CHAPTER
2
Culture History: A Culture- Historical Approach
GARY
The history of ideas is concerned with all that
insidious thought, that whole interplay of representations that flow anonymously between
men.
-Michel
Foucault,
The Archaeology of Knowledge
CULTUREHISTORYCAN be variously conceived. Many
have considered
it the dominant
twentieth-century paradigm prior to the New Archaeology of the
1960s-at least among Anglo-American
trained archaeologists (Strong 1952; Trigger 1989:206; Lyman
et al. 1997b:v, 1997a:1; Binford 1965, 1968; Caldwell
1959; Meltzer 1979; Dunnell 1978; Flannery 1967).
Others, like Clarke, have seen it as a preparadigmatic
"disconnected bundle of inadequate sub-theories" (D.
Clarke 1968:xiii). It is often written about as though
synonymous with the research histories or biographies
of certain key figures, "culture history is what culture
historians do;' or, as Lyman et al. (1997b:vi) note, as
"the thinking of a group of archaeologists characterized by processual archaeologists as 'culture historians'" (Daniel 1950; Fitting 1973; Willey and Sabloff
1974; Trigger 1989:414, bibliography).
Culture history has also been variously referred to
as a period or stage in archaeological evolution (Willey
and Sabloff 1980); as a movement (Trigger 1989:table
1), an approach (Trigger 1989), a perspective (Preucel
and Hodder 1996:6), an interpretive trend (Trigger
1989:12), and as an intellectual adaptation to specific
sociopolitical circumstances (Trigger 1989: 148, 1978;
Patterson 1986). Alternatively, its texts have been examined as literary tropes (Hodder 1989) and exploited
for literary effects (Webster 1999).
Instead, I have chosen to conceive of culture history-as
a culture historian should-as
one among
several archaeological traditions to which archaeologists contributed, mainly during the first half of the
twentieth century. This view approaches archaeological texts of the period as artifacts-the
material expression of the shared ideas or norms governing a
particular kind of archaeological thought and practice
S. WEBSTER
called culture-historical.
And it distinguishes culturehistorical from alternate contemporaneous
types of
texts (e.g., functional-processual,
evolutionary) on the
basis not of age or author or sociopolitical function,
but rather on the basis of the formal characteristics
displayed by their statements.
As with any classificatory approach, culture history has benefits and weaknesses (Mayr 1995). On the
positive side it puts order to the unwieldy variation
displayed by the massive culture-historical
literature.
In doing so it makes possible comparisons with other
such traditions, as well as their accompanying
discourse. A classificatory approach also seems especially
suited to a phenomenon
of such uncertain historical
integrity. For it is important to realize that culturehistorical archaeology-its
tenets and principles-was
largely defined in retrospect, and usually by its critics
(Lyman et al. 1997b:vii). Archaeologists who actually
practiced culture history were little aware of it, at least
prior to the 1950s. They rarely referred to themselves
as culture historians, nor saw what they were doing
as particularly culture-historical,
as opposed to other
kinds of archaeologies. "Culture history" as a term
and concept would have been better understood as it
was used in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
German ethnology, to denote the product of research: a
Kulturgeschichte, or culture history (Trigger 1989: 148).
Archaeologists seem not to have used the term themselves until the 1930s (Kidder 1932) and only rarely
before the 1960s to differentiate a distinctive kind
of approach (Taylor 1948; Willey and Phillips 1958).
Rouse's (1953) often cited programmatic
essay "The
Strategy of Culture History" is a review of "research
planning with respect to the study of culture history,"
and not a description of one particular paradigm compared to others. lt is likely that most archaeologists of
the period saw themselves simply as archaeologists
doing archaeology-as
studying the archaeological
record, with the only real distinction being whether
they were dealing with prehistoric or historic remains. In contrast to later periods there was less reflection, less self-awareness; the modern (or rather
11
postmodern)
idea of alternate archaeologies (Hodder
1999) would have been foreign.
This has several implications. It raises first a question about the wisdom of undertaking
any project
which hopes to characterize
in some concise and
useful way a phenomenon
which could in reality be
no more than the label which history and historians
have hung on nebulous congeries of poorly articulated concepts, ill-reported
methods, and badly remembered personalities. At the same time it warns
of the potential dangers of studying any such phenomena typologically. The greatest one is certainly
the ramifications of confusing typological creations
with empirical reality; assuming that people lived
in a prehistoric past where the units archaeologists
recognize and navigate by in the present are the same
as those used by their prehistoric subjects. In the
present chapter the risk is of lending historical reality to what may be largely a typological creation. It is
easy to confuse the illusion of a consensus of opinions produced by typologically
reducing variation
with some real consensus originally present. There
are risks to taking the subject of culture history as a
distinct body, when the ideas could be an arbitrary
chunk of the normative
continuum
between culture history, and contemporaneous
traditions such
as functional-processual
or evolutionary
traditions.
Culture historians worry about just these problems
(Lyman et a!. 1997a).
In the remainder of this chapter, 1 will describe the
diagnostic features of a culture-historical
tradition as
1 have defined it.
NORMATIVE
THEORY
Culture-historical
texts are first distinguished by statements which reveal common notions about the nature
of ancient cultures; about their qualities; about how
they related to the material record; and thus about
how archaeologists might effectively study them.
As Trigger (1978:100-101,
1989:161-163)
has
chranicled, by the turn of the twentieth century archaeologists were looking for new concepts to put
order to increasingly numeraus and diverse collections of remains. As classic evolutionism lost influence, archaeologists adopted concepts from ethnology
and human geography (Daniel 1963:98). One was the
belief that it is possible to group archaeological collections-assemblages,
aggregates-that
are comparable on some measure to form cultural units that are
analogous to eth nological cultures (Trigger 1978: 100).
Several interrelated assumptions are involved.
12
GARY
s.
WEBSTER
Partitive Culture or Cultures
A central notion of culture history is that cultures constitute real or empirical divisions of the cultural whole,
which E. B. Tylor (1871:1) defined as "that complex
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morais,
law, custom, and other capabilities and habits acquired
by man as a member of society." As Trigger states it
(1978:76), "From this holistic or processual view of
culture it was an easy step to a partitive one of individual cultures as ways of life transmitted by specific
peoples from generation to generation." The resulting
parti tive or unit concept of culture came originally frorn
German ethnology and geography (Trigger 1989:162)
and was used by the mid-eighteenth century to denote
customs of individual societies and published as culture history (Kulturgeschichte and Kulturwissenschaft)
(Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952). By the late nineteenth
century Friedrich Ratzel and Franz Boas promoted the
idea of cultures as geographically discrete entitiesculture areas or "blocks" with unique characteristics
braught about by chance combinations of traits (Trigger 1989:148-163). Taylor summed up the concept
(1948: 110) as follows:
By culture as a partitive concept, I mean a historically
derived system of culture traits which is a more or less
separable and cohesive segment of the whole-that-isculture and whose separate traits tend to be shared by
ali or by specially designated individuais of a group
or society.
The unit-culture
concept gained popularity
in
American ethnology in culture area and age-area
concepts (Mason 1896; Wissler 1923:61-63; Kroeber
1931) which reinforced similar notions in archaeology
(cf. Holmes 1914). The distinction between holistic
culture and parti tive culture became thus a central
tenet of culture history (Kluckhohn 1960:139; Childe
1956a:26).
Normative Cultures
A second concept-perhaps
originally from Durkheim
(1895)-is
the idea that cultures are bound together
by common and distinct sets of norms, the normative
view of culture (Willey and Phillips 1958:18). As Childe
(1956a: 17-18) described it, culture (in a partitive sense)
denotes patterns of behavior common to a group, to
ali members of a society ("every society of men does
impose on its members close conformity to more or less
rigid standards or norms of behavior") in traditional
standards of behavior. Culture, then, is a mental construct consisting of ideas (Taylor 1948: 101).
This ais o implies that cultures are to be studied as whole entities, since as natural packages they
are normatively homogeneous
(Willey and Phillips
1958:18; Binford 1965:204; Rouse 1953:84). C. Hawkes
(1954:157) stated it as a central axiom: "The human
activity which it [archaeology] can apprehend conforms to a series of norms, which can be aggregated
under the name of cultures."
Fluid Cultures
Cultures in the partitive-norrnative
sense were further understood
to behave in a manner described
metaphorically
as fluid-the
so-called aquatic view
of culture (Binford 1965:204). Culture-historical
texts
abound in phrases like "cultural stream," "the flowing of new cultural elements into a region," and "vast
flowing stream of ideational norms" (Ford 1949:3839; Binford 1965:204). The idea was inherent in the
original age-area concept in which culture traits were
thought to disperse out from their point of origin-a
culture center (Wissler 1923:203-205)-like
"ripples"
(Murdock 1948:294; quoted in Lyman et al. 1997a: 19).
Steward (1941:376) later said of archaeology, "the purpose is to represent the development, interaction, and
blending of diverse cultural streams."
Particulate Cultures
Cultures are thought to be fluid but also vaguely particulate-composed
of unique traits. The notion that
traits dispersed from culture centers or diffused from
one to another culture were well established in ethnology and human geography from the time of Ratzel
and Boas. By mapping trait distributions
one could
establish a culture's boundaries as well as its history
(Trigger 1989). A consensus on what a culture trait
actually constituted was never established in either
ethnology (e.g., a unit of observation of tribal culture
[Wissler 1923:50]; ambiguous and partable [Kroeber
1940:29]) or archaeology (e.g., "unit of culture" [Taylor 1948:96]; "an artifact" [Ehrich 1950:471]).
Despite a need for consensus on this issue (Dunnell
1978), no agreement on unit of culture has entered
common use in culture history for classifying cultural
similarities and differences (Lyman et al. 1997a:161162,165,183,191).
Evolutionary archaeologists argue
that the best way to know what the true cultural units
are is to monitor their replicative success over time
(Dunnell 1978; Lipo et al. 1997; Lyman and O'Brien
1998). Others define the cultural unit as a statistical
clustering of physical traits or artifacts (Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman 1981; Clarke 1968; Fry 1979).
Archaeological Cultures
Culture history typically views the archaeological
record as not the culture itself, which is a fluid-norrnative phenomenon,
but rather as its cultural product:
the objectified or materially expressed norms of the
culture or cultures that produced it (Ford 1954c:47).
The resulting concept-the
archaeological culture-is
considered by some (Hodder 1991:3) to be the single
most significant building block of European prehistory. Trigger (1989: 165) traces its European origins
to Kossinna (1911), who interpreted his mapped distributions of northern European artifacts as cultural
mosaics (Kulturen or Kultur-Gruppe)
comprising the
remains of discrete peoples with diverse lifestyles and
ethnicities. It was eventually adopted by Childe (1925,
1929, 1939), who systematized its use. In America
the concept may have an independent origin in early
work by Mills (1902) and others in the Ohio valley. It
was eventually used by Kidder (1924) in the first culture-historical synthesis of southwestern archaeology
(Trigger 1989:187-188; Meinander 1981).
CULTURAL TYPOLOGIES
A second distinguishing feature of culture-historical
texts is a preoccupation with classification and typology. Normative cultural theory implies that archaeology properly carried out is a compara tive study of the
material expressions of normative culture units or
archaeological cultures, each of which, according to
C. Hawkes (1954:157), is "definable in terms of time
and space and recognizable each by its standard [read:
normal] range of material products." Thus a primary
objective of culture history is to document the historical development of cultures in various areas, through
a study of the relationships of form, temporal locus,
and spatiallocus exhibited by their representative artifacts (Lyman et al. 1997a:2; Kidder 1932:8; Willey
1953b:361).
Classifying Data
Culture historians have employed several systems for
ordering their data-classification,
typology, taxonomy. Rouse (1952:324-340, 1953:89-90) laid out the
more or less standard classificatory procedure. First,
artifacts are grouped according to material (ceramic,
stone, wood, glass, etc.); then they are subdivided on
the basis of techniques of manufacture, shape, decoration, function, and so on. The result is a hierarchical
series of classes, subclasses, and so forth, each consisting of artifacts with similar physical properties, uses,
and features. As empirical groupings, such classes are
Culture History
13
deemed best for describing aggregates of artifacts or
other material units having fixed provenience (e.g.,
sites, features, components), and they might be further
used as a basis for drawing behavioral or even ethnological inferences (Smith 1910; Clark 1952; Taylor
1948:170-171; cf. Kroeber 1939b). From such classes
one might then define types as "a series of attributes
which are shared by such a group of artifacts and
which distinguish them as a class"; while the series
of diagnostic attributes (its significata) he termed a
mode (Rouse 1952:325-330). Types being theoretical
or analytical units (as opposed to classes) could be
used "in defining units of culture for use in distribution studies or for some other interpretive purpose"
(Rouse 1953:89).
Cultural or Normative Types
Types are needed on practical grounds for reducing
the "bewildering variety of human behavior to manageable proportions for scientific treatment" (Childe
1956a:34; Piggott 1965:2; Rouse 1953:98). But how can
they also serve to document normative culture units?
Culture history addressed the problem by translating
abstract notions of cultural norms to concrete notions
of material norms as manifested in the observable
variability within material traits-artifacts. Flannery
described the arguments as follows (1967:119):
culture historians ... treat culture as a body of shared
ideas, values, and beliefs-the "norrns" of a human
group. Members of a given culture are committed to
these norms in different degrees-the norm is really
a beLl-shaped curve of opinions on how to behave.
Prehistoric artifacts are viewed as products of these
shared ideas, and they toa have a "range of variation"
that takes the form of a bell-shaped curve.
C. Hawkes (1954:157) was similarly explicit (see
also Childe 1956a:34; Krieger 1944:272):
In the standard range, however delicately the bounds
of classification are adapted to the variability, the notion of types must be comported. And change, from
one norm to another, is to be followed in the changing
of the types, and of the standard ranges of the products whence the norms can be inferred.
Consequently culture history tends to focus on
variation that is thought to reflect the diagnostic
norms of a culture, rather than merely utility or function, in hopes of "abstracting from cultural products
the normative concepts extant in the minds of men
now dead" (Binford 1965:203; cf. Childe 1956a:1l),
14
GARY
s.
WEBSTER
and thus revealing "the inherent order that exists in
culture at ali times and places" (Ford 1954c:52).
In practice this has often been a matter of trial and
error. Certain types defined on the basis of style attributes may have "limited and coherent temporal and
spatial distributions" (Krieger 1944:272,277-278; cf.
Whiteford 1947:228), thus making them more usefui for discovering or analyzing culture-historical
units (Ford 1938). The assumption that style might
cross-cut functional variation and measure normative-cultural variation became well established (Kidder 1916:122; Kroeber 1916b:36, 1919:239; Nelson
1916:162; Spier 1917:277; Wissler 1916:195). As Lyman et al. (1997a:1O) explain,
Because styles change independently of changes in
selective environments, one can define classes [read:
types] of styles-historical
classes-that allow the
measurement of time; further, because stylistic similarity results from transmission, styles can be used
to measure interaction between spatially separate
groups of people.
Thus culture history tends to focus on potentially
homologous as opposed to analogous similarities (Lyman et al. 1997a:1O)measurable by types which would
"to a greater or lesser degree, be a reflection of the
boundaries to one stream of ideas which the culture
bearers considered related" (Ford 1954c:52). Types
found to consistently fulfill this role have come to
be alternately termed diagnostic, cultural, historical,
index, marker, or key types, sometimes type fossils
(Ford 1954c:52; Childe 1956a:111-134; Willey and
Woodbury 1942:236).
Seriation
Culture history requires methods to establish the relative age of various classes of remains as a basis for
defining and comparing culture units. Before the development of radiocarbon dating and the widespread
use of dendrochronology, frequency seriation-the
relative dating of assemblages on the basis of proportional representations of constituent culture-historical
types-was the primary method (Heizer 1959:222343,376-488). It was not only precise but made use of
the most common remains: pottery shards.
Less precise forms of seriation (cf Rouse 1953:94)
had long been used in the Old World-termed alternatively contextual, developmental, or phyletic seriation
(Lyman et al. 1997:43-62). There were several necessaryassumptions: (1) types change gradually over time
as observed stratigraphically; (2) due to the diffusion
of norrns, geographically similar types are more or less
contemporary; (3) types tend to improve, evolve, or
develop (rarely degrade) over time. On this logic C. J.
Thomsen arranged European collections into successive Stone, Bronze, and lron Ages; Montelius seriated
bronze implements as a basis for his regional cultural
sequences; and Petrie seriated Predynastic Egyptian
pottery from cemeteries at Diospolis Parva (Trigger
1989:73-80,155-161,200-201).
Such methods based
on qualitative (presence/absence)
comparisons
and
cross-dating, although rarely precise, continued in use,
especially outside North America (Rouse 1953:94-95;
Garrod and Bate 1937; cf. Piggott 1965:11).
Frequency seriation, by contrast, is quantitative, requires no developmental assumptions, and is based
on the critical discovery that types (generally called
styles) change in frequency over time in a more or less
uniform manner-according
to the so-called popularityprinciple (Lyman et al. 1997:43). Styles are thought
to appear, gradually to reach a peak of popularity, then
gradually to decline. When viewed diagrammatically
the changing frequencies produce normal, unimodal,
or lenticular patterns-so-called
battleship curves.
Assemblages collected in single-component
sites or
from the surface can be thus relatively dated from the
relative percentages or frequencies of the constituent
styles. Seriations were corroborated
by stratigraphic
excavations; and dendrochronology,
used in both Europe and North America from the 1920s for dating
structures, eventually offered absolute date calibrations
for seriations (Baillie 1982; Douglass 1919, 1921).
Frequency seriation appears to have developed first
in the southwestern United States, after Nelson at
Pueblo San Cristobal (Nelson 1916) and Kidder at
Pecos Pueblo (Kidder and Kidder 1917) recognized
normal frequency distributions of pottery types across
levels. But Kroeber first used the popularity principie
for seriating shards collected from the surface of Zuni
Pueblo, New Mexico (Kroeber 1916a,b). The procedure was continuously refined (Spier 1917; Robinson
1951; Brainherd 1951; Deetz and Dethlefsen 1965;
Kendall 1969) and widely employed, for example, in
the Viru valley, Peru (Ford 1949), the lower Mississippi valley (Ford 1936), the Arctic (Collins 1937),
and the Middle East (Hole et al. 1969). More recently,
some archaeologists are showing renewed interest in
frequency seriation (Lipo et al. 1997).
Classifying and Synthesizing Aggregates
Culture- historical types have been widely used for elassifying and correlating aggregates of remains to build
larger culture units. According to Rouse (1953) this
is done by"classifying sites instead of artifacts, structures, or parts thereof" (when dealing with culturally
homogeneous sites or components): "one groups the
sites or occupational units into classes on the basis of
the similarities and differences in their cultural material, notes the elements of culture which are shared by
each class and uses these elements to define the type of
culture represented by the class" (Rouse 1953:91).
In Europe, following Oscar Montelius and Gustaf
Kossina (Trigger 1989:155-170), Childe used select
diagnostic types or index types to define a culture as
"certain types of remains-pots,
implements, ornaments, burial rites, house forms-constantly
recurring together" (1929:v-vi), and (later) "an assemblage
of the same types that recur at several distinct sites"
(1956a:14, 16). Although he felt the concordance of
several types was required to define a culture (cf.
Childe 1956b: 126; Piggott 1965:7), it was rarely possible to find concordance among a greater number.
Childe was, however, careful to distinguish between
the definition of a culture on typological grounds and
its description by delineating its constituent elements:
"A culture ... is not constituted by the few types used
as diagnostic fossils but by the whole assemblage of
types and traits associated" (1956b: 121).
For determining
the spatial extent of a culture,
Childe (1956b: 112) reasoned that because
a people always inhabits a definite territory, and its
extension must be in some sense orderly, though
not necessarily continuous ... the distribution of
an archaeological culture should define the habitat
of its authors, and thus its distribution will most
conveniently be revealed by the distribution of the
diagnostic types used to distinguish it. Hence ... [a
type] should exhibit an intelligible pattern and cluster round one or more recognizable foci. Every other
type, attributed on the strength of associations to the
same culture, when mapped in its turn should exhibit
the same general distribution pattern.
Rarely was it possible to identify archaeological
cultures with known ethnic divisions such as Celtic or
Iberic "with the aid of toponymy and written sources"
(Childe 1956a:36). Usually a conventional name was
affixed designating a diagnostic trait (e.g., Battle Ax,
Bell Beaker, Tumuli) or with a geographic location,
sometimes with period suffixed (e.g., Aunjetitz, Hallstatt, Thessalian Neolithic, British lron Age, etc.). By
aligning the resulting cultures chronologically
by
means of stratigraphy, seriation, and synchronism,
Culture History
15
Childe constructed the first major cultural syntheses
of several European regions (Childe 1925, 1929; see
ais o Leakey 1931; Clarke 1968 for review of classifications in Europe).
A variety of systems were developed in North
America, which were mainly modifications
of two
basic schemes (Lyman et a!. 1997a: 159-205). The
Gladwin system was a hierarchical classification of
culture units for the American Southwest (Gladwin
and Gladwin 1934) based on the relative degree of trait
similarities, including common pottery types. Roots
subsumed the large regional groupings: Basketmaker,
Anasazi, Hohokam, Caddoan. Roots comprised stems
denoting specific regional culture units. These in turn
were further subdivided
into more geographically
specific branehes and phases (similar to Childe's cultures, above; see Rouse 1955). The resulting dendritic
classification defining temporal, spatial, and formal
similarities gave the appearance of a tree of historical relatedness of southwestern
cultures (Lyman et
a!. 1997a:168), although it never demonstrated
common ancestry and subsequent divergence (Willey and
Sabloff 1980:105).
More influential outside the Southwest was the
so-called Midwestern taxonomic or McKern system
(McKern 1939) originally developed for classifying
large amounts of materials from unstratified contexts. It toa classified finds on formal criteria. As in
Childe's procedures, assemblages from single occupation units-eomponents-were
grouped into foei
(similar to Gladwin's phases and Childe's; see Rouse
1955) on the basis of shared types (styles); foci were
in turn grouped into aspeets; aspects into phases (not
equivalent to Gladwin's); phases into patterns (MeKern's phases and patterns were later dropped). Like
European cultures, foci and aspects were arranged to
form local and regional cultural chronologies (Trigger
1989:192).
Components
of both classifications (often with
modified nomenclature and meaning) were later synthesized (Phillips and Willey 1953; Willey and Phillips 1955) for integrating broader regions, Ford and
Willey's (1941) synthesis of eastern North American
prehistoric
phases (cultures)
used developmental
stages-Archaic,
Burial Mound I, Burial Mound II,
Temple Mound I, Temple Mound 11. The system correlated phases and foci on the basis of a persistence
of traits-types,
classes, assemblages-to
form traditions (Rouse 1939:14; Willey 1945:53), and geographically on the basis of trait similarities to form horizons
(Kroeber 1944:108-111; Rouse 1953:70).
16
GARY
S. WEBSTER
Ethnologieal Interpretations of Culture Units
Inherent within the normative theory of culture is the
original notion that archaeological cultures represent
real ethnic or cultural units in the ethnological sense.
Thus larger culture units were frequently interpreted
in these terms. In Europe, Childe (1956a:36), following Kossina (1911) and others (Myres 1911; Peake
1922; Fox 1923) referred to the material remains of a
people or peoples. "Now types are repeatedly assoeiated together not only because they were current at the
same time, but also because they were made and used
by the same people." But he was rarely more specific,
saying "the sociological counterpart
of an archaeological culture can only be designated by the noncommittal term people" (Childe 1956b:133); and he
cautioned, "what sort of unit that society was-a tribe,
a nation, a caste, a profession-can
hardly be decided
from purely archaeological data" (Childe 1956a:18).
Similar interpretations were sought in North America (Jennings 1947:192; Sears 1961). Holmes (1914:413;
1919:77) spoke of antiquities in terms of ethnic and
tribal differences; Spier (1918:345; 1919:386) interpreted pottery styles in terms of groups, and Vaillant
(1931, 1936, 1937) in terms of peoples and tribal
entities. Speaking of components, McKern (1940:18)
stated, "A complex of traits at a site may represent the
customs and ways of ... a local group representing a
single variety, or band, of Indians." Gladwin's roots and
stems were likened to groups of people, and branches
to culture areas. Colton (1939:5) called culture units
tribes, and Phillips and Willey (1953) referred to a
"locality or site" as "cornmunity" and a "region" as a
"tribe." Despite these frequent pronouncements,
systematic efforts to correlate archaeological with ethnic
or sociocultural units have never been central to the
culture-historical
tradition.
Problems and Debates
Culture historians had problems trying to isolate and
define culture units as they had conceived them. Establishing the boundaries of such units by the concordant distributions of more than a few diagnostic
traits was notoriously difficult (Childe 1956a; McKern 1934); ethnology had similar difficulties (Kroeber 1939a:1-2). Moreover, problems with blurring,
mixing, overlapping, and blending of type distributions as well as the drifting or creeping of type modes
worsened as sample coverage and size increased within
regions or even stratified deposits, or when measured
quantitatively (Ford in Phillips et a!. 1951 :223-224;
Kroeber and Strong 1924:49-54; Colton and Hargrave
1937:2-3, 30; Rouse 1953:92; Lyman et al. 1997a:65,
68-69, 87). What today are better understood as typological and sampling effects were-prior
to the
1960s-interpreted
variously as behavioral-coming from trading or raiding (Childe 1956b:1l8), phyletic-from
historical relationships (Haury 1937:212;
Kidder 1915, 1917), and postdepositional-from
mixing (Brew 1946:63); they were only rarely identified as
typological (Ford 1954c).
Methodological
responses also varied. In heavily
studied areas like the lower Mississippi valley and
the Southwest, subtypes and varieties were designed
better to reflect the ceramic continuum
(Wheat et
al. 1958:35-36; Phillips et a!. 1951:63). Approaches
taken to control the problem of toa much variation
included using only a few diagnostic types (e.g., index
fossils, key types, marker types) to define units (Childe
1956a:20, 1956b:112; Willey and Woodbury 1942:236)
and favoring qualitative presence/absence criteria over
quantitative statistics for unit discrimination
(Childe
1956b:121; Kluckhohn 1960:139).
Rouse (1953:93-94) noted the difficulties archaeologists were having establishing culture areas from
distribution
data (Strong 1933; Shettrone
1941),
since "culture areas are not so likely as natural areas
to remain constant through time" (Rouse 1953:93),
although there were apparent exceptions (Bennett
1948). Rouse suggested that alternatively one might
refer one's data: (1) "to the (cultural) center (Wissler
1923:61-63) which it most closely resembles ... [for
example 1 where several tribes with different cultures
live side by side and it is therefore impossible to define
a single, culturally homogeneous
area"; (2) to arbitrary geographic divisions such as cartographic areas
(Rouse 1953:94) like the map quadrangles used by
Gladwin and Gladwin (1934); or (3) to natural areas
(Rouse 1953:93) as is still done today to form archaeological regions-geographically
bounded areas with
some cultural homogeneity (Fagan 1991:47). Ali these
responses had the effect of masking variation and reifying the unit culture concept.
Prior to the 1960s, such concerns were frequently
aired in debates over the meaning of types (Kluckhohn 1939; Rouse 1939; Krieger 1944; Brew 1946; Taylor 1948; Ehrich 1950; Brainerd 1951b). These reached
a climax in the famous Ford-Spaulding
debate (Ford
1954a,b,c; Spaulding 1953a,b; 1954a,b; see Lyman et
al. 1997a:149-157 for a detailed summary and interpretation).
Spaulding-probably
representing the
majority (Brainherd 1951b; Gifford 1960; C. Hawkes
1954:157; cf. Childe 1956a:18) view-held
that types
were empirically real: they potentially corresponded to
the emic types of their makers, which were expressed
materially as discontinuous
clusters of attributes. He
suggested they might be discovered using statisticscluster analysis-and
compared qualitatively (Spaulding 1953a,b). Ford-representing
the minority view
(Brew 1946:46)-held
that all types-whether
constructed by the archaeologist, the ethnologist, or the
ancient artisan-were
classificatory devices used to
break up the cultural continuum. Although types did
exist as "a reflection of the boundaries of one stream
of ideas which the cultural bearers considered related,"
so constructed, they provided little help in measuring
culture history (Ford 1954c:45, 52).
In a brilliant study of space/time variation in housing on the fictitious island of Gamma, Ford (1954c)
illustrated what some ethnologists (Milke 1949) had
begun to suspect already: that types varied not only
over time (by the popularity principle) but also relative to the levei of abstraction chosen for the definition, and also socio-centrically-as
"a function of the
locality at which it is defined." Ford showed how types
looked real or natural" when the spatial sample was
small, but began to overlap or blur, and the mean or
norm of the type to drift as sample coverage increased.
His conclusion: Given the multidimensional,
conceptual nature of cultural types, archaeologists should
employ theirs to cut the cultural stream into arbitrary
pieces as a methodological
expedient for measuring
space/time variation in selected attributes or traits-as
was done in seriation (Ford 1954c).
In retrospect these debates seem at cross-purposes:
Spaulding's approach wanted to group traits into
natural classes, then compare them qualitativelyclassification. Ford's wanted rather to make types to
measure cultural variation over space and time. Cowgill (1963:697) has suggested the approaches are not
incompatible, and Childe seems to have used both
to distinguish a culture's defining characteristics (by
concordant select types or typology), from the same
culture's description (an enumeration
of its contents
as a class of phenomenon by classification) (cf. Childe
1956a:118-120).
Pield Methods
Although methodology
is treated elsewhere in this
volume, note that some field methods employed by
early culture historians tended to confuse or obscure
rather than clarify issues of interpretation.
Using
natural strata as analytical units produced the appearance of abrupt transformations
which were often
Culture History
17
interpreted as real cultural discontinuity (Lyman et al.
1997 a). Similarly, the restricted lateral excavation samples deemed sufficient for classifying sites by cultural
affiliation (Trigger 1989:204) reinforced notions of
cultural homogeneity (Willey and Phillips 1958:18).
But, as Trigger (1989:199) points out, modern forms
of three-dimensional
excavation and recording within
lateral exposures were widespread by the 1930s under
the advocacy of Sir Mortimer Wheeler (1954).
HISTORICAL
EXPLANATIONS
Explaining cultural variability as revealed through elassification and typology has never been a primary objective within the culture-historical
tradition (Childe
1956b:112; Hawkes 1968:236). So culture history is often characterized as descriptive (Fagan 1991 :41). Still,
culture-historical
texts do frequently include generalizing statements which attempt to explain (Rouse
1953:99), to explicate (Binford 1962:218) or-e-more
accurately--to
interpret variability in the material
record in terms of the historical processes or mechanisms which created them O. Hawkes 1968:236;
Spaulding 1968:34; Rouse 1953:98; Sabloff and Willey
1967:313). What culture historians mean by historical
has been much debated (Taylor 1948; Spaulding 1968;
Binford 1968; Morris 2000). As stated by J. Hawkes
(1968:236), "the reconstruction of individual events in
time" is the final historical purpose of archaeology; and
this seems to be the common understanding
(Sabloff
and Willey 1967:269; Spaulding 1968:36; BuettnerIanusch 1957; Binford 1962:217; Morris 2000:4-6,
109, 3lO). Toward this end, culture history can be said
to support historic objectives.
Historic Objectives
In his programmatic
1953 paper, Rouse listed ten
categories of processes as historic objectives, these
being "possible explanations for the facts of culture
history" (1953:98). Of these, six fall squarely within
the culture-historical
tradition as Ihave defined it: diffusion and persistence; independent invention; migration and other mechanisms of spread; participation
in culture; acculturation;
and parallel development.
The remainder-evolution,
phylogeny,
ecological
adaptation,
other processes-seem
better placed
within parallel archaeological traditions of functionalism, processualism, and evolutionism. In any case,
these culture-historical
processes can be seen as derivatives of a central concept: diffusion.
Diffusion in its variant forms has been the principle
explanation for the widespread (geographically)
or
18
GARY
s.
WEBSTER
continuous (temporally) distribution of culture traits
(artifact types, assemblages, etc.): "that the unit has
diffused from one point in its distribution to the others-usually
from the point where it occurs earliest
or in greatest complexity" (Rouse 1953:98; Hawkes
1954:165; Childe 1950:9-lO). 1t thus follows the agearea assumption (Wissler 1923:203-205 and above).
Geographical diffusion might be primary, involving
"actual folk migrations of peoples, or human groups"
(Hawkes 1954:165), or even invasions (Sabloff and
Willey 1967) if, for example, the "diffused unit is complex, as in the case of a Kulturkreis" (Rouse 1953:99;
Schmidt 1939). Or it might be secondary, involving acculturation or transculturation
(Rouse 1953:99; Oritz
1947:97-lO3) and amounting to "influences transmitted from one group or people to another without
actual group migration"(Hawkes
1954:165). Literally,
"the peoples involved have borrowed the idea from
one another" (Rouse 1953:99; Linton 1936:324-346) as
might occur through trade or other intercultural contacts. Willey (1953a:379) saw such evidence as "a blend
of the intrusive elements with the old local forms."
Diffusion has been used both to explain and to
align area sequences when their dissynchrony was
thought to be due to the inherent time lag in the
spatial movement of traits (Ford 1952). Evidence for
geographical discontinuity on the other hand might
be explained in terms of barriers to acculturation and
diffusion that were natural (e.g., rivers, mountain) or
cultural-linguistic,
developmental, habitual (Linton
1940; Binford 1965:204). Migration and diffusion are
deeply rooted concepts in culture-historical
thought
(Trigger 1989:150-160,420-421).
Similarly, the evidence of a continuous/discontinuous distribution of a culture unit through time has
been explained in terms of intergenerational
diffusion or enculturation. First, temporal continuity as
observed in the persistence of a trait over time may be
assumed-other
things being equal-to
be the natural rate of cultural change (given the aquatic view of
culture, as a "slow shifting of norms," Ford 1949:3839). Discontinuity, on the other hand, has often been
assumed to be the exception (but see Spaulding in
Willey and Phillips 1958:15-16); and hence requiring explication by invoking the processes of, for example, diffusion/migration,
trade, or even invasions,
if there were abrupt differences in superimposed traits
(Childe 1956a:19; Caldwe1l1958:1; Ritchie 1937; Willey 1953a:370, 374).
When frequency data (as from seriation analysis)
has revealed the expected normal distributions, such
trait persistence might be further characterized in
terms of the rising and falling of its popularity relative
to alternatives-the
popularity principie described
above (Philips et al. 1951:219-223), sometimes calIed
drift (Ford 1954c:51), participation in culture (Rouse
1954:99), or change in fashions (Childe 1956a:19).
Aberrant or atypical traits might represent either normaior deviant behavior on the part of the makers, or
intrusions fram outside contact (Rouse 1941:14-15,
1954:99; Linton 1936). Only rarely have original innovation or independent invention been invoked to
explain change, for example, when a new trait caused
temporal discontinuity in a sequence (Spaulding
1953a). Some have believed these events were limited
to the rarer so-called innovating societies (Piggott
1965:18-19); others have wondered whether they ever
took place at all (Rouse 1953:99; Lowie 1937:158).
EspecialIy in North America, diffusionary explanations have been posed in terms of cultural traditions
reducing, elaborating, diverging, converging, or persisting as direct, on the basis of temporal variations
in the similarity or dissimilarity of traits (Thompson
1956;Rouse 1953:100;Sapir 1916:43;Childe 1956a:19).
Spatial continuity/discontinuity might be explained in
terms of the extent of a cultural horizon (see above
and Lyman et al. 1997a:185-202).
If as Spaulding (1968:35, quoting Brodbeck
1962:254) pointed out, "There are no such thing as
historical explanations only the explanation of historical events," what can be said about the interpretive
statements made by culture history? Spaulding (Lyman et al. 1997a; Kluckhohn 1939; Binford 1968:267)
contrasted culture-historical statements with scientific explanations as typicalIy relying on implicitly
stated generalizations about human dispositions
which were-whether coming fram ethnology or history-based on common sense and not theoretically
justified (e.g., stylistic influences, popularity, receptivity to new traits, conservativeness/innovativeness,
etc). In consequence, culture-historical explanations
have been termed idealist, ideational, or ideographic
as well as particularizing-sometimes
with reference to Collingwood's methods (Trigger 1989:373;
Collingwood 1939:132; Renfrew and Bahn 1991:416;
J. Hawkes 1968:236).
lnduction
and Validation
In the preface to his 1951 edition of Man Makes HimselJ, Gordon Childe stated, "Almost every statement
in prehistory should be qualified by the phrase: 'On
the evidence available today the balance of prabability
favors the view that.'" Culture-historical methodology
has tended to be inductive in its procedures for gaining
knowledge (Hawkes 1954:157). Frankfort (1951:21)
calIed it "a viewpoint whence many seemingly unrelated facts are seen to acquire meaning and cohesion
[and] likely to represent an historical reality." For
Childe (l956b:1l2) it was a matter of"the induction
of the pattern that integrates the bits" (or data) fram
classifications. Kidder (1917:369) saw theories "forrning themselves frorn data."
Still, it would be wrong to characterize culture history as lacking any theory or objective performance
standards (Carr 1967:3-35), as some have suggested
(Lyman et al. 1997a:3; Thompson 1956:335). It is clear
that culture-historical generalities were derived from
a common set of assumptions about a norma tive
basis of culture (above). Although these have rarely
taken the form of explicitly stated deductions as nomothetical-deductive methodology requires (Hempel
1966), these explanations have constituted hypotheses
of sorts (Rouse 1953:100). As such, they have been
submitted to continuous evaluation as part of the
normal course of research. For example, expectations
about the distributions of culture units in the space/
time continuum have changed in light of new data;
while interpretations of these patterns have gained or
lost favor. Migration (or primary diffusion) gave way
to diffusion (or secondary diffusion) as a preferred
account toward the middle of the twentieth century
(Trigger 1978:29; Rouse 1953). Piggott (1965:10) referred to this kind of evaluation of archaeological facts
as "cumulative credibility" (Childe 1956a:35).
ASSESSMENTS
Following the publication of Walter Taylor's Study of
Archaeology in 1948, culture history carne under increasing criticism for what were perceived as inherent
limitations to the normative-inductive appraach for
explaining cultural variability (Binford 1962, 1965).
The result was the now well-documented fall of culture-historical archaeology to the so-calIed New Archaeology during the 1960s (Trigger 1989:244-328;
Willey and Sabloff 1980; Binford 1965).
More recently Lyman et al, (l997a,b) have argued
that early innovations in culture-historical archaeology-frequency seriation and a materialist conception
of cultural variability (the particulate-aquatic view of
culture)-promised
the development of a truly scientific theory of archaeology. That this was never realized they have attributed to culture history's "wrong
view of reality" (Lyman et al. 1997a:2) manifest in a
Culture History
19
-
---
-------
basic paradox first detected by Brew (1946). As Lyman
et al. (l997a:93) see it,
on the one hand, human history was a stream of attributes, ever changing, flowing from past to future;
on the other hand, experience suggested that humanity was divisible into more or less discrete groups
or cultures and it was these groups that required
explanation.
The critical result, according to Lyman et al. (1997a,b),
was the conflation of two metaphysics-essentialist/
typological and materialist/population
thinking which
led culture history to futile attempts to study typological units such as types, cultures, phases, traditions, and
so on, as though they were real, rather than artificial
chunks of the space/time continuum.
At the same time, culture history's contributions to
archaeology have been widely recognized. Most agree
it filled an essential stage in the evolution of the discipline by laying the necessary classificatory foundation
(Phillips and Willey 1953:214-231; Willey and Sabloff
1974); in doing so it was "a logical prelude to the systematic study of prehistoric cultures from functional
and processual perspectives" (Trigger 1989:288; see
also Binford 1962:217).
CULTURE HISTORY TODAY
Although no longer commanding
a central position
in theoretical discourse, culture history continues to
assert a profound influence on archaeological thought
and practice. The established utility of its concepts and
practices can be seen in several areas of research.
First, as Trigger has documented,
culture history
remains viable in regions where historical conditions
support an interest in understanding
the prehistory
and identity of specific peoples or ethnic groups (Trigger 1989:205, 174-186; cf. Hodder 1991), as for example on the west Mediterranean
islands (Webster
1996a:15-19). Trigger (1989:205) concludes:
Ethnic and national groups continue to desire to learn
more about their prehistory and such knowledge can
play a significant role in the development of group
pride and solidarity and help to promote economic
and social development. ... While the findings of
cultural-historical archaeology can be enriched by
techniques of reconstructing prehistoric cultures and
explaining cultural change that have developed outside the framework of this kind of archaeology, only
an approach that is focused on understanding the
prehistory of specific peoples can fulfill the needs of
nations in a post -colonial phase.
20
GARY
s.
WEBSTER
The culture-historical
tradition also remains influential within archaeologies less influenced by anthropology. This applies to much of European prehistoric
research today within the so-called Germanic School,
where the emphasis is on the study of artifactsmainly pottery and metal-toward
the primary aim of
constructing and refining regional cultural sequences
(Champion et al. 1984:2). This is particularly true,
for example, within the west Mediterranean
(Webster
1996a:15-25).
Although developing its own distinctive archaeological tradition, classical archaeology-at
least as it
is traditionally practiced-remains
strongly culturehistorical to the degree that it focuses on artifacts as
the normative expressions of culture units (see Gill,
chapter 5). As William Biers in his widely influential
text The Archaeology of Greece (1987:13) states, "Archaeologists work primarily with the objects or artifacts they recover, seeking to fit them into the cultural
and historical framework of the area. Cultures differ,
as does the evidence available to archaeologists in reconstructing them."
Classical archaeologists have tended also to address
questions of material variability in culture-historical terms. The classic debate over interpretations
of
Barbarian Ware within Iron Age Greek contexts as evidence alternatively for foreign-Dorian-invasions,
migrations, or cultural diffusions is a prime example
(Morris 2000: 198-20 1).
Much of archaeology as it is practiced today operates within a culture-historical
framework. A perusal
of major syntheses of European and American prehistories reveals the continued usefulness of organizing concepts like archaeological culture, culture
area, phase, tradition, and horizon (Fagan 1991; Iennings 1987; Champion et al. 1984). Our confidence in
identifying materiaIs from excavations and surveys as
representing known types, as well as the subsequent
assignment of these types into known culture units
(e.g., Anasazi, Hopewell, Woodland in North America;
Beaker, Polada, Chassen, Hallstatt, Nuragic in Europe),
rests on a deeper culture-historical
assumption that
formal stylistic variability follows normative principles-the
essentialist metaphysic. As such, culturehistorical procedures continue to serve the interests of
low-Ievel theory (Trigger 1989:21).
Normative culture unit assumptions also underpin
much of middle-Ievel theory, particularly the archaeological interpretation
of patterns of exchange and
interaction (e.g., Harrison's study of the Bell Beaker
Folk [Harrison 1980], Braun's study of the Hopewell
Culture interaction sphere [Braun 1986:117-126],
Hedeager's study of exchange between imperial Rome
and free Germany [1978:191-216], and our own study
of native-colonial interactions in Late Nuragic Sardinia [Webster and Teglund 1992]. In the absence of
analytically based source analyses (e.g., trace element
analysis, isotopic analysis) such studies have relied on
typological analyses for determining the distribution
and movement of goods, and for identifying them
as indigenous or foreign. The underlying assumption-usually implicit-comes from culture history:
that there are culturally specific, and archaeologically
identifiable, ranges of formal stylistic variation (Renfrew and Bahn 1991:307-337).
Recently Preucel, and Hodder (1996:6-7) have recognized culture history's general usefulness
as describing a facet of any archaeological research
in a region, as sites and artifacts are categorized into
cultural units which can be compared and dated.
The description of the development, diffusion and
movement of cultural traits establishes a space-time
systematic which forms an essential building block
for research in a new region.
There are interpretive advantages to conducting
field-based research-regardless of its ultimate theoretical aims-within a culture-historical framework, as
our own work at the Nuragic culture settlement ofDuos
Nuraghes can attest. Interpreting finds within a nested
series of partly inherited/partly newly constructed
culture units (architectural feature, settlement, local
culture, regional culture, insular culture) has allowed
reconstructions having social and historical relevance.
At the same time, it has forced us to confront the elassificatory nature of such units when studying them in
relation to newly introduced (colonial) cultures, which
in turn has led us to reconsider questions of cultural
origins, transitions, influences, and extinction (Webster 1996b; Webster and Webster 1998b,c).
CULTURE HISTORY TOMORROW
But is there a future for culture-historical archaeology
within so-called post-processual archaeologies? Before
giving an opinion, I want to consider the implications
of the question implied by culture history's critics:
Why in the face of disparaging evidence did culture
history remain popular for so long?
The easy response is simply that it took fifty or so
years of feedback from field data for culture historians
to realize the futility of a normative-typological-historical approach, and so to move on to more realistic
alternatives, as, for example, Lyman et alo (1997a)
have implied. But it seems there were plenty of early
clues. The chronic problems with methodology (see
above and Lyman et al. 1997a,b) included difficulties
in establishing multiple-concordant trait distributions
and determining culture areas and in interpreting
typological effects like transitional, overlapping, and
intermediate types and typological creep. The result:
much debate among archaeologists over types, and
their space/time distributions, less over the cultural
meanings of these units.
Moreover, the ethnological correlates of the emergent units were rarely well defined or well supported
by archaeological evidence; and ethnologists themselves were rethinking unit culture concepts (Milke
1949; Kroeber 1939a:I-2; Quimby 1954). At the same
time, early functionalists were showing the benefits of
alternate approaches for reconstructing ancient lifeways, such as functional typologies and ethnographic
analogy (Smith 1910; Childe 1931; Clark 1939).
In light of the evidence, culture history