Study Guide for the Arab League
Framework for Shared Military Units
The creation of a pan-Arab military force has been a goal of the Arab League for a good 65
years, when the Arab nations signed a rarely used joint defence pact. The endeavour has,
however, never been realised. Discussions around the issue flared up again in 2015, when the
Arab League announced the creation of a joint military force but again, it was soon postponed
indefinitely.
History
The Arab League has a long history with attempting to implement joint military plans. The
Joint Defence Council was created in 1950 after the experience of the 1948 war with Israel,
when five Arab states failed to act jointly and were each defeated separately by Israel. The first
Arab summit in January 1964 promised to create a joint Arab military command but the plan
was never realised. However, some integration of forces has occurred, the most advanced in
the internal security field. 1
Historically, the most effective Arab actions were those led by a Saudi-Egyptian alliance. The
1973 Arab-Israeli War, for example, perhaps the Arab states’ most effective war of the 20th
century, was fought largely by Egyptian and Syrian troops. However, the Saudis, along with
Algerians and other Arabs, played a key role economically and politically because oil was an
essential weapon.
When the Lebanese Civil War escalated in 1976, the Arab League created an international
peacekeeping unit under the command of the Syrian forces composed of Syrian as well as
Sudanese, Saudi Arabian and Libyan forces. It was named the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF).
Initially, it consisted of 30,000 troops, 25,000 of which were provided by the Syrian
administration. The mandate of the ADF aimed at deterring the conflicting parties from
relapsing into outbreaks of violence. This included attempting to maintain cease-fire,
confiscating heavy weaponry and supporting the Lebanese government in re-asserting their
monopoly of power.
In 1991, when Saudi Arabia cooperated with a U.S.-led force to combat Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia was encouraged to participate by Egypt, whose support Washington
had secured even before asking the Saudis. In fact, after the war, Hussein was quoted saying
that he blamed Mubarak for the Arab action more than King Fahd of Saudi Arabia because the
Iraqi dictator believed the Saudis would have been reluctant to act without Egypt.2
Gulf nations, under the umbrella of the Gulf Cooperation Council, joined forces to defeat a
string of destabilizing Arab Spring protests in 2011 by the Shiite majority in Sunni-ruled
Bahrain.3
1
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/30-riedel-can-joint-arab-military-force-succeedyemen-saudi-arabia
2
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/04/01/why-arab-states-have-chosen-now-to-build-a-jointmilitary/
3
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3016267/Questions-answers-Arab-peacekeeping-force.html
Facing the escalation of the Syrian popular uprising in 2012, the Arab League requested a joint
U.N.-Arab League peacekeeping mission. The peacekeeping force aimed at putting pressure on
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. A communiqué called on members to "open channels of
communication" with Syrian opposition groups and provide "political and financial support."
It urged members to cut diplomatic and economic ties with Damascus "except for those that
directly affect Syrian citizens”. The proposed peacekeeping mission would oversee the
aftermath of a ceasefire. The Arab League had suspended Syria's membership in January of that
year, and the Syrian government announced that any decision made without it was “not
binding". According to the Syrian government, the proposal reflected "the state of hysteria
affecting some Arab governments, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, after Qatar's failure to
pass a U.N. Resolution that allows foreign intervention in Syria," according the Syrian
government.4
Arab League Summit in March 2015
In March of 2015, Arab leaders announced, during an Arab League summit in Egypt, the
establishment a joint military force named Operation Storm Resolve to maintain security within
the region. Army chiefs of staff from member states of the Arab League drafted a protocol for
a new joint force to intervene in Middle East conflict zones.5 The decision was primarily aimed
at fighting insurgencies, especially jihadis who had overrun large parts of Iraq and Syria and
won a foothold in Libya. A further concern was the rise of Daesh, who was perceived as a
destructive force that threatened “ethnic and religious diversity”. A final summit communique
outlined the leaders’ views; Yemen was on the brink of the abyss, requiring effective Arab and
international moves after all means of reaching a peaceful resolution have been exhausted to
end the Houthi coup and restore legitimacy.6
