were released in 1917 3 signing a parole agreement which
demanded "loyalty and obedience to the laws of Canada and a periodical report to the
nearest police a u t h ~ r i t ~ . " ' ~
As for the internent of prisonen of war, this began when the Canadian
authoritjes. after consulting with the British govemment, decided to detain al1 potential
Geman army and naval reservists caught on Canadian temtory.lg Under the terms of the
German Imperid and State Narionu2iry.L~of July 19 13, a Gennan was able to retain his
German nationality and rights even if he had been naniralized in another country. Since di
Gennans were subjected to universal conscription and were to serve in reserve uni&
many "enemy aliens" considered to be Geman reservists were arrested and detained as
prisoners of war as of November 1914:'
Further. at Britain's request. some 800 prisoners
of war. mostly merchant seamen caught in various ports under British jurisdiction, were
transfened to Canada fiom Newfoundland and the West indies in 1915. These were the
only prisoners of war intemed in Canada to have actually seen action. Overall. some 3.180
prisoners of war were detained in the counûy during the war." As for enemy soldiers
captured by Canadian troops on the European battlefields, most were intemed in Great
Britain. This was done for logistical reasons. namely the United Kingdom's proximity to
the European front lines. In fact, Great Britain absorbed most of the prisoners of war
caught by British imperid forces. By 1918, some 250,000 prisoners of war were detained
in close to 500 camps across the British Ides
Overall. Canada operated 24 internment
camps during the warSz3
Canadian internment camps treated both civilian intemees and prisoners of war in
accordance with the 1907 m e Hogue Convention. intemees were given the sarne standard
of clothing. food and quarters as Canadian soldiers2' and were fkee to give concerts, create
gardens, conduct athletic events, Mew weekly movies, have hobbies and attend
educational classes. Furthemore, prisonea had access to camp libraries where they could
read books, magazines aad newspapers once having been scanned by a censor. Further,
medical facilities and religious services were also provided for the inmates." Prisoners
were also allowed to send and receive two letters each week? The prisonea also
benefited fiom the services of relief societies such as the International Red Cross and the
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA). The International Red Cross was the most
important of these associations. It had been founded at Geneva (Switzerland) in 1864 by
Henri Dunant to prevent and alleviate human suffering. During the war, it kept track of ail
prisoners of war and "enemy aliens" detained by al1 belligerents, provided medical
assistance and coordinated a huge W i c of parcels usually filled with cloth, food and
medicine intended for war prisoners.27As for the YMCA, a benevolent organization
founded in 1844 by Sir George Williams, it contributed greatly to the welfare of pnsoners
during the war as it provided recreational and sports equipment, games and books to
i n t e m e e ~ .Furthemore,
~~
camps were inspected by delegations fiom neutral powers,
notably fiom Switzerland, to assure the humane treatment of pnsoners.'g
Work projects were also integrated into camp life. According to the 1907 The
Hague Convention, prisoners could work on various tasks "as long as the projects had no
comection to the war effort. the labour was not excessive, and the men were paid a rate
As labour çhortages becarne critical in Canada during
equivalent to that of so~diers."~~
1915. the federal government believed that it could compensate by ernploying both
civilian intemees and prisoners of war on labor projects. Numerous duties awaited
inmates. They would be used to clear land; work on f m s ; buiid roads and railways; cut
wood; work in mines: and labour in mills. Many private companies such as the Canadian
Pacific Railway and the Asbestos Corporation came to employ intemees. At al1 times.
armed guards followed the prisoners in thei. tasks. In April 1916, the situation changed
when "selected pnsoners were released in the custody of farmers willing to guarantee
thern the prevailing rate for f m labour and to report on their behavior." As a result, some
intemment camps were closed? The liberation of the intemees, namely German pnsoners
of war. only began once the Treaty of Versailles, which officidly ended the war, was
signed on June 28, 1919. Although most remaining "enemy aliens" were liberated upon
that date. the repatriation of the prisoners of war lasted until May 1920 due to logistical
problem?2
The Canadian example demonstrateci well how the intensification of intemment
operations had become a reality of modem war. It also showed how fighting nations
possessed the ability to detain large populations in times of war. During the First World
War, similar internment experiences also took place in Ausrria-Hungary, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Russia, Turkey, the United States and rnost other fighting
nations."
h 1929, the Geneva Convention was modifed md provisions were made for the
protection of prisoners of war, a subject which had been dealt earlier in The Hague
Convention of 1907. From now on. the treatment of prisoners of war was placed under the
jurisdiction of the Geneva Convention. This was done to correct and expand clauses
which had proved troublesome during the Great War. This was the case for rneasures
dealing with pnsoner of war work and punishment. The 1929 Geneva Convention proved
to be of great importance since it now integrated under one document
dl aspects of
warfare.
Nevertheless. the First World War intemment experience had already proved its
wonh and in the intenvar years numerous nations resorted. once again, to such measures.
It was during this period that intemment facilities were transformed into "institutions of
terror." In most cases. intemment centres were used by totalitarhn regimes as instruments
to neutralize political opposition. For instance, following the Russian Revolution (1 917)
and Civil War ( 19 18- 192 1). the new Soviet government resorted to intemment camps to
incarcerate political pnsoners. Many corrective labour camps. commonly known as
Gulags. were established in northem Russia and Siberia. Although deportation to these
regions had been a legacy of old Russia, it had now been integrated into the concentration
system. In such camps, political prisoners were used as forced labour to build railways
and waterways and to work in factories and mines. In a sense, internent camps had been
converted into '?O&
of ~lavery."~~
With the advent of the Second World War (1939-1945), inteniment camps were
once again used by al1 belligerents, including Gemany, Great Britain. Italy, Japan, the
United States and Canada. Even neutral -tes
such as Afghanistan, Sweden, Switzeriand,
Spain, Portugal, Eire and the Vatican resorted to such facilities in order to detain
"exchanged POW and airmen who foiced-landed in neuaal temtones..." In fact,
intemment camps were created on d l continents. This had to do with the intensity of the
conflict at hand.s6 Fwthermore, intenunent operations were used on a much larger scale.
Between 1933 and 1945, some 26 million prisoners of wu, politicai prisoners and
civilians were incarcerated in German intemment camps and used as forced labour.
During the wu, it was in Germany that the harsh nature of intemment camps was
exploited to its maximum. Mer d l , it was this country which, in 1940, added a new
dimension to intemment operations by introducing death camps. These facilities were
created with one single aim in mind: the complete and systematic extermination of ail
people considered to be ''undesirable" by the Gemans, notably the Gypsies and the Jews.
This process, which became known as the "Final Solution." comprised series of camps
located in eastem Europe. Overall. millions of intemees were put to death in Geman
internment camps through "hunger. cold, pestilence, torture, medical experimentations
and other rneans of extermination such as gas charnber~."~~
Despite the German case.
conditions in the internment facilities of most of the other nations at war. notably in
Canada, largely accorded to conditions set out in the Geneva Convention.
The social examination of the German internment camp operation in Canada
during the Second World War is quite new. Few historians have approached this subject.
Although research in this field began in the late 1970s. the lack of accessible primary
sources rendered the study of war camps problernatic. This can be explained by the fact
that most of the oficial documents relating to Canadian intemment camps were kept from
public scrutiny by the Department of National Defence (DND). Hence. most of the
researchers who wrote on the topic prior to the early 1990s had to rely on personal
accounts rather than officia1 documents. Eric Koch's 1980 autobiography Deemed Suspect
-A
Wartime BIunder is probably the best example of this genre. By the early 1990s. the
DND's sources were opened for consultation at the National Archives of Canada. As a
result, numerous researchers began venturing in the uncharted waters of the Canadian
internment operation. One can think of Yves Bernard and Caroline Bergeron's 1995 snidy
Trop loin de Berlin
- Des prisonniers
allemands au Canada. and Bill Waiser's 1995
account, Park Prisoners: The Untold Story of Western Canadàs National ~ ~ r k s ? ~
However, still no thorough study of the camps of southem Quebec exists.
This thesis is based on research in both primary and secondary sources. Extensive
government documents relating to Canadian intemment operations are contained in the
collections of the National Archives of Canada. Sources relating to internment operations
were collected from Record Group 24 (Records of the Deparmient of National w n c e ) .
All oficial papen relating to the Canadian intemment operation during the Second World
War are contained in this collection. This includes correspondence, reports, standing
orders, strengrh retums and war diaries. Most of these sources were issued at the time by
representatives from National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa and by the
authonties of each camp. Southem Quebec's five intemment camps are included in this
collection. Also used were interviews with ex-intemees gathered h m the -Collection
Eric Koch" in Manuscript Group 30 (Manuscripis of the First Hav of the Twentieth
These interviews enabled a thorough study of how inmates perceived their fate
Centur~).
and how they lived behind the barbed wires. in addition. records from the Eastern
Townships Research Centre (E.T.R.C.) were utilized. Interviews fiorn the E.T.R.C.'s
Eastern Townships Collection "Oral History of Eastern Townships Anglophone Women
During the Second World War" ofTered an opportunity to study how the local civilian
population perceived the camps. Printed prirnary sources were also consulted. Fint-hand
.
documents such as Mario Duliani's La Ville Sans Femmes [ 1945 ] and François Lafitte's
The lnternrnent of Aliens [ 19401, have proven a fine supplement to the prirnary sources
listed. Further. printed government documents such as Red Cross and Prisoners of War
Conventions [ 1 942 ] and Orders and Insn~ctions. Ihternmen~ Camps [ 1945 ]
contributed greatly in understanding the regulations governing the administration of
internment camps in Canada.
By looking at the intemment operations in southem Quebec, this case study will
enable one to appreciate the relationship which existed between small rural communities
and the war camp apparatus. ï h e mere support of relief societies such as the YMCA and
the International Red Cross, the use of prisoners in Work Prognuns, the re-education of
prisoners by local teachers were, among many others, symbols of this relationship.
Further. by analyzing the everyday life of prisoners, this will demonstrate how Gemans
interacted with each other and with their guards in such camps. Overall, this thesis will
enable one to appreciate the drastic rneasures that can be taken by a govemment in the
advent of total war, but also, despite that fact, how well Gexman prisoners were treated by
Canadian authorities during these hunultuous years.
NOTES
"Prisoner o f war," The New Encvclopaedia Britannica Vol. 9 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1995), p. 7 1 1.
Cbid, p. 71 1.
Mark Mayo Boatner III. The Civil War Dictionary (New York: David McKay Company,
196 1 ). p. 15.; Clement Eaton. A Histow of the Southern Confederacv (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1968). pp. 106-107.; André Kaspi, La Guerre de sécession. les états
pp. 148- 149.; George Levy, To Die in Chicago,
désunis (Evreux (France): Gallimard, 1W?),
Confederate Prisoners at Camp Douglas.
1862- 1 865 (Evanston (Illinois): Evanston Publishing,
1994). pp. 280293.; J. G. Randall and David Donald. The Civil War and Reconstruction
(Boston: D.C.Heath and Company, 1966). pp. 336-337.
Jonathan F. Vance, Ob-iects o f Concem Canadian Prisonen of War Through the Twentieth
Century (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994). p. 1 2.
"Geneva Convention," The New Encvclo~aediaBritannica Vol. 5 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia
Britannica. 1995). p. 1 80.; Vance, Obiects.. ., p. 12.
Robert Jackson, The Prisoners. 1914-18 (Londonmew York: Routledge, 1989), p. 4.;
"Prisoner of War." The New Encvclopaedia Britannica Vol. 9 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia
Britannica 1993,
p. 7 1 1 .; Vance. Obiects.. ., p. 12.
Canada Red Cross and Prisoners of War Conventions (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier Printer to
the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1942). pp. 48-61 .: Jackson. pp. 5-6.:Vûnce. Obiects.. .,
pp. 16-17.
Jackson. p. 7.
Canada Red Cross and Prisoners.. ., pp. 48-5 I .
"Concentration camp." The New Encvclopaedia Britannica Vol. 3 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia
Britannica. 1974), p. 60.
Phi1 ippe Masson and A lain Me lchior-Bonnet, eds., Dictionnaire de la seconde auerre
mondiale Vol. 1 (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1979), p. 527.: "Concentration camp." nie New
Encvclo~aediaBritannica Vol. 3 (Chicago: Encyciopaedia Britannica, 1974), p. 60.; G.H.L.
Le May. British Supremacv in South Afnca. 1899-1907 (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1965). pp.
9 1-99.
Le May,pp. 106- 1 10.
Jackson, pp. 134-135.; Miriam Kochan, Blitain's lntemees in the Second World War
(London: The Macmillan Press, 1983), p. 1.; Ronald Stent A Besaattered Page? The
htemment of His Maiew's "Most Lovai Enemv Aliens" (London: Andre Deutsh. 1980). p.
16.
David Edward Smith, "Ernergency Government in Canada," Canadian Historical Review, Vol.
50, No. 4 (December 1969). pp. 43043 1.
*Alien," The New Encvclo~aediaBritannica Vol. 1 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica,
1974). p. 243.; Brenda Lee-Whiting, ""Enemy Aliens," Genan-Canadians on the Home
Front," The Beaver, Vol. 69, No. 5 (November 1989), p. 53.; Lubomyr Luciuk, ed., Righting
an Iniustice. The Debate over Redress for Canada's First National Internment Ooerations
(Toronto: The Iustinian Press, 1994), p. 141.; Desmond Monon, "Sir William Oner and
Internment Operations in Canada during the First World War," Canadian Histoncal Review,
-
Vol. 55, No. 1 (March 1974), pp. 35-36.; John Herd Thompson, Les minorités ethniques
pendant les euerres mondiales (ûttawa: Société historique du Canada, 1991), p. 7.
Cornelia Bartl, T h e Loss of the GermanCanadian Image," Geman-Canadian Yearbook. Vol
XIII. Georg K. WeiBenbom, ed. (Toronto: University of toronto Press, 1994), p. 308.; LeeWhiting, p. 55.; Luciuk, p. 2.
Jean Laflarnme, Les camos de détention au Ouébec durant la première guerre mondiale
(Montreal: t 973), p. 8,; Morton, p. 3 8,45.
BMI, p. 308.; David J. Carter, Behind Canadian Barbed Wire: Alien. Refugee and Prisoners
s Canada 1914-1946 (Calgary: Tumbleweed Press, 1980). pp. 20-26.; Bohdan
of War C a m ~ in
S. Kordan and Peter Melnycky, in the Shadow of the Rockies D i w of the Castle Mountain
Internment Carn~. 1915-1 9 1 7 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Uhinian Studies Press,
1991 ), pp. 8-9.: Laflamme, pp. 7-1 0, 42.; Lee-Whiting, pp. 53-55.; Luciuk, p. 141.; Morton.
pp. 32-38.; Smith, p. 436.; Thompson, pp. 5-8.; Bill Waiser, Park Prisoners. The Untold Stoy
of Western Canada's National Parks. 1915- 1 946 (Saskatoon: Fifih House Publishers, 1995).
pp. 3-4.
Morton, p. 34.
Carter, p, 20.; Laflamme, p. 20.; Thompson. p. 6.
Carter. p. 22.; Kordan and Melnycky, p. 12.; Lee-Whiting, p. 53.; Luciuk, pp. 8, 65. 157.:
Morton. pp. 32.4647.
Jackson, p. 1 34- 14 1 .
Bartl. p. 308.; Carter, pp. 19-32.; Jackson, p. 141.; Kordan and Melnycky. p. 16.: Laflamme,
p. 10.; Luciuk. pp. 1.2.8, 54.93, 141.: K. M. McLaughlin, nie Gennans in Canada (Ottawa:
Canadian Historical Association, 1985). p. 12.: Morton. pp. 3?,56-58.; Thompson. p. 8.
Jackson, p. 137.; Morton, p. 41.
Carter, pp. 23.29.; Jackson. p. 1 37.
Jackson. p. 137.: Morton. p. 4 1.
John F. Hutchinson, Champions of Charitv, War and the Rise of the Red Cross (Boulder
(Colorado): Westview Press. 1996). pp. 1 1- 1 2. 179-285.; Jackson. pp. 62-66.: Vance,
Obiects.. ., p. 20.
Carter. p. 39.
"Geneva Convention". The New Encvclopaedia Britannica Vol. 5 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia
Britannica 1995). p. 180.
Waiser. p. 10.
Caner. pp. 25-26.; Kordan and Melnycky, p. 18.: Lee-Whiting, pp. 55-58.: Luciuk. p. 6.;
Morton. pp. 16-49.; Thompson, p. 8.; Waiser, pp. 1047.
Bml. p. 308.; Caner, pp. 19-22.; Jackson, p. 14 1.; Kordan and Melnycky, p. 16.: Laflamme.
p. 10.; Luciuk, pp. 1,2,8.54,93, 141.; K. M. McLaughlin, The Gennans in Canada (ûttawa:
Canadian Historical Association, 1985), p. 12.; Morton, pp. 32, 56-58.; Thompson, p. 8.
Canada Red Cross and Prisoners.. ., pp. 87- 1 3 7.
"Geneva Convention", The New Encvclo~aedia Britannica (Chicago: Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1995), Vol. 5, p. 180.; "Pnsoner of Waf', The New Encvcto~aediaBritannica
(Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, I995),Vol. 9, p. 7 1 1.; Vance, Obiects.. ., p. 88.
"Concentration Camp", The New Enc~ciotmedia Britannica (Chicago: Encyciopaedia
Britannica, 1974), Vol. 3, pp. 60-61.; David J. Dallin and Boris 1. Nicolaevsky, Forced
Labour in Soviet Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 206-2 16, 299-305.;
Masson and Melchior-Bomet, pp. 527-528.
Vance, Obiects..., p. 5.
37
38
"Concentration Camp", The New Encvclo~aediaBritannica Vol. 3 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1974), pp. 60-6 1 .; Masson and Melchior-Bonnet, pp. 528-531.
Other general sources include David Carter's Behind Canadiun Borbed Wire - Aliens, Refugee
and Prisoners of War Camps in Canada 1914-1916 [ 19801 John Melady's Escape fion
Canada! - The Untold Story of German POWs in Cmuda, 1939-194.5 [ 198 1] and Eckehart
Priebe's Thank You, Canada - From mess ers ch mit^ Piiot to Canadian Citizen 1 990 3 . There
is also John Joseph Kelly's fine Masten thesis from the University of Windsor entitled The
Prisoners of Wor Camps in Canada, 1939-191 7 [ 19761 . Some usehl thematic works have
appeared in the periodicai literature. These were helpful in analyzing how the governmcnt
came to institute internent operations and how the camps functioned. Among the articles
are: John O. Buffinga, "The War Prisoners' Aid of the YMCA and Hermann Boeschenstein's
Role as an Ethnic Mediator (1943-1947)~"Canadian Ethnic Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1988), pp.
53-70.; N.F. Dreisziger, "7 December 1941: A Turning Point in Canadian Wartime Policy
Toward Enemy Ethnic Groups?," Journal o f Canadian Studies. Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring 1997).
pp. 93-1 1 1 .; John Joseph Kelly. "intelligence and Counter-intelligence in Geman Prisoner of
War Camps in Canada during World War Il." Dalhousie Review, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Summer
1978). pp. 185-294.; John Stanton. "Governrnent Intemment Policy. 1 939- 1 945." LabourLe
Travaii No. 3 1 (Spring 1993). pp. 203-24 1 .
-9
ORGANIZING AND DEVELOPING SOUTHERN QUEBEC'S
INTERNMENT OPERATION
When Canada declared war on Nazi Gemany on September 10, 1939, measures
were imrnediateiy taken by the federal govenunent for the incarceration of "enemy
subjects." The protection of one's homefront against enemy infi~ltrationand sabotage had
become a harsh reality of twentieth century wars and intenunent was believed to be an
effective method for neutralizing this threat. For many Canadians. this was a revival of
Canada's First World War internment operation. The story of southem Quebec's
internment operation began in the early S u m e r of 1940 when Canada agreed to
accommodate internees detained by Great Britain, most of whom were German refugees.
The region's internment operation can be divided in two phases. During the first
phase (1 940- 1943). civilians of German descent formed the bulk of the h a t e population,
whiie during the second phase (1942-1946), it was German prisoners of war. Despite its
shon lapse of time. the first phase was of great importance. It was during this penod that
the region's camps flourished from small ghettos
to
highly sophisticated internment
centres. The knowledge gained with the civilian intemees enabled camp authorities to
solve early deficiencies, correct mistakes and improve installations. As a result, when it
was decided in 1942 to use the region's internment camps for the incarceration of Gerrnan
prisoners of war. the authorities were prepared to meet the new challenge. The experience
gathered during the fmt phase had provided the perfect training ground for handling
prisoners of war. With this in mind, the intemment operation which developed on the
south shore of the St. Lawrence River became a complex and well orchestrated network
of internent facilities.
Canada's Second World War intemment operation was the result of several years
of planning. The process began on August 20, 1936, when Order-in-Coumil PC 2097 was
passed, fonning a Canadian Defence Cornmittee whose purpose, among others, was to
handle the issue of "enemy aliens" in the advent of war. The architect of this was Minister
of National Defence Ian Mackenzie.' in March 1938, this Cornmittee was divided into a
number of sub-cornmittees, including a.Cornmittee on the Treatrnent of Enemy Aliens on
the Outbreak of Hostilities. later re-named the Interdepartmental Cornmittee on the
Treatment of Enemy Aliens and Enemy Propexty. Chaired by the Under Secretary of State
and taking in members h m the Departments of the Secretary of State, Extemal Affain,
Justice. Mines and Resources. National Defence and Finance, this sub-cornmittee was to
"inquire into and report upon the treatment of aliens and alien property in time of war or
emergency. real or apprehended.. ." Working in conjuncture with the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP).it compiled a list of ail "enemy aliens" believed to be involved
in subversive activities.'
When Great Britain declared war on Gemany on September 3. 1939, Canada.
though not yet oficially a belliperent, responded by issuing the Defince of Canada
ReguIations, which. arnong other measures. provided in Section 21 for the internment of
al1 individuais "acting in any matter prejudicial to the public safety or the safety of the
state." The establishment of this regulation had been possible because a state of
"apprehended war" had been proclaimed since August 23, 1939, and because civil rights
had been suspended with the introduction of the War Measures Act on September 1. 1939.
immediately after the regulation becarne law, suspected German sympathizeen, whose
names were taken From the list compiled by the Cornmittee on the Treatment of Enemy
Aliens on the Outbreak of Hostilities, were rounded up by the RCMP. This was a
precaution against sabotage and the rise of a Canadian ''fifi colwnn." Canada's Second
World War internment operation had begun'
M e n Canada declared war on Gennany on September 10, the anti-German
manhunt intensified. Al1 Gemian immigrants who had arrived in Canada aftw 1922 were
forced to register with the authonties. However, of the 16.000 Gennan-Canadians who
did so, only a few hundreds were arrested. As the Defince of Canada ReguIations
stipulated: "Al1 enemy aliens legally admitted to Canada and ordinarily resident in
Canada, so long as they peacefully pursue their ordinary avocations, M l be allowed to
continue to enjoy the protection of the law and shall be accorded the respect and
consideration due to peacefül and law-abiding citizens, and they shall not be arrested.
detained or interfered with, provided they comply with the requirements in respect of
registmtion.. ." The main reason for this situation was the deep sense of indifference that
mon Geman-Canadians displayed regarding German politics. The ovenvhelming
majonty of persons of Geman origin in Canada had either been bom in Canada or had
emigrated to the country in order to escape Germany and its problems. The Canadian
govenunent understood this. which explains why only 850 German-Canadians were
intemed during the war out of a population of some 470.000." Because the Canadian
authorhies expected to handle 8 0 ~ n the
l y Canadian civilian intemees imprisoned under the
Defince of Canada Regria~ions."no measures were taken in 1939 to accentuate the
country's internent openition. In fact. Canada operated only three internrnent camps
at
the time. located at Kananaskis (Alberta), Petawawa (Ontario) and Valcartier (quebec).'
The situation changed in the spnng of 1940 when the British govemment began
negotiating with Ottawa for the transfer of thousands of Gennan intemees to Canada. At
the time. Great Bntain detained both "enemy aliens" of German descent and prisoners of
war. Britain's internent operation was initiated when it declared war on Germany on
September 3. 1939. Because civilians of German descent were perceived as potential
threats, special tribunals were set up in late Septernber to examine al1 "enemy aliens" over
the age of 16 with the object of "sifting out anyone who might not be fiiendly to the
country." Overall, some 120 tribunais were established. each dealing with more than 500
cases? As a result, "enemy aliens" were graded into three categories: Class '-A" being
"aliens about whose loydty and reliability the tribunals had doubts and who rnight
constitute a potential security risk; Class "B" king ''diens about whose loyaity the
tribunals were not absolutely certain and who for one reason or the other should be kept
under a form of supervision"; and Class "C" k i n g "al1 those about whom the tribunals
were satisfied."' The aim of this classification system was to keep t n ~ kof al1 Ge"enemy aliens." M e r dl, by 1939, some 75,000 Gennan "enemy aliens" were in the
country, 55,000 of whom were refugees.8 In fact, since 1933, Nazi ~ l i c yhad k e n 10
expel ail 'hdesirables" fiom Gennany. With this in minci, numerous Jewish refugees
found their way to Great Brîtain. According to one Jewish internee: T h e p v s e was to
rob us and to force emigration, to force us to leave and to blackrnail other countries into
taking us. And it worked.. ."g However. as xenophobia and war hystena increased in the
Btitish Isles, London decided to "intern the lot" in early 1940. This meant the
incarceration of most individuals classed under the "ABC" system.'* For the Geman
refugees who had fled Nazi Gennany, Britain's general internment policy came as a
shock. As one intemee recalled: 'LI
was surprised in England that they had intemed us
in the fint place because we came as their fnends. There is an Arab proverb. ..'The enemy
of my enemy is my fiiend'. ..we were the enemies of Hitler. The British were the enemies
of Hitler so we assumed that they m u t be our fnends.. ."" As for the German war
prisoners detained in Brîtain. most were enemy merchant searnen whose ships had been
caught in British ports; Gennan Navy sailon captured at sea by the Royal Navy; and
German Air Force pilots whose planes had been shot d o m over British temtory.I2
Therefore. Britain was forced to detain large populations of civilians of Gennan descent
and prisoners of war by 1940.
The reason guiding Great Britain's desire to transfer al1 of its prisoners overseas in
the spring of 1940 was to alleviate the pressures that internment operations imposed on
the British homefiont. At the tirne, Britain was coping with German aerial bombardments
and was facing the prospect of a German invasion. Because the British govemment felt
that "internent on the Bntish Isles was no longer sufficiently secure." the Chiefs of Staff
recommended that most German intemees be transfened ~verseas.'~As Eric Koch
indicated in his book Deemed Suspect, three reasons guided this decision. First, in the
advent of a German invasion, the danger of fiflh columnists wodd be lessened; second,
there would be less mouths to feed in Britain; and third, less military personnel would be
required to guard Bntish internment camps.14
in late May 1940, the British government began sending requests to its dominions
asking them if they would be prepared to accept British internees. As British Secretary of
State, Viscount Caldecote, told Vincent Massey, High Commissioner for the Canadian
govemment in London, on June 7, 1940: "...The United Kingdom government sincerely
hopes that the Canadian pvemment may be pressed to corne to the assistance of the
United Kingdom by agreeing to receive at the earliest possible moment, at least the
intemees whose removal fiom this country it is desired to secure on the ground that their
continued presence in this country is b o n d to be a source of the most senous risk."ls
Despite much British pressure, the Canadian government debated the issue and on June
19, 1940, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King announced in the House of
Commons that Canada "agreed to accept Geman pnsoners of war and [civilian]
intemees from the United ~ i n ~ d o r n . " ' ~
The fim batch of prisoners sent to Canada left Liverpool on June 20. 1940, aboard
the Duchess of York, a 20,000 ton vessel belonging to the Canadian Pacific Stearnship
Company. The ship's cargo of 2,112 Class "A" intemees and 535 German prisoners of
war reached Quebec City on June 29. Although the Duchess of York's trip across the
Atlantic Ocean went according to schedule, nothing of such c m be said of the ill-fated
Arandora Star. Having lefi Liverpool on July 1, 1940, with a contingent of 473 Class "A"
intemees and 717 Italian inmates, the Arandora Star, once a Blue Star luxury liner, was
torpedoed by a German U-Boat off the Irish Coast on July 2. Approximately 146 German
and 453 Italian intemees died. Those who survived the Arandora Sior disaster were later
packed aboard other ships, also bound for Canada Then. on July 3, 1940, the Ettrick lefi
Liverpool with 1.308 Class "B" and "C" internees as well as 785 Geman prsoners of war
and 405 Italians. The 1st vessel to leave Britain for Canada with a cargo of intemees was
the Sobieski, a Polish luxury liner. Having left Greenock. Scotland. on July 4, 1940, with
982 Class " B and "C" intemees and 548 German prisoners of war, the Sobieski reached
Quebec City on July 15, two days after the ~ttrick."
What this transfer demonstrated was that there were less prisoners of war
than
civilian intemees king sent to Canada. Furthemore, the bulk of the prisoners were Class
"B" and "C" captives, "moa of whom should never have been sent fiom England,"
according to historia. John Joseph ~ e l l ~ As
. " British author François Lafine indicated in
1940: "This showed clearly - out of the mouths of the Ministers tkmselves - that the War
Office, the Home Ofice and Mr. Chamberlain [British Prime Minister Arthur Neville
Chamberlain] between hem made a complete mess of the job of selecthg people for
deportation in a sensible and democratic way and of organizing the oveneas transport of
less than 8,000 men." Lafstte M e r stated: "The plain fact is that thousands of innocent
refugees have been treated like cattle in the name of national security." Nevertheless.
because the intemees were being kept for the British govemment, the Canadian
authonties had no choice but to detain them. Only the British Home Secretary had the
"ovemding power here of ordering release in any case where he is convinced that release
will be in the national interest, or in the interest of our [British]war eff~rt."'~
However, Canada was unprepared to accommodate an intlux of pnsoners from
Great Britain, as the country lacked proper detention facilities. This led Ottawa to create
new intemment camps to accommodate the British intemees. The immediate result of this
decision was the creation of temporary inremment centres in Quebec. Operations began in
June f 940. with the construction of two such facilities: the first was built at Cove Fields
on Quebec City's Plains of Abraham and the second was located on the Trois-Rivières
exhibition gound property. It was in these facilities that the arriving prisoners were first
held. While this was being done, permanent detention facilities were king built in New
Brunswick. Ontario and Quebec. These provinces were chosen because Canadian
authorities believed it was unwise to send the internees to the Canadian West due to the
significant German populations living there. As such, eastem Canada was chosen for
security reasons."
It was within this context that southern Quebec's internment operation was
initiated in 1940. At the tirne, four permanent camps were behg built in the province to
accommodate the bulk of the British civilian intemees. These were Camp "A" Famham,
Camp "1" Île-aux-~oix,Camp "N" Sherbrooke, and Camp '3"he Ste. Hélène. Except for
Camp 5,"which was located in Montreal and whose pinpose was to incarcerate Italian
inmates, d l of the other camps were situated in southem Quebec and detained civilians of
Geman descent. 21
The first phase of internment in southem Quebec had begun. Although
responsibility pertaining to the "administration, treatment and security of pisoners of war
and intemees" was that of the Department of National Defence's Directorate of
-
intemment Operation - later re-named the Directorate, Prisonea of War Military District
4 headquarters in Montreal was in charge of al1 internent camps located in Quebec. In
each camp, the Directorate Veterans' Guard of Canada (VGC) had complete jurisdiction
over camp personnel. The VGC had been established on May 24. 1940, as a special corps
of First World War veterans to be used-for guard duties wherever needed. The aim was to
exploit the veterans' military experience for the benefit of the homefiont. Indeed, the
unit's tasks were to guard intemment camps. cable stations. oil refinenes, bridges. canais.
ammunition depots, factories, and many other such sites. Although the age-limit for
enlistment was fixed at 49 years, a number of older men were accepted including some
veterans of the Boer War. This k e d up the younger military personnel for overseas
service. The VGC replaced die Canadian Provost Corps as the most preminent guards at
internment camps. By 1945. the corps numbered 15.000 men who served in Canada. the
Caribbean. Great Bntain and Newfoundland. In muthem Quebec. most of the VGC
personnel were unernployed French-Canadian veterans. -11
Because of the urgency to find proper quarters for the British intemees. the three
camps which were created in southem Quebec in 1940 were set up in haste. The first
camp built in the region was Camp "1" he-aux-~oix.It was constmcted within the walls
of old Fort L e ~ o xan
. eighteenth century fortress situated on the Île-aux-~oix- an isiand
on the Richelieu River near St. ~ean? The history of Camp île-aux-Noix began on July 1.
1940, when Major Eric D.B. Kippen was asked by the officer commanding Military
District 4 to find a suitable location for an internment camp. Following a thorough
investigation of the île-au-Noix's existing facilities. Kippen reported favorably to his
superiors about the site and work on the camp began on July 4.
However, converting old Fon Lemox into an internment camp was no easy task.
As Kippen wrote in the camp's war diary on July 5: "There is a lot to do. The old banacks
and other buildings have not been inhabited since 1880. Water and light must be installed:
wire fences put up and a great many other things attended t ~ . " ~ Because
'
of the urgent
necessity to fmd new intenunent centres, Camp île-aux-~oixwas constructed in haste. AS
Kippen stated: ". ..I'd taken about three weeks [ to build the camp ] . 1 had some engineen
working on it night and day. They had to iastall a...proper lighting and had to do a lot
about the water and the drainage and al1 that sort of thing, because it [Fort Lennox] hasn't
been lived in about 60 or 70 years. It was full of bats.. .and al1 sorts of animds.. .it was a
rotten place, really, but it was the only thing 1 could fmd in a hur~y."'~When Major
Kippen received the order to prepare for the arriva1 of the fxst intemees on July 15, 1940,
the camp was still in the midst of construction. As he wrote: "This news causes
considerable excitement in view of the fact that the camp was far fiom complete, at the
iime..." In fact. civilian workers were still being employed by the camp three weeks after
the arriva1 of the prisonerç.26
The inexpenence of the camp staff was another problem. This could be seen
through the lack of coordination characterizing the arriva1 of the first prisoners on July 15.
Upon reaching St. Paul. a srnall town facing the ile-aux-~oix.at 7 p.m.. the 273 prisonen
were divided into groups of 35 and shipped to the island on a large barge escorted by a
fleet of motor boats. Because only one barge could be used. the transfer to the ile-auxNoix was a slow process. By midnight. some 76 pnsonen were still waiting on the St.
Paul shore to be transferred to the isiand. Complicating matters was the fact that the entire
operation was done at night and in the rnidst of pouring min. As they amived in the camp.
prisoners were thoroughly searched. were given a hot shower, and were examined by
medical officers before being sent to their quarters. So slow was this process that the
prisoners were not completely settled until 4 o'clock in the moming. As a result. the
intemees transfer fiom St. Paul to the camp took nearly ten hours. Major Kippen well
summarized why the tmsfer was so slow: 'The whole thing was quite a job, considering
the camp was partly fullshed and the stafl'were quite inexperienced of this kind of work."
27
inexperience aiso ied to m e r logistical problems. The camp staffs manipulation
of the inmates' luggage well demonstrated this issue. Aithough prisonen were allowed a
maximum of 40 Ibs. of baggage, most disobeyed orders and brought with hem between
75 lbs. and 250 Ibs. Moreover, nothing was done to protect the prisoners' belongings as
they were msferred fiom St. Paul to the camp. Transported amidst pouring rab, most of
the luggage sustained serious damage. Since most of the bags were of poor quality, wet
cases ofien npped due to the sheer weight of their contents. As a result, many possessions
were lost. Although the intemees were blamed for this problem, the camp staff also held
some responsibility. Despite the poor weather. no soldier made any attempts to preserve
the pnsoners' luggage. instead, the already broken possessions were piled up and covered
with small canvas sheets outside of the camp and lefi to the inclement weather for a
couple of days. Moreover, many soldiers resorted to pillage.'8 Stolen were gold and silver
wristwatches, lighten. kitchen ustensiles, silverware, wallets, knives and even boots.
shirts and pants.'g Although Major Kippen was unaware of the looting, he indicated to the
intemees that their baggage had been handled some ten times since it left Britain. "thereby
running al1 the hazards of loss. damage and thefi." He added that 'iinder wa. time the fact
that the prisonen are regarded with some considerable hostility by civilians and in some
cases soldiers are inclined to look upon prisoners of war property as fair $ame.'"' A Court
of Inquiry was assembled in September 1940 to investigate the r n a ~ ~ e rAlthough
.~'
it
admitted that the internees "have suffered the loss of personal effects and property." the
court came to the conclusion in February 1941 that it was "unable to artive at a definite
conclusion and to hold anyone in particular accountable for the unforninate mishap."
There was not enough evidence, it claimed. '70 show exactly how and where the alleged
loss or polfenng had taken place." Too many oppominities to tamper with the luggage
took place during the long journey fiom Britain to Canada. Further, since most of the
luggage was made of poor quality fabrics which "could hardly stand the Wear and tear
incidental to traveling by land and sea." the court began to wonder how anyone could
know if some of the baggage had not already k e n broken before the mival of the
intemees at Camp île-am-~oix.Because no system of control by means of receipts had
been issued. no one could be found directly responsible for the safety of the luggage.
Despite its conclusion. the Court of Inquixy mentioned that it might be ''worthwhile to
have the Provincial Police punue inquiries, not only in Montreal but also St. Jean and the
vicinity of St. ~ a u l . " ~
The Quebec Provincial Police's investigation of the matter was much more
conclusive. M e r interrogating several witnesses. the police concluded in July 1941 that
"it is therefore proven that the articles lost by the prisoners had been stolen at île-auxN o k by the soldiers, the members of the Veterans Home Guard and the employees of
National Defence and the offcers in charge are to be biamed for what ~ccurred."'~
According to the civilian workers employed by NDHQ at Camp île-aux-~oix,the luggage
was looted on the island. As one worker said: "The suit cases were opened and several
broken and tom. Lots of stuff was stolen. The guards who were there were kicking the suit
cases open with their heels, saying that al1 these things were to be burned and that the
prisoners were never
to
see their belongings any more." With this in mind, the civilian
worken began searching the luggage for valu able^.'^ Also. one civilian worker recalled.
"there was about 50 soldiers and these men went through and pilfered the luggage of the
internee~."~'
Meanwhile. hoping to alleviate crowding in the camps already estabiished in
Quebec. new sites were considered in August 1940. in southem Quebec. the result was
the creation of Camp "A" on the Dominion Experirnental Farm at Famham and Camp
"N" on the property of the Quebec Central Raiiroad (Newington) at Sherbrooke. Unlike
Camp ile-aux-~oix.both these camps were situated in Quebec's Eastern Townships. An
altemate site was offered by the Quebec govemment on the Brompton F m near
Sherbrooke. This site. which would have been known as Camp "O," never materialized as
federal authorities did not deem n e c e s s q the construction of a fourth camp in the
region.36
The story of Camp "A" began on August 1, 1940, when the Dominion
Experimental Farm in Farnham became the property of the Department of National
~efence."Immediately. a thorough investigation of the site was made by members of the
Directorate of htemment Operations for the construction of a new camp. As they stated in
their report on August 8: "It is i m p o m t that this camp be completed.. .so as to move the
intemees now in temporary camp "L" Cove fields, Quebec City, a very unsatisfactory
place." Despite the urgent need, the construction of the camp did not begin until mid-
September. As a result, work was still in progress when order was given to open the
facility in early October, 1940. 38
Camp Faniham became operational on October 9, 1940, when Major Eric D. B.
Kippen, who was then in command of Camp île-aux-~oix,was transferred to Famham.
When he d v e d , the camp was in a primitive state. At the time. some 120 civilians were
still working on the camp's facilities. There was still a lot to be done, for only one line of
barbed wire had been erected. Although nearing completion, most of the buildings still
remained inhabitable. Further, no towers were yet installed at the four corners of the
compound. In fact, the compound was literaily strewn with debris. Still, orders had been
given to Kippen and his men to senle the camp. This was no easy task since no huts
existed to house the camp's staff. Kippen tried to correct this deficiency by immediately
ordering the conversion of two old tobacco-drying buildings - remnants of the Dominion
Experimental Farm - into huts for his men. in the meantirne. large tents had to serve as
living quarters for the voops while Kippen and his oficers stayed at the Montcalm Hotel
in ~amham.'~
The main purpose of Major Kippen's presence in the camp was to accelerate the
construction process and supervise %e iast stages of the building..
To increase
production. Kippen began using night sshifts. This enabled work to go on 34-hours a day.
in the span of five days, the entire barbed wire fence system was built. most of the
buildings and huts were completed and the four towers were erected. The camp was able
to welcome its first intemees on October 15, 1940. Still. there was still a lot of work left
to be done. As Kippen wrote in the camp's war diary: "..A will probably take another
week to complete the work going on in the camp." Clearly, camp authonties were not
ready to welcome a huge influx of inrnates. Nevextheless, in the course of a few days.
Camp Famham was forced to accomrnodate 520 internees. The initial batch, which
consisted of 140 men, arrived by train on October 15, and was followed by a second
shipment of 180 men on October 16, and a third group of 200 inrnates on October 18."
This created a serious security problem since the camp was not ready to accomrnodate
such a large number of intemees. Work was still in p m p s s in the compound and on the
barbed wire fences and buildings. Further. the camp lacked beds for intemees thus forcing
many
to
sleep on the floor. This problem was solved three days later when the long
awaited double decker iron beds were sent to Camp ~ambam."
To accelerate the construction of the camp, the civilian workrnen were replafed by
the intemees themselves. According to the camp's war diary, '.a lot of work inside the
compound can now be done by the intemees and there seems to be many skilled men
among them." Despite the prisoners' belief that the camp should have been completed
prior to their arrival. most complied with the authorities' request and began working on
the facility" However, should intemees hurt themselves in the process, no facilities
existed within the camp to mat them. in fact, the intemees' hospital was still in the midst
of construction. Further. no trucks or cars were in the possession of the camp authorities
at the time. This was a senous handicap. for it meant that any wounded prisonen could
not rapidly be evacuated to a nearby hospitaLu Although no injury was sustained by any
of the inrnates, the use of intemee labour constihited a serious risk taken by the
authorities.
The story of Camp " N ' Newington in Sherbrooke was somewhat similar. for it too
was still being constnicted when prisonen mived. The site originally belonged to the
Quebec Central Railroad (Q.C.R.)and was transferred to the Department of National
Defence in September 1940. It consisted of two main buildings (hangars); an old machine
shop and boiler house; an oil house: and the administration building of the Q.C.R.
Furiher. railway tracks and oiling pits extended throughout the yard. According to the
camp's wa. diary: "The facilities are so inadequate that when the Sherbrooke Fusiliers [a
local regiment] made an inspection in September 1940, exploring the possibilities of
using the site as their headquarters. the officer cornmanding flatly rejected the project."
Nevertheless, Brigadier-Genral Edouard de Bellefeuille Panet. Director of Internent
Operations. requested Major D. J. O'Donahoe. Engineer OScer at Military District 4, to
inspect the site in late September with a view of using it as a camp. According to
O'DonahoeWsreport, dated September 24. 1940, "the camp could be made ready for
occupation by October 4.1 940."'
Although this completely contradicted the Sherbrooke Fusiliers' report, the
Directorate of htemment Operation aulhorized the construction of an uitemment camp on
the Q.C.R.site. However, transfomihg this property into an internment facility pioved a
slow process. Because of the enormous amount of work to be done, none of Major
O'DonahoeYsdeadlines could be respected. When the camp opened on October 5, 1940,
the site was far from k i n g completed. As Major S. H. Grifin, camp commandant,
reported: "There are vimially no sanitary arrangements other than 6 out of date toilets in
the boiler house. The lighting system is extremely limited and the uncleanliness of the
main buildings is beyond description." Despite the harsh conditions, Griffin's men aied to
"give the place a semblance of habitability" while preparing for the arriva1 of the
internees? Despite this effort to rapidly complete the camp, the site remained unready to
welcome intemees. When 618 prisoners arrived on October 15, the "appalling conditions
According to Eric Koch:
at the camp" generated a considerable amount of di~content.'~
...the property consisted of two repair sheds. one for locomotives and the
other for railroad cars...The milway ûacks and oiling pits that ran through
the sheds were filled with black water. The place had six-old fashioned
lavatories without ventilation. two urinals and seven low-pressure water
taps which also had to serve the kitchen. The windows were broken and the
roofs were leaky: so were the noisily hissing heating pipes. The floor space
allotted to each of the.. .intemees amounted to 19 square feet. That was
contrary to British Ministry of Health regulations which required a
minimum of 35 square feet for each person incarcerated in a British
prison.'8
htemees won came to the conclusion that this camp was "not fit for human habitati~n.'''~
The camp lacked bedding equipment. As one intemee recalled: "When we arrived at these
sheds we started to laugh and Say, 'This is a camp? Where are the beds. where are the
mamesses, where are the blankets?' ...it was completely ridiculous.. ."50 This had resulted
from the faulty routing of the camp's bedding equipment; mattresses destined for Camp
Famham were sent to Camp Sherbrooke while bed -es
were sent to ~ontreal."
Furthemore, pnsoners had to wash *by means of a small bowl, &er having queued up for
about half an hours' time to get a spot of hot water, if any. in a coal pit under the boilea.
And if one wanted to make use of one of six lavatones, another hour had to be ~~ent.'''~
Obviously, camp conditions were inadequate. This shocked most of the prisoners
who had been told by the authorities of Camp Cove Fields that living conditions in
southem Quebec camps would be much bener. Feeling betrayed, the internees imrnediately
resorted to passive resistance by refusing to prepare meals, eat or do work of any nature.')
The camp staff immediately negotiated with the intemees in order to queIl this small
mutiny. This was reflected when assistant adjutant, second lieutenant J. A. Edmison,
addressed the intemees on the moming of October 16. Because most of the intemees were
Jews. Edmisson pointed "that their present conduct was highly damaging to their own
cause, that it would arouse resentrnent rather than sympathy, would aid spread anti-
semitism in Canada and severely handicap the efforts of Canadian Jewry to work out plans
for post-war Jewish immigration."" According to Eric Koch, Edmison made a great
impression on the intemees? As a result. the prisonen agreed to cooperate. but on the
basis of a three day trial. Although this ended the hunger strike, it did not erase the
inrnates' discontent. However, helping to cool down the already heated climate was the
camp commandant's speech of October 18. whereb he pleaded for c ~ o ~ e r a t i o To
n.~~
further entice the inmates into cooperating. camp authorities, in association with Major D.
J. O'Donahoe. agreed to pay each internee 2% per day for any work done to improve the
camp. As a resuit, a Work Cornmittee of intemee technicians was formed to "draw up
pians for imrnediate requirements."" Immediately. internee labour was used to construct
outside latrines. patch leaks in the roofs and holes in the floors, prepare the kitchen and
mess hall. install ice boxes and cook-stoves and to improve lighting? From this moment
on. the situation began improving, though there still remained a lot of work to be done."
The treatment of the internees was to be in accordance with the 1929 Geneva
Convenrion Relufhe to the Treatment of Prisoners of Wur. Although the convention was
to apply solely to enemy combatants, the Canadian government had decided in 1939 that
it should also pertain to civilian intemees. This was done by integrating both prisoners of
war and civilians into the same category. For instance. prisoners of war were referred to as
"prisoners of war Class 1 whereas civilian intemees were termed "pnsonen of war Class
"
2." This system of classification enabled civilian intemees to benefit h m rights as
prismes of war. As it was stated by the Canadian authorities: "Enemy Aliens intemed as
Prisoners of War under the Definse of Canada Regulations are not entitled to the special
rights and privileges accorded to those Prisoners of War defined in.. .the International
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. It is intended that the
provisions of that convention shall be made applicable to them as regards their general
treatment, but saving and excepting certain articles of said Convention which are
considered applicable to Prisoners of War.. .'O
This was reinforced on May 3 1, 1940,
with the introduction of Order-in-Council PC 2322 which mentioned that dl hterned
individuals in Canada were to be termed as pnsoners of w d ' According to historian
John Stanton. there was now "no legal distinction between the British intemees and
prisoners of war sent to Canada; the prisoners of war captured in combat by Canadian
soldien: the Canadian citizens who were political dissenters; and the enemy aliens." As
he concluded: "It was a neat way of disguising the fact that these people [civilian
intemees ] were in fact political prisoners.''62 Because southern Quebec guards had been
told that they were to guard dangerous "enemies of the state" and prisoners of war. the
an-ivai of the civilian inmates created much confusion.63 Major Eric D. B. Kippen.
commandant of Camp ile-aux-~oix.recalled how he was shocked at the sight of the
internees. especially the Orthodox Jews.
Fint of al!. an old feilow cornes out [ of the train] ...I guess he must have
been ai least 80 ...he could hardly walk ...then there was a young boy, he
was 16 or 1 7.. .these were dl.. .refugees. that had been brought over in this
ship [Sobieski]. Weil. the information I had got was entirely wrong. and I
got quite a shock when 1 saw them. because 1 said. "Hell. these aren't
prisoners of war". ..a lot of them were Orthodox Jews.. .64
This amalgarnation of civilian intemees and prisoners of war into the same
category dernonstrated that the Canadian govemment did not understand who their
inmates were. Although it created a clirnate of unifonnity and enabled civilian inrnates to
be protected by the Geneva Convention, the situation made it dificuit for camp
guardsmen to distinguish the specific needs of one type of prisoner fiom another. For
instance, military p e r s o ~ e understood
l
the concept of internment and the treatment they
were to receive if ever caught in battie. Most had received classes pertaining to the subject
in their specific regiments and al1 understood the provisions of the Geneva Convention.
They knew what to expect and understood that they were to remain incarcerated until the
end of the war. On the other haad, cidian internees had not been prepared
psychologically for internment. h most cases, they did not understand the reasons for
their internment and very few knew about the provisions of the Geneva Convention.
Further, they did not comprehend why the Canadian government beated them as prisoners
of war, for most of them wished no harrn to the British Commonwealth. This whole
situation meant that camp authorities had to deal with very different psychological
profiles among the intemees. Hence, the uniformity of the pnsonen' statu was bound to
create discornfort and discontent among the civilian prisoners. For the civilian intemees of
southem Quebec. this issue was solved in 1941 when the Canadian govement agreed to
change the British inmates' status fiom prisoners of war to refugees.
in the sumrner of 1941, the British government, which remained responsible for
southem Quebec's internees. acknowledged the fact that most of the civilian inrnates were
German refugees and that they constituted no threat to the security of the realrn? When
the Canadian government was made aware of this change. measures were immediately
taken to rectiQ the pnsoners' status. On June 25. 194 1. Ottawa issued Order-in-Council
PC 4 6 8 which granted the inrnates refbgee status. This meant that the civilians of German
descent were no longer to be treated as prisoners of war class 2. It also meant that they
were no longer registered under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. The camps of
southem Quebec became known as rehgee camps. Because the administration of such
camps was to be distinct from prisoner of war camps. a Central Cornmittee for Interned
Refugees was created by the Secretary of State. This rneant that though the Department of
National Defence remained responsible for the camp staffs, it was the Department of the
Secretary of State which coordinated ail rehgee
As refugees. the civilian inmates of southem Quebec benefited fiom new
pnvileges. These were introduced on July 15, 1941. through Order-in-Council PC 5246.
intemees were given cornplete freedorn in the performance of their religious duties; were
ailowed to obtain liquor; were permitteci to receive visitors; were given special privileges
regarding mail quotas; saw their prison uniforms discarded; and faced less surveillance by
guards.67At Île-aw~oix,inrnates could "almost undisturbedly walk out of camp and take
a stroll on the island or take a swim in the Richelieu River.. ." " However, because many
intemees had been misguided to believe that their new status would ensure drastic changes
in terms of camp organhtion, some dissatisfaction was e ~ ~ r e s s e d . ~ ~
#en
Great Britain began releasing some 17,000 Germans civilians in April 1941,
Canada responded by doing the same. "Friendly aliens" were to ''return to Bntain where
their manpower could be put to use in the war effort, or to remain in the intanment camps
in Canada until each refugee could qualie for admission to Canada under the prevailing
immigrant regulation."70 The fmt people to be released were the very old and sick. Then,
there were those whose work was considered vital for the war effort such as engineers,
scientists and factory owners. Then, there was the very young people. They were followed
by what might be termed "anomalies," characten "Who through ignorance or neglect were
regarded as Germans or Austrians, but could speak no German and who had been in
%tain unintemptedly since early chi~dhood."~'Further. prisoners could accelerate their
release by enlisting in the unarmed "alien" companies of the Auxiiiary Military Pioneer
Corps. a para-military unit used Oro build roads. camps and airfields. to shovel coal. to
load and unload railway trucks with coils of barbed wire. pit props and ail manner of
warlike stores. [and] to act as unskilled handymen to the armed forces of the ~rown."~'
For men aged between 18 and 50 years old. enlistment in the Pioneer Corps proved to be
an opportunity to demonstrate their fnendliness to the Allied cause. For southern
Quebec's inmates. the Pioneer Corps was the only way to r e m to Great Britain.
Altogether. some 5.000 intemees joined the Corps dunng the war. intemees could also be
released if th- had relatives in Canada. Finally, authority was granted to release refuges
on parole so that they could study or work in
ana da.'^
The release of refugees was a very meticulous operation. Before being released.
inmates were intervieweci by immigration oficea working for the Canadian Centrai
Committee for hterned Refugees. h most cases. they cooperated with the United Jewish
Refugee and War Relief Agencies. Furthemore. intemees had to be sponsored by
Canadian civilians or recognized institutions. The sponsoring of refugees led many v i s i t o ~
into the camps." Although numerous businessmen, farmers, private companies and
universities sponsored inmates, the Canadian Jewish Congress was the most active
institution in this field. The sponsorship operation not only helped the prisoners but also
went some way to enlightened Canadian civilians that the vast majority of refugees were
no threat to the security of canada?
By 1942, the strength reductions in southem Quebec camps had become so drastic
that the Canadian govemment began to consider new applications for the region's
internrnent operation. The result was Ottawa's decision in early 1942 to use the camps of
southem Quebec for the incarceration of pnsoners of war class 1. It was during that sarne
year that al1 of Camps Famharn and Sherbrooke refugees were transferred to Camp Îleaux-Noix. As a result, île-aux Noix remained the only facility in southem Quebec to
detain refugees. However, because more and more refugees were k i n g released by
October 1943, it was finally decided ta close that camp altogether. ui fact, only 42
inmates resided in the camp by November 1943. With this in rnind, al1 of the camps'
captives were transferred to Camp Hull on November 4, 1943." Udike the other camps
siniated in southem Quebec. Île-aux-~oixwas not converted for the accommodation of
war prisoners. Instead. the site was handed over to the Department of Mines and
Resources in June 1944.This marked the end of a chapter in the history of southem
Quebec's internment operation. for civilian intemees would no longer be incarcerated in
this region. Southem Quebec's fint phase of internment had thus corne to an end with the
closure of Camp île-aux-~oixin 1943."
Southem Quebec's second phase of internent, which was marked by the
incarceration of Geman prisoners of war, was initiated in early 1942. This was the result
of intense negotiations between the British and Canadian govemments. The process began
in February 1941 when representatives of the British War Office suggested that "dl
prisoners taken by United Kingdom and dominions' forces, whether acting separately or
in combination, should be placed in an Empire pool in respect of which the United
Kingdom would be the detaining power and the dominions wouid have the stahis of
agents."
In other words, German prisoners of war were to be shipped overseas for
incarceration in the dominions. The main reason was that pnsoners of war had to be
removed fiom the banlefields and kept away fiom danger. This was in keeping with the
Geneva Convention. Article 7 stipulated: "As soon as possible afier their capture,
prisoners of war shall be evacuated to depots sufficiently removed fiom the fighting zone
for them to be out of danger."" Becaw Great Britain comtantly faced the prospect of
German aerial bombardrnents, it was deemed logical to send the prisonen around the
British Commonwealth. However, wishing ro fight a "limited liability war," the William
Lyon Mackenzie King govemment initially refûsed such an offer. But when the British
authonties persisted. the Canadian government finally agreed to "serve as one of the
officia1 gaolea for the Allied war effort." Anangements were immediately formalized
whereby the Canadian government agreed to incarcerate Geman prisoners of war in
North Amenca as long as the British authorities accepted to cover the costs of
transporthg and maintahhg them. Prisonen of war were to corne from al1 branches of
the German Wehrmacht. which included the Luftwafle (air force), the Kriegsmurine
(Gerrnan Navy), the Reichsheer (Geman army) as well as the Shutzstaflel (SS) and the
Geheime Staatspolirei (secret sÿite police
- Gestapo). Furthemore, also includeci were
enemy merchant seamen (E.M.s.)."
This decision to incarcerate prisoners of war in Canada led Ottawa to reorganize
its intemment operation. New intemment camps had to be created for the detention of the
incoming pnsoners. By October 194 1. Canadian intemment camps were classed in
accordance with the military district in which they were located. This led to the nse of the
numeral system of camp classification. This was done to facilitate the bureaucratie
efficiency of Canadian camps. For instance. the camps registered by M i l i t q District 4
headquarten in Montred were assigned numbers in the 40s. The first digit indicated the
camp's district while the second gave the camp's code. The camps of southem Quebec
were registered as followed: Camp No. 40 Famham; Camp No. 41 île-aux-Noix: and
Camp No. 42 Sherbrooke. As a result. the old classification system whereby camps were
designated by letten of the alphabet and which had been operational since 1939, was
abandoned?
'
Camp Farnham was southem Quebec's first intemment centre to be chosen for the
accommodation of pnsoners of war class 1. The process began in September 1941 when
Military District 4 Headquarters advised camp authorities that Farnharn was to be
converted for the detention of prisoners of war." Al1 of the camp's 445 refugees were
transferred to Camp Sherbrooke on January 23,1942. Camp Famham was then closed for
a period of three months in order to prepare for the amival of the enemy c~rnbatants.'~
As
it was stated in a report dated January 27, 1942: "It is anticipated that this camp will be re-
opened about the middle of April and will contain POW [s]. ..fmm the u.K."~ The camp
became operational on Apnl 18, 1942, when 597 enemy merchant seamen arrïved at
~arnham.~'In the autumn of 1942, Canadian authorities decided to convert Camp
Sherbrooke into a facility for the detention enemy merchant seamen. This was done
because refugee populations were declining and since many Geman prisoners of war
were miving in Canada As a result, d l of Sherbrooke's 299 refugees were transferred to
Camp Île-aux-~oixon November 25, 1942.86
Camp Sherbrooke was used for*theincarceration of enemy merchant seamen until
its closure in June 1946.~'Its refugee population was replaced on December 2. 1942, by
the arriva1 of 594 enemy merchant seamen fiom Camp Farnham. At the time, Famham
was chosen for the temporary incarceration of prisoner of war officers. In accordance with
the Geneva Convention. enemy officers were segregated fiom the rest of the prisoners of
war. Also. they were to be treated differently.88 As article 2 1 stipulated: **. ..belligerents
shall be required reciprocally to inform each other of the titles and r a d s in use in their
respective m e d forces. with the view of ensuring equaiity of treatment between the
corresponding ranks of offices and persons of equivalent status. Officen and persons of
equivalent status who are prisoners of war shall be treated with due regard to their rank
and age."" This meant that the incoming oficers could not be detained in the same
facilities as enemy merchant seamen. in the end. some 177 German officers and 50 other
ranks were sent to Farnham on December 6. 1942.90The reason why a limited number of
other ranks were sent to Famharn was because oficers were, according to micle 22 of the
Genevo Convenrion. not allowed to perfonn manual labour?'
Because Camp Famharn had not k e n created for the accommodation of prisoner
of war oficers. the newcomers were much appalled by camp conditions. As they
indicated to the Consul General of Switzerland in Canada
- which was in charge of
German interest - on December 6, 1942:
As you perhaps know already. it concems a camp of wooden barracks made
for soldiers only, which is in every respect completeiy unsatisfactory for
oficea even for only temporary lodging for the following reasons: (1 ) mass
lodging in wooden huts without considering the various grades. Thus for
older senior officers the same quarters only is available as for lieutenants
and as for the youngest soldiers; (2) One washroom, shower and toilet for
89 men; (3) Huts are dilapidated. They represent the most primitive lodging
that cm be imagined. It is in contradiction to numerous rulhgs of the
Geneva Convention and forms an immense contrast to the lodging which is
given to the British officers in German camps - even in temporary
The pnsoners' conclusion was that "this camp here was absolutely unfit in every respect
for offcers even for temporary acco~nrnodation.'"~As camp authorities mentioned in the
Farnham war diary: "They were pretty arrogant and considered the camp absolutely unfit
for Geman oficers, lighting inadequate and no cubicles or small rooms for senior officen
and staff oficers and many other complaints.. .It would appear that they complained about
being overcrowded at Bowmanville and Gravenhurst [Ontario]early in the summer but
cannot understand why they were moved to this temporary camp just before Christmas.
They say it must be considered as a punishment."94
Camp authorities tried to cornply with some of the inmates' complaints. For
instance, the pnsonen were given permission to "divide their huts into cubicles with spare
the~ meantirne. measures were
sheets belonging to them" and to improve l i & ~ t i n in
~.~
being taken to find a suitable camp for the prisoner of war oficers. Since the auturnn of
1942. NDHQ had advised Military District 4 of its intention to create a prisoner of war
officer camp in Southem Quebec. At the tirne, the aim was to tind a better location for the
German officers who were temporarily incarcerated at Camp Fanham. Several properties
were ~onsidered.'~One such site was located 75 miles north of Montreal at St. Donat in
the Laurentians. The complex consisted of a hotel and several large cottages. The
advantage of this site was its isolation, king located in a very hilly country covered with
heavy bush. Furthemore, the area was sparsely populated. The main problem with this
isolation was in terms of logistics since only one single grave1 road led to the site. This
meant that in winter, the camp would have to be supplied by means of snowmobiles?
Another potential site known as the Domaine de l'Esterel was located at Ste. Marguerite
in the Laurentians some 65 miles north of Montreal. The property, like the one at
St.
Donat, had the advantage of king located in a hilly area with heavy bush. However,
unlike the previous site, it was located in an area which was very popular for surnmer
vacations and winter sports. Situated on a small plateau, the property was surrounded by
three precipitous descents. Furthemore, the ground was very rocky and keguiar,
rendering tu~elingdifficult if not impo~sible?~
However, the site's hotel was then
occupied by the Canadian School of A m y Administration. Because this property could
not be occupied until alternative accommodatioos could be provided for the school, the
project was rejected. 99
With this in mind, Military District 4 officiais decided to find a suitable location in
southem Quebec. On September 12, 1942, they began investigating the possibility of
using the Grande Ligne Mission's Feller Institute premises situated near Napierville in the
village known as Grande Ligne (presently saint- lai se).'^^ Located on a 240 acre fami,
the property originally served as a residential school for young men and consisted of a
four storey Stone building, a brick gymnasiurn. eight h
e houses. a large barn and
numerous smaller buildings.lO' Suitable in every way to serve as an internment camp for
prisoner of war officers. the Privy Council began negotiating with the Grande Ligne
Mission. An agreement ensued on November 24, 1942 whereby the Mission agreed to
lease its property to the Crown for the s u m of $15.000 per ann~m.'~'
On January 15.
1943. Militai). District 4 headquarters authorized the creation of intemment camp No. 44
Grande Ligne.lo3 Work began immediateiy to convert the Feller Institute into an
internment facility.la>
While this was done. the situation in Famham remained problematic. When
prisoners learned that a new camp was being built at Grande Ligne for their convenience.
pressure was made to accelerate their transfer to this new faci~it~.'*~
Conditions at Camp
Fanihm had not improved. Large groups of prisoners were ail1 king housed in the sarne
wooden barracks. As the prisoners indicated to Swiss representatives in April 1943: "The
quarten are not different at ail from those provided for corporals and men. The oldest staff
officers have the sarne quarters as Lieutenants and the youngest privates. During the winter
months. it was not possible to heat the banacks adequately. And with the spring thaw,
water is nuuiing fiom the ceiling in various places. Taking everything into consideration,
the quarters here can only be called unworthy of an ~ f i c e r . " 'This
~ ~ issue led to much
debate when the Consulate General of Switzerland in Canada was reqwsted by the
German legation in Berne (Switzerland) to inquire into the case at Camp Farnham. As the
Swiss Consul indicated to the Canadian Depariment of Extemal Affairs: 'The German
authorities have gained the impression from reports that camp Famham is not suitable for
officers and request an early temoval to the new quarters. In case the tramfer should not
take place in the immediate future, I am asked to request the Canadian authorities to
alleviate the principal deficiencies such as insufficient electric light, housing of officers in
large dormitones, and Iack of cupboards through which personal effects are riamaged fiom
exposure to dwt ."'O7
On the other hand, Swiss represmtatives were much impressed by the facilities at
Camp Grande Ligne. As one dipiomat indicated following his inspection of the camp on
June 18. 1943: "...I was deeply impressed by the work undertaken in order to adapt
perfectly the existing buildings and annexes to the new purpose. 1 think that, in spite of
the natural dificuities due to the very hard winter and conditions prevaiiing in wartime.
the Canadian authorities have done splendid work on this place and 1 have no doubt but
that the new camp will be on the same level, in the way of comfon and facilities. as the
Bowmanville oficer's camp, which is universally regarded as being an outstanding place
of intemment."'"
Neverthelea. it was not until J w e 78. 1943. that al1 of Camp
Famham's inmates were transferred to oficer Camp Grande Ligne. With Famharn now
empty. Military District 4 authorities decided to use this camp as a regional headquarters
for the Veterans Guard of Canada. l w
In October 1943. a "Scout School" was established within the camp to train VGC
personnel. Its purpose was to farniliarize guardsmen with the administration of internment
camps and the detention of pnsonen of war. Training sessions normally lasted for four
weeks.
