DhirubhaiAmbaniModelUnitedNations2016|20thOctober2016–23rdOctober2016
Forum:
Issue:
TheSecurityCouncil
CurbingthestrugglefordominanceintheIndianOcean
StudentOfficer:AnujShah
Position: DeputyPresident
Introduction
The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean the world, and in terms of trade and
strategic interests it has emerged to become one of the most significant maritime corridors.
Beingsurroundedbythreemajorcontinents-Africa,AsiaandAustralia-thisregionservesas
the main highway of maritime communication not only for countries sharing a coastline with
theoceanbutalsoforothercountrieshavingeconomicambitionsinthisresourcerichregionof
the world. It connects East Asia, South Asia, Africa with Europe and the Americas. The Indian
Oceandoesnotonlyhavearegionalsignificancebutaglobalone,sincetheoutwardtradeflows
from the IOR constitutes nearly 80% of all the maritime trade (mainly composed of crude oil
exports).Intermsofresources,theIndianOceanRegion(IOR)isestimatedtohaveaboutone
third of the global gas resources and has large deposits of uranium, gold, diamonds, coal, and
iron ore.1 These alluring characteristics of the Indian Ocean region have certainly not gone
unnoticedbytherisingpowersofthe21stcentury.Moreover,RobertKaplan,arenownedglobal
affairsauthorpointedoutinhisbook2thatinthisregiontheinterestsofChina,IndiaandtheUS
are beginning to overlap, therefore the IOR is bound to become a centre of 21st century
internationalconflictandpowerdynamics.
The two fastest growing nations in the world – India and China are the two major
dominating nations sailing in the IOR. Historically, the Sino-Indian relationship does not
completelyreflecttheprinciplesoftrust,unanimity,andtransparency.Therehasbeenahistory
ofhypocrisy,mistrust,hatred,andsuspicionbetweenthesetwocountries,butattheverysame
time,therewasapointwhentheslogan“hindi-chinibhaibhai”(IndiansandChinesearejustlike
twobrothers)echoedthrougheveryIndianhousehold.Thisshowsthecomplexityandduplicity
thatliesembeddedintheirexchanges.
1Goud,R.Sidda,andManishaMookherjee.ChinainIndianOceanRegion.N.p.:n.p.,n.d.Print.
2
Kaplan,RobertD.Monsoon:TheIndianOceanandtheFutureofAmericanPower.NewYork:RandomHouse,2010.
Print.
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Inthe21stcentury,thecenturyofglobaleconomicmonopolization,thesetwocountries
havehadtheirdisputes:revolvingaroundtheprotectionofeitherside’sterritorialintegrity,but
nowinthemaritimescenariotoo,apotentiallydestructivedisputeisdevelopingintheIndian
Ocean region (IOR). It is the struggle for maritime dominance. Although there are many
countriesinvolvedintheIOR’sactivities,IndiaandChinaarethemaincontenders.
AlthoughChinageographicallydoesn’tpossessacoastontheIndianOcean,ithaslately
developedanaggressivemaritimepolicyofexpansionofitsmaritimefacilitiesintheIOR.China
has now begun to mould the IOR’s strategic environment by investing in the debt, supplying
traditional loans to India’s rival and neighbouring nations such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and
Myanmar. For example: the building of power plants, railways, roads, ports dams and power
plants.ChinahasestablishedaninfluenceintheIORbyissuingseveralvetoesintheUNSecurity
Council on their allies’ behalf: : thereby, providing assistance and stalling action, which is in
thesenations’interest.
On the other hand, India, the very country after which this Ocean was named, has
realised the threat of the Chinese expansion in the IOR. It has an effective geographical
advantageovertheChineseintermsofcoastalexposuretotheOcean.Itconsidersitselftobe
thenetsecurityprovidersoftheregion3.(EventheUnitedStatesofAmericarecognisesthisrole
thatIndiahasadopted4)ItaggressivelyquestionstheneedforthepresenceofChinesenuclear
submarines in the Indian Ocean. India asks whether anti-piracy operations require nuclear
involvement. Prime Minister Modi has taken substantial measures to increase the capacity of
India’s maritime facilities and its vessel strength. The Indian Government has also efficiently
improvedrelationshipswithotherIORcountries:forexampletheGovernmenthasenteredinto
an agreement with Sri Lanka, under President Sirisena, to increase cooperation in the field of
defenceandsecurity.
ThethirdpartytothisissueistheUnitedStatesofAmerica(USA),whichaimstosecure
globalmaritimedominancebyestablishingitscontrollingpresenceintheIndianOceanaswell.
India and the US have lately developed their relations under the Modi and the Obama
administration as strong military partners with various strategic military deals and
agreements - such as the sale of a total of twelve P-8I long rage surveillance and antisubmarinewarfareaircraftssince2013-asChinastepsupitsunderseaactivities.
3“PM’sspeechatthefoundationstonelayingceremonyfortheIndianNationalDefenceUniversityatGurgaon,”Prime
Minister’sOffice,May23,2013,http://pmindia.nic.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=1316
4SeeDepartmentofDefense,QuadrennialDefenseReviewReport,February2010,60.
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This issue, although still in a very nascent stage, could develop to become a struggle
for dominance between extremely powerful sides, each with its allies. This could lead to the
escalation of this conflict to unimaginable proportions and potentially even a war between
twoofthefastestgrowingcountriesoftheworld.
DefinitionofKeyTerms
IndianOcean
The Indian Ocean is a body of saltwatercovering approximately one-fifth of the
totaloceanarea of the world. It is the smallest, geologically youngest, and physically
mostcomplexoftheworld’sthreemajorOceans.Itstretchesformorethan6,200miles
(10,000km)betweenthesoutherntipsofAfricaandAustralialand,withoutitsmarginal
seas,hasanareaofabout28,360,000squaremiles.5
SeaLinesofCommunication
SeaLinesofCommunication(SLOCs)arekeymaritimepassagewaysthatfacilitateheavy
shippingtrafficvolumesandhostingthetransportationofkeymaritimetradessuchas
crudeoil.Theyfeaturenarrowpassagesor‘chokepoints’whichincaseofanyaccident
can result in disruption to shipping traffic that can have adverse repercussions on the
economic interests of the littoral states and on international trade. By virtue of this
definition, SLOCs hold tremendousstrategicimportanceandgeopoliticalvaluetotheir
users.6
BlueWaterNavy
A blue-water navy is a maritime force capable of operating in the deep waters of the
openoceans.Thetermismorecolloquialthandoctrinalandmostsea-goingstatesdiffer
onitsspecifics.Broadly,however,mostnaviesagreethatablue-waternavyiscapableof
prolonged and sustained operations across the open oceans, and has a capacity to
project“crediblepower”inthedistantseas.7
5Morgan,JosephR."IndianOcean."EncyclopediaBritannicaOnline.EncyclopediaBritannica,n.d.Web.04July2016.