The draft planned for membership to be voluntary. A decision to intervene would be based on
a request from a member state that currently faces threats. The defence ministers of participating
member states would be in charge of running the force, with two-thirds of votes required to
pass decisions. Military plans on engagements would be up to the member states’ military
chiefs.7
The idea of an Arab joint force has already been tested in the ongoing Saudi-led coalition’s air
strikes against Houthis in Yemen. Many of the Arab nations, including Egypt, Jordan and most
of the Persian Gulf monarchies, have supported campaigns of airstrikes to counter advances by
the Iranian-backed Houthi movement in Yemen. The USA provide intelligence and logistical
support. Saudi Arabia is leading the airstrikes while Egypt, with the largest Arab army, has
4
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/12/world/meast/syria-unrest/
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/05/26/New-joint-Arab-military-force-plans-inmotion.html
6
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/29/arab-leaders-agree-to-form-joint-military-force-tocombat-jihadis-in-region
7
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/05/26/New-joint-Arab-military-force-plans-inmotion.html
5
pledged to send ground troops “if necessary.”8 But observers say that in cases like Libya,
consensus on a military intervention would be difficult since different Arab countries support
rival parties in the North African nations.9
Disagreements include the headquarters location of the forces. The original draft names Cairo
as the headquarters.10 The joint Arab force will most likely be made up of Egyptian troops, with
token support from Jordan and other countries.11 Egyptian military and security officials have
said the proposed force would be made of up to 40,000 elite troops based in either Cairo or
Riyadh. It would be backed by fighter jets, warships and light armour.12
The biggest obstacle to an effective joint Arab force, however, may be that dealing with
insurgencies and failed states — the problem the force was created to address — requires more
political and economic means than military prowess. The pan-Arab force is also designed to be
partly political. It spreads the responsibility and the blame and could provide added legitimacy
beyond the resolutions of the Arab League. Yet, much of the simmering anger that fuelled the
Arab uprisings in the first place had been aimed at many of the governments now leading the
way for a pan-Arab force.13
Iran
The announcement came as Western diplomats were attempting to reach a deal with Iran to
restrict its nuclear program in exchange for the removal of economic sanctions. In response,
Saudi Arabia and other American allies in the region have made clear that they are seeking to
bolster independent regional security measures because they see the proposed accord as a
betrayal of Washington’s commitment to their security. Regardless of Iran’s nuclear
programme, they complain, the deal would do nothing to stop Iran from seeking to extend its
influence around the region by backing favoured factions, as it has done in Lebanon, Iraq,
Bahrain and Yemen.
The concern about Iran is not so much a direct military one, nor even about Tehran’s nuclear
potential. While the Arab nations surely do not want to see Iran become a nuclear power, the
8
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/30/world/middleeast/arab-leaders-agree-on-joint-militaryforce.html?_r=0
9
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/05/26/New-joint-Arab-military-force-plans-inmotion.html
10
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/05/26/New-joint-Arab-military-force-plans-inmotion.html
11
http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary/arab-joint-military-force-raises-hopes-andquestions?print
12
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/29/arab-leaders-agree-to-form-joint-military-force-tocombat-jihadis-in-region
13
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/04/01/why-arab-states-have-chosen-now-to-build-a-jointmilitary/
biggest worry is Iran’s expanding political influence in Arab region, especially around Saudi
Arabia.14
Reactions
The announcement that the Arab League intends to form a unified military force has produced
different reactions from observers around the globe. For the most part, the decision was
welcomed. Faced with the insurgency in Yemen as well as ongoing conflicts in Libya, Arab
leaders felt that unified action was required and that the formation of a unified military force to
counter growing security threats was a step in the right direction. The notion is that Arab nations
must collectively face various challenges, especially terrorism.
As the idea is not new, some observers are reserving judgment until concrete action has been
taken. There is a sense among many, however, that even if the Arab League follows through,
regional peace will not be secured through military means alone.
The consequences of not solving solutions politically, some suggest, could be a “war of all
against all”. Despite needing to prepare for the worst, what the region really needs is a political
rather than military solution. The argument is that the interests of the MENA region, and the
Gulf in particular, not in large-scale military confrontations, but in compromises and political
understandings as proxy wars have failed in the region.15
Postponement
A planned meeting by the Arab League to discuss the formation of a joint force was postponed
for the second time in July 2015, this time “indefinitely”. The motion was backed by Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Iraq. It is not clear what the main reason behind
the delay was, but most likely it was due to disagreements among member states on where to
deploy such forces, if at all. Despite statements of unity, there are still vast differences as well
as political distrust between the Arab states and their opinions towards military intervention.16
Outlook
A resolution on creating a joint Arab force would send a strong message to the world that Arabs
have decided to take the initiative themselves. The creation of a pan-Arab force may be a way
14
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/04/01/why-arab-states-have-chosen-now-to-build-a-jointmilitary/
15
http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary/arab-joint-military-force-raises-hopes-andquestions?print
16
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/meeting-arab-joint-force-postponed-indefinitely-1054743930
to confront the need for immediate action in Yemen. Though Saudi Arabia’s decision to play a
war-fighting role is bold and new, challenges ahead should not be underestimated, particularly
if ground forces are ultimately needed, and attacks from Yemen on Saudi territory expand.17
A special concern is the growing influence of Iran. A proposed alliance may be a way of rebalancing power structures in the region. There is an incentive for the Arab states to show that
they can and will protect themselves instead of relying on intervention by other states and super
powers.
In terms of the specific aspect of the League’s military force, some hindrances are still to be
removed. Financing, for one, should not be a problem due to the oil rents received by the Gulf
countries. Yet, particularly the creation of a joint force requires a high degree of mutual trust,
which is difficult to achieve among rather authoritarian regimes. Related to this is the issue that
an Arab military force will turn out to be a powerful instrument only if it is embedded in an
institutionalized system of collective security, which requires sophisticated institutional design,
including the readiness of member states to waive some rights of sovereignty. Whether the Arab
League under the leadership of Saudi Arabia will be capable of implementing far-reaching
institutional reforms to become the “Arab NATO” is far from clear.18
Saudi Arabia may want to register that it has finally arrived militarily. Though Saudi Arabia is
the world’s largest importer of arms, few nations view the kingdom’s military as a major factor
in the regional military balance. The Saudi military role is untested, so they don’t want to be
alone in the fight, neither politically nor militarily.19
There appear to be two meaningful criteria for assessing an Arab military force: whether it
would increase regional self-determination on the one hand and enhance human security on the
other. Simply put, regional self-determination would be boosted if the Arab military force
developed as a powerful tool of a Saudi-led Arab League, since this could spare the region from
more American campaigns. Moreover, in the light of Western attempts to prevent the
emergence of regional powers, a greater role for an Arab regional power may appear
progressive. However, the regime in Riyadh constitutes one of the most reactionary political
systems in the Middle East: not only has Saudi Arabia been in charge of securitization policies
toward Shiism, but its human rights record is also one of the worst on a global scale. Thus, even
if the Arab military force proved to be an effective tool of the Arab League to stabilize the Arab
state system, it is far from clear whether this would not be to the benefit of the security of states
only rather than to the Arab people.
Questions a Resolution Should Answer
17
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/04/01/why-arab-states-have-chosen-now-to-build-a-jointmilitary/
18
http://www.e-ir.info/2015/05/22/upgrading-the-arab-league-by-establishing-a-joint-military-force/
19
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/04/01/why-arab-states-have-chosen-now-to-build-a-jointmilitary/
1. In organisational terms, what should be the extent of the joint military forces? Military
cooperation or a fully integrated Arab defence pact?
2. In which cases could shared military units be deployed? How is a “threat” determined
and who determines it?
3. Which is the priority: safety of citizens and their human rights or the stability of the
respective regime?
4. Assessing the danger of Iran to regional security.
5. Is a joint military framework the appropriate tool to tackle Daesh and the insurgencies
in Libya and Yemen?
6. What should be the role of other international actors, such as the UN, the US, or NGOs?