"O
Within this short time span. guardsmen were given classes on the Geneva
Convention; on chernical warfare; on intemal security; on camp discipline; on how to
guard prisoners of war; on fmt aid treatment: on how to conduct camp searches; on map
usage; on escape and recapture plans; on how to detect tunnels; and on the operation of
rifles, pistols and machine guns."' The Camp Farnham Scout School was a complete
success. As camp authorities indicated in the Famham war diary in Febniary 1944: "This
course has improved their [VGC guardsmen] outlook on scout duties and they al[ agree
that the knowledge they have gained in this course will be of great benefit to them in their
future work."'" The camp school was so important that guardsmen fiorn dl over Canada
came to Farnham to be educated. By April 1944. some 498 guardsmen were staying in the
camp.''-'The operation came to an end when order was received from the Department of
National Defence on May 13, 1944. to close the camp altogether. Because no reason was
given. this order came as a shock for camp authonties. As indicated in the camp's war
diary: "This [closure of the camp] is an impossibility unless we just waik out and leave it
on that short notice. No provisions were made of where staff and 160 attached men could
go for rations and quarters." Nevertheless, the camp was officially closed on May 15,
'
1944.
I''
Camp Famham re-opened on 18 September 1944 with the arriva1 of some 547
oficers and 49 other ranks of internees fiom the United States. This was done to relieve
American intemment camps as the U.S. government had agreed since the surnmer of 1942
to incarcerate in the United States many of the German prisonen of war captured by
British and Commonwealth forces. This process was known as the 50/50 Sharing
this had been done to solve the British Commonwealth's housing
~ ~ r e e r n e n t Although
."~
problems. it was only normal that Canada help the United States when this latter faced
internent-related difficulties of its own. Because Camp Famham had been rnodified
between June 1943 and May 1944 for the accommodation of Canadian troops. the
facilities were deemed acceptable for the intemment of prisonen of war oficers. Camp
Farnham. like Camp Grande Ligne, becarne a facility for the detention of Gerrnan officers.
It remained so until the camp's closure in 1946.
' l6
Following the successful Allied landing in Nomandy (France) on June 6, 1944.
both British and Canadian forces began capturing Gerrnan soldiers by the tens of
thousands. The First Canadian Army, for instance. had captured more than 25.000 German
prisoners in Northwestem Europe by September 1944. This soon created serious problems
in
ternis of
accommodation. Although the bulk of these prisoners were king interned in
camps located in France, Belgium, Holland, and eventually Germany, the British
government pressured the Canadian govemment in December 1944 to accept 50.000
additional inmates for incarceration in North America. At the t h e , some 34,000 Geman
prisoners of war were already king held in
anad da.'" With this said, Ottawa's
response
was hesitant. As Canada's Minister of National Defence indicated on December 11, 1944:
"Reception of more than 7,000 couid not be recomrnended because of the additional s t m h
on the aiready tight manpower situation and because of the potential risk in~olved.""~
Britain's High Commissioner brktled claiming in January 1945, that:
Whereas in the whole of Canada they are at present accomrnodating only
34,000 German prisoners (as compared with 66,000 captured by Canadian
troops in North Western Europe alone apart fiom those captured in Italy),
we in this small overcrowded island, where much accommodation for our
own people has k e n destroyed by enemy action, are now holding 306,000
prisoners of war of whom 139,000 are Germans and no less than 22,000
British troops are required for their administration and security..A is
estirnated that before the surrender of Gemany or the break-up of organized
resistance ai least another 300,000 prisoners of war will be captured in
North West Europe for half of which the United Kingdom government will
be responsible. Negotiations are in progress with the French, Belgian and
Dutch govemments to accommodate and guard some of these
captures...We have appealed to the United States govenunent to $ive
funher assistance in this matter but they have refused and have given as
their main ground that insuficient use is being made of British
Commonwealth resources in general and Canadian resources in
particulW...It will be seen from the figures.. .that the request which we
made of Canada is actuated only by the urgent needs of a situation for
which appears no other solution. We are stretched to the utrnost and we
greatly hope that they will therefore see their way to corne to Our
assistance.
"
However. Ottawa maintained its reiiisal. As Canada's Secretary of State for Extemal
Affairs stipulated on January 22, 1945:
...no M e r comrnitments in this matter should be assumed by the
Canadian govemment...Canadian govemment's paramount purpose is to
maintain and support Canada's fighting forces in Northwestem Europe and
in M y . They proposed to do this without seeking any reduction in the
combatant strength of those forces...At the same tirne the government is
anxious to fdfill completely the demands which are king made, or are
likely to be made, on Canada for munitions under the Munial Aid
arrangements. This program of munitions production will require
employrnent of many additional workers in munitions factones.. .The
manpower position with regard to prisoners of war is as follows. 5,374
troops are engaged on guard duties in co~ectionwith the 34,000 German
prisoners in Canada.. .There are certain factors which make the ratio
necessarily higher in Canada than would be the case, say, in Great Britain.
For example, the camps are widely spread in diffeient parts of the country
and the guard forces are therefore not within a distance of each other which
would enable them to give mutual support in case of trouble in one or other
of the camps. On the present bais, therefore, some 8,000 extra men would
be required to guard 50,000 additional prisoners whom you propose. Such a
figure is completely out of the question under present circumstances in
Canada.. .The Canadian authorities cannot risk running short of
reinforcements for overseas service.. .There is a good deal of evidence of
plans amongst the pnsoners to make demonstrations and to attempt mass
escapes. Many of the prisonen are desperate and fanatical Nazis ready to
cause trouble even though this in effect means their cornmitting mass
suicide.. .The Canadian winter is long and extremely severe. Camps
therefore need a more elaborate accommodation than is the case in gentler
climates. Their construction takes much more labour.. .At present the labour
for extra construction work could not be provided without prejudicuig more
urgent war tasks...120
Canada's refusal to accept Bntain's 50.000 Geman pnsoners of war demonstrated how
internent had caused severe strains on the Canadian home front. There are no doubts that
should Ottawa have accepted this huge influx of intemees. the internment camps of
southem Quebec would have been afKected. It would have meant a huge increase in the
number of pnsoners in the region and would have necessitated much more cornplex
internment camps. Nevertheless, very few German prisoners of war were sent to Canada
after this dispute. Instead, the Canadian authorities decided to concentrate their efforts on
the political re-education and de-nazification of those prisoners of war already being held
on Canadian soil. a topic which will be analyzed in Chapter 4.
The Canadian governrnent decided in Feb~ary1945 to create a re-assessrnent
camp for the purpose of re-educating Geman prisoners of war dong democratic lines. At
the time, Great Britain was developing its own re-educational camps and was hoping that
Canada could do the same. As it was stated in a special British report: "sociologists and
psychologists are of the opinion that the fiiture peace depends fmt and foremost on a
change in the German nationzl character and the patterns of inter-personai relations." The
document M e r stipulated the main purposes for operating sqch experimental facilit ies.
F h t , such camps were to offer inmates training in social responsibility. This included
valuable training and experience in spontaneous democratic leadership and social
responsibility. The aim was to use the graduates for "practical employrnent under military
government, control commission or elsewhere to fom focus points of healthy innuence
withui the German community." Second, these experimental camps were to study the
effects of Allied propaganda, including re-educational literature, films, and broadcasts.
A h , re-educational lectures, debates and study groups were to be given in such facilities
in order to study the degree of social change among inmates. The main purpose of such
facilities was to "help medicai authorities to know how to coordinate and control German
POWS.""'
in March 1945, the Canadian govement proposed mo sites for the purpose of reeducation. These were situated at Sorel and Montmagny in southem Quebec. Despite
much discussion. only the Sorel option was rerained.'" It was this site, which was situated
on the property of the military's Sorel Basic Training Centre. which became internment
Camp No. 45
or el.'^ The camp became operational on May 9, 1945. with the amival of
the camp's staff'. It was at that time that work began on the site's facilities. Barbed wire
fences were laid and the huts were repaired and improved.
''"The first prisoners arrïved at
the camp on the 2zfld and 29" of June 1945.125Unlike other intemment camps. prisoners
were selected on a voluntary basis and came from a11 Canadian prisoner of war camps. The
aim was to gather intemees who were willing to cooperate with the ~1lies.I'~
Furthemore.
because military ranks and hierarchy had been abolished at Camp Sorel. the camp housed
nearly as many Geman oflicers as other ranks.'" With this in mind, Camp Sorel was an
anomaly in southem Quebec.
Althou& hostilities in Europe came to an end on V-E (Victory-in-Europe) Day on
May 8, 1945, German prisoners of war held in Canada were not Unmediately released
despite the fact that the Geneva Convention stipulated that "the repaniation of prisoners
shall be effected as soon as possible after the conclusion of peace."'28 Due rnosdy to the
logistical problerns involved in repatriating thousands of G e m prisoners back to
Gennany and the impressive re-educational program initiated in Canada the Canadian
govemment decided to wait until early 1946 before s w i n g to transfer the intemees back
overseas. Because Great Britain was responsible for most of Canada's 35,000 G e r m
prisoners of wa., the Canadian government agreed to send all of its inmates to the British
Ides. From there the prisoners would return to their "~atherland."'"
Camp Sorel was the frst internment centre in Southem Quebec to repatnate its
prisoners. Such was due to this camp's devotion to re-education. In fact, the Sorel inmates
were to be repatriated to Gemany as fast as possible in order to work for the Allied
Control Commissions in both the Amencan and British zones of occupation.f30Although
ail of its prisones were initiaily msferred to the United Kingdom on March 4, 1946,
Camp Sorel was not closed until April 16, 1946. The main reason for this phenornenon
was that the camp's staff was king used to clean up the facilities.13' The next camp to be
closed in the region was Camp Grande .Ligne. nie process began on April 16, 1946, when
the bulk of the camp's inmates was transferred to Camps Farnharn and Gravenhurst in
order to await repatriation. The camp was finally closed on April 30. 1946. following the
disbandment of the camp staff.
13'
For the Grande Ligne Mission, the legal owner of the
site, the closure of Camp Grande Ligne was more than welcome. Ever since the Second
World War had corne to an end on August 14, 1945. with Japan's capitulation. the Grande
Ligne Mission Board had applied pressure upon the Department of National Defence for
the return of its property "since our board plans to re-open the school at the earliest
possible date." However. because the lease stipulated that "the lessees shall have the right
to so renew the present lease for only one period of one year subsequent to the termination
of the present world war," the camp remained operationai well until 1946.1J3As for Camp
Famham, the bulk of its prisonen was transferred to the United Kingdom on May 22.
1946. Although the Department of Labour took over most of the camp's huts on June 6.
1946 in preparation for occupancy by Japanese families, the camp was not officially closed
until June 17, 1946. Finally, al1 of Camp Sherbrooke's prisoners were repatriated on June
11, 1946, and the camp closed its dooa on June 14, 1946. The closure of Camp
Sherbrooke marked the end of internment in Southem ~uebec.'"
By July 1946, only 4,000 Gennan prismes of war out of a total population of
35,000 remained in Canada. Al1 of them were evacuated by November 1946 except for 60
inmates who had ken hospitalized. The Canadian intemment operation came to an end in
January 1947 when these last intemees were transferred to the United Kingdom. It is
interesthg to note that more lhan 6,000 Geman prisoners of war had made applications to
stay in Canada. However, because the Geneva Convention stipulated that al1 prisoners had
to be repatriated and due to the fact that Canadian immigration policies were very strict
about allowing in Gemans, none of these intemees were allowed to stay. Nevertheless,
great many emigrated to Canada in later years.'35
The internment operation which ernerged in southem Quebec was set up in haste.
Although Canada began i n t e d g civilians of German descent as early as September
1939, the country's intemment operation was still limited in scale by the spring of 1940.
Ottawa's decision to accept Bntain's request to intem some 7,000 British "enemy aliens"
and prisonen of war on Canadian soi1 in June 1940. compiicated matters. With the British
prisoners arriving in Canada as early as July 1940. the creation of new internment camps
became an urgent necessity. With this in mind. three sites were chosen in southern
Quebec: Camp Farnham, Camp île-aux-~oixand Camp Sherbrooke. The estabiishment of
these intemment centres demonstrated well how the Canadian authorities were unprepared to accept the huge influx of British intemees. The main problem was that not
enough time had been alloned for the construction of these sites. As a result, none of these
camps were ready to welcome internees. This created much discontent among the
internees. especially at Camp Sherbrooke where a hunger suike ensured. Therefore. the
early days of internent in southem Quebec were not a success. for they demonstrated the
early deficiencies of the Canadian internment operations. However. over time, the
region's internment operation improved and flourished. When the bulk of the civilian
refugees were released between 1942 and 1943, authority was ganted to use the region's
facilities for the incarceration of German prisonen of war. The region's prominence as an
internment centre was M e r reflected by the construction of two new internment camps:
Camp Grande Ligne in 1943 and Camp Sorel in 1945. What the pnsoner of war phase did
was to prove how flexible southern Quebec's intemment operation had become. Each
camp specialized in a certain type of operation: Sherbrooke focused on enemy merchant
seamen: Farnham and Grande Ligne concentrated on German officen; while Sorel served
as a re-educational facility. Although the bulk of the region's inrnates were not repatriated
until 1946, southem Quebec's internment operation demonstrated how the Canadian
homefiont was constantly forced to adapt to the pressures irnposed by years of total war.
John Joseph Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps in Canada 1939- 1947 M.A. Thesis,
(Windsor: University of Windsor, 1976), pp. 1-4.; National Archives of Canada [NAC 1 ,
Orders-in-Council [OC], RG-2, Vol. 1592, File: 14296, "Order-in-Council P.C. 2097,"
August 20, 1936.; Daniel Robinson. "Planning for the "Most Serious Contingency": Alien
Internment, Arbiaary Detention, and the Canadian State. 1938-39," Journal of Canadian
Studies, Vo1.28, No. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 6.
Yves Bernard and Caroline Bergeron, Troo loin de Berlin - Des prisorniers allemands au
Canada ( 1939-1946) (Sillery: Éditions du Septentrion, 1995). pp. 4617.; Canada. Debates of
the House of Commons Vol. 1 (1940). May 23, 1940. p. 143.: Kelly, The Prisoner of War
Camps..., pp. 5-7.; Stanton, p. 272.
Bartl. p. 3 13.; Bernard and Bergeron, p. 48.; Canada, Debates of the House of Commons,
Vol. 1 (1940), June 3, 1940. p. 443.: Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps..., pp. 10, 15.;
Robert H. Keyserlingk. '"Agents within the Gates': The Search for Nazi Subversives in
Canada during WorId War II," Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (June 1985). p.
21 1 .; NAC, OC, RG-2. Vol. 1653, File: 1948G, "Order-in-Council P.C. 2483." September 3.
1939.; Robinson. p. 5.; Stanton. pp. 210.219-221.
Bad. pp. 314-315.: Canada. Debates of the House of Commons. Vol. 1 (1940). May 23.
1940. pp. i 44- 146.; Canada, Debates of the House of Commons. Vol. 1 ( 1940). June 1 1. 1 940.
p. 663.: Canada Defence of Canada Reeulations (Consolidation (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier.
Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty. 1941). p. 30.; Kelly. The Prisoner of War
Cam~s..
.. p. 1 5; Keyserlingk. "'Agents within the Gates'. . pp. 2 14-2 15.; Robert H.
Key serl in&. "The Canadian Government's Attitude Toward Germans and Geman Canadians
in World War II." Canadian Ethnic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1984). pp. 18-19,; McLaughlin.
pp. 1 5- 1 8.: Eckehart J. Priebe. Thank You. Canada - From Messerschmitt Pilot to Canadian
Citizen (West Vancouver: Condor Publishing. 1990), p. 175.; Stanton. pp. 221. 231.;
Thompson. p. I 3.
Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camm .... p. 47. 50.; John Melady, Escam from Canada - The
Untold Stow of Geman POWs in Canada. 1939-1945 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada 1981 ).
p. 28.
Eric Koch. Deemed Suswct A Wartime Blunder (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1980), p.
9.; Kochan. p. 10.; François Lafitte. The Internment of Aliens (New York: Penguin Books,
1940), p.37.; Stent, p. 35 .
Koch. p. 9.: Kochan, pp. 10-18.; Lafitte. p. 37-39,6365.; Stent pp. 35-37.
Kochan, pp. 1-2.; Lafitte, pp. 36-37.; Stent, pp. 2 1.30.
NAC, Manuscripts of the First Half of the Twentieth Century FHTC], Collection Eric Koch
[EK],MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Ernil Fackenheim by Hany Rasky (CBC) in
Toronto", [1980's],p. 25.
Kochan, p. 59.; Stent, pp. 69-72.
NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of B.Ernst Waengler by Hany Rasky
(CBC)in Toronto", [ 1980's], pp. 1- f 3 - 1-1 4.
Stent, p. 97.
Kochan, pp. 19-20,594 Stent, pp. 48-52,69-72.
Koch. Q. 27.
.."
-
%id., p. 28.
Bartl, p. 314.; Koch, p. 29,34.; Kochan, p. 58-59.
Koch, pp. 40-60.; Kochan, pp. 84-94.; Lafitte, pp. 123-143.: Melady, pp. 1 8-20.; Stent, pp. 971 12. Priebe,
pp, 55-56.
Kelly, The Prisoner of War Carnos.. ., p. 54.
Lafitte, p. 13, 135, 143.
Paula Jean Draper. "The Accidental Immigrants: Canada and the Interned Refugees: Part 1."
Canadian Jewish Historical Societv Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1978), p. 15.
Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps..., pp. 50-54.; Priebe. pp. 176-177.
Carter, p. 1 1 7.; Fada Jean Draper, "The Accidental Irnmimnts: Canada and the Intemed
Refugees: Pan 2," Canadian Jewish Historical S o c i e ~Journal. Vol. 2. No. 2 (Fall 1978). p.
91.; Kelly, The Prisoner of War Cam~s..., pp. 58-59.; Melady. p. 32.; NAC, Records of the
Department of National Defence [DND],Sources Relating to Intemment Operations [IO], RG24, Vol. 15,400. Volume 32 (May 1943), War Dias, ofhternmenr Camp "N" (No. 42).
Newingtm (Sherbrooke), "Camp Orden," May 29. 1943. Appendix 1. p. 25.
Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps .., p. 54.: NAC. FHTC, EK. MG-30,C 192, Vol. 3.
"Interview of Colonel Eric Kippen by Hany Ras@ (CBC) in Como (Quebec)," [ 1980gs] pp.
7-9 - 7-1 1.
NAC. FHTC, EK, MG-30. C 192, Vol. 3. "Interview of Colonel Eric Kippen by Han), Rashy
(CBC)in Como (Quebec)." [ 1980's]. pp. 7-1 1 - 7-12.: NAC. DND. 10. RG-24. Vol. 15.399,
Volume 1 (July 1940). War D i q of lnrernment Camp "1" /No. 41). Fort Lennox, ile-auxNoix, July 1 , 1940 and July 5 , 1940. p. 1.
NAC, FHTC. EK. MG-30. C 192. Vol. 3. "Interview of Colonel Eric Kippen by Hany Rash
(CBC) in Como (Quebec)." [ 1980'sI pp. 7- 1 1 - 7- 12.
NAC, DND. IO. RG-24. Vol. t 5.399. Volume I (July 1940). War D i a v ofhternmenr Camp
"1" INO. 41). Fort Lennox. fie-oia-~oix.July 15. 1940. p. 3.; NAC. DND. 10. RG-24. Vol.
1 5,399. Vol urne 2 (August 1940). War Diury of internment Camp "I '* N o . 4 I ) . Fort Lennox.
ile-aux-Noix. August 1, 1940. p. I .
NAC. FHTC. EK. .MG-30. C 192. Vol. 3. "lnterview of Colonel Eric Kippen by Hamy Rashy
(CBC)in Como (Quebec)." [ 1980's , pp. 7- 1 1 - 7- 12.: NAC, DND.10. RG-24. Vol. 1 5.399.
Volume I (July I9JO). War Diary of lntenmenr Camp "I" No. JI). Fort Lennox. ÎleamNok. July 1 S. 1940. p. 3.
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24. Vol. 15,399. Volume 1 (July 1940). War D i q of Internment Camp
"IV N o . 41). Fort Lennox, île-aux-Noix, July 16, 1940 and July 17 1940. pp. 3-4.
NAC. DND, 10. RG-24.Reel: C-5377, File: HQS 7236-18. Vol. 1-2. Adminisrroiion. Camp
jle-otu-~oix.19.10-1946. "List of P/W Missing Articles - internment Camp 1." June 16. 194 1 .
NAC, DND. 10. RG-24, Vol. t 5.399. Volume 2 (August 1940), War Diury of fnrernment
Camp "1" (No. 4 I), Fort Lennox, ile-am-~~lr,
August 3 1, 1940. p. 8.
NAC, DND, 10. RG-24,Vol. 15,399, Volume 3 (September 1 WO), W m D i q of lnrernment
Camp "1" (No. 41). Fort Lennox, jle-aux-~ok,September 25, 1940, p. 8.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5377, File: HQS 7236-18. Vol. 1-2, Administration, Camp
île-uux-Nok, 1940-1946, "Findings of the Court of Inquiry," Febniary 19, 1941.
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5377, File: HQS 7236-18. Vol. 1-2. Administrution. Camp
ile-aux-~oixI W O - 1946, "Detective Léon Pronovost to the Director of the Quebec Provincial
Police," July 11, 1941.
.
.
34
35
36
37
38
39
'O
"
42
'3
44
"
"
''
19
'O
''
"
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5377, File: HQS 7236-18, Vol. 1-2. Admjnis~ration,Camp
île-au-Noh. l94O-f946, "Voluntary Statement of Hermas Labonté of St. Jean," June 10,
1941.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5377, File: HQS 7236-18, Vol. 1-2. Adminishation. Cump
de-am-Noir. 1WO-19J6, "Voluntary Statement of René Trochei of St. Jean," June 10, 1941.
Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps..., pp. 55-57.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5378, File: HQS 7236-20, Orgoniroiion und Adminisfmtion.
Camp Farnham. 1940-1946, "BrigadierGenerd Edouard de Bellefeuille Panet (Director of
lntemment Operations) to the Adjutant-General (Department of National Defence),"
September 5, 1940.
NAC, DND. 10,RG-24, Reel: C-5378, File: HQS 7236-20. Orgrniinrion and ddminis~alion.
Camp F o n h n , 19.10-19.16, "Brigadier-General Edouard de BeIlefeuille Panet (Director of
lntemment Operations) to the Secrerary of State." August 8, 1940.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,397. Volume 1 (October 1940), W m Diary of Inremmenf
Camp "A " N o . 40). Farnham, October 9, 1940. p. 1
NAC. FHTC. EK. MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, 9nterview of Colonel Eric Kippen by Hany Rasky
(CBC) in Como (Quebec)," [ 1980'sJ , pp. 7-16 - 7-1 7.
NAC. DND. IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 1 (October 1940). War Diary of Infemment
Cump "A " flo. 40). Fmhnm, October 10. 1940; October 1 1. 1940; October 15. 1940:
October 16. 1940; and October 1 8, 1940. pp. 1 -6.
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24. Vol. 11.253, File: 11-240, Inspection Reports. Camp Farnhum.
1910-1941. *'Report on Inspection of Camp A". October 22. 1940.; NAC. DND, 10. RG-24.
Vol. 15,397. Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diory of Internmenf Camp "A" (No. 40).
Farnhum. October 2 1. 1940, p. 9.
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24. Vol. 15.397, Volume 1 (October 1940). War Diuw of Internment
Camp '*.4 " N o . 40). Farnham. October 18. 1940 and October 20. 1940. pp. 6-8.
NAC. DND. 10. RG-24. Vol. 1 1.253, File: 1 1-2-40, Inspection Reports, Camp Farnham
IWO- 1941. "Report on Inspection of Camp A", October 22, 1940.
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399. Volume 1 (October 1940). War Diary of Inrernment
Camp "N" lNo. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), October 5, 1940. p. 1 .
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diu? of Internnent
Camp "N" N o . 42). Newington /Sherbrooke), October 5, 1940 and October 7, 1940. pp. 1 -2.
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 1 (October 1940), War Diav of Inremment
Camp "N " (No. 42). Novington (Sherbrooke). October 15. 1940, p. 3.
Koch. p. 126.; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Harry Rasky, The Spies Who Never
Were. Part 2 (CBC, 1981)," pp. iI- 12 - U- 13.
NAC, FHTC. EK. MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Emil Fackenheirn by Hamy R a s 6
(CBC) in Toronto," [ 1980'sj .pp. 40-4 1.
NAC. FHTC, EK. MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "interview of Fred Wolff by Harry Rasky (CBC) in
Toronto." [ 1980's], pp. 3-3 1 - 3-32.
NAC. FHTC, EK, MG-30,C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Emil Fackenheim by Hamy Rasky
(CBC) in Toronto," [ 1980Ts],pp. 40-41.; NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399. Volume 1
(October 1940), War Diary of Infemment Cump "N" No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke),
October 15, 1940, p. 3.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 5 (February 1941), W m Dimy of Internnteni
Camp "N"No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), "hternee Statement," Febmary 21, 1941,
Appendix 2, p. 2.
- -
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
a0
"
"
63
*
"
66
67
One intemee even recalled a guard telling him "that there will be no barbed wires [in Camp
Sherbrooke] ...y ou're on the honor system. We know you're not Nazis ..." This led to the
"deep-rooted belief that they [internees] had been ousted fiom their cornfortable quarters at
Camp Cove Fields to make way for Nazi prisoners.' See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192,
Vol. 3. "interview of Emil Fackenheim by Hany Rasky (CBC) in Toronto,* [ 1980'sI ,pp. 4041.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 1 (October 1940). W m D i q of
Inrernment Camp "N" mo. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke). October 15, 1940. p. 3.
NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 1 (October 1940), W m Dimy of Internmenf
Camp "N" No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke). October 16. 1940, p. 3.
As Koch indicated in his book: "1 shall never forget the impression Edmison made on me.
Here was a man in Canadian uniform who knew who we were, who realized that there were
men among us who had been in Gennan concentration camps...he appealed to us, trying to
persuade us to cooperate with the authorities...His main point was thar, if we were more
flexible, we could make the camp more livable. He said. even the officers had to put up with
sub-standard accommodation." See Koch, p. 128.
As the camp commandant indicated: "Sherbrooke is not gohg to be a tempora- camp. Both
you [ intemees]and I [camp commandant ] are going to be here for a long tirne!. ..There are
among you many clever and qualified men; to them, 1 throw out the challenge to assist in the
planning and erection of this new camp. You will tell me what materials you want and 1 will
supply them without delay ...The winter is fast approaching and every day's delay is
serious...1 speak to you now not only as commandant but as man to man. and 1 hope a lot of
things will be different from now on." Sre Koch. pp. 129-130.
Koch. pp. 129-130.: NAC. DND. 10, RG-24. Vol. 15.399. Volume 1 (October 1940). War
D i a o~f In~ernmenrCamp "N " /No. 42). Newington t'Sherbrooke). October 1 8. 1940. p. 4.
NAC.DND. 10 RG-24, Vol. 15,399. Volume 1 (October 1940). War Diary of hfernmenf
Cump "N" (No. 42). Newington lsherbrooke), October 21. 1940. p. 4.
For instance, when a brief snow stom struck the camp on the night of October 18-19.
satisfaction was expressed by the intemees at the wamth of the buildings. Further. the
prisonen indicated that the meals were "highly satisfactory." See NAC. DND, 10. RG-24.
Vol. 15.399, Volume 1 (October 1940), W m Diary of Internrnenr Cump "N" lNo. 42),
Newingtun (Sherbrooke). October 19. 1940,
p. 4.
Canada. Reaulations Governina the Maintenance of Discipline Arnong
- and Treatment of
Prisonen of War (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude Pnnter to the King's Most Excellent Majesty.
1939), p. 3.
As it was stated: "The terni 'prisoner of war' used in this Regulation [Definse of Canada
Regulations) shall include any person detained or intemed under these Regulations." See
NAC, OC. RG-2,Vol. 1675. File: 20896, "Order-in-Council P.C. 2322," May 3 1, 1940.
Sianton, pp. 223-224.
Kochan, p. 65.
NAC, FHTC. EK, MG-30. C 192, Vol. 3, "lnterview of Colonel Eric Kippen by Hany Rasky
(CBC) in Como (Quebec)." [ 198O'sI pp. 7- 12 - 7- 13.
'AC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 6576, File: 1-2-4. Policy - (i.K re. Treaîment and Rations,
1911, "Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in London to the Secretary of State for
Extemal Affairs in Ottawa", February 1, 1941.
NAC. OC,RG-2, VOL 172 1, File: P.C.4568, "ûrder-in-Council P.C.4568" June 25. 1941.
Draper, T h e Accidental Immigrants...Part 2," p. 85.; NAC, OC, RG-2, Vol. 1724, File: P.C.
5246, "Order-idouncil P.C. 5246", July 15, 1941.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399,
.
.
--
69
70
''
"
74
'5
76
77
-
-
--
- -
Volume 10 (July 1941), War Diory of Internment C m p '*Ar" (7%. 42). Newingron
(Sherbrooke), July 23, 1941, p. 5.; Priebe, p. 178.
NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-20, C 192, Vol. 3, 'Werview of Rabbi Erwin Schild by Harry Rasky
(CBC) in Toronto," [ 19809s], pp. 1 1-13.
Dissatisfaction was expressed at Camp Sherbrooke on July 24, 1941 where some of the
inmates expected more liberties and the complete removal of the barbed wire system. See
NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (July 1941), W m Dimy of Intemment Camp
"N"(No. 12). Newington (Sherbrooke). July 24, 1941. p. 6.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol.
1 5,399, Volume 10 ( h ly 194 1), Wur Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 12), Newington
(Sherbrooke), July 25, 1941, p. 6.; NAC. DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (July
1941), W m D i q of Inremmeni Camp "'N" (No. 42). Newingron (Sherbrooke/, July 28, 1941.
p. 6.
Bad, p. 3 14.; Draper, 'The Accidental Immigrants.. .Part 2," pp. 92-94.
Koch. p. 230.; Kochan, pp. 132-1%: Stent, pp. 242-243.
Draper, "The Accidental Immigrants...Part 2," pp. 81-82.; Kochan, pp. 90. 166.; Stent, p.
1 78.24 1. 249.
Kochan, p. 90, 165-166.; NAC, FHTC. EK. MG-30. C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Ernst
Waengler by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Toronto." [ 1980's], p. 5-18.; NAC, DND. IO. RG-24,
Vol. 6576. File: 1-24. Policy - U K re. Treatment and Rutions, 1941, "Col. H. Stethem
(Commissioner of lntemrnent Operations) to H. D. Scully (Commissioner of Customs)," luly
23. 1941 .: S t e n ~p. 24 1.
One such case occurred on December 7. 1941 when some 40 visiton came to he-aux-~oixto
meet the inmates they were to sponsor. See Draper, ''The Accidental Imrnignnts...Pari 2." p.
94.: NAC, DND, 10. RG-24. Vol. 15.399. Volume 18 (December 1941). War Dm of
Inremment Camp 'Y"m. 41). Fort Lennox. i l e - a u - ~ o kDecember
.
7. 1941. p. 1 .
The release of refugees into civilian life created humorous ironies. Such was the case of Kurt
Swinton. a Camp Farnham refupe who became an officer in the Royal Canadian Signal Corps
upon his release. Swinton recalled the visit he made to Camp Famharn in his new military
uniform: "It was a traumatic experience both for me and for the othen. And the guards. they
thought ihey were dreaming...The guards saluted! It killed them but they did it ..." See NAC.
DND. IO, RG-24. Vol. 15.397, Volume 13 (October 194l), War D i q of Internment Camp
' 2" N o . 40. Famhom. October 13, 1941, p. 3.; NAC, FHTC. EK. MG-30,C 192, Vol. 3,
"Interview of Kun Swinton by Hany Rasky (CBC) in Toronto." [ 1980's], pp. 15-16.; NAC.
FHTC. EK. MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Constance Hayward by Hamy Rasky (CBC)
in Wolfii lle (Nova Scotia)," [ 1980Ts].pp. 10-15.
Koch. p. 246.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: NQS 7236-96-41. Consmction
and Mainienance. Camp he-aux-NO& lWO-f9N, "Major-General H.F.G. Lemion (AdjutantGeneral) to District Oficer Cornrnanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4." Octobr 30, 1943.:
NAC, DND,10,RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 4 1 (November 1943), W'D i q of Inremment
Camp 'Y" (IVo. 441 F m Lennox. /le-aux-~oir.
November 4. 1943, p. 2.
NAC. DND, IO, RG-24,Reel: C-53 77, File: HQS 7236-1 8, Vol. 1-2. Administration, Camp
ile-aux-Nok, WO-fW6, "Deputy Minister (Amy) to V. 1. Grossman. Executive Secretary of
the Canadian Olt. ûrganiuition," April 20, 1944.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5377.
File: HQS 72361 8, Vol. 1-2, Administration, Camp ~e-aux- NO^. 1940-1946, "Lt.-Col. F. H.
Collins, Engineer Accounts and Stores to Financial Supenntendent, Department of National
Defence," Febniary 7, 1946.
NAC, D m , 10. RG-24, Vol. 6576, File: 1-24, Policy - U K re. Treatment and Rations.
1941, bbORiceof the High Commissioner for Canada in London to the Secretaiy of State for
Extemal Affairs in Ottawa", February 1, 1941.
Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners.. ., pp. 90-9 1.
Waiser, pp. 2 I 7-2 18.
Carter, p. 137.; Bernard and Bergeron. pp. 17-19.; Melady, p. 20 1.
N AC, DND,10, RG-24, Vol. 1 5,399, Volume 12 (September 1941 ), Wur Dimy of lntemment
Camp "N"(No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke). September 1 1, 1941, p. 2.; NAC, DND, 10,
RG-24, Reel: C-5378. File: HQS 7236-20, Organization and Administration. Camp Fmham.
1940-1946. "K.H. Coleman (Under Secretary of State) to Colonel H. Desrosiers (Acring
Deputy Minisrer - Amy)". September 16. 1941.; NAC, DND. 10, RG-21, Vol. 15,397,
Volume 13 (October 1941), War Dairy of lntemmenr Camp ' A " (No. 40). Farnharn. October
I O , 1941, p. 3.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24. Vol. 15,397. Volume 16 (January 1942). W m Diary of Intenimeni
Camp '2" N o . 40). Farnham. January 23. 1942, p. 5.
NAC. DND,10. RG-24. Reel: C-53 78. File: HQS 7236-20. Organi:ution and Administration.
Camp Furnharn, IWO- 19.16. "Memorandum of the Director of Organization and
Administration to the Chief Treasury Offker ( A m y Service)", January 27. 1942.
NAC, DND, 10. RG-24. Vol. 15.397, Volume 19 (April 1942). War Diary of Internment
Camp :4' " (No. 40). Farnham. April 18, 1942, p. 3.
NAC. DND, 10. RG-24. Vol. 15.400. Volume 26 (November 1942), War Diary of lnternment
Camp Y" N o . 42). Newington (Sherbrooke). Novem ber 25. 1 942. p. 4.
NAC. DND. 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5374, File: HQS 7236-1- 10-42. Snength Returns. Camp
Sherbrooke, 194I-1946, 1942-1946.
NAC. DND. IO, RG-24. Vol. 15.398. Volume 27 (December 1942), War Diaiy of lnternment
Camp "A " (No. 40). Furnhum. Decernber 2. 1 942 p. 1 .; Priebe. p. 1 8 1 .
Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners.. ..pp. 96-97.
NAC. DND. IO, RG-24. Vol. 15.398. Volume 27 (December 1942), War Dian, of lnternment
Camp ''A " (No. 40). Famhum. December 6. 1942. p. 3.
Canada,
pp. 96-97.: Waiser. p. 219-220.
NAC. DND, 10, RG-24.Vol. 11,147. File: 9-1-3 (40). Complaints. Camp Farnham. 1942.
"Oberstleutnant Schlichting (Camp Spokesman) to the Consul General of Switzerland in
Canada," December 6, 1942.
NAC, DND, 10. RG-24, Vol. 1 1,247, File: 9- 1-3 (40), Complaints. Camp Furnham. 19.12.
'bTelegram by Oberstleutnant Schlichting (Camp Spokesman) to the Consul General of
Switzerland in Canada," December 6. 1942.
NAC, DND,10. RG-24, Vol. 15,398. Volume 27 (December 1942), Wor D i q of Iniernmenr
Camp "A " (No. 401, Famhom, December 6, 1942, p. 3.
NAC, DND. IO. RG-24, Vol. 15,398. Volume 27 (December 1942). W m Dimy of Internment
Camp "A " m.410). Farnhacn, December 10, 1942 and December 12. 1942, pp. 5-6.
NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-9644, Consiruc~ion and
Maintenance. Camp Grande Ligne. 1943-1946, "Lt .-Col. R. W. Cano (Vetetan's Guard of
Canada) to Director of Administration (Veteran's Guard of Canada),.' October 19, 1942,
Appendix "D"
NAC. DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-44, Construction and
Maintenmce, Camp Grande Ligne. 19434946, "Lt.-Col. R.W.Cano (Vetenin's Guard of
Canada) to Director of Administration (Vetenui's Guard of Canada)," October 19, 1942,
Aowndix " B .
-
-
NAC, Dm, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420. File: HQS 7236-96-44, Construction and
Maintenunce. Camp Grande Ligne. 1943-1946. "Lt.-Col. R W. Cano (Veteran's Guard of
Canada) to Director of Adrninismtion (Veteran's Guard of Canada)," October 19, 1941,
Appendix "A".
99
NAC. DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7136-96-44. Construction and
Maintenance, Camp Grande Ligne. 1943-lW6, "Brigadier-General N.B. MacDonald (Disaict
Quarter-Master General) to DAG," September 23, 1942.
IW Bernard and Bergeron, p. 205.; NAC, DND, 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-9614,
Consnucrion and Maintenance. Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-19.16. "Lt.Co1. R. W. Cano
(Veteran's Guard of Canada) to Director of Administration (Vetem's Guard of Canada),"
October 19. 1942, Appendix "D".
'O' NAC. DND. 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5420. File: HQS 7236-96-44. Construcrion and
Muintenance. Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1916, "Brigadier-General N.B. MacDonald (District
Quarter-Master General) to DAG," September 23, 1942.; NAC, DND, IO. RG-24. Vol.
15,403, Volume 1 (January 1943). War D i q of Internment Camp No. 44. Grande Ligne.
**Minuteof a Meeting of the Cornmittee of the Prîvy Council. P.C.10854," December 1. 1942.
Appendix 1, pp. 1-3.
'O N AC, DND, 10. RG-24. Vol. 1 5.403, Volume 1 (January 1943). War Di' of lnternment
Camp No. U. Grande Ligne. .'Minute of a Meeting of the Cornmittee of the Privy Council.
P.C.10854.'. December 1, 1942. Appendix 1, pp. 1-3.; NAC, D M . 10. RG-24. Reel: (3-5396.
File: HQS 7236-79. OjJcers. Grande Ligne. 1942-1946. "General Secretary of the Grande
Ligne Mission to the Secretary (Department of National Defence)," January 12. 1943.
'O3 NAC. DND. 1
0.RG-24, Reel: C-5396. File: HQS 7236-79. Oflcers, Gronde Ligne. 19421946. *'General Secretary of the Grande Ligne Mission to the Secretary (Depanment of
National Defence)." January 12. 1943.; NAC, DND. IO. RG-24. Vol. 15.403. Volume 1
(January 1943). War Diary of lnternment Camp No. 4 4 Grande Ligne, January 1 5 . 1943. p.
1.: NAC, DND. 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5396, File: HQS 7236-79, 0flcer.s. Grande Ligne. 19421946. "Lt.-Col. E.I. Undenvood (Director of Postal Services and Chief Superintendent of Post
Oftice Service) to Director Prisonen of War (Department of National Defence)." February 5.
1943.
IM
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24. Vol. 15.403. Volume 1 (January 1943), War Dia- of lnternment
I
,
Grande Ligne. January 17. 1943, p. 1.
Camp No. I
'O' NAC, DND. 10. RG-24. Reel: C-54 13. File: HQS 7236-91- 1-40, Visifs&v Representuiives of
Protecting Power, Camp Furnham, 1943-1945, "Memorandum of the Consulate General of
Switzerland in Canada. in charge of Geman interests," May 1 1, 1943.
NAC. DND, IO.RG-24,Reel: C-5413. File: HQS 723691440, Cornploints by PM, Camp
Furnharn, i943-MJ5,'5chlichting (Camp Spokesman) to the Consul General of Switzerland
(Protecting Power)," April8, 1943.
'O7 NAC. DND,IO. RG-24. Reel: C-5413, File: HQS 7236-91-4-40, Campkaints by
Cmp
Famhom. 1943-1945, "Consul General of Switzerland to the Department of Extemal Affairs,"
May 31, 1943.
'Oa NAC, DND, IO. RG-24, Reel: C-5413, File: HQS 7236-9 1- 1-44. Visits by Represenroiives of
Prorecting Power, Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1915, "0.Jaccard (Consul General of
Switzerland in Canada) to Colonel H.N. Süeight (Director Prisoners of War)," June 1 8. 1943.
'09 NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5378, File: HQS 7236-20, ûrganuation und Administration,
Camp Fanihom. 1940-1946. "Major-General H.F.G.Letson (Adjutant-General) to the District
Officer Cornmanding (D.O.C.)Military District 4," September 16, 1943.; NAC, DND, 10,
RG-24, Reel : C-5378. File: HQS 7236-20,Orgmuation mid Administration, Camp Farnham.
"
Pm
-
-
19.10-1916, "Memorandum of J.A. Lacornbe (Military Distict 4 Treasury Officer)," January
24. 1944.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 4 1 (Febniaiy 1944), W m D i a y of
Internmenf Camp "A " (N'o. 40). Farnham,February 6, 1944, p. 2.
110
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 37 (October 1943), W m Diary of Infemment
Camp "A" (No. 10). Farnham, October 17, 1943 and October 18,1943, p.3.
" NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 1 5,398, Volume 39 (Decernber 1943), W m Diay of lnfemment
Camp **A" N o . 40). Famham, b'Syllabusof Training - Scout School - Veterans Guard of
Canada," December 1, 1943, Appendix 4, pp. 1-4.
"* NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Vol. 1 5,398, Volume 4 1 (Febniary 1944). W m Diury of lntemment
Camp ''A " (No. 401, Farnhurn. February 25, 1944, p. 5.
"j NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. i 5,398, Volume 42 (March 1944), ?b
Dimy of infemment
Camp "A " No. 10). Farnham, March 1, 1944, p. 1.; NAC, D M , 10, RG-24,Vol. 15,398.
Volume 43 (April 1944), War Diary of Intemment Camp '*A" (No. 10). Fumham,
"Department of National Defence Parade State for Camp Farnham." April 19, 1944, Appendix
3, p. 1.
Il4
NAC, DND, 10. RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 44 (May 1944). War Diary of lntemment Camp
'A " No. JO), Furnham, May 13, 1944 and May 15, 1944. pp. 3-4,
I l 5 In fact, the Arnerican govemment intemed some 380,000 German prisonen of war in the
United States during the war. See Daniel Costelle, Les Prisonniers. (Pans: Flammarion, 1975),
p. 236.
Il6
Costelle. p. 18.: NAC. DND,10, RG-24. Reel: C-5378, File: HQS 7236-20. Organizafion and
Adminisnufion. Camp Farnham, 1940- 19.16. "Letter addressed to Colonel H.N. Streight
(Director Prisoners of War)," September 11. 1944.: NAC. DND. 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5365.
File: HQS 91391140. Camp Intelligence. Cump Fmhum, 19444946. "Colonel H.N. Streight
(Director Prisoners of War) to Chief Postal Censor (Ottawa)," September 22. 1944.: NAC.
DND. 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5378, File: HQS 7236-20, Organimion and Administration. Camp
Farnhum. 1940-1946, "Major-General H.F.G. Letson (Adjutant-General) to the District
Offcer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4." Septernber 23, 1944.; NAC. DND. 10.
RG-24. Reel: C-54 13, File: HQS 7236-9 14-40, Complaints by P/W. Camp Farnham. 19431945. '~Colone!Hans Jay (Camp Spokesman) to the Consul General of Switzerland," October
22, 1944.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-5413, File: HQS 7236-91-4-40. Complaints by
P/W. Cump Farnhaïn, I 9 G l N ' i . "Colonel H.N.Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to the
Department of Extemal Affain (Special Section POW)," October 28, 1944.; NAC. DND. 10,
RG-24. Reel: C-5413, File: HQS 7236-91-4-40, Complaints by
Camp Fantham, 19431945. "Under Secretary of State for External Affain to Department of National Defence,"
Decernber 19, 1944.
I l 7 Carter, p. 139.: Kelly. 'The Pnsoner of War Camps.. .", pp. 124-125.; Iake MacDonald. "nie
Beast of War and the Beautifid Lake," The Beaver, Vol. 76, No. 2 (April-May t 996), pp. 2930.; Melady, p. 18.22.; Priebe, p. 178.
John F. Hilliker, ed., Documents on Canadian Extemal Relations. Volume 10 ( 1 944- 19451
(Ottawa: Canadian Govemment Publishing, 1987), pp. 1 102-1103.
Il9 Ibid.. p. 1 104-1 105.
'O Ibid., pp. 1 106-1 109.
12' NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-9, Adminisnatim, Camp Sorel. 19151946, 'Lt.Co1. H.V. Dicks (Royal Amy Medical Centre) to Director of A m y Psychiatry,"
Febniary 24, 1945.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-9, Administration. Cump SoreI. 194519.16, "Colonel H.N.Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to D. MT.," March 16. 1945.
'
Pm
"'
'"
'" NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-5421, File: HQS 7236-99, Orgrniroiion und Administration,
Camp Sorel, 1945, "Certified Minute of a Meeting of the Treasury Board (Privy Council),
Approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council.," May 16,1945.
lZ4 NAC, DND. 10, RG-24 Reel: C-542 1, File: HQS 7236-99, Orgonuation and Administrationl
Cump Sorel. 1945, "Memorandum by Colonel H.N. Sûeight (Director Prisoners of War),"
April 20, 1945.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24,Vol. 15,404, Volume 1 (May 1945), W m Dimy of
Internment Camp No. 45, Sorel, May 9, 1945, May 10, 1945 to May 16, 1945, p. I .; NAC,
DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,404, Volume 2 (June 1949, War Diary of Internment Camp No. 15.
Sorel, June 22. 1945 to June 29, 1945, pp. 2-3.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,404. Volume 2 (June 1945). Wm D i q oflntemment Camp
No. 15,Sorel. June 22, 1945 to June 29, 1945, pp. 2-3.
NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5421, File: HQS 7236-99, Organirorion and Adrninistrotion,
Camp Sorel. 1945, "Recommendation for Camp Sorel by the Director Prisonen of War," May
19, t945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5421, File: HQS 7236-99, Organization and
Administration, Camp Sorel. 1945, "Major-General A.E. Welford (Adjutant-General) to the
District Oficers Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military Districts 2.3.4, and 13.." May 24, 1945.
NAC, DND, 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5374, File: HQS 7136-1-10-45. S~rengthRetums1 Camp
Sorel, 1945- 1946, 194 5- 1946.
128
Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners.. -,
pp. 1 16- 1 17.
129
Hilliker. Documents.. .Volume 10,. ., pp. 1 1 16- 1 1 17.
""AC.
DND. 10,RG-24. Reel: C-5366. File: HQS 9 1 39-9. Adrninistrotion. Camp Sorel. 19451916, "Major G.W. Hamilton (The War Office in London) to Colonel Raymont (Office of the
High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom)..' November 29, 1946.; NAC. DND.
IO. RG-23. Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9 139-9. .4dminisnation, Camp Sorel. lWS-l9J6.
"Deparnent of National Defence Enquiry re. Employment, Usefulness and Repatriation of
Gennan POWs transferred from Canada to the United Kingdom.." December 4. 1946.
13' NAC. DND,10. RG-24. Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9 139-9, Admini.strafion.Camp Sorel. 19451946. "Director Militaq Intelligence to Major E.E.J. Barber (Director Prisoners of War)."
February 27, 1946.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5421, File: HQS 7236-99, ûrganizution
und Administration, Camp Sure!. 1945. "Lt.-Col. H.W.Pearson (Director Prisoners of War) to
lntemment Camp Sorel." February 57. 1946.: NAC, DM>. IO. RG-24, Vol. 15.404, Volume
1 1 (March 1946). War Diaw of infemment Camp No. 45, Sorel, March 4, 1945 and March 5,
1945, p. 1.; NAC, DND. 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5421. File: HQS 7236-99, ûrgankorion and
Adminisrration, Camp Sorel, 1945, "Major-General E.G. Weeks (Adjutant-Generai ) to District
Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Miliiary District 4." March 6. 1946.
13' NAC. DND, 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-44. Cfa.ss$cation of PM,Camp
Gronde Ligne. 1944-1946, "Major-General E.G. Weeks (Adjutant-General) to District
Oficen Cornmanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 2 and 4," April 2. 1946.: NAC, DND. 10,
RG-24. Reel: C-5396, File: HQS 7236-79, Wcers, Grande Ligne, 1942-1946, "MajorGeneral E.G. Weeks (Adjutant-General) to the District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," April 10, 1946.; NAC, DND, 10. RG-24, Vol. 15,404, Volume 40 (April
1946), War Dios, @Inremennt Cump No. 44, Grande Ligne. April 10, 1946; Aprit 12, 1946:
April 1S. 1946; April 16. 1946; A p d 19, 1946; and April30, 1946, pp. 2-4.
'j3 NAC.
DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-44, Consîruction and
Maintenunce, Cump Grande Ligne, I 9 G f W 6 , "D.W. Jerry (President of the Grande Ligne
Mission) to the Depamnent of National Defence (Amy)," Aupst 16, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO,
RG-24, Red: C-5420, Fiie: HQS 7236-96-44, Construction and Muintenonce. Camp Grande
"'
"'
Ligne, 1943-1946, "Major-General H.A. Young (Quartemaster General) to Deputy Minister
(Department of National Defence)," February 28, 1946.
"Le camp d'internement Newington cédé à la corporation des biens de guerre," La Tribune de
Sherbrooke, December 2, 1946, p. 2.; "Délégation de Sherbrooke auprès de la Corporation des
biens de guerre," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, April 23, 1946, p. 3.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,
Reel: C-53 78, File: HQS 7236-20, Orgrniration and Administration, Cump Farnham. 19401946, "Memorandum by Lt.-Col. H.W.Pearson (Assistant Director Prisoners of war)," May
14, 1946.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5378, File: HQS 7236-20, Organization and
Adminisrration, Camp F a r n h , 1940-1946, "Memorandum by Colonel LM.Taylor (Director
Veterans Guard of Canada)," May 17, 1946.; NAC, D m . 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume
64 (May 1 W6), Wur Diary of lntemment Camp "A" N o . 401, Farnham, May 22, 1946, p. 3.;
NAC. DND, IO.RG-24,Vol. 15.398, Volume 65 (June 1946), War Dimy of Inteniment Camp
"A " (No. JO), Fantham, June 6, 1946 and June 17, 1946, pp. 1-2.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,
Vol. 15,401, Volume 69 (June 1946), War Diory of Infemment Cump "N" (No. 42).
Newingion (Sherbrooke), June 1 1 , 1946 and June 14, 1946, p. 2.
Bernard and Bergeron, pp. 345-350.; Carter, pp. 228-229.; Kelly, "Intelligence...". p. 792.;
"Les internés allemands au camp Newington," La Tribune de Sherbooke, January 30. 1947.
p. 3.: Priebe, pp. 190-19 i
CHAPTER 2
LIFE BEHIND BARBED WIRES
Living conditions in the camps of southem Quebec was marked by a duality of
emotions. Both feelings of contentment and stress prevailed behind the barbed wires.
Although intemees were protected by the provisions of the 1929 Geneva Convention and
benefited from nurnerous privileges. the sheer reality of being held captive was enough to
pnente psychological strains. Well aware of this situation. camp authorities did their best
to improve the pnsoners' standards of living. They permitted them to benefit from the
pnerosity and humanitarianism of international organizations and to entertain themselves.
However. such attempts could never completely eradicate the pressures imposed by years
of internment. Restricted mobility. sexual deprivation. social alienation and the privation
of material comfon were al1 factors which influenced the morale of captives. As a
consequence. prisoners became restless and uncooperative. Often this led to the nse of
dissension and increased attempts at escape. Such behavior forced camp authorities to
consolidate their powers and increase the degree of camp discipline, a situation that
intensified life behind barbed wires. Political motives was another important factor which
guided the behavior of prisoners. The presence of Nazis. anti-Nazis and Communists
inside the camps of southem Quebec oflen created a stresshl and divisive environment
which had to be dealt with by camp authorities.
To serve their own needs, captives were given the opportunity to appoint
representatives. As article 43 of the Geneva Convention stipulated: "In any locaiity where
there may be prisoners of war, they shall be authorized to appoint representatives to
represent them before the military authorities and the protecting powers."' This was dow
to permit prisoners to administer theù own affairs and to enable them to have weight and
infiuence despite king held behind barbed wires. As such intemees elected a camp
spokesman. This individual represented the communal interests of the entire inmate
population and served as the official intermediary between the prisoners and camp
aulhorities.' Because such administrative positions were very important, only the most
comptent individuals couid be chosen. As it was pointed out Ui the Camp Île-aux-~oix
war diary: "For intemal govemrnent, a lot depends on the camp leader and assistant camp
leader and they are positions that have to be filled with considerable
are."^ Being a camp
spokesman was no easy task. The appainted individuals had to bear huge pressures and
ofien had to endure al1 sorts of demands and pressures at the hand of their brethren. In fact,
they were often blamed by their peers for collaborathg with camp authorities. Because of
such pressures. one Camp Sherbrooke spokesman was forced to resign in June 1941 ."
Supporting camp spokesmen were hut leaders. Inside each internrnent camp.
intemees were divided into small hut groups. As such. each barrack would appoint group
representatives comrnonly known as hut leaders. These individuals were responsible for
the administration and discipline of huts. Canadian regulations described well the duties of
these individuals:
The members of each group will select a representative who will assist the
camp staff in maintainhg order in his group and will bring to the notice of
the staff any matter bearing upon the comfon or well being of the pnsoners
which require attention. The appointment of such representatives shall be
subject to the approval of the commandant. Prisoners of war are not
permitted to set up any other fom of administrative organization among
themselves unless and until such f o m of organization had ken submitted
to the Director of internment Operations and been duly approved?
Camp spokesmen and hut leaders worked together. In La Ville Sans Femmes, Mario
Duliani descnbed well how the camp system of internai administration functioned. As he
stated:
Le camp ressemble aussi à une petite ville par son administration qu'on
pourrait qualifier de politique mais qui, bien entendu, n'exige des
"administrateurs" aucune connaissance profonde non plus qu'aucune
expérience des affaires publiques. Je veux dire que chaque baraque se
choisit un chef, un Hut Leader, et ces douze mandataires ont chacun la
responsabilité de ce qui se passe chez eux. Ils exercent leurs fonctions de
concert avec le porte-parole ou représentant de tous les internés qui, lui,
est élu par eux en assemblée générale. Ce "chef' du camp est
l'intermédiaire reconnu entre chaque interné et le commandant militaire.
C'est à lui que le commandant indique ce qui doit se faire et ce qui ne doit
pas se faire dans le camp. Deux ou trois fois par semaine, le représentant
général. réunit les douze chefs de baraque, auxquels se joignent le
directeur de I'hôpital, le directeur de la cantine et quelques autres, pour
transmettre des ordres et examiner les problèmes du camp. Cette
assemblée forme en quelque sorte le conseil municipal du camp. Les
passions, les heurts, les discussions et les prises de bec y sont quelquefois
aussi vives et aussi violentes que dans de véritables conseils
Aside fiom this system. prisoners were not permitted to set up any other form of
administrative organization among themselves uniess it had been approved by the
Department of National Defence. 7
The proper treatment of intemees was supervised by delegates fiom neuval
nations. According to the Geneva Convention, each belligerents could choose a neutral
country to act as protecting power. Neutra1 nations acted as arbiters whose dulies were to
protect the interests of belligerent nations. According to article 86 of the convention:
The representatives of the protecting power of their recognized delegates
shall be authorized to proceed to any place. without exception. where
prisonea of war are intemed. They shall have access to al1 premises
occupied by prisoners and may hold conversation with prisonen. as a
eeneral rule without witness, either peeonally or through the intennediary
of interpreten. Belliprents shall facilitate as much as possible the task of
the representative or recognized delegates of the protecting power.8
C
Protecting powers were important assets for belligerents. They enabled fighting nations to
know exactly hûw their captured military personnel were treated by the enemy. They also
forced belligerents to comply with the clauses of the Geneva Convention. The protecting
power reported back to the nation it represented. If this country was not happy with the
treatment experienced by its prisoners held in enemy hands, it could always retaiiate on
the enemy subjects it detained. Although the laws of war forbade such procedures,
retaliatory measures prevailed and remained one of the most important eiements guiding
the treatment of prisonen of war.
in the case of Germany, the protechg power was Switzerland. As such, the
Consulate General of Switzerland in Canada's main duty was to visit inteniment camps,
where its personnel was given complete fieedom to inspect al1 buildings and to interview
intemees without a third party king present. At no tirne were Swiss delegates to "deliver
to, or receive from prisoners of war or intemees any papers, documents, letters or
parcels.. ." Swiss representatives acted as mere inspectors. During the civilian phase of
intemment in southem Quebec, internees refused contact with the Swiss Consul. Because
most were refugees from German aggression, internees insisted not to be represented by
Nazi Gemany's protecting power. Furthemore, civilian intemees resented k i n g treated
as prisoners of war. As a result, the prisoners becarne stateless men, for no protecting
power other than Switzerland could represent theK German interests. It was not until the
arriva1 of the first prisoners of war in early 1942 that the Swiss Consul began taking care
of inrnates in the camps of southem ~uebec.'
[nternees also depended upon the generosity of relief societies. According to
article 78 of the Geneva Convention, "societies for the relief of prisonea of war.. .shall be
permitted to distribute relief in the camps and at the halting places of repatriated prisoners
under a personal permit issued by the military authority. and on giving an undenaking in
writing to comply with al1 routine and police orders which the said authority shall
prescribe."'O Thousands of neutral relief organizations were created around the world
during the Second World War to help with the educational, spiritual and recreational
needs of prisonea of war. Certainly, Geman intemees benefited from the work of
international organizations such as the Red Cross and the YMCA as well as relief
societies fiorn Germany and neutral nations. Very few Canadian relief agencies helped
German prisoners. for their mission was to support Canadian soldiers in captivity
overseas.
''
The international Cornmittee of the Red Cross and the War Prisoner's Aid of the
World's Cornmittee of the YMCA were the two main international relief organizations
addressing the needs of German intemees. Both organizations were neutrd, based in
Switzerland and offered their services to al1 belligerents. While the International Red
Cross concentrated on the matenal. physical and sanitary conditions in intemment camps.
the YMCA concemed itself with the intellectual, recreational and religious needs of
prisoners. This easured that both organizations complemented rather than duplicated each
other's efforts.
'' On August 28, 1940, the Intemational Red Cross received the honor of
being the first relief organization to be permitted hto Canadian intemment camps,
followed by the YMCA on September 9, 1940.13 This privilege enabled representatives
from these associations to visit the camps of Southem Quebec on nurnerous occasions.'"
During such visits, delegates talked with camp commandants and camp spokesmen. This
permitted relief organizations to help supervise how prisoners were treated by the
detaining power. On such occasions. intemees ofien requested special services fiom relief
organizations. This often related to the purchase of goods required to alleviate the
pressures of internment. in most cases, recreational equipment was requested.I5
in principle, intemment camps provided the inrnates with basic necessities in
terms of shelter, food. clothing and personal hygiene. This was done in accordance with
the Geneva Convention. In regards to shelter. article 10 of the convention stipulated that
"Prisonen of war shall be lodged in buildings or huts which afford al1 possible safeguards
as regards hygiene and salubrity. The premises must be entirely free from darnp. and
adequately heated and lighted. A11 precautions shall be taken against the danger of Bre. As
regards domitones. their total area minimum cubic air space. fittings and bedding
material. the conditions shall be the same as for the depot troops of the detaining power."
Article 1 1 addressed the issue of nutrition. stating that the "...food ration of prisoners of
war shall be equivalent in quantity and quality to thai of the depot troops" while article
12, which dealt with the inmates' clothing. stated that "clothing, undenuear and footwear
shall be supplied to prisonen of war by the detaining power. The regular replacement and
repair of such articles shall be assured." Finally, hygiene matters were descnbed in article
13. which said that "belligerents shall be required to take ail necessary hygienic measures
to ensure the cleanliness and salubrity of camps and to prevent epidemics."l6 Therefore. in
essence, the Geneva Convention limited the Canadian authorities material obligations to
the strict minimum.
Despite such obligations, sorne Canadian citizens became jealous of the intemees'
standard of living. At the tirne, Canadians were king rationed for the war effort. As a
correspondent to the Toronto Globe and Mail noted in 1943: "Some Canadians obviously
felt that rations for German POWs were better than they should be: 'we are giving our
Geman prisoners of war better food than the average Canadian taxpayer can fiord to
buy.'"" As Major Eric D.B. Kippen recalled when commanding Camp Famham: ". ..In
some cases. people were jealous of the prisoners. Civil society had to face rationing and
some items of i'ood were rationed. However, prisoner were fed Canadian A m y rations in
accordance to the Genevu Conveniion." Kippen further recalled what some local ladies
told him:
"...We're having an
awful tirne getting certain...articles of food and we
understand that these refugees are getting, at no trouble at dl. a m y rations."" Despite
such complaints. Canadian authoritks continued to provide inmates with basic
necessities. Anphhg acquired beyond this had to be done by the prisonen themselves
through relief ~r~anitations.'~
Sending parcels to inmates was one of the prime activity conducted by aid
societies. However. there were certain restrictions. For instance. relief oqanizations were
prohibited fiom including such items as field glasses. photographie apparatuses. sextants.
compasses. electric torches, maps. money. fountain pens. telegraphic and telephonic
matenals. radios. inflammable materials. spirits. liquors and wines. dnigs. weapons.
foreign literature and civilian ~ l o t h i n ~In. ' ~other words. they were banned from sending
any items which might help or entice prisoners to escape or adopt riotous conduct. This
meant that all parcels had to be exarnined by the Canadian authorities. As a result. the
German government requested in the sumrner of 1941 that the Canadian government issue
proper reports of al1 parcels received in internrnent camps." Canada's Under-Secretary of
State for Extemal Affairs responded to this request on August 23. 1941 by orderhg the
Directorate of internrnent Operations to begin compiling summaries of parcels received in
al1 Canadian camps and to send these repons to ~ e r m a nTo
~ .make
~ certain that German
pnsoners had received their parcels, each fom had to be completed and signed by the
camp spokesman. It was then examined by the camp's commandant before k i n g sent to
Internent Operations headquarters in Ottawa for transmission to the Swiss consul? This
whole procedure enabled the proper supervision of al1 parcels received by Canadian
internent camps.
Parcels delivered to internment camps were divided into five categories: (I)FOOD:
canned goods, cheese, chocolates, etc.; (11) CLOTHING: unifomis, shoes, gloves.
underwears, socks, etc.; @I) CIGARETTES AND TOBACCO;(IV) WELFARE: billiard
tables, books, garnes, gramophones, musical instruments, sport articles, moving picme
projectors, etc.; and (V) MIXED PARCELS.'~These packages were usudly sent by relief
organizations from such countries as Argentina, Chile, Germany, Paraguay, Switzerland
and the United
ta tes.^' Table 1 offers a good example of the nurnber of parcels received
by southern Qwbec camps. Although thjs chart concentrates on the 1944-1946 penod due
to lack of sources, it clearly demonstrates that the bulk of packages were sent from
Germany. It also gives an impression of the huge amount of parcels received in the region.
Hence, relief organizations contnbuted greatly to the welfare of the pnsoners.
Such parcels enabled southem Quebec intemees to enjoy nurnerous leisure
activities in the fields of the ans. education and spons. Recreational equipment sent by
relief organizations contributeci notably to camp Iife. While some internees tumed ro
physical activities, othen played music, made handicrafls, read books and played garnes
like poker, bridge and bingo. Such activities helped raise morale. This certainly seemed
mie dunng concerts. plays and athletic c ~ m ~ e t i t i o n Whatever
s.~~
the activity was. it
helped intemees to retain a certain sense of sanity by allowing them to psychologically
escape their fate as prisonen. at least for a few moment.
Although iecreational activities enabled inmates to ease their condition behind
barbed wire, they could not prevent the nse of psychological strains. After all. the
pressures imposed by years of internment could not be eased over night. In his book
entitled Essai sur la psychologie du prisonnier de guerre. Jean Cazeneuve described well
the pressures imposed by years of intemment. Captured by the Germans in 1940 while
defending his native France from invasion, Cazeneuve had lived the remainder of the war
in a pnsoner of war camp."
The privation of material cornfort was the most important strain that intemees had
to endure. As Cazeneuve indicated: "...la nourriture, le coucher, le logement.
I'ammeublement, l'habillement et les moyens de défence contre les variations de
température constituent une régression sensible par rapport au niveau de vie que la plupart
des gens connaissent dans le civil. C'est là, dans la captivité, une des causes les plus
élémentaire de la souffrance." Hence, lack of cornfort created both physical and
Table 1
Number of Parcels Received in the Camps
1944-1946
Relief
Organhtion
German Red
Cross
TYPSof
Parcels
I
II
111
IV.
v
Private
Individuals in
Gennany
International
Commitîee of the
Red Cross
Other Aid
Societies and
Private Sources
Outside Gemiany
Sources:
I
II
111
IV
V
I
II
III
IV
V
I
II
111
IV
V
,
CAMPS
No. 40
No. 42
No. 44
No. 45
779
245
578
1
51
657
O
88
O
488
437
260
O
5658
39
3146
443
23
98
2936
2
8
12
130
1
368
12
1
8
27
28
1
8
11
13
296
3
3
127
12
51
27
O
25
3
418
88
3
78
136
54
79
8
147
490
94 1
1
26
41
126
17
8
121
460
O
1
O
O
O
1
O
17
1
32
6
4
14
2
225
13
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5376, File: HQS 7236-1-11-44,
Parcels, Lelters to ExternalA ffairs, IRC, and Swiss Consul,
1942-1946, "Statement of Parcels Received at Camp Grande
Ligne", 1944-1946.; NAC, DND, 10,Reel: C-5376,
File: HQS 7236-1-11-45, Parcels, Lettes to External Alifairs, IRC,
and Swiss Consul, 7 94Z-Ig66, "Statementof Parcels Received
at Camp Sorel," 1944-1946.; NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Red: C-5375,
File: HQS 7236-1-1 1-42, Parcels, Letfers to ExtemalA ffairs, IRC,
and Swiss Consul, 7942-f 946, "Statement of Parcels Received
at Camp Sherbrooke," 1944-1946.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,
Red: C-5376, File: HQS 7236-1-11-40, Parcels, Letters to
fitemal A flairs, IRC, and Swiss Consul,7942-1946,
"Statement of Parcels Received at Camp Famharn," 1944-1946.
psychological pains. For the German pnsoners incarcerated in southern Quebec, exposure
to the cold Canadian weather was a source of discomfort which generated physical pain.
Adaptation to instinctive tendencies was the only remedy for such problems. Afker dl, the
human body could adapt to such changes as colder temperatures. On the other hmd,
psychological pains were based on habits and developed when prisoners recalled past
luxuries. For example, a suficient and healthy portion of camp food could be seen as
inadequate when compared with an exquisite meal. ui that sense, the privation of civilian
life comforts created a nostalgia of old habits which ensured mental discontent."
Adaptation and acceptance of one's fate was the only solution to combat psychological
pains." However, adaptation could not totally annihilate both physical and psychological
pains. Although pnsoners becarne more accustomed to life behind barkd wires. their
conscience could never forget lost pleasures.30 According to one Sherbrooke intemee,
prisoners becarne so obsessed with the camp's environment that some attempted suicide
while othea suffered nervous breakd~wns.~'
Resrricted mobility was another problem which created psychological strains.
Limited to camp enclosures. pnsoners were often stnick by "Barbed Wires Psychosis." As
Cazeneuve indicated: "La psychose des barbelés porte sur la simple conscience d'une
impossibilité. Même si rien ne venait exciter le désir de franchir l'enceinte. il suffirait
pour en soufir. de savoir qu'il serait impossible d'en sortir le cas échéant. Le barbelé
représente pour l'esprit une interdiction." This restriction of personai fieedom created
both monotony and boredom. Understanding that one's mobility was restricted was
enough to create sufYering." in that sense, "Barbed Wire Psychosis," known to most
southem Quebec prisoners as "intemitis," contnbuted greatly to the inmates' mental
suffering. In Deemed Suspecr, Eric Koch explained the symptoms of this "disease" as
being "a combination of despondency, touchiness, and worst of dl, self-absorption and
~elf-~ity.'"~
As one southem Quebec intemee explallied: "It is hell on earth mentally to
wake up in the middle of the night.. . and to say to yourself, '1'11 never get out of here,'
'This war is not going to end in my lifetime', and 'They'll keep me here for life.' That
This feeling of ~ e c l u s i o nalso
~ ~led some prisoners
feeling was the wom of intern~nent."~~
to consider suicide.36 Overall, camp authorities ackwwledged the fact that prisoners
sufTered fiom some son of psychosis. As stated in the Camp île-aux-~oixwar diary in
September 1940:
The trouble is of course that men behind barb wire develop various
complexes and one very definite one it to magnify mole hills into
mountains and there are "rnany tempests in the compound tea cup." A
vague disease known as *'barb wireitis" seems to develop in some prisoners.
It is a combination of languidness, fatalism and despair and in some cases
expresses itself violently and in a devil-beîare way, and in other by passive
resistance. During the 1 s t two days, there have been symptoms of this
malady and it has been necessary for the commandant to address the camp
and section leaders using a mixture of stemess. phiiosophy, tact and
~alesrnanshi~.~~
The absence of a feminine presence was another factor influencing the prisoners'
psyhe. This created a suitable climate for sexual obsession. Unable to fulfill their sexual
instincts. prisoners would often talk or drearn about ~ o r n e n . ~Mario
'
Duliani well
descnbed this phenornenon in his book properly entitled Lu ville sans Femmes. lnterned
at Camp Farnham. Duliani recalled that women dominated the collective thoughts of
prisoners.39As he indicated:
Dans chaque baraques. des dessins en couleun qui font des tâches criardes
sur les m m , les vitres des fenêtres. les cloisons de carton des couchette.
même sur le dossier des chaises. étalent des corps féminins nus ou presque
nus en des poses provocantes et lascives. Ces dessins ont été découpés dans
les magazines Esquire ou d'autres périodiques semblables par des
camarades victimes de "refoulement." A travers cette iconographie naïve.
la femme absente reste toujours ~rnni~résente.''~
This nostalgia of past pieaslaes was often reflected in art work. In their paintings.
poems and sculptures. pnsoners would often treat the femde body as an object of
idealization. This conception was demonstrated when Mn. AM Cowan of the Canadian
Jewish Congress visited Camp Île-aux-~oixin 1941. Upon her amival at the camp. where
she was to interview civilian inmates regarding their future liberation. the camp
commandant infonned her that the pnsoners "had never seen a women in two years." For
her personal security, she was escorted into the camp's compound by armed guards with
fixed bayonets. As she recalled, the prisoners were eager and placing "a table on top of
another table so that 1 would be inte~ewingthem." Further, the intemees gave her
numerous presents which included poems, watercolors and a wooden ashtray?' However,
idealization also created distorted views about women. As Cazeneuve explained:
Le portrait que garde le captif dans son souvenir n'est pas un cliché
photographique; c'est bien une copie mouvante et qui s'écarte de plus en
plus de son modèle réel. Ainsi s'explique l'extrême susceptibilité, la
sévérité même des exilés quand ils reprennent contact avec cette réalité et
mesurent la différence.. .Combien de plaintes recueilles-t-on quand arrive le
courriers. C'est que l'être réel ne s'exprime pas dans ces lignes comme l'eût
fait l'être idéal qui est né de lui dans la méditation du
This reality ofien generated feelings of aband~nment."~
As a result the absence of women
led prisoners to becorne more aggressive. Unable to suffice their sexual needs, men would
become restless and violent?
When circurnstances permitted and intemees were able to meet ~ornen."~
they
ofien did not know how to react. Years of seclusion and inexperience with ladies took its
toll. When a small goup of young Farnharn refugees was taken to Montreal for
esaminations in the fall of 1941. the Canadian Jewish Congress organized a party which
was attended
by Jewish girls. According to one internee:
...It's the strangst experience. ..you think you son of immediately go and
grab them.. .but most of us really didn't know how to handle the situation at
ali.. .The girls were very nice looking and we had sort of bragged among
ourselves what we would do with those girls.. .Some of them were going to
go right to bed with them.. .I doubt that 1 as much as said ten words to a girl
and I found that experience really traumatic...suddenly to be with the
opposite sex after al1 this time. And acnially. 1 had a sleepless night after
that. 1 was so mad at myself for not taking more advantage of the
0~~0""ty.'~~
Seclusion fiom women also led to the development of hornosexuality. Although
not much is known about this sexual behavior in the camps of southem Quebec. a few
inmates claimed that homosexual activities were an everyday occurrence. According to
Eric Koch who was intemed at Camp Sherbrooke: "The absence of women had a very
predictable influence on the lives of many inmates. The o d y way in which prisoners
could have heterosexual love &airs
was in their fantasies. Yet. no fantasy at d l was
required to have &airs with men. By far the greatest nurnber of love fiairs were between
men who before and afier internent were perfectly straight.""
Social alienation was another cause for psychological strains. Isolated fiom their
families, friends, professions and the customs of their country, prisoners
kame
"home ~ick.'*'~ This feeling of alienation was also accentuated by the prisoner's
realization that life went on at home without him. Hence. though life inside internrnent
camps were known ro be "micro-societies," inmates remained nostalgie for their native
country and their past life.4g Social alienation was aiso intensified by the prisoners'
recognition that Canadian society flourished outside the camps. Ln fact, prisones were
often reminded that life continued on the "outside world" through Canadian newspapers
and magazines. The rare contacts with Canadian civilians also re-affhed such feelings.
Knowing that cornmunities prospered beyond the barbed wire was both a source of
hstration and envy. Such realizations were often enough to entice a prisoner to escape.
Funhemore. there was always the threat of illicit correspondence and exchange of
valuable information. As a result. contact between pnsonen and civilians was kept to a
strict minimum. AAer all. article 2 of the Geneva Convenrion. stipulated that prisoners
"shail at al1 times be humanely treated and protected.. korn public curio~it~."'~
Public curiosity was a major problem. Although Canadian propaganda pictured the
Germans as "bloodthirsty Huns and savages," Canadian civilians still wanted to see for
themselves who was behind the barbed uires. According to a Sherbrooke resident:
...my mother would worry.. .about us going out at night when there was an
escape that was sounded. She'd Say. 'You can't go beyond the property
because there are prisoners around' ...The thing that my mother did not
know was that these prisoners of war used to go sskiing. They would walk
wirh guards to the Bowen Hill. and tbey would go down and ski down there.
Us girls would ski down the Ml.. .and we'd kind of talk to these prisoners.
Our parents didn't know that for a long tirne, that we were actually talking
to them. They weren't allowed to say much to us because of the guards. We
never got near the fence.. .5 1
Some civilians even approached the camps' enclos~res.~~
The problem becarne u,
h a t i c at Camp Farnharn in 1942 that warning signs had to be posted around the camp
because curious motorists and pedestnans ofien approached the camp's periphery."
Nevertheless, such incidents enabled the prisoners to see, if only for a slight moment,
faces fiom the "outside world." The sight of Canadian civilians was a constant reminder
that while they were incarcerated, others were fiee. Therefore. lack of material cornfort,
restricted mobility, the absence of a ferninine presence and social alienation were basic
factors which created a climate of dissatisfaction in the camps of southem Quebec.
One result of psychological sîrains was marked by the rise of dissension.
Dissension was expressed through numerous foms of protest. In most cases, intemees
exploited the Canadian govement's fear of Geman reprisais. At the time. retaliatory
rneasures were a common fonn of political pressure. According to historian Jonathan F.
Vance. -'the (Canadian] govemment remained comrnitted to the principle of reciprocity.
The treatment of prisoners in Canada was seen to be inextricably linked to the treatment
of Canadians in enemy hands. and the govemment generally lodgd a protest when
conditions afliecting Canadians in Axiç hands were markedly worse than those
experienced by POWs in Canada." It is important to note at this point that the Geman
govemment adhered to sirnilar policies. Understanding this situation. most of the Geman
intemees in Canada used this tactic to pressure camp authorities to cave in to their
demands?
The power of retaliatory means had k e n well demonstrated dunng the shackling
controveny of 1942- 1943. The process began in the irnrnediate aftennath of the ill-fated
Dieppe raid of August 19. 1942 whereby 1.000 British and 5,000 Canadian troops
attempted a military landing in northem France. Since the Germans found many of their
own dead with their hands tied on the Île-de-~arkfollowing an earlier British commando
raid. Germany responded by shackling some 1,376 Canadian and British prisoners of war
intemed in both W a g s (oficer camps) and Stalags (other-rûnks camps) on October 8.
1942. immediately, Britain threatened to shackle an equivalent nurnber of German
prisoners in both Great Britain and Canada. When Germany raised the stakes on October
10 by chaining some 4,128 prisoners. Britain requested the Canadian govemment to
approve the handcuffig of 3.888 Gerrnan prisoners of war. Four Canadian internent
camps were chosen for this purpose. These were camps Gravenhurst, Espanola Monteith.
and Bowmanville. Although the British and Canadian governments decided to unshackle
the Geman pnsoners on December 10, 1942, the incident did not end until November
1943 when Germany hally agreed to unchain the Canadian and British i ~ i a t e s . ~ '
The exploitation of the Canadian govemment's fear over German reprisais
encoumged the intemees to adopt rekllious behavior. Numerous methods were adopted
by the pnsoners to express their dissatisfaction. One form of pressure was by compiaining
to the Swiss Consul. Acting as the prisoners' protective power, Swiss delegations had to
report al1 incidents to the German govemment. As such, this created much pressure and
often led camp authorities to irnprove treatment of the prisonea.s6 Passive resistance was
another method used by the inrnates to express their discontent and was often expressed
through strikes, namely hunpr strikes. By refushg to prepare meals or to eat, prisoners
placed enormous pressure upon the Canadian authonties. Should any prisoners' health be
af3ected by this form of strike, there was aiways the threat of Gerrnan reprisals. On such
matters. belligerent nations ofien did not care to know if it was the pnsoners or the camp
authorities who were responsible for the dirninishing health. For them. what was important
was the treatment that their pnsonen received while in the hands of the enemy. Therefore.
any health problem was usually blamed on the enerny a~thorities.~'In order to limit the
chances of retaliation on Canadian prisooen of war, camp authorities usually nodded to
the prisonen' demands? Another popuiar form of protest was postal strikes. The belief
was that if no inmate made use of his privilege to send letters home. his family and fiiends
would wony and initiate pressure upon the German government to make formal
inquiries." Pnsoners also resorted to labour strikes. as each southem Quebec camp
employed inrnates on special work projects.60
Sometimes, intemees adopted riotous behavior. including camp mutinies.
Although rare. such forms of dissension created enormous pressures for camp authonties.
Such a case occurred at Camp Famham between September 2 6 and
~ September 28"
1941. At the tirne, a strong Communist movement had grown inside the camp. As camp
authorities indicated in early September 1941: "A cornmunistic element among the
refugees is becoming moa assertive and vocal.. .An effort is king made to discover who
the ring-leaders of the Cornmunists are." They M e r stated: "...there are about ten to
twelve professional politicians and Communist leaden who work with indirect and
undercover methods. Someday theu efforts will probably blossom forth in some kind of
riot or trouble.'*' It is important to note that the intemees of this camp were divided over
the issue of Cornmunism. This generated much tension. As camp authonties indicated: "It
is quite apparent that the refugees in this camp are a mixed group as previously reported
and differences consists not only of race and religion but there are differences of a violent
,962
political and social nature. Cornmunists as previously reported are very strong...
Rioting emerged when camp authorities decided to transfer seven of the most politically
active Communists to Camp Île Ste. Hélène on Septernber 26. The process began in the
early moniing when the camp spokesman requested 'that the movement be irnmrdiately
canceled, if it was not a hunger strike would immediately commence." In order to place
more pressure, he fiirther added that "'heads would fa11 over this move." As camp
authonties indicated, "there was great commotion. excitement and hi& feeling in the
compound over the whole n ~ a t t e r . "The
~ ~ riot which ensured was well descnbed by Major
E.D.B. Kippen who was then camp commandant:
At approximately 1200 hours on Friday. September 26" the hunger strike
started and the refugees removed the rations from the kitchen and brought
them d o m to the main gate of the camp although much was strewn over
the compound. ..The refugee canteen was closed by the compound hut
leaders at l JO0 hours when the (seven] refugees were embussed and lefi
for Camp "Sv. This was the cause of tremendous excitement in the
compound and semi-rioting and general confusion. Just before the bus was
about to start three rifle shots were discharged into the air outside the guard
roorn and this had the eff'ect of caiminp down the compound for
awhile...M e r the bus had left. the various factions in the compound were
involved in disturbances and some of the refugees were injured although
none very senously, which was more by good luck than by anything else.
During the rest of the aftern&n the sentries were doubled and the police
force inside the compound was increased so as to give NI protection and
firthermore to protect groups of refbgees from each other. Attacks were
made on individuals and on groups. During the balance of the day the
agitation continued.. .The hunger svike continued al1 day during the 27"
and there was outbreaks of noting and attempted attacks on groups and
individuals. Approximately 100 to 125 refbgees broke away fiom the strike
and manageci to get some breakfast and lunch although their fires were put
out on several occasions by raids made on the kitchen. The cornpound
police were able to control the situation very well but at times groups were
able to break through their cordon. It was necessary to move about 51
refbgees out of the various huts and they were segregated in the quiet roorn.
This was done for theu protection...The next &y, Septernber 28' camp
representatives were i n t e ~ e w e dand given instructions to stop the hunger
suike. They were given until 1430 hours.. .and at that time they reported
that the hunger süike was over. During the balance of the day there were a
number of disturbances but they were mal1 incidents. On September 29"
the situation improved considerably and by noon of September 30' it was
considered normal.. . 64
This riot, which was caused by the political atmosphere that reigned arnong Camp
Faniham prisoners demonstrated the power and esciency of communal actions. Although
such violent incidents were rare, they clearly showed the importance of cohesion.
Dissension was ais0 expressed through illicit activities. Diunkemess was one such
form. Hoping to escape the hardships of life behind barbed wires. prisoners often
consumed alcohol. Drunkenness. although vigorously prohibited by Canadian officiais,
was a serious problem inside the camps.
To control this phmornenon, beer was made
available to the intemees on a limited scale. As Canadian regulations stipulated:
"Intemees will be permitted to purchase beer daily. during a period not exceeding one
hoW... No limit will be placed upon the amount purchased during the hours of sale. but
strict control will be maintained to prevent drunkenness." It was further indicated that
"permission to purchase beer will be considered as a privilege. If the privilege be abused
in any way the Commandant will withdraw same, and imrnediately and suitably discipline
the intemees con~erned.'"~Although camp authorities did their best
to
prevent
drunke~essand restrict prisoners from having access to other forms of aicoholic
beverages. they could not prevent the clandestine making of such drinks. in fact. prisoners
did their best to concoct their own hard liquor. known as Moonshine. Eckehart Priebe.
who was a Camp Grande Ligne prisoner of war, described the process:
First. one needs an electrical hot-plate. The base was fashioned fiorn some
clay we found in the compound. the bedsprings provided the wire to make
the coil. The big pot to go on the plate originally contained two pounds of
tobacco. the copper piping for the coolhg and drip-otr process was
'requisitioned' fiom the overflow tubes of the toilets. The fruit used as
basic ingredients came fiom the canteen with which we had a 'contact' for
al1 the rotten apples or peaches they could not sell. The biggest dificulty
was to hide the equipment. but we somehow rnanaged?
Drinks could be made fiom dl sorts of ingredients, including peaches, apples and cacao.
However, the manufacture of alcohol necessitated certain precautions. As Priebe
expiained:
Came the 'historic' moment when the first drop was about to appear at the
lower end of the piping. We crowded around the originator of the project,
spoon at the ready. He was eager to exercise his privilege of fmt tasting.
Full of anticipation he lified the fiat teaspoonful of self-made booze,
brand narne 'Grande Ligne special,' to his tongue, immediately dropped it
and blew the precious booze al1 over the place. We learned the hard way,
that the first drops of such a distillation were 100% pure alcohol which,
like acid, can bum a hole in your tongue. 67
For the Canadian authorities, the clandestine making of alcohol was perceived as an act of
dissension on the part of the prisonen. Searches would often be made to h d stills and the
ingredients which made camp micro-bre~eries.~~
Illicit activities also included the usage of hidden radio receivers. As Eckehart
Priebe indicaied: "The POW is always hungry for news; news fiom home, news fiom the
war theatres. news of things to corne. news. news, news. He is a notorious optimist, always
expecting good news as bad news from the war fronts would prolong his confinement."
Radio sets would often be improvised by the prisoners themselves. 69 As Camp Farnharn
authonties noted in March 1941:
It has been brought to our attention that parts of sound projectors for films
cm be used in the manufacture of improvised wireless sets by experts in
wireless. No doubt there are many such experts arnong the prisoners of war
and internees. Therefore. those camps. to which sound projectors have been
donated or loaned, must take the necessary precautions to prevent any
prisoner from having the opportunity of taking any parts h m or in any way
tarnpering with the apparatus.'*
Finally, secret correspondence was another form of illicit activity. Although article
36 of the Geneva Convention stipulated that "each of the belligerents shall fix periodically
the number of letters and postcards which prisoners of war of different categories shall be
permitted to send pet month." prisoners often tried to trammit valuable information to
individuals in Germany and other Canadian intemment camps using secret writing
matenal." Daniel Costelle well described such constraints in Les Prisonniers:
...les lettres passaient.. .à la censure qui rayait soigneusement tout ce qui
pouvait de près ou de loin ressembler a une indication d'ordre militaire. Les
sacs de lettres étaient ensuite rassemblés et embarqués à bord de bateaux
neutres, suédois. sud-américains ou suisses et amenés à Marseille, où ils
étaient mis dans des wagons plombés à destination de Genève. Ils étaient
-
ensuite transportés a la frontière et remis aux Allemands. Les lettres étaient
dors de nouveau ouvertes et lues par la censure allemande, qui rayait
soigneusement tout ce qui de près ou de loin pouvait ressembler à un éloge
de l'Amérique. Entre les paragraphes entiers passés à l'encre noire, les
parents, les femmes ou les enfants des prisonniers pouvaient toujours
essayer de deviner la vie de leur être cher...Dans le sens inverse, le trajet
était le même, et les prisonniers recevaient des pages entières rayées par la
censure. ..72
Letters could not contain controversial subjects such as reference 'TO either armed forces,
political situation, numbers intemed, passages fiom documents or books, cypher code,
secret writing, shorthand, marking signs, underlinings, cnticisms of, or reference to the
business of the camp or conduct of any other prisoner of war.. .Letten must not contain
political propaganda or abusive. insolent. derogatory. or threatening language with respect
to the govenunent or military authorities of the Allied nations.'' This led pnsonen to
adopt diverse methods to convey important information in their letters. The most
ingenious means were %wisible ink" and secret coda7) Secret writing matenal was
usually received inside the camps in parcels sent by Geman relief organizations and by
Pro-German associations in Latin America Germany and the United
tat tes.^^ The most
common used materials "for developing by heat are writings in rnik; orange juice; orange
juice. sugar and water; starch and water; cabbage juice; potato juice. urine: equal parts of
sulphrate of copper and salarnoniac dissolved in water; sulphuric acid and water. also the
common styptic pend ...Another fom of secret writing is by the use of linseed oil.
ammonia and water."" Although %ew sensitized paper which prevented the use of any
liquid secret writing ink, or other commonly known secret writing techniques in prisoner
of war correspondence" was introduced by Allied chemists, the use of "invisible ink"
prevailed inside the camps of southem ~uebec." As for secret codes, numerous
techniques could be adopted. Canadian authorities warned censors to examine letters for
the following coding methods: "Underlinhg of phrases, words or letters or use of
question marks; veiled and obscure language in music. spelling of words backwards, and
by chess problems or mathematical formulae; the use of drawings to conceal messages in
shorthand, morse, or other codes.""
Prisoners aiso tried to send secret letters by
concealing them in outgoing packages?8 In most cases, secret letters would be used to
transmit valuable military information, to cornmunicate cases of ill-treatment on the part
of the Canadian authorities and "io report to G e m y the names of prisoners of war who
appeared unfaiffil to ~azism."'~
Escapes were another consequence of psychological strain. Although Canadian
regulations warned that "any prisoner of war attempting to pass the boundaiy fence, wall,
or to go out through any gate, exit or other opening without a permit signed by the
commandant after being only duly warned and disregarding that waming, will be fired
on," intemees continued to attempt escapes.a0During southem Quebec's civilian phase.
there were very few escape attempts. A major reason which can explain this phenornenon
was the fact that most intemees were refugees. As such. inmates understood that good
behavior rnight accelerate their chances to be released on parole. There was also no need
for escapes since such attempts could mean a prolongation of internent. Also. unlike
prisoners of war who escaped in order to return to Gemany. refugees had nowhere to go.
This made the prospect of escape less attractive. However. despite these circumstances.
the idea of escaping was always on the mind of many intemees. As one Sherbrooke
inmate recalled:
We had no idea how long we would be there. how long the war would last.
or if we would be released be fore the war was over.. .so I made plans for
building a tunnel.. .I managed to steal maps of the area out of one of the
military automobiles and ...I thought seriously that I would start digging if
it [the war] went on for too long ... what 1 had done was to arrange the
floor of one of the huts.. .so to have some boards easily removable so 1
could get into the sub-floor. And I reckoned that the sub-floor would have
sufficed to accept al1 the earth I would have to dig out. And the fence was
not very far Frorn that but."
Although this prisoner did not try to escape, some did. in most cases. these attempts took
place in the latter part of the civilian phase at a time when the pressures imposed by years
of internment were at their highest.'* Escape attempts intensified in southem Quebec with
the arriva1 of prisoners of war. This can well be demonstrated by table 2. Enerny
combatants saw it as their duty to try and escape if ever captured. The belief was that
escapes greatly helped Germany's war effort by keeping the Canadians occupied and
forcing them to concentrate more troops for the protection of internent camps.
Table 2
Number of Attempted Escapes in Southern Quebec
Date of Escape
July 16, 1942
November 8, 1942
December 6,1942
April 8, 1943
April14, 1943
April22, 1943
May 24, 1943
June 28, 1943
August 5,1943
August 13, 1943
August 19, 1943
August 27, 1943
March 16, 1944
April 17, 1944
May 3, 1944
May 6, 1944
May 7,1944
July 29, 1944
September 13, 1944
September 26, 1944
Decernber 18, 1944
March 29, 1945
May 14, 1945
November 17, 1945
March 24, 1946
Sources:
Camp
Famham
Sherbrooke
Sherbrooke
Sherbrooke
Sherbrooke
Farnham
ile-aux-Noix
Farnham
Sherbrooke
Grande Ligne
Farnham
Grande Ligne
Grande Ligne
Sherbrooke
Sherbrooke
Sherbrooke
Sherbrooke
Sherbrooke
Grande Ligne
Grande Ligne
Famham
Famham
Sherbrooke
Sorel
Sherbrooke
Date of
Recapture
July 17, 1942
November 28,1942
December 11, 1942
April9, 1943
April 17, 1943
April22, 1943
May 24, 1943
June 29,1943
August 6, 1943
August 13,1943
August 22, 1943
August 27,1943
March 16, 1944
April 17, 1944
May 3, 1944
May 6, 1944
May 7, 1944
July 30, 1944
September 14, 1944
September 26, 1944
December 18, 1944
Aprii 1, 1945
May 15, 1945
November 17, 1945
March 27, 1946
NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Vol. 15,397-15,398, Volumes 22 to 51,
(July 1942-April 1945), War Diary of lntemment Camp "A" (No. #O),
Farnham , July 1942-Aprit 1945.; NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Volume 15,399,
Volume 35 (May 1943), War Diary of Infemment Camp "la
(No. 4 f ) ,
Fort Lennox. /le-aux-~ox , May 24,1943.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,
Vol. 15,400-15,401, Volumes 26 to 66 (November 1942-March 1W6),
War Diary of lntemment Camp *Na(No. 421, Newington (She&wke) ,
November 1942-March 1946.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,403,
Volumes 8 to 2t (August 1943-Septernber 1944), War Dimy of Intemment
Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, August 1943-September 1944.; NAC, DND,
10.RG-24, Reel: C-5389, File: HUS 72364442, Escape Plans and
Conespondence, Camp Shedmoke, 7944-lg45, April9,1943, April 12,
1943, and May 14, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Reel: C-5389, File: HQS
7236-4440, Escape Pkns and Conespondence, Camp Famham, 7 9471945, August 20,1943.; NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Red: C-5416, File: HQS
7236-94-642, intelligence Reparts, Camp Sherbrooke, 19434946, May
5,1944.; NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Red: C-5421, File: HQS 7236-99,
0~aniz1)tion
and Adminiàtmtbn, C m p Sonl, f046, Nwemkr 17,1046.
Cutting through a camp's barbed wire system was one of the moa common means
of escape. This was usually done at night, the prisoners using stolen tools or improvised
equipment to cut holes. Improvised tools included stolen kitchen knives converted into
saws as well as saws made h m old gramophone springs. Also, prisoners would often
remove their iron beds' cross pieces and spnngs to make wire cutters. This was a very
delicate operation since the intemee had to work in the open without any means of
c0ncealment.8~Also, such endeavon took tirne for usually three lines of barbed wire
fences had to be cut. Despite such dificulties. inrnates used this method on numerous
occasions and succeeded." Furthermore, prisoners also escaped by climbing over the wire
fences. As Camp Farnham authorities warned: "If a man cannot go through the wire. that
is to say by using wire cutters. he might go over it with the aid of ladders. Cases have been
known where a ladder in three or four sections has been carried towards the wire in a
creeping position and then the movement of the sentry timed so as to bring it into action at
a favourable ti~ne."'~
Prisoners also dug tunnels underneath the camps hoping to reach the other side of
the wire fences. The only problem with such an enterprise was the amount of work
involved. Building tunnels was a complex procedure which needed special tools. These
usually were fashioned by the prisoners' themselves From scrap wood. iron and even
kitchen utensil~.~~
Mining operations also needed to be properly coordinated. Plans had to
be established to know where to dig, how to hide the tunnel's entrance, how to organize
the work and where excavated earth was to be thrown to avoid detection. Furthermore.
mining projects took a lot of time and energy. The construction of a tunnel could take
several months. As Camp Farnham authorities indicated: "It is practically impossible to
tunnel faster than say a yard a day and even that is dificult; therefore, to build a tunnel 30
or 40 yards long it would take at least 30 or 40 days for the tunneling alone." Because of
such conditions, numerous intemees had to be involved in such projects. rendering the
issue of secrecy somewhat problematic. Because of such conditions, mining operations
were rare. Still, there were incidents in southem Quebec camps."
Yet, other approaches were used by the prisonen in order to escape. Inmates
sometimes escaped through the main gate, ''the pnsoner hiding himself in the garbage and
ash boxes or by concealing himself in a truck, car. or under it..."88 Other intemees
atternpted escapes by impersonating camp guards. As Camp Famham authorities warned:
It would be possible for a prisoner to get hold of a uniform, although it
might be difficult. At the sarne tirne, many pnsoners are ingenious,
intelligent, imaginative and courageous and dificulties are not insuperable
to such people. This stunt is aiso worked on the lone wolf basis. that is to
Say. prisoners dressing up as officen, NCOs or soldiers and coming boldly
up to the gate and asking for exit. This is generally done late in the
aftemoon just before dusk, when the light would not show up any
imperfections in his unifom ...There have been actual cases of
impenonation. It generaily takes a good actor to do this and it is a very
daring ~ ~ e r a t i o n . ~ ~
To conceal their escapes, some prisoners even went as far as placing dummies in their
beds -70 look as if they were sleeping in them."90
The goal for German escapees was to reach the United States. With most
Canadian intemrnent camps located in proxirnity of the Amencan border. intemees saw
the U.S. as a natural asylum. Stimulating the prisoners intentions was the legend of
prisoner of war Franz Von Werra. a Gerrnan Lufhvafle oofticer who managed to escape
Canada and retum to Germanny by fleeing through the United States in January 1941. It is
important to note at this point that when this incident occuned. the U.S. was a neutral
country. As the story goes. Von Werra jumped out of a train in the midst of snow storm as
it neared the American border near Prescott. Ontario. Reaching the Gennan embassy in
Washington D.C.a few days later. Von Werra was told that the best way to return to
Germany was through South Arnenca. Issued with falsified identification papen. Von
Werra was sent to Brazil where he boarded an ltalian aircraft bound for Rome. Arriving in
the Italian capital in April 1941, he was then taken to Germany aboard a Luf~afle
aircraft. The success of Von Werra's adventure gave hope to al1 Gerrnan pnsonen of war
held in canada.'' Although the United States joined the Allied cause in December 1941.
the German pnsoners' zest for escape continued. Their new aim was to traverse the
United States with the help of sympathetic Gennan-Arnencans and reach ~ e x i c o . ~As
'
the Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI) indicated to the RCMP in November 1942
while searching for two Camp Sherbrooke escapees: "...ces deux hommes essaieront par
tous k s moyens possibles d'entrer aux États-unis et qu'ensuite ils tenteront probablement
de retourner en Allemagne via l'Amérique du Sud." 93 When another escape ensured at
Camp Sherbrooke in December 1942, the FBI and the Arnencan Immigration Department
"began an investigation into the possible existence of an underground system to aid
pnsoners in escaping fiorn Canada to the United
tat tes.^
In al1 of southem Quebec internrnent camps, measures were taken to prevent
escapes. Alertness was very important for camp g u d s . According to a document entitled
Notes on Prevention of Escapes issued by the Department of National Defence on
December 24, 1940:
The whole question of safe custody of prisonen must depend on the
constant alertness of each and every member of the staff and guard. No
arnount of mechanical equipment. no matter how eficient. will prevent
escapes. if the individual guard is not constantly and at d l tirnes on alen. If
one [meaning the pard] gets in the habit of assurning that the fence is
unclimable. that the rocky nature of the ground of the fiost wiil prevent
tunneling or that perfection illumination by flood and pistol-grip
searchlights makes escape practically impossible. then escapes will
occur.. .The troops employed in connection with pnsoners.. .should be
made to realize that the prisoners are always studying their habits and trying
to discover their weaknesses. and any person comected with an internment
camp who becomes apathetic in his duties is a menace to the security of the
camp."
Because "plots and preparations for escape are constantly going on among the
prisoners. especially among combatant prisoners of war." camp guards were constantly
being trained in prevention. The main problem with the Veterans' Guard of Canada was
that most of its members had not seen active service since the Great War. The necessity
for training was well demonstrated in the early days of southem Quebec's intemment
~ ~ e r a t i o n sAs
. ' ~it was stated in the Camp Farnharn war di-
on October 24. 1940:
The guards have to be instructed in intemment camp work as guarding an
internrnent camp is very different fiom guarding say a bridge or a munition
plant or something of that nature. The guards have received several lectures
fiom the commandant and other oficers on their work, and it is pointed to
them that everlasting vigilence is their first duty and that they must not rely
too rnuch on the mechanical equipment of the camp, such as the wire, flood
lights. etc. Sentries. provost police and escorts for working parties must be
made to realize that prisoners are contiaually studying their habits and
customs and endeavour to pick the weak points of each one personally or
the organization as a wt~ole.~'
Every week, the guards in southern Quebec's internent camps traîned in order
the perfect their skills. The guards had to understand the d e s pertaining to the treatment
They also
of the pnsonen and the rnethods they could use to enforce reg~lations.~~
needed to know what to look for in the advent of escapes:
When an escape is being planned. there is an atmosphere about the camp
that is unmistalcable. When you sense tension in the air do not ignore it as a
figrnent of your imagination. but see that everybody is on their toes.
Prisoners who intend to escape usuaily accumulate chocolate. cake or food.
Special attention shouid be p&d to prisoners who are noticed taking
exceptionally vigorous walking exercise: also to any group who appear to
be somewhat pale and who sieep continuously in the daytirne. which may
indicate night tunneling operations. Periodical searches should be made for
contraband. that is. civilian clothes. money. maps. compasses. etc.. .Watch
for signs of fiesh earth. etc.. sprinkled over the exercise ground or filling up
holes. etc. If prisoners are noticed leaving the huts or going out on working
parties with bulging pockets. examine same in case they are canying out
eanh from excavations. Wood is essential in building tunnels. Keep a close
watch for planks removed From walls. floors. etc. Avoid leaving boxes and
boards in places that are accessible to the prisoners?9
They were also told that "a pnsoner planning an escape generally arranges with
accomplices for a diversion so as to attract attention to something else rather than his own
particular activities. There are many possible diversions ranging al1 the way from a
commotion to a fire. When anything out of the ordinary happens.. .it is a good nile.. .not to
concentrate too much attention on the particular incident..." The inrnates' practice of
substitution. ?ha1 is to Say, one prisoner attempting to give the name and number of
another [during roll calls] so as to cover up a comrade who may have escaped or is
attempting to do so." was also noted.Iw
To prevent escapes. prisoners were issued with speciai unifomis. Aside fiom the
prisoner of war officers who were authorized to Wear their military unifonns and the
refùgees who were panted pemiission to Wear civilian clothing, al1 intemees were issued
with special marked clothing. This consisted of dark blue upper garments marked on the
back by a 14" red circular patch and gray trousers with a 3" red stripe down one leg. The
aim of the uniform was for the rapid identification of escapees. The circle on the shin was
to serve as a target if a guard was aiming his nfle at an escapee. The size of the circle was
chosen delibenitely to ensure it could not be removed without wrecking the gament.
Furthemore, to facilitate the recapture of escapees, each southem Quebec intemee was
photographed and finger p ~ t e dby the RCMP. These pictures were distributed to local
police forces and the media whenever escapes occurred. With this in mind, pnsonen were
not allowed to have long hair or bards. 'O'
Daily camp inspections, also known as roll calls. were crucial in preventing
escapes. On such occasions, prisoners would fa11 in two ranks in their numerical order and
be counted for and inspected by the camp's commandant. Such inspections helped ensure
that the 'discipline of the prisoners is maintained." Moreover, they permitted camp
authorities to know if prisoners had escaped.lO' As a rule. each camp was to have two roll
calls per day: one in the moming and one in the evening. However, often. a third
inspection was made as an extra precaution.
Preventing escapes was a tiresome enterprise for camp authorities. in many ways. it
was a game of cat and mouse which constantly forced camp guards to rernain on alen.
Although camp authorities knew that pnsonen were preparing escapes. they had no way of
knowing when such events might occur. This was certainly the case at Grande Ligne
where the inmates began attempting escapes as soon as they arrived. In fact, camp guards
discovered the entrance of a tunnel as early as July 6, 1943. When six pnsoners attempted
to escape by cuning their way through the wire fences on Aupst 13. 1943. it was clear
that camp authonties had become restless. What womed them even more was the fact that
the pnsoners had in their possession numerous documents including detailed maps of
eastern North America. This was of major concern for the camp authorities since it meant
that pnsoners had access to restricted information.'" M e n a second escape attempt
occurred on August 17. 1943. Military District 4 headquarten imrnediately responded by
ordenng a surprise search of the prisonen' compound. More than 100 VGC personnel and
50 RCMP constables took part. The operation was a complete success. Confiscated were
numerous forged documents which included Argentine, British, Dutch and Latvian
certificates of identity and U.S. A m y drafi certificates. Also found were detailed maps of
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan. New Brunswick, New Hampshire. New York, Nova
Scotia Ontano, Quebec and Vermont as well as compasses, wire cutters, home made
daggers, tools. codes and dimees. Furthemore, it was discovered that the prisoners of war
kept detailed records of the movements of camp sentries and of trains h v i n g at the local
railway station. When home-made VGC shoulder badges were found on September 2,
1943, as well as a metal tunnel W e w o r k the next day, camp authorities began to
The fear was that prisoners might be able to escape by means of impersonating
camp personnel. To meet this threat. camp personnel were issued on September 6, 1943,
with a special identity disc which was to be wom around the neck like "dog-tags." The
issue also led to an intensification of-the camp's security system. For instance. large
searchlights were put on each of the camp's towen and extra lines of barbed wires were
built in October 1943. ' O 5
However. these measures did not prevent prisoners fiom attempting escapes. in
fact. between January and February 1944. Camp Grande Ligne authorities becarne
convinced that the prisoners were building another tunnel when large Stones belonging to
the foundation wall of one of the buildings were discovered. One of them. which weighed
225 ponds. was even found concealed under the piano in the prisoners of war officers'
mess. Night afier night. camp authorities began searching for the tunnel's
entrante. It was
tinally found on February 27, 1944. under a window in the pnsoner of war Iibrary room.
When the tunnel was inspected. an eiectrician's rock drill and two pieces of galvanized
pipes were found in the hole, It was estimated that the prisoners had removed some % tons
of rocks fiom the foundations.lo6
To keep a closer watch on the prisoners in March 1944. camp authorities formed a
special intelligence group known as the "Ferrets." Manned by camp scouts. the Ferrets'
duties were to makr nightly searches in the prisoners of war compound to find out if the
inmates were preparing escapes. In the sumrner of 1944, digging operations resumed at
Camp Grande Ligne. As a result experiments were carried out at night by camp authorities
using listening apparatuses bomowed h m the RCMP. However, such attempt proved
unsuccessful since water pipes and other underground noises neutralized the eficiency of
these instruments. In the meantirne, some prisonen irnposed more pressure by attempting
to cut through the wire on July 30. 1944, while some 350 inmates were in the camp's yard
watching a soccer match. As a result, the camp guards intensified their supervision of the
enc~osure.'~'As camp authorities indicated: "It will be extraordinary if some well planned
scheme of escape is not tried this month - between now and the middle of September. The
gardens are now full of vegetables, h i t s , etc. and it is possible for a man to exit for days
without much in the way of provisions...next attempt might be a slick wire job. It's a great
game and the zest
of it is the unknown." Eventually. the "Ferrets" discovered the
intemees' tunnel on Aupst 26, 1914. In early September, the pnsoners were told of the
tunnel's a couple o f surprise searches of the camp were initiated, and a considerable
nurnber of contraband items were found. These included complete battle-dress suits fitted
with hornemade Veteran's Guard of Canada badges made of tin. homemade wedge caps,
shoulder badges, escape rigs, civilian clothing made out of blankets. tunnel ventilators.
hand-made tools. wires. falsified documents, maps, diaries and a tremendous amount of
scrap iron.'08 In late September 1944. the strain of escapes was widely felt by VGC
guardsrnen. As camp authorities indicated: ". ..VGC personnel feel they should get % 10 to
$1 1 gratuity. in view of duties guarding POW. being similar to battlefield d ~ t ~ . " ' ~ ~
Whenever prisoners escaped. camp authorities requesied local support.' 'O Because
"it is to be expected that a prisoner will endeavor to reach the United States border and
will rnake use of any available means of transponation. such as motor vehicles. trains.
bicycles, etc.." camp personnel had to react rapidly. After having notified Military District
1 headquarters. local security forces would irnmediately be contacted. These included the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP),the Quebec Provincial Police, the New York
State Police. the Vermont State Police. the Canadian Provost Corps, the Canadian
National Railroad (CNR) and Canadian Pacific Railroad (CPR) security forces, the Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Service Police, the United States Immigration Border Patrol,
the American Immigration Department authorities. municipal police corps as well as local
military units and Canadian Army Training Centres (CATC). Search parties wouid then
be forrned and sent around the region.
RCMP special agents and dog handlers would
usually coordinate such teams which. more than often, consisted solely of policemen.
Roadblocks and observation poas would also be established in the local countryside in
order to warn civilians about the escape and to interrogate and search both pedestrians and
motor-ists.
'' '
Furtbermore, local newspapers and radio stations would be advised of the escapes
and asked to communicate this information to the general public. in newspapers, this was
usually done by printing a photo of the escapee dong with a short text describing the
individual's physical characteristics. As for radio stations. they were usually requested to
broadcast the prisoner's description in both English and French every 15 minutes. W d n g
Canadian civilians about escapes was the only time the media was authorized to openly
discuss camp-related matters. The fact was that Canadian censorship forbade both
newspapers and radio stations to communicate to the public any information conceming
Canadian internent camps. Instead, the press kept dl its effort on detailing the
progression of the Allied forces. Local jounialists and reporten were almost never allowed
to visit southem Quebec internent camps. Because of t l s strict control of information.
some Canadian civilians were ofien unaware of the existence of internment camps in their
regions.'12 This situation was well reflected by the number of articles written about Camp
Sherbrooke by La Tribune de Sherbrooke. In fact. of the twenty-four articles published by
this newspaper during the war about the camp, sixteen of them dealt exclusively with the
issue of escapes. As for the other articles. they deah with such vague topics as change of
camp commandants and fires.
'13
The civiiian population responded well to the media
warnings about escapes. On some occasions. the public contributed to the recapture of
escapees."" Although moa escapees were usuaily recaptured within a day. some were
actually able to dodge searching parties for several days. in some cases. southem Quebec
escapees were even able to reach such metropolitan areas as Montreal.'15 In dl. some 600
attempted escapes were registered in Canada during the wu. Most were recaptured within
a couple of days.
When not confonning to camp niles. prisoners could be punished by the detaining
power. According to article 45 of the Geneva Convention. "Pnsonen of war shall be
subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the armed forces of the detainhg
power." In accordance with articles 46 to 53 of the convention, punishments were to be
humane. The moa severe disciplinary punishment which could be Micted on a prisoner
was solitary confinement. As article 54 stipdated: "The duration of any single
punishment shall not exceed thirty days...Where, during the course or after the
termination of a penod of imprisonment, a prisoner is sentenced to a £iesh disciplinary
penalty, a penod of at least three days shall intervene between each of the periods of
imprisonment, if one of such penods is of ten days or over." The condition of prisonen
inside detention cells was governed by articles 55 to 59 of the Genevo Convention. As it
was stated, facilities were to be kept in a constant state of cleanliness. Furthemore.
prisoners were to be given at least two hours per day for outdoor activities and provided
with the opportunity to read and write. Never were pnsonen to be sent outside of the
camps to serve their disciplinary sentences. As article 56 of the document indicated: "in
no case shall prisoners of war be transferred to penitentiary establishments (prisons,
penitentiaries, convict establishments. etc.) in order to undergo disciplinary sentences
there."'
l6
To conforxn with the provisions of the Geneva Convention. each Canadian
intemment camp was provided with a specific number of detenrion cells. Any prisoner
committing an offense was liable to be impnsoned in such facilities. As regdations
stipulated: "Any prisoner of war guilty of disobedience to orden or of any act prejudicial
to the safety. good order or discipline of the camp will be liable to punishment.""7 The
maximum sentence a prisoner could receive was 28 days detention. This was usually
given for attempted escapes, thefi. illicit activities and smuggling messages. When
prisoners disobeyed orden; when absent during inspections; when insolent; or when
committing acts of aggression. they were usually sentenced to 21 days detention. Any
inmate involved in the destruction of property was given 14 days detention. As for
prisoners convicted for minor infractions, punishrnents included confinement to quarters
for periods not exceeding 14 days and the issue of extra fatigue duties. This applied for
fighting, disobedience of orders, insubordination and refusal to work. It is important to
note that disciplinary sentences could only be awarded by Canadian oficers vested with
disciplinary powers such as camp commandants and the responsible officers acting as
their substitutes. Furthemore, when cases proved too complicated for camp authonties,
they were usually submitted to the district's commanding ~fficer.~"
In the early days of southem Quebec's intemment operatioos, camp authorities
were somewhat uncornfortable when awarding sentences to specific prisonen because
they had no idea how the inmates would react as a whole. As a result, they only gave
intemees short sentences. Despite this leniency, the authonties undemood the necessity of
showing the prisoners that they were in charge. As Camp Île-aux-~oix, authorities
claimed when arresting their first inmate on July 2 1, 1940: "This will have a very salutary
eEect on many of the others and it is obvious that the pnsoners need some considerable
training and discipline." They M e r stated on August 2, 1940: "It is necessary to
maintain a high degree of discipline among the prisoners and even the smallest infraction
of regulations must be immediately ~hecked.""~This explains why so many intemees
were arrested for rninor infiactions in the first months of internment in southem Quebec.
For instance. 37 of the 40 intemees disciplined by southem Quebec camp authorities
between July 1940 and Mach 1941 were awarded sentences of less than 10 days'
detention.''O
The main problem with the civilian intemees was their lack of discipline. Because
most had never served in the military. such intemees had a hard tirne adapting to the
regimentation and control of life behind barbed wires. This can explain why so many
cases of insubordination and refusal to obey orden occurred during the civilian phase of
intemment. On the other hand. pnor militaq training helped prisoners of war have a
better integration into camp life. Their respect for authorities and understanding of
discipline made them in some respects better inmates. However. as Table 2 suggested.
they were more prone than civilians towards trying to escape.'?'
Since some prisoners adopted criminal behavior. judicial proceedings had to be
initiated. This was done in confomity with the Geneva Convention. In such cases. the
Canadian authorities had the right to court martial offenders. This was usually done in the
case of such crimes as murder. mutiny and offenses against Canadian personnel. Canadian
regulations specified that "military courts shall have power to try any prisoners of war
upon any such charges as may be preferred before them for any offence which if
committed in Canada by a person amenable to Canadian law, would be triable before a
civil court of criminal juridiction, or for any act, conduct, disorder. or neglect prejudicial
to the safety or well-king of His Majesty's Dominions, armed forces or subjects, or to the
d e custody, control or well-king of any prisoner of war, or to good order and discipline
among prisoners of war." On conviction by a military cou* punishment could usually be
awarded according to the following d e : (1) death; (2) pend s e ~ t u d for
e iife or for any
term not less than three years; (3) impisonrnent, with or without hard labour, for any term
not exceeding two years; (4) detention for any term not exceeding two years; and (5) field
punishment for any period not exceeding three months. in al1 cases, pnsoners could be
sent to local prisons to serve their terms. However, none of these sentences could be
carried into effect until they had been confirmed by the Govemor-General-in-Councilor
the Minister of National Defence in accordance with the prisonen' protecting power.'2'
In southem Quebec. judicial hearings were very rare. It seems that the only one took place
at Camp Sherbrooke on April 3, 1945, when a pnsoner of war was tried by a District
Court Martial for "steding property belonging to a person subject to military law." The
fact was that this prisoner had stolen the watch of one of the Canadian guards. The
prisoner was eventually sentenced to 90 days imprisonment without hard labour at the
Bordeaux prison in Montreal. lZ3
However. the threat of disciplinary action did not always control troublesome
ideological motives arnong the prisoners. This created problems for southem Quebec
authorities. The major factor. it seerns. denved fiom strong political opinions arnong the
inmates. In fact. most of the Geman intemee populations held by Allied powers were
divided along ideological lines. Some pnsoners were Nazis while other were anti-Nazis
and in some cases. Communists. This situation created friction which often Ied to
violence. As a result. the detaining powen were forced to segregate the prisoners along
political and ideological lines. This was no easy task for there was almost no way of
knowing exactly what was going in a penon's mhd.
During southem Quebec's civilian phase of internment, the main concern for the
Canadian authorities was the presence of Comrnunist elements. The fear was that
Comrnunist ideologies might entice intemees to consolidate themselves againfi camp
authorities and initiate intemal disturbances. As Eric Koch explained in Deemed Suspect:
"...Cornrnunists were in the forefiont of those making demauds, for recognition of the
refugee stanis, against the use of prisoner of war stationery, against sites unfit for human
habitation, against mail delays...and so on. Cornmunists were activists and trouble-
makers." Furthemore, most western powers, includïng Canada, were staunchly opposed to
Cornmunism, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was fighting on their side against Nazi
Germany. The doctrine was perceived by many as a "social disease" that had to be
annihilated. When Camp Famham authorities learned in May 1941 that close to 45% of
their
inmates
were
Communist
sympathizers.
they
responded
by
stating:
"Communists.. .declare that they are "social thinking people" but their social thinking i s
similar to the attitude the Nazis take regarding their new "Social Order in ~ u r o ~ e . This
"'~~
can explain why the Camp Farnham authonties wrote in September 1941:
...the Cornmunists in this camp have become most active and vocal. Their
activities fiom an administrative standpoint are of coune most troublesome
and tiresorne ...The leaders of this group are doing their best to spread the
gospel of communisrn.. .in a recent election held in this camp some two
weeks ago. cornmunists or communist sympathzen were selected for most
of the posts. This means that they are now in a position to exen a
considerable amount of influence over the life of the compound ...This
Comrnunist element in the camp will have to be dealt with and more
important still it will have to be watched.. .lt is therefore in its larger aspect
a problem of considerable importance as it has a bearing on the present and
cenainly the funire.'"
Although Communkm was perceived as an ideologicd threat. its supporters rarely
resoned to violence. However, this situation changed with the advent of the prisoner of
war phase. At that time. the main problem for the Canadian authorities was to counter
Nazi dominance. Nazi prisoners oflen terrorized other inrnates in order to neutralize anti-
Nazis and ensure that no one cooperated with the Canadian authonties. On numerous
occasions. Nazis spied on new intemees, threatened fellow prisonen. and beat-up anti-
Nazis. Nazis often gathered impressive arsenals of clubs, knives and other weapons.
Sometimes they held Kangaroo Courts, where fellow inmates were judged on charges of
"treason" for having cooperated with the camp authorities and for openly admitting that
" ' ~ ~ aiso "waged
they were anti-Nazis. Prisoners began talking of "Camp ~ e s t a ~ o s .Nazis
symbolic war" by defjing and taunting the Canadian authorities. They would do so by
singing Nazi marching songs. waving Nazi regalia such as home made swastika bannen
and using the Nazi salute both among themselves and when confronting Canadian
offieers. The celebration of Nazi holidays, including Hitler's birthday, were also held to
provoke camp staffs.
'"
The entue situation demonstrated that Nazis and anti-Nazis had to be segregated.
A system of classification had to be introduced by the Canadian authorities. With this in
mind a Psychological Warfare Cornmittee was created in 1943 to handle the issue of
pnsoners of war segregation and re-education (as will be detailed in chapter 4). In 1944. a
system of classification known as PHERUDA, was introduced by the Psychological
Warfare Cornmittee to segregate Nazis fiom anti-Nazis. To confonn with this new
scheme, pnsoners were interrogated by Camp Intelligence Onicen and classed in three
categones: Black (Nazis), Grey (no strong political interests or convictions) and White
(anti-Nazis). Each letter of the term PHERUDA referred to the fint capital letter of the
areas in which pnsoners were to be interrogated. These categones considered the inmates'
(1) POLITICAL leanings (from democrat to rabid Nazi): (2) attitudes toward HITLER
(from anti-Hitler to fanatically pro-Hitler); (3) level of EDUCATION (from university to
minimum): (4) RELIGION (fiom devout Protestant or Catholic to neo-pagan): (5)
USEFULNESS in ternis of labour (fiom willing to cooperate and skilled to refuse
to
work): (6) DEPENDABILITY (from known dependable to undependable): and (7)
attitudes towards the ALLIES (from pro-Allied to anti-Allied). Fwther. each PHERUDA
file came with an Interrogation Report which included five sets of questions covering
personal details of the internee's life. such as his general background (education, work.
and home life): prisoner of war history (attitudes, work record and camps where he had
been detained); political history (how politically oriented he was in Germany); military
history (attitudes, units in which he served, and on which fronts he fought); camp
information; and the examiner's remarks (personaiity, tnithfulness, reliability). By
combining PHERUDA files with interrogation Reports, intelligence Onicers were able to
segregate inmates in one of the three color ~ a t e ~ o r i e s . " ~
The Canadian governrnent's new color system of classification enabled camp
authorities to completeiy reorganize the Canadian internent operation dong the political
ideals of the internees. In that sense, the introduction of PHERUDA meant a tadical
transformation. in southern Quebec, it meant that camps were to specialize in the
incarceration of cenain types of prisonen. For instance, Sherbrooke and Famham were
Gray camps, Grande Ligne was an institution for Blacks and Sorel was a White camp.
However, PHERUDA classification was no easy task, for each war prisoner had to be
interrogated. According to historian Bill Waiser: "The process was so incredibly slow that
by war's end, aimost two-thirds of the Gennan prisoners held in Canada had yet to be
classified." By late September 1945, only 9,172 inmates had been classified by
PHERUDA teams out of a total population of some 34,000 prisoners of war.IZg
As such. despite the introduction of the PHERUDA classification system, Nazi
elements continued to infiltrate the camps. Such was the problem at Sherbrooke in
December 1944 where the arriva1 of 63 prisonen from Camp Monteith created a reign of
terror. The problem was that many Nazis were among the newcomers. This Ied to much
unrest on the part of the inmates. Rumors were that the Nazis were planning hangings.
beatings and other forms of bnitality. Two Nazi prisoners were even overheard saying:
"We have hung some at Monteith. let's erect a gallows here." It seemed that the aim of
these troublemakers was to deliberately create fear among the other prisoners. As a result.
numerous intemees began approaching the camp authorities for protective custody or for
transfer to the anti-Nazi camp they believed to be in existence. Some of them even made
applications for the Pioneer corps."'
By February 1945, the problem had become so
tense that camp authorities began taiking about a "war of nerves inside the enclosure."
Prisonen threatened by Nazis were ofien psychologically tense as they feared for their
lives; finding a rope noose in one's own bed as a death warrant was extremely
traurnatizing. So intense were these pressures that according to the camp's Intelligence
Officer. one prisoner even "broke down and wept while telling his story to the camp
~ornmandant."'~~
The Sherbrooke "Reign of Tenor" only came to an end on Mach 26,
1945 when 49 Nazi trouble makea were transferred to Camp M ~ n t e i t h . ' ~ ~
Nazi military training was another problem in southem Quebec camps. The focus
behind such a project was to secretly prepare German prisoner of war officen for
participation in future Nazi wars. Although such training offered no direct threat to the
security of intemment camps, it kept the spint of Nazism and militarism dive among
inmates. One such rnilitary training initiative was introduced at Camp Famharn. There,
Black prisoners working in the POW orderly rwm began a census of al1 Nazi oficers
incarcerated in the camp. Initiated on October 15, 1944, this census took the fomi of a
"Card-Index System." Each card represented an individual and indicated his rank; date of
enay into the German a m y ; date of last promotion; miiitary position last held; number of
years in the field; number of service years at home; date of capture; formation or military
unit: military district; and whether he was a regular soldier or a reservist. The purpose for
collecting this h d of data "is to build up an underground movernent and to re-educate
the officers for the next war." 0nicers.fiom al1 branches of the military were given secret
classes connected with their hiture in the German general staff. Lectures comprised such
topics as military science, intelligence, map reading and comrnanding troops in the field.
The purpose for these lectures was to counter the fact that a nurnber of officers were
loosing their enthusiasm for Nazism. A secret lecture room was established in one of the
camp's huts and ail oficen were grouped in the sarne quarters. The reason for keeping
candidates together was to create cohesion and ensure that senior ofkers had total
control. Nevertheless. despite the secrecy. camp authonties learned of this rnilitay
training program in December 1944 fiom a White prisoner.'33
Nazis were very organized. especially at "Black" camps like Grande Ligne. The
camp had been constructed to house German pnsoner of war oficers. Canadian
authorities believed that Camp Grande Ligne was bound to expenence more Nazi
activities than any other southem Quebec camps. They were nght. in the sumrner and
early autumn of 1944. camp authonties leamed how organized and aggressive the camp's
Nazi officers reaily were, for they had created their own intelligence section, propaganda
section. escape cornmittee and Gestapo section.'" This organization on the part of the
prisoners was a major threat for the security of the camp and the local area. With such a
system. there was always the possibility that escapees might be used to collect data or
even to commit acts of sabotage. indeed, it became known that one of the campsT
escapees had carried out a reconnaissance of the Dorval airport in Montreal and reporied
back to the prisonen' intelligence section upon his retum. As the authorities indicated in
October 1944: 'The fact that they have an intelligence section which has obtained a m a s
of information on railroads, bridges and airports in the Montreal area and upper New
York State has k e n known for some ti~ne.""~
Although camp authonties knew of such
organization and actions, they did not understand the prisoners' real purpose for such a
system.
The answer came in October 1944, when the camp authorities leamed that the
prisoners had created an organization called the Hari-kiri Club. Based on the old Geman
Goetierdiimmerung (Twilight of the Gods) myth whereby the gods killed each other off in
a final orgy of violence, the Hari-kiri Club proposed that the camp's Nazi prisoners revoit
in a desperate act of bravado as soon as they regarded the war as absolutely lost. The Harikiri Club was to initiate the action by killing al1 the bbcowards"among the inmates as well
as the entire camp staff. including the camp commandant and the intelligence oficer.
Camp authorities learned of this club's existence on October 3, 1944. through a secret
message given by internee George Felber, the camp's Roman Catholic priest. The fact
was that Felber feared for his life, for he and his followers had been persecuted for many
months by anti-Christian Nazi elements. According to Felber. the Hari-Kin Club had to
be dissolved and this "must be done with extreme care and skill, because otherwise the
Hari-Kin Club would begin the amck." He then gave the authorities a list of the
ringleaders and other dangerous prisoners. lt included some 100 names.13'
To confimi the authenticity of Felber's story, a White officer named Alois Frank
was interrogated on October 12, 1944. while in Montreal for an eye treatrnent. A staunch
anti-Nazi. Frank gave the authorities a detailed account of the Hari-Kin Club's aims. As
he indicated: "The purpose of the club is to do as much darnage and sabotage as possible.
The organization is aware that they will be fired upon by soldiers and that there will be a
number of innocent people killed, but some will get out of the wire and proceed to the
nearest plants and industrial areas in order to commit sabotage although they do expect to
be killed in the act." He even indicated some of the prisoners's targets, notably the
munition dumps at l'Acadie situated some six miles 6om Grande Ligne and the St. Jean
airport located some five miles from the camp and where a great number of military
planes were concentntted. He M e r stated that the prisoners were operating a secret
radio through which they could receive signals fiom Germany. This meant that the
inmates would be able to know the exact date of G e m y ' s capitulation and at this point
initiate their own ~otterdirnrnerun~.~~'
nie Hari-Kiri Club scheme was taken very senously by the Canadian authorities.
Knowing for several months that the prisoners' Intelligence Section had collected
information on specific objectives withh the area fiom recaptured prisoners of war, the
authorities feared that the HariXiri Club might use these sites as targets for their eventuai
a t t a ~ k . 'On
~ ~ October 17, 1944, the Department of National Defence's Directorate of
Military intelligence came to the conclusion that such a mass suicide effort was quite
possible. They also admitted that should it occur, " a considerable number of German
prisoners of war officers will be shot with perhaps unfortunate repercussions on our own
POW in Gemany; some of the camp staff will be killed; and some of the Nazis will
succeed in breaking out and in reaching wlnerable objectives such as the Dorval and St.
Hubert air fields." As a result it was "suggested that because of this threat and the
proximity of Grande Ligne to Montreal, it might be better if Grande Linge not be made a
black officer camp."'39 This decision was supported by the camp authonties. who
requested the transfer of the Hari-Kiri Club leaders to a new Black camp. By doing so. the
belief was that this would neuuaiize the Hari-Kin ~ l u b . ' ~ '
The imminent threat imposed by the Hari-Kin Club also led to an imrnediate
strengîhening of Camp Grande Ligne secunty system. So fearful were Canadian authorities
that Colonel C.P. Lavigne (NAdjutant-General, Directorate Veteran's Guard of Canada).
in cooperation with Major Fainveather. (Internent Operation officer at Military District
4) suggested a most impressive "order of battle" to defend the camp from the Hari-Kin
Club. Among the items requested were one armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) and one
-
Universal Carrier which was a small tracked axmoured vehicle used for general purposes.
As is was stated. "the AFV could be used inside the camp's enclosure while the Universal
camer would be usehl to follow escapees over fields." It was also suggested that Camp
Grande Ligne be provided with six additionai heavy machine guns, seven portable radios,
a supply of tear gas. grenades and a good quantity of "parachute flares and pistols grip
lights" to be used in the advent of an elecbical breakdown. Further, the camp's guard
companies were to be equipped with U.S. style steel helmets '90 af5ord greater protection
against clubs. Stones, etc."14'
In the end, Colonel J.M. Taylor (Director VeteranTsGuard of Canada) refused
most of the items recommended in Colonel C.P. Lavigne's memorandum. As he stated:
*It is respectfully suggested that the POW personnel of this camp remain as at present,
and in addition to, or in place of Vickers guns...which the V.G.C.are not trained in the
use of, that sufficient Reising guns be made available to place two in each tower instead
of one as at present. That tear gas be not suppiied, but instead fue hose might be used to
rout the POW out of buildings. That an adequate supply of flash and pistol grip lights be
kept on hand; and that a supply of wood clubs. Say fiom 2 to 2% feet in length. be on hand
for close combat skirmishing, inside buildings. where it is not possible to use
bayonets.""" It seems that Colonel Taylor did not perceive the Hari-Kiri Club with the
same feu. He even opposed the transfer of Hari-Kiri Club leaders to a new Black camp.
As he srated: "The question of establishing a black camp for oficer prisoners of war is
one that should not be [done] hastily.. .Up to the present. attempts towards segregation
have accomplished little of a constructive nature and have added substantially to the
confusion and unrest arnongst POW.""~
Although urgent requests to segregate the compound were issued by numerous
regional officers. higher authonties remained hesitant. The main reason was that no one
understood if prisonen of war in other camps knew of the Hari-firi Club or if similar
Nazi organizations had been established in other internment centres. There was the dual
possibility that transferring Hari-Kiri Club leaden might initiate the suicide process at
Grande Ligne and trigger the rise of similar groups in other camps.'" Nevertheless. this
situation changed on December 1, 1944. when Major-General E.J. Renaud (District
Oficer Commanding Military District 4) urgently recommended that the Depariment of
National Defence move dl Black prisoners out of the district. He M e r indicated that a
camp other than Grande Ligne should be choxn to house Black inrnates. His main
reasons were that Camp Grande Ligne was located in an area where the density of the
civilian population was quite high and that it was too close to Montreal where there were
a considerable number of factories working for the war effort. The proximity of the camp
to vital power plants such as Beauhamois. Cèdres, Black River and even Shawinigan; to
important airports such as those located at St. Jean, St. Hubert. and Dorval; and to the
ammunition dumps located at L'Acadie and Delson was also problematic. As a resuit, it
was decided on December 2, 1944, that Grande Ligne no longer be used as a Black camp.
Al1 pnsonen were to be trawferred to a new Black Camp located at Wainwright
(Alberta). However, because work was still in progress at Wainwright, the transfer of
Grande Ligne's Black prisonen had to wait. In the meantirne, it was proposed to add an
additional barbed wire entanglement to Camp Grande Ligne and reinforce other aspects of
the camp's defence. lA5
More troops were posted at Grande Ligne with additional firearms. Machine gun
posts were established at strategic points around the camp with weapons facing in and
guard towers were reinforced. Arrangements were also made with No.9 Air Observation
School at St. Jean for military aircrafts and with the Vrterans' Guard of Canada Training
Centre located at Camp Farnharn for three platoons to act as a reserve force. These men
were to be mobilized in the advent of any escapes to form a "recapture screen" around the
camp. These units were also to protect al1 bridges and railway stations in the vicinity and
intercept al1 civilian t r a c on nearby roads. To ensure that the Canadian authorities
benefited fiom a proper communication system in case prisoners cut telephone lines. radio
transmitting and receiving equipment was installed at the camp. To assure the proper
protection of the region's civilian population. a temporary headquarters with barracks.
comrnonly referred to as "Bleak House," was established by Military District 4 one mile
away fiom Grande Ligne. Based at this headquarten were two well trained platoons. In
order to facilitate communication with locals, al1 troops detailed for the protection of
civilians were to be French-speaking. Arrangements were also made with Quebec Hydro
for the armed protection of the Beauharnois and Cédres elecaic power plants. Further, in
case of escape, al1 fieight nains passîng within the area and heading towards Montreal
were to be exarnined by soldiers and the Chiefs of the Canadian National Railway (CNR)
and Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) investigation bureaus.
'
"
Black prisoners were evennially transferred to Camp Seebe in Alberta instead of
Camp Wainwright on February 6, 1945. In order not to agitate the prisoners and face a
possible Hari-KVi Club attack, the move was kept a secret. As a result of this surprise
move, the Hari-Kin Club threat faded away. Overall, sorne 236 inmates were transferred
nom Grande Ligne.
147
Despite the lessons learned from the Hari-Kki Club experience, Nazi elements
continued to flourish in the camps of southem Quebec. Although support for Nazism was
weakened when Germany unconditionaily surrendered to the Allies on May 8. 1945,
"Black" power remained an important force. This was a problematic issue, especially
since the Canadian govemment was in the midst of re-educating its war prisoners. This
was the case of Camp Grande Ligne where camp authorities pleaded in June 1945 for the
transfer of Black pnsoners because they were a "stubborn hindrance to the efforts of
cooperation which were made by the camp spokesman." The problem with the presence
of Nazi elements was that it had a retarding effect on the development of White attitudes.
The situation worsened in July when rnany Whites were transferred to Camp Sorel in
order to work for the Allied Control Commission. As one report stated: "There is now not
enough counter-pressure to keep the Blacks in check. This situation tends to endanger the
success of the policies of re-education that have been laid down by high authority." The
culminating point of this issue occurred on August 7, 1945. when Blacks prisoners
spokesman. in fact, the latter was "perceived as a traitor and collaborator whose removal
by murder was desirable." The problem with that stnke was that 90% of the camp's
strength participated in it. Although the strike ended when camp authorities intervened.
the situation demonstrated the considerable power that hard-core Nazis prisonen still
held. lJ8
Therefore. psychological strains were a source of constant wony in the camps of
southem Quebec. Although intemees were given numerous oppomuiities to pursue
recreational activities, the pressures hposed by years of internent could not be
eradicated. In fact, restricted mobility, sexual deprivation, social alienation and the
privation of material cornforts were al1 factors which influenced the morde of prisoners
and which created severe psychological strains. In order to express their discontent,
dissension began to emerge b i d e the camps of muthem Quebec. This resulted into
strikes, nots, illicit activities and escape attempts. As a consequence, camp authorities
were forced to apply discipline by punishing the perpetraton. The main problem had to do
with the prisoners' political thoughts. In fact, both Communism and Nazism prospered
inside the camps and had to be controlled by the Canadian authorities. Despite the
introduction of the PHERUDA system of prisoner of war classification and intense
censorship, such contrasting ideologies pe~isted.Because violence was sometimes used
by Communists and Nazis in order to convert fellow inmates, camp authonties found
themselves in a constant state of den. Such was certainly the case with the rise of the
Hari-Kin Club at Camp Grande Ligne. Hoping to minimite the consequences of
psychological strains. the Canadian governrnent introduced two schemes whereby
internees could be used for specific tasks. First, prisoners were given the opponunity to
participate in camp labour projects. The belief was that working prisoners had less time to
on their hands
!O
plot against camp authorities. Second, the introduction of educational
p r o p m s was done to modiQ the minds of the prisoners. Captives were bombarded with
information about democracy in Canada and the rest of the British Commonwealth. '4s
will be discussed in the next two chapters. labour projects and educational program kept
the intemees occupied and in many cases opened their minds to new ideologies.
'
3
5
6
9
10
II
"
13
'
15
'O
17
18
19
20
''
Canada, Red Cross and Prisonen.. .,pp. 104-105.
Canada, Reaulations.. p. 5.; Draper, "The Accidental irnrnigants.. .Part 2," p. 88.
NAC, DM), 10, RG-24,Vol. 15,399, Volume 3 (September 1940). War D i a v of Intemment
Camp Y" (No. 41). Fort Lennox, ileilux-NOU, September 14, 1940. pp. 5-6.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 9 (June 1941), Wur D i v of lnternment Camp
"Y" (No. 42). Newing~onlSherbrooke,L June 9. 1941. p. 2.
Canada, Reaulations.. ., p. 5.
Mario Duliani, La Ville Sans Femmes (Montreal: Société des Éditions Pascal, 1945). pp. 4849.
Canada, Regulations.. .,p. 5.
Canada, Red Cmss and Prisonen.. . pp. 120-1 23.
Switzerland also supervised exchanps of prisoners of war between Canada and Gemany. On
one such case. Swiss delegates contributed to the release of an old German soldier from Camp
Sherbrooke in March 1945. This intemee, who had served in the German military in both
worid wan, had already spent ten yean of his life in inteniment. When notified about this
case. the Consulate General of Switzerland in Canada decided to pressure the Canadian
Department of National Defence into including this inmate in the next exchange of intemees
between Canada and Gemany. See Canada Orders and Instructions. Internment Camp
(Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1945). p. 62.: Draper. "The Accidental
lmmigranB...Part 1 2 . pp. 25-26.: NAC, DND. 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5413. File: HQS 723691-4-49,. Cornploints by PM Camp Sherbrooke. 1943-1945, "The Consul General of
Switzerland to Prisoner of War Hans Knups," March 6, 1945.
Canada. Red Cross and Prisoners.. .,pp. 1 1 8- 1 19.
Jonathan F. Vance. Tanadian Relief Agencies and Prisoners of War. 1939-45". Journal of
Canadian Studies, Vol. 3 1, No. 2 (Summer 1W6), pp. 133- 147.
Buffinga p. 57.: Melady, pp. 5 1-52.
Draper. "The Accidental Immigrants.. .Part 1...", pp. 25-26.
NAC. DND. 10. RG-24. Red: C-5416. File: HQS 7236-94-6-40. Intelligence Reports. Camp
Famiron. 1943-1946. "March 1943 Intelligence Summary", April 1, 1943.
NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.399. Volume 6 (March 194l), W m Dimy of Internment
Cun~p"N" No. 42). Nwingfon (Sherbrooke), March 5, 1941, p. 1 .
Canada Red Cross and Prisonen.. ., pp. 92-93.
Vance. Obiects.. .,p. 131.
NAC. FHTC. EK. MG-30,C 191, Vol. 3. "Interview of Colonel Eric Kippen by Hany Rasky
(CBC) in Como (Quebec)," ( 1980'sI ,p. 8-7.
Buffinga, p. 57.
Canada Orders and Instructions..., p. 60.; NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 5
(Febniary 1941). W m Dimy of Internent Camp "N" N o . 42). Newingîon (Sherbrooke).
"Camp Standing Orders for internees," March 5, 1941, Appendix "A"
As the Gemans indicated: "Following an enquiry canied out in war prisonen' camps in
Gemany, it is stated that the British prisoners of war held in Gemany receive within
reasonable time a regular and considerable flow of parcels, partly through the British Red
Cross and partly through other channels. The sarne certitude does not seem to exist s o far for
..
.
the numerous panels addressed to German prisoners in Great Brîtain and Canada....The
German authorities would attach great i m p o ~ c eto having the senior officers and the
spokesmen of camps housing Gerrnans in Canada...to fil1 in the enclosed form every
month ...The Ernbassy of the United States of Amerka, in its capacity of representative of the
protecting power for British prisoners in Gemany, is carrying out a similar enquiry in the
English camps in Gemany and the Geman High Cornrnand has given its agreement." See
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5376, File: HQS 7236-1-1 1, Parceis. Letlers to ExtemaI
Affairs, IRC, and Swiss Consul. 1942-1946. "Consulate General of Switzerland in Canada to
Depanment of External Affairs." August 8. 1941.
NAC, DND, 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5376. File: HQS 7236-1-1 1. Pmcek Letfers ta fitemal
Affirs, I K and Swiss Consui. 1942-1946. "Under-Secretary of State for External Anairs to
lntemment Operations." August 23, 194[ .
NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5376. File: HQS 7236-1-1 1. Parcels, Leuers 20 Erternai
.4#airs, IRC, and Swiss Consul. 1912-19-16, "Colonel H. Stethem (Commissioner of
Internment Operations) to the Camp Commandants." August 26. 194 1.; NAC, DND. 10. RG24. Reel: C-5376. File: HQS 7236-1-1 1. Parcels, Letfers ro Exferna!Affairs, IRC. and Swiss
Consuf, 1942-1916, "Lt.-Col. E.H.Minns (A/Commissioner of Internment Operations) to the
Camp Commandants." October 9. 1941.
NAC. DND. IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5376. File: HQS 7236-1 -1 1, Parcels, Letters to Exremal
Affuirs, IRC, und Swiss Consul. 1942-1946. "instructions for Completing F o n 1.0. 32
[Monthly Retum Fom of Parcels Received in Camps]
[n.d.] .: NAC. DND. 10. RG-24.
Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 l391-30. Camp Intelligence. Camp Famham, 1944-f 946.
"February 1946 Interpreter8sRepon". January 3 1. i 946.
NAC. FHTC. EK. MG-30.C 192. Vol. 3. "Interview of Emii Fackenheim by Hamy Rasky
(CBC) in Toronto". [1980's]. p. 43.: NAC. DND. 10. RG-14. Vol. 15,399. Volume 3
(Decem ber 1 940). War Diof litternment Camp "N " 6%. 42). Newington lsherbrooke).
December 13. 1940. p. 3.: NAC. DND, 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5403. File: HQS 7236-83-7-40,
IRC Correspondence. Cump Fumham 1943- 19.14. "Colonel Jay (Camp Spokesman ) to the
Ladies of the Red Cross of Argentina in Buenos Aires." February 25. 1945.: NAC. DND. 10.
RG-24. Reel: C-5416. File: HQS 7236-94-6-42. Intelligence Reports, Camp Sherbrooke,
I943-19N~"November 1944 Intelligence Report," November 1944.: NAC. DND. 10. RG-24.
Reel: C-5375, File: HQS 7236-1 -1 1-42. Porcels. Letters to ExtemaI ADirs. IRC. and Swiss
Consul, 1942-1946, "Staternent of Parcels Received at Camp Sherbrooke." October 1945 to
January 1946.
Draper, "The Accidental Immigrants.. .Pan 3." p. 90.
Jean Cazeneuve. Essai sur la psvcholoaie du misonnier de guerre (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1945). p. Vil.
Ibid.. pp. 15- 16, 18.
As Jean Cazeneuve indicated: "Un être qui ne jugerait pas ou qui n'aurait pas d'éléments de
comparaisons n'en souffrirait pas et ne parlerait même pas de privation. Un prisonnier sur la
paillasse regrette son lit de plumes, mais il est probable que les indigènes de I'Afnque noire
sont très heureux dans de tel conditions. De même, on est malheureux quand une panne
d'élecmcité vient gicher une soirée. Mais nos ancêtres qui s'éclairaient au suif pouvaient-ils
se sentir privés d'un luxe qu'ils ne prévoyaient même pas?" See Cazeneuve, p. 20.
As Jean Cazeneuve stated: "C'est pourquoi chez ceux qui s'obstinent a maintenir l'importance
des biens matériels perdus, la douleur peut s'aviver par un phenornene d'exaspération ou
d'obsession intellectuelle," See Cazeneuve, DD. 22-23.
."
.
31
32
33
El
35
36
NAC, FHTC, EKTMG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "htenriew of John Newmark by Harry Rasky (CBC)
in Montreal," [1980's], pp. 11-12 - 11-13.
As Cazeneuve explained: "Pour tout prisonnier, la chose est bien certaine: on pourrait mettre
dans l'enceinte du camp tous les biens, toutes les délices qu'il aimerait, le fait même de rester
emprisonné lui pèserait." See Cazeneuve, pp. 33-35.
Koch, p. 143.
NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Ernest Guter by Harry Rashy (CBC)
in Dorval (Quebec)," [ 1980'sJ ,pp. 34- 12 - 34- 13.
As one Sherbrooke prisoner indicated: "...the worse thing about any prison situation is you
don't know when you corne out. At least if you're a convict you know you've got a fmed term.
If you're a prisoner of war...y ou don3 know when you're coming out." See NAC, FHTC, EK,
MG-30, C 192. Vol. 3, "Interview of Klaus Scheye by Hany Rasky (CBC) in New York"
[ 1980's ] , p. 30-6.
As one Sherbrooke pnsoner of war stated: "One slowly declines here morally. One has days
that one would like to take one's own life. Nobody can imagine what it means to be five years
behind barbed wires." On February 26, 1943, one Farnham prisoner attempted suicide. As
camp authorities indicated: "One POW officer missing off the evening count was found in an
unconscious condition in a bath with a cut on wrist in the officers' recreation room with the
door locked. He apparently tried to commit suicide." See NAC, DND, IO. RG-24, Vol.
15,398. Volume 29 (February 1943). War Diary aflnternment Camp 'O.4 (Na. 40). Farnham,
Februay 26, 1943 and February 27. 1943, pp. 8-9.: NAC, DND, IO. RG-24. Reel: C-54 16.
File: 7236-94-643. Intelligence Reports. Camp Sherbrooke, 1943- 1946. "October 1944
Intelligence Report." November 1. 1944.
NAC. DND, 10, RG-34, Vol. 15.399, Volume 3 (September 1940). War Di- of Internrnent
Camp Y" N o . J I ) . Fort Lennox, le-aux-~oix. September 14. 1940. pp. 5-6.
As Jean Cazeneuve indicated: "Les plaisirs devenus impossible envahissent la méditation. les
rêveries. accaparent les conversations. N'est-ce pas la le pur instinct sexuel qui. ne trouvant
plus ses moyens d'expressions physique. se déguise et revët la forme de la réflexion
intellectuelle pour reconquérir ses droits." See Cazeneuve. pp. 39-4 1.
Duliani. pp. 205-206.
bid., p. 2 19.
As one Grande Ligne prisoner of war recalled: "Nous avions la permission de cultiver un petit
jardin à t'extérieur de notre camp. ..Unjour, l'un de nous trouve une enveloppe au beau milieu
de notre jardin. A I'intérÎeur. une feuille blanche sur laquelle e n inscrit: *Jem'appelle Mimi.
je ne suis pas une enemie.' Imaginez le succès qu'eut cette lettre...Pendant plusieurs
semaines, tout le monde voulut aller au jardin espérant y trouver d'autres messages de Mimi.
Malheureusement, nous n'avons jamais eu d'autres lettres. Malgré tout, cela nous permit de
nous accrocher à un fol espoir. .." See Bernard and Bergeron. p. 292.; NAC, FHTC. EK, MG30. C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Mrs. Ann Cowan by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Toronto
(Ontario)," [ 198OYs], pp. 1 1- 14.
Cazeneuve, pp. 45-50
As Mario Duliani explained: "Celui qui a une maîtresse ou une femme et vit ici pendant
longtemps a l'impression que le Mur de l'Éloignement devient peu à peu le Mur de l'Oubli. Et
il lui faut une grande force pour se défendre contre le découragement." See Duliani, p. 209.
According to internee John Newmark, "...when you're in prison as we were, with no sex, food
M e s place instead of sex. To the extent that I've seen grown men with knives going at each
other for a bigger steak." See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of John
Nemark by Hany Rasky (CBC) in Montreal," [ 198OYs],p. 1 1 1.
"
y
38
39
-10
JI
'
53
44
-
4s
JO
47
49
!O
"
"
Prisoners were sometimes given the opportunity to meet women. As Eric Koch indicated: "If
you were a favorite of the Sergeant Major, you were sometimes allowed to go alang on the
garbage truck to the city dump.. .it was a treat to see downtown Sherbrooke. The truck driver
was a nice man, and on at least one occasion he took the favorite to the entrance of the local
whorehouse, put three dollars in his hand and said, 'Go in. have a good time. 1'11 pick you up
in half an hour.'" See Koch, p. 137.
NAC, FHTC. EK,MG-30,C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Josef Kates by Hamy Ras@ (CBC) in
Toronto." f 1980's], pp. 1-2 and 2 1-22.
Koch. pp. 157-159.: Melady, p. 60.; NAC, FHTC. EK. MG-30. C 192, Vol. 3. "Interview of
Gerry Waldston by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Willowdale (Ontario)," [ 1980'sI ,p. 22.
As Jean Cazeneuve indicated: "La rupture de tous ces liens est évidemment cause de
boulvenement intérieurs très importants. Elle se traduit par un sentiment de regret, de tristesse
et une impression de dépaysement. Cet arrachement sign itie la cessation complète d'habitude
ancrées depuis longtemps chez tous homme." See Cazeneuve. p. 55.
According to Cazeneuve: "Le déracinement. c'est la souffhnce accrue du prisonnier quand il
s'aperçoit que la vie là-bas, dans son pays. a repris sans lui. quand il constate en lisant les
journeaux ou certaines lettres. que la société se passe aisément de lui. que ce vide créé par son
absence a été comblé dans l'entrecroisement des fibres sociales. comme une plaie se referme
par la croissance des tissus. Sa place dans sa profession a été occupée par un autre ...Il semble
pour l'exilé que cet oubli de son absence e n une sorte de mon pour lui." See Cazeneuve. pp.
57-58.
Canada Red Cross and Prisoners.. .. pp. 88-89.: Eastem Townships Research Centre [ETRC].
Eastern Townships Collection [ETC],98-003, Box No. 121. File 3.4. Omf History of Euslem
Tmvnships .dngfophone Women During ihe Second Worid War. "lnterview of Norma Beattie
by Carol Gaskell. Judy Green and Susan Lefebvre." August 2 1. 1991.; NAC. DND. 10. RG24. Vol. 15.400. Volume 40 (January 1944). War Dia? of lnternrnent Camp "N" (No. 42).
!Vrwington ISherbrooke), January 8, 1944 and January 9. 1944. pp. 2-3.: NAC. DND. 10.RG24, Vol. 15.400, Volume 45 (June 1944), War Dior), of Inrernrnent Camp "N" (No. 4 3 ,
Navington (Sherbrooke), June 15, 1944 and June 16. 1944. p. 1.
ETRC. ETC, 98-003. Box No. 12 1. File 2.12. Oral Hisiory o/Eastern Townships .4ngiophone
Wumen During the Second World War,"Interview of Shirley Hall by Carol Gaskell and Susan
Lefebvre." August 2. 1991.
As one Sherbrooke woman admitted: "We used to walk up there ...where the prisoner of war
camp was and look at those fellows through the fence. We had no business there at al!. but 1
remeber tracking up there on a nice fall day and seeing those Gennan prisonen through the
fence.. .I never got any cioser to them than that, but that was off lirnits, and we didn't go
oflen ..." See Carol Gaskell. Women's Words Eastern Township Analophone Women
Rernember the Second World War (Lennoxville: 1999, p. 105.
niese signs bore such messages as ''WARNING AND NOTICE It is strictly forbidden for
anyone to enter this military ana unless properly authorized" and "KEEP MOVMG Anyone
trespassing on this properiy does so at his own risk. Trespassers are subject to drastic military
action and prosecution. See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 7 (April 1941), W m Diary of
Inremment Camp ''A " (No. 40). Farnham, Apri1 25, 194 1, pp. 6-7.
Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners.. ., pp. 88-89.; Vance, Objects.. .,pp. 1 30- 131.
ûttawa's decision to shackle German prisoners of war in Canada eventually led to violence.
At both Espanola and Monteith, the prisoners resorted to passive resinance while those at
Gravenhum "hrew their shackles into the stoves, rendering them useless and making it
necessary to lofate additional supplies." Resistance was even stiffer at Bowmanville. In this
-
'
54
"
camp, the intemees rebelled on October 11, 1942 and began barricading themselves inside
their huts and used hockey sticks, clubs, baseball bats and broom handles as personal weapons
and bottles as grenades. M e n Canadian troops charged the buildings on October 13 with
fixed bayonets and high-pressure fire hoses. they were met by "a hail of glass, clubs and
tableware." Although the prisoners were dislodged, dozens of minor casualties were sustained
by both sides. One intemee iost his left eye in this upheaval. In the end, the prisonen were
handcuffed as Ottawa ordered. What became known as the three day Battle of Bowmanville
demonstrated how far prisoner dissatisfaction could go. Eventually, many of the Bowmanville
prisoners were tninsferred to Camp Grande Ligne. See Bernard and Bergeron, pp. 174-178.;
Caner. pp. 144-148.; John F. Hilliker, ed., Documents on Canadian Extemal Relations,
Volume 9 ( 1 942-1943) (Hull: Canadian Government Publishing, 1980), pp. 473-525.;Melady,
pp. 62-69.; NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5413, File: HQS 7236-91-1-44, Visits by
Representatives of Protecting Power, Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1945, "Memorandum of the
Consulate General of Switzerland in Canada in charge of Genan Interests," November 30,
1943.: Priebe. pp. 107-1 17.; Jonathan F. Vance, "Men in Manacles: The Shackling of
Prisoners of War, 1942-1943," The Journal of Militarv History, Vol. 59, No. 3 (July 19951,
pp. 485-497.; Vance. Obiects.. ., pp. 134- 137.
Such an example occurred at Camp Farnharn in October 1942 when the crew of the Geman
merchant ship M/S Gonzenheim complained to the Swiss delegation that they were not being
treated properly as prisoners of war. According to these enemy merchant seamen, they were in
possession of identification papeo which integrated hem into the Geman Navy when their
vesse1 was captured by the Allies. The fact was that article 81 of the Geneva Convention
stipulated that. "persons who follow the armed forces without directly belonging
thereto...who fall into the hands of the enerny, and whom the latter think fit to detain, shall be
entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. provided they are in possession of an authorization
from the military authorities of the armed forces which they were following." Althou& the
Swiss Consul remained skeptical of the prisonen' statement, they conducted a proper
investigation. As they indicated , "Captain Krieger, of the MIS Gonzenheim. cornplaints that
he and his crew are entitled, under article 81 of the Geneva Convention, to be treated as
prisoners of war since they were at the time of capture fumished with the papers necessary to
establish such a rigbt. While it is not thought likely that such papers could have been issued to
the crew of a merchant ship or, if issued, would substantiate such a claim. ...inquiry is king
made in the United Kingdom to detemine what papers. if any of this sort were taken fiorn the
prisoners at the time of capture...The probtem is that articfe 81 was not applicable to
merchant seamen or members of the reserve forces when employed in auxiliary capacity to
army forces." See Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners.. . pp. 1 18-119.; NAC, DND,IO, RG-24.
Vol. 1 1.247, File: 9- 1-3 (40), Comploints, Camp Fmham, 1942. "Consul General of
Switzerland in Canada to Captain K. Krieger (Camp Spokesman)," October 1. 1942.
Priebe. p. 89.
Such was the case at Camp Famham during the civilian phase when a hunger strike was
initiated as a means to oppose the camp authorities' punishment of one intemee who had not
made his bed right. As a result, the arrested individual was immediately released. The main
reason was summed up in a statement made by camp authorities to the inmates: "...we cannot
deny you food because if we do that, in one camp in Germany, our soldien will also be denied
food." See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30,C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Helmut Pokomy by Harry
Rasky (CBC)in Perth (Ontario)," [ 1980's 1, pp. 3-8 - 3-9.
Priebe, p. 89.
.
-
60
-
Such a strike occurred at Camp Sherbrooke on September 3, 1943 when the prisoners noticed
that the camp censor had thrown away al1 of their incoming mail without having opened it or
censored it. As the camp spokesman told the camp authorities: "1 am sony to have to infom
you that we have evidence and witnesses that the camp censor has destroyed and thrown away
incoming mail fiom Germany as well as England dated June and July. 1943 destined for
prisoners of war ...This matter has aroused considerable excitement and protest from the
community of this camp and I would herewith infom you that 1 am not responsible for the
consequences resulting out of this and 1 shall have to report this matter to the Protecting
Power and the Director Prisonen of War." To express their dissatisfaction, the intemees
initiated a small labour strike which forced camp authorities to initiate an investigation which
resulted in the anest of the censor. Realizing that suitable action was being taken, the intemee
retumed to work. See NAC. DND, IO. RG-24, Reel: C-5409, File: HQS 7236-87-5-42,
Correspundence re. Mail. Camp Sherbrooke. 1943-3-1946."Carl Win (Camp Spokesman) to
Capt. M.J. O'Brien (NCamp Commandant)," September 3. 1943.: NAC, DND. 10, RG-24.
Ree 1: C-5409, File: HQS 7236-87-5-42. Correspondence re. Mad. Comp Sherbrooke. 19431946. *'Major D.J. O'Donahoe (Works Program) to the Director Prisoners of War." September
6. 1943.
NAC. DND. 10.RG-24. Vol. 15.397. Volume 12 (Septernber 194 1 ) . R'ar Diun of Inrernment
Camp "-4 " (Nu. 40). Farnhanr. September 2. 1 94 1 : September 1 1. 194 1 : September 19. 194 1 :
September ? 1. 194 1 :and September 25. 194 1. pp. 1-6.
NAC, DND. 10, RG-21. Vol. 1 5.397. Volume 12 (September 194 1 ), Wur Diu? uf Intenintenr
Camp 'il" N o . 40). Furnham. "Major E.D.B. Kippen (Camp Commandant) to District
Onicer Commanding (D.O.C.) Milita- District 4." September 30. 1931 . Appendir 5 .
NAC. DND. 10. RG-24. Vol. 15.397. Volume 12 (September 1941 ). War Diu? of Inrernntenr
Curnp "A " {No. 40). Farnham. "Major E.D.B.Kippen (Camp Commandant) ta District
Olficer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Milita. District 4." September 30. 194 1. Appendix 5 .
NAC. DND. 10,RG-23. Vol. 15,397. Volume 12 (September 194 1 ). War Diap oflnternmenr
Cump "A" (No. 40). Farnham. "Major E.D.B. Kippen (Camp Commandant) to District
Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Milita- District 4." September 30. 194 1. Appendix 5.
Canada Orders and Instructions. ... pp. 20-2 1.: NAC. DND, 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5398. File:
HQS 7236-8 1-10. Cunteens. Camp Farnham. 1942-1948. "Camp Spokesman to Emest L.
Maag (Delegate in Canada for the International Red Cross)". April 19. i 943.
Priebe. p. 149.
Ibid., p. 150.
On September 13, 1941, the Camp Farnham authorities indicated: "Four large demi-jars of
wine confiscated in the cornpound today. The wine is really fermented potato juice. raisins.
etc. It is a very nrong wine and fiom time to time jars of it are spotted by the compound police
and confiscated." The same applied at Camp Sherbrooke between January and March 1944
when camp authorities confiscated at ieast four home made stills. See NAC, DND. 10. RG-24,
Vol. 15.397, Volume 12 (September 1941), W m Diary of lnternment Camp "A " 17% 40).
Farnham. September 13. 1941. p. 4.; NAC, D m . 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 40
(January 1944). Wur D i q of lnternment Camp "N" (7%. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke).
January 22, 1944; January 23, 1944: and January 24. 1944. pp. 5-6.; NAC, DND. 10, RG-24.
Vol. 15.400, Volume 4 1 (February 1944), W m Diary of lntemment Camp "N" (No. 422).
Newington (Sherbrooke), February 29, 1944, p. S.: NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.400,
Volume 42 (March 19443, War Diary of Intemrnent Camp "N" (No. 42). Newington
(Sherbrooke),March 4. 1944 and March 6, 1944, p. 1.
Eckehart Priebe expiained well how a radio was created by Grande Ligne inmates: "For
reasons beyond our understanding we were denied radio, even local stations were not for us.
What we really needed and wanted was a shortwave receiver to pick up original Gerrnan
communiqués and reports at the source.. .Fortunately we had a particularly gifted Air Force
Reserve oficer, crafty in al1 fields of electricity and radio communication, one of those
ingenious types who can make anything from nothing. Together with some Navy engineers he
staned building a shonwave receiver from tin cans, pieces of wire, aluminum foil. even
toothbrushes. The result was a most amazing contraption lacking onIy the rnost important
ingredients, the tubes...The Canadians were the only possible source.. .A request was
submitted and returned with the condition that we could have an amplifier. but only on our
word of honour that it would only be used for concerts with the record player. The inference
was that we could convert the amplifier into a shortwave receiver ...a few weeks Iater we had
Our record player and amplifier. ..Our experts went to work and a few days later the 'voice of
Germany' came through loud and clear behind Canadian barbed wire. Only a handful of
POWs knew of the existence and whereabouts of this new source of information. It was used
under the most elaborate of precautions twice a day. While stenographers worked feverishly,
watchful eyes protected the listening post from the inquisitive guard patrols. With the original
information and reports at our disposa1 we were now the best informed POWs on world
events..." Searches were often initiated by the Camp Grande Ligne authorities to find
primitive shortwave receivers comrnonly known as the Staubsauge. As Priebe explained. "it
was concealed in window sills. double-bottom self made easy chairs, even double bonoms of
record containers or in gymnastic equipment, such as medicine-balls when the receiver had to
be moved. In the end. this homemade radio was found in February 1945. See Priebe. pp. 141145.: NAC. DND. 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5365.File: HQS 9 139-4-44. Camp htelligence. Camp
Grande Ligne, I9-l+ 1946, "February 1945 lntelligence Summary," February 1945.
NAC. DND, 10. RG-14. Vol. 15.397. Volume 6 (March 194 1). War Diof Infernment
Camp "A" (No. 40). Farnham. "Colonel H . Siethem (Director of lnternment Operations) to
the Commandants of al1 internment Camps," March 19. 1941. Appendix 1 1.
Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners.. ..pp. 1 02- 103.
Costelle. p. 178.
Canada Orders and Insmictions.. ., p. 52.; Priebe. pp. 180- 1 8 1.
Melady. pp. 70-7 1 .: NAC. DND. 10. RG-24, Vol. 1 1,250, File: 1 0-2-3-40. Intelligence
Reports, Camp Famham. 19.11-19.12. "Intelligence Report." September 16. 1942.: N AC.
DND, IO,RG-24, Reel: C-5410. File: HQS 7236-88-5-44, Correspundence, hsmctions re.
Censorship. Camp Grande Ligne. 1943-1945, "Colonel of the Directorate of Military
to the Director Prisonen of War," April 24, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO. RGIntelligence (D.M.I.)
14. Ree 1: C-5409. File: HQS 723 6-88-5-40, Correspondence, Insîructions. Fe. Censorship.
Camp Farnham, l9J3-19#6. "Lt.-Col. A. W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Offker
Commanding (D.O.C.)Military District 4," March 25. 1945.; NAC, DND. IO, RG-24. Reel:
C-54 10, File: HQS 7236-88-5-42. Correspondence. Inshuctions re. Censorshi' Camp
Sherbrooke, 1943-1946. W.-Col. H.W. Pearson (AlDirector Prisoners of War) to Camp
Commandant." November 8, 1945.: Don Page. "Tomrny Stone and Psychological Warf'are in
World War Two: Transfonning a POW Liability into an Assefn Journal of Canadian Studies.
Vol. 16. No. 3 4 (Fall-Winter 1981), p. 1 12.
NAC, DND. 10, RG-24.Vol. 15,400. Volume 16 (January 1942). Wor Diary of Inremment
Camp "N" lUo. 12).Newington (Sherbrooke), "insmictions for the Censor," Ianuary 1942.
Appendix 4,
pp. 2 1-23.
76
77
''
79
80
13'
13'
83
84
"
Kelly, "Intelligence.. .", pp. 289-290.
Canada, Orders and Instructions..., p. 54.
Such was the case on April29, 1943, when one Camp Farnham pnsoner attempted to slip out
a letter amongst parcels destined to a prisoner of war camp in Alberta. As camp authorities
indicated. the message was found when "the mick driver pilfered some cigarette papers fiom
one of their parcels, gave the cigarette papen to a fnend who discovered a letter written in
Geman." See NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 3 1 (Apnl 1943), W m Diay of
Internment C m p '2" (Ab. 10). Fumham, Apnl29, 1943. p. I 1.
As the Camp Sherbrooke censor indicated in March 1945: *. ..attempts have been made. or are
k i n g made. by oficer camps to contact this camp. This was overheard in a conversation in
the Works Program office of this camp by two POW.Several weeks ago, a POW of this camp
was asked by a Gemian oficer of another camp to fumish the names of the anti-Nazis of this
camp. The answer was to be given to the next POW who was going to St. Anne de Bellevue
Miliiary Hospital." See Kelly, "Lntelligence ...", pp. 289-290.: NAC, DND. 10. RG-24, Reel:
C-5409. File; HQS 7236-87-5-42. Correspondence re. Mail. 1913-1946. "H.D.Hedley (Camp
Commandant) to Headquarters. Military District 4," March 6, 1945.
Canada, Regulations..., p. 4.
NAC. FHTC. EK. MG-30.C 192, Vol. 3. b'Interview of Thomas Gold by Harry Rasky (CBC)
in Ithaca (New York)." [ 1980's ] .pp. 29- 12 - 29- 13.
The most ambitious atternpt occurred at Camp ile-aux-~oixon the early morning of May 24.
1943 when one inmate attempted to leave the island by stealing the camp's motor boat.
Unable to start the engine. the escapee paddled the vesse1 down the river until the current took
hold of it. He then jumped into the river and swam for the mainland. It was at this point that
the escapee was sponed by a local innkeeper. who irnmediately contacted the Camp île-auxNoix authorities. The internee was recaptured that same day. See NAC, DND. 10. RG-24.
Vol. 15,399, Volume 35 (May 1943). Wur Diary of Internrnenr Camp "I" N o . 41). Fort
Lennox. lie-am-NOU.May 24, 1943. pp. 4-5.
Snow storms sometimes facilitated the escape of prisoners. In fact when deep snow drifts
fonned in proximity to the wire fences. there was always the possibility that inmates might dig
through them and used these tunnels as means of concealment in cutting the wire. This forced
camp authorities to constantiy keep the fences clear. See NAC. DND. 10. RG-21, Vol. 15.398.
Vol urne 29 (February 1943), W m Dia? of Internrnenr Camp "'A" N o . 40). Farnham.
February 13. 1943: February 16. 1943; and Febniary 18. 1943. pp. 4-5.; NAC. DND. 10. RG24. Vol. 15.398. Volume 31 (April 1943), War Diary of Inremment Camp "A " (No. 10).
Farnham. April22, 1943. p. 8.
Such a case occurred at Camp Sherbrooke on March 24, 1946 when one of the intemees was
able to cut a hole in the camp's barbed wire system and escape using a pair of plien which he
had stolen from the camp's workshops. See Carter. p. 122.; NAC. DM). 10, RG-24. Vol.
1 5.40 1. Voiume 66 (March l946), W m Diary of Intemment Camp " N u (No. 12). Newington
lSherbrooke). "Major A.R. Turner (Camp Commandant) to Headquarters, Military District 4."
March 24, 1946. Appendix 3.
p. 1 .
NAC. DND,10, RG-24, Vol. 15.397, Volume 2 (November 1940), W m D i q of lntemment
Camp "A " /No. 40). Fantham. "Escapes - What to Look For,**November 1940, Appendix 7,
PP*1fi
NAC, DND. 10, RG-24. Vol. 15,397, Voiume 2 (November 19401, W m Diury of I n t e m e n t
Camp "A " (No. 40). Fumhom, "Escapes - What to Look For," November 1940, Appendix 7,
87
88
pp. 2.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 15 (March 1944), W m Dimy of
Inremmeni Camp
No. 44, Grande Ligne, March 21, 1944, p. 6.
For instance, a tunnel was found at Camp Farnham on January 25, 1943. M i l e working under
one of the camp's huts. an electrician discovered an air vent nicking out of the ground. He
even mentioned to camp authorities that he could hear two prisoners working underground.
However, because camp authorities had no idea whcre the tunnel's entrance was, VGC
personnel found their way into the tunnel by digging around the air vent using spades. What
they found was an 18 feet long tunnel. As a result, the trap door of the tunnel was found
behind one of the huts' stoves. It was concealed behind a cord of wood. Another tunnel was
found at Camp Grande Ligne in 1948 when "a truck driver backed up a loaded p v e l truck
and the wheels of the vehicle sank into the earth. Evidently. the truck had crossed over the
incomplete escape tunnel built by the Germans." See NAC. DND. 10. RG-24.Vol. 15.397.
Volume 2 (November 1940), War Dia? of Interriment Camp "A " (na. -101, Farnham.
"Escapes - M a t to Look For," Novernber 1940, Appendix 7, p. I .: NAC. DND, IO. RG-24,
Reel: C-54 1 6, File: HQS 7236-94-6-40, intelligence Reports, Camp Farnham. 1943- 1946.
"January 1943 Intelligence Surnmary," February 4. 1943.; NAC. DND. IO. RG-24. Vol.
15.398. Volume 28 (January 1943). N.ur Dian, of lnfernrnenrCamp '*A" No. 40). Farnham.
January 36, 1943; January 27. 1943: January 28. 1943; and January 29. 1943. pp. 8-9.: NAC.
DND, 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5389. File: HQS 72364444, Escape Plans and Correspondence,
Camp Grande Ligne, 1943- 19-18. "Royal Canadian Mounted Police Comrnissioner to the
Director of Administration - A m y (Department of National Defence)." December 2 1. 1948.
On April 14. 1943. for instance, two Sherbrooke prisoners attempted to escape by concealing
themselves in large freight bags which were to be loaded aboard a train. 60th were caught on
April 1 7, 1943. Another case occurred at Camp Grande Ligne on September 13, 1944. when a
captive escaped by hiding himself inside a tnick and avoiding detection when the vehicle was
searched at the gate. Camp authorities were greatly annoyed by this incident. indicating that
"this is old routine stuff and should not have happened." In fact. al1 motor vehicles and horse
drawn carriages were to be thoroughly searched with a sharp-pointed iron prodding stick. This
was to make certain that no one was concealed therein. Walking along the Richelieu River. he
reached the United States where he was caught on September 14 near Rouses Point. New
York. His recapture caused F a t problems since this latter had been handcuffed by mem bers of
the Canadian Provost Corps. This action was in complete violation of the Geneva Convention.
As the camp spokesman wrote: "1 herewith most pointedly protest against this action. We as
Gennan oficers consider such an action an attack on our honor. Simuftaneously I refer to the
Gennan note of protest of Fall 1943 conceming the shackling of Ceman POWS."" Althou&
the situation did not deteriorate. it reminded Canadian oficials of the 1942-1943 shackling
controveny. See NAC. DND, 10, RG-24,Vol. 15.397. Volume 1 (October 1940). War Diary
ojlntemmenr Camp ''A " /;No. 41). Famhum, October 25. 1940. p. 1 1.; NAC. DND, 10. RG'74, VOL 15.397, Volume 1 (ûctober 1940). Wàr Diary of Inteniment Camp "A" N o . 10).
F m h , "Camp Standing Orders," October 25, 1940, Appendix 2.: NAC. DND, 10, RG-24.
Vol. 15,397, Volume 2 (November 1940), W m Diary of Infemment Camp ' A " N o . 40).
Fmnhum? "Escapes - What to Look Foi," November 1940, Appendix 7, p. 2.: NAC, DND, 10.
RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 5 (February 1941). Wor Dimy of lnternment Camp "A " N o . 401,
Fmnhon, "Notes on Prevention of Escapes." December 24, 1940, Appendix A. pp. 1-4.; NAC,
DND, 10, RG-24, Red: C-5389, File: HQS 723644942, Escape P l m und Correspondence.
Camp Sherbrooke. 19444945, "Lt.-Col. B.B.W. Minard (Camp Commandant) to
Headquarters, Military District 4," April 22, 1943.; NAC, DND. IO, RG-24,Vol. 15.403,
89
90
Volume 21 (September 1944), Far Diary of lnternment Camp No. 44. Gronde Ligne,
September 13, 1944; September 14, 1944; September 15, 1944; and September 28, 1944, pp. 45.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-54 13. File: HQS 7236-9 1-4-44, Comphints &y PM Camp
Grande Ligne, 1913-1945, "Camp Spokesrnan to the Consul General of Switzerland in
Canada," October 17, 1944.; "Police Dragnet Spread Through District for Two Escaped
Nazis," The Sherbrooke Dailv Record, April 16, 1943, p. 3.; "Two Escaped Gennan Prisoners
of War are Found Hiding lnside Camp," The Sherbrooke Dailv Record, Apnl 1 7, 1943, p. 3.
NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 2 (November 1940), War Diary of lnternment
Camp ';I" ('No. 40). Famham. "Escapes - What to Look For," November 1940, Appendix 7,
p. 2.
NAC, D m , 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 7236-44-44. Escape Plans and
Correspondence. Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-19.18, "Lt.-Col. E.D. B. Kippen (Camp
Commandant) to the District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," August 3 1,
1943.; NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 7236-44-40, Escape i'fans and
Correspondence, Camp Frunham. 1941- 1945, "SJSgt. F.J. Devereaux (Veteran 's G uard of
Canada) to Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant)," December 18, 1944.; Priebe. p.
187.
91
92
93
94
"
97
Costelle. pp. 13- 16.; Priek, p. 187.
Priebe, p. 122.; Bernard and Bergeron, p. 75.
*-Recherchesdes ? evadés," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, November 26, 1942. p. 3.
"Les deux évades de Sherbrooke sont repris a Newport, Vermont," La Tribune de Sherbrooke,
December 1 1. I9J?. p. 3.: "Two Escaped German Prisoners are Recaptured at Newport. Vt.,"
The Sherbrooke Dailv Record, December 1 1, 1942, p. 3.
NAC. DND, 10. RG-24. Vol. 15.397, Volume 5 (February 1941 ). War Dia. cf hternmenr
Camp ".I"(No. 40). Farnhom. "Notes on Prevention of Escapes". December 24. 1940.
Appendix A, pp. 1 -4.
For instance, a false alam was initiated in Camp Île-aux-~oixon luly 19, 1940 when a sentry
accidentally fell against the siren bunon. Although the alarm was a good practice for the camp
staff. it dernonstrated how VGC personnel were unfamiliar with the facilities. The result was
extensive training for the guards not on duty. As it was stated in the camp's war diary on
August 15: "...al1 troops not on duty received considerable training and drill in squad and rifle
drill. From now on this will be a daiLy occurrence and it is planned to give lectures on various
military subjects..' See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.399. Volume 1 (July 1940), War
Dimy of bternment Camp "1"(No. 41). Fort Lennox. he-aux-NOU, July 19, 1940, p. 5.;
NAC, DND. 10. RG-24,Vol. 15,399, Volume 2 (August 1940), War D i q of lnternmeni
Camp '$1"(No. 41). Fort Lennox, [le-mu-~ok,August 15, 1940, p. 4.
NAC, DND, IO. RG-24, Vol. 15,397. Volume 1 (October 1940), W m Dimy of Intemment
Camp "A N o . JO), Farnham. October 24. 1940, p. 10.
NAC, DM>,10,RG-24,Vol. 15,397, Volume 2 (November 1940), W m DioTy of internment
Camp "A " (No. JO), F m h . November 25, 1940. pp. 8-9.: NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol.
15.397, Volume 4 (Januaxy 1941), W m Diory of Intemment Camp "A (No. 400). Fmnham,
"'No. 4 Active Company - Veterans' Guard of Canada Syllabus of Training," lanuary 27,
1941, Appendix F, p. 1.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 20 (May 1942), Wor
D i w o/Internment Camp ''N"(No. 42), Nmingron (Sherbrooke), "Camp Orders." May 5,
1942; May 6, 1942; and May 1 1.1942, Appendix 1, pp. 5-6, 1 1.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Vol. 15,397, Volume 5 (February 1941), War Dîory of fntemment
Camp "A " (NO.40). F m n h , "Notes on Prevention of Escapes", December 24, 1940,
Appendix A, pp. 1-4.
"
98
-
"
"
'00
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 2 (Augun 1940). Ww Dimy of Intemment
Camp "IV(No. Il), Fort Lennox, jle-aux- NO^, August 26, 1940, pp. 6-7.; NAC, DND, 10,
RG-24,Vol. 15,397, Volume 2 (November 1940), W m Diary of lniemmen~Cump "A " NO.
JO). Fumham, "Escapes - What to Look For." November 1940, Appendix 7. p. 3.; NAC,
FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Ernest Guter by Hany Rasky (CBC)in
Dorval (Quebec)," [ 1980'sI ,p. 24-7.
Carter, p. 82.; Kelly, "The Prisoner of War Camps...", pp. 92-94.; Melady, p. 54.; NAC,
DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume I l (August 1941). W m Diary of lntemment Camp
"A " (No. 401, Furnham, August 8, 1941, p. 3.; NAC, DND. 10,RG-24, Vol. 15,399. Volume
2 (November 1940). W m Diary of lnternment Camp 'N"(No. 42). Nèwingtm (Sherbrooke),
November 29. 1940, p. 2.; NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 3 (December 1940),
W m Di- of lntenment Camp "A " No. 40). Farnhoni, December 29, 1940, p. 7. NAC.
FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192. Vol. 3, "Interview of Ernst Waengler by Harry Rasky (CBC) in
Toronto," [ 1980's]. p. 1-1 7.; Priebe, p. 173, 188.
NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 2 (August 1940), War D i q of Internment
(No. 41). Fort Lennox, Île-aux- oh. August 3, 1940, p. 1.
Camp
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-54 16, File: HQS 7236-94-6-44, inteffigence Reports, Cump
Grande Ligne. 1943-1946. "Lt.-Col. E.D.B.Kippen (Camp Commandant) to the Director
Prisoners of War," July 7, 1943.: NAC, D m ,IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 7 (July 1943),
War Diary of Internment Camp No. 44. Grande Ligne. Juiy 7, 1943. p. 2.: NAC, DND. 10,
RG-24. Vol, 15,403, Volume 8 (August 1943), Wur Dimy of Intemment Camp No. 44,
Gronde Ligne. August 14, 1943: August 15, 1943; and Aupst 19. 1943, pp. 4-5.: NAC.
DND, 10. RG-21, Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 7236-44-44, Escape Plans und Correspondence.
Camp Grande Ligne. 19.13-lW8, "Li.-Col. E.D.B.Kippen (Camp Commandant) to the
Military District 4." August 3 1. 1943.
District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 8 (August 1943), War D i q of Internmenr
Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne. Aupst 27. 1943. p 8.: NAC, DND, 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5389.
Fi le: HQS 7236-44-44. Escape Plans und Correspondence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1 943- I 948,
"Major-General R.J. Renaud (District Onicer Commanding Military District 4) to the
Secretary (Department of National Defence)." August 3 1. 1943.:NAC, DND,10,RG-24. Vol.
15.403. Volume 8 (Aupst 1943), War Diury of lnternrnent Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne,
August 3 1. 1943. p. 9.: NAC. DND, 10, RG-24. Vol. 15.403. Volume 9 (September 1943),
Ror Diary of internment Camp .%.44, Grande Ligne, September 2, 1943, p. I .;N AC, DND,
10. RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 9 (September 1943), W m Diury of lntemment Camp No. 44.
Grande Ligne, September 3. 1943. p. 1.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.403, Volume 9 (September 1943). W m Diary of Intemment
Camp No. 448 Gronde Ligne, September 6. 1943. p. 2.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Vol. 15.403.
Volume 10 (October 1 943). f i r D i q of lntemment Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, October
13, 1943 and October 2 1. 1943, pp. 3, 5.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Vol. 15,403, Volume 10
(October 1943), War Diary of Internment Camp No. 44. Gronde Ligne, "Part 1 Otders."
October 28, 1943, Appendix 1, p. 25.
NAC, DND, IO,RG-24,Vol. 15.403. Volume 14 (Febmary 1 944), Win Dios, of internment
Camp No. II,Grande Ligne, Febmary 16, 1944 and February 26, 1944, pp. 4,8.; NAC, DND,
10, RG-24,Vol. 15.403, Volume 14 (February 1944), W m Dimy of lntemment Camp No. 44.
Gronde Ligne. Febniary 27, 1944 and February 29, 1944, pp. 8-9.; NAC, DM), 10, RG-24.
Red: C-5389, Fik: HQS 72364b44, h p e P l m und Correspondence. C m p Grande
Ligne, 19434948, "Lt.Col. E.D.B. Kippen (Camp Commandant) to Headquarters (Military
District 4)," March 3, 1944.
-
'"
-
-
--
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Vol. 15,403, Volume 8 (August 1943), W m Dimy ofhemment
Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, August 17. 1943, p. S.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-54 16,
File: HQS 7236-94-6-44. Intelligence Reports, Camp Grande Ligne, NJM9J6, "March 1944
Intelligence Summary," March 1944.; NAC, D m , 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 19 (July
1944). Wor Diary of Intemment Camp No. 44, Grmde Ligne, l u ly 13, 1944, p. 4. N AC, DND,
10, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 19 (July 1944), War Diary of lnternment Cump No. 44,
Grande Ligne. July 17, 1944, p. 5. NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 19 (July
1944). War Diary of lniemmenf Camp No. 44. Grande Ligne, July 30. 1944, p. 8.; NAC,
DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 7 2 3 6 4 4 4 , Escape P l m and Correspondence,
Camp Grande Ligne. 1943-1948, "Lt.-Col. E.D.B. Kippen (Camp Commandant) to the
Military District 4," August 8, 1944.
District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
'Og NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.403, Volume 20 (August 1944), Wor Diav of Infemmen~
Camp No. 44,Grande Ligne. August 8, 1944, p. 3.; NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,403.
Volume 20 (August 1944). War Diav oflnternment Cump No. 44. Grande Ligne, August 16,
1944. p. 9.; NAC, DND,10. RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 2 1 (September 1944), W m Dia- of
Internment Camp No. 44. Grande Ligne, September 4. 1944 and September 5, 1944, pp. 1-2.;
NAC, DND, 10,RG-24. Vol. 15,403, Volume 2 1 (September 1944), War Dia? of lnternmenr
Camp "A" (No. 10). Funtham. "Lt.-Col. E.D.B. Kippen (Camp Commandant) to District
Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," September 7, 1944. Appendix 5. pp. 1-2.;
NAC. DND. IO. RG-24, Vol. 1 5,403, Volume 2 1 (September 1944). W m Dimy of lnternmeni
Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, September 13. 1944; September 14. 1944; and September 15.
1944. pp. 4-5 .: NAC, DND. IO. RG-24. Vol. 1 5,403, Volume 2 1 (September 1944). W m
D m of hternment Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, "Lt.-Col. E.D.B. Kippen (Camp
Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4." September 13.
1944, Appendix 7, p. 1.
NAC. DND. IO. RG-24. Vol. 15,403. Volume 21 (September 1944). W m D i q of Internmenî
Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, September 28. 1944, p. 9.
1 IO
In 1940. for instance. Camp Famham authorities fomed an "Emergency Car Brigade" manned
by fifteen civiiian volunteer motorists. This unit was used to provide transportation for search
parties in the advent of escapes. Each car carried up to five VGC personnel. The "Emergency
Car Brigade" was also used for other tasks. M e n severe thunderstoms created power failures
at Camp Farnham in November 1940, and June 1941, the unit's cars were "placed around the
outside wire with the lights shinning in; in this way the approaches to the wire were fairly well
lighted up." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Vol. 15,397, Volume 2 (November IWO). W m
Di- of Infemment Camp "A " No. 40). Fantham, November 8, 1940. p. 4.; NAC. DND. 10.
RG-24, Reel: C-5389. File: HQS 7236-44-40, Escape Plans and Correspondence. Cump
Farnham,1941-1945, "Escape Standing Orders," January 10, 1941.; NAC, DND, IO. RG-24,
Vol. 15,397. Volume 2 (November 1940), W m D i w of Inlemment Camp "A " (No. 40).
Fmnhom, November 11, 1940, p. 5.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 9 (June
1941 ), Wur Diary oflntemmenr Camp "A " (No. JO), Farnhom, June 25, 1941, p. 5.
Melady, p. 43.; NAC, DM), 10, RG-24,Red: C-5389, File: HQS 7 2 3 6 4 4 4 , Escape Plans
and Correspondence. Camp jie-aza-~oir.1940-1941, "Escape Plan." December 12, 1940 and
F e b r u q 26, 1941.: NAC, DM), 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 7136-44-40. Escape
P l m und Correspondence, Cump Fumhonr 194191945, "Escape Operation Order No. 3,"
October 1, 1941.; NAC, D m ,10,RG-24, Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 7236-44-42, Escape Plans
und Correspondence. C m p Sherbrooh 1944-1 945, "Recapture ûperation Chder No. 2,
Appendk B," November 23, 1943.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 72364442, Escape Plmr and Correspondence. Cump Sherbrooke, 1944-1945, "Recaphire
'"
"'
Operation Order No. 2, Appendix D," November 23, 1943.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C5389, File: HQS 72364440, Escape f lans and Correspondence, Camp Fmnham. 194I - 1945,
"Recapture Operation Order No. 1. Appendix B," August 24, 1944.
AAer the war, Lo Tribune de Sherbrooke wrote: "II est maintenant possible de lever le voile
sur une multitude de faits qui se sont déroulés au cours de la dernière guerre et que la censure
empêcha de divulguer. La vie des prisonniers de guerre dans les camps d'internements
canadiens est au nombre des faits sur lesquels le silence fut de rigueur." See Bernard and
Bergeron, pp. 146-147.; "Les internés à Sherbrooke vécurent avec confort mais dans l'angoise
jusqu'à la victoire alliée," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, February 3, 1947, p. 10.; NAC, DND,
10, RG-24, Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 7236-44-42, Escape Plans and Correspondence, Camp
Sherbrooke, l9J./-l94j9"Escape Orders, Intemment Camp Sherbrooke," kbruary 22, 1941.
I I 3 "Les évadés sont encore en liberté," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, November 10, 1942, p. 3.;
"Recherches des 2 évadés," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, November 26, 1942, p. 3.; "Les deux
évadés du camp sont repris à Sand Hill," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, November 30, 1942. p.
3.;"Les deux évadés de Sherbrooke sont repris a Newport, Vermont," La Tribune de
Sherbrooke, December 11, 1942, p. 3.: "Les deux évades de Newington," La Tribune de
Sherbrooke, April 9, 1943. p. 3.; "Les deux évadés de Newington sont retrouvés a Ascot
Corner." La Tribune de Sherbrooke, April 10, 1943, p. 5.; "Deux autres prisonniers
s'échappent. hier soir, du camp de Newington," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, April 15, 1943, p.
2.; "Les évadés sont retrouvés dans le camp," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, April 17. 1943. p.
5.; *'Évasion du camp de Newington," La Tribune de Sherbrooke3 August 6, 1943. p. 3.;
"L'Allemand est repris a St-Malo." La Tribune de Sherbrooke, August 7. 1943, p. 5.; "Un
violent incendie rase un vaste bâtiment du camp d'internementl" La Tribune de Sherbrooke,
October 16. 1943. p. 5.: ''Deux journalistes. un photographe au camp d'internement."
Tribune de Sherbrooke, October 16, 1943, p. 5.; "Un vieil incendie, une photo neuve." La
Tribune de Sherbrooke. January 14, 1944. p. 3.: "Un prisonnier Nazi s'évade puis se rend,"
Tribune de Sherbrooke, July 3 1, 1944, p. 3.; "Un commandant nouveau au camp
d'internement" La Tribune de Sherbrooke, September 20. 1944, p. 3.; "Deuxième grand
incendie en moins d'un an au camp d'internement," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, September 23.
1944. p. 3 .: "Un prisonnier boche s'évade de Newington." La Tribune de Sherbrooke. May 14.
1945, p. 3.: "Les recherches se poursuivent pour Friedriech," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, May
15. 1945. p. 3.; "Le prisonnier évadé est capturé près de Coaticooke." La Tribune de
Sherbrooke, May 16, 1945, p. 3.; "Une journée avec les prisonniers allemands du camp
Newington." La Tribune de Sherbrooke, October 29, 1945. p. 10.; "Évadé du camp de
Newington." La Tribune de Sherbrooke, March 25, 1946, p. 3.; "Le prisonnier boche évadé a
été capnirél." La Tribune de Sherbrooke, March 28, 1946, p. 3.; "Délégation de Sherbrooke
auprès de la corporation des biens de guerre," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, A p d 23, 1946, p.
3.; "Le camp d'internement Newington cédé a la corporation des biens de guerre," La Tribune
de Sherbrooke. December 2, 1946, p. 2.
Such a case occuned on November 28, 1942. when two Camp Sherbrooke escapees, who had
k e n hiding in the region's forests for nearly thme wnks and who had recently begun working
on a local farm. were found when a neighboring fanner saw their picnires in a newspaper and
conîacted the RCMP. Ever since they had lefi the camp on November 8: 1942, the two
escapees stayed in a small bivouac which they had built out of bed covers. During this period,
they both Iived on charity and thefi. The two prisoners well explained the reasons which
guided their decision to find work. As they aipulated: "Nous étions fatigués de la vie du
camps [bivouac] . Il commençait a faire froid et notre argent diminuai& alors nous avons
décidé de se trouver du travail vendredi. Nous avons dû déménagé notre camp au début de la
"'
"'
semaine. Les patrouilles de I ' m e e semblaient très active sur les routes." Another case
occurred in December 1942 when two Camp Sherbrooke intemees were caught in Newport
(Vermont) when a local grocer recognized them fiom pichires in a Canadian newspaper. Both
prisonen had reached the United States by walking along Lake Memphremagog. See "Les
évadés sont encore en liberté," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, November 10, 1942, p. 3.; "Les
deux évadée du camp sont repris a Sand Hill," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, November 30,
1942. p. 3.; "Widespread Search Continues for Escaped Prisoners of War," The Sherbrooke
Dailv Record, December 8,1942, p. 3.; "East Angus-Weedon A n a Searched for Two Escaped
German Seamen," The Sherbrooke Dailv Record, December 10, 1942.; "Les deux évadés de
Sherbrooke sont repris a Newport. Vernoni," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, December 1 1, 1942,
p. 3.; "Two Escaped German Prisonen arr Recaptured at Newport, Vt.,- The Sherbmoke
Dailv Record. December 1 1, 1942, p. 3.
I l 5 Such was the case for a Sherbrooke prisoner who escaped on March 24, 1946 and was
recaptured in Montreal on March 27, 1946.1t was also the case for one Farnham prisoner who
was recaptured by the Quebec Provincial Police near the Dorval airport in Montreal on June
29, 1943. See NAC. DND, IO. RG-24. Vol. 15,398, Volume 33 (June 1943), War Diary of
Inrernmenr Camp "A " (No. -/O), Farnham. June 28, 1943 and June 29, 1943, pp. 8-9.; NAC,
DND, IO, RG-24. Vol. 15,401, Volume 66 (March 1946), W m Dimy of lnternmenr Camp
"N" (No. 42). Newington fSherbrooke). "Major A.R. Turner (Camp Commandant) to
Headquarters. Military District 4." M a c h 29. 1946. Appendix 4. p. 1 .
Il6
Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners.. ., pp. 106-1 1 1.
(17
Canada Regulations.. .. p. 4.
Bernard and Bergeron. p. 3 13.: Canada Red Cross and Prisonen.. .. pp. 1 10-1 1 1 .; Canada.
.... pp. 8-1 1.; Koch, p. 139.: NAC, DND. 10. RG-24. Vol. 15,400, Volume 16
Repulations
(January 1942). War Dia? of lnternmenr Camp "N" (No. 4.17 Novington ISherhrooke).
"January 24. 1942. p. 6.; NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Vol. 15.400, Volume 18 (March 1942). War
Diav of Internrnent Camp "N" (No. 42). Abvington (Sherbrooke), March 10, 1942: March
I 1, 1942; March 12, 1942: March 13, 1942: and March 14. 1942. pp. 2-3.; NAC. DND, IO.
RG-24, Vol. 15,400. Volume 18 (March 1942). War D i q ofinteninient Camp "N"(No. 42).
Newinglon /Sherbrooke), March 24. 1942. p. 4.; NAC. DND. 10. RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume
13 (April 1944). War D i q of Inremmeni Camp "N"(No. 42). Newingion (Sherbrooke}. April
3. 1944: April 4, 1914: April 5, 1944: April 6. 1944; April 7, 1944; A p d 8, 1944; April ?O.
1944; and April 24, 1944. pp. 1-4.; NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5389. File: HQS 723614-40. Escape Plans and Correspondence, Camp Fmharn, 1941-1945, "Major-General E.J.
Renaud (District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)Military District 4) to the Secretary
(Department of National Defence)," December 21, 1944.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24. Reel: C542 l, File: HQS 7236-99, Organhtion d Administration. Camp Sorel, 1945, "MajorGeneral E.J. Renaud (District Ofticer Commanding (D.O.C.)Military District 4) to the
Secretary (Department of National Defencc)," November 17, 1945.; NAC. FHTC. EK. MG30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Edgar Steinberg by Harry Rash (CBC) in Willowdale
(Ontario)," [ 1980's 1, p. 23.; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30,C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Emest
Guter by Hany Rasky (CBC) in Dorval (Quebec)", [ 1980Ts], p. 34- 10.;
IL' NAC, Records of the Depamnent of National Defence, Sources Relating to lnternment
Operations, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 1 (July 1940), W m Diury of Internent Camp "I"
m. d l ) , Fm Lennox, [le-uux-~oix, July 21, 1940, p. 6.; NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Vol.
15,399. Volume 2 (August 1WO), Wur Dimy of lntemment Camp "1" No. JI), Fort Lennox,
île-azu- NO^, August 2, 1940, p. 1 .
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 2 (August 1940), W m Diary of Internment
Camp "I"(No. 4 0 , Fort Lennox, he-aux- NO^, August 16, 1940 and August 17, 1940, p. 4.;
NAC, DM), 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 3 (September 1940). W m Dimy of Internment
Camp "I" (No. 41). Fort Lennox. fie-ou*-~oix,September 4, 1940, p. 1 .; NAC, DND,10, RG24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 3 (September 1940), War Didry of Intentntent Camp "l'"o.
41).
Fort Lennox. jle-our-~ok,September 7 , 1940, p. 3.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,397,
Volume 1 (October 1940), W m Diwy cf Internment Camp "A" (No. JO). F m h a m , October
30, 1940, p. 12.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Vol. 15,397, Volume 2 (November 1940), W m
D i q of Infemment Camp "A " (No. 40). F a m h , November 8, 1940, p. 4.; NAC, DND,10,
RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 3 (December 1 WO), W m Dimy of Inremment Camp "A" N o .
40). F m h a m , December 23, 1940, p. 5.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 4
(January 1941). War Diary of lnternmerit Camp *+A
" (No. 40). Fmham, January 10, 1940, p.
3.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 5 (February 194I), Wur Diary of Intemment
Camp "A" (No. 10). F m h a m , Febniary 13, 1941; February 16. 1941; February 17. 1941; and
February 20, 1941, pp. 4-6.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 6 (March 1941 ),
War Diary of Internrnent Camp "A" No. 40). Fmhatn, March 1 1, 194 1 , March 22, 194 1;
March 23. 194 1 ;March 24, 194 1 ;and March 25, 194 1, pp. 3-7.; NAC, FHTC.EK. MG-30. C
192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Helmut Blume by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Westmount (Quebec)."
[ 1980'sI , p. 37-1 5 .
Fratemization between camp personnel and internees was sûictly forbidden Guards were to
refrain ffom comrnunicating to any prisoners unless it was in the execution of their duties.
Severe disciplinary action were to be taken against any of those who infiinged. Despite such
wamings, some prisonen did develop bonds with guards. One such incident occurred at Camp
Sherbrooke in January 194 1. when one of the guards proved to be involved in illicit activities
with three intemees. The situation began when one of the camp guards gave an internee artist
a photopph of his daughter so that this latter could draw a sketch of her. ln exchange. the
guard agreed to give the artist a bottle of rum. food h m the camp staffs kitchen as well as a
few bottles of beer. Furthemore, the prisoner was given the opportunity io write to the
guard's daughter. The situation deteriorated when other intemees began writing to the young
girl. begging her to send letters to fnends and relatives in the United States and other
Canadian intemment camps. When higher authorities learned of the situation, the offending
intemees were sentenced to 28 days detention while the guard was tried by court manial. See
Draper, "The Accidental Immigrants...Part ...", pp. 33-34.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol.
15.399. Volume 4 (January 194 1 ), W m Dimy O/ Intemment Camp "N" flo. 422). Newington
(Sherbrooke), January 25, 1941, p. 1 .; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Vol. 15,401, Volume 48
(September 1944), War Diary of lntemment Camp "N" (No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke),
*'CampOrders", September 6, 1944, Appendix 1, p. 5.
Canada Red Cross and Prisonen.. ., pp. 1 10-1 13.; Canada, Remlations.. ., pp. 1 1- 15.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,401, Volume 55 (April 1945), W w Diary of Inteminent
Camp "N''(No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), "Camp Orden," April 1 7, 1945, Appendix 1, p.
15.; NAC. DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Inzelligence. C m p
Sherbrooke. 119441946, "April 1945 Intelligence Report," May 3, 1945.
Koch, p. 163.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 1 1 ,250, File: 10-2-340, intelligence R e m s ,
Camp Fmnhonr, 1941-1942, "Capt. F.W. StaîT(Mi1itary Intelligence) to Onicer Commanding
Intemment Camp Famham," May 27, 194 1.
NAC, D m ,10,RG-24, Vol. 1 5,397, Volume 12 (September 1941), War Dias, of fntemment
C m p ''A " (No. 40), Fmham, "Major E.D.B.Kippen (Camp Commandant) to Comrnissioner
of Refiiaee Carn~s,"September 19, 194 1.
--
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-
Kelly, "Intelligence...," pp. 285-286.; MacDonald, p. 30.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol.
15,398, Volume 26 (November 1942). W w Diory of Internment Cump ''A" (No. 40).
Fumham, Novernber 13, 1942, p. 4.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 40
(January 1944), W m Diary of Intentment Cump "N" (No. 42). Newington (S'herbrooke),
January 21, 1944, p. 5.
This was the case at Camp Sherbrooke where in January 1943, the camp spokesman ordered
fellow inmates to place pictures of Adolf Hitler over the prisoners' hut doon along with large
"Victory is with Hitler" signs. This was done so that the Canadian authorities would have to
pass under hem each time they visited the huts. Needless to Say that the pictures and signs
were irnmediately removed and the camp spokesman was relieved of his functions. As the
camp commandant indicated "During the short period of tirne thar Captain Krieger was camp
leader, he proved to be a trouble maker of the meanest type." See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,
Vol. 1 1.247, File: 9- 1-3 (42). Complaints, Camp Sherbrooke. 1943, "Lt.-Col. B.B.W. Minard
(Camp Commandant} to the Cornmissioner of Intemment Operations", January 2 1, 1943.; Ron
Robin. The Barbed-Wire College - Reeducatinn German POWs in the United States Durinq
Worid War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 34-35.
128
Carter, p. 143.; Kelly, "Intelligence ...," p. 285,293.; Page, p. 1 15.
129
Bernard and Bergeron. p. 304.; Kelly, "Intelligence.. .."p. 29 1.; Waiser, p. 226.
"O NAC, DND, 10. RG-24, Reel: 42-5366, File: HQS 9139-42, Classification of PM Camp
Sherbrooke. 1944-1946. -'Report of a visit to Camp ~herbrooke by Lt. E. Davidson
(R.C.N.V.R.)," December 1 5- 16, 1944.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-54 1 6. File: HQS
723 6-94-642, Inieifigence Reports, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-19.16, "Decem ber 1944
Intelligence Repon" December 1944.: NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365. File: HQS
9 139-43?. Camp Inirlligence, Camp Sherbrooke. f 9 J M 9 J 6 , "February 1945 Intelligence
Report," March 4, 1 945.
NAC. DND, 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9139-4-42. Cump Intefiigence. Camp
Sherbrooke. 1914-1946, "January 1945 Intelligence Report" February 4. 1945.: NAC, DND,
10. RG-24. Reel: C-5366.File: HQS 9139-42. Classification of P/W. Camp Sherbrooke, 19441946. "Lt.-Col. H.D. Hedley (Camp Commandant) to Headquartn (Milita. District 4),"
February 7. 1945.; NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9139-4-42. Camp
Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1948- 1946. " F e b r u q 1945 intelligence Repon." March 4,
1945.
A similar situation also took place at Camp Farnham in late 1944 where SS personnel came to
dominate the enclosure. Having established their own intelligence section. these Nazis would
watch fellow prisoners and search the rwms of anti-Nazis during their absence. They even set
up a secret Nazi tribunal "which claims for itxlf the power of life and death over defeatists
and anti-Nazis." See NAC, DM), IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-440, Cump
Intelligence. Camp Famham. 1944-1946, "December 1944 Intelligence Report." December
1944.; NAC, D m ,10. RG-24,Red: C-5365,File: HQS 9 139-4-40, C m p Ihiellgence, Camp
F m h , f9JCf 946, "January 1945 intelligence Report," January 29,1945.; NAC, DND. 10.
RG-24,Ree 1: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139442, Camp Intelligence. Camp Sherbrooke, 19441946, "March 1945 intelligence Report," April2, 1945.
Another secret militaiy training prowas known as NAPOLA [Nazi Political Leaming]
and was established by the ptisoner of war officers of Camp Grande Ligne. NAPOLA
members were gathered by invitation. Activities mainiy consisted of lectures on Nazi topics.
For instance, one such class studied Adolf Hitler's Mein Kimpj However, despite NAPOLA'r
early popularity, the program diminished in s a l e when ~ & Gemany
i
was defeated in May
1945. As camp authorities indicated by June 1945, 'WAPOLA activities have either ceased or
126
"'
are being carricd on so secretly that our contacts are unable to locate the meeting place."
Nevertheless, militas. training offered prisoner of war officers an opportunity to reafirm their
cornmitment to the Nazi cause while re-establishing their skills in the art of war. See Bernard
and Bergeron. p. 303.; NAC, DND. 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-40,
Class$cation of P/W. Camp Farnham. 194+19&. "Major H.H. Cuning (AlCamp
Commandant) to Major-General E.J. Renaud (District Oficer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military
District 4)," December 26, 1944.: NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-444. Camp Intelligence. Camp Grande Ligne. 1944-1916, "Lt.-Col. H.W. Hi lu (Camp
Commandant) to District Oflicet Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," June 17, 1945.
134
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 913944, Classification of Pm', Camp
Grande Ligne, lY.CJ-19J6, "Chief of the General Staff' to the District Oficer Commanding
(D.O.C.) Military District 4." September 15. 1944.; NAC. DND. 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5416,
File: HQS 7236-94-6-44, Intelligence Reports. Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1946, "Director
Military lntelligence to D.C.G.S.),"October 18, 1944.
13' NAC. DND. 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-444. Camp intelligence. Camp
Grande Ligne. 19-14-1945, "Lt.-Col. D.D.M.I. to M L 3 (Department of National Defence)."
Octaber 1 7, 1944.
'M NAC. DND, 10. RG-24. Reel: C-54 16. File: HQS 7136-94-6-44. btelligence Reporrs. Camp
Grande Ligne. 1943-1946, "Priest George Felber (Prisoner of War) to Captain Jungbluth
(Camp Intelligence Officer)." October 3. 1944.: NAC. DND. 10. RG-14. Reel: C-5416. File:
HQS 7236-94-6-44. Intelligence Reports. Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1946. "Director Mil itary
Intelligence to D.C.G.S.)." October 18. 1944.
NAC. DND. 10. RG-24. Reel: C-54 16. File: HQS 7236-94-6-44. Intelligence Reporrs. Camp
Grunde Ligne. / 943- 1946. "W. Fisher (Assistant Camp Censor) to the Camp Commandant."
October 16, 1944.: NAC, DND, 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-44,
Intelligence Reports. Camp Grmrde Ligne, 1943-1946, "Director M ilitary Intelligence to
D.C.G.S.)."October 18. 1944.
138
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24. Reel: C J J 16. File: HQS 7236-94-6-44. Intelligence Reports. Camp
Gronde Ligne, l943-19-/6. "Director Military lntelligence to D.C.G.S.), October i 8, 1944.
13' NAC. DND. 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44. Camp intelligence. Camp
Grande Ligne. 1944-19.16, "Lt .-Col. D.D.M. 1. to M.L3 (Department of National Defence)".
October 1 7. 1944.
''O NAC. DND. 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5416. File: HQS 7236-94-6-44. Intelligence Reports, Camp
Grande Ligne. lW3-NJ6. "Memorandum by Lt.-Col. H. W. Pearson (Adjutant-General) to the
Director Prisoners of War," October 25. 1944,
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 22 (October 1944), War Diu? of inrernment
Camp No. 44. Grande Ligne. October 23. 1944. p. 6. : NAC, DND. 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5416.
Fi le: HQS 7236-94-644, Intell~gence Reports. Camp Gronde Ligne. 1943- 19.16.
Wernorandum of a visit to Military District 4 by Colonel C.P. Lavigne. NAdjutant-General
(Directorate Veterans' Guard of Canada)," October 27, 1944.
14' NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5416. File: HQS 7236-94-6-41. Intelligence Reports. Cump
Grande Ligne. 1943-1946, "Report of Colonel J.M. Taylor (Director Veterans' Guard of
Canada)," October 27, 1944.
NAC. DND. 10. RG-24,Reel: C-54 16. File: HQS 7236-94-6-44, Intelligence Reports. Camp
Grande Ligne, 1913-1946, "Colonel H.N. Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to D.A.G.."
October 3 1. 1944.
NAC, DND. 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5416. File: HQS 7236-94-6-44, Intelligence Reports. Camp
Grande Ligne, 1943-1946, "D.D.M.I. to al1 camp intelligence Officers", November 14, 1944.
'''
"'
"'
"'
'41
'"
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 723694-6-44, Intelligence Reports, Cump
Grande Ligne. 1943-1946, "Major-ûeneral E.J. Renaud (District Oficer Commanding
(D.O.C.) Military District 4) to the Secretaq (Department of National Defence)," December
1, 1944.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 723694444, Intelligence
Reports, Camp G r d e Ligne, 1943-1946, "Major-General A I . Walford (Adjutant-General)
to District Oficer Comanding (D.0.C.) Military District 4," December 6,1944.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-44, Intelligence Reports, Camp
Grmde Ligne, 1943-1946, "Memorandum of a visit to Military District 4 by Colonel C.P.
Lavipe, A/Adjutant-General (Directorate Veterans' Guard of Canada)," October 27, 1944.;
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reei: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-44, Inteiligence Reports, Camp
Grmde Ligne, 1943-1946. "Colonel H.N. Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to D.A.G.,"
October 3 1, 1944.; NAC, DND, IO, UG-24, Red: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-44,
Intelligence Reports. Cump Grande Ligne. 19334946, 'Report Covering the Arrangement
king put into effect as a result of the alleged plans for a mass escape at camp 44' by the
Cornrnissioner of the RCMP," December 4, 1944.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-44. Camp Intelligence, Camp
Grmde Ligne, 1941-1946, "February 1945 Intelligence Summary", Febmary 1945.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Red: C-5366,File: HQS 9139-44, CIassifcution of PlW. Camp
Grande Ligne, 19J4-1946, "Lt.-Col. H.W. Hiltz (Camp Commandant) to District Oficer
Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," June 6, 1945.; NAC, DND,10. RG-24,Reel: C5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-44, Camp Intelligence. Camp Grande Ligne, 194M946, "June 1945
lnteliigence Summary,"June 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Red: C-5366, File: HQS 913944, Classfication of PM, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. H.W. Hiltz (Camp
Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," luly 3 1. 1945.;
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-54 19, File: HQS 7236-94- 14-44. Reports for Psychlogical
W M k e Conmittee, Cump Grande Ligne, 1911-19.16, "Lt-Col. H. W. Hiltz (Camp
Commandant) to Dishict Onicer Comrnanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," August 9, 1945.
"'
Id'
CHAPTER 3
LABOUR PROJECTS
The internment operation which emerged in southem Quebec contrîbuted to
Canada's war effort through its labour projects. Although lhis scheme included unpaid
compulsory services, the bulk of the program was paid. This included employment on
fanning operations and in camp workshops. introduced in 1940, the labour projects'
purpose was to employ intemees on a voluntary b a i s for the production of goods which
had no direct connection with the operation of the war. The aim was to ease the pressures
imposed by billeting huge numbea of prisoners on the Canadian homefiont and to
contribute to the country's agriculniral and industrial production. The most important of
southem Quebec's internee labour contribution was through the Works Program. This
was an industrial project whose purpose was to use intemee labour in "camp factories."
Established in most of the region's camps, these workshops produced huge quantities of
goods. such as camouflage nets. bots and ammunition boxes. Labour projects became an
important aspect of life behind Canadian barbed wires. It gave the intemees a constructive
pan-time while giving them an oppomuiity to earn money which they could use to buy
goods from camp canteens. Moreover, the work projects gave the prisoners the ability to
practice new trades which they could use afier the war. For the camp authorities. labour
projects were effective methods for neutdiring unrest among the inrnates. A working
intemee had less time io plot against the authorities. The fact that inmates were paid for
their labour gave the authorities the hope that prisoners would not dare bite the hand that
fed them. Lasting well until 1946, intemee labour programs aiso became a noteworthy
part of the Canadian homefront's effort to aid the war.
The use of internee labour in times of war was a complex phenomenon.
Regdations governing the employment of civilian intemees and bonafide pnsoners of war
were very different For instance, the treatment of prisoners of war was controlled by
international conventions, unlike with civilian prisoners. According to article 27 of the
1929 Geneva Convenrion "belligerents rnay employ as workmen pnsoners of war who
are physically fit, other than officers and penons of equivalent status, according to theu
rank and their ability.'. This was reinforced by articles 29 and 30 which indicated that "no
prisoner of war rnay be employed on work for which he is physically unsuited" and that
"the duration of the daily work of prisoners of war.. .shail not be excessive and shall in no
case exceed that permitted for civil worken of the locality employed on the sarne work."'
Further. it was stipulated in article 3 1 that ' ~ o r kdone by prismes of war shall have no
direct connection with the operations of the war. in particular. it is forbidden to employ
prisoners in the manufacture or transport of arms and munitions of any kind. or on the
transport of material destined for combatant units." It was also prohibited in article 32 to
**employprisoners of war on unhealthy or dangerous ~ o r k . "None
~ of these conditions
applied to civilian intemees. for whorn the prospect of cheap exploitation became a
possivity. However. evennially helping to alleviate this segegation was the fact that both
civilian intemees and enemy combatants were originally integrated in the sarne category:
prisoners of war were referred to as "pnsoners of war Class 1" while "enemy aliens" were
categorized as "prisoners of war Class 2". This system of classification enabled civilian
internees to benefit fiom tk same rights as prisoners of war and contribute on an equal
scale in labour p o j e c t ~ . ~
Camp labour projects began in southem Quebec with unpaid compulsory work.
According to article 34 of the Geneva Convention. "prisoners of war shall not receive pay
for work in connection with the administration, intemal arrangement and maintenance of
camps.'' This was reinforced by the Department of National Defence's Orders and
Insmctions in~emmentCamps. which stipulated that "prisoners of war, below the tank of
corporal or the equivalent ratings, and htemees may be compulsorily employed without
pay on maintenance work." This included maintenance work on the buildings within the
enclosure; the maintenance of the camps' roadways; the clearing of snow; unloading and
hauling rations, fuel, and other camp supplies; sawing and splitting wood for fuel
consumption; cutting hay; tidying up; repain to made buildings; and any other work
approved by the Department of National ~efence.'Ln other words, intemees were not paid
for duties which contributed to their persona1 well king6 Unpaid compulsory work was
crucial for the good functioning of the camps and was used for the duration of the region's
internent operation.
On the other hand, paid labour formed the bulk of soouthem Quebec's work
projects, namely service sector jobs and construction work. According to the Orders and
instructions. Internrnent Camps. service sector jobs were vital for the proper functioning
of Canadian internment camps. Because internment centres had to be self-suficient. each
camp was equipped with a tailor shop, a cobbler shop, a barber shop. a carpenter shop. a
hospital and a kitchen. For these services, intemees with specific skills were employed.
Aside from doctors and dentists. who were paid 50t per day. intemees involved in other
trades earned between 20c and 30e per day.8 However. because of the limited number of
positions. few inmates benefited h m such employment. For instance. by February 1943,
it was said that only the Camp Leader. the Deputy Camp Leader. and the Camp Adjutant
were paid for their services at Camp Sherbrooke dong with ten accountants and clerks.
wo docton. three hospitai orderlies. two dentists. two tailors, four barben. twenty-seven
cooks. six stokers. Rine cleaners, one electrician, one plumber, one carpenter. and one
runner. out of a camp population of approximately 900
in mate^.^ Despite their
limited
numbers, these jobs ensured that the prisoners benefited from certain services. Service
sector work became common in al1 of southem Quebec's internment camps and these
positions remained active for the duration of the war. They helped keep morale up by
providing food. clothing, grooming, leadership and medical attentim.
Camp related work also involved construction duties inside or outside the camp
area "involving capital outlay, whereby the state benefited f m cid1y." Prisonen were
paid for the construction of new buildings, drains, roads, and any other type of
modification to the existing facilities.1° For the duration of the war, intemees benefited
from such duties in al1 of southem Quebec's internment camps. Because Camps F a t n h ~
île-aux-~oixand Sherbrooke were incomplete in the early days of internment, camp
authorities irnmediately resorted to use intemee labour to accelerate the considerable
amount of work that needed to be done and prepare the facilities for winter. For such
tasks, prisoners were paid between 20c and 30C per day." Such working opportunities
were usually welcomed by al1 internees for it offered them a means to earn money.
The problem with camp related work was that internees were either employed in
limited numbers or temporady. What they needed were stable labour projects which could
employ most intemees. However, this process began in early 1940 when the Canadian
authorities began to consider using intemee labour for the benefit of Canada's homefront.
This was reflected through a June 1940 Military District 4 report entitled Schemefor the
Employrnent ojlnterned Aliens which indicated well the main reasons why the govenunent
intended to introduce major work projects within the barbed wires.
When any group of men. large or small. are forcibly detained in a resvicted
area removed from their ordinary activities, their morale rapidly deteriorates
if they are not given some occupation. This leads to discontent which gives
rise to insubordination, a tendency to destroy property wantonly. and
renders the group dificult to handle. The result is that an increased number
of men are required to puard them. Material of al1 kinds is destroyed. food
is wasted and an internment camp becomes rnuch more expensive than is
necessary to operate. ..It is therefore of pnrnary necessity to provide some
form of labour for those forcibly detained.I2
Further. the document indicated that '*conditions have forced us to concentrate into camps
a nurnber of men who must be fed. clothed, and housed at our expense...If we have to
detain these people, we should plan to make the best possible use of them." The aim of
this document was for the introduction of agriculnual work within the camps. The object.
as it was told. was to prepare land for hiture senlement while making the camps selfsupporting in the shortest possible time. This meant clearing suscient land to start
farming operatioas. As it was stipulated: "...while intemees are not criminais. they are
perçons confimed for the safety of the state, and, as they cost a certain amount to keep,
every effon should be made to make hem self-supporting, and. if possible, profitable."'3
Hence, f d n g was to give the intemees an opportunity to raise their sense of self-esteem
and escape the boredom of life behind barbed wires while contnbuting to the welfare of
the camps.
The fmt internment centre which adopted an agriculture scheme in southem
Quebec was Camp Farnham. Located on the property of the Dominion Experimental
Farm, it possessed al1 the necessary assets for the introduction of such an operation. Mer
d l , the site had the infrastructure, the tools, the livestock and the nch arable land essential
for faming. The Directorate of Intemment Operation decided to exploit this advantage for
the benefit of the intemees as early as September 1940. As Brigadier-General Edouard de
Bellefeuille Panet, Dùector of internent Operation, said: "It is recommended that the
present fann foreman and herdsman be employed to take care of the herd, and also harvest
the crop...We undentand the cows are being milked and the milk sold to a dairy in
Farnham. The foreman and herdsman will have to be employed permanently to supervise
the work of the internees while the camp is occupied by them."14 When the prisoners
arrived at Camp Farnham in October 1940. some 40 acres of land was made available to
them along with 23 cows. 4 hotses. a tractor and numcrous tools. Because of the lateness
in the season. work on the fm had to begin irnmediately. As the camp authorhies
indicated: "It is planned to have the farm ploughed and this should be done in the next
few weeks."15 Land had to be prepared for seeding in the spnng. As a result. two
prisoners skilled in the art of agriculture went to the fields on October 27. 1940. and
began preparing I? acres of the land, thus initiating the camp's farming operation. In the
spring of 1941. the fann's first seeds were planted. Further, a deal was made with a
neighboring farmer to rent 21 acres of land for $150. This increased the size of the
Camp's f m to some 30 acres.
16
Soon after? Camp île-aux-~oixinitiated its own f m i n g operations. The process
began on May 12, 1941, when representatives fhrn the Dominion Experimental F m at
Ste. Clothilde visited the camp in comection with the creation of a farm. Immediately.
enthusiastic prisoners begm preparing the fields with a dix-harrow that the
representatives of the Ste. Clothilde Experimental Fann bad brought with them." The
f&ng
operation at camp île-aux-~oixwas somewhat smaller than the one in Famham;
oniy 49 intemees were employed on the fann at Île-aux-~oix as opposed to 80-100
inrnates working on the one at ~arnham." In the end, Camp Famham was the most
productive. During the 1941 season, the farm produced 38,700 lbs. of canots, 48,900 lbs.
of tumips, 3.800 Ibs. of beets. 62,000 lbs. of potatoes, and 21 tons of hay.Ig As in the case
of île-aux-~oix.rnost of the products were either sold to local grocers or consumed within
the barbed wires. According to the camp's war diary: ''The farm was a success. Aside
from providing some 150,000 lbs. of vegetables, the f m has paid for the labour of the
intemees who were utili~ed."'~This well demonstrated the efficiency of using intemees
on farm work and the profits that could be made by using (hem.''
When Camp Grande Ligne becarne active in June 1943. a f m i n g operation had
already been initiated. The process began in January 1943 when the Geman oficers
intemed at Camp Fanihm asked Emest L. Maag. delegate in Canada for the international
Red Cross. if an experimental farm school could be created at Camp Grande Ligne where
they were to be soon transferred. On January 2 1. 1943. Maag approached Colonel H.N.
Streight. Director Prisoners of War, and introduced the request. to which this latter
agreed.
- A confirmation from the Farnham intemees was then asked by the Canadian
17
authorities. whereby the camp spokesman indicated: "1 and the oficen in Camp 40 are
very interested in such an enterprise. There is a great demand for it. and many would take
that profession [famier]after the wu." Further. the prisoners mentioned that they were
ready to begin the preliminaries. emphasizing their wish to operate a garden farm with
cows. poultry. and hogs. To pay the expenses, the intemees approached the German Red
Cross for a $5,000 loan. which they were to reimburse with the fami's profits." To ensure
that this project was senous and that money was well invested. the Red Cross asked for a
written assurance, signed by the officer in charge of internment operations in Military
District 4 and by the Camp Famham spokesman. As the document stipulated. the
prisoners "pledge themselves to look after the livestock regardless of what may happen at
the camp...The oficers also are prepared to pledge their word that these schools will not
be used to facilitate escapes, al1 garde* and f m workers king strictly on parole."24As a
resuit, the Grande Ligne farm was inaugurated and the pnsoners began to buy livestock
and farm implements with their loan from the Red Cross. While the pnsones were still at
Camp Farnham in June 1943, arrangements, were made with a local farmer at Grande
Ligne to begin work on the fm for $100. As a result, the 40 acre farm was readied for
the season, its land having been disked, harrowed and ~eeded.~'When the prisoners
arrived at Camp Grande Ligne on June 28, 1943, they were very much pleased with the
farm and irnmediately began working the fields.'6
in the end. the Grande Ligne fming operation was a complete success. Production
during the first season was profitable. For instance. 82,000 lbs. of potatoes were harvested
during the 1943 season as well as 28.000 Ibs. of Nmips, 6.500 Ibs. of red beets. 3,500 lbs.
of beans. 750 Ibs. of peas, 1.500 lbs. of oats. 800 Ibs. of barley, 4.000 Ibs. of hay, 32
square mile of corn for provender. 4.500 cobs of sweet corn. 2.085 lbs. of radishes, 20.000
cucurnben. 43 bags of lettuce and 38 bags of silver beets. Some 350 German prisoner of
war officers worked on the f m . " Camp Grande Ligne. like Camp Farnham also relied on
livestock. When the first animals arrived in the camp in September 1943. a Department of
Husbandry was immediately created to coordinate the stables. This meant that f m i n g
operations were divided. as some prisoners were assigned to the fields while othen to the
stable. At the time. the camp's livestock was comprised of 3 milk cows. 8 pigs and 101
chickens. By February 1944. the number of animals in the camp had reached a peak of 9
milk cows. 2 1 pigs, 20 1 chickens and 15 geese.28 The livestock enabled the prisoners to
benefit from Fresh eggs, meat and milk. On numerous special occasions. permission was
granted by the Canadian authorities for the slaughter of certain animals for camp
consumption. For instance. in December 1945, five pies and one cow were killed for the
Christmas dimer."
Camp Grande Ligne also experirnented with other products. In March 1943, when
the prisoners expressed their desire to use maple products. an arrangement was concluded
with the Grande Ligne Mission, who owned a mgar bush on the camp's site. The Mission
was to set up the necessary equipment and provided the expert labor while the intemees
furnished a few men. Further, maple sugar production was to be divided 50/50 between the
camp and the Mission. The sugaring operation resulted in 1,300 maples taped and the
production of more than 200 gallons of symp. So successful was the maple symp
production that it was renewed in 1944.30The intemees at Grande Ligne also exploited a
nearby orchard for camp consumption in September 1944. By the end of the month, the
total amount of apples picked amounted to two tons. These were stored and issued Nnce a
week to the prisoners as long as stocks lasted. 3 L The prisoners at Camp Grande Ligne also
produced honey in early 1943. Ten colonies of bees in thriving condition were acquired
and rumor circulated that these bees had k e n purchased From a f m owned by a brother
of American General George S. Patton. As a result, the internees nicknamed the insects
u'Patton'ç ~anzerbees."~?
Although the production of honey went accordingly, problems
emerged in June 1945 when it was reported that the bees were s w i n g . The main reason
was that the insects' natural feed had been depleted due to early fiost. Funher. the bees
were unable to geet sugar as a substitute. Nevenheiess. the colonies survived and in early
August the prisoners decided to increase honey production by buying more bees." A11
these efforts enable the intemees to enjoy certain luxuries. which. as a result. helped to
sustain morale.
in the Autumn of 1944. fanning operations resumed at Camp Famham after two
seasons of inactivity. However. the function of the 30 acre fm was to be somewhat
different as it came to be operated under a Share Crop arrangement. According to this
scheme. 2 3 of the production's profits were kept by the intemees while 1/3 was retained
by the Canadian authorities. To ensure that this operation was profitable, prisoners were
given classes on Canadian f m i n g techniques and even the oppomuiity to visir
neighboring f m s on parole.34 During the winter, three greenhouses located outside the
camp enclosure were rented by the prisoners from the Canadian authorities. They were
used to seed vegetables which would be tmsplanted on to the f m in the spring. This
enabled prisoners to work on fami-related work al1 year
By April 1943, use of
greenhouses proved its worth as some 54,000 cabbage, 54.000 cauliflower, 28,000 red
cabbage and 15.000 tomato plants had ken grown during the winter while radishes,
letttzce, c m t s , celery, home radishes and spinach were seeded? In the Auhunn of 1945.
as the fim season came to an end, the vegetables grown on the camp farm where sent to a
local cannery where they were canned at 6 C per can. For this task, some 16 prisoners were
employed at the cannery on parole.37The products were then marketed in Montreal. Total
profits for the 1945 season came to $15,000; $10,000 for the pnsonen and $5,000 for the
Canadian a~thorities.~'The prisoners also harvested luxury crops such as tobacco. This
enabled the inrnates to be self-suficient as to their needs for smoking?'
A small famiing operation was also initiated at Camp Sherbrooke in the summer
of 1945. Prisonen created small gardens from which they cultivated flowers, vegetables.
strawbemes and r a ~ ~ b e m e sThese
. ' ~ gardens were very popular and helped to embellish
the camp.'" So important had become gardening at Camp Sherbrooke that greenhouses
were established for the sole purpose of growing plants in the winter. Expert gardenen
even went as far as cultivating tropical plants in these glas buildings.'"
Until the repatriation of the prisonen in 1946. the farming operations at Camps
Farnham. Grande Ligne and Sherbrooke continued to be active and formed a major
component of the work projects. The prisoners appreciated this oppomuiity to work the
fields and consume their own products. As a Farnham prisoner said: "Planning a better
living ...is important
-A
plentifid supply for our consumption of *'greensT'during the
summer is assured. as well as extra vegetables for our use next Fail and Winter.
Vegetables are one of the essentiais of better and healthier living.'J3
As of September 1945. intemees could also be employed on parole for work on
local private farms.At the tirne, labour was desperately needed on Canadian f m s due to
rnilitary recmitment and the movement of numerous Canadian lads to cities where better
paying industrial jobs were available.
In order to benefit fiom internee labour, a f m e r
had to produce a certificate fiom the National Defence Headquarten' Selective
Commission before signing any contracts with the prisoners and the camp authorities. In
order to obtain internees' labour. famee had to prove to the Commission that they could
not obtain civilian labour. The prospect of working on f m s located outside the camps
was very popular among the intemees. Every time positions opened on local farms.
prisoners voluntarily applied in great nubers? For instance, when a cal1 was made in
Camp Sherbrooke in May 1946 for 14 volunteers to work on individual farms, some 104
internees a p p ~ i e dNeedless
~~
to Say that so many applications obliged the camp
authorities to choose candidates. Usually, the authorities' decision rested upon the
intemees with the best records. As it was indicated, "The men were chosen on their good
behavior and their good work attendan~e."~Once chosen, prisoners had to give in writing
their promise "not to escape or act contrary to regulations.'T'7 in most cases, pnsoners
were lodged and fed on their respective farms. However, in some cases, intemees would
work on local farms during the day and corne back to the internrnent camp each Nght. For
instance. at Camp Farnham in October 1945, some 43 inmates were billeted on f m s
while 75 others lefi the camp on parole each day for jobs on local f m s . Usually, one
prisoner was assigned per fami. However. in some cases. it reached levels of three
individuals. depending on the size of the farm and the famier's needs."'
At al1 times, prisoners were to be under the supervision of the hinng farmers.
However. the relationships between f m e r s and intemees often moved rapidly from mere
tolerance to warm fkiend~hi~.)~
In Behind Canadian Barbed Wire. David Carter even
mentioned that "in some instances, relationships between the farmer and the POW
becarne so positive that the POW would be lefi for days on end with the f m . livestock
and children in his care. Some POWs were sponsored back into Canada afier the war by
their farmer fiends. Some rnarried the f m e r ' s daughter."jOIn most cases. f m e r s were
satisfied with the pnsoners' labour. As a result, more and more requests for intemee
labour were issued by famers and received daily in each camps." The camp with the
largest nurnber of internees working on local famis was Farnham, growing fiom 4
individuals in Septernber 1945 to 126 in March 1946.~'For the internees. work on
independent f m s offered an opportunity to escape the monotony and constraints of life
behind barbed wires while earning money. It also gave the intemees a chance to see for
themselves how Canadians lived. In a sense, this contributed to the indoctrination and reeducation of the inmates. By getting acquainted with Canadian civilians, the prisoners
could see how Canadian society effectively bctioned and how it differentiated fiom the
totalitarianism of the Nazis in Gemany. Thus, as much as working on f m s offered a
certain degree of fieedom and autonomy to the inmates, it also demonstrated some of the
strengths of Canada in tems of personal fkedom, liberty and democratic thought.
Aside fkom fami work, the Works Program had iotemees contribute voluntarily to
Canada's war effort by working in camp workshops. The program was initiated in
southern Quebec in October 1940 when it was noticed that Camps Sherbrooke and ileaux-Noix, unlike Camp Famharn, did not possess the necessary acreage for farming
operations. The airn of the Works Program was to offer the intemees of these two camps
an alternative. With this in mind, Brigadier-General Edowd de Bellefeuille Panet,
Director of hternment Operations, in cooperation Major D.J. O'Donahoe, the Military
District 4 Works Program Coordinator, decided to estabiish a scherne whereby intemees
could be employed on light manufacturing projects within the carnps.j3 As it was stated in
the Camp ile-aux-~oixwar diary on October 5, 1940:
The idea is to erect a building...in one end would be housed Ii&t
rnanufactwing machinery while the other would be devoted to a wood
making plant. It is first of al1 necessary to have the pnsoners erect the
building. then to equip it with the necessary machinery. As soon as this is
done, prisoners wiil be rmployed on manufacninng such articles as Amy
folding tables. benches, chairs. kit bags, bandolien, prisoner's uniforms.
shins. hold-alls and many other articles.'"
In charge of this Works Program was the Ordinance Branch of the Department of
National ~ e f e n c e .It~ was
~ this organism. dong with the Munitions and Supply and
Contract Branches, that controlled the contracts for the Works Program.
56
The reason
why the Works Program was introduced in southem Quebec instead of other Canadian
regions had to do with the fact that most of the prisoners incarcerated in this region at the
time were civilians. The belief was that civilian intemees, unlike enemy combatants.
could be employed on work more closely c o ~ e c t e dwith the war effort. Funher. the goal
of the program was to exploit the skills possessed by the internees. In fact, many pnsoners
had backgrounds in science, engineering and management. Aside fiom the Works
Program managers, controllers, accountants, and department supervisors who were paid
SOC per day, other employees e m e d 20 C per &y, which was raised to 30c on October 1,
1941
M e n the Canadian authorities f d l y realized the full potential of this project.
the Works Program was expanded to include al1 Military District 4 internment camps. As
a result, workshops were built by the intemees at Camps Faniham. île-aux-~oixand
Sherbrooke as well as the Italian internment centre located on île Ste. Hélène in
~ontreal.~'
However. numerous delays afTected the pro-.
For instance. problems emerged
in the shipments of machinery and tools to the camps. In most cases, the necessas,
equipment was not received before January 1941. As a result, this impeded the
manufacture of products in camp workshops. Further, the civilian internees' motivation to
participate in the Works Program was very weak. In fact. very few of them desired to
work while being incarcerated. Hence. negotiations took place between the inmates and
the camp authorities. These complications. among many others. delayed the Works
Program's operation until early 194 1.j9
The first operational workshops were established in Camp Sherbrooke. According
to Major D.J. O'Donahoe. Sherbrooke was to be the "starting point of the workshop
program." In that sense. Sherbrooke was to act as a "prototype camp." inaugurated on
December 11. 1940. the Sherbrooke workshops. which consisted of a Wood Working
Depanment. a Sewing Department. a KNtting Department. a Net Making Department and
Shoe Repairing Department became operational in January 1941." By Jul y 194 1. more
than $27.000 worth of goods (which included camouflage nets, kit bags. tables. benches
and ammunition boxes) had been produced.61However, camp authorities were hoping for
a much larger output. As they indicated in the camp's war diary: "...greater results could
and should be achieved..."62 Still? some 200 intemees were employed in the Works
Program at Camp Sherbrooke by July 1941.63The workshops remained operational until
the civilian intemees were transferred in December 1942. The arrivai of prisoners of war
led to the resurnption of the program. which lasted until June 1946.
When it was decided on January 7, 1941, to expand the Works Program to include
Camps Fanifiam and île-aux-~oix. workshops were immediately buiit by the intemees.
Camp île-aux-~oix,contribution to the Works Program was somewhat limited. In fact.
the camp workshop specialized on only one item: camouflage nets? On the other hand,
Camp Farnham's Works Program operation was bigger. Workshops became operationai
on Febrwy 17, 1941, and were divided in a Wood Working department, a Sewing
Department and a Knitting Department. Further, a Net Making Department was opened
on Apnl 15, 1941, as well as a Painting ~e~artrnent.~'
By J d y 1941, approxirnately 300
men were involved in the Famham Works ~rograrn." When the camp workshops closed
on November 30, 1941. prior to the civilian intemees tramfer io Camp Sherbrooke,
production had been most impressive. The Wood Working Department had produced
1.200 soldiers' chests, 500 carpenten' . tool boxes, 200 razor blade boxes, 300 bayonet
racks, 1.457 fly screens and dooe. 50 sign posts for camp Farnham (with lettenng and
painting done in the camp's paintshop). 1.201 MK-IV folding tables and 1.500 al1 wooden
tables. As for the Sewing Department. it made 30,720 hold-alls, 2.500 kit bags, 700,000
hospital swabs and 8.337 alteration to the clothing of prisoners fiom Camps Farnham. ileaux-Noix. and Sherbrooke when their status changed to refugees in June 1941. As for the
Knitting Department. it produced 8.880 pairs of arrny woolen socks while the Net
Department made 3.707 camouflage nets and 2.000 projectile grunmets for holding 4.9"
diameter artillery ~hells.~'
There was aiso a lot of recycling done in the Works Progrm.
Each day. saw dust was bagged. waste wood was brought to the cookhouse for camp
consumption and waste cloth and wool was bundled and removed to the Quartemaster
When die civilian intemees' status changed to refugees in June 1941. camp
workshops began to close since many prisoners were being released. The only exception
was Camp Sherbrooke, where the Works Program continued until 1946. Although the
change in status gave the inmates new pnvileges, it aiso created work-related problems at
Camp Sherbrooke in October 1941. Two major issues guided the refugees' discontent.
First, the inmates made it clear that "the change in designation has not brought about the
changes in conditions which the new status suggests and that as refugees, they should be
given conditions of living far more closely associated with k d o m ...". Second. the
increase in saiary fiom 20e per day to 30e, which occumd on October 1, 1941, did not
please the intemees who resented the fact that a "fixed and maximum value should be set
on al1 workers and that no opportunity exists for refugees to eam in relation to their
production." Most refugees wanted to be paid for what they produced (piece work)
instead of a fixed salary. Furthemore, refugees wanted to control the internai
administration of the Works Program. By doing so, they felt that they "could better
determine the value of each individual, both as regards his ability to produce and
suitability for work" and that they could thus increase production. Believing that the
solution to the present problem was to establish "a system whereby refugees could work
happily and create an indusüy in this camp which could be developed into ever-growing
importance to our war effort. rather than await developments of an ugly nature," camp
authonties proved willing to grant the refugees what they wanted. However. more senior
representatives From Military District 4 headquarters saw the situation as a "naturd result
of intemrnent" and refused to budge to the inmates' requests. What this situation proved
was that the Works Program had become a "banlegound for inmate discontent and that
prisoners were not always pleased with its f b n c t i ~ n i n ~ . ~ ~
Refuses were given the opportunity to work on parole for Canadian industries.
This process was initiated in May 1941, when the Canadian governrnent decided to
consider the release of civilian intemees if sponsors could be found in civil s o ~ i e t ~ . ' ~
With the intemees no longer being classed as prisonen of war, the restrictions imposed by
the Geneva Convention no longer applied. As refugees. inmaies could now enjoy more
Freedom such as working in war-related functions. This could only be done if Canadian
industrialists were willing to sponsor their release. This was not a problem since many
industries were desperate for labow. With this in mind, a scheme was developed within
the Works Program whereby refugees with certain skills could work voluntarily in
Canadian factories for the war effort. As it was stated: "In response to the reiterated
claims on the part of refugees that they are willing and anxious to assis in the war effort,
an opportunity has k e n developed through the Works Program to find employment for
certain skilled tradesmen under conditions of fieedom within a restricted area." By
October 1941, tool makers. machinists, machine operators, welders, pattern makers.
blacksmiths,
draughtsmen and architects could benefit fiom this project. If this
expenment was a success, new job oppomuiities were to emerge for more intemees? So
important was felt to be the use of skilled interne labour in Canadian industries that the
Canadian government tried to promote this as best it could. For instance, in late 1941, a
scheme for rebuilding machine tools was established in cooperation with Camp Faniham.
For this purpose, the Canadian government bought the Emmerrnan machine tool factory
in Chicago and brought the tools to Canada in order to create a new crown Company
named Citadel Merchandising. This new company was located at Ville Lasalle near
Montreal in an old marble mil1 which refugees had renovated to suit Citadel's purpose of
rebuilding machine tools and rnodiSring them for munitions production. In charge of this
"Machine Tool Rebuilding Area" was a civilian administrator by the name of Arnold and
three Militaiy District 4 personnel including Major D.J.
0 ' ~ o n a h o e The
. ~ ~bulk of Citadel
Merchandising's labour force consisted of refugees. AS a result. a group of engineers from
Camp Farnham were released for work in the new factory. As one intemee said: "We
were fiee people working for the Canadian Governrnent for standard normal wages.. .We
succeeded fairly well. It's not easy within a shon time to put up a full fledged machine
tool rebuilding operation. but we did.. .so we had a successful operation until 1944-1945."
lntemees fiom Camp Sherbrooke and Camp île-au-~oixalso found work at Citadel
~anufacturing'~
Another similar operation was initiated near Lachine in late 1941.
Known as the Lachine Machinery Service, this company also employed skilled refùpes
~
according to Eric Koch. sorne 250 refugees
and engineers on war related ~ o r k . ' Lndeed.
were released by April 1942, mostly for work in Canadian ind~stries.'~Besides the
refugees who worked in Ville LaSalle and ~achine.'~many others were employed at a rate
of $2.50 per day by factories in Montreal, Toronto and ~rantford."
Aside fiom work in Canadian factones. some refugees cooperated with the
Canadian authorities on other war-related work. At Camp Sherbrooke in September
1941.one refugee gave the camp authorities a proposal for the design of a new type of
bullet or shell for anti-tank or anti-aircraft guns. Major W.J.H. Ellwood, Camp
Sherbrooke's commandant, was so impressed by this design that he submitted the
drawings to the District Onicer Cornmanding Military District 4 '%th
the
recommendatioa that they be passed on for study and exPenment."" Moreover. refugeeengineers established a design office at Camp Famham where they made nurnerous
studies relating to artillery pieces used by the Canadian
Apart f?om scientists and engineen, unskilled rehgees could barely contribute to
Canada's war effort and were less likely to be liberated than skilled refugees. Solutions
had to be found. in order to help unskilled refugees develop trades and find jobs. the
Canadian authorities agreed to let the Montreal-based Canadian ORT Organization erect a
Mechanical Training Workshop at Camp île-aux-Noix. The process began in December
1941 when representatives fiom this organization visited Camp Île-aux-~oix." In order
not to dismb the military authonties and lose tirne. the ORT decided to constmct the
building at its own expense.'' Ln January 1942. sixty intemees began building the
~orksho~,~bhihich
opened on May 29. 1942.'~At the tirne. Camp île-aux-~oixwas the
last camp in southem Quebec where refugees were housed. Nevertheless. this
organization's aim was to "train Jewish young men and women in the industrial and
agricultural fields in order to equip hem with a trade or calling which will enable them to
take their place in life and earn a living in manual
Howard
Kennedy.
Quartemaster
General.
occupation."^
indicated:
As Major-General
". ..The Canadian ORT
Organization.. .is devoted to the creation of a new occupational existence for refbgees and
the masses of European Jews through industrial workshops. vade schools, fann
colonies.. .
7385
In other words. the task was to prepare highly skilled apprentices for war-
related work. in that sense, the ORT training workshop at Camp Île-aux-~oixconcenttated
on training refbgees as mechanics and to prepare them for work in machine shops engaged
in war production.86As the workshop prepared men for future employment in Canadian
war industries, employers ofien visited the facilities to seek new recruits. In one such case.
three representatives fiom Machinery Services Ltd. and a representative h m the Citadel
Merchandising Company, visited the camp's shop and assessed the students in late
September 1942. As a result of this visit, six refugees were selected for work at Machinery
Services Ltd. The representatives dso indicated that in the next few weeks, fifieen other
men would be chosen. Further, arrangement were made with the camp's Tools
Controller's Ofice to send old machines nom the Citadel Merchandising Company to îleaux-Noix for training purposes.87This proved that there was a great degree of CO-operation
and success between the ORT training centre at Camp île-aux-~oix and Canadian
industries.
Nevertheless, the ORT workshop began expenencing problems in early 1943 due
to reductions in the intemee population at Camp ile-aux-~oix.As Colonel H.N. Streight.
Director, Prisoners of War, indicated in a report dated March 23, 1943: "Since the 1''
December, camp strength was reduced. fiom 354 to 180. Latter figure will be down to
about 138 by reason of releases recently authorized. This will affect the ORT scho01.''~~As
it became evident that Camp île-aux-~oixwas about to close due to the reduction in the
number of refugees, the camp's ORT training school was liquidated. and al1 the rnachinery
was taken to the
ORT Technical Training School in Montreal on A p d 27, 1943. As
a
consequence, the Department of National Defence inherited the workshop on the ile-auxNoix. in the end. the ORT workshop at ile-aux-~oixwas operationai for six rn~nths.'~
Still. the Canadian ORT Organization's workshop at île-aux-~oixwas a success. A
considerable number of refugees benefited fiom this training and were able to find work in
various Canadian war industries. notably Canadian Vickers. Canadian Car and Foundry
and Defence industries Ltd. Although the Île-aux-~oix workshop was closed. the
Montreal-based office of the ORT Organization continued to serve the needs of refugees
and had re-trained 269 of its 4 18 trainees by May 1943.90 According to historian John
Joseph Kelly. the operation of the Works Program duMg the civilian phase of internent
was a complete success. As he stated: "...the Works Program was a success in that it kept
refugees gainfully occupied; it permitted them to eam money with which to finance any
purchases they deemed necessary from the camp canteen; it did not leave them idle time
with which to contemplate their fate; it gave the govemrnent materials and crops that it
would not have received otherwise; and it provided a profit for the program as a whole."
So successful was the Works Program that when prisoners of war replaced civilian
intemees at Camp Sherbrooke, the operation resumed. Furthemore, the Works Program
paved the way for the larger-scale labour projects that emerged in 1943 to compensate for
the lack of labour in Canada. This included the employment of prisoners of war by lumber
compMes and western wheat fields owners?'
The Works Program had been such a success that when prisonea of war arrived at
Camp Sherbrooke in December 1942, the project remained operational. At the time, there
was "a growing demand for the better allocation of human resomes on the homefiont."
Ottawa was beginning to view the immense pool of prisoners of war as
a passive labour
force which could be exploited for the benefit of Canada. Ody a few month later, on May
10, 1943, the Canadian Govenunent authorized the Departments of Labour and National
Defence to employ prisoners of war on a voluntary basis for essential work projects across
the country at a rate of 50c per day. As a result, when the war ended, some 16,000
pnsoners of war had been employed since early August 1943. in more than 169 different
projects in factories. on docks, in mines, in fields and in forests? Hence. the resurnption
of the Works Program at Camp Sherbrooke was but a mere inteption into this wider
scheme. As camp authorhies indicated: "The continued operation of the Works Prograrn
depends upon production. So long as sufficient production is maintained to warrant
economical operation. workshops will be maintained. otherwi'se the Works Program will
be ciosed d o ~ n . ' "Lt.-Col.
~
W.D.Graham. Camp Sherbrooke's commandant. even stated
in July 1943. that '-ihe Works Prograrn has been considered to be the main reason for
having the camp. and discipline has been a secondary consideration."
To maximize production and create the best work environment possible, most of
the camp's "bad elements" were transfened to other camps as of May 1944. These
included professional gamblen; manufacturers and dealers of alcoholic drinks; escapees;
and fanatical Nazis. This ensured that only those prisoners willing to cooperate with the
Works Program remained in the camp. To M e r alleviate the tensions arising from
intemment and to raise morde, the prisoners at Camp Sherbrooke were given a great
many privileges and liberties. For instance, prisonen could walk out of the camp on
parole and go fishing on the nearby St. François
Prisoners appreciated these
specid privileges and undemood that any breach would mean a r e m to past conditions.
As one inmate told his wife:
-
"We have walking privileges in this camp we can't
see a
guard armed, and it is up to us, how long we will enjoy these liberties. Anyone should try
to escape these Iiberties will be over..."" Inmates greatly appreciated what the Canadian
authorities were doing by easing camp discipline. As another intemee told his wife: "This
camp is the best camp in this country
- which fact has been also established by the
protecting power. - Al1 POWs going to work every day in factory, myself working 8 h o m
a day over a year aiready - and enjoying more pnvileges over the other POW camps.
Therefore 1 would beg you al1 neither food stuffs, nor cigarettes to send
- as we have
everythmg we need."97 So successful had been the Works Program that when operations
were teminated in June 1946 with the camp's closure, the Department of Justice took
over most of the workshops' machinery with the intention of integrating a similar
program into Canadian prisons.98
In the end. labour projects enabled inmates to earn money while k i n g intemed.
However. such progams were not the only way through which intemees could gain
income. According to the Geneva Convenfion, pnsoner of war ofticen were to continue
receiving their military salaries. As article 23 stipulated:
Officers and persons of equivalent statu who are prisonen of war shall
receive from the Detaining Power the same pay as officen of coiiesponding
rank in the armed forces of that Power, provided, however. that such pay
does not exceed that to which they are entitled in the armed forces of the
country in whose service they have ken. This pay shall be paid to them in
Ml, once a month if possible, and no deduction therefiom shall be made for
expenditure devolving upon the Detaining Power, even if such expenditure
is incuned on their behalf. An agreement between the belligerents shall
prescnbe the rate of exchange applicable to this payment; in default of such
agreement, the rate of exchange ado ted shall be that in force at the moment
of the commencement of hostilities.&
This meant that the Canadian govemment was responsible for the service pay of German
pnsoner of war officen. For instance, a Geman Brigadier-General received $53.16 per
rnonth while a Lieutenant earned $21.26. AS for the other pnsonea of war it was the
German govemment which took care of their salaries. These were paid in the form of
monthly allowances, which were distributed to the intemees through the Swiss delegation.
Nonîommissioned officers were paid $1 1 per month while privates received $6.60. On
,
the other hand, enemy merchant seamen received quarterly payments from their shipping
companies. in most cases, their monthly salas, was $13-26. Civilian intemees could also
receive an allocation fiom the Geman authorities if they declared to the Swiss Consul
their loyalty to the Third Reich.''' Furthemore, intemees oflen received money in lettea
fiom fiiends and relatives and sometimes benefited fiom donations by relief societie~.'~'
Because inmates were not allowed to carry money on their persons, earned incornes
were usually credited to the pnsoners' trust accounts. 'O2 The main reason for doing so was
to forbid pnsoners from resoning to . illicit activities such as gambling and bribery.
Prisoners were prohibited fiom using any form of oficial currency, whether it be cash.
money orders or cheques. in the labour projects, this financial procedure was followed.
Pay lists were prepared monthly fiom daily time sheets by the internees' Works Onice and
çubmitted to the camp's orderly room for double-checking. The lists were then forwarded
to the Deputment of National Defence. which was responsible for the printing of pay
cheques. As soon as these cheques were received in each camp. "the individual prisoners
whose name appear on the pay list are credited with the arnount of wages earned by them
for the month in question." At no point was an intemee to be credited in his account with
pay for work until payment had been received h m 0ttawa.lo3 Similar procedures also
applied whenever pnsoners received allowances fiom Germany or money from relatives.
In that sense, rnist accounts formed the comerstone of camp monetary system.
Although pnsoners were not allowed to c a r y money. they could use their credit to
purchase goods fiom their canteen. According to article 12 of the Geneva Convention. "in
al1 camps. canteens shall be instailed at which prisoners shall be able to procure, at the
local market price, food cornmodities and ordinary articles. The profits accming to the
administrations of the camps from the canteens shall be utilized for the benefit of the
pi~oners."'~
This enabled intemees to reinvest money in their camp's economy. Because
intemees were aot allowed to carry money, an altemative means of purchase had to be
adopted. It was with this intention in mind that canteen tickets were issued by camp
bank~.'~~
Whenever an interne desired to Gthdraw credit fiom his account in order to
buy goods fiom the canteen, he would be provided with this fom of currency. As it was
indicated in a Camp Famharn memorandum of 1941:
These tickets are issued to the intemees as required by them against their
signature on an Acquittance Roll prepared for this purpose. A cheque for
the total arnount of these Acquiitance Rolls is then made on the Famham
intemment Camp Trust Account in favour of the Camp "-4" htemees
Canteen and deposited to the credit of that account in the bank, and each
prisoner is then debited with the amount s h o w opposite his name in the
Trust Account ledger.'06
Such a procedure ensured that credit was adequately nansferred fiom an internee's account
to the canteen. However. this could only be done if the internee concemed had suffîcient
balance in his trust account and if the Acquittance Roll had k e n authenticated by both the
camp spokesman and the treasurer.
The issue and control of canteen tickets was the
responsibility of the intemees thern~elves.'~'Denominations recornmended for canteen
tickets were of the values of $1.00, 50C. 2%. 1Oc. 05 e and O1 do*
To ppreveni illegal
activities. numerous mesures were introduced for the proper administration of canteen
tickets. As it was indicated in the Orders and lnstruciions. Internmenr Camps:
Coloured printed tickets only will be used. Tickets will bear the numbdr of
the camp. the value, and the period of validity. Colours will be changed
semi-annually...Tickets of different denorninations are to be in different
colours. At the end of each half year (June 30. December 3 1) al1 tickets wiil
be calied in an a fresh issue of tickets made of a different colour.. .Ail
tickets called in at the end of half-year periods.. .are to be cremated in the
presence of a responsible officer representing the Commandant. 'Og
By introducing new canteen tickets every six months, prisoners were prevented fiom
accumulating large surns which could be used for gambling and participation in other
illegal acti~ities."~
When a prisoner was transferred elsewhere, tickets to be redeemed
were retumed to the camp treasurer and a certificate to this effect was handed over to the
camp staff. Wfunds were available. the appropriate amont was credited to the internee's
mst account."' h the end, canteen tickets were the only form of currency that intemees
could use to purchase commodities. As such. prisoners could only buy outside goods
through camp canteens.
'l2
The operation of canteens was coordinated by a cornmittee selected by the
prisoners. 1 1 3 Canteens offered intemees an oppomuiity to improve thek standard of living.
" ~ were
Canteen were usudly established within a month of a camp's o p e r ~ i n ~ .Items
classed in eight categories: (1) TOBACCO:ash trays, cigars, cigarettes. lighter, matches,
pipes, tobacco. etc.; (2) CONFECTIONERY: beer, candies, candles, chewing gum,
chocolate bars, soA drinks, etc.; (3) GROCERIES: cakes, coffee, ice cream, fresh fniits
and vegetables, sauces, sugar, tea, etc.; (4) TOILET ARTICLES: bnishes, hair tonic,
mirrors, razoa and blades, scissors, shoe polish, soap, toothpaste and toothbnishes. etc.;
(5) STATIONERY: books. glue, gramophone needles, ink, music records, paint and
bnishes. paper, Fens and pencils. playing cards, rulers, etc.: (6) CLOTHING: jackets.
gloves, pyjamas. shirts, shoes and laces. shower sandals. socks, ties, towels, undenvear.
etc.: (7) LITERATURE: daily. weekly or monthly magazines published in Canada or the
United Kingdom and newspapers.; and (8) MISCELLANEOUS: c m openers. fly
repulsers. pillows, remedies. seeds. tumblen. watches. etc.''' Al1 of these products had to
' l6 Numerous Canadian enterprises were involved
be purchased directly fiom the suppliers.
in such transactions. including the Colgate-Palmolive Company, imperid Tobacco and the
Eaton Company. Canteen merchandise could also be acquired fiom local businesses.
Products were purchased fiom local daines. greenhouses, news companies and
pharmacies. Because commodities were usually purchased in large quantities, canteens
contnbuted notably to the region's econorny.''' However, none of these supplien could
fumish camp canteen with goods which had been rationed for the war effort or were in
short supply for the civilian market. For instance, when the Camp Famham canteen tried
to acquire 20 Ibs. of nuts, 50 Ibs. of raisins or currents. 300 lemons, 100 Ibs. of butter and
60 lbs. of coffee for their Christmas festivities in November 1944,"'
the Depanment of
National Defence replied: "Any rationed article such as butter will not be approved at any
time.. .the other supplies such as raisins, currents, etc. are in short supply for the civilian
market and are not approved for that rea~on.""~
Aithough internees were forbidden to buy rationed goods through normal Canadian
suppliers. they could do so via relief organizations. Such organizations were regarded by
the Canadian authorities as viable suppliers for camp canteens. Because most relief
societies were neutral organizations which operated world wide, intemees couid
sometimes purchase products which were not available in Canada and had been rationed
on the Canadian market. Such was the case in April 1943 when the Camp Farnharn
spokesman requested the International Red Cross to gather such rationed grocery products
as cimamon, essence of almonds, vanilla, cloves, pot-herbs, paprika and nuts for the
canteen. Furtherrnore, the camp spokesman indicated: "It should be specially appreciated,
if you could find some way in securing oranges and grapefnuts in those months when
Canadian fresh fruits are not available." Needless to Say that such acquisitions were not
always appreciated by camp authorities since they had to conform with Canada's rationing
p~licies."~
Canteen inventories usually varied on a monthly basis. Such was the case at
Camp Sherbrooke where the canteen held $5.954 worth of merchandise in July 1945 and
9 1,392 the next month. 12'
Canteen cornmittees would send their requests to suppliers and pay upon receipt of
the merchandise.'= To ensure the viability of this procedure. canteen stewards had to
make sure 'ïhat at al1 times the cash in bank is sufficient to pay al1 outstanding
commitments: this meant that prisoners had to purchase canteen tickets in advance of the
orders placed with s ~ ~ ~ l i e r s To
. " "help
~ administer canteens. internees aiso loaned money
from relief oqanizations. Such was the case at Camp Famham in Febniary 1945 when the
canteen committee handed the International Cornmittee of the Red Cross a Canadian Bank
of Commerce Draft in the amount of $1.600. This was to be the final p a v e n t due on an
original loan of $5,000 which had been arranged between the Red Cross and the Camp
Farnham
ant te en.'^^
To assure profits, canteens were allowed to buy products from local suppliers at
usual civilian or retail prices and seil them at a higher rate. 125 Prices were controlled and
supervised by camp authorities, but a profit margins still existed. Coffee was purchased
fiom supplien at a cost price of 36C and sold to the intemees for 50e; playing cards were
bought for 29 c and sold for 33 e ;'26 chocolate bars were acquired for 6 c and sold for 7C ;
beer was bought at 19C and sold at 20C; and chewing gum was purchased at 6 C and sold
for 7C.'21 Canteens also enabled intemees to eam money by selling handicrafts. Talented
prisones and artists created incredible masterpieces out of wood, Stone and other products
which could usually be found within the camps. Woodcarving was one of the moa
popular fonn of art. Using nothing but small pocket knives and old razor blades, inmates
fashioned ashtrays, bottieshipç, chas boards, cigarette holders and, of course, figures.'*'
Artists also created incredible drawings, sketches, painting and p~erns.'~~
Numerous
topics were addressed Ui works of art, including women, camp life and l a n d s ~ a ~ e s . * ~ ~
Canteens gave such artists thepssibility to eam money by selling their products.
In moa cases, canteen kept 10% of al1 sales. Prisoners could also sel1 their artistic
products through the numerous
an exhibitions held inside the camps. During such
exhibitions. inmates were often given the opportunity to seIl their art work outside of the
enclosure. Ali sales were to be done through the "proper channels" and were to be guided
by nvo conditions: "(1) The price of each article is to be marked plainly and the censor's
s m p must be placed on each article before sale; (2) payment for micles sold ourside the
enclosure will be made to the accounts officer who al1 credit the individuals trust account
with such payments. The securing of handicrafts through the medium of gifts or barter is
strictly prohibited."'3' Works could also be sent to Geneva (Switzerland) to be displayed
for the International Red Cross prisoners of war art expositions Such was the case for two
Camp Famham prisoners in Ianuary 1945. 13'
in general. canteen profits were used for the amelioration of living conditions in
the camps of southem Quebec. Kept in a special account, this money gave the inmates
enough financial power to serve many of their collective needs. Sometimes. profits were
used as payment for intemee damage to camp property.'33 As for the rest of canteen
profits, pnsoners could use it as they pleased.'34 As it was indicated in a Camp Farnham
memorandum in March 1941: "...profits for the month.. .are paid out to various prisonen
as decided by the Prisoners' Cornmittee in the fom of wages to those who do not receive
wages from the Director of Internment Operations...and also for general camp
benefits."'" Canteen profits were oRen used for the purchase of recreational and
educational rnateria~.'~~
However, when most of the camps closed in 1946, it became very
dificulr to distribute left-over canteen profits among the prisoners. Because al1 of the
prisoners had been ûansferred to the United Kingdom contacting every one of them over
the issue of canteen profits proved impossible. For this reason, the profits made by d l
Canadian intemrnent camp canteens were placed in a special mist fbnd registered by the
Receiver General of Canada This money was then handed over to any international
organization willing to use the fimd for the benefit and aid of those prisoners of war who
had formerly been held in canada.13'
The establishment of labour projects enabled southem Quebec inrnates to eam
money which could be reinvested in camp economies by purchashg commodities through
canteens. Such oppomuiities gave prisoners a sense of autonomy while contributing to
Canada's war effort. Whether they worked on famis or in workshops, intemees leaned new
uades which they couid use after the war. It also pennitted camp authonties to better
manage internee behavior. Afier dl, a working intemee had less tirne to plot against camp
authonties or plan escapes. Furthemore. the bare fact that they were eaming money from
the Canadian authorities led fewer intemees to adopt rebellious behavior. in fact. prisoners
undentood that any act of dissension on their part might mean the end of paid pnvileges
and the labour projects altogether. With this in mind. camp life became very much
influenced by such propms. With their earnings, southem Quebec inrnates could
purchase goods through their camp's canteen. By doing so. pnsoners were able to increase
their standard of living and. as far as possible. their enjoyment of camp life.
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Red Cross)," November 26, 1940.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 2
(November 1940), W m Diary of Internment Camp "A " (No. 410). Fmnham, November 23,
1944 p. 8.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 5 (February 1941), Ww Dicrry of
Infemment Camp "N" OVo. 42, Newingîon (Sherbrooke). %temee Statemenf" Febmary 2 1,
1941, Appendix 2, p. 3.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 7 (April 1941), War
Diury of Intemmenr Camp '*Nu(No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), Apt4 3, 1941, p. 1.;
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 13 (October 1941), W m Dimy of Intemment
C m p "NuNo. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), October 13, 1941 and October 16, 1941, pp. 34.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Vol. 15,400, Volume 14 (Novernber 194 l), War Diury of
Intemment Camp "N" (No. 42)1Newingron (Sherbrooke), November 7, 1941, p. 1 .
NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Vol. 65 76,Fiie: 1 - 1-5, Employnient und Pay oflntemees, 1939-1943,
"Scheme for the Employment of [ntemed Aliens," June 1 1, 1940.
NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Vol. 6576, File: 1 1-5, EmpIoyment and Pay of Infernees, 1939-1943,
"Scherne for the Ernployment of Intemed Aliens," June 1 1, 1940.
NAC, DND, IO,RG-24, Reei: C-5378, File: HQS 7236-20, ûrganixtion and Administration.
Camp Farnham, 1940-1946, "Brig.Cen. Edouard de Bellefeuille Panet (Director of
intemment Operation), to the Adjutant-General (Department of National Defence)."
September 5. 1940.
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,397. Volume 1 (October 1940), W m Diury of Inrernment
Camp "A " No. -10).Furnham, October 18. 1940, p. 6.
NAC, DND. IO. RG-24. Vol. 15.397, Volume 1 (October 1940), Wur Dias) of Inremmen!
Camp ''A N0.40). Farnhom. October 27, 1940. p. 1 1 .; NAC. DND, 10. RG-24. Vol. 15.397.
Volume 6 (March 194 1 ). War Diary of Internment Camp "A " No. 40). Fmnham. March I 1.
1941. p. 4.; NAC, DND. IO. RG-24. Vol. 15,397, Volume 8 (May 194 1). War Diav of
Infemment Camp * A"(No. 40). Farnham. "May 1. 1941, p. 1. ;NAC, DND. 10. RG-24. Vol.
1 5.397. Volume 8 (May 194 1 ). War Dia? of lnrernme~Camp "A " (No. 40). Farnhom. May
14. 1941: May 15, 1941; and May 19, 1941. pp. 3 4 .
NAC. DND. 10. RG-24. Vol. 15.399, Volume 1 1 (March 1941 ), War Diary of Inrernment
Camp "I"(No. 411, Fort Lennox, jle-aur-hiok May 11. 1941. p. 3.
NAC. DND. IO. RG-24. Vol. 1 1 .Z3. File: 1 1-34 1, Inspection Reports. Comp he-aux-~oix.
1940-I941, "Inspection Report," June 25. 1941.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399.
Volume 27 (September 1942). Wor Diory of Inteniment Camp "1"(No. 41). Fort Lennox. fleaux-Nok, September Il. 1942, p. 1.
NAC. DND, [O, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 13 (October 194l), War Diary of Internment
Camp "A " (No. JO), Farnhant, October 7, 1941 and October 14, 194 1, pp. 2,4.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24. Vol. 15,397, Volume 12 (September 1941), W m D i q of lntemment
Camp "A " No. 401, F m h a m , September 8, 1941 and September 30, 1941, pp. 3,7.
However, the transfer of prisoners within the camps had reperîussions on the h s , as was
the case in Famham. Durhg the 1941 season, when civilian intemees were held in the camp,
production on the farm was somewhat diversified. The main reason was that numerous
captives had previously k e n fmen. On the other hand, when Enerny Merchant Seamen
(EMS) fomed the bulk of the intemees during the 1942 season, emphasis was placed on
potatoes since they were easier to harvest. The fact was that most sailors had never famed. in
fact, the camp harvested 1,500 Ibs. of beets, 5,760 Ibs. of cabbage, 4,350 Ibs. of carrots, 60
Ibs. of cucumbers, 3,000 Ibs. of tumips and 9,955 ibs. of tomatoes during the 1942 season as
oppose to 101,625 Ibs. of potatoes. ïherefore, lack of famiing experience led seamen to place
ernphasis on a crop which was easy to produce. This well demonsûated how different kinds of
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intemees coordinated and practiced farming. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397,
Volume 23 (August 1942). Wor Diary of lniemrneni Camp "A N o . 40). F m h o m , "Fam
Produce Works Program," August 1942, p. 8.
NAC. DM), 10. RG-24, Reek C-5403, File: HQS 7236-83-7-40, IRC Correspondence. Camp
Furnham, 1943-194.1, "Emest L. Maag (Delegate in Canada for the international Committee
of the Red Cross)to S. Marley Scott (Department of Extemal Anairs)," March 23, 1943.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5396, File: HQS 7236-79, q c e r s . Grande Ligne. 19121916. "Schlichting (Camp Famahm Spokesman) to Emest L. Maag (Delegate of the Red
Cross)," January S 1, 1943.
NAC. DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5403, File: HQS 7236-83-7-40, MC Correspondence. Camp
Farnhum. 1943-1944, "Emest L. Maag (Delegate in Canada For the international Comminee
of the Red Cross) to S. Marley Scott (Department of Extemal Affain)," March 23, 1943.
NAC, DND, IO. RG-24, Vol. 1 5,403, Volume 6 (June 1943). War Diary of lnlernmenf Cump
No. 44, Grande Ligne. June 1, 1943; June 5, 1943; and lune 6, 1943, p. 1.
NAC. DND. IO, RG-24. Vol. 15.403, Volume 6 (June 1943, Wur D i q of infernmenf Camp
No. 44. Grande Ligne. June 28, 1943; lune 29, 1943: and June 30, 1943, p. 5.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-44, hefligence Reports, Camp
Grande Ligne. f9Gl946. "September 1943 intelligence Summary." October 1 1. 1943. ;
NAC, DND, IO. RG-24, Vol. 15.403, Volume 9 (September 1943), Wm D i q ofhemmenr
Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne. "Lt.Sol. E.D.B. Kippen (Camp Commandant) to Director
Prisonen of War." September 30, 1943, Appendix 3.
NAC. DND. IO. RG-24. Reel: C-54 13. File: HQS 7236-9 1- 1-44. Yisirs by Representafives of
Protecting Power. Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-194S. "Report by E.L. Maag (International
Committee of the Red Cross)," July 21, 1943.; NAC. DND. IO, RG-24. Vol. 15.403. Volume
9 (Septernber 1943). War Diary oflnternment Camp No. 44. Grande Ligne, September 7,
1913: Septernber 15. 1943: September 22, 1943: September 13. 1943; and September 24.
1943. pp. 3-6.; NAC, DND. IO. RG-24. Reel: C-5416. File: HQS 7236-94-6-44. Inrelligence
Reports. Camp Grande Ligne. 19434946. "Septernber 1943 Intelligence Summary," October
1 1, 1943.; NAC. DND, IO. RG-24, Vol. 15.403, Volume 10 (October 1943). War D i a y of
lnternmenr Camp No. 44. Grande Ligne. October 25, 1 943, p. 5. ; NAC, DND. 10. RG-24.
Vol. 15,403. Volume 13 (January 1944), War Diary of intenimen! Camp No. 44, Grande
Ligne. lanuary 13, 1944. p. 3.: NAC. DND, 10, RG-24. Vol. 15.403. Volume 14 (February
1944), War Diary of infemment Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, February 1 1, 1 944. p. 3.
NAC, DND. 10. RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 12 (December 1943), War D i q v of Inlemment
Camp No. 44. Grande Ligne, December 6, 1943, p. 2.: NAC, DND,10. RG-24,Vol. 15,403.
Volume 21 (September 1944), W m Diary of Intement Ccnnp No. 44, Grcmde Ligne.
September 12, 1944, p. 4.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-44, Camp
Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, "December 1945 Information Summarv,"
January 5. 1946.
NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 3 (March 1943), W m Dimy of Inremment
Cump No. M Grande Ligne, March 24, 1943, p. 6.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Vol. 15.403.
Volume 4 (April 1 943), War D i m of Infemment Camp No. 44,Grande Ligne, April 1 . 1943;
April3, 1943; and April2 1, 1943, pp. 1,4.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24,Vol. 15,403, Volume 15
(March 1944), W m Dimy of lnrernment Camp No. 44, Gronde Ligne, March 1 9, 1944 and
March 2 1, 1944, pp. 5-6.; NAC. DND,IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 17 (April 1944), Far
Diaty of Internent Camp No. 44, Gronde Ligne, April 14, 1944 and A p d 2 1. 1944. pp. 4,6.
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35
36
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NAC, DND, 10, RG-24. Vol. 15,403, Volume 2 1 (September 1944), W m Dimy of Inremment
Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, Septernber 12, 1944, p. 4.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,403,
Volume 21 (September 1944), W m Diary of Intemment Camp No. 44, Gronde Ligne,
September 2 1 , 1944, p. 7.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Cump Intelligence, Camp
Grande Ligne, 194.1-IW6. "June 1945 intelligence Summary", June 1945.
NAC, DND.IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 30 (June 1945), W m D i q of lnternment Camp
No. 44, Grande Ligne, June 4. 1945, p. 1 .; NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,404. Volume 32
(August 1945), War Diary oflnfemment Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, August 7, 1945, p. 1.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp intelligence, Camp
Farnham, 1941-1946, "Juiy 1945 interpreter's Report," August 1, 1945.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24. Red: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-40, Reports for Psychological
Worfare Cornmirtee. Camp Famham, 1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp
Commandant) to District Officet Comrnanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," March 15. 1945.
NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-40, Reporis for PsychoZogical
Warfoe Committee. Camp Farnham, 1944-1946. *'Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp
Commandant) to District Oficer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4." A p d 12. 1945.
NAC, DND, 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence. Camp
Famhani. 1941-1946. "August 1945 interpreter's Report," August 3 1, 1945.; NAC, DND,10.
RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 1394-40, Camp intelligence, Camp Fmham, l94M9.16.
"September 1945 Interpreter's Report," September 30. 1945.
NAC, DND. IO. RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence. Camp
Farnhom. 1WCZ9.16. "August 1945 Interpreter's Report," August 3 1. 1945.
NAC. DND. IO. RG-24, Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9139-4-40. Camp Intelligence. Curnp
Farnham. 1944-1946. "August 1945 Interpreter's Report," August 3 1. 1945.
"Les 'huttes'sont entourées de jardins de la victoire ou l'on a récolte des centaines et des
centaines de livres de légumes de toutes sortes. Un grand jardins communal en dehors de
l'enclos fournit même une abondante récolte de pommes de terres et de choux, si populaire
parmi les allemands. Ils pratiquent aussi l'élevage des lapins, de sorte qu'un dimanche par
mois ils jouissent d'un civet en plus du menu ordinaire." See Alfred Desrochers, "Une journée
avec les prisonniers allemands du camp Newington," La Tribune de Sherbrooke, October 29,
1945. p. 10.; Gaskell. p. 105.
As the camp intelligence officer reported in May 1945: Wearly al1 of the prisoners had their
sharing lots and were looking after hem." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File:
HQS 9 1 39-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 19441946, "Apd 1945 Intelligence
Report", May 3, 1945.; NAC, DND, D.RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp
intelligence. Camp Fumham, 1944-19J6, "July 1945 interpreter's Report", August 1, 1945.
Prisoners also raised a male canary in these greenhouses. See NAC, DND. 10. RG-24, Reel:
C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Cump Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, "Marc h
1945 intelligence Report." April 2, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS
9 139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, "Febmary 1945 Inteiligence
Report," March 4, 1945.;
NAC, D m ,10, RG-24,Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-40, Reprtsjor Psychological
WoTfie Committee. Cump Funhcmt. 1944-1946, "Lt.Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp
Commandant) to District Oficer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," April 12, 1945.
ETRC,ETC, 98-003, Box No. 121. File: 2.25, &al History of Eusrem TownshipsAnglophone
Women Dwing the Second World War, "interview of Eleanor Taylor by Susan Lefebvre and
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inteIZigence, Cump Fomham, 1944-1946, "September 1945 Interpreter' s Report," September
30, 1945. ;NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Red: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence,
Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, "Febniary 1946 Intelligence Report.," Feb1946.; NAC,
DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5374, File: HQS 7236-1-1044, Snength R e t m s , Camp Grande
Ligne. 1943-1946, "State of POW Employed on Work Projects," February 13, 1946.; NAC,
DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9 139-4-40, Camp intelligence. Camp Fmham,
1944-1946. "March 1946 Interpreter's Report," April 5, 1946.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24,Reel:
C-5376, File: HQS 7236-1- 13-40, Monthly Retum of PM Q.artered ond Rcirioned Outside
Cump, Camp F m h a m . 194449.16, "Retum of PsOW and Intemees on strength of Camp No.
40 who are Quartered and Rationed Outside Camp," September 30, 1945; Novernber 30,
1945; Mach 30, 1946; and May 3 1, 1946.
Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps.. ., p. 75.
NAC. DND,10, RG-24,Vol. 15.399, Volume 4 (October 1940), War Diury of ïntemmenr
Camp Y" N o . J I ) . Fort Lennox. fie-aux- NO^, October 5, 1940, p. 2 .
Koch, p. 219.
Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps..., p. 78.
NAC. DND, 10, RG-24. Vol. 15,400, Volume 13 (October 1941). War Diury of Infemment
Camp "N" (No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), "Report by Major W.J.H. Ellwood (Camp
Commandant)," October 23, 1 94 1. Appendix 1, pp. 32-33.
Kelly, The Prisoner of War C a m ~ s ..,. pp. 76-77.; Priebe, p. 183.
Kelly. The Prisoner of War Camps.. ., pp. 76-77.; Priebe, p. 183.
Koch. p. 2 19.: NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 3 (December 1940), Wor Diory
of lnternmrnt Camp "N"N o . 42), Newington (Sherbrooke), December 2 1. 1940. p. 2.
NAC. DND.10. RG-24. Vol. 15,399. Volume 10 (July 1941), Wur Diay of Infemment Camp
" N u (No. C).Newington (Sherbrooke). July 20, 1941, p. 5.
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24. Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (July 1941). War Diary of Internrnenr Camp
"N" No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), July 2 1, 1941, p. 5.
Kelly. The Prisoner of War Camps.. .. p. 79.
Opened on April 15, 1941, the Net Making Department employed some 1 10 internees by July
1941. By that time, some 300 camouflage nets had k e n produced and had been shipped to the
dyen. The project ended in the Autumn of 1941 and was replaced with the Canadian ORT
Organization's workshop in early 1942. See Kelly, The Prisoner of War C a m ~...,
s p. 78.:
NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 10 (April 1941). Wor Diary of Internrnenf
Camp "1" No. J I ) , FUPILennox. ~le-aia-Akx,A p d 15, 1941, p. 2 .: NAC, DND,10, RG-24.
Vol. 15,399, Volume 1 1 (March 1941), W m D i q y of Internment Cmp "1" 6%. J I ) . Fort
Lennox, i l e - m - ~ o i xMay
,
3 1, 1941, p. 4.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 1 1,253, File: 11-24 1. Inspection Reports. Camp ,!le-atn-~o~t.
1940-1941. "hspection Report," June 25. 1941.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 13 (July 194 1), Wor Diary cf Inteniment Camp
"1" (No. II), Fort Lennox, he-aux-~oix,July 6, 1941, p. 1.
NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 4 (January 1941), W m Dimy of Internment
Camp "A " (No. 40/, Fumham, January 7. 1941;January 7, 1941; lanuary 8, 1941;January 22,
1941; and January 27, 1941, pp. 2- 10.; NAC, DND, IO. RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 5
(Febniary 1941), W m D i q of lnternment Camp '*A" (No.JO), Fmnhm, February 24, 194 1,
p. 7.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 14 (November 194 1), W m Diory cf
Infemment Camp "A " (No. 40). Fumham, November 194 1, Appendix 4.
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Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps..., p. 79.; NAC, DND, IO. RG-24, Vol. 1 1,249. File: 9-53-40, IRC Report, Camp Fmho>n Ig#O-f9#i, "Report of the April7, 1941 Red Cross visit to
Camp Farnharn," June 2, 1941.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 1 1,253, File: 1 1-2-40, Inspection Reports. Camp Famham.
1940-1941, "Inspection Report," June 24. 1941.; NAC. DND, 10, RG-24. Vol. 15,397,
Volume 14 (November 1941), Wur D i q of Inremment Camp "A " (No. 40). Farnham,
November 1941, Appendix 4.
NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 6 (March 194l), W m Dm of Intemment
Cump "A " (No. 41). Fmham, '"'Shop Rules and Regulations Governing Interna1 Discipline
for the Successful Operation of the Factory by Major E.D.B. Kippen (Camp Commandant),"
March 3, 1 94 1, Appendix 3.
NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.400, Volume 13 (October 1941), War Diary of Intemment
Camp "N" (No. 12). Newingron (Sherbrooke), "Camp Spokesman Statement," October 1 5.
194 1, Appendix 2. pp. 1-3.: NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.400, Volume 13 (October 194 1).
War Diary of lnterrtmenr Camp "N" (No. 42). Newing~on(Sherbrooke), "Major W.J.H.
Ellwood (Camp Commandant) to the District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Militaq District
4." October 24. 1941. Appendix 1, pp. 36-37. NAC. DND. 10,RG-24, Vol. 15.400. Volume
13 (October 194 1 ). Wur Diury of lnternment Camp "N" (No. 12). Newington (Sherbrooke).
October 1. 1941; October 24, 1941; and October 28. 1941. pp. 1-5..
Koch. p. 230.
NAC. DND. 10. RG-24, Vol. 15.400. Volume 13 (October 194 1 ). War Dia? of lnternment
Camp "N " N o . 42)).Newington (Sherbrooke), "Camp Spokesman Statement," October 1 5.
1941. Appendix 2. pp. 1-3.: NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.400, Volume 13 (October 1941 ),
War Diu? of lniernrnent Camp "N" (No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke). "Major W J.H.
Ellwood (Camp Commandant) to the Camp Spokesman." October 20. 194 1. Appendix 1. p.
28.
NAC. FHTC. EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Heimut Pokomy by Hamy Rasky
(CBC) in Perth (Ontario)," [ 1980's], pp. 3-1 1 - 3-13, 3-22 - 3-23.
NAC, FHTC. EK, MG-30, C 192. Vol. 3. "Interview of Helmut Pokomy by Harry Rasky
(CBC) in Perth (Ontario)," [ 1980's ] , pp. 3- 1 1 - 3- 13.
NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 12 (September 1941 ), W m D i q cf Intemment
Camp "A " (No. 401. Fumham, September 14. 1941, p. 4.
Koch, p. 230.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 16 (January 1942), War D i q of lnternment
Camp "N" OVo. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), January 27, 1942 and January 30, 1942, pp. 78.; NAC. DND. 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 17 (February 1942), W m Diary of
infemment Cump "N"(7%. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), Febmary 2, 1942, p. 1.
Carter, p. 135.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 2 1 (June 1942). Wor D i q of
Internment Camp "N"No. 42). Navington (Sherbrooke), "Refugees Leaving Camp", June 26
1942, Appendix 2, p. 5.; NAC, DND, 10, KG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 22 (July 1942), War
Diory of Intemment Camp "N" (No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), Wominal Roll of
Refugees Leaving Camp", July 7, 1942 and July 18, 1942. Appendix 2, pp. 2,6.
According to the inmate's rough drafts: "...atîached to the base of the bullet or shell there
should be a second part filled with magnesium or highly inflammable wire which on
percussion wouid be broken at its c o ~ e c t i n gneck from the bullet proper and be set on fire.
By some device the base of this portion shouid be made to split outwards so that it would be
prevented fiom passing through the hole made by the bullet on contact with its target and so
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have the effect of expending the buming time. It is fiequently reported that aeroplanes renirn
riddled with bullet holes and the feeling is tbat if each bullet left behind it a piece of buming
magnesium wire, the effect would be disastrous. Similarly in anti-tank operations an amour
piercing bullet passing through the gasoline tank and leaving its trail of burning magnesium
would be most effective." See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Vol. 15,400, Voiume 13 (September
194 1), W m Diory of Internment Camp "N"(No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), "Major W .J .H.
Ellwood (Camp Commandant) to District OfXcer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4,"
Septernber 8, 194 1, Appendix 1 . p. 1 8.
As one refugee-engineer recalled: "...I personally was involved in setting up a design office
for gun reernea and tools for the guns in conjunction with industries.. .they made the 4' naval
guns, and out of the camp compound we set up a design office for about I I or 15
engineers.. .under the supervision of a Fienchman from.. .Paris. who had corne over to help US
design these special tools for the guns." As another intemee noted: "There were a group of
engineen who were experts in cheeks and fixtures and so on and they designed al1 the cheeks
and fixtures of one of the famous Canadian guns in the Second World War, the 25 pounder,
and that was all done in the camp." See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192. Vol. 3, "Interview
of Helmut Pokorny by Hany Rasky (CBC)in Perth (Ontario)," [ 1980's], pp. 3-10 - 3-1 1 .;
NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30. C 192. Vol. 3, "interview of Toni Obert by Harry Rasky (CBC) in
Hudson Heights (Quebec)," [ 1980's] , p. 38-3.
NAC. DND. 10. RG-24, Vol. 15,399. Volume i 8 (December 194 1 ), Wur D i q of Internment
Camp "I" (No. 41). Fort Lennox. lie-aux-NO&. Decernber 18, 194 1 . p. 3.
NAC. DND. 10, RG-1-4, Reel: C-5420. File: HQS 7736-96-41. Consrruction and
Mainienonce. Camp fle-dur-!Voix, IWO- IWJ. "Louis Fitch (President of the Canadian ORT
Organization) to Lt.-Col. R.S. W Fordham (Comrnissioner of Refugee Camps. Department of
the Secretary of State)," May 18, 1942. ; NAC, DND. IO. RG-24, Reel: C-5420. File: HQS
7236-96-4 1. Consn~cfion
and Manifenance. Camp jle-aux-NOU, 1940-1944. "Report by V.I.
Grossman (Executive Sectetary of the Canadian ORT Organization)," May 20, 1943.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 19 (January 1942), W m Diary of Internment
Camp "'1"INO.441 Fort Lennox. jle-am- NO^, January 17. 194 1 . p. 2.
NAC. DND, 10,RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 23 (May 1942), W m D i q of lnternment Camp
"1" (No. 4 0 , Fort Lennox. he-aux-~olx,May 29, 1942. p. 4.; NAC, DM). 10, RG-24. Reel:
C-5420. File: HQS 7236-96-41. Construction and Maintenance. Cump Île-aux-hioix. 19401944. "Colonel H.N. Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to the Adjutant-General," November
1 , 1943.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41. Consmction and
Maintenance. Cump he-aux-~oix.IWO-lgJd, "Louis Fitch (President of the Canadian ORT
Organiuition) to Lt.-Coi. R.S.W Fordham (Commissioner of Rehigee Camps, Department of
the Secretary of State)," May 18, 1942.
NAC, DND, IO. RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction und
Maintenance. Cump jle-aur-~oir. l91U-l9#1, "Major-General Howard Kennedy
(Quartemaster-ûeneraî) to Deputy Minister (Department of National Defence)," November 9,
1943.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reek C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction und
Maintenance. Camp f i e i ~ - ~ o1940-1944,
~t,
"Louis Fitch (President of the Canadian ORT
ûrganization) to Lt.-Col. R.S.W Fordham (Commissioner of Refugee Camps, Department of
the Secretary of State)," May 18, 1942.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction und
Maintenance. Camp jle-our-NO& 19.10-1944, "V.I. Grossman (Executive Secretary of the
Canadian ORT Organization) to Lt.-Col. R.S.W. Fordharn (Commissioner of Rehgee Camps,
Department of the Secreîary of State)," September 22, 1942.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-9641, Consfrucfion und
Maintenunce. Camp Île-aux-~oir.1940-1944, "Col. H.N. Streight (Director Prisonen of War)
to Director of Works and Construction (National Defence Headquarters)," March 23, 1943.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 34 (April 1943), W m Diary of Internment
Camp "1" No. 41). Fort Lennox, ile-aux-~oix,April 27, 1933, p. 4. ; NAC, DM), 10, RG24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction and Maintenance. Camp Île-ou- NO^
19504955, "V.1. Grossman (Executive Secretary of the Canadian ORT Organization) to
Major J. Renaud (District Oficer Commanding M i l i m District J)," September 2 1. 1943.:
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction und
Maintenance. Camp /le-aur-~oir.1940-1944, "Colonel H.N. Streight (Director Prisonen of
War) to the Adjutant-General," November 1, 1943.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-96-41, Construction and
hlointenonce. Camp ne-aur- oh, i9.IO-i94l9*Reportby V.I. Grossman (Executive Secretary
of the Canadian ORT Organization)," May 20, 1943.
Bernard and Bergeron, p. 24 1 .; Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps. .., p. 79, 162.
Caner. p. 135.: Kelly. "The Prisoner of War Camps.. .". pp. 15 1. 154.; Waiser, p. 220.
The new Camp Sherbrooke Works Program was divided into three depamnents: a Wood
Working Department. a Sewing Department and a Boot and Shoe Repairing Depamnent. As
Lu Tribune de Sherbrooke indicated: "Le camp de Sherbrooke est le seul camp de prisonniers
de guerre au Canada qui relève du Programme des Travaux ...A Sherbrooke. il y a quatre
grands ateliers ou les internés s'occupent a ouvrer le bois. a réparer les chaussures et à coudre
divers genre de vêtements...Le Programme des travaux fonctionne sur la même base qu'une
entreprise industrielle ordinaire...L'ouvrage du bois est la partie la plus importante du
programme. Les ateliers sont divises en deux sections. l'une où I'on pratique la production en
série et l'autre ou sont ouvrés les articles uniques ou de petite quantité. Dans la première, on
produit surtout des caisses de toutes dimensions, en planchette a claire-voie ou en bois
contreplaqué, des paliers d'entreput et tels autres travaux d'ouvriers-layetiers. On peut aussi
se faire une idée de l'importance qu'a cet atelier en songeant qu'en une seule période de deux
semaines, l'été dernier, il en sortit dix-huit wagons de marchandises.. .Parmi les commandes
qu'a remplies le Programme des travaw depuis sa fondation, il se trouve plusieurs milliers de
tables pliantes et de chaises pliantes, toutes en bois, pour les camps de l'armée canadienne,
une de 20.000 paliers d'entre@& une de 1 15 portecivietes, dont le dessin fut tracé a
Sherbrooke. et qui est une grande amélioration sur les appareils similaires déjà existants. une
autre d'une soixantaine de paires de béquille ajustables, et d'innombrables pièces particulières
allant du petit fichier à cartes jusqu'au monumental pupitres des salles administratives. Dans
de nombreux cas, le personnel devait inventer à la fois le dessin et le procédé de construction
de l'article demandé.. .Le grand atelier comprend tout l'outillage nécessaires au travail de
production en quantité: scies multiples, scies à chantourner, planeuses, embouveteuses,
façonneuses, moulureuses, etc. L'atelier spécialisé comprend un outillage aussi complet, mais
de moindre capacité et de plus grande précision, ainsi que des tours a bois et d'innombrales
outils à mains.. .Dans une série de salles voisines, une centaine d'internés s'occupent à refaire
les chaussures usagées de l'armée canadienne, pour distribution aux population d'Europe. On
reconstruit ainsi actuellement quelque 2,000 paires de souiiers et bottines Dar semaine, et I'on
s'attend prochainement à atteindre le chiffre de 5,000 paires par semaines. Les chaussures
sont d'abord examinées pour voir si elles sont bien appareillées, puis elles sont plongées dans
une solution huileuse d'ou elles sortent souples et pliables. Les semelles et les talons sont
alon aplanis et l'arche bisautée. Une équipe pose ensuite les iaonsneufs et pique à faux-frais
les semelles de caoutchouc qui seront ensuite cousws par des machines ultra-moderne.. .A la
salle des couture, il y a trente-six machines à coudre, dont une complète m e boutonnière en
10 secondes. entaille et ourlet, et une autre coud le bouton dans un temps aussi bref. L'atelier
de couture est lui aussi agencé de même façon que les ateliers industriels. II y a des ciseaux
électriques qui peuvent tailler des centaines de plis de tissus a la fois. Cette division du
Programme des travaux a rempli, il n'y a pas longtemps, une commande de 200,000 tabliers.
une autre de 100,000 pochettes à rations. Actuellement, on y façonne des chemises khaki. En
plus des ces quatre grands ateliers qui' servent a la production, il y a une boutique pour
l'ouvrage du métal, qui sen surtout à la réparation des machines et à la fabrication de pièces
particulières dont on se sert au camp. Cet atelier comprend une forge, un appareil a souder,
des tours à métaux, des foreuses, une planeuse a métal et tous les outils à main du machiniste
et du forgeron." Between 1943 and 1946, these workshops produced a wide amy of goods. So
great was production that between January and June 1945 the Wood Working Department
produced 23.842 boxes, 15.808 packing cases, 5,000 paint crates, 160 tables, 21,432 flat
pallets. 200 razor blade boxes, 300 lane marken. 209,240 shoe mes and 500 naval lockers.
On the other hand. the Sewing Depament, produced 19.653 shirts. 17.826 jackets (Summer
and Winter). 22.886 bousers (Sumrner and Winter), 96 1 pyjama trousers. 3.30 1.650 swabs.
4.200 water bonie covers, 1 1 ambulance stretchers. 4.500 chernical warfare respirator cases
and 1.853 bags. Finally, the Boot and Shoe Repainng Department made and repaired 93.481
pairs of boots and shoes. By early 1946, some 250 prisoners were employed in the program.
See Alfred Desrochers, "Une journée avec les prisonniers allemands du camp Newington." La
Tribune de Sherbrooke, Octokr 29, 1945, p. 10.; NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.400,
Volume 18 (March 1942), War Diaty of Inrernment Camp "IV" N o . 42). Newington
(Sherbrooke). "Works Program," March 1942, Appendix 1, p. 36.; NAC. DND, 10. RG-24.
Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42. Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke. 19-14-1946.
"January 1945 Intelligence Report," Febmary 4, 1945. ; NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Reel: C5365. File: HQS 9 139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 1WC19-16,"February
1945 Intelligence Report," March 4, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365.File: HQS
9 139-4-42. Camp Intelligence, C m p Sherbrooke, 1944- 19-16, "March 1945 Intelligence
Report," April 2, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp
Intelligence. Cump Sherbrooke. 1944-1946, "April 1945 Intelligence Repor&"May 3, 1945.;
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence. Camp
Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, "May 1945 Intelligence Report," June 15, 1945.: NAC. DND, 10,
RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 I 39-4-42, Camp h~elligence,Camp Sherbrooke, 194419.16, "February 1946 Intelligence Report," Febnmy 1946.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Red: C-5420, File: HQS 7236-9642, Consmcrion and
Maintenance. Camp Sherbrooke, 1942-I945, "Lt.-Col. W.D.Graham (CampCommandant) to
the Ditector Prisoners of War," July 3. 1943.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-42, Intelligence Reports, Camp
Sherbrooke, 1943-19.16, "May 1944 Intelligence Report," May 1944.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Red: C-54 16, File: HQS 7236-946-42, Intelligence Reports, Camp
Sherbrooke. 1943-1946, "June 1944 Intelligence Report," June 1944.
97
One inmate even described his Sunday schedule to his wife in order to allay anxiety and so
that she could understand how well he was king wated: "With beautifil sunshine we staried
the day at 6 A.M. with concert and coffee outside, then we walked for a long stroll into the
bush, by îwelve we were back to the camp. After the meal we had rnoving pichires, 3 OYClock
cof5ee with cakes, then afler this - there is a little river around the camp where we are allowed
to fish until five. Our dogs are crazy to go in for a swim. fhen supper and afier super football
game with coffee and cakes again outdoors - As you see, we are doing well - 1 wish you could
be here." See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Red: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-42, Intelligence
Reports, Camp Sherbrooke, 19#3-lW6, «May 1944 Intelligence Report," May 1944.
" NAC, DND,10,RG-24, Vol. 1 S,4O 1, Volume 68 (May 1946). W m Diory of lntemment Camp
"N" (No. a),Newington (Sherbrooke), May 9, 1946, p. 1.
*100 Canada, Red Cross and Prisoners.. ., pp. 96-97.
Bernard and Bergeron, p. 22.; Kelly. "Les internés allemands au camp Newington,"
Tribune de Sherbrooke, January 30, 1947, p. 3.; "The Prisoner of War Camps...", pp. 117120.
101
Carier. p. 13 7.; NAC. DND, 10, RG-24,Vol. 15,397, Volume 6 (March 1941), W m Diary of
infemment Camp "A" (No. 40)). Famham, "Memorandum Covenng the Operations of the
Farnham lntemment Trust Account," March 1941. Appendix 4. p. 2.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24.
Vol. 15,397, Volume 6 (Marcn 194l), War Diary of Inteniment Cump "A " N o . 401,
Farnham, March 5. 194 1,
p. 2.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24. Vol. 15,398, Volume 27 (December 1942), War D i q of
Internment Camp "A" (No. 40). Farnham, December 3, 1942. p. 2.
' O 2 NAC. FHTC, EK. MG-30,C 192, Vol. 3. "Interview of Hamy Greenfield by Harry Rasky
(CBC) in Toronto." [ 1 980Ts] p. 16,
'O3 NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.397. Volume 6 (March 194 1 ). War Dia? of I ~ n m e n t
Camp "A" (No. 40). Farnham. *'Memorandum Covering the Operations of the Farnham
Internment Trust Account," March 1941, Appendix 4, pp. 1-3.
Canada Red Cross and Prisonen.. ., pp. 92-93.
105
Priebe. pp. 1 85- 186.
'" NAC. DND, 10. RG-24. Vol. 15,397, Volume 6 (March 1941), Wat Dia? of Inîemment
Cump "A" N o . 40). Fmhum, "Memorandum Regarding the Procedure Followed in
Operating the Camp "A" Internees Canteen, Famharn, P.Q.,"March 194 1. Appendix 5, p. 1.
'O7 Canada. Orders and Insmictions..., p. 26.
'O8 Canada. Orden and Instructions..., p. 30.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Vol. 15,397. Volume 6
(March 1941), Wur Diary of lntemment Camp "A " (No. a),
Fmham, "Memorandurn
Regarding the Procedure Followed in Operating the Camp "A" intemees Canteen, Famharn,
P.Q.," Mach 1941. Appendix 5, p. 1 .
Canada Orders and Instructions...,p. 30.
I l 0 Bernard and Bergeron, p. 22.; Priebe, pp. 185- 186.
'" Canada, M e n and Instructions.. .,p. 3 1.; Pnebe, pp. 185-186.
"'Canada, Orden and Insmictions. ., p. 20.
'13 Ibid., p. 19.
"'
NAC. DND, 10,RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 2 (August 1940), Wm Diary of inremment
Camp "1"(No. II). Fort Lennox, ile-uzu-NOU, August 4, 1940, p. 2.; NAC, DND.10, RG-24,
Vol. 15,399, Volume 2 (November 19401, W m Dimy of Intemunent Camp "N" No. 42).
Newingion (Sherbmoh), November 2, 1940, p. 1.
.
'"
115
Canada, Orders and Instructions.. ., pp. 2 1-25; NAC, DM), 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume
2 (August 1!NO), W m Diary of Intemment Camp 7" (No. II), Fort Lennox, Île-am-~oix,
August 4, 1940, p. 2.; NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 5 (Febniary 1941), W m
D i q of lnternmenr Camp "N" No. 42). Newingfon (Sherbrooke), February 22, 1941, p. 1.;
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5398, File: HQS 7236-8140, Canteens, Cump F m h m ,
1942-1948, "lnventory Stock on Hand, POW Canteen, Camp Farnham," June 30, 1942.; NAC,
DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5398, File: HQS 7236-8142, Cunteens, Camp Sherbrooke. 19441946, "inventory Stock on Hand, Camp Sherbrooke Canteen," Auyst 3 1, 1944.; NAC, DND,
10, RG-24, Reel: C-5398, File: WQS 7236-8 1-40, Canteens, Camp Farnhom, 1942-1 948,
"lnventory Stock on Hand POW Canteen, Camp Famham," August 3 1, 1945.; NAC, DND,
10, RG-24, Reel: C-5398,File: HQS 7236-8140,Canteens. Cump Fmhum. 1912-1948,
"General Expenses List," May 20, 1946.
Il6 Canada, Orders and instructions.. .,p. 19.
II7
NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5398,File: HQS 7236-81-42, Canleens, Camp Sherbrooke.
194.1-1946. "Abstract of Receipts and Disbursernents for the Canteen of Camp Sherbrooke,"
August 3 1, 1944.: NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5398,File: HQS 7236-8 1-40, Canteens.
Camp Farnham, 1942-1948. "Account Payable for the Cunent Month of May 1946," May
1946.
Il8
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5398, File: HQS 7236-81-40, Cmeens, Camp Farnham,
1942-1948. "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to Director Prisoners of War."
November 23. 1944.
Il9
NAC, DND, 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5398. File: HQS 7236-81-40, Canteens, Camp Farnham.
1942-1948. "Colonel H.W. Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf
(Camp Commandant)," November 34, 1944.
"O NAC. DND. 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5398.File: HQS 7-36-8 110. Cunfeens. Camp Farnham.
1942-1948. "Camp Spokesman to Emest L. Maag (Delegate in Canada for the International
Red Cross)." April 19, 1943.
NAC, DM). 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5398. File: HQS 7236-81-42. Canteens. Cump Sherbrooke,
l 9 W I 9-16,"Abstract of Receipts and Disbursements for the Canteen of Camp Sherbrooke."
August 3 1. 1944.
Canada Orders and Instructions.. ., pp. 28-29.
'3 NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,397, Volume 6 (March 194 1 ), War Dia?
of Iwnnrenf
Camp '*A" (No. JO), Farnham, "Memorandum Regarding the Procedure Followed in
Operathg the Camp "A" Internees Canteen. Famham, P.Q.,"March 1941, Appendix 5, p. 2.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-5398, File: HQS 7236-8 1-40, Camens, Camp Famham.
1942-1948, "Colonel H.N. Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to Ernest L. Maag (Delegate
Febniary 3, 1945.
in Canada for the International Cornmittee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.),"
125
Canada, Orders and Instructions..., p. 30.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-5398, File: HQS
7-36-8140, Cmeens, Camp Famham. 1942-1948, "Major-General K.G. Weeks (AdjutantMilitary District 4," Novernber 30, 1946.
General) to District Ofker Commanding (D.O.C.)
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5398, File: HQS 7236-81-40, Canteens, Camp Fumhum.
1942-1948, "inventory Stock on Hand, POW Canteen, Camp Famham," June 30, 1942.
127
NAC, DM). IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5398,File: HQS 7236-81-40, Cunteens, Camp Farnham,
1942-1948, "Inventory Stock on Hand, POW Canteen," March 3 1, 1946.; NAC, DND, IO,
RG-24, Reel: C-5398, File: HQS 723681-40. Canteenî. C m p Fmham, 1942-1948,
"lnventory Stock on Hand, POW Canteen," April30, 1946.
"'
"'
"'
128
One Farnharn prisoner even carved a nine inch mode1 yacht fitted with movable pulleys.
Another prisoner made a beautifil "handîarved set of chess figures, complete with board.
The figures were most artistically carved out of w d , so carefully done that the very faces of
the pawns showed individual expressions." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File:
HQS 9 139-2-40. Material for Broadcasting to Germany, Camp Famham 1944-1946, "Major
G.H. Cuning (A/Camp Commandant) to District Officet Commanding (D.O.C.)Militas.
District 4," December 22, 1944.: NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 72369414-40, R e m s for Psychological Wdure Committee, Camp Famham, 1944-1946, "Report
on Camp Famham by Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant)," January 1945.
179
In the autumn of 1944, Camp Sherbrooke prisoners even made Christmas toys for poor
Canadian children. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-93-632,
Intelligence Reports, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1 946, "November 1944 intelligence Report,"
November 1944.; NAC, DM), 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-42,
InteiIigence Reports, C m p Sherbrooke, 1943-19.16. 'Wovember 1944 intelligence Report,"
November 1944.; NAC, DNI). IO, RG-24,Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-40, Reports
for Psychologicai Wmfare Cornmittee. Camp Farnham, 1944-19.16, "Report on Camp
Farnham by Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant)," January 1945.; NAC. DND. 10.
RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Furnham. 194-1946,
"May 1945 Intelligence Report," May 3 1, 1945.; NAC, DM). IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File:
HQS 9 139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke. 1944-1946. "January 1946
htelligence Report," January 1946.
130
ïhere were many great artists in the camps of southern Quebec. The most well known was
probably Oscar Cahen, who had been interned at Camp Sherbrooke during the civilian phase
and who becarne Canada's leading abstrrict expressionkt painter. As Eric Koch indicated in
Deemed Suspect: "Had anyone told him then that his works would one day be part of the
National Gallery's collection in ûttawa he would have uttered his unfogettable. hi&-pitched
laugh." See Koch, p. 156.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: (2-8436. File: HQS 9139-2-43,
Material for Broadcusting to Germany. Camp Gronde Ligne, 1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. E.D.B.
Kippen (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Cornrnanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4.'.
August 17, 1944.
Canada Orders and Instructions..., p. 67.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 47
(August 1 944), W m Diwy of Inîemment Camp "Np'(No. 43, Newington (Sherbrooke),
"Camp Orders," August 3 I , 1944, Appendix 1, p. 27.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-54 16,
Fi le: HQS 7236-94-6-42, Intelligence Reports, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, bWovember
1944 Intelligence Report," November 1944.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,404, Volume 35
(November 1945), W m Diary of Intemment Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, "Camp Daily
Orders." November 22, 1945, Appendix 1, p. 2 1.
13' NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 723694-1 4-40' Reports for Psychological
WaJare Committee. Camp F m h , 19444946, "Report on Camp Farnham by Lt.-Col.
A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant)," January 1945.
AS it was stipulated: "Fifty percent of canteen profits will be set aside each month to create a
reserve for banack darnages, until such tirne as the said reserve has reached the amount fixed
for the camp, on the basis of $2.00 per prisoner of waf' or $1,000 for a camp not exceeding
500 inmates and $2,000 for a camp detainhg between 500 and 1,000 intemees. See Bernard
and Bergeron, p. 22.; Canada, Mers and Instnictions, p. 20,32.
Canada Orders and Instructions.. .,p. 20.
"'
'"
135
DM), IO, RG-24,Vol. 15,397, Volume 6 (March 194 1)- War Dimy of lnternment
Camp "A" (No. 10). Farnham, "Memorandum Regarding the Procedure Followed in
Operating the Camp "A" Intemees Canteen, Farnham, P.Q.," March 194 1, Appendix 5 , p. 2.
136
Bernard and Bergeron, p. 22.; Canada, Orders and Instructions, p. 32.
13' NAC. DND, 10, RG-24,Reei: C-5398, File: HQS 7236-81-40, Cunteens. Camp F m h a m ,
1912- 1948, ''Deputy Minister (Department of National Defence) to Car1 Muller (United States
zone in Gemany)", August 1 1, 1948.
NAC,
CHAPTER 4
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
Educational programs constituted an important part of life behind barbed wires in
southem Quebec. Fostered by the intemees' thirst for knowledge, education eventually
became a characteristic of camp life. It broadened the mind of inrnates. helped them
maintain sanity. showed them alternatives to Naism and prepared them for post-war
professions. Initiated in 1940 for civilian internees, early camp education was organized
and coordinated by the inmates themselves. Prisoners specialized in certain fields of study
would organize discussions and classes. The aim was for the prisoners to share with one
another and gain knowledge. This intellectual climate cventually led the Canadian
authorities to authorize younger prisonen to pursue their personal education through
correspondence courses with Canadian universities. The amval of prisoners of war in
1942 drarnatically changed the nature of educational prograrns. As German soldiers, most
of these internees had been manipulated by Nazi propaganda. As the war progressed, the
Canadian authorities became aware that the presence of Nazi ideology in internment
camps "contarninated the prisoners. It was detenined that the prisoners needed to be
shown an alternative, and this was done through a program of re-education. The aim was
to influence pnsonea dong democratic lines so that
when they retumed to Gerrnany, the
roots of Nazi thoughts would be "exteminated." To ensure that the German authorities
would not see this as "brainwashing," only volunteers were chosen among the inrnates to
participate in this program. Re-education evennially became an important tool in the war
against Nazi ideology. Through discussion groups, classes, special p
s t
speakers, films
and literature, many inmates came to conclude that democracy was a much better system
than National Socialism. So important becarne re-education that in 1945, a camp was set
up in Sorel for that specific purpose.
The issue of intemee education was neglected by the Geneva Convention. In fact
there were no clauses which dealt exclusively with the education of prisoners. Only article
17, which stipulated that "belligerents shall encourage as much as possible the
organization of intellectual and sporting pursuits by the prisonen of war," touched upon
the issue.' The problem with this clause was that detaining powen could interpret it
differently. This complicated matters and made the international control of education very
dificult. The only reason which restricted certain nations from using propaganda methods
to indocvinate prisoners of war was the fear of enemy reprisais. This explains why the reeducation of Geman prisoners of war was not introduced in Canada before the end of the
war. However. the Canadian authorities did agree to introduce penerai educational
programs in the civilian phase. According to Canadian regulations: "Educational study
courses will be permined under the direction of the international Red Cross. the
international YMCA. and any other organization approved by the Director, Prisonen of
war."'
During the civilian phase. general education flourished in the camps of southern
Quebec. Since many academics and ex-professors were among the prisoners. the camps
provided an excellent leaming environrnent. in fact, many of these individuals were
highly distinguished European schoiars who had made important contributions in a
This
variety of disciplines. This led many prisoners to seek knowledge fiorn one an~ther.~
intellectual environrnent was commonly referred to as the Université populaire. The mere
presence of so many people of different trades and professions ogered tremendous
opportunities to expand one's mind. For instance, mechanics developed close ties with
famous musicians while scientists mingled with lawyers. In other words. internment
brought together people who would have never met under normal circurnstances. This
informal process began at Camp île-aux-~oixin July 1940:
and was mon followed by
the other camps.5It proved very popular and generated quite a lot of satisfaction arnong
southem Quebec b a t e s . 6
To exploit this highly charged intellecnial environment, forma1 camp schoois were
eventually established at Camps Famham, Île-aux-~oixand Sherbrooke. These were
created and coordinated by the prisoners themselves, upon approvd fiom camp
authorities. The fust camp school was established at Famham in November 1940 by
William Heckscher, an intemee who had taught at Hamburg University. He did so after
realizing that there were at least one hundred young boys in the camp, age 16 to 20, who
needed proper guidance and education. niese pupils were viewed as king easy targets for
the camp Communists who were seeking new recruits. Some thirteen internee teachen
were involved in the program. Cooperating with the camp school were the camp's
authorities who gave the internees the possibility of using a hut for educational purposes
and exempted students fiom fatigue duties? The camp's war diary summarized well the
reasons guiding the camp authorities' involvement in the program:
The idea behind this is to give intemees as much mental activity as
possible. as it takes their minds off their many womes and makes them that
much easier to control. After d l in the running of an internent camp. the
expedient thing to do is to run it with as little trouble as possible fiom the
pisoners. If they are given considerable arnount of freedom conceming
interna1 affairs in the compound and as much self-government as possible.
ii has the effect of making them that much easier to control and govem.8
Camp schools were also created at !le-aux-~oixand Sherbrooke in the Spring of 1941.9
Inrnates who participated in camp schools studied topics such as chemistry, economics.
geography. history, language. mathematics and music. Furthemore. they were given the
opponunity to participate in junior and senior matriculation examinations held by
Montreal's McGill ~niveaity."The junior matric could be written anywhere in Quebec
as long as McGill approved of the exams' supervision. This meant that prisoners could
write such exarns inside their respective camps while king supervised by Canadian
officers. On the other hand, the senior matric had to be written in Montreal. The main
reason was that fewer people were writing them." Eventuaily. other Canadian univenities
becarne involved in their program." Camp schools were highly successfi~l.'~
So important
were they that in September 1941, more than 347 intemees were registered in educational
prograrns at Camp Sherbrooke out of a population of approximately 587 inmates. Aside
from matriculation classes, intemees could also prepare for pst-war professions through
vocational training cla~ses.'~
Furthemore, guest speakers sornetimes lectured inmates on
Canadian topics. l5
When ptisonea of war began arriving in the camps of southem Quebec in 1942,
the Canadian authorities were hesitant to continue camp schools.
In fact. educational
programs were not re-established until late 1943 when correspondence courses were
initiated with the University of Saskatchewan. Again, like during the civilian phase, the
pnsoners were credited for their work through matriculation examinations.16
Anangements could also be made with other academic institutions as long as intemees
pursued educational classes without king credited for them. "
Education was also helped by the establishment of camp libraries. As Canadian
regulations stipdated, ?ext books not prohibited.. .will be admitted, if supplied by the
International Red Cross, the International YMCA,, the German Red Cross. Canadians
universities and libraries. or from such other institutions or persons as may be authorized
by the Director. Pnsonen of war."18 The first camp libraries were created during the
civilian phase. In most cases. ptisoners requested relief organizations to purchase specific
Novels remained
books. magazines and newspapers for which they paid upon deli~ery.'~
among the most popular form of litetanire inside the camps.'* In Sherbrooke. where the
camp library compnsed some 3.600 volumes in September 1944. 36% of the books were
classed as non-fiction. 10% dealt with economics, 10% addressed history, 15% were testbooks and 39% were classified as fiction." Although a form of entenainment. novels
helped prisoners to develop their intellect and imagination. In many ways. novels helped
pnsoners to psychologically evade the pressures of intemment? Also, so that prisoners
not be obliged to purchase books at their own expense. a "Traveling Library" was
organized by McGili ~nivenity?
Not al1 books were accepted by camp authorities. in fact, camp censorship was
very strict and forbade inmates to read literaîure which was deemed to be damaging to the
Allied cause or which was thought to entice prisoners towards violence or ~azisrn."
Indeed, Canadian authorities decided in September 1944 that "only educational books will
be permitted to be purchased by the POW and then only such books as are necessary for
the course îhey are taking within the enclosure. Books dealhg with Navy, Amy, Air
Force (British or Allied), espionage, map making, weapons and annarnents, spying, or
formulae for the rnanufacturùig of alcohol or poisons, publications which are
predominantly enemy propaganda will be forwarded to National Defence Headquarten; if
however the propaganàa element is of an incidental nature and the scope of the
publications chiefly education or recreational they may be ad~nitted."~'Numerous books
and magazines were censored and removed from camp Iibrary invent~ries.~~
In the end,
camp Iibraries offered southem Quebec inrnates an oppomuiity to educate themselves and
leam more about the world. It also helped them to acclimatize themselves to the North
Amencan way of life."
Education was also promoted through motion pictures. Although they entertained
prisonen. movies also served as an important means of indoctrination. In many ways. they
permitted prisoners to learn more about life in North Amerka. In fact. such films initiated
German internees to the noms and values of both American and Canadian societies and
ofien engendered a certain sense of respect towards these cultures. In many ways. films
served as a form of Allied propaganda. As authorities at Camp Grande Ligne indicated:
"One h e m that these pictures induce in many prisoners a great inclination towards our
way of life. Moving pictures play a tremendous part in the somewhat restricted life of a
prisonen. and each detail is thought over and placed under the magnifying glas. Hence,
films iire an excellent tool of psychology and proPaganda.'"'
Moving picture projectors
and equipment were funiished by relief ~r~anizations.'~
The YMCA was in charge of the
general distribution of movies. Working in conjuncnire with such film distributors as
Twentieth Century Fox. United Anists and Warner Brothers, the YMCA was able to
supply the inmates with one movie per week for which the organization bore the
expense30In most cases. prisoners were given movie lists from which they could choose
the titles which were of interest to them3'
Movies were
fim presented in southem Quebec during the civilian phase The
process began in early 1941 when both Camps Sherbrooke and ile-aux-~oixreceived
their f k t motion picture projecton through relief ~r~acljzations.'~
They were followed by
Camp F d a m in the summer of 1942, Camp Grande Ligne in the summer of 1944, and
Camp Sorel in the fdl of 1945." In order to help with the costs of the movie shows,
intemees had to pay 5 c . This money was usually obtained fiom the pnsoners'canteen
funds. American and Canadian movies shown inside the camps were among the most
popular of the era." Furthemore, the Canadian govemment had the obligation to issue
the prisoners with Gennan-made films. Historian Ron Robin described well the
circumstances of this situation: "As part of a reciprocal agreement mediated by the Red
Cross. the Allies sent a small seiection of pre-approved movies to their prisoners in
Gemany. In exchange, German pnsoners in Allied POW camps viewed a limited nurnber
of German film productions. Al1 these German rnovies had been meticulously censored
for any overt or covert Nazi propaganda.'"5
The presence of Nazi prisoners of war in Allied internrnent camps eventually led
the Amencan, British. Soviet and Canadian govemments to inaugurate more formal re-
educational programs. The major goal was to "reorient the political thinking of enemy
pnsoners through a process of re-education with the hope of using these "graduates" as a
vanguard in directing the defeated state [Gemany] toward a specific form of
govemment." The problem with re-education was that western Allies had diff'erent
political ideals than the Soviets. For instance, Canada, Great Bntain and the United States
wanted to re-educate Geman prisoners dong democratic lines while the Soviet Union
hoped to do so using Communia ideology. As a resuit, each re-educational program
became a reflection of the political motives of the nation which introduced it. Aside fiom
indoctrinating Geman prisoners dong new political beliefs, re-education offered each
Allied nation an opportunity to prepare a vanguard to plant the seeds for a new German
govemment and collaborate with them in their respective zones of rnilitary occupation.36
in Canada. the issue of prisoners of war re-education was introduced in 1944. The
process began when the British Foreign Onice approached the Canadian Govemment on
the matter. Canada was detaining German prisoners of war which had been caught by both
British and Commonwealth forces. Because Canada had the necessary manpower and
space, Great Britain felt it norrnai that a proper re-education program be initiated in that
country. ûttawa's initial answer was negative. As the Canadian Director of Internent
Operations indicated: "The govenunent did not countenance any campaign to re-educate
and convert the Nazis." As a result, the British became very pessimistic vis-&vis
Canadian cooperation. As the British Foreign Onice stated: "The Canadians have done
vllnially nothing to re-educate prisoners.. .Indeed, the Canadian camps are a hot-bed of
Nazi ideology. The Party regime appears to be fully established amongst prisoners in
some camps, and even those on whom.we might make a promising beginning in the U.K.
would certainly revert to Nazism on aniving in
anad da.'"' However, British pressure was
finally rewarded in June 1944 when Canada finally agreed to cooperate on a re-education
program. The entire project was to be coordinated by the Canadian Psychological Warfare
Cornmittee. which had been created in 1943. To ensure the success of such an operation.
Nazis had to be properly segregated from anti-Nazis. This resulted in the introduction of
the PHERUDA systern of classification. (see Chapter 1)? The goal of re-education.
which had a naturalistic component, was to make "listeners aware of Canada's separate
and distinct identity within the United Nations and underscoring its contributions to the
Allied effort. The benefits of democracy could be lauded by referring to Canadian
achievements and standard of living."39
Although Canada agreed in rnid- 1944 to initiate its own re-educational program,
the project was not oficially introduced until early 1945. At the tirne, the program was
very limited in scale and consisted solely of lectures. This situation changed as of May 8.
1945 when Germany sunendered. As a consequence, Canada's re-education program
intensified. With the fa11 of Gemany, intemees were more inclined to abandon National
Socialist
doctrine^.^ As a Camp Sherbrooke intelligence officer indicated: "...the
wind
has k e n completely knocked out their sails. The rabid Nazis finally realized that their
game was up. Strong-arm Gestapo methods are a thing of the past, and to the best of my
knowledge complete peace and quiemess reigns within the enclosure. The anti-Nazis are
now more or iess able to hold up their heads and even to a certain extent dictate their own
policies.'"
As time passe& German prisoners of war became less arrogant and more
~ o o ~ e r a t i vNo
e . ~prisoner
~
was forced to participate in the pgrarn."
Also, because the
original idea was to create a system which united al1 the ' g d e m o c ~among
"
the prisoners
of war, Allied countries began creating special re-assessrnent camps."
The special re-educational centre in southem Quebec was Camp Sorel. It was
created in June 1945 as requested by the Psychological Warfare Commiîtee and served as
a transit camp for White pnsonen of war destined to be repatriated to Germany to serve
the Allied cause. The camp's functions were as follows: "(A) to assess the prisoners of
war for reliability, leadership qualities and suitability for employment in their particular
fields either here or in Germany; (B) to strengthen the Anti-Nazi attitudes of the pnsonen
of war. and familiarite them with certain basic principles and attitudes of the Western
Allies; (C) to provide facilities for propaganda work (press, radio) either in Germany or to
the other camps; (D) to provide special or refiesher training in specific occupation; and
(E) to collect data of value for guidance in planning propaganda to Gemany and in reeducationai work (lectures. films. broadcasts) in other camps."'-' As a re-assessrnent
centre. Camp Sorel selected "students" meticulously. As camp regdations stipulated:
Recommendation for the transfer to this camp of suitable POWs will be
made.. .by POW camp commandants al1 over Canada. in consultation with
the camp intelligence officen. Such recommendations will only be made
after a detailed interrogation according to the PHERUDA system and a
statement that the POWs desires to work for the reconstruction of Gemany
and to be transferred to the special camp in Sorel. Such recornmendations
will be forwarded to the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) for
consideration. Final decision as to suitability and time of transfer shall rest
with DM1 who will make the necessary requests to the Directorate Prisoners
of War. in selecting POW,consideration will be given to professions and
occupations, partly with a view to the establishment of discussion groups,
partly in terms of requests fiom the U.K., and partly in order to create a
well-balanced camp.. . An attempt was made to draw men fiom ail camps in
Canada in order to show that White attitudes were by no means confined to
one or two camps. 46
Al1 White prisoners selected for Camp Sorel were volunteers and came fiom al1 over
anad da" Before k i n g sent to Sorel, inmates had to sign a d t t e n underiaking whereby
they agreed to cooperate with the Allies and conforni to Canada's re-educational project!8
Gennan officers, other ranks, and enemy merchant sailoa were al1 declared as suitable for
this scheme. Camp regdations stipulated that "distinction of rad, it is hoped will
disappear amongst the POW when in classes. discussion groups or engaged on
psychological warfare ~ o r k . " ~With this in mind, "al1 ranks were abolished and al1
insignia of ranks taken down." This was done "to express the idea that al1 were finding
themseives under identical c~nditions."~~
The good of the screening process was to select prisoners who '%ouid adapt to the
[re-educational] program by opening.their minds to new ideas and by working hard to
understand what was being presented to them. Success or failure rested with the men
chosen."" Because -'special emphasis is laid upon the fact that willingness to cooperate
must be with al1 the Allies." each selected internee had to be formerly asked '*whether he
is willing to cooperate actively with the Allied nations. both here and in Europe, in the
reconstruction of Gemany. in accordance with Allied plans and agree to his proposed
transfer to Camp Sorel. It should be made clear to the prisoner that this camp will provide
both training and refresher courses for the occupations most needed and that if found
suitable the prisoner will be employed to the best advantage.'"' lnmates were also chosen
based on their previous civilian occupations and professions. The aim was to exploit the
inrnates' speciai talents for the benefit of the Canadian re-educational pro-.
Initially.
intellecnials were chosen. They were to form a "brain-tmst" for the democratization of
Germany and of fellow prisoners of war. However. the program evennially came to cover
a wide variety of job categones?
The main problem with the Camp Sorel segregation system was that Gray and
Black "prisoners sometimes played the game and gave the interviewers what they
[authonties] war~ted.'"~This meant that "even the more careful çcreening couid not
prevent the inclusion of students who were just looking for an easier or more interesting
way to spend their intemrnent, and had no intention of taking re-education s e r i o ~ s l ~In
."~~
fact. opportunias believed that participation in the re-educational program might
accelerate their repatriation. As Camp Faniham authonties said: ''there are those who
have drastically changed ovemight fiom Black to White. niese are nannally recognized
as opportunists who are rnost unreliable and in~incere."~~
With this in mind, Nationai
Defence Headquarters (NDHQ)refused numerous intemees access to Camp
or el."
Originally, each selected group of pnsoners was to stay no longer than three
months at Camp Sorel. The idea was to repatriate these intemees as soon as possible h
order that they might serve the Allied occupation forces in Gemany. However, this
proved to be an impossibility due to the chaotic situation that persisted in Gemany d e r
the war. Because Sorel prisoners became more and more dissatisfied with the
postponement of their transfer home, camp authorities readjusted their operational
policies in September 1945. A plan was introduced by M.L7 on October 26, 1945, to
transform Camp Sorel into a re-educational "productioo centre." The task of re-educating
prisoners of war in Canada had grown considerably since V-E day and the demand for reeducational material and agents kept increasing. To comply with this situation. Sorel
inrnates became involved with the production of re-educational matenal.58Because most
of the Sorel prisoners could not benefit from labour projects, as was the case in the other
southern Quebec intemment camps. the Canadian authorities decided in November 1945
to pay hem 50
e per day for their re-educational work. The main argument was thar these
intemees were replacing Canadian personnel in this dutyS9With this in mind. the camp
was guarded by a limited nurnber of VGC
The production of re-educational material was coordinated by the camp's Counter
Propaganda Cornmittee. It was formed '%th
the object of producing [Gerxnan
written] literature, mainly in the f o m of pamphlets, which will on the one hand refute
Nazi ideology and attitudes in various fields and on the other hand produce material
designed to help in mental and mord reeducation. These pamphlets are to be sent to al1
internment camps in Canada." This cornmittee was divided into a number of subcornmittees which were "headed by experts in the fields they atternpted to cover." The
following sub-cornmittees were established: law, history, theology. racial theories,
forestry. agriculture. economics, education and "a special section to combat Nazi
slogans.'*' The re-educational material produced in Camp Sorel was quite diversified and
also led to the establishment of radio broadcast sections, press sections, film sections, and
even a cornmittee for the reconstmction and rehabilitation of Gennany. The radio
broadcast section had the important task of cooperating with the international service of
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in the preparation and recording of re-
educationai radio scripts. These were to be broadcast in Canadian internment camps and
in ~ e r m a n ~ . "
The press section was in charge of producing the weekly Loger Post newspaper
known as Der Weg. Articles for this publication were not only provided by Sorel inmates
but also by prisoners fiom other internment camps. The press section also published reeducational bulletins, lecture outlines, newspapers, leaflets and pamphlets, which were
distributed to other Canadian intenvnent camps on a weekly basis. This was done in
cooperation with the camp's translation bureau." From Camp Sorel there came three
major sources of re-educational literature. First. there was the Bruecke Zur Heimut. which
was a weekly newspaper simiiar to Reader S Digest. Second, there was the Nachrichten,
which was a weekly bulletin containing the latest news. Third, there was the Historische
Rundbriefe. which was a fortnightly pamphlet covering aspects of German h i s t ~ r yThe
.~
production of re-educational material at Camp Sorel ceased on March 2, 1946. Overall, 22
dinerent pamphlets had been produced as well as 8 editions of the Histurische
Rundbrieje. 25 editions of the Nachrichten. and 34 editions of the Bruecke Zw ~ e i m a t ?
This literature was also "designed for.. .prisoners employed in lumber camps and other
works projects which could not be reached for re-educational purposes in any other
fa~hion."~~
Moreover. copies of these documents were distributed to Canadian internent
camps on a weekly basis. Each week, 130 copies of Historische Rundbriefi, 600 copies of
Nachrichten, 1.850 copies of Bruecke Zur Heimat and 3,300 pamphlets were produced at
Camp Sorel and distributed throughout canada!'
To facilitate the preparation of re-educational material, Canadian authonties
provided Sorel b a t e s with special literature. In most cases, volumes illustrating
democratic attitudes, experiences or governmental methods were chosen.
'*
Furthemore,
unlike other Canadian internent camps, prisoners were given the opportunity to access
National Sociaiist propaganda and books addressing Nazi issues.69This was done because
the buk of the Sorel prisoners were known to be staunch anti-Nazis. The belief was that
such literature might be used by the intemees to demonstrate the flaws of ~azism."
Re-educational work was also inaugurated on a voluntary basis at Camp kunbm.
When decision was taken in the spring of 1945 to create a re-assessrnent camp in Sorel,
camp Famham authonties replied by proposing to use their facilities "as a preliminary
sifung camp."71At the time, the Canadian authorities felt that there was a considerable
number of Gray prisoners in no country with "'definiteanti-Nazi attitudes" who did not
feel ready to be transfened to Camp Sorel due to "residues of militaristic sentiment.
unwillingness to break with cornrades, and oath to Hitler." Camp Farnham authorities
explained well the probiem:
That is to say that these people do not denounce democracy but rather that
ihey find it extremely bard to snake off National Socialist doctrines.
pumped into them incessantly during the Hitler Regime. Although the
earnest endeavor to understand democracy and the sincere attempt to
practice it in their own smail community, is a fact. the younger element at
Camp 40. officers and OR'S who did belong to the Jung Voik and Hjiler
Jugend, consequently received their one-sided education only in Nazi
ideology, find it extremely hard to comprehend many factors about the
democratic way of life."
As such. the idea of a preparatory camp seemed logical. Consequently. the Canadian
govemment agreed to use Camp Farnharn as the "final pre-Sorel screening point'' in May
1945. As it was stated: "It [Camp Farnham] is in the same military district as [Camp]
Sorel. so that transfers between camps could be made with a minimum of dificuity."
htemees from al1 over Canada were liable to be tmsferred to Camp Famham "without
the consent of the prisoners concemed. but simply on suitable recommendations from the
camp
commandant^."^^
With this project in rnind, the bulk of the Black prisonen
incarcerated at Camp Farnharn were transferred in the fa11 of 1945 in order to make room
for the newcomers. This enabled the camp to flourish and become an important reeducational centre.
At Famham, pnsoners were given the oppomuiity to establish among themselves a
democratic fonn of govemrnent to administer their own &airs. This was allowed in order
to initiate Geman prisoners of war to the principles of democracy and let them experience
the system for themselves. This was seen as the perfect way to prepare Camp Famham
inmates for their potential transfer to Camp Sorel. The direct consequence of this was the
formation of a camp Democratic Cornmittee on July 1. 1945. This eight men
representative council, elected by secret ballot, had the task of coordinating "dl POW
affairs, administrative as well as political." The Democratic Cornmittee also became very
active in the re-educational program. As it was stated: "Afier years of Nazi indoctrination,
these POW are highly propaganda-minded and look for political significance to every
newspaper article, lecture or addresses by their own fellow POW. To overcome this
attitude it has been the policy of the Democratic committee to slowly guide these people
into a new channel of thought." The Democratic Cornmittee began operating a weekly reeducational program consisting of newspaper reviews, lectures and political
discussion^.'^
By August 1945, the camp's inmates proposed to administer their own flairs through a
new fonn of democratic govement. For this purpose, four prisoner of war "lawyers"
created a camp constitution which they submitted to the camp authorities on August 7.
An election by secret ballot was then held to know if the pnsoners were in favor
of the constitution and the establishment of an elective assembly or if they preferred to
retain the camp spokesrnan as their official representative. The election was carried out on
Auy s t 1 1, 1945 without any evidence of coercion. The result was clear-cut: 95% of the
internees were in favor of the constit~tion.~~
As table 3 demonstrates, the Camp Farnham pnsoner of war govement, as
established through the camp constitution, was divided into two major entities: the
representative assembly and the executive cornmittee. The executive committee was the
higher echelon of this camp govemment. It took decisions in consultation witb the
representative assembly, but it was also this body that negotiated with camp authorities. It
was made up of thtee elected mernbers. The
challman, otherwise known as the camp
speaker, acted as camp spokesman. Under him was the spiritual and politicai advisor and
the administrative advisor, both king in charge of their respective sections within the
representative assembly. At the tirne, al1 of the executive cornmittee's representatives
Table 3
Camp Farnham lnternee Goveinment
1945-1946
CAMP EXECUTIVE COMMIITEE
1 CHAIRMAN (CAMP SPEAKER) 1
1
SPIRITUAL AND
POLITICAL
REQUIREMENTS
REQUIREMENTS
I
1
1
1
REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY
Y
RADIO MESSAGES
(1 man)
SPORT
1
LIBRARY
1
(1 man)
1 NEWSPAPER
1 CORRESPONDENCE 1
1
(1 man)
(1 man)
GENERAL LECTURES 1
1
TOOLS
(1 man)
(1 man)
CANTEEN
POSTAL KlTCHEN
(1 man)
-
(2 men)
(2 men)
FILM-
(1 man)
(1 man)
1 POUTICS AND
MUSIC
i
PAYMASTER
ml
MEDICAL
DENTAL
Sources: NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Red: C-5365, File: HQS 9139440, Camp
Intelligence, Camp Famham, 1944-1946, mAc!ministrativeChart of
the POW Represenbtive Assembly at Camp Famham",
September 20,1945.
were former officers. This changed in February 1946 when one "other rank" was granted
permission to sit on the committee." The representative assembly was the lower echelon
of this camp system. Each hut would eiect two representatives, each king assigned a
specific function in the assembly. The representative assembly was divided into t h e
sections: spintual and political, administration and medicd. Al1 were coordinated by the
executive cornmittee. The assembly's role was to discuss specific camp-related issues and
propose new measures to the executive committee. Overall, 20 memben were elected by
the intemees for the representative a~sernbl~.'~
Camp authorities were very much pleased
with the establishment of the democratic camp governrnent. As they indicated: "this is an
encouraging sign as to their [prisoners] sincerity to adjust their political bearing."'9
Re-education was also introduced on a limited scale in camps Grande Ligne and
Sherbrooke. However. the continuous presence of Black elements inside both camps
conni tuted an immense problem as they senously retarded the efforts made by Canadian
personnel io re-educate the pnsoners.80 As a result. series of transfers were initiated in the
fa11 of 1945. The a h was to segregate the enclosure so that Gray prisoners rnight be more
prone to participate in the re-educational program without king influenced by Black
elements. Results were obtained as the remaining prisoners increased their participation in
the Canadian re-educational program. Still, attempts to initiate re-education at Camp
Sherbrooke were quite weak and unfhitfûl . Because this camp was the only facility in
southem Quebec to still be involved in the Works Program, re-educationd activities were
less advanced than in other internent camps. The pmblem was that not enough time
could be alloned during the day for re-educational lectures and courses since most
intemees were working. Furthemore, since the bulk of the camp's inmates were poorly
educated merchant searnen. interest in reading and snidying re-educational matenal did
not attract many prisoners?' Because participation in the Canadian re-educational
program was voluntary, the bulk of the inmates became more inclined to use their spare
time for recreational activities." This situation only began changing in April 1946 when a
new inteiligence oficer anived in the camp and fonned the Camp Sherbrooke
Educational Cornmittee. With such emphasis, sorne prisoners began to participate in the
program."
L e c m were an important aspect of the Canadian re-education program."
Special re-educational classes in English fonned the bulk of this system. The
administraton and teachers employed for this task were people with professional teaching
backgrounds. In most cases, they were university professors who specialized in the fields
of humanities and social ~ciences.'~Re-education classes were coordinated by the
University of Toronto's Canadian Association for Adult Education ( C M ) . In charge of
this organization was George W. Brown, one of the university's history professon. Each
year. the CAAE sent each camp a list of potential lectures from which the intemees made
se~ections.~~
Professors f h r n Bishop's University, McGill University, the University of
Toronto and the United Theological College participated in the CAAE pro-
and
iectured southem Quebec inmates. Furthemore. Canadian military personnel, pnests.
memben of Canada's National Film Board and representatives fiom relief organizations
Between 1944 and 1946. pisoners were
gave classes. Al1 were paid $7.50 per lect~re.~'
lectured on democracy, on constitutional issues. on politics, on economics. on
international afTairs. on British and Canadian history, on western literature and on the
Canadian way of life. Overall, more than 100 CAAE lectures were given in southern
Quebec camps during that period.88 Because the CAAE largely depended upon the
availabiiity of univenit. professor, lectures were usually discontinued in the s~rnrner.~~
Southem Quebec inmates appreciated well these weekly lectures.
However, because the
language of instruction in the camps was predorninantiy English, this created a major
disadvantage. The main problem was that most Canadian professors had no knowledge of
Gerrnan. 9' As a result, interpreters had to be used, which meant that inmates "had far
more contact with someone other than the designated instructor. This 'someone?was very
ofien a German Jewish rehigee." Therefore, the language banier and religious prejudice
proved to be handicaps for Canada's re-educational program?'
Some re-educational classes in German were inaugurated in the camps of southem
Quebec. These were "intended not merely for acadernic information, but to illuminate the
present situation and suggest, overtly or by implication the causes of preesent ills and a
solution to present problems."93 Such lectures were organized, directed, and taught by
White prisoners of war o f f i c e r ~ This
. ~ ~ process was initiated at Camp Farnham in July
1945 when the camp's Dernocratic Cornmittee established the basis of a program "for the
education and enlightenment and generd bettement of the young POW,on democratic
principles."g5 Although the process was followed by Camp Grande Ligne, such was not
the case with Camp Sherbrooke. Because no Geman prisoner of war officers were
residing in the camps and since there was strong resentment "against combatant officers
of the former Nazi anny," the Camp Sherbrooke enemy merchant seamen requested that
Canadian civilian speakers give them such lectures. With this in min4 local city teachers
were approached to lecture the intemees in December 1945.96
Re-educational classes aimed at preparing the German intemees for future reintegration into German society. Prisoners of war had to be thought how to react to the
transition from military to civil life. The Canadian govemment did not want a repetition
of the events which had followed the end of the F h t World War in Gemany, namely the
1919 German Revolution and the nse of para-military movements including National
Socialism. In southem Quebec. the main problem was the German officen intemed in
both Camps Farnharn and Grande Ligne. Many of them had never held a civilian
profession nor had they received any preparation for hture employment in civil society?'
Classes were initiated in both camps to teach the prisonen of war various civil
professions and trades. This program was on balance successful. By May 30, 1945. some
438 Grande Ligne officers were registered in civil employment classes.98
Because the goal of re-education was to prepare Germans to cooperate with the
future Allied occupation of Gemany, great importance was attached to the teaching of the
English language? As a result, English language classes were inaugurated in ail of
southem Quebec's internent camps. So important became the study of English that
some eleven such classes were in progess at Camp Sorel by July 1945.1mnie success of
English language classes was so great that camp authorities estimated that 60% of the
Sorel prisoners were fluent in English by Novcmber 1945.'~'
Advanced students codd
participate in daily Endish conversation sessions, commonly known as "round table
con fer en ce^."^^^
These were usually attended by some 30 intemees as well as camp
intelligence officers and censors. Prisoners usually chose the topics of conversation for
such sessions. in most cases, inmates fkely discuss the arts, democracy and politics.
Although these discussions helped the prisoners' English, they also pennitted camp
intelligence officen to have a better understanding of the inmates' con~erns.~~.'
Eventually, French language classes were also inaugurated.
'"
Finally, study groups were organized in most of the camps. Similar in concept to
the Camp Farnham English language seminars, the aim of such groups was to prepare the
inmates for funue cooperation with the Allied occupational forces on German soil. These
discussion groups were deemed to be useful in providing "assessrnent matenal regarding
POW ui their group relations; studies and reports on practical probierns of reconstruction.
administrative and technical; and providing opportunities to certain POW to carry on reeducational work amongst their cornrades." Study periods were usually held once per
week.'oI
Literature was another major form of re-education. In al1 camps, Amencan.
British. Canadian and even Soviet-produced information was distributed to the inmates.'"
Such bulletins were not always welcomed by the inmates who saw them as Allied
propaganda.'07 However, during the war, most of southem Quebec's internment camps
produced camp newspapea and magazines. The pnsoners of war who participated in the
publishing of such documents usually attended special "Press Classes." During such
classes, the prisonen were taught how to print and bind. In most cases, the men involved
in such projects had fomerly been joumalists or bad demonstrated an interest in
becoming joumalists once the war ended.
Io'
At Camp Famham, one such publication
was known as DKD (Deutscher Kriegsgefungenen Dienst). This newspaper' s purpose was
to stimulate new thoughts in the minds of prisoners. DKD was published on the 15" and
30' of each rn~nth.'~~
DKD's fvst edition was launched on October 15, 1945.'1° Overail,
seventeen issues of this short magazine were published at Famharn before production
ended on May 20,1946."' Another camp paper, known as Der Regenpfiifer was created
at
Camp Grande Ligne and began to be published in December 1945 in order 'Zo foster a
literary forum for discussions on matters political, educational, religious and
philosophical and to propagate a humanitarian and Christian moral code."'12 The Camp
Grande Ligne press group was in charge of this camp newspaper.l l3
To re-educate the German inmates, special propaganda films were ais0 shown to
them. In most cases, these short films were provided by the Military District 4 film library
and included nurnerous ne~sreels.~
l4 Most of these short films lasted no longer than 20
minutes and were usually show on movie nights before the feature presentation. These
films were provided by most of the western Allies. Although al1 of them dealt with
different subjects, they d l shared the comrnon goal to initiate the German prisoners of war
to dern~crac~.''~
Special films were also shown to test the prisonen' reaction to specific
issues.
' ''When the Allies learned of the atrocities committed in Geman concentration
camps during the war. the Canadian governrnent decided to show German prisoners of
war short films and photopphs which depicted the scenes of barbarism that the Allied
forces encountered when liberating such facilities. The aim was to create a sense
"collective culpability." make the intemees feel responsible for the actions of their
govemment and convince them how wrong the Nazis really were.' l7 Official atrocity
films. as they were called. were shown to the intemees on compulsory parade. They
depicted gas chambers. crematoriums, mass graves. the liberated prisoners and other
aspects of what came to be known as the Holocaust. It was reported that the prisoners'
reaction to such films varied considerably. Although rnost were shocked by what they
saw. many refused to believe that such events had actwlly taken place.1" Some of the
Fanihm pnsonen felt so shocked and hurniliated with the atrocities commined that many
requested that they be allowed to donate their blood. regardless of whose lives they
saved.
''
Radio was another important propaganda tool used for political re-education. In
Febniary 1945, the govemment authorized the International Service of the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) to record prisoner of war broadcasts to be d i h e d
throughout Germany. The intemees' initially responded to this scheme by asking: "Why
should we tell our relatives in Gemany that we are well treated here in Canada. Over
there our people are thoroughly convinced that we receive the best of everything. In fact,
our people are jealous of us k i n g here." The Canadian authorities clarified the situation
by telling the inmates that the aim was to tell the German people about the "fûtility of
m e r resistance, and about the fact that the Canadians do not intend ' h m and
destruction' but 'peace and rehabi~itation.""~~
As a result, radio groups of 15 men each
were created in most southem Quebec internent camps between May and July 1945.'~'
For their work for the CBC, radio group personnel were paid 50C per day?
Scripts
depicting life in the camps of southem Quebec and the treatment of prisoners by Canadian
authorities were fonvarded to the CBC in Montreal for transmission to ~ e r m a n ~ .CBC
~"
personnel were authorized to visit the camps with the necessary equipment to record radio
transmissions. In sorne cases. prisoners of war were brought to the CBC studios in
Montreal to record their messages whenever portable equipment was ~navailable."~
Positive messages came fiom individual prisoners and sometimes camp orchestras were
even recorded to reinforce the upbeat mood.12' Discussions between inrnates were also
recorded where. once more. in rather positive terms. camp life was depicted and the men
also spoke about democracy, thek r e m to civil life, cooperation with the Ailies and the
reconstruction of ~ e r m a n ~ .In" ~the end. the CBC deerned it necessary to fix weekly
quotas for al1 camps participating in radio production; Camp Sorel (20 scripts). Camp
Famharn (8 scripts) and Camp Grande Ligne (3 scripts).'27
For the intemees' relatives in Gemany, CBC broadcasts brought an immense
sense of happiness. This was often reflected in the letters sent to prisoners of war in
Canada. As a Camp Sorel prisoner's sister wrote in November 1945: "Your radio report
fiom the camp was a great event for us in ihese days as it was the first time we ourselves
were able to hear you speak fiom abroad. You cannot imagine our joy.. .Now we feel fully
relieved about you ..." In another instance, a mother indicated to her son: "Since I heard
you on the radio, 1 am not womed about your fate...r, 128
Radio receivers were only allowed for re-educational purposes in Gray and White
camps.'" There, southem Quebec inmates grew fond of the CBC's Verchires
transmissions. This was a f i k e n minute Geman language wws broadcast aired daily by
the CBC at 17145h o ~ r s . " So
~ popular was this show that 75 % of Camp Farnharn's
intemees listened to it each day.13' Because most prisoners took for granted that the
Verchères broadcasts were "intended primarily for the prisoners of war Ui Canada and
only secondly for al1 Geman-speaking circles," camp radio groups often sent suggestion
to the CBC regarding the show. Such was the case when the Camps Famham, Grande
Ligne and Sorel radio groups requested CBC oficials to abolish dl topics regarding ''the
collective responsibility of the German people for the misfortune that bas befallen them"
fiom the Verchères f0r~nat.l.'~
initially, the Canadian re-educational program was af5ected by the prisonen'
occasional lack of enthusiasm. The reason for this related to delays in the repaaiation of
in mate^.'^^ According to the Camp Grande Ligne authorities: "Re-education is now 'over
the hump.' The whole educational and re-educational work has become overshadowed in
the minds of the prisonen of war by the question of their return
IO
the UK. One factor
which has contributed to the decrease in enthusiasm is the unconfiied rumor that the
prisoners wiil have to do reconstruction work in England, before retuming home."'34
Furthemore, the fate of relatives living in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany
affected most inmates. In fact, the prisonen were very concemed with the Soviet
occupation of eastem Gemany. As a result, this came to affect morale in the camps of
southem Quebec. This was even more so when new prisonen anived in the camps with
fint hand news about the harsh Soviet treatment of civilians in ~ e r r n a n ~ .Needless
'~'
to
Say that such comments aroused much discontent inside the camps. As a result, prisoners
were less inclined to participate in re-education work. The only remedy to this situation
was the arriva1 of letters fiom the Soviet
zone of occupation, 'Wus relieving the
exaggerated feus which many POW had maintained with regard to Russian treatment of
ci~ilians."'~~
Nevertheless, it was estirnated by 1946 that 95% of southem Quebec
inrnates were anti-~ommunists.'~'
However, overtime, the Canadian re-educational program had positive results. in
1945, for uistaace, "confiidence in the strength and sincerity of purpose of the western
world" was said to have increased by 70% at Camp Grande ~igne."~
~e-educationalso
contnbuted to creating a climate of cooperation between German inmates and the
Canadian auth~rities."~uideed, the names of approximately 300 persons in Gemany
"considered to be willing and tnistworthy to cooperate with the Allied Control
Commission" were obtained fiorn southern Quebec inmates and submitted to the
Directorate of Military ~ n t e l l i ~ e n c eIn. ' ~the
~ end, many southem Quebec intemees were
pleased with the education they received in the region's camps. Said one former Sorel
inmate after having k e n tninsferred to&e United Kingdom in early 1946: "1 have written
this letter to you [Major L.L. Brunton, former Camp Sorel Commandant], Sir, because
you should know that 1, as weil as many other POW returned fiom Canada, have brought
back from there a conception of life whereby we can still hold our heads high. in spite of
the propaganda directed agauist al1 Germans; because this conception will help dong
those who still have a home and will provide a healthy foundation for the ~ture."'"
Although the aim of re-education was to prepare a vanguard for the establishment
of democracy in Germany, numerous intemees began to express deep resentments in
going back to their "Fatherland." In fact, "many POW's expressed their reluctance to
leave Canada and hoped they would be allowed to immigrate to Canada in the near
f ~ h ~ . AS
" 'the
~ Camp
~
Grande Ligne intelligence officer indicated:
A somewhat unexpected byproduct of re-education crops up in the attitude
of the many POW who have failen under its influence and who now know
so much about the flairs and life on this continent. that the idea of
reniming to Germany has become utterly distastehl to them. Of course, the
main objective of re-orientation is to make a contribution towards the
creation of a strong democratic element in Germany. However, rnany of the
POW who for 5 years read Canadian newspapers, accepted Canadian views
and are pdually shedding their inner allegiance to the "Fatherland". In one
respect it is discouraging to find that d e r many months of work on a
prospective proponent of democratic ideas in Germany, the POW in
question appears one day at the ofTice with a long dissertation in which he
sets forth that he is through with Germany. lastead, he wants to immigrate
to canada. '43
lntending to immigrate to Canada, numerous prisoners attempted to accelerate the process
by demonstrating how essential could be their contribution to the Canadian economy.'"
Some prisoners attempted to immigrate by promoting their scientific howledge. Since V-
E Day, most Allied powes began racing against one another for the acquisition of German
scientists. At the time. southem Quebec prisoners were reading about this situation in both
American and Canadian newspapers. Perceiving this as an immigration oppomuiity, some
intemees began promoting this skill. Such was the case, for example, for a Sorel inmate
who was specialized in aircraft turbines.'"
However. no prisoner was allowed to
immigrate in the immediate afiermath of the war. This was due to Canada's stict
immigration policies and the Geneva Convention's emphasis that al1 prisoners were to be
repatriated. What these immigration attempts proved was that instead of wishing to return
home to implant the basic principles of democracy. intemees had "fallen in love" with
their detaining power. Furthemore, as histonan Ron Robin indicated: "Neither British
[Canadian] nor Amencan re-education officiais were able to secure pivotal governent
positions for their graduates. There is no evidence of large numbers of POWs from either
program serving as apodes of democracy in their home co~ntry.""~Clearly. the reeducation program fell short. and. in a sense. backfired.
The creation of educational progams enabled prisonen to satisQ their thint for
knowledge. The belief was that while inmates were busy leaming. they would be less
prone to concentrate on their captivity. This led to the establishment of camp schools.
However. during the pnsoner of war phase. the situation became more cornplex. This had
to due with the political ideology of the captives. At the time, Nazism prevailed in the
camps of southem Quebec and was leading to much violence. This led the Canadian
government to initiate a re-educational program which aimed at indocvinating prisoners
dong democratic lines. The goal was to modify the intemees' beliefs so that when they be
repatriated to Gemany, the root of Nazi thoughts would be "exterminated." And by using
lectures, films. radio broadcasts and special literature as re-educational tools. Canadian
officiais were indeed able to open the minds of prisoners towards new ideologies.
particularly the democratic ideal.
NOTES
Canada. Red Cross and Prisoners.. .,pp. 94-95.
Canada, Orders and Instructions.. ., p. 66.
As Sherbrooke intemee John Newmark indicated: "If you come to think of it, we had
everything you can imagine there. Professors of astronomy, architects.. .fur traders.. .and
Cambridge and Oxford snidenü ...musicians, painten and sculptors; al1 the arts were
represented, a!l the sciences, history.. .. lt was a micrmosma in itself. everything was there.
That's why 1 learned such a lot ..." As Eric Koch wrote in Deemed Suspect: "The academic
talent assembled in the Camps [of southem Quebec] exceeded that of many Canadian
univenities." As another intemee recalled: *'Sherbrooke was a highly charged intellectual
group ...it was very exciting fiom that point of view we had every conceivable profession
amongst the inmates and if you wanted to know about anything a11 you had to do is ask either
somebody in the bed above you or near you and you get a very leamed lecture on the subject."
See Koch. p. 146.: NAC. FHTC, EK. MG-30. C 192, Vol. 3, "lnterview of Walter Loevinsohn
by Harry Rasky (CBC) in Côte St. Luc (Quebec)," [ 1980'sJ ,p. 9- 13.; NAC, FHTC, EK, MG30, C 192. Vol. 3, "Interview of John Newmark by Hamy Rasky (CBC) in Montreal."
[ 1980'sI. p. 11-1 1.
Carter, p. 82.; NAC. DND, 10. RG-24. Vol. 1 1,249. File: 9-5-34.IRC Report on Camp Îleaux-Noix. 1940-1 941. **Reportof the August 28, 1940 visit to Camp he-aux-Noix by Emest L.
Maag (Delegate in Canada for the International Red Cross." September 1940.
So important were these infonnal lecture sessions that each Saturday was devoted to series of
conferences held by the inmates at Camp Farnham. On one such occasion. intemee Hans
Karler, who commanded the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War (19361939). gave general lectures on the military lessons of that conflict. See Duliani. pp. 200-20 1 .:
NAC. FHTC. €K. MG-30. C 192. Vol. 3, "Interview of Emil Fackenheim by Harry Rasky
(CBC) in Toronto," [ 1980's], pp. 6-7.: NAC, FHTC. EK. MG-30.C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview
of Walter Loevinsohn by Hamy Rasky (CBC) in Côte St. Luc (Quebec)," [ 1980'sl. p. 9-13.
According to one Sherbrooke intemee: "1 think...1 learned more in the camp universities than
I did at Cambridge before and afrer [the war] ." One intemee even went as far as saying that
"Sherbrooke was one of the tightest groups of intellectuals ever assembled perhaps in this
country." See NAC, FHTC, EK. MG-30,C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Emil Fackenheim by
Hany Rasky (CBC)in Toronto," [ 1980's], pp. 6-7.: NAC, FHTC. EK. MG-30, C 192, Vol.
3. "Interview of Thomas Gold by Harry Rasky (CBC) in lthaca (New York)," [ 1980's], p.
29-7.
NAC. FHTC, EK, MG-30,C 192. Vol. 3, "Interview of William Heckscher by Harry Ras@
(CBC) in Princeton (New Jersey)," [ 1980'sl ,pp. 27-5 - 27-6.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Vol. 15,397, Volume 2 (November 1!MO), War Diary of l n l e m n t
Camp "A " (No. 40). Famhum, November 7, 1940, p. 3.
Koch. p. 151; NAC. FHTC. EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Emil Fackenheim by
Harry Rasky (CBC) in Toronto," [1980's], pp. 6-7.; NAC, FHTC, EK. MG-30,C 192. Vol.
3, "Interview of Fred Schlessinger by Hamy Rasky (CBC) in Ottawa," [ 1980'sI ,p. 34.
When the Farnharn camp school was created in November 1940, Montreal's McGilI
Universitv anreed to have the riso on ers write their matriculation examinations. When the fint
"
"
13
IJ
l5
l6
exams were held in the Spring of 1941. some 100 young men h m Camps Famham and ileaux-Noix had registered. See Draper, "The Accidental Immigrants.. .Pan 2," pp. 86-87. N AC,
DND, IO, RG-24. Vol. 1 1,253, File: 11-2-41, Impectiun Reports, Camp Ile-cm-Noix, 19401941, "Inspection Report", lune 25, 1941.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 11,249, File: 9-5-340. IRC Reporî, Camp Fmham, 1940-1941, "Report of the November 26, 1940 Red Cross
visit to Camp Famham by Emest L. Maag (Delegate in Canada for the International Red
Cross)", November 26, 1940.
Tho& who intended to write such exams were hansferred ternporarily to the Italian internment
camp situated on the île Ste. Hélène in Montreal. Cordial relationship immediately ensured
between German and Italian prisoners during such visits. For example. when the first German
prisoners amved at ile Ste. Hélène in the autumn of 1941 to attend McGill's senior matrics,
"the ttalians kept a crew up to feed the students coffee so that they could stay awake while
studying." As one intemee said: 'We played soccer with them [Italians] . Germany-Austria
venus ltaly and at the very end, the night before we left they put on a special. ..variety show."
See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 15 (September 1941), Wur Dimy of
Inremment Camp "Ir' (7%. J I ) . Fort Lennox. ~ l e - t l z ~ x - ~September
ok,
7, 1 94 1 and Septernber
1 8, 194 1. pp. 1. 3.; NAC. FHTC,EK, MG-30,C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Josef Kates by
Hany Rasky (CBC) in Toronto," [ 1980's], pp. 17-20.
For instance. beween April 12 and April ?O 1943, examinations set forth by Queen's
University of Kingston were held at Camp he-aux-~oix.See NAC, DND.10, RG-24. Reel: CH O l. File: HQS 7236-83-6-4 1. YMCA Reports on We#iare Matters. Camp île-our- NO^, 1943.
"Lt.-Col. R.S. W . Fordham to Major Bruce Thompson (Camp Commandant)," April 1. 1943.
As Major E.D.B.Kippen. Camp Famham's commandant, rold William Heckscher, the camp's
school coordinator: "The results [of the matriculation exanis ] are fantastic.. .and 1 wish 1
could send my two sons to your school ..." See NAC. FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192. Vol. 3.
"Interview of William Heckscher by Hamy Rasky (CBC) in Princeton (New Jersey),''
[ 1 9801s], p. 27-8.
At Camp Sherbrooke a musical circle was inaugurated as well as a vocational training school
specializing in wwd and metal work, an Engineering school, and an agricultural studies
school operated in cooperation with McGill's Macdonald College. To suit the educational
needs of internees involved in the camp's Works Program. the Camp Sherbrooke School
Board also offered evening lectures and eventually established a general education plan which
included English language classes. See Koch. pp. 15 1- 152.
Such was the case at Camp Ïle-aux-~oixin April 1942 when one of McGill University's deans
lectured the inmates on Canada. See NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 22 (April
194?), W m Diary of lnremwtent Camp " I r(No. d l ) , Fort Lennox, he-uur-hroix, April 13,
1942: April2 1, 1942, and April28, 1942, pp. 2-4.
Prisoners preparing for matriculation examinations studied such subjects as history,
geography, rnathematics, cherni-,
physics biology, music and arts. Those studying foreign
languages leamed English, French, Italian, Latin, Latvian, Spanish, Russian and even
Japanese. So successfùl were language classes that 571 Grande Ligne prisonen were involved
in this progam in the faIl of 1943. Furthemiore vocational classes were a h held and included
sessions on agriculture, fore*, physiology, public speaking, draughting, music, history, the
arts, arithmetic, physics, chemistry, navigation, bookkeeping, Iaw, business management,
metallurgy, rnathematics, electricity, geology, automobile engineering, geometry, and
railroading. These classes were usually taught by specialized prisoner of war officers. Study
circles were also established inside the camps. See Bufinga, p. 66.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24,
"
23
24
l6
83-3-44, Educotond Facilities, Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-19.16, "Report of Camp
Spokesman Schlichting," May 1, 1944.
NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Red: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-42, Re-Education, Camp
Sherbrooke, 19444946, "Department of National Defence Report," September 6, 1944.;
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence, Camp
Sherbrooke. 1944- 1946, "May 1945 intelligence Report," June 15, 1945.
NAC. D m ,10,RG-24,Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Educational Facifities.Camp
Sherbrooke, 1943-1946. "Alfred Pauli (Camp Spokesman) to the Travelling Library
Department (MacDonald Col lege)," J uly 12, 1944.
NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Educationui Facilities, Camp
Sherbrooke. 1943-1916, "Alfred Pauli (Camp Spokesman) to the Travelling Library
Department (MacDonald College)," July 12. 1944.
NAC, D m ,IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-44, Educutionol Facilities. Camp
Grande Ligne. 1943-1916, "LI.-Col. E.D.B. Kippen (Camp Commandant) to the District
Officer co&anding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4." August 18. 1944.
Canada Orders and Instructions.. ., pp. 60.; NAC, DND. 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5400, File: HQS
7236-83-3-44. Educationd Faciliiies. Camp Grande Ligne. 1943-1946, "Colonel H.N.
Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to Lt.-Col. E.D.B. Kippen (Camp Commandant),"
September 12. 1944.
Nazi propaganda books such as Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf and the German Army's Soldaten
Briefe were removed fiom most camps. Furthemore. books dealing with current military
subjects such as The Politicai and Smegic lnterests of the United Kingdom and His
Majesty 'sShips were restricted. The same applied to volumes promot ing revolution and social
change such as Karl Mm's Dar Kapitoi and The Communist Munijesto. Although some
Atlases were toierated, many were retumed by camp censon. The reason was that maps of the
United States and Canada were too big. According to regulations. "maps of the northem
hemisphere or parts of the British Empire are not admissible if the scale exceeded 60 miles to
one inch. Maps showing 61 miles or more miles to one inch are good and 59 or less are
excluded." The main reason was that larger maps might be used by the prisonen to plan
escapes. Canadian and American magazines were also censored. In some instance. articles
were removed from publications. Such a case occurred in February 1946 with a Reader's
Digest article entitled We are bungling the Job in Germmy. As the Directorate. Prisoners of
War indicated: "It is considered that said article is apt to amse misgivinp...
and may also
serve to encourage the more fanatical pro-Nazi POW in the belief that their cause is not
e n t i ~ l ylost. Consequently, it will be necessary to remove pages 87-92, as well as to obliterate
line 26 on the cover of this publication, prior to its admission to POW as reading material."
See Canada., Orders and Instructions.. ., p. 58.; NAC, DND, 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File:
HQS 7236-83-34,
Edtlc~tionalFacilities, Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1 946. "Colonel H.N.
Streight (Director Prisoners of War) to Dale Brown (European Student Relief Fund)," June 2,
1944.; NAC, D m , IO, RG-24, R d : C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Educationd
Facilities. Camp Sherbrook, 1943-1946, "Colonel H.N.Smight (Director Prisoners of War)
to Dale Brown (Secretary of the European Students' Relief Fund)," Febniary 19, 1945.; NAC.
D m , 10,RG-24,Ree 1: C-54 10, Fi le: HQS 723688-5-4 5, Correspondence. Instructions re.
CensorshQ, Camp Sorel. 1945, W.-Col. B.B.W.Minard (Camp Commandant)to the Director
Prisonen of War," July 20, 1945.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Reel: C-5410, File: HQS 7236885-42, Correspondence, i ~ ~ ~ c t ire.
o nCensorship,
s
Camp Sherbrooke. 1943-1946, "Lt .-Col.
H.D. Hedley (Camp Commandant) to Director Prisonen of War," November 19, 1945.; NAC,
--
DM), IO, RG-24 Reel: C-54 1 O, File: HQS 7236-88-5-42, Correspondence, Instructions re.
Censorship. Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, "Lt.-Col. H. W. Pearson (AIDirector Prisoners of
War) to Camp Commandant," Febniary 5, 1946.
'' As the Camp Sherbrooke spokesman told the "Traveling Library" Departrrtent of the
MacDonald College in July 1944: "Thank you for the enteriainment and educational material
provided by your library. This is, apart from newspapen, Our only opporninity to keep in
touch with the literary and political movements of tbis continent." Furthetmore, according to
Eckehart Priebe, who was intemed at Camps Famham and Grande Ligne: "To me as to many
othen the oppomnity to midy the Canadian press and literature becarne of great importance
and of far reaching consequences, not realized before.. .m a t happened here...was a slow,
imperceptible familiarizaiion process, not ai al1 forced down out throats, provided as naturally
as food and shelter. You could literally read yourself into the character, history, economy or
politics of a nation of which, hitherto, you had known next to nothing. We got acquainted with
Canada and the Canadian way of life in a very unobtmive but equally e f cient way. There
was no intention to indoctrinate us. Information and reading material was provided as a matter
of course. It was of enonnous help not only to pass the time away but to understand the inner
workings of the democracies allied against our fatherland. The tolenuice of the Canadians in
providing newspapers, magazines, books and study material amazed me." See NAC, DND, 10,
RG-24, Reel: C-5400. File: HQS 7236-83-34, Educational Facilities. Camp Sherbrooke.
1 9 8 -19.16. "Alfred Pauli (Camp Spokesman) to the Travelling Library Department
(MacDonald College)," July 12, 1 944.; Priebe, p. 142.
As Camp Sorel authorities indicated: "English and American films receive the best reception,
for the POW emphasize that these give them the best oppominity to leam the English
language, while at the same time the films have a very strong influence toward understanding
of the Anglo-saxon way of life." See NAC, DND. 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 91394-44, Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, "September 1945 Intelligence
Report." October 4, 1945.; NAC, DND. 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5365,File: HQS 9139-4-45.
Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel, 1945-19.16, "November 1945 lntel l igence Repoh" December
''
2, 1945.
'' This included such relief organizations as the Canadian Legion, the Knights of Columbus, the
O'
"
j3
United Jewish Cornmittee for Intemed Refugees and the YMCA. See NAC. DND, 10,RG-24.
Vol. 15,399. Volume 10 (April 1941). W m Diav of Intemment Camp "1" N o . 42). Fort
Lennox. ile-aia-iVok April 30, 1941, p. 4.; NAC, D m ,10, RG-24, Vol. 15.397, Volume 24
(September 1942), W m Diary of Intement Camp '*A" (No. JO), Famham, September 12,
1942, p. 4.; NAC, D m , 10, RG-24, Vol. 6583, File: 3-3-5 (40), YMCA Gifls und Donations.
Camp Famham. 194249.13. "Jerome Davis (YMCA) to Major H.W. Pearson (Intemment
Operations)." January 19, 1943.
Buffinga, p. 59.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5401, File: HQS 7236-83-6-40. YMCA Reports on Welfme
Matters, Camp Fumham. 1943.1946, "Colonel Jay (Camp Spokesrnan) to H. Boeschenstein
(Director in Canada for the War Prismer's Aid of the YMCA)," August 29, 1945.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 6 (March 1941), Wor Diory of Intemment
Camp "Nu(No. 42), Novington (Sherbrooke), March 25, 1941. March 28, 194 1, and March
29. 194 1, pp. 2-3.; NAC, DND, 10,RG-24. Vol. 15,399, Volume I O (April 1941), W m Dimy
of Intemment Camp "IWO.
441). Fort Lennox, fie-ata~oir,
A pril30, 194 1, p. 4 .
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Vol. 6583, File: 3-34 (40), YMCA G i j s and Donations. Camp
Fumham, M Z - f 9 # 3 , "K. Kneger (Camp Leader) to Dr. Davis (YMCA)," August 30, 1942.;
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5396, File: HQS 7236-79,Ofleers, Grande Ligne, 19421946, "LtXol. E.D.B. Kippen (Camp Commandant) to Duector Prisonen of War
(Department of National Defence)," August 5, 1944.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Red: C-5365,
File: HQS 9 13 9 - 4 4 , Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel. 1945-1946, "September 1945
Intelfigence Repos" September 1945.; NAC, DND IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5401, File: HQS
7236-83-6-40, YMCA Reports on Weljare Morters, Camp Faniham. 1943-1946, "Lt.-Col.
H.W.Pearson (Director Prisoners of War) to Dr. H. Boeschenstein (Director in Canada for the
War Prisoner's Aid of the YMCA)," April24, 1946.
These included such titles as South of Suez starring Brenda Marshall and George Brent;
Mmpower, starring Marlene Dietrich, Edgar G. Robinson and George Raft; and International
Squudron, stamng Ronaid Reagan. See NAC, DND, 10, RG-34, Vol. 15,400, Volume 22
(July l94î), War Diary of Intemment Cump "N"o. a),Newington (Sherbrooke), ''Camp
Orders", July 8. 1942, Appendix 1, p. 9.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.400, Volume 22
(July 1W),
War Diary of lnternment C m p "N" (No. 42), Newington (Sherbrooke). "Camp
Orden." July 28, 1942, Appendix I. p. 29.; NAC. DND,IO, RG-24,Vol. 15,400, Volume 22
(July 1942). War D i q of Intemmenr Cump "Nu(No. 42). Newingron (Sherbrooke), 'Tarnp
Orders," July 29. 1942, Appendix 1, p. 30.; NAC, DND,10. RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volume 24
(September 1942). Wm Dimy of lntemment Camp "IV" Wo. 4.12 Newington (Sherbrooke).
"Camp Orders." September 4. 1942, Appendix 1, p. 4.: NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Vol. 15.400.
Volume 24 (September 1942). Wor Dimy of lntemmenr Camp "N" N o . 42). Newingron
(Sherbrooke), "Camp Ordea." September 22, 1942, Appendix 1. p. 12.; NAC. DND. 10. RG24. Vol. 15.400, Volume 25 (October 1942). W m Diaty of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42).
Newington (Sherbrooke), "Camp Orders," October 12, 1942. Appendix 1, p. 9,; NAC, DND,
10,RG-24, Vol. 15,400. Volume 25 (October 1942). War D i w oflnternmenr Camp "N" N o .
42), Newingron {Sherbrooke), "Camp Orders," October 29, 1942. Appendix 1. p. 16.; NAC,
DM), IO. RG-24, Vol. 15.400, Volume 26 (November 1942), Wm Dimy of Internmenr Camp
"N" (No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), 'Camp Orden," November 17, 1942. Appendix 1, p.
9.
Robin, p. 109.
Robin, p. 172.; Arthur L. Smith, Jr., The War for the Gennan Mind - Re-Educatinp. Hitler's
Soldiers (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996),p. xiii.
Smith Jr., pp. 23-24.
As the Canadian authorities stated: "It is a waste of time and effort to try and do any reeducation until the rabid Nazis have been segregated." See Smith Jr., p. 24.
Page, p. 1 16.
The process began when the proclamation issued by the Adjutant-General in Ottawa was read
in both English and Geman to the prisoners in al1 Canadian intemrnent camps. As it
indicated: "The German Forces on land, sea and in the air have k e n utterly defeated and
Germany has surrendered unconditionally. The Allied Govemments of the United Kingdom.
the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the French
Republic, acting in the interest of all the United Nations, have assumed suprerne authority,
including al1 the powers formerly possessed by the Gennan Goverment, the High Command
and al1 State, Municipal and Local Govemments and authorities in Germany. The Allies will
make provision for the maintenance of order and the administration of Gennany. All
requirements of the Allies will be carrieci out unconditionally by the German authorities and
the Geman people." Although the imrnediate sentiment was one of sorrow and deception, the
situation hopehilly meant the end of Nazi thought behind barbed wires. See NACI D m ,IO,
RG-24, Vol. 15.401, Volume 56 (May 1945), W m D i q of lntemmens Camp "A " No. 40).
Fumhum, "Proclamation/Bekanntmachun&" May 1945, AppendVr 5, p. 1.; NAC, DND,10,
RG-24,Vol. 15.403, Volume 29 (May 1945), Ww Diwy ojlnfemmensCamp No. 14, Grande
Ligne, May 8, 1945. p. 2.; NAC, DM). IO. RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40. Cump
In~elligence.Camp Farnham, ]9.1./-1916, "Lt.-Col. A. W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to
Director Prisoners of War," May 9, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Reel: C-5365,File: HQS
9 139-4-40, Camp Intelligence. Camp Fumham, l9Wl946, "Lt.-Col. A. W. De Wolf (Camp
Commandant) to District Oficer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," May 12, 1945.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42. Camp Intelligence. Camp
Sherbrooke, 1914-1946. "May 1945 Intelligence Report,*'June 15, 1945.
The conclusion of war with Genany enabled the Canadian authorîties to adopt measures
which were considered forbidden when hostilities prevailed. For instance, Canadian officiais
began to interview pnsoners on war-related matters. Now that war was over with Germany,
the belief was that intemees would be more likely to cooperate. This contradicted article 5 of
the Genevu Convention which stipulated "Every prisoner of war is required, if he is
interrogated on the subject, his tnie narnes and rank, or his regimental number.. .No pressure
shall be exened on prisoners to obtain information regarding the situation in their armed
forces or their counp..."
Nevertheless, these interviews were conducted in a most
exploitative fashion since they took advantage of the inmates recent vulnerability. In June
1945, for instance, three mernben of the 12" SS Panzer Division Hider Jugend, wwho had been
captured in Normandy in the fall of 1944. were interrogated at Camp Farnham regarding the
vicious and brutal murder by their rnilitary unit of 156 Canadian soldien. Their response was
that "they fought against Polish uoops, not ever engaging Canadians at any time. On being
transported to England. after capture. they heard that Canadians had been in battle with the
12' SS Panzer Division near Caen. and that Canadian prisonen had been shot by SS ~oops.
They themselves had not wimessed any shooting of prisonen or partisans.'. Whether this
statement was true of not, chances were that none of these men would ever acknowiedge the
fact that that they had participated in a war crime. Nevertheless. such interviews well
demonstrated how the end of hostilities enabled the victorious powers to adopt measures
which would have not been deemed acceptable under wartime circurnstances. See Canada,
Red Cross and Prisoners..., pp. 88-89.: Howard Margolian. Conduct Unbecominn - The Stow
of the Murder of Canadian Prisoners of War in normand^ (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press. 1998). pp. 1 187.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 91 39-4-40. Cump
Infelligence, Camp Farnham. l9#-lW6, "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to
Military District 4," June 26, 1945.
District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Smith Jr., p. 2 1.
Costelle. pp. 218-219.; NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 913944.
Cfassifcation of P/IY. Camp Grande Ligne. 1914-1946, "Lt. A.G. Steiger to Camp
Commandant," September 7, 1945.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-54 19, File: HQS 7236-94-14-45, Reports for Psychoiogical
Wm$are Cornmirtee. Camp Sorel, 1915-1946, "Assessrnent Camp Sorel," May 3, 1945.; NAC,
DND,10, RG-24, Reel: C-542 1, File: HQS 7236-99, Organization and Adniinistration, Cump
Sorel, 1915, "Lt.-Col. H.W. Pearson (Director Prisoners of War) to the Adjutant-General
(Camp Sorel)," September 25, 1945.; NAC, DNDT 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 91 3945, CIass~~cation
of P/W. Camp Sorel. 19454946, "Confidential Report on Camp Sorel by
Lt.-Col. R.G.Wygard (M.I.,)," Febniary 15, 1946.; Page, p. 1 15.
-
became camp agricultural experts; and lawyen and judges worked for the Camp Sorel's law
and administration section. See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5366,File: HQS 913995,
Classification of Pm,Camp Sorel, 19454946, aconcise Assessrnent of POW in Special
Camp Sorel," February 15, 1946.
Y Smith Jr., p. 72.
Ibid., p. 64.
56
NAC, D m , 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Inrelligence, Camp
Farnham, 1943-1946, "Lt.-Coi. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District OFficer
Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," July 7, 1945.
" Such was the case in June 1945, with a Camp Peuwawa internee deemed to be "unreliable
and unsuitable for any position of trust with the Allied Govemment in Gemany or
elsewhere." As NDHQ indicated: "(A) He is not a confirmed Anti-Nazi; (B) He is an
opportunist and it is believed he would serve or cooperate with anyone as long as it would be
in his own interests to do M; (C) He possesses an unpleasant personality and will "grovel" at
the slightest sign of fnendliness or if he is requesting a favor." A sirnilar situation occurred in
November 1945 when a Sorel prisoner atternpted to srnuggle a message to Camp Grande
Ligne "in which was haen statements prejudicial to the good of Camp Sorel." As a result,
the individual was irnrnediately transferred. See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5421, File:
HQS 7236-99, Orgrniroiion and Administrafion. Camp Sorel, 1915, "Brigadier V.C.
Thackray (Commandant Camp Petawawa) to National Defence Headquarten (NDHQ)." lune
15, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10. RG-24.Reel: C-5421, File: HQS 7736-99, ûrganizarion and
Adrninisncilion, Camp Sorel, 1945, "Major-General E.J. Renaud (District Oficer
Commanding (D.O.C.)Military District 4) to the Secretary (Department of National
Defence)," November 17, 1945.
j8 Despite this change, the camp retained certain prisoners who did not possess the education to
do such work. For camp authorities, the presence of such individuals *-as considered
essential in order to create a well-balanced group and to assess reactions of the cornmon men
towards certain re-educational measures." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Red: C-5366, File:
HQS 9 1 39-45. Clussification of P/W. Camp Sorel, 1945-IW6, "Con fidential Report on Camp
Sorel by Li.-Col. R.G.Wygard (M.I.,)," February 1 5. 1946.
59
As Camp Sorel authorities indicated: "This suggestion might solve a good many of the
interna1 diflculties in Sorel and would tend to uni@ the camp a good deal." See NAC, DND,
10. RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 139- 1-45. Re-Educarion. Camp Sorel. lWj-iW6,
"Director M ilitary lntel ligence to the Secretary (Prisonen of War Cornmittee)," November 7.
1945.
As the Director of Military intelligence indicated in Novernber 1945: "1t has always been my
position that guards and administrative personnel could and should be kept at a minimum."
See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9139-4-45. C m p Intelligence, Camp
Sorel. 1945-1946, "July 1945 Lnterpreter's Report," Augst 1, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10,RG-24,
Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-45, Clussifcation of P/W. Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "Director
to D.C.G.S.," November 27, 1945.
Military Intelligence (D.M.I.)
6 i NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9 139-9, Administration, C a p Sorel. 194.51946, "Repon of the Counter Pmpaganda Committet," 1945.; NAC, DM), 10, RG-24, Reel:
C-8436, File: HQS 9 139-1-45, Re-Education, Camp Sorel, 196-1946, "Synopsis of ReEducational Pamphlets by Director Military Intelligence (D.M.I.)? February 6, 1945.; NAC,
DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 913945, Chsifctation of PM, Camp Sorel,
'
1945-1946, 'Fonfidential Repori on Camp Sorel by Lt.Çol. R.G.W y g d (M.h)," Febniary
15, 1946.
" NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-54 19, File: HQS 7236-94- 14-45. Reports for PsychologicaI
Wirjime Committee, Camp Sorel, 196-1946,"Assessment Camp Sorel," May 3. 1945.; NAC,
DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Fantham.
M d - 1946, "August 1945 Intelligence Report," September 1, 1945.
63 Bernard and Bergeron. p. 3 16.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Reel: C-54 19, File: HQS 723694-144 5, Reports for Psychological W+e
Committee, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946. "Assessment
Camp Sorel," May 3, 1945.; NAC, D m , 10, RG-24,Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40,
Camp Intelligence, Camp Famham, l9+M-l946, "August 1945 Intelligence Report,"
September 1, 1945.
a NAC. DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5365,File: HQS 9139-4-45, Camp Intelligence. Camp Sorel,
1945-1946, "January 1946 Intelligence Report," January 3 1. 1946.
6 " ~ ~ , DND, 10, RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-45. Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel.
I94j-1W6, "February 1 946 Intelligence Report," March 7, 1946.
66 NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-45, Classijkation of Pm,
Camp
Sorel, 1945-I9J6. "Confidential Reporc on Camp Sorel by Lt.-Col. R.G. Wygard (M.I.,),"
February 15, 1946.
67 NAC. DND. 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436. File: HQS 9139-1-45, Re-Education, Camp Sorel,
1945-1946, "Report - Stock and Consumption for Printing Supplies," January 16, 1946.
NAC. DND.10. RG-74, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-45, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel.
lWj-l946, "August 1945 Intelligence Report," August 1945.
69
These books included Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf, F.L. Neumann's Anatomv of k i s m . H .
Rauschning's Totaliiurianism or the Revolution of Nihilism. C . Heiden's Hitler. and E.
Mann's Schoolfor Barburians and Education under the Nazis. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,
Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 139- 1-45, Re-Educdion, Camp Sorel, 1945-1943. "German
Books," September 1945.
'O As camp authorities indicated in November 1945: "Several POW have emphasized that they
have attained a mental freedom and scope which they could not possibly have attained in other
camps. All POW here are outspoken opponents of Fascisrn and other forms of totalitarianism;
al1 are keen leamers of the foms of democracy and at least nearly al1 of them recognize that
the difference between totalitarianism and democracy is in the spirit and in the way of Iife,
rather than in the structures of govement." See NAC. DND, 10,RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File:
HQS 9 139-4-45, Cmp InteIIigence, Camp Sorel, 19454946, 'Wovem ber 1945 Intelligence
Report," December 2, 1945.
As Camp Farnham authorities indicated in Apd 1945: "In view of the impending
establishment of a "White" te-assessrnent Camp at Sorel within the next few weeks, it would
be desirable to be able to use Camp 40 Famham as a prelirninary sifting camp. Essential for
this is that no known "Blacks" should remah in the camp." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel:
C-5366, File: HQS 9 139-40, Classrfzcaiion of PM Camp Fanham. I944f-î946, "Direct or
to Director Prisonen of War (D.P.W.),"
April3, 1945.
Military Intelligence (D.M.I.)
NAC, DM), IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, Fik: HQS 9 139-40, Classifcation of P/R: Camp
Famham, 194401946, "Lt.-Col. G.F.Armstrong (Camp Commandant) to the District Oficer
Commanding (D.O.C.)Military District 4 for transmission to M.1.7 and N.I+," November 8,
1945.
" NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-5419,File: HQS 7236-941445, R e m s for Psychologka1
W e e Committee, Camp Sorel, 194501946, "Assessment Camp Sorel," May 3, 1945.
"
"
NAC, DND. IO, RG-24,R d : C-5365, File: HQS 9139440, Cump Intelligence, Cump
Famham, 19444946, Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer
Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," March 20, 1945.; NAC, D m , 10, RG-24, Reel:
C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp F m h a m , 1944-1946, "April 1945
intelligence Report," May 1, 1945.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Reel: (2-5365, File: HQS 9139-440, Cump Intelfigence, Camp Fmnham, 1944-1946, "July 1945 lntelligence Report," August
1, 1945.
The provisions of the constitution are included as follow: "The POW,of Camp 40, Canada,
have decided in order to regulate their own personal, spiritual and economic requirements,
insofar as these requiremenü are not limited tbrough the relation between POW, and the
Retaining Power or the Geneva Convention, to set down the following regdations for the
duration of intemment. REPRESENTATWE ASSEMBLY: (Article 1) The community of
POW.shall detemine changes in this constitution and regulation necessary for a productive
"living-topther" in camp, beneficial to all. (Article 2) For this reason al1 POW. shall elect a
representative council. (Article 3) For the Representative Assembly two representatives from
each hut (Four representatives from hut At - ûther Ranks - ) shall be elected thmugh secret
ballot. A preliminary election can be held for nomination. substitutes shall be elected. (Article
4) An ordinary vote-plurality of ofcupiuits of a hut shall be sufficient to withdraw
representatives for lack of confidence. (Article 5) A camp representative has the privilege to
resign his seat in the Representative Assembly if he so wishes, or he can be excluded by
decision of the Jury. in this case his rights of king a representative are suspended pending
this decision. (Article 6) On written application of one third of the inmates of the camp ail
POW, shall decided by ballot on resignation of the Representative Assembly of on changes of
constitution. (Article 7) Relative to articles 4 to 6, a new election must take place as soon as
possible. THE CAMP COMMITTEE: (Article 8) As the organ of the Representative
Assernbly a camp committee is set up. It is responsible to it for decisions as given by the
Representative Assembly. (Article 9) The camp committee shall consist of two mernben, who
must not be members of the Representative Assembly, and the camp spokesman. who will act
as chairman. The two members shall be elected by a 5/4 majority by the Representative
Assembly. They can however be removed by the Representative Assembly for lack of
confidence. The appointment of spokesman, adjutant and Quartemaster is subject to approval
of the Canadian camp commandant. (Article 10) One camp committee member shall conduct
the financial, economic and administrative matters of the camp, whereas the other one shall
guide the political and cultural requirements of the POW. If it concems economic and
financial maners of imporîance to uich POW,the Representative Assembly must previously
consent to that. (Article 1 1) The camp committee shall decided policy through rnajority vote.
Each one of the 3 committee members has the nght to demand the decision of the
Representative Assembly in doubtfiii cases. (Article 12) In the execution of their tasks the two
representatives of the camp committee as mentioned in Article 10 shall carefully choose
experts, for their spheres of action as they deem it necessary. The Representative Assembly
can at any t h e demand the resignation of any of thex experts and appointment of others.
(Article 13) The camp committee &es part in al1 Representative Assembly meetings. They
have no vote in i t (Article 14) Members of the camp cornmittee can resign on their own
request or be relieved of their position in case of being transferred to another camp. in these
cases, before mlieved of their positions. the Representative Assembly will, owing to
employment of those people in adminimation, issue a clearance certificate to them. THE
SPOmSMAhi: thticle 15) The smkesman is the rebresentative sbeaker for the carnn.
(Article 16) The spokesman has the rights and duties as layed d o ~ in
n this constitution and its
regulations. His duties and rights, as empowered to him by the detaining power remain
untouched. THE JURY: (Article 17) The meeting up of a jus., to administer major disputes, is
reserved to a senlement still to be agreed upon by ballot of the camp. ADMINISTRATIVE
AUDIT: (Arîicle 18) An auditor shall be elected by the Representative Assembly in order to
examine the economic and financial requirements of the camp. He shall receive his
instmctions hom the representative assembly. FUGHTS OF PRiSONERS OF WAR: (Article
19) All POW have the same rights. The Representative Assembly and the camp committee
shall cake care of their concems equally. They have the right of fkedom to express their
opinion. They have the right to make suggestions and complaints. Decisions must be given
them," See NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365,File: HQS 9139330, Camp Intelligence,
Camp Fmham, 1944-1946, "Camp Constitution for POW, Camp 40, Canada," Augua II,
1945.; NAC, D m ,10,RG-24,Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp
Fantham. 1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Ofiicer
Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," August 11, 1945.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139440, Camp Intelligence, Camp
Farnham. l9J#-lW6, "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer
Cornmanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4." August 1 1, 1945.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp intelligence. Camp
Farnham. 194-1-1946, "December 1945 Intelligence Report," January 5, 1946.; NAC. DND,
IO, RG-24.Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp Farnham, 19441946. "January 1946 Intelligence Report," February 2, 1946.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24. Reel:
C-5365, File: HQS 9139440. Camp Intelligence. Camp Famham 1954-1946, *Febmary
1946 lntelligence Repon" March 6, 1946.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence. Camp
Famham. 1944-1946, "Camp Executive Cornmittee and Representative Assembly," August
1 1 , 1945,
NAC. DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence. Camp
Fumham 1944-1946, "August 1945 Intelligence Report," September 1. 1945.
As Camp Grande L i p e authorities indicated: "What a few intelligence oficen can do in a
week can easily be undone by the insidious propaganda of a highly educated crew of Blacks."
See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-44, Camp Inteffigence.Camp
Grande Ligne. f!W-I946, "September 1945 intelligence Repos" October 4, 1945.
NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42. Camp Intelligence, Camp
Sherbrooke. 19444946, "December 1945 intelligence Repo*" December 1945.
As camp authorities indicated in December 1945: "...due to the fact that every POW in this
camp, unless he is si& is engaged in one kind of work or other, the educational activities
here, with the exception of Wednesday and Saturday afiemoons, are ptactically Nil during day
tirne." See NAC, DND, 10,RG-24,Reel: C-8436, File HQS 9139-1-42, Re-Education. Camp
Sherbrooke, 194-1946, "Lt.-Col. H.D. Hedley (Camp Commandant) to District Officet
Commanding (D.O.C.)Military District 4," Decemkr 26, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,
Ree1: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-42,Camp Intelligence. Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946.
"lanuary 1946 Intelligence Report," January 1946.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Cmp Intelligence. Camp
Sherbrooke, 19441946, "April 1946 intelligence Report," Apd 1946.
As the Camp Grande Ligne authoorities indicated: "The lectures are a medium for the
description and explanation of our way of life." See NAC. DND, IO?RG-24,Reel: C-5365,
-
"
87
88
-
-
File: HQS 9 139-4-44, Camp Intellgence, Camp Grande Ligne, l9Wl946, 'Wovember 1945
Intelligence Report," December 3,1945.
According to historian Arthur L. Smith Jr. teachers were "representatives of the educated
genteel rniddle class who respected education as the foundation of an enlightened
demwracy.. ." As Camp Sorel authorities indicated: "...the impact of intensive contact with
outstanding Canadian personalities should have detinite educational value. Impressions of the
POW gained by the lectures might also be useful because outside, check on our evaluations."
See Smith, Jr., p. 30.; NAC, D m , 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-45,
Reporrs for Psycho~ogicalW N m e Committee. Camp Sorel. 1915-1946, "Assessrnent Camp
Sorel," May 3, 1945.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: H Q S 9139-142, Re-Educu~ion. Comp
Sherbrooke. 1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. H.D. Hedley (Camp Commandant) to Director Prisoners of
Wu," November 14, 1944.; NAC, DND,10,RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94- 14-40,
Reporis for Psychologicol Warjiare Committee, Camp Fmhum. f9Abl9.16, "Lt.-Co1. A. W.
De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Ofticet Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4,"
January 10, 1945.; NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-40,
Educa~ionalFacilities, Camp Farnham, 1943- 19.16, "George Brown (Chairman of Special
Committee of the Canadian Association for Adult Education) to Colonel H.N. Streight
(Director Prisoners of war)," February 23, 1945.
NAC, DND. JO,RG-24, Reel: C-8436. File: HQS 9 139-1-40, Re-Educurion. Camp F u m h m ,
1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. G.F.Armstrong (Camp Commandant) to District Offîcer Comrnanding
(D.O.C.)
Military District 4," November 16. 1945.: NAC, DND. IO,RG-24. Reel: C-8436,
File: HQS 9 139-1-42, Re-Education, Canip Sherbrooke. 1!WJ-IW6, "Lt.-Col. A.G. Wygard
for Chief of the General Staff to District Officer Cornmanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4,"
January 2 1. 1946.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reef: C-5365, File: HQS 9139444. Camp
Intelligence. Camp Gronde Ligne. /W./1916. "Febmary 1946 intelligence Report," March 5,
1946.; NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-42, Re-Educarion. Camp
Sherbrooke, 19-lif-lW6. "Administrative OfXcer (Department of External Affairs) to The
Deputy Minister (Department of National Defence)," March 18, 1946.; NAC, DND,10. RG24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 139- 1-42, Re-Education, Camp Sherbrooke. 1944-1946, "Major
A.R. Turner (Camp Commandant) to Direcar Military Intelligence," March 30, 1946.
Lectures were given in ail of the camps by such professors as John I. Cooper (McGill), D.C.
Masten (Bishop's), Anthony Preston (Bishop's), John Hughes (McGill), D.J. McDougall
(Toronto), John Dando (McGill), E.F. Beach (McGill), E.H.Yarrill (Bishop's) and Frank R.
Scott (McGill). Classes were on such topics as "The English Civil War (1642- 1660) and
Oliver Cromwell," "The Development from the League of Nations to the United Nations
charter," "The constitution of the United States," "The constitution of New Zealand,"
"Canadian school institutions," "Modern Canadian art and literaturc," "Relations between
Canada and the United States in the course of Canadian history," "The connections between
French Canada and Europe," T h e story of the Royal Canadian Mounted Poiice," "The history
of Great Britain and the Commonwealth," "Eighteen Century England and her empire," "The
constitutional revolution of the Seventeenth Century," "industrial and political changes in the
Nineteenth Cenîury," "The development of self-government," "Repmnitative and responsible
government in the colonies," "Social welfare," "Racial biology," "Scientific Management,"
"Canada and its people," "Shakespeare," "Music and ans," "Plant breeding," "Canadian
industry and transport," "Canadian educational institutions," "New France." "English novels,"
"Canadian Indians," "Canadian medical histoy," "Anmals and plants," "Canadian art,"
"Canadian n a m l histocy," "Foresûy," "Modem novels," "Canadian political parties,"
"Canadian birds and mimals," "Canadian architecture," "nie British labour party," "The
British Parliamentary System," "British Rule in India," "Commonwealth relations," "AfricanArnerican music," "Democracy in the Canadian Amy," "The constitution of Canada," "The
occupation of Germany," "The Canadian federal and provincial governrnents," "The YMCA
in China," "The Gerrnan press," Canadian history, 1500-1946," b'Canadan democracy," and
"The Canadian press." See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-6-44,
Intelligence Reports. Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1946, "Marc h 1944 Intel l igence Summary",
March 1944.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Red: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-40, Educationai
Facilities, Camp Farnham. 19.13-1946, "Camp Spokesman Jay to the Canadian Association
for Adult Education", December 6, 1944.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436,File: HQS
9 139- 1-44, Re-Educorion, Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, "Lt.Col. H. W. Hiltz (Camp
Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," January II,
1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Educc~tional
Facilities, Camp Sherbrooke, 1983-1916, "G.R.E.MacFarlane (Camp Censor) to Lt.-Co 1.
H.D. Hedley (Camp Commandant)", Febniary 1945.; NAC, DND. 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5400,
File: HQS 7236-83-344, Edwational Facilities, Camp Grande Ligne. 1943-1946, "Tirnetable
of Lectures by the Canadian Association for Adult Education at Camp Grande Ligne".
February 19, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42.
Educr~ionalFacilities. Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, "Timetable of lectures offered by the
Canadian Association for Adult Education for Camp Sherbrooke", Febniary 22, 1945.; NAC,
DND, 10. RG-24. Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-40, Reports for PsychologicaZ
Waflare Cornmittee. Camp Farnham, 1944-1946. "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp
Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4". March 5, 1945.;
NAC. DND. 10,RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Educationai Faciiities. Camp
Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, *'Colonel W.H. Kippen (District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4" to the Secretary (Department of National Defence)", March 10, 1945.;
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-42, Re-Educution. Camp
Sherbrooke, 1944-19.16, "Alfred Pauli (Camp Spokesman) to Sgt. Maj. MacFarlane (Camp
Interpreter)", March 18, 1945.; NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-1440, Reports for Psychologicai Wmfwe Cornmittee. Camp Famhtn, 1915-1946. "Lt.-Co l .
A. W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military
District 4", March 26, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-40,
Re-Education Camp Farnhom. 1944-1946, Lt.-Coi. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to
Military District 4", March 26, 1945.; NAC, DND,10,
District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139442, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 19441946, "March 1945 Intelligence Reportn, April 2. 1945.; NAC, D m , 10, RG-24, Reel: C8436. Fi le: HQS 9 139- l -42, Re-Echccation, Camp Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, "Alfred Paul i
(Camp Spokesman) to Sgt. Maj. MacFadane (Camp Interpreter)", April3. 1945.; NAC, DND,
10. RG-24.Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-40, Educatiod Facilities, Camp Fmharn.
1943-1946, "Schedule of Lecturesw,A p d 9, 1945.; NAC. DM), IO, RG-24, Red: C-5400,
l
Camp Famham, 1943-1946, "Sc hedule of
File: HQS 7236-83-3-40, ~ u c a t i o n a Facilities,
Lectures", Aprii 10, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-340,
Educationai Facilties. Camp Fumham* 1943-1946, "Jay (Camp Spokesman) to the Canadian
Association for Adult Education," May 24, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Red: C-8436,
File: HQS 9139-1-40, Re-Educationt Camp Fmhom* 1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf
(Camp Commandant) to District Offcer Cornmanding (D.O.C.)Military District 4;" A u g a
89
90
25, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Red: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-45, Re-Eüucation, Camp
Sorel, 1945-19J6, "Lt.-Col. B.B.W.Minard (Camp Commandant) to Major A. Wygaard (M.1.t
)", September 15, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-45, ReEducorion. Camp Sorel, l9./5-1946, "Lt.-Col. B.B. W. M i w d (Camp Commandant) to
Military District 4", September 21, 1945.; NAC, DND,
District OfEcer Commanding (D.O.C.)
10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 91394-44, Camp Intelligence. Camp Gronde Ligne.
19441946, "September 1945 Intelligence Report", October 4, 1945.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24,
Reei: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-40, R e - E d ~ i o n Camp
,
Fmnhom. 19444946, "Lt. Henning
Sorensen (R.C.N.V.R.) to Camp Commandant,"November 27, 1945.; NAC, DM), 10, RG-24,
Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-45, Educationol Facilities, Camp Sorel. 1945-1946,
"Major-General A.E. Welford (Adjutant-General) to the District Oficer Commanding
(D.O.C.) Military District 4", November 30, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Red: C-8436,
File: HQS 9 139-1-40, Re-Education. Camp Famttam, 19JJ-1946, "F.R. Scott (McGill
University) to Lt. Henning Sorensen (Camp Famham)", December 10, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10,
RG-24, Reel: C-5400. File: HQS 7236-83-3-40, Educational Facilities, Camp F m h a m , 19131946, "Major-General E.G. Weeks (Adjutant-General) to the District Onicer Commanding
(D.O.C.)
Military District 4", lanuary 8, 1946.; NAC. DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5400, File:
HQS 7236-83-34 2 , Educarional Facilities. Camp Sherbrooke, / 943-1946, "Major A.H.
Turner (Camp Commandant) to Headquarters (Military District 4", February 6, 1946.; NAC,
DND. 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 139- 1 -44, Re-Education. Camp Grande Ligne,
1944-1946, "Major A.J. Reid (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4". February 20, 1946.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436. File: HQS
9 1 39- 1-45. Re-Educarion, Camp Sorel, 194li-19J6, "First Lieutenant W. Ratzlafial (Camp
Sorel) to District Oficer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4". Februaq 25. 1946.;
NAC. DND,IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5400. File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Educarionuf Facilities, Camp
Sherbrooke. 1943-1946. "Major A.H. Turner (Camp Commandant) to Headquaners, Military
District 4". March 1, 1946.
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24. Red: C-5400. File: HQS 7236-83-3-40. Educatiunul Fadiries. Cump
Fmnhunt. 1943- 1946. "George W . Brown (Chainnan of Special Cornmittee of the Canadian
Association for Aduit Education) to Colonel H.N. Streight (Director Prisoners of War)." June
21. 1945.
Prisoners often commented on the lectures. Such was the case at Camp Sherbrooke following
a lecture entitled "Canadian Indians" given by Bishop's University Professor D.C. Masten on
March 20, 1945. As the camp spokesman said: "lt must not be overlooked that most of us here
read al1 about tndians in our boy's story books - Indians Stones included. Cooper's [James
Fenimore Cooper - author of The L a t of the Mohicms] have always k e n popular with boy's
in Germany end their ways and customs are fairly familiar to us. After we al1 have read so
much fiction about lndians in Our youth, it would have been interesting to round off the
picture with facts e.g. more items taken fiom their history perhaps with special reference to
Cooper's works." See NAC. D m , IO, RG-24,Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-42, ReEducution. Cmnp Sherbrooke. 1944-1946, "R. Hertzel (Prisoner of War) to the Camp
Censor," March 23, 1 945.
One such exception was professor E.H.Yarrill of Bishop's University who gave lectures in
German twice weekly at Camp Sherbrooke in March 1946. Sec NAC, D m ,10, RG-24,Red:
C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Educutional Facilities, Camp Sherbrooke. 1913-1946,
"Major A.R. Turner (Camp Commandant) to Headquarters (Military District 4);" Febniary 6,
1946.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-540, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Eiiucational
-
91
'*
93
94
95
%
FaciIities, Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1946, "Major A .H.Turner (Camp Commandant) to
Fieadquarters, Militiuy District 4," March 1, 1946.; Smith Jr., p. 3 1.
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Red: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-42, Re-Education, Camp
Sherbrooke, 1944-1946, "R. Hertzel (Prisoner of War) to the Camp Censor," March 23, 1945.;
Smith Jr., p. 3 1.
N AC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-54 1 9. File: HQS 7236-94- 14-45, Reports Psychoiogica/
Wmfme Committee, Camp Sorel. 1945-1946, "Assessment Camp Sorel," May 3, 1 945.
NAC, D m , IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139- 1-40, Re-Education, Camp Famhom,
19444946, "LbCol. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding
(D.O.C.)
Military District 4," February 15, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436. File:
HQS 9139-1-40, Re-Educazion, Camp Fantham, 19444946, Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp
Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) in Military District 4," February 23,
1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-40, Re-Educarion, Camp
Famham, 1944-1946. "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Oficer
Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," March 5, 1945.
As the camp intelligence oficer indicated: "The Cornmittee now has appointed some of its
members to take charge of various fields. On Monday aftemoons an article on current affairs
in Europe is read and translated to the prisoners out of Reader 5 Digest.. .Saturday aftemoons
are taken up with a Wochenschau, where the event of the past week are discussed from
newspaper articles of particular interest. The lecturer, a cornmittee rnernber or one appointed
by the Committee. expounds the ides of democratic logic in presenting his review. An open
discussion by the audience with the reviewer takes place after the address has been
completed.. .ln order to gmdually prepare young POW oficers for a more balanced and saner
political outlook. to make thern farniliar with other types of government but National
Socialism. two Committee rnembets.. .have been appointed to supervise the scheduled lectures
on constitutions of Democratic countries. The first lecture will be on the constitution of
Switzerland.. .There will follow Sweden, British Commonwealth, USA and Canada, On
conclusion of this series of lectures one pend will be devoted to National Socialism, pointing
out its crimes and bad points to the young POW, who do not understand what Nazism meant.
Some of the points to be raised will be: The suppression of Religion and infiltration of
"cruelty literature," thus justiQing any crime as long as it was beneficial to National
Socialism. Further state autocracy over Individualism. Discussions and lectures are aîtended
by the Camp Intelligence OfXcer whenever possible." See NAC, DND,IO,RG-24, Reel: C8436, File: HQS 9 139-l -40, Re-Education, Camp Farnham, 1944-f 946, "Lt.-Col. A. W. De
Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Oficer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4,"
July 19, 1945.
Lectures were given on "The Weimar constitution," "The history of Gennany since 1870,"
"The rebirth of a humane Gemany." "Germany and modem national states," "The European
balance-of-power under Napoleon," "The transition fiom military to civil govemrnent in
Germany," "Brod outlines about funire British-German relationships," "Attitude and
Reaction to German artists," "The Nuremberg war crime trials." "The technical problems in
reconstruction," "Gemany's ultirnate place in Europe and the world." and "the hiture of
Gennany." See NAC, DM), 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-1445, Reportsfor
Psychologka1 W d m e Committee. C m p S d , 194501946, "Assessment Camp Sorel," May
3, 1945.; NAC, DM>,10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, Fik: HQS 9139-1-40, Re-Education. Camp
Fantham, 1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Oficer
Comrnanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," July 30, 1945.; NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Reel: C-
-
97
98
99
-
-
5365, File: HQS 9 13 9 4 4 5 , Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel. 1945-1946, "August 1945
intelligence Report," August 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365,File: HQS 9139-445, Camp InteIZigence, Camp Sorel, 119454946, "September 1945 intelligence Report,"
September 1945.: NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, R d : C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-45, Camp
Intelligence, Cmp Sorel. l9JW946, 'Wovember 1945 intelligence Report," December 2,
1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence, Camp
Grande Ligne, 19444946, 'Wovember 1945 Intelligence Report," December 3, 1945.; NAC,
DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-42, Re-Edwation. Camp Sherbrooke,
1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. H.D. Hedley (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding
(D.O.C.) Military District 4," December 27, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Red: C-5365,
File: HQS 9 139-4-45. Camp Inrelligence, Camp Sorel, 1915-1946, "January 1946 htelligence
Report.," lanuary 3 1, 1946.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5366.File: HQS 9 139-45,
Classification of P/Ai Camp Sorel, 1915-1916, "Confidential Report on Camp Sorel by LI.Col. R.G. Wygard (ML,)," February 15, 1946. NAC, DND. 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5400, File:
HQS 7236-83-3-45, Educational Facilities, Camp Sorel, 194.5-1946, "F/Lt. W. Ratzlaff
(NCamp Commandant) to the District Oficer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4."
February 25, 1946.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436. File: HQS 9139-1-45, ReEducaiion. Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "Major L.L. Brunton (Camp Commandant) to District
Milibry District 4," February 28, 1946.; Smith Jr., p. 136.
Of'fïcer Commanding (D.O.C.)
As Lt.-Coi. A. W. De Wolf. Camp Famham's commandant. warned in 1945: "lt is evident that
these oficers, a great many of whom are veiy Young, wiil be a source of trouble in Germany.
should the opportunity not be afforded to them to prepare themselves for their change over
into civil life." See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Intelligence
Report, Cump Fumharn. igJJ-l9&& "Lt.-Col. A. W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District
Military District 4," Iune 18. 1945.
Otfcer Commanding (D.O.C.)
These included courses on how to become proper administrators, accountants, architects,
bankers, construction workers, economists, electricians, factory workers. famiers, joumalists,
lawyers, rnechanics, rnerchants, policemen, public servants, railway workers. schoolteachers,
technicians and many others. See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139444, Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne, 19-11-1946, "May 1945 intelligence Report,"
May 1945.: NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,403, Volume 29 (May 1945), War D i q of
Internment Camp No. 44. Gronde Ligne, May 14. 1945; May 15, 1945; May 24, 1945; May
25, 1945; and May 26, 1945. pp. 3, 5.: NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-8436, File: HQS
9139-144, Re-Educution, Camp Grande Ligne, 1914-1916, "Lt.-Col. H.W.Hiltz (Camp
Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," May 30, 1945.;
N AC, DND, 10, RG-24. Reel :C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-40, Educational Facilities, C m p
Furnham, 1943-1946, "Lt.-Col. G .F. Armstrong (Camp Commandant) to the District Offlcer
Military District 4." December 28, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,
Commanding (D.O.C.)
Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-40, Educutionul Facilities, Camp Farnham, 1943-19.16,
"LKol. G.F.Armstrong (Camp Commandant) to the District Oficer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," January 16, 1946.
As Camp Grande Ligne authorities indicated: "The anticipated prospect for returning to a
occupied Germany caused a great number of intemees in the camp to place an increase stress
on the study of the English language." See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS
9 139- 1-44, Re-Educution, Camp Grande Ligne. 1944-1946, "Report on Educational Act ivities
dunng the Winter terni, 1945-1946 at lntement Camp 44:' [ n.d. ]
-
100
..
--
-
-
NAC, DND, IO,RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-1445, Reprfsfor Psycholagical
Warjore Commitiee, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "Assessment Camp Sorel," May 3, 1945.; NAC,
DND, IO, RG-24,Red: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-45, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel, 19451946, "August 1945 intelligence Report," August 1945.; NAC, D m . 10, RG-24,Red: C5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-45, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel, l !M-l946, "September 1945
intelligence Repo*" September 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS
9 139-4-45, Cump Intelligence, C m p Sorel, 1945-1946, 'Hovember 1945 Intelligence
Repoe" December 2, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 91394-45,
Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel. 1945- 1946, "Januaiy 1946 lntell igence Report," January 3 1,
1946.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-45, Clacs~jkationof P/W,
Camp Sorel, 19.15-1946, "Confidential Report on Camp Sorel by Lt.-Col. R.G. Wygard
(M.I.,)," February 15, 1946. NAC, D m , 10, RG-24,Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-1-45. ReEducaiion. Camp Sorel. 1945-1946, "Major L.L. Brunton (Camp Commandant) to District
Oficer Cornmanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," February 28, 1946.
101
In May 1946, sorne 288 "students" graduated from Camp Farnham English classes. See NAC,
DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-45, Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel. 19.151946, "November 1945 Intelligence Report," December 2, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,
Reel : C-5400, Fi le: HQS 7236-83-3-40. Educa~ionalFacdities, Camp Fonthum, 1943- 1946,
"E. Boeschenstein (YMCA)to Col. E. Jay (Camp Spokesman)," May 13, 1946.
'O2 Such seminars were inaugurated at Camp Farnham following Gemany's capitulation in May
1945. The goal was to prepare "students for future relations with the Allied authorities in
Germany, teaching them how to make verbal inquiries, requests, etc." See NAC, DND, 10.
RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Cump inrelligence, Camp Farnham. 1941-1946,
"November 1945 intelligence Repo*" November 30, 1945.
'O3 As the Camp Famharn intelligence oficer stated: "It is noteworthy to observe how every
conversation wanders away tiom its original starting point to the fear of the Russians and
Communism." He also wrote: "The ever apparent desire CO probe deeper into democratic
ideologies and practices can clearly be seen by the enthusiastic reception of these
conversations and the animated discussions resulting from subjects introduced by the
Canadian officers." See NAC, DND, 10. RG-24,Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp
Inrelligence. Camp Famham, 1944-1946, "May 194 5 intelligence Report." May 29, 1945.;
NAC. DND. 10. RG-24,Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-40, Reports for Psychological
W e r e Cornmittee. Camp Famham. 1944- 1916. "Lt.-Col. G.F. Armstrong (Camp
Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," November 16,
1945.
This was the case at Camp Sorel where two French classes were initiated in October 1945. As
camp authorities indicated: "A class in French conversation was started, which we hope to use
to the same effect as the English language classes, namely, as a channel to ciassification of the
POW taking part, and to provide a situation through which the POW can be influenced
regularly by Our thought." See NAC, DND,10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139445,
Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "October 1945 intelligence Report," October 3 1,
1945.
' O 5 At Camp Sorel, special study groups created by the camp's work cornmittee were organized in
sucb fields as education, law, industry, organization of transportation, introduction to science,
medicine, economic organization, religion and the organization of churches, philosophy,
publicity, veterinary midies, gardening, health, the reorganization of agriculture, foremy,
social welfiue, and insurance, S a NAC, DND. 10, RG-24, Reel: C-54 19, File: HQS 7236-94-
1445, Reports for Psychologicol Wdare Committee, Camp Sorel, 1945- 1946, "Assessrnent
Camp Sorel," May 3, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, Rû-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139445,
Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel, 1945-5-1916, "August 1945 Intelligence Report," August
1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-45, Camp Intelligence. Cump
Sorel, 194-1945, "September 1945 Intelligence Repxt," September 1945.; NAC, DND. 10,
RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-45, CImsijicarion of
Camp Sorel, 1945-1946,
"Confidential Report on Camp Sorel by Lt.-Col. KG.Wygard (M.I.,)," Febniary 15, 1946.;
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-45, Classificarion of P M , Cump
Sorel, 1945-1946, "Concise Assessment of POW in Special Camp Sorel," Febniary 15, 1946.
106
Such 'Tapers and periodicals" were read by so many prisoners, according to the Camp Grande
Ligne authorities, "that in the end they were rags." See Kelly, "The Prisoner of War
Camps...", p. 190.; NAC, DND. 10,. RG-24. Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp
Intelligence, Camp Grande Lipe, 1944-19.16. ''September 1945 intelligence Report," October
4, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Reel: C-5365,File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence,
Camp Grande Ligne, 19441946, 'Wovember 1945 Intelligence Report," December 3, 1945.
1O7
One such incident occurred at Camp Sorel in November 1945 when four issues of the
infornation Bulletin of the Soviet Union's embassy in Washington D.C. were received as
"propaganda material from a fiendly power." After carefùl examination of the producü, camp
censors came to the conclusion that although these bulletins were very instructive, "Gennan
POW do not make a distinction between the Soviet Union as such and the Communist party."
Fearing that such pamphlets might introduce party mife in the enclosure, it was decided to
reject such literature. As the Directorate of Milita* intelligence headquarters indicated: ". ..it
is just as well not to admit any material, no rnatter from what source, which might stan
undesirable political arguments in our POW camps." As a result, the bulletins were rejected
by the Directorate of Military Intelligence. See NAC. DND. 10. RG-24, Reel: C-5410. File:
HQS 7236-88-5-45. Correspondence. Insmctions re. Censorship. Camp Sorel. 1942. "Lt .Col. B.B.W. Minard (Camp Commandant) to the Director Prisonen of War," November II.
1945.
108
The first camp newspaper was fomed at Camp Famharn in October 1940 and was known as
the Stackeldrohr. It was last published in November 1941. See NAC, DND, 10,RG-24. Vol.
1 5.397, Volume 14 (November 1941 ). War Diary of Internment Camp "A " (No. 40).
Fanham. Novernber 13. 1941. p. 3.; NAC, DND, IO. RG-24, Vol. 15,397. Volume 14
(November 194 1 ). War Diap of lntemment Camp "A " No. 40). Fmnhum, "The S/uckeIldrat
Farewellnumber," November 1941, Appendix 2, pp. 1-8.; Smith Jr., p. 53, 134- 135.
109
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-40, Reports for Psychological
Worfme Committee. Cump Farnhom, 1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp
Commandant) to District Officer Comrnanding (D.O.C.) Miiitary District 4," October 12,
1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence, Camp
F m h , 1944-1946, "ûctober 1945 Intelligence Repoc" October 3 1, 1945.
I IO
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15.398, Volume 57 (October 1945), FYar Diary of lntemment
Camp "A " No. 40). Fmham, October 15, 1945, p. 2.
l 1 NAC, DND, 10.RG-24, Vol. 15,398, Volume 64 (May 1W6), W m D i q of ln~ernmentCamp
'il " Wo. JO), Fantham, "DKD, Number 17," May 20, 1946, Appendix 3, pp. 1-28.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Cmnp Intelligence, Camp
Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, "December 1945 infornation Sumrnary," January 5, 1946.
I l 3 So efficient was this group that in Februaxy 1946, some 56 articles had been written for future
publication. See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp
Pm
'
"'
Infelligence, Camp G r a d e Ligne. 1914-1946, "February 1946 Intelligence Report," March 5,
1946.
Il4
See NAC, DND, 10,RG-24, Red: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Inteffigence,Camp
Gronde Ligne, 119444946, "December 1945 Intelligence Reporî," January 7,1946.
In January 1946, for instance. some fifieen shon films were received in camp Sherbrooke for
re-educational purposes. Five were Arnerican-made, two were British and eight were
Canadian. They bore such titles as Pincers on Japan, Atlantic Patrol (RCIV), New Canada1
Smoke Steel, Battfe of Europe, This is the Enemy, People's W m and Price of Vicfory. Sec
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-42, Reportsjor Psychological
Warfure Comnit~ee,Camp Sherbrooke. 1945-1 996,"Major A.R. Turner (Camp Commandant)
to Headquarten, Military District 4," January 29, 1946.
116
Such was the case at Camp Farnham . in April 1946 when a Frank Capra film entitled The
Negro Soldier, which had k e n designed to get more men into service, was show to examine
the prisonen' sense of racism. This film produced much criticism and one prisoner of war
Colonel actually walked out during the performance. As camp authorities reported afterwards:
"This picture was chosen by the intelligence officer to probe the racial prejudices of the POW.
These are still strong in the majority of the prisoners." Authorities also tested the prisoners
perspective regarding Cornmunism. This was usually done by presenting pro-Russian films
such Otcr Northem Neighbor. See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-414. Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande Ligne. 1944- 19.16. "May 1945 ln tell igence Report,"
May 1945.; NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 1 39-4-45, Camp Intelligence.
Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "January 1946 Intelligence Report," January 3 1, 1946.; NAC, DND,
10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365,File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence. Camp Farnham. 194419-16,"March 1946 Intelligence Report," April9, 1946.
Il7
According to one Sherbrooke internee: "At times we see films in Geman of which the film
"Gerrnan Concentration Camps" made a special impression. One may Say the same of the
news reels. Ruins of once proud cities, de-lousing of old men, women and children,
continuous executions of men. Then the loving care given to the slave workers by the
Allies.. ." See Bernard and Bergeron, p. 3 15.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File:
HQS 9 139-4-40, Camp Intelligence. Camp Fmham, 1944-1946, "May 1945 htelligence
Report," May 29, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reef: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp
Inrelligence, Cump Sherbrooke. lWN9.16, "September 1945 intelligence Report," October 1.
1946.
At Camp Grande Ligne, for instance, White prisoners accepted the content of such films as
king tme while most Blacks believed it to be mere Allied propaganda. At Camp Farnharn, on
the other hand, it was said that "the prisoners are convinced that the atrocities comrnitted in
German concentration camps are true but they state their disbelief that they could have been
condoned by the Wehrmacht.They think that arch cnminals could only have been responsible
for such inhuman deeds." As it was indicated in the Potsdam Agreement of 1945: "...the fact
that they [prisonen of war] blame a distinct section, the SS, for atmcities, and another
distinct section. the Russians for the war indicates that the POW hem have a tendency to
excuse thernselves as a people." See NAC, DND,10, RG-24,Red: C-5365, File: HQS 91394-10, Camp Intelligence, Camp Fanihom. 1944-1946. "May 1945 Intelligence Repos," May
29, 1945.; NAC, D m , 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 91394M, Camp Inteffigence.
Camp G r d e Ligne, 1944-1946, "July 1945 Intelligence Repon," August 3, 1945.; NAC,
DND, 10,RG-24,Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-45, Cump Intelligence. Camp Sorel. 19451946, "July 1945 Intelligence Report," August 4, 1945.
"'
"'
.
119
Other Farnham prisoners asked the Canadian authorities on May 17, 1945 ''for consent to
work on the land. The produce fiom theù effort, they propose to forward to the needy
countries. Alternatively, the produce is to be sold locally and the cash value handed to the
authorities for food and supplies." See NAC, D m , IO, RG-24,Reel: C-5365, File: HQS
9 1394-40, Camp Intelligence. Camp Fumhum, 1941- 19.16, "May 1945 Intelligence Repo*"
May 29, 1945.
As the CBC indicated: "...programs ought to indicate that the POW's were conscious of the
problems and dificulties of present day Gerrnany and were planning constnictively and
sympathetically to make what contribution they could to the reconstruction of Germany. A
complete break with the past must be indicated. Possible subjects for discussion might be the
rebinh of German trade unions or the food problem in Germany, or non-political questions."
See NAC, DND. IO, RG-24,Reel: (3-8436, File: HQS 9139-2-40, Material for Broadcasting
to Germany, Camp Famham. 19444946. "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to
Militmy District 4," February f 6, 1945.; NAC, DND,
District Onicer Comrnanding (D.O.C.)
IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436. File: HQS 9 139-2-45, Moteriaf for Broadcasting to Germany,
Camp Sorel, 19454946, "Report on a Visit to Camp Sorel by H.G. Skilling (Supervisor for
the Central European Section of the CBC)," July 12. 1945.
NAC, DND. IO, RG-24, Rcel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 139-2-45, lkiateriol for Bruadcasting to
Germany, Camp Sorel. 1945-1946, "Report on a Visit to Camp Sorel by H.G. Skilling
(Supervisor for the Central European Section of the CBC)," July 12, 1945.: NAC. DND. 10.
RG-24. Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 139-2-40. Material fur Broadcasting to Germqv, Camp
Furnham, 19.14- 1946. "Lt.-Col. A. W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer
Commanding (D.O.C.) Militay District 4." July 30, 1945.; NAC, DND,10, RG-24. Reel: C5365, File: HQS 9 139-440. Cump Inrelligence, Camp Fmnham, 19JJ-lW6. "July 1945
Intelligence Report." August 1. 1945.
NAC. DND, IO. RG-24. Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9139-4-40. Camp hielligeme, Cump
Farnham, 1944-1946, "October 1945 Intelligence Report," October 3 1, 1945.
NAC. DND. 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436. File: HQS 9139-2-40. Muteria//or Bruadcasting IO
Germany, Camp Farnhm. I9.11- f9./6. W.-Col. A. W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to
District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4." May 16, 1945.
NAC, DM), IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-2-40, Material fur Broodcaring tu
Germany, Camp Fanihum* 19Wf946, "Lt.-Col. A. W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to
Director Prisoners of War," October 4, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reei: C-8436. File:
HQS 9 139-2-40. Material for Broadcasting to Gennany, Camp Furnham, WJ-f9J6. "Report
on the Recording of POW messages fiom Camp Famahm at Montreal Studios of the CBC
International Service by Helmut Blume (Chief Editor of the German Section of the CBC
International Service)," October 6. 1945.
To facilitate the impact of such messages, prisoners targeted certain Geman regions. As one
Camp Farnham inmate indicated: "We should addms different areas in Germany separately.. .
Bavaria must be addressed by a Bavarian, who knows the people there and who does not
speak with a Ptussian accent" while the Sudetenland mua be addmsed by prisoners with
Czech accents. Furthemiore, inmates were supplied with Nazi propaganda speeches so that
they may mimic them and confuse the Geman listeners. As such, speeches made by Nazi
oficials such as Paul Joseph Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, Robert Ley, Baldur von Schirach
and many othen were ordered by the Camp Famham radio p u p in Decernber 1945. As camp
authorities indicated: "We understand these speeches have appeared in pamphlet fonn. Such
material could in our opinion Drove verv usefil. The leader of the radio m u a Lt. Karl Gass.
..
-
- -
can imitate the voice of Goebbles to perfection. With access to the above mentioned material
we should be able to produce some very effective radio scripts. We therefore request that such
material be placed at our disposai." These commentators told the German populations of these
regions about "the futility of further resistance, and about the fact that the Canadians do not
intend 'harm and destniction' but 'peace and Rehabilitation.'" See NAC, DND, IO,RG-24,
Reel : C-54 19, File: HQS 723 6-94- 14-40. Reports for Psyclologicol Wwfme. Cump Fmham.
1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Oficer Commanding)
Military District 4." February 16, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Red: C-5365.File: HQS
9 13 9-440, Camp Intelligence. Cmp Fmham, 1944-I9J6. "May 1945 Intelligence Report,"
May 29, 1945.; NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: H Q S 9139-4-44, C m p
Intelligence. Camp Grande Ligne. 1944-1946,%ne 1945 Intelligence Summary," June
1945.; NAC. DND, 10. RG-24, Reel: C-54 19, File: HQS 7236-94-1 4-40, Reports for
Psyclwlogical Warjiare Cornmittee. Camp Famhom, 1914-1946. "Lt.-Col. G.F.Armstrong
(Camp Commandant) to District Oficer Commanding (D.O.C.)Military District 4."
November 2, 1945.; NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Reel: C-54 1 9, File: HQS 7236-94- 14-40, Reports
for Psychological Wm-me Cornmirtee. Camp F u m h . 1944-1946, "Lt.-Col. G.F.Armstrong
(Camp Commandant) to District Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)Military District 4."
Decernber 10. 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 139-2-42. Materiai
for Broadcasting to Germuny. Camp Sherbrooke. 1914-1946, "Adjutant-General CO District
Officer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," April23, 1946.
Iz6 One such broadcast entitled What do we Wmr was actually a discussion between three
prisoners of war on the future of democracy in Germany. 'They openly rejected Nazism and
preached cooperation with the western Allies. See NAC, DND. 10, RG-24.Reel: C-8436.
File: HQS 9 139-2-40, Material for Broadcasting to Germuny. Camp F m h a m . 1944- 1916.
"Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Officer Cornrnanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," July 30. 1945.: NAC. DND,10.RG-24,Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 1 39-240, morer rial for Broadcaiing fo German~,Camp Furnham. 1 944- 1946, W.-Coi. A. W. De
Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Of'fïcer Comrnanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4,"
September 1 1, 1945.
'Y Eventually. Camp Sherbrooke became involved in the program and produced 18 scripts by
January 1946. As the camp commandant indicated: "The rcason for this is the low standard of
education of EMS (who comprise 99% of the POW strength) and that they are fairly busy
under the Works Program.." See NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 139-2-44.
Material for Brwdcacling to Gemuny. Camp Grande Ligne, 1941- 1946. "Report of a Visit to
Camp Grande Ligne by Helmut Blume (Chief Editor of the German Section of the CBC),"
October 2, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Red: C-5365, File: HQS 9139444, Camp
Intelligence. Camp Grande Ligne. f944-i9.16, "September 1945 intelligence Report," October
4, 1945.: NAC. -DND,10. RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-2-45, Material for
Broadcasfing io Germony, Camp Sorel, 1945-1946, "Report of a Visit to Camp Sorel by
Helmut Blume (Chief Editor of the German Section of the CBC)," October 18, 1945.; NAC.
DM), 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-2-42, Materid for Broadcusting to
Gennmy, Cump Sherbrooke. 19415-1946, "Major A.R. Turner (Camp Commandant) to
Headquariers Military District 4," January 22, 1946.; NAC, DND,IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436,
File: HQS 9 l39-?-4S, Material for Brdcasrting to Germany, C m p Sorel. 19154946,
"Report on a visit of five POW's from Sorel Camp at international Service Studios by Helmut
Blume (Chief Editor of the Gennan Section of the CBC)," October 26, 1945.
120
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-2-40, Materid for Broadcasting to
Germany, Camp Fmhorn, 19.141946, "Lt.-Col. G.F.Armstrong (Camp Commandant) to
District Offîcer Comrnanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," lanuary 15, 1946.; NAC, DND,
IO, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 139-2-45, Materiol for Bruadcasring to Germany,
Camp Sorel, 1945-19.16, "A. Small (A/Carnp Commandant) to District Offïcer Commanding
(D.O.C.) Military District 4," January 19, 1946.
129
Kelly, 'The Prisoner of War Camps.. .",p. 190.
l M NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-2-44, Material for Broadcasting to
Germany, Camp Gronde Ligne, 19444946. "Lt.Çol. C.G. Kerr (Camp Commandant) to
District Onicer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," October 23, 1945.; NAC, DND,
10, RG-24, Reel: C-54 19, File: HQS 7236-94- 14-40. Reports for Psychoiogicai FVurfme
Cornmittee. Cmp Farnham. 1944-1946, "Lt.401. G.F. Armstrong (Camp Commandant) to
District Onicer Commanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," December 7, 1945.; NAC. DND,
10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp intelligence. Camp Furnham, 19.141946, "February 1946 Interpreter' s Report," March 1, 1946.
13' NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436. File: HQS 9139-2-40, Materiai for Broadcusting fo
Germany. Camp Farnham. 1944-1946. "Lt.-Col. G.F.Armstrong (Camp Commandant) to
District Ofker Comrnanding (D.O.C.) Military District 4," December 19, 1945.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9139-2-40, Muterial for Broadcasting to
Germany, Camp Fmham. 1944-19.16. "Report by Helmut Blume (Chief Editor of the
German Section of the CBC)," December 1 945.
As the Camp Sherbrooke intelligence officer stated in December 1945: '-the question of going
home absorbs most of the prisoners thoughts." See NAC. DND, 10, RG-24.Reel: C-5365.
File: HQS 9 139142, Camp Inteffigence. Camp Sherbrooke. 1944-2 9.16. "December 1945
Intelligence Report," December 1945.
13.1
This lack of enthusiasm led many Canadian plannen to ask themselves if their re-educational
methods were achieving their ends. In the early years of re-education, it seemed that brutal
Soviet methods were more successful. As hisotiran Arthur L. Smith indicated: "The western
Allied plannen of re-education may well have asked themselves at some point if the severe
deprivation encountered by the Gennan prisoners in Russia was a stronger inducernent to
study than the more national arguments presented by the U.S. and Britain. If temble living
conditions could be improved by studying cornmunisrn. many prisoners would conclude that
they had nothing to lose; if camp conditions were tolerable of even quite good as in some
American and British camps, prisonen did not have the same incentive. However, Western
plannen could console themselves that the prisoners who chose their offer to study democracy
did so because of a genuine interest in learning about it." As such. the temptation to abandon
the program altogether became evident on numemus occasions. However, the fear that Nazi
thoughts might prevail forced Canadian authorities to pursue re-education despite the
weaknesses encountered. As Camp Farnham authorities indicated: "Re-education must stay
active. It is held by this office that, should work in this field be tenninated now it is rumored
the success and progress already achieved here will slowly disintegrate. The desire to l e m is
there. the sincerity and eagerness to hetp those young ones solely educated under the Nazi
regirne is there. To neglect this fertile ground now would be an indication of lack of
imagination and vision." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 91394-40,
Camp intelligence, Camp Fantham, 1944-1946, "September 1945 intelligence Repon"
October 1, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Red: (2-5365, File: HQS 9139444, Camp
'''
"'
Intelligence. Camp Grande Ligne, 1944-1946, "January 1946 intelligence Report," Febwary
4, 1946.; Smith Jr., p. 63.
Such was the case when the commander o f the German submarine U-889 arrived at Camp
Farnham in May 1945 afier having sunendered his boat to the Royal Canadian Navy at HMCS
Shelbume, Nova Scotia, following Germany's capitulation. As he told fellow intemees
"Russians rape young German girls and make slave labourers out of Gemian workea. .." See
NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Reel: C-5369, File: HQS 7236-1-6-40, Naminal Rolls Prepared on
ArrivaI, Camp Fmham, 1942-1915. "May 1945 Nominal Roll," May 23, 1945.; NAC, DND,
10, RG-24,Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9139-4-40, Camp Intelligence. Camp Fmham, 19411946, "June 1945 Intelligence Report," July 1, 1945.
"6 NAC, DND, LU, RG-24, Reel: (3-5365.File: HQS 9139440, Camp InteIIigence. Camp
F u r n h n , fW.(-ZW6, "March 1946 Intelligence Report," Apd 9. 1946.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-45. Camp Intelligence, Camp Sorel,
195-1946, "February 1946 Intelligence Report," March 7, 1946.; NAC, D M . 10, RG-24,
Reel: C-5365,File: HQS 9 139-4-40. Camp helligence, 194WZ9-16, "Lt.-Col. G.F.Armstrong
(Camp Commandant) to District Officer Cornmanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4." March
27, 1946.
13' As the camp intelligence officer indicated in Novernber 1945: '-Al1 indications confinn that
the process of re-orientation has become substantial. in this camp. It now becomes evident
how successful has been this somewhat consemative policy of morally providing the rneans
whereby the POW can exercise their own faculties and develop their own thoughts, and by so
doing gain an appreciation of our ideais." So strong was re-education that Camp Famham
prisonen even went as far as to disavowing their ties to the German rnilitary. As camp
authonties said: "Significant indication of the anti-militaristic feeling in camp 40 are the
remarks passed on arriva1 here of 200 new uniforms through the Red Cross. Some officers and
OR'S stated as foilows: 'We are done with militarism. We don't want them."' See NAC,
DND, 10. RG-24,Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9 139-4-44, Camp Intelligence. Camp Grande
Ligne. IW&Z9+/6. "July 1945 Intelligence Report," August 3. 1945.: NAC, DND. 10. RG-24.
Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-40, Camp iniefiigence. Camp Fantham. IW-f-IW6,
"September 1945 Intelligence Reporî," October 1, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24.Reel: C5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-44, Camp Intelligence. Camp Grande Ligne. 1! ? U Z 9.16,"Novernber
1945 Intelligence Report." December 3, 1945.
139
In March 1945, for instance, Camp Sherbrooke inmates indicated that, "Gennans like to be
missioned.. .they wonder why not more is done to prevent the rise of Cornmunism. Cynicism,
Nihilism and other odious issues. They say that they will return to Gemany without having
seen anything but the newspapers. It is not obvious that Nazism could only succeed because
the average German has not the slightest idea of other people's way of life." To correct this
situation, they proposed "sigtitseeing tours in locked buses" and small group visits of the
Canadian parliament and univenities. Although this solution proved to be an impossibility,
their suggestion was most vital in proving some of the weaknesses of re-education. See NAC,
DND, IO, -24,
Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-42, Reports for Psychologicuf
W d i e Cornmittee. Camp Sherbrooke. 194fSfN6, "Report on Weekly Lecnires by R.
Hertzel (Prisoner of War)," March 23, 1945.
"O NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-40, Camp Intelligence. Cump
Faniham. 1941-1946, "June 1945 Intelligence Report," July 1, 1945.
'"
141
Pm
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,Reel: C-5366, File: HQS 9139-45, CZasstfmztion of
Camp
Sorel. 1945-1946, "Richard Marchfelder (Prisoner of War) to Lt.Col. R.G.Wygard (M.L7),19
August 1946.
142
NAC, DND,10, RG-24. Red: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-45, Camp Intelligence. Camp Sorel,
1945-1916. "February 1946 Intelligence Reporî," March 7, 1946.
NAC. DM). 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence. Cmp
Gronde Ligne, 1944-1946, "Novernber 1945 intelligence Report," December 3,1945.
144
At Camp Grande Ligne, for instance, two ptisonen gave camp authorities an a ~ c u l h i r amidy
l
of their own entitled S u m m q Dealing with Barnyurd Manure. They did so after the
Department of agriculture had aven the Grande Ligne Uunates pamphlets. bulletins and
publications depicting the great differences between fartrting in Canada and Germany. At the
time, the Canadian govemrnent did so with the sole purpose of helping the intemees working
on the camp farm. Nevertheless, sorne intemees took this as an indication that the Canadian
govemrnent was seeking new immigrant famiers. As the two prisoners indicated: "Our one and
only intention is. to show you Our gratitude for fümishing us with Canadian f m e r ' s literanire.
We do hope, that our essay may be worth reading for you, though we are fully awaw of the fact
that Canadian fming-conditions differ greatly from those in Gemany ...but we would like to
give you a specirnen of our interest in farming. which we hope to prove practically in case Our
petitions to immigrate into Canada as farmers.. .should be granted." See NAC, DND, IO,RG24, Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 139- 1-44, Re-Education Camp Grande Ligne, 1944- 1 946.
"Summary Dealing with Barnyard Manure," March 28, 1946, pp. 1-16.; NAC, DND, 10,RG24. Reel: C-8436, File: HQS 9 139-14 4 . Re-Educution, Camp Grmde Ligne, 1 W W W 6 . "Rud
Bohnisch and Ernst Breiler (Prisoners of War) to Major T.L. Reid (Camp Commandant),"
March 29. 1936.
145
Having read in the newspapers "that the United States is going to transfer German engineers
and scientists to that country in order to let them continue their expriment and that England
also approached Gennan scientists of chernical and plastic plants for the same purpose and
that Russia also engaged many Gennan scientists and engineers to continue their research. he
became interested to be empioyed as such in Canada." Between 1935 and 1939, he had
worked as a gas-turbine engineer in Berlin. With this experience in mind. he offered his
services to the Canadian govemment by enciosing a detailed report and the sketch drawing of
an aircraft combustion turbine that he had worked on More the war. As he described; "Before
the war, the German Reich asked engineers to build a new kind of engine which could use
many kind of fuel, especially alcohoi, acetylene, hydropn and the like which can be produced
in Gerrnany. For unknown reasons, the proâuction of hi& economic turbines was delayed for
the dunition of the war in favor of other kinds of engines to be used in planes and for Vweapons [reactors and rocket engines] . The combustion turbine was designed to create an
engine witb a low consumption of fuel. It is propelled by two rotors which are geared together.
Through this, the effect is almost the same as that of a standard reaction-turbine. On each side
of the two roton are air inlets channels. Shortly before the blades of both the rotors run into
one another fuel is added into the air inlet to rotor No. 2. The blades cornpress the mixture and
at the climax ignition elements explode the charge. The expanding gases drive the blades by
applying rheir power to the rotors." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5366, File: HQS
9 139-45, Clussijicution of P/W. Camp Sorel, 19454946, "Richard Marchfelder (Prisoner of
War) to Lt.Col. B.B. W. Minard (Camp Commandant)," September 19, 1945.
Robin, p. 176.
"'
'"
CONCLUSION
The intemment operation which was initiated on the south shore of the
St.
Lawrence River during the Second World War reflected well the pressures imposed by
total war. By using Canada's home front for the incarceration of civilians of German
descent and prisoners of war. both the British and Canadian governments demonstrated
how intemment operations had become an integral part of any belligerent's war effort. It
also pennitted a better understanding of the drastic measures that could be adopted by any
government in the advent of war. Overall. Canada detained some 40.000 civilians of
German descent, refugees and prisoners of war during the conflict. Aside From Germans,
the country also incarcerated other "enemy ethnic groups." These included civilians of
Italian. Japanese. Finnish, Hungarian and Rumanian descent as well as other individuals
whose ethnic background lay with countries supporting Axis forces or at war against the
~llies.'Canada also detained home-grown Fascist sympathizers such as Adrien Arcand
and rnembers of his Parti National Socid Chrétien, Comunists as weIl as civilians
perceived as subversives such as Montreai Mayor Carnilien Houde who had preached
against conscription.' Aside from these intemees, Canada also detained thousands of
prisoners of war oveneas. In fact, James Bacque demonstrated in Other Losses that both
British and Canadian Armed Forces captured some 2,873.900 German prisoners of war in
Europe alone following V-E Day (May 8, 1945). Overall, the Allies captured more than
9,000.000 Germans rnilitary personnel during the war.'
Caring for so many prisoners in Europe after V-E Day proved to be a hard task for
Allied authorities. In fact, the Allied powers were at first short of food and shelter for
their astounding nurnbers of W e h c h t prisoners. As James Bacque explained: "In a &y
and a half, Field Marshal Montgomery repoaed, half a million Germans sumndered to
the 2 1" Army Group in north Germany.. .Bitish and Canadian camps soon provided just
enough food aud shelter for the prisoners to survive in fair health." This situation led to
abuses on the part of the Americans, French and Soviets. According to James Bacque,
"the western Allies had commitîed a gigantic war crime fiom 1944 to 1946. More than
790,000 surrendered [Geman] soldien died from deliberate neglect after the war in the
camps of the French and Amencan amies. Half a million more were rnissing/presumed
dead in Soviet
in fact, these governments refused to supply the inmates with
adequate shelter and to provide them with the necessary supplies to survive. As a
consequence, German prisoners were scattered in open field camps where they had to dig
holes in the ground and live in cardboard boxes to protect themselves fiom the inclement.
As Bacque contended, it was the policy of these nations to "deprive the captives of shelter
and of m y food as soon as the war was overy' although access to supply surpluses
existed. This "act of revenge" even went as far as refûsing to allow relief organizations
and protecting powers inside the camps. This was done in cornplete defiance of the
Grnevu
onv vent ion? On the other hand. both the British and Canadians proved that it was
possible to keep millions of prisoners dive. in fact, both these nations provided humane
waunent to their newly caphued prisoners in Europe. As Bacque indicated: "The captives
in the British-Canadian camps got shelter, space. enough clean water. better hospital care
and so on ....The Canadian Army pertnitted at least one German unit to retain al1 its
telephone equipment and even to continue operating a radio trammitter. Within a few
months. pnsoner were receiving visitors in British and Canadian camps."' Overall.
probably no more than 10,000 died in British and Canadian bands.'
The Gennan prisonen held in Canada during the war were also fairly treaied.
Because Canada f m l y abided by the provisions of the 1929 Genevu Convention, the
treatrnent of German captives proved adequate. This was certainly the case in southem
Quebec. Provided with recreational equipment through relief organizations, prisoners
could undertake numerous activities in terms of the arts, education and sports. Prisoners
read books. played garnes, wrote letters and poems, painted and made handicrafts. Music
and sports were among the most important sources of collective entertainment. Both
helped pnsoners bond with one another and enabled the nse of a "community~' in the
camps. Music boosted morale and helped to break the monotony of camp life. AS
Sherbrooke intemee H e h u t Blume recalled, music %as of great importance. Not ody to
us musicians but to the camp as a whole.. .I think that in this environment of uncertainty
and fear which any type of prisoner behind barbed wire would feel, music helped a great
deal to re-establish a kind of a balance and a kind of h ~ ~ eWith
. " ~musical instruments
loaned by relief organizations, camp musicians formed orchestras and bands in order to
entertain fellow prisoners. ' O During the civilian phase, intemees benefited Eom the
presence of numerous professional musicians of European renom. Many of them had
been educated in the great musical academies of Vienna and Berlin. As such, they brought
to the intemrnent camps of southem Quebec a taste of European operas and concert
halls.'' At Camp Sherbrooke. so great were the artists that when concerts were given at
the camp, civilians would gather on the other side of the St. François River to hear the
music." In the end. string quartets. jazz bands, bras bands. and choirs were formed in
southem Quebec camps while other orchestras concentrated on classical music. rnilitary
marches and even operatic music.13 These bands usually gave concerts on a weekly
basis.
'
Sports were also very important inside the camps of southem Quebec. Physical
activity was considered vital for the well being of inmates since it helped keep the
prisoners' body and sou1 in shape. Spon equipment was usually furnished through relief
organi~ations.'~
Special courts and facilities were even conmcted in most camps by the
prisoners themselves. l6 In each camp, inmates appointed sport supervison whose task
was to make anangements for the necessary equiprnent, organize sporting events, teach
various classes and take part in competitions." Prisoners of war oficers would ofien
encourage esprit de corps through team sports. As they indicated, sports helped build
character and served as a rallying point for group solidarity'' As such, numerous athletic
competitions were held in the camps of southem Quebec. During such events, prisoners
organized teams representing different regions of Gerrnany as well as uni6 of the Geman
'
armed forces. During such contests, prisoners wen ofien rewarded with special prizes?O
In the summer, soccer was the prisoners' most favored sport. It was played every evenhg
in al1 of the camps.
*' In winter, ice skating and hockey were most popular. Ice rinks were
created in d l of the camps and were maintained by the pnsoners. Although skating was a
novel for most Germans and mcessitated lots of dexterity, the inrnates' interest for this
fonn of outdoor recreation never seemed to fade."
Clearly. the Canadian govemment proved itself an adequate detaining power.
Indeed Canadian prisoners of war sometimes found themselves the recipients of
privileges as a result of the conditions enjoyed by German Prisoners of war held in
Canada. in Objects of Concern, historian Jonathan F. Vance noted an announcement made
by Gennan authorities;
Our FOhrer has k e n very impressed with the official reports of the
treatment received by German prisoners in Canada. He has therefore
authorized that preferential treamient be given to Canadian pnsonen of
war.. .a new allaCanadian camp is being prepared near Stettin. There
Canadians will be aliowed the fieedom of the town. They will be able to
mix arnong the civilian population, and go to shows and other
entertainment. Their food will be increased to double ration."
Still. camp life created severe psychological strains. Afthough intemees were
protected by the provisions of the Geneva Convenrion and benefited fiom numerous
privileges. the sheer reality of being held captive was enough to generate stress. Restricted
mobility. sexual deprivation. social dienation and the privation of material cornforts were
al1 factors which affected the morale of prisoners. As a consequence, intemees becarne
restless and uncooperative. In order to express their discontent, dissension sometimes
emerged in the camps of southem Quebec. This resulted in strikes, riots, iilicit activities
and escape attempts. This situation forced camp authorities to apply discipline and punish
the perpetrators. Another major problem had to due with the prisoners' political thoughts.
This was certainiy the case at Camp Grande Ligne with the nse of the Hari-Kiri Club.
Hoping to minimize the consequences of psychological strains, the Canadian
govemment introduced two major schemes in the camps of southern Qwbec: labour
projects and educational programs. The belief was that both these projects would keep
intemees occupied and forced them to spend less t h e ploning against camp authonties.
The aim was to broaden the mind of the prisoners, help them maintain saniv, show them
alternatives to Nazism a d prepare thcm for post-war professions. To ensure that the
German authorities would not see this as "brainwashing," ody volunteers were chosen to
participate in these projects.
Because the treatment of prisoners remained adequate in southem Quebec camps,
acts of dissension on the part of the inmates were rare. Instead, prisoneo actively
panicipated in the activities organized within the camps. Al1 of southem Quebec's
intemees were repatriated by the end of 1946. The internees' r e m to civilian life had its
toll. Since most had been intemed for several years, their reaction towards "fieedom" was
mixed. As Eric Koch explained in Deemed Suspect: &'Formany, release was a bittersweet
experience; they felt lonely and confused at first, having become accustomed to camp life
where al1 decisions were made for them and everythmg was predictable and safe. Now.
suddenly, crossing a street in a busy city was an unnerving experience; sleeping alone in a
room without hearing the cornfortable sound of 100 men snoring was like being exiled to
However, on the other hand, hundreds of
some distant. unfamiliar and boring is~and."~~
prisoners immigratecl to Canada in the pst-war years.25lnfluenced by the fair treatrnent
they had received in the country during the war and the dificult economic situation which
existed in post-war Gerrnany, these individuals chose Canada as their new home because.
deep inside. they had corne to believe in the superiority of democracy and fieedom over
Nazism and tyanny.
NOTES
I
Dreisziger, pp. 93- 105.: Keyserlingk, "The Canadian Govemment's.. .", p. 18.; Robinson,
p. 10.; Thompson, pp. 14-1 9.
Lita-Rose Betchennan, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf Fascist Movements in Canada in
the Thirties (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside. 1979,pp. 145-147.; Robinson, p. 14.
James Bacque, Other losses - An Investination Into the Mass Deaths of German Prisonen at
the Hands of the French and Americans Afier World War Ii (Bolton: Little, Brown and
Company, 1999), pp. 208-209.
Ibid., p. 132.
Ibid., p. xxiii.
Ibid., pp. 15-69,87-89, 169.
Ibid., pp. 1 72- 175.
Ibid p. lix.
NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, "Interview of Helrnut Blume by Hany Rasky (CBC)
in Westmount (Quebec)," [ 1980's ] ,p. 3 7-9.
The musical instnirnents that were introduced in the camps included accordions, basses,
chelos, clarinets, flutes, guitars; harmonicas; saxophones. sithers, viola. violins and even
pianos. See NAC. DND. 10. RG-24, Vol. 1 1,249, File: 9 4 - 3 4 1, IRC Report. Camp Île-ourN o k 1940-1Wl,"Report of the August 23, 1940 visit by Ernest L. Maag (Delegate in Canada
for the International Red Cross)," September 1940.; NAC. DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. i 5,399.
Volume 3 (December 1940). War Dias) of Internment Camp "N" (no. 42). Newington
(Sherbrooke),December 1 8. 1940, p. 2.
As Eric Koch recalled in Deemed Surpect: "Many of us had a richer musical life behind
barbed wire than we had before or after intemment. 1 cannot ever hear the Wandereqianfmie
by Schubert or the F-Minor Ballode by Chopin without thinking of Helmut Blume practicing
these pieces ...in shed A in Sherbrooke." Musicians were so engrossed with the "sound of
music" that they ofien did not want to be disturbed when playing their instruments or listening
to others. Such an incident occurred at Camp Sherbrooke on December 7, 1941 when pianist
John Newmark and his fiiends were listening to the radio broadcast of a concert held at
Carnegie Hall by Arthur Rubinstein. When a fellow intemee burst into the hut in order to
announce Japan's bombing of the Arnerican Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Newmark hushed
him and whispered: "Quiet please. The war wiil go on for a long tirne, but Rubinstein is an old
man. Who knows how long we'il still be able to listen to him!" See Koch, pp. 155-156. See
Koch. pp. 155-1 56.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.399, Volume 3 (September 1940). W m
Diary of lnternment Camp "1" (No. 4 I l , Fort Lennox, ile-ota-~ok,September 4, 1940, p. 1 .
Bmard and Bergeron, p. 163.; Gilles Dallaire, "Paxtis d'Allemagne en conquérants.. .ils sont
prisonniers a Sherbrooke," La Tribune de Sherùrmke, October 12, 1985.
Such was the case at Grande Ligne where a 40man strong orchestra specialized in classical
music was created along with a smailer one indulging lighter hyrnns and two dance bands. See
Buffinga, p. 59.; NAC, DND,10,RG-24,Reel: C-54 16, File: HQS 7236-94444, Intelligence
Reports, Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1946, "December 1943 Intelligence Summary,"
December 1943.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp
Intelligence, Camp Sherbrooke, 19444946, "Febniary 1945 Intelligence Report," March 4,
1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-1440, Reports for
-
3
'
6
7
..
9
1O
"
'
l3
14
15
'
Psychologicaf Wmfme Cornmittee, Camp Fanham. 1944- 1946, "Lt.401. A. W. De Wolf
(Camp Commandant) to District Oficer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4," March
12, 1945.; NAC, D m , 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9139-4-44, Comp IntelIigence.
Camp Gronde Ligne. 1944-l9J6, "December 1945 information Sumrnary," January 5, 1946.
Musicians also coordinated theatrical productions. During the civilian phase of internment,
Camp Sherbrooke internee John Newrnark directed numerous plays and often chose stones to
which the pnsonea could relate. For instance, the camp's first play was known as Androoufw
and the Lion and was about Roman Emperor Nero and the perçecution of Chriaians.
Newrnark chose this story because a parallel could be made with the pmecution of the Jews
in Gerrnany. After al!, many of Camp Sherbrooke's inmates were German Jews at the time.
With this in rnind, "...the story was switched. They [the cast] were not called victims of
Roman persecution but.. .victims of Nazi persecution. .." See NAC, FHTC, EK, MG-30,C
192, Vol. 3, "hterview of John Newrnark by Hany Rasky (CBC) in Montreal," [ 1980's], pp.
1 1-3 - 1l A.NAC, DM). IO, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 3 (Septcmber 1940), W m Dias, of
Internment Camp "1" (No. 41). F m Lennox, jle-ma-NOU, September 4, 1940, p. 1.; NAC,
DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365,File: HQS 9139-4-44, Camp Intelligence, Camp Grande
Ligne. 1944-1946, "May 1945 Intelligence Report," May 1945.; NAC, DND. 10. RG-24.
Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp Intelligence. Camp Sherbrooke. 1911-1946, "May
1945 Intelligence Repoq" June 15, 1945.; NAC. DND, 10, Re-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS
9 1 39-4-42, Cump In~eIIigence.Camp Sherbrooke, 1911- / 9.16. "January 1946 Intelligence
Report," January 1946.
Prisonen were given the opponunity to practice a great variety of activities. These included
such sports as badminton, baseball, basketball. boxing, fencing, fistball. gymnastics. handball.
home shoe, ice hockey, ice skating, JuJitsu, ping pong, soccer, tennis. track and field,
volleyball, wrestl ing, and weightlifting. At Camp Sherbrooke. starting in 1945. skiing parties
were even organized weekly See NAC. DND, IO, RG-24. Vol. 15,399, Volume 6 (March
1941 ), W w Diary of Internment Camp "N" (No. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), March 5.
194 1, p. 1 .; NAC, DND, IO. RG-24, Vol. 1 5.399, Volume 10 (July 1941), W m Diarr, cf
internment Camp "N" (No. 42). Nouington (Sherbrooke). July 27, 1941, p. 5.; NAC. DND.
10. RG-24. Vol. 15.399, Volume 12 (Septernber 1941 ), W m Diory of Internment Camp "N"
INO. 42). Newington (Sherbrooke), Sepiember 13, 1941 and September 14. 1941, p. 3 .; NAC.
DN D. 10, RG-24, Reel : C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-42, Camp Intelligence. Cump Sherbrooke.
1943- 1946. "January 1945 Intelligence Report," Februw 4, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24,
Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-42, Reports for Psychologicaf Wmfme Committee,
Camp Sherbrooke, 1945-1946, "Broadcast information on Camp to Headquarters Military
District 4," February 20, 1945.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 1394-44.
Camp Ilttelligence. Camp Gronde Ligne, l9#-1946, "May 1945 lntelligence Report," May
1945.: NAC, DND,10. RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139442. Camp Intelligence. Camp
Sherbrooke. 19441946, "May 1945 htelligence Report," June 15, 1945.; NAC, DND, 10,
RG-24, Reel: C-5365, File: HQS 9 139-4-44, Camp Intelligence, Cump Grande Ligne, 194.11946, "December 1945 Information Sumrnary," January 5, 1946.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,
Reel : C-5365. Fi le: HQS 9 139-4-42, Camp Intelligence. Camp Sherbrook, 1944-1946,
"February 1946 intelligence Report," Febniary 1946.
NAC, DND, 10, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volume 4 (January 1941), W m Dimy of lnternment
Camp "N"(No. 42), Newington (Sherbrook), January 1, 1941, p. 1 .; NAC, DND, 10,RG-24,
42).
Vol. 15,399, Volume 10 (July 1941), W m Diury of Ihtemnrent Camp "N"(1vo.
Newington (Sherbrooke), July 1, 1941, p. 2.; NAC, DND, IO, RG-24,Vol. 15,403, Volume 7
(luly 1943), W m Diary of lnternmeni Camp No. 44, Grande Ligne, July 23, 1943, p. 6.; NAC,
DND, 10, RG-24, Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-64. Intelligence Reports, Camp Grande
Ligne, 19.13-1946, "December 1943 intelligence Summary," December 1943
NAC, FHTC,EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, b'Lnterview of Ernest Shield by Hany Rasky (CBC)
in Ste. Marthe-sur-le-Lac (Quebec)," [ 1980's , pp. 38- 10 - 1 8-1 5.
Physical activities becarne so important during the prisoner of war phase that Camp Grande
Ligne inmates even went as far & building their own sports ground between May and lune
1944. It consisted of a 500 yards oval running track, a 100 yard track, jumping pits, tennis
courts and soccer fields. As camp authorities indicated: "These improvements will be of
immense benefit to the generation of young Canadians, who will corne to the Feller Institute
afier the War." So important were sports that Camp Sorel authorities decided that every
Tuesday and Thursday afiemoons would be used for physical activities. As it was indicated:
"These sport days are not holidays and no soldiers will leave the camp area." See NAC. DND,
IO, RG-24, Reel: C-54 16, File: HQS 7236-94-6-44, intelligence Reports. Camp Grande Ligne,
2943-1946, "May 1944 Intelligence Summary," May 1944.; NAC, DND, 10, RG-24.Vol.
15.404, Volume 6 (October 1945), W m Diqw of Intemment Camp No. 45, Sorel, "Camp
Daily Orders", October 22, 1945, Appendix 1. p. 25.
NAC, DND, IO,RG-24. Reel: C-5416, File: HQS 7236-94-644, intelligence Reports, Camp
Grande Ligne. 1943-1946, "June 1944 Intelligence Summary," June 1944.
Duhg one such tournament held at Carnp Sherbrooke in November 1944, the winnen were
awarded various kinds of German sausages. See NAC. DND. 10. RG-24, Reel: C-54 16, File:
HQS 7236-94-642. lnreiligence Reports. Camp Sherbrooke. 1 W3-i9&i. "Novem ber 1 944
Intelligence Report," November 1 944
As Carnp Farnham authorities mentioned: "They [soccer players] are getting in shape. and
also selecting members for future teams. Owing to the lack of football shoes. momentarily. the
dress for these soccer practices is a bit unorthodox. but surely catches the eye. Namely, shorts
and jackboots!" See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5419, File: HQS 7236-94-14-40,
Reports for Psychological Warfàre Committee, Cump Farnham, 1944-1946, "Li.-Col. A. W .
De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to District Oficer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Military District 4,"
Apnl 10. 1945.; NAC, DND. IO, RG-24. Reel: C-5365. File: HQS 9139-4-42, Camp
In~e/Iigence.Camp Sherbrooke, NJJ- 1946, "April 1945 Intelligence Report," May 3. 1 945.
Such was the case at Camp Fmham in March 1945 when an hockey tournament was
organized by the internees following the viewing of a short film on ice hockey. As camp
authorities recalled: "...the ri& is just crowdeû, POW trying to master some of the play
pictured in the film. One can see these officers nishing up and d o m the ice with fervor, their
Iack of hockey-technique k i n g made up by enthusiasm, and even hard spills not curbing their
affection for the game." See NAC, DND, IO, RG-24, Vol. 15.403, Volume 13 (lanuary 1944).
Wm Diary of Intemment Cump No. 44,Grcmde Ligne, January 17, 1944, p. 4.; NAC, DND,
10, RG-24, Reel : C-54 19, File: HQS 7236-94- 14-40, Reports for PsychoIogicaI Warjime
Committee, Camp F u m h m , 1944-19#6?"Lt.-Col. A.W. De Wolf (Camp Commandant) to
Military District 4," March 7. 1945.
Dimict Offcer Commanding (D.O.C.)
Vance, Obiects.. ., pp. 133- 134.
Koch, p. 233.
As Eric Koch indicated: "Although some prisoners maintained hard grudges about their
intemment, most confessed to having derived irnmeasurable benetits from the
experience...Most of us feel that the years spent in this compression chamber betwcen Europe
and North Amenca, befween Hitler and the pst-war world, tau@ us a great deal about
ourselves and about the way a community works." In fact, for those prisoners held in Canada,
captivity offered numerous benetits. For one, it offered an asylum h m the war's destruction
in Europe. See Koch. pp. 166, 168.; NAC, FHTC,EK, MG-30, C 192, Vol. 3, ''Hm Rasky,
The Soies Who Never Were, Part 2 (CBC, 198 1)", pp. 11-29 - 11-30.
Appendix 1
Number of lnternees lncarcerated at Camp Farnharn
FARNHAM
January 1-75
January 16-31
February 1-15
February 16-28
March 1-15
March 16-31
April 1-15
April 16-30
May 1-15
May 16-31
June 1-15
June 16-30
JUIY 1-15
JUIY16-31
A U ~ U1-1
S ~5
AU^ US^ 16-31
September 1-15
September 16-30
October 1-15
October 16-31
November 1-15
Novernber 16-30
December 1-15
December 16-31
Nil
Nil
445
445
234
234
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
597
597
598
598
599
597
599
332
233
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
523
523
556
545
446
597
598
600
600
600
594
594
597
229
234
334
334
334
334
235
235
235
467
Nil
Nil
Nil
6
7
1-Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
596
602
657
657
657
656
656
43f
427
427
394
394
394
492
799
733
4
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nurnbers represent increases or decreases in the camp's strength
during a given half-rnonth period. Numbers from July 1941 to
December 1941 are an approximation based on the movement of
prisoners as registered in the camp's war dianes.
Sources:
NAC, Records of the Department of National Defence, Sources Relating
to lnternment Operations, RG-24, Vol. 11,254, File: 13-3-5, Retums
Camp Famham, 194M941,1940-1941.; NAC, Records of the Department
of National Oefence, Sources Relating to lntemment Operations, RG-24,
Red: C-5374, File: HQS 7236-1-1040, Stmngth Retums, Camp Famham
1941-1946, 1941-1946.
Appendix 2
Number of lnternees tncarcerated at Camp île-aux-~oix
1
Ileaux-Noix
January 1-15
January 16-31
Februav 1-15
February 16-28
March 1-15
March 15-31
Aprii 1-15
Apnl 16-30
May 1-15
May 16-31
June 1-15
June 16-30
JUIY f -15
JUIY76-31
August 1-15
A U ~ U1S
6-3
~1
September 1-15
September 16-30
October 1-15
October 16-31
November 1-15
November 16-30
December 1-15
Oecember 16-3 1
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
273
273
273
273
273
273
305
195
195
179
179
154
151
151
147
139
135
122
115
100
95
89
88
83
81
52
42
Nil
Nil
Nil
Numbers represent increases or decreases in the camp's strength
during a given half-month penod. Numbers from July 1941 to
December 1942 are an approximation based on the movement
of prisoners as registered in the camp's war diaries.
Sources:
NAC, Records of the Oepartment of National Defence, Sources
Relating to t nternment Operations, RG-24, Vol. 11,254,
File: 13-3-10. Retums, Camp \le-aux-Nok. 1940.f941. 1940-1941.;
NAC, Records of the Department of National Defence, Sources
Relating to lntemment Operations, RG24. Real: C-5374.
File: HQS 7236-1-1O 4 t l . Strength Retums, Camp /le-aux-Noix
i94I-lW3, 1941-1943.
Appendix 3
Number of lnternees lncarcerated at Camp Sherbrooke
SHERBROOKE
January 1-15
January 16-31
February 1-15
February 16-28
March 1-15
March 16-31
April 1-15
Apnl 16-30
May 1-15
May 16-31
June 1-15
June 16-30
JUIY1-15
JUIY 16-31
A U ~ U1-1
S ~5
A U ~ U16-31
S~
September 1-15
September 16-30
October 1-15
October 16-31
Novernber 1-15
November 16-30
December 1-15
December 16-31
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Ni1
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
618
412
412
412
404
405
405
405
405
395
395
362
736
736
721
721
565
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Numbers represent increases or decreases in the camp's strength
for a given half-rnonth period. Numbers frorn October 1940 to Navember
1942 are an approximation based on the movement of prisoners as
registered in the camp's war diaries.
Sources:
NAC, Records of the Department of National Defence, Sources Relating
to lntemment Operations, RG-24, Reel: C-5374, File: HQS 7236-1-1042,
Stmngth Retums, Camp Shehmke, l 9 4 l - l 9 4 6 , l 9 ~ l - l 9 ~ 6 . ;
NAC, Records of the Department of National Defence, Sources Relating
to Internment Operations, RG-24, Vol. 15,399, Volumes 1 to 12
(Octaber 1940September 1941), War Oiary of lntemment Camp 'N"
(No. 42), N8~hgt01)
(Sherbrooke), October 1940-September 1941.; NAC,
Records of the Departmentof National Defence, Sources Relating to
Internmerit Opemtions, RG-24, Vol. 15,400, Volumes 13 to 26
(October 1941-November l942), War Diary of lntemment Camp "Na
(No. 421, Newriigton (Sherbrmke), ûctober 7 941-November 1942.
Appendix 4
Number of lnternees lncarcerated at Camp Grande Ligne
GRANDE LIGNE
January 1-15
January 16-3 1
February 1-1 5
February 16-28
March 1-15
March 16-31
April 1-15
Apnl 13-31
May 1-15
May 16-3 1
June 1-15
June 16-30
JUIY 1-15
July 16-31
A U ~ U 1-1
S ~5
A U ~ U1S6-31
~
September 1- 15
September 16-30
October 1-15
October 16-30
November 1-15
November 16-30
December 1-15
December 16-31
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
464
467
603
603
603
603
601
601
621
621
596
596
596
593
564
564
508
508
508
239
12
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Numbers represent increases or decreases in the camp's strength
during a given half-month period.
Sources: NAC, Records of the ûepartment of National Defence, Sources
Relating ta lnternment Operations, RG-24, Red: C-5374,
File: HQS 7236-1 -10-44, Strengfh Retums, Camp Grande Ligne,
7943-1946, 1943-1946.
Appendix 5
Number of Internees lncarcerated at Camp Sorel
Sorel
January 1-15
January 16-31
February 1-15
February 16-28
March 1-15
March 16-31
April 1-15
April 16-30
May 1-15
May 16-31
June 1-1 5
June 16-30
July 1-15
JUIY 16-31
A U ~ U 1-1
S ~5
August 16-31
September 1-15
September 76-30
October 1-15
October 16-31
November 7-15
November 16-30
December 1-1 5
December 16-31
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
121
225
225
226
223
207
208
208
232
229
227
234-21 5
213
212
212
212
185
184
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Numbers represent increases or decreases in the camp's strength
during a given half-month period.
Sources: NAC, Records of the Department of National Defence, Sources
Relating to lnternrnent Operations, RG-24, Reef: C-5374,
File: HQS 7236-1-10-45,Shength Retums, Camp Sorel, 1945f946,
1945-1946.
Appendix 6
The Canadian lnternment Camps for German Internees
C-
#
1941-1941
"A"
"B
"C"
"E"
"F
"H"
"1"
"K
t(@
"M"
"NU
"Q"
"R"
"S"
'Tt
I
V
"W"
"X"
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
No. 40
No. 70
No. 20
No. 21
No. 31
No. 32
No. 41
No. 130
Nil
No. 22
No. 42
No. 33
No. 23
Nil
No. 43
Nil
Nil
No. 100
No. 101
No. 10
No. 30
No. 44
No. 45
No. 132
No. 133
No. 135
Sources:
FARNHAM
FREDERICTON
GRAVENHURST
ESPANOU
KINGSTON
HULL
(LE-AUX-NOIX
KANANASKIS (SEEBE)
COVE FIELDS (QUEBEC)
MlMlCO (NEW TORONTO)
SHERBROOKE
PETAWAWA
MONTEITH
RED ROCK
ÎLESTE. H É L ~ N E
TROIS-RIVIÈRES
VALCARTI ER
NEYS
ANGLER
CHATHAM
BOWMANVILLE
GRANDE LIGNE
SOREL
MEDICINE HAT
LETHBRIDG€ (OZADA)
WAINWRIGHT
PROVINCE
OPEN
CLOSED
Quebec
New Brunswick
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Quebec
Quebec
Alberta
Quebec
Ontario
Quebec
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Quebec
Quebec
Quebec
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Ontario
Quebec
Quebec
Alberta
Alberta
Alberta
1940
1940
1940
1940
1940
1941
1940
i 939
1940
1940
1940
1939
1940
1940
t 940
1940
1939
1941
1941
1944
1941
1943
1945
1943
1942
1944
1946
1946
1946
1943
1943
1947
1943
1946
1941
1944
1946
1946
1946
1941
1943
1940
1940
1946
1946
1946
1945
1946
1946
1946
1946
1946
Bernard and Bergeron, pp. 17-19.; Carter, p. 309.; Melady, p. 201.
ABBRVIATIONS
D m
Records of the Depariment of National Defence
DOC
District Oficer Commanding
EK
Collection Eric Koch
ETC
Eastern Townships Collection
ETRC
Eastern Townships Research Centre
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.A.)
FHTC
Manuscripts of the First Half of the Twentieth C e n ~ l y
IO
Sources Relating to Intemrnent Operations
NAC
National Archives of Canada
NDHQ
National Defence Headquarten
OC
Orders-in-Council
QCR
Quebec Central Railroad
RCMP
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
VGC
Veterans' Guard of Canada
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1945- 1 946.
Reel: C-5369. File: HQS 7236-1 -610, Nominal Roils Prepared on
.Irrivul, Cump Fmnham. 1 942- 1 945.
Reel: C-5374. File: HQS 7236- 1 - 10-40, Strength Returns, Camp
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Reel: C-5374. File: HQS 7236- 1 - 1041. Snength Returns, Camp îleaux-Noix, 194 1 - 1943.
Reel: C-5374, File: HQS 7236-1-1 0-42, Strength Returnr. Cump
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Reel: C-5374, File: HQS 7236-1-10-44, Strength Returns, Camp
Grande Ligne, 1943- 1946.
Reel: C-5374, File: HQS 7236-1-1 0-45, Strength Returns, Camp Sorel,
1 945- 1 946.
Reel: C-5375, File: HQS 7236-1-1 1-42, Parcels, Letfers to Erremal
Affuirs, IRC, and Sw iss Consul, Camp Sherbrooke, 1 942- 1946.
Reel: C-5376, File: HQS 7236-1-1 1-40, Parcels, Lefiers to &ternul
Affairs, IRC, and Swiss Consul, Camp Farnham, 1 942- 1 946.
Reel: C-53 76, File: HQS 7236- 1 - 1 1-44, Parcels, Letters to Eriernd
Afairs, IRC, a d Swiss Consul, Camp Grande Ligne, 1 943- 1946.
Reel: C-5376, File: HQS 7236-1- 1 1-45, Purcels, Letters to Errernul
Aflairs, IRC, and Swiss Consul, Canrp Sorel, 1945-1 946.
Reel: C-5376, File: HQS 7236- 1 - 13-40, Monthly Return of P/W
Quartered and Rarioned Ourside Camp, Camp Furnham, 19441946.
Reel: C-5376. File: HQS 7236- 1- 13-42. Monthly Return of P/W
Quartered und Rat ioned Ourside Camp, Camp Sherbrooke. 1 9441946.
Reel: C-5377. File: HQS 7'36au-Nok. 1940- 1946.
1 8. Vol. 1-2. Administration. Camp ile-
Reel: C-5378. File: HQS 7236-20. Organization and Administration.
Camp Farnham, 1940- 1 946.
Reel: C-5389. File: HQS 7236-44-40, Escape Plans and
Correspondence. Camp Farnham. 194 1 - 1945.
Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 7236-44-4
1, Escape Plms und
Correspondence, Camp he-aux- NO^. 1944- 1945.
Reel: C-5389, File: HQS 7236-44-42. Escape Plum and
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Reel: C-5389. File: HQS 723604444, Escape Plam and
Correspondence, Camp Grande Ligne, 1943-1948.
Reel: (2-5396,File: HQS 7236-79. Oflcers, Grande Ligne. 1 942- 1 946.
Reel: (2-5398, File: HQS 7236-8 1 40. Canteens, Camp Farnham, 19421948.
Reel : C-5398, File: HQS 7236-8 1-42, Canteens, Camp Sherbrooke,
1 944- 1 946.
Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-40, Educatiod Facilities, Camp
Farnham,
1943- 1946.
Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-42, Educutional Fucilities, Camp
Sherbrooke, 1943-1946.
Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-44, Educationcd Facilities, Camp
Grande Ligne, 1943-1946.
Reel: C-5400, File: HQS 7236-83-3-45, Educationul Fucilities. Camp
Sorel, 1945- 1946.
Reel: C-540 1, File: HQS 7136-83-6-40, YMCA Reports on Welfae
Mut fers, Camp Frirnhum, 1 943- 1946.
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Matters, Camp ne-aux-~oix,1 943.
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Camp Sherbrooke, 1943-1 946.
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re. Censorship, Camp Farnham, 1943- 1 946.
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Protecting Power, Camp Gronde Ligne, 1943- 1945.
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Farnham, 1943-1945.
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by Pm,
Camp
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Camp
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Wurfare Committee. Cump Sherbrooke. 1945- 1946.
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Judy Green and Susan Lefebvre." 1991.
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NEWSPAPERS
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