6"PolymersunderStrain."Science276.5321(1997):n.pag.Web.
7"'Blue-Water'NaviesintheIndianOceanRegion."TheDiplomat.N.p.,n.d.Web.15July2016
<http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/blue-water-navies-in-the-indian-ocean-region/>.
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"PivottoAsia"
One of the Obama Administration's central foreign policy initiatives. Simply put, the
pivot is meant to be a strategic "re-balancing" of U.S. interests from Europe and the
MiddleEasttowardEastAsia.8
TheIndianOceanRimAssociation(IORA)
Indian Ocean Rim Association was formed in March 1997. It is aninternational
organisationconsisting of coastal states bordering theIndian Ocean. The IORA is a
regional forum, consisting of 21 nations, bringing together representatives of
government, business and Academia for the promotion of cooperation and closer
interaction among them to allow sustainable economic growth and balanced
developmentoftheIndianOceanRegionandoftheMemberStates.9
TheSilkRoadEconomicBeltandthe21st-centuryMaritimeSilkRoad
ItwasalsoknownasOneBelt,OneRoad(OBOR).Itisadevelopmentstrategy,proposed
by Chinese leaderXi Jinpingthat focuses on connectivity and cooperation among
countries, primarily between thePeople's Republic of Chinaand the rest ofEurasia. It
consistsoftwomaincomponents:theland-based"SilkRoadEconomicBelt"(SREB)and
the oceangoing "Maritime Silk Road" (MSR). The strategy underlines China's push to
takeabiggerroleinglobalaffairs,anditsneedtoexportChina'sproductioncapacity.10
TheChinaPakistanEconomicCorridor(CPEC)
It refers to a clutch of major infrastructure works currently under way in Pakistan,
intendedtolinkKashgarinChina’sXinjiangprovincetoGwadardeepseaportcloseto
Pakistan’sborderwithIran.Severalotherroad,railandpowerprojectsareassociated
withthecorridor,andtheprojectseekstoexpandandupgradeinfrastructureacrossthe
length and breadth of Pakistan, and to widen and deepen economic ties with its “allweather friend”, China. Chinese firms will invest just under $ 46 billion in the project
over six years — including $ 33.8 billion in energy projects and $ 11.8 billion in
8
N.p., n.d. Web. <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/what-exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-ispivoting-toasia/274936/>.
9 N.p., n.d. Web. <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/what-exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-ispivoting-toasia/274936/>.
10"China-PakistanEconomicCorridor:Pakistan'sRoadofHighHopes."TheIndianExpress.N.p.,18Apr.2016.Web.
15July2016.<http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/cpec-pakistan-china-nawaz-sharif-xi-jinping-2758111/>.
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infrastructure.ItisamerepartofChina'sambitiouslyproposed21stcenturySilkRoad
initiative.
BackgroundInformation
TheAllegedStringofPearlsStrategy
ChinafirstshowedinterestintheIndianOceaninthe1980stofulfiltheirevergrowing
energydemand.DefencecontractorBoozAllenHamiltonpublished“EnergyFuturesinAsia”in
2005, which stirred the waters of the Indian Ocean. The report suggested that China’s
investmentsinseaportsacrossthelittoralareasoftheIndianOceancouldbeusedtocreatea
networkofnavalbases,havingastronginfluencefromSouthernChinatoPakistan.Thisbecame
known as the alleged ‘String of Pearls’ strategy of the Chinese in the Indian Ocean. Ultimately
China ended setting up access and
navalbasesincontinuity,fromChina
all the way to Sudan, in the Indian
Ocean. Despite it officially being a
pure
economic
policy,
it
was
popularlyinterpretedbyexpertsand
nations all around the world to have
more of a strategic and military
significance than commercial. The
popular belief was that its objective
to gain military dominance in the
Indian Ocean, along with effectively
minimizing the strength of India in
theregion.11
BeijinghasbeenstrengtheningthisSouthAsianpolicyoftheirssincethelast4decades.
It started off with the aim to protect the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCS) in the Indian
Ocean,whichwerevitalforthecountry’senergyimports.Theimplementationofthispolicywas
firstseenin1980swhenChinasetupseveralenergyrefuellingstationsintheIndianOcean;it
11Image-N.p.,n.d.Web.<http://cimsec.org/sea-based-pla-navy-may-not-need-string-pearls/18053>.
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slowly expanded its maritime reach. Till 1980 it followed the policy of “near coast defence”;
then till 2004 it followed the “near seas control” doctrine; in 2004 it went on the acquire the
first “string” of islands; then in 2015, it eventually changed its policy from “off shore waters
defence”to“openseaprotection”underthepretextthatitwastocreateapiracyfreeMSR,since
majority of the maritime business of China is through the Indian Ocean.12 China’s newly
released Defence White Paper has emphasized a greater focus on the seas, including a more
effectivenavalroleextendingbeyonditsmaritimebackyard.TheWhitePapersaysthat,aspart
of China’s effort to establish itself as a major maritime power, its navy will shift focus from
“offshorewatersdefence”to“openseasprotection”.Asacorollary,theChinesenavalobjective
hasundergoneachangefromthatofconductingcoastaldefenceactivitiestooffshoredefence
andfinallytofarseadefence.AccordingtotheJapantimes,“Itisamovethathelpsexplainits
(China’s)newfocusontheIndianOcean,withtheMaritimeSilkRoadinitiativeatthevanguard
oftheChinesegrandstrategy.UnderthispolicyChinahasdevelopedstrategicmaritimecenters
orrelationsinPakistan,SriLanka,Bangladesh,Myanmar,MaldivesandSomalia.Onlyin2016,
reportshaveconfirmedChinadeveloping‘supportfacilities’intheDjiboutitoaiditspresencein
theHornofAfrica.ButChinaeffectivelymaintainsthatitonlyseeksaccessseeks,notbases,for
economicgain.”
The Chinese establishment of naval sea bases has raised various eyebrows globally.
China views this facility at Djibouti as a development primarily helping its navy to undertake
increased humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and anti-piracy missions in the region. The
People’sLiberationArmyNavy(PLAN)hasbeenextremelyactiveinitsmissionsagainstpirates
of the coast of Somalia and also in the Gulf of Aden. It was also involved in rescuing and
evacuating Chinese and other foreigners from the violence prevailing in Yemen while it was
underabombingcampaignfromSaudiArabia.Obock,China’sbaseinDjibouti,inparticular,has
hosted PLAN ships regularly. For Beijing, the Djibouti base is a testament to the PLAN’s
increasingglobalroleasaproviderofpublicgoodsonthehighseas.
NotallstatesshareChina’sviewofthisfacilityinDjibouti.Forexample,thisbasewould
only emphasize and let Indian analysts more confidently suggest and believe in the “string of
pearls”theory-ChinaencirclingIndia;Indiananalystsandobservershavelongbeencautiousof
the fact that China’s investment in civilian ports in the region is leading up to a unexpected
proliferationofdual-useormilitaryfacilitiesintheIndianOceanregion..
12
Goud,R.Sidda,andManishaMookherjee.ChinainIndianOceanRegion.N.p.:n.p.,n.d.Print.
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The US, too, noticed Chinese the naval missions and operations in the western part of
the Indian Ocean. The U.S. Department of Defence confirmed that China’s nuclear
poweredShang-class andSong-class submarines have been deployed in the Indian Ocean. If
these submarines continue to operate in the region and continue to make appearances in
Djibouti, it would bring China’s intentions in the Indian Ocean under the red light: that China
designed the Djibouti facility as a naval base to specifically to support the PLAN’s expansion
towardsWestAsia.NuclearsubmarinesarmedwithYJ-18supersonic anti-shipmissilesaren’t
conventionallyusedforhumanitarianaidandanti-piracyoperations
BrahmaChellaneyoftheCenterforPolicyResearch(CPR),anindependentIndianthink
tank, strongly suggests that a ramped up Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is consistent
with President Xi Jinping's intention of making maritime power central toachieving Chinese
dominanceinAsia.13
India’sActEastPolicy
Under the leadership of Prime MinisterNarendra Modi,India’s new government has
madeimprovingrelationswithEastAsianneighboursaforeignpolicypriority.Thiscomesata
timewhentheUShasengagedina'PivotofAsia'mind-set-shiftingitsfocusfromtheMiddle
East to the IOR. Mr. Modi has undertaken a mission of improving relations with most South
AsiannationsbynumeroustoIORnationssuchasSeychelles,SriLanka,Mauritius,Bangladesh,
UAEandIran.
ItisalsonoticedthatdespiteChina’sadvancedmilitarycapabilities,India’sallystrength
and its geographical advantage gives it a great advantage over any other nation wanting to
replaceorquestionitsimportanceintheIndianOcean.
India’sStance
BeingamajorcountryintheIOR,havingalongcoastline,significantnationalinterests
(tradeandenergy)andbluewaternavyambitions,theIndianstanceisanimportantfactorin
theIOR.Indiaimportsover70%ofitsoilthroughtheIndianOceanregion.14Asaresult,ithas
beenenhancingitsstrategicinfluenceinthisregionbyusingsoftpowerandbecomingamajor
13"Confirmed:ConstructionBeginsonChina'sFirstOverseasMilitaryBaseinDjibouti."TheDiplomat.N.p.,n.d.Web.
04July2016.<http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/confirmed-construction-begins-on-China%E2%80%99s-firstoverseas-military-base-in-djibouti/>.
14Goud,R.Sidda,andManishaMookherjee.ChinainIndianOceanRegion.N.p.:n.p.,n.d.Print.
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globalinvestorinregionalmining,gas,infrastructureandoilprojects."Activatingpartnerships
andexpandingcapabilitiesintheIndianOceanhasbeencentraltoourquestforsecurity,"said
IndianForeignSecretarySubrahmanyamJaishankarinApril2016.
In 2001, India’s Ministry of Defence in its Annual Report outlines India’s security
environment:
“India’s parameters of security clearly extend well beyond the confines of its conventional
geographical land borders. Given its size, location and extensive Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ),India’ssecurityenvironmentextendsfromthePersianGulfintheWesttotheStraitsof
MalaccaintheEast…theequatorintheSouth.”15
Thus, this shows that India has always taken up the responsibility of being the net
security provider of the region. In the 2004 Indian Maritime Doctrine, India reiterated its
stance.
In December 2015, India came out with its latest maritime guidance document
regardingsecurityoperations.EnsuringSecureSeas,thenewIndianMaritimeSecurityStrategy
(IMSS-2015)portraysIndia’snauticalobstacles,predominantmaritimepractices,technological
trends, and evolving operational functions at sea. This document instantly prompted a
discussiononIndia’ssecurityroleintheIndianOcean.
SpeculatorssuggestthatIndiaisresolvingthisissueofdominanceintheIndianOcean
byformingstrongdiplomatictieswithvariousnations,whichplayanactiveroleintheIOR.But
India has been very careful in not releasing any direct official statement condemning China’s
activitiesintheIOR,norhasitbeenovertintakingstepstobuildupitsowndefenceorcounter
China’sactivities.
The Indians believe that under the disguise of anti-piracy operations, Chinese
submarines have been undertaking specific stand-alone missions. These missions are usually
part of the process of laying the groundwork for a rotating but permanent deployment of the
PLAN in the IOR. Observing the deployment pattern of Chinese submarines, Indian analysts
suggest that - emphasizing on their “open seas protection” policy, which was outlined in
Beijing’s 2015 Defence White Paper, China’s submarines plan to secure access to disputed
regions of the Indian Ocean. This analysis was further supported by India’s Andaman and
15N.p.,n.d.Web.<http://modi.nic.in/samachar/july15-01/html/ch1.htm>.
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NicobarCommand’s(ANC)reportsofanincreaseinthenumberofattemptsby Chinesenaval
shipstogetclosetoIndianterritorialwaters.16
India,withitsextremelydynamicforeignpolicy,hassilentlymadewayforitsinterests
in the island nations and African nations in Indian Ocean Region, which includes Seychelles,
Madagascar Mauritius, Maldives, South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique: for example
extensiveeconomiccompensationlikethedoubletaxationexemptionwithMauritius,andalso
themilitaryaidtomanyofthenations.
India, though not as extensive as China, possesses one of the world’s strongest navies.
AlongwithstateoftheartoutpostsatGoaandDehraDun,itmaintainseightsurveyships,and
numerous survey aircrafts (12 high tech survey aircrafts were bought from the US in total).
India’snavyhashadseveralsuccesses,havingundertakenassignmentsforcountrieslikeSaudi
Arabia, Oman and other island nations in the IOR. This has led India to build its positive
strategic footprint in the region, indirectly irking China. During Prime Minister Modi’s visit to
Oman, India inked a deal where it received ship birthing rights, which will prove to be of
strategic importance in India’s fight against piracy, while allowing it to survey the SLOCs of
Aden and Hormuz. India has signed a MoU with Mozambique that will provide the African
nationIndianpiracypatrols.A2007report(whichthegovernmenthasnotdenied)statedthat
India also setup a listening post in Madagascar17. The Indian Ocean Rim – Arrangement for
Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) have been formed for
better energy and commercial connections with Africa. India persuaded Mozambique,
Mauritius, and Madagascar to vote against Pakistan’s IOR-ARC membership. China’s access to
IBSAwasalsoblockedbyIndia.Accordingtoanotherreport(whichhasn’tbeendeniedbythe
Government) Indiacame to an agreement with Mongolia on Defence Cooperation, in 2001 –
allowing India to station radar systems which would be able to monitor Chinese missile tests.
WithMaldives,Indiahasstrongmilitaryties-involvingbasingtwohelicopterspermanentlyin
Maldives, which would help India to enhance its surveillance capability. Twenty six radars,
interlinked with the Indian radar chain, were setup in Maldives, by India, along its entire
coastlinetodetectapproachingvesselsandaircrafts.IndiasetuptheMauritiusCoastGuardin
16"Malabar2015:StrategicPowerPlayintheIndianOcean."TheDiplomat.N.p.,n.d.Web.04July2016.
<http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/malabar-2015-strategic-power-play-in-the-Indian-ocean/>.
17"IndiaActivatesFirstListeningPostonForeignSoil:RadarsinMadagascar-IndianExpress."India
ActivatesFirstListeningPostonForeignSoil:RadarsinMadagascar-IndianExpress.N.p.,n.d.Web.15July
2016.<http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/india-activates-first-listening-post-on-foreign-soilradars-in-madagascar/205416/>.
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the70s.MauritiusontheotherhandleasedtwoislandstoIndiaallowingittouseit“asperits
benefit”.Onland,IndiahastheFarkhorairbaseandhasbeeninvolvedinrenovatingAyniair
basebothinTajikistan-minutesfromPakistanOccupiedKashmir(POK)andChineseoccupied
partofKashmir.
When Chi Haotin, general of People’s Republic of China said, “The Indian Ocean is not
India’s Ocean”. India said, “South China sea is not China’s sea”. China’s increasing activities in
Bangladesh,PakistanandSriLanka,stimulatedIndiaintoaction.Indiatooksimilarstepsbyits
involvement in the South China Sea (SCS) against China. Knowing that it may not be able to
containChinaalone,IndiacollectivelywithUS,RussiaandtheJapanstandsagainstChinainthe
SCSconflict.
WithVietnam,Indiahassignednumerousdefenceagreements,includingthesaleofthe
world’s fastest cruise missile, Brahmos and the allotment of basing rights to Indian ships on
westernshoreoftheSCSataportnamed,NhaTrang.RussiaandIndiatogetheraredeveloping
Brahmos II which is another hyper sonic cruise missile. In 2011, India agitated China by
acceptingVietnamsofferofexploringtheSCSregion.Indiaalsovolunteeredtosurveywrecksin
the Malacca Straits which was approved by the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG),
furtherirkingtheChinese.
It is frequently noticed that India easily bows down to China in context of territorial
issues and direct exchanges. But in international soil and waters with its coalition member
countriesIndiadoesnotdetertotakeanassertivestancetocontainChineseactivities,suchas
intheSCS.
Vowing to spend huge sums of money building up the nation’s navy, including
development of anti-submarine warfare, India has called for peaceful solutions of maritime
disputesbetweennationsandalsoemphasisedonthefreedomofnavigation-bothaspartofits
ActEastpolicy.Indiaaimstoclaimtheleadershipoftheregionandhasprogressedtowardsits
goalbyconstructingnewmilitarybases,maritimeassets,modernizingfleetsandexpandingits
securitytiesintheregion.18
BoththeUSandIndiaaregrowingconcernedatthereachandambitionoftheChinese
navy, which has not only taken up an assertive stance in the South China Sea but is also
challenging India’s position in the Indian Ocean. According to The Reuters, New Delhi finally
18"IndianStringofPearls"Unstringing"ChineseStringofPearlsTheory."–TheWorldReporter.N.p.,n.d.Web.04July
2016.<http://www.theworldreporter.com/2013/06/unstringing-Chinese-string-of-pearls.html>.
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agreedtoopenupitsmilitarybasestotheUSinApril2016.InreturntheUSwouldgrantIndia
access to high tech weapon systems. India and the US, which already conduct joint naval
exercises, both fly the new version of the P-8 aircraft, helping the sharing of highly sensitive
submarine activities between the two nations. They recently in July, 2016 inked a deal for 4
moresurveillanceaircrafts.
MajorCountriesandOrganizationsInvolved
China
The alleged aggressor into the IOR is the People’s Republic of China. China’s policy
concerning the IOR is lately becoming more dynamic and pronounced due to its increased
recognitionofthecrucialnatureoftheregionfortheenergysecurityofthenation;notingthat
morethanthreequartersofitsrequiredoiltransitsthroughtheregion,itrealizesthatforthe
country'senergyimports,protectionoftheSLOCSalongtheIndianOceanhasbecomevital.To
increaseitsstrategicreachintheIndianOcean,Chinahasdevelopedadditionalportswithnaval
access facilities at Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Kyaukpya, Hianggyi, Great Coco, Mergui and
ZadetkyiinMyanmar,MaraointheMaldivesandGwadarinPakistan.Thedevelopmentofthese
‘StringofPearls’portsmaybealegitimatereflectionofChinesecommercialinterests.19
However,variouscoincidingeventssuggestthatithasthepotentialtoservetheChinese
militaryintereststoo.AccordingtoDavidBrewster,anAustralianexpertonSouthAsiaandthe
Indian Ocean region, there is no doubt that such ports, developed by China and located in
countrieswhichhavenotalwayssharedamicablerelationswithIndia,couldbeusedduringa
militarycontingency20.
India
Like China, India has always had major diplomatic, economic and military interests at
stakeinAsianwaters.AmajorfactoronwhichIndia’seconomicgrowthdependsisitsimported
oil availability. Seventy per cent of India’s oil and gas comes by sea, which is expected to
increase to ninety five per cent by 2025. A number of security analysts have asserted that
energysecurityneedstobeIndia’sprimarystrategicconcernforthenexttwentyfiveyears,and
19N.p.,n.d.Web.<http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1977>.
20Brewster,‘BeyondtheStringofPearls’,pp.142-3.
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thatIndiamusttakeurgentstepstoaddresstheseneeds.Morebroadly,seventysevenpercent
of India’s trade, by value, transits through the Indian Ocean. India’s trade with Indian Ocean
littoral states grew exponentially in the last decade and, from 8th position in 2001, India
catapultedtothe4thlargesttradingpartnerintheIndianOceanregionby2007.21
Recognizing the importance of trade by sea, India’s 2004 maritime military strategy
declared that “control of the choke points could be useful as an effective bargain chip in the
international power brawl, where the currency of military power remains a stark reality.”
22Becauseofthenation’speninsularcharacterandgeographicalposition,theIndianOceanwill
alwayshaveapreponderantinfluenceoverIndia’sdestiny.
Indiahasalreadytakencertaindiplomaticandsecurityinitiativewhicharelikelytoget
moreintensifiedfurtherdowntheline.TheIndianExternalAffairsMinisterofIndiavisitedthe
MaldivesandtheUAEandtheIndianPrimeMinisterwenttoSriLanka,Seychelles,Mauritius-
boththesevisitsin2015totheIORcountrieswereagainstthebackdropofChina’sincreasing
focusintheregion.ModirenewedcommitmenttotheOceaneconomieswhereIndiaenvisages
its role as a “net security provider”(a unique, undefined term used in an Official Defence
Document of India-Ensuring Secure Seas: India’s Maritime Security Strategy, IMSS-2015). He
also visited Bangladesh, where he established a line of credit of $2 billion –for the country’s
infrastructure and development. Prime Minister Modi also visited Fiji, situated right in the
Pacific, showing India’s realization of the importance of its integration in the Indo- Pacific
region. India and Sri Lanka, under President Sirisena, have reached an agreement to expand
their cooperation in defence and security operations.23The issue getting focus now is their
maritimecooperation,includingtrilateralformatwithMaldives.Indiaiskeentostrengthenthe
IORA.Inthemilitaryfield,apparentlytocounterthepotentialChinesechallengesintheIndian
Ocean, India is considering plans to build 7 frigates armed with stealth characteristics and 6
nuclearpoweredsubmarines.24
WhileChinaismodernizingitsnavyasabluewaterforceandalsoissupplyingPakistan
with 8 submarines, 4 F-22P frigates and type 022 missile boats, India’s priority is to build its
own navy capable of countering the aforementioned; the Indian Navy too is aiming to have a
200 ship-fleet by 2027. This ambitious plan includes adding three aircraft carriers and local
2124Agnihotri,‘ProtectionofTradeandEnergySuppliesintheIndianOceanRegion’,p.15.
2228MinistryofDefence,IndianMaritimeDoctrine,IndianGovernment:NewDelhi,April2004,p.64.
23"MappingPMModi’sForeignTrips:26Countriesin2015,3soFarin2016;NowofftoIran."TheIndianExpress.
N.p.,23Dec.2015.Web.04July2016.<http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/mapping-pmmodis-foreign-trips-in-2015-15-countries-and-now-russia/>.
24"IndiaClears$8BillionWarshipsProjecttoCounterChineseNavy."Reuters.ThomsonReuters,18Feb.2015.Web.
04July2016.<http://www.reuters.com/article/india-defence-navy-idINKBN0LM1A920150218>.
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construction of six nuclear submarines in addition to the existing INS Arihant. The
contemplatedmoveoftheIndianNavy,willdoublethesizeofitsfleetfromexisting137ships.
ThecountryhasalsooptedtoconductmaritimeexercisesandnavalgameswithUS,Japanand
Australia.25
India,USandJapaninSeptember2015engagedintrilateraltalks.Accordingtoareport
onthemeetingfromWashington,“ThethreeMinistershighlightedthegrowingconvergenceof
theirrespectivecountries’interestsintheIndo-Pacificregion.”26Thissignifiesconvergenceof
India’s Act East Policy, Japan’s stand on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the
US’sAsia-Pacificrebalancestrategy.Importantsecurity,economicanddiplomaticissueswere
alsodiscussedintheministerialmeeting.Onmaritimesecurity,itisworthnotingthatallthree
countries, who already conduct the Malabar Exercise together, have boosted their efforts to
empower individual Southeast Asian states to tackle various challenges, including China’s
growingassertiveness.
TheUnitedStatesofAmerica
TheUS,beingoneofthelargestimportersofoilandotherenergyresourcesfromWest
Asia (although now declining with the finding of shale gas), currently has over 1 trillion USD
worth material transitting through the Strait of Malacca every year. The USA certainly
recognisestheIORimportanttoitseconomicinterestsandisconsequentlyinvolvedinvarious
IndianOceanactivities.TheAmericannavyfirstarrivedintheIndianOceaninthe1940s,inthe
Arabian Sea (the area covered by the 5th Fleet today). Since then it has been expanding. US
firmlyestablisheditselfinthisregionfirstin1966whenitleasedout,forfiftyyears,theBritish
IslandofDiegoGarciaintheSouthernpartoftheIndianOcean.Thisbasehasbeenextensively
usedduringthecoldwar,forIraqoperationsoftheUSandalsoUS’globalwaronterrorismin
Afghanistan.
“TheIndo-USframeworkforMaritimeSecurityCorporation”wasagreedtobythetwo
nationsin2006,whichcalledforcooperationinvariousmaritimeexercisesintheIndianOcean
such as anti-piracy. In 2008, India and the US initiated the “Malabar” exercise. Eight thousand
five hundrednaval personnel participated in this week long drill in the Arabian Gulf aimed to
enhancemaritimeinteroperabilitybetweenthetwonations
25N.p.,n.d.Web.<http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1977>.
26"InauguralU.S.-India-JapanTrilateralMinisterial."U.S.DepartmentofState.U.S.DepartmentofState,29Sept.2015.
Web.04July2016.<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/247483.htm>.
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On May 16, 2016 for a “maritime security dialogue” the American and Indian officials
metinNewDelhi.InapressreleasetheIndianMinistryofExternalAffairsstated,“Thedialogue
covered issues of mutual interest, including exchange of perspectives on maritime security
development in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region as well as prospects for further
strengtheningcooperationbetweenIndiaandtheUnitedStatesinthisregard,”27
OnrecognisingIndiaasa'MajorDefencePartner',anObamaadministrationofficialhas
said,thatIndiawillbeoneoftheonlycountriesoutsideUS’sformalallies(accordingtotreaty),
which will be given access to about 99% of US’s defence technologies.The US Senate has
authorized a move to upgrade military cooperation with the Indian military- helping in the
development of threat analysis, force planning, logistical support, military doctrine, and
intelligence collection and analysis. The Senate has given the Defence Secretary the
responsibility of ensuring significant strengthening of joint operations, including maritime
security counter-terror cooperation, counter-piracy, and maritime security in the Indo-AsiaPacificregion.28
The US has also overtly supported India’s admission into the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the latter being fruitful (China has
opposedIndia’sadmissionintotheNSG).
Pakistan
PakistanisextremelyimportanttoChina’sOneBeltOneRoadplansinceitisacountry
throughwhichboththe‘belt’andthe‘road’pass.ThecountryliesrightinthecentreofBeijing‘s
plansforanetworkofroads,ports,pipelinesandrailwaysthroughthemajorcitiesofEastAsia
totheresourcerichMiddleEast.OnlyonceChinaestablishessubstantialcontroloverPakistan’s
coastline,willitbeabletolaunchitselfintoaglobalnavalpower,withareachfromthePersian
GulftotheArabianSeaandtherestoftheIndianOcean.
A part of ―One Belt, One Road, the mega-project of China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC)involvesthedevelopmentofadeepseaportatGwadarandanetworkofoilpipelines,
highways, railways and power generation projects. It also includes several special economic
zonesanddryports.A1,800kilometrerailwaylinewilllinkGwadarwithKashgar.Theoverall
cost of the project is expected to reach around US$75 billion. Of this outlay, roughly US$ 46
27N.p.,n.d.Web.<http://www.mea.gov.in/press-
releases.htm?dtl/26829/Inaugural+IndiaUS+Maritime+Security+Dialogue>.
28N.p.,n.d.Web.<https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2901/text>.
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billion will ensure that the corridor becomes operational by 2020, the remaining investment
beingspentonenergygenerationandinfrastructuredevelopment.29
Most of these projects are likely to reach completion in the next three to five years,
although some of the infrastructure projects could take about 10 to 15 years too. The
memorandums of understanding of most of these projects were signed during the Chinese
President‘svisittoPakistaninApril2015.TheCPECisanticipatedtoactasaneffectivecounterbalanceagainstthegrowingstrategictiesbetweentheUSandIndia,aswellastheirinterestsin
the Indian Ocean. The corridor, at least in part, is driven by President Obama‘s Pivot to Asia
announcedin2011-tocounterit.
ThelynchpinofCPECisthestrategicallylocatedportofGwadar,onthewesternfringes
of Pakistan‘s coast of Makran (Balochistan). Geographically, it is close to the international
maritimeenergychokepoint,theStraitofHormuz.Nearlythirtypercentoftheworld‘sseaborne
oilshipmentspassthroughthis21mileswidewaterway.In2005,Pakistan‘sChiefofNavalStaff
statedthatGwadarwouldbethecountry‘sthirdnavalbase,andwouldimprovethecountry‘s
defenceindeepseawaters.
In Pakistan, there is an adequate rationale for using Gwadar as a naval facility. The
Gwadar port is sufficiently deep to accommodate submarines and major surface combatants.
From China‘s perspective, Gwadar‘s proximity to the Persian Gulf may provide a potential
location for oil trans-shipment, and a permanent, reliable facility for PLA Navy ships needing
support points close to the Middle East, North Africa or East Africa. Although China denies
havinganysuchintentions,GwadarcouldstillbeusedbyPLANavy.Indiahasrepeatedlyraised
concernsthatpresenceofChinainGwadareffectivelyamountstoIndia’sstrategicencirclement.
ChinahasalreadyestablishedalisteningpostandothernavalfacilitiesatMyanmar;ithasmade
strategic commercial investments in Sri-Lanka, and is inching closer to Bangladesh on the
EasternseaboardofIndia
The naval collaboration between Pakistan Navy (PN) and PLA Navy has seen a
significant increase over the past decade. In October 2005, Pakistan‘s Ministry of Defence
Productionsignedacontractof600millionUSDwithChinaShipbuildingandTradingCompany
(CSTC) for the construction of four F22P frigates for PN with Transfer of Technology (TOT).
Thesefrigates,threeofwhichwereconstructedinChinaandoneinPakistan(KarachiShipyard
and Engineering Works) have since joined PN fleet. In November 2012, it was reported that
29http://www.dawn.com/news/1177116
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CSTChadsecuredanorderfromPNforfouradditionalimprovedvariantsoftheF-22PZulfiquar
classfrigates.30
However,themostnotabledevelopmentinstrategicdefencecollaborationbetweenthe
two sides was the recent multi-billion dollar deal that would see Beijing provide eight
submarinestoPakistan.ThedealisbeingtermedasthelargesteverChinahasconcludedwith
any country. The resources China is planning to invest in Pakistan are more than twice the
amount of all foreign direct investment (FDI) Pakistan has received since 2008 and
considerablymuchmorethantheentireassistancefromtheUSsince2002.TheCPECwillfulfil
Beijing‘swishesofhavingdirectaccesstotheIndianOceanandbeyond.
Djibouti
DjiboutiisasmallNorthAfricannationandaformerFrenchcolonythatsitsjustatthe
mouthofthestrategicstraitofBabal-Mandeb,whichisbetweentheIndianOceanandtheGulf
ofAden.AccordingtotheEnergyInformationAdministration(EIA)figuresfor2015,4.7million
barrels of crude oil31 passes through this strait per day, making it an extremely important
resource chokepoint of the world. Djibouti has hosted the French, US and Japanese defence
forcesforaboutadecade.BeinganactivebasefortheUSinthewaragainstterrorandalsofor
the drone strikes in Somalia and Yemen Djibouti has served as an effective defence outpost.
However,PresidentGuelleh’sdecisiontoallowChinatosetupaDjiboutibaseinMay,2015,just
adayafterJohnKerryvisited,surprisedtheUS.Thisundoubtedlyisastrongindicationofthe
growingChineseinfluenceintheregion.
30
"Military." F-22P PNS Zulfiquar / Type 057 Jiangwei-II. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 July 2016.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/f-zulfiquar.htm>.
31"U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration-EIA-IndependentStatistcsandAnalysis."OilTradeoffYemenCoast
Grewby20%to4.7MillionBarrelsperDayin2014.N.p.,n.d.Web.04July2016.
<http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=20932>.
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PresidentXiJinping’s‘OneBelt,OneRoad’initiative–speciallythe“MaritimeSilkRoad”
requires overseas naval bases, with which the PLAN could operate in the IOR and protect
extendedsealanes.Djiboutiisoneofthem.DjiboutigivesChinaabaseforitslongrangenaval
air assets. These are capable of maintaining surveillance India’s island territories off the
WesterncoastaswellasovertheArabianSea.
The PLAN’s presence in Obock, Djibouti impacts the security of Peninsular India.
AccordingtotheChineseMilitaryStrategypaper2015,thePLANispoisedtopatrolandprotect
sea lanes that pass through the IOR. These sea lanes pass proximate to India’s coastal regions
andthuscouldbeapotentialareaofconfrontationbetweenthetwopowers.
SriLanka
The Changbaishan, an amphibious landing ship, and Yuncheng, a frigate of the 18th
escort fleet of the PLAN, was present at the Colombo harbour in mid-August, in 2014. In late
2014,SriLankaallowedthedockingofaChinesesubmarineatitsColomboharbour,despitethe
concerns raised by India regarding “China's warming relations with the Indian Ocean island
nation."(TheIndianDefenceMinistry)
Coinciding with the election of President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005, assistance from
China has grown manifold-especially in infrastructure. Assistance worth $4.7 billion has come
fromChinabetween2005and2012.In2012-2014Chinahascommittedanother$2.1billionas
loanstoSriLanka,becomingthenumberonedonoroffundstoSriLanka.Inthepastyear,to
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DhirubhaiAmbaniModelUnitedNations2016|20thOctober2016–23rdOctober2016
win the goodwill of India, Sri Lanka under President Sirisena had denied admission to the
Chinesenavydockingatitsportsbuthasfinallyallowedthemtobeadmittedagain.32
SituatedrightatthetipofIndia,SriLanka’sgeo-politicalindependenceisvitalforIndia
anditsforeignpolicycouldbecomeapotentialthreatforIndia.
Myanmar
China has been voluntarily pitching to increase its influence in the IOR through
Myanmar by the construction of a deep-water port, which also includes a Special Economic
Zone (SEZ) at the cost of 280 million USD. Kyaukphyu, in the troubled southwestern Rakhine
Province of Myanmar, is the venue chosen for the project. By 2025, the project is expected to
contribute around 10 billion USD to annual GDP of Myanmar. The Kyaukphyu project would
provideChinastrongconnectivitywiththeIndianOceanthananyofitscounterparts-theother
“Pearls”,includingtheGwadarportinPakistan.Withthenewdemocraticgovernmentcoming
to power, China, in an attempt to regain the position it once enjoyed under Myanmar’s old
military government in Myanmar, is bringing the new democratic government under its
influence by expanding investments in growth sectors like infrastructure - construction of
roads,railwaysandports.
33
32"ChinaDefendsDockingofItsSubmarineinSriLanka-TimesofIndia."TheTimesofIndia.N.p.,n.d.Web.04July
2016.<http://timesofIndia.Indiatimes.com/India/China-defends-docking-of-its-submarine-in-SriLanka/articleshow/45029781.cms>.
33N.p.,n.d.Web.<http://www.theworldreporter.com/2013/06/unstringing-chinese-string-of-pearls.html>.
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DhirubhaiAmbaniModelUnitedNations2016|20thOctober2016–23rdOctober2016
TimelineofEvents
Date
Event
Mid1980s
ChinabeginsregularincursionsintotheIndian
Oceanforfuel
November,2004
USconsultingfirmBoozeAllenHamiltoncoins
the term “String of Pearls” in its report
“EnergyFuturesinAsia”
October,2008
India and US first participate in exercise
“Malabar”theArabianGulf
January,2009
USFifthFeetestablishesCombinedTaskForce
inIOR
November,2009
India deploys INS Savitri for surveillance of
exclusive economic zones of Seychelles and
Mauritius
January,2013
Pakistan transfers Gwadar Port to Chinese
OverseasPortHoldingsLimited
May,2013
China releases first Blue Book centered over
India’saccelerated“LookEast”policyandUS’s
“pivot”toAsiastrategy
September7th,2013
President Xi Jinping announces Maritime Silk
Roadidea
December,2013
Announcement of “One Belt One Road”
initiative
March,2014
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2014
oftheUSDepartmentofDefensenotesIndiaas
thenetproviderofsecurityintheregion.
July,2014
JapanjoinsexerciseMalabar
March,2015
Indian PM visits Sri Lanka and Maldives to
expand cooperation in defense and security
issues.
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DhirubhaiAmbaniModelUnitedNations2016|20thOctober2016–23rdOctober2016
April,2015
Under CPEC, a $46 billion investment into
PakistanannouncedbyChina
May,2015
China releases its Defence White Paper,
revolving over a shift in PLAN operations to
“offshoredefencewithopenseasprotection”.
October,2015
China–Pakistan8Subdealfinalized
February,2016
Construction Chinese “support facilities” in
Djibouticommences
RelevantUNTreatiesandEvents
•
United Nations Resolution 2832 – Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, adopted by the
UNGA, 16th December 1971 INDIAN OCEAN AS ZONE OF PEACE," Resolution 2832
(XXVI)
Notably,therehasn’tbeenanyUNactionorresolutionacknowledgingthisgrowingissueinthe
Indian Ocean Region. Although India and China, both have taken their turns to assert their
dominance and end the strife once and for all, none of the countries have moderated their
position in this region. There haven’t been any direct previous attempts to mediate peace
betweenthetwocontendingsides.
PossibleSolutions
Possiblesolutionscouldbe:
•
First and foremost, International Organizations must ensure that both countries
acknowledge and understand the importance of ending this struggle for dominance in
theregion,sinceitcouldeasilyescalateintoaglobalwarbetweentwostrongalliances
and thus cause massive destruction, both humanitarianly and economically, on both
sides.Thus,ifnotvoluntary,thecountriesshouldbepressurisedbyinternationalbodies
totakethefollowingstepstosolvetheissueathand.
•
TheUNshouldstronglyurgenationsintheIORtofollowapolicyofnon-alignmentwith
eitherside,especiallyinmilitaryendeavorsdemeaningorinstigatingtheopposingside.
•
There should be increased transparency and communication in certain policies of the
Governments of India and China concerning territorial integrity and maritime
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DhirubhaiAmbaniModelUnitedNations2016|20thOctober2016–23rdOctober2016
ambitions.Thiswillfuelgoodwillbetweenthenations.TheChineseGovernmentneeds
topubliclyreleaseacleardefinitionofitsIndianOceanStrategysothatspeculatorscan
stopaddingfueltothefire.
•
Instead of only helping India’s neighbours in terms of military strength, China should
also invest in India in its military and infrastructure – for example, with respect to
helping India fight off various security threats such as terrorism. Along with economic
gains, this will be an act of goodwill and better their relationship. It would also work
towardsthegoalofcurbingtheincreasingtensionbetweenthecountriesandsolvethe
problem of global terrorism. There could be increased cooperation between the two
nations in the investment sector, with the help of broader initiatives like the BRICS
DevelopmentBankandtheAsianInfrastructureInvestmentBank.
•
TheIORAshouldstrengthenitsroleintheIORbytakingastrongerstanceregardingthe
securityoftheregionandshouldtakemeasurestocurbthegrowingcompetitioninthe
region by promoting Joint naval exercises between member nations; Pakistan should
certainlybeadmittedintotheorganization.
•
Also, instead of individual nations themselves undertaking anti piracy operations, the
IORA should intervene and conduct internationally regulated anti piracy operations
withtheconsentofallmembernations.Itshoulddosonotonbehalfofanyparticular
country(ifso,ulteriormotivesmayevolve)butunderthenameoftheveryorganization.
The equipment should be supplied by the member nations, but the operations will be
regulated by officials from the IORA. This will, first of all, strongly control anti-piracy
operations with all actions undertaken under one organization and not individual
nations.Secondly,intheseoperations,alongwithIORAofficials,therewillbeofficersof
various navies also involved; consequently, promoting cooperation between nations.
Preventing any country from individually operating in this region for anti piracy
operations, will also ensure that interested nations will deliver to the IORA all the
necessary and updated equipment so that the highest security is ensured for their
goods.Thiswaylatesttechnologywillbesharedbetweennations.Individualnaviesnot
being able to operate will remove the question of countries having ulterior motives
underthepretextofantipiracyoperations.
•
There should be increased cooperation between the Indian and the Chinese navy in
various operations the Indian Ocean such as disaster relief, search and rescue and
fisheries.Thiswillreducethesuspicionandtensionbetweenthetwonavies.
•
International Organizations should put pressure on China by questioning its foreign
policyandshouldorderChinatostopviolatingIndia’sterritorialintegritythroughthe
latter’seasternlandborder.Itshouldcurtailitsaggressiveforeignpolicywithrespectto
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DhirubhaiAmbaniModelUnitedNations2016|20thOctober2016–23rdOctober2016
India. It must make China confine its maritime operations in the Indian Ocean to its
SLOCsandnothingelse.
•
The UN must condemn the USA’s active presence in the Indian Ocean region, which is
only causing more problems; asking it to limit itself to its own SLOCs. Instead of
supportingIndiaandinstigatingChinatostepupitsplay
•
Finally, India should come to terms with China’s entry into the Indian Ocean and thus
should include China in various maritime military exercises like the “Malabar” to
establishtrustbetweenthetwonations.
BothnationsneedtorealisethatforaregionasbigastheIndianOceanregion-noone
powercandominateit,noonepowerwillbethewinner.Sonationsshouldstopcompetingfor
hegemonyandstartworkingforthebettermentandsecurityofthisregionasawhole.
In 2009, Robert Kaplan predicted the emergence of “dynamic great-power rivalry”
between India and China - and his prediction may as well come true if the world sits on its
laurelsanddoesnotactasearlyaspossible
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Books
1. CHINAININDIANOCEANREGION-editedbyDrSiddaGoud,ManishaMookherjee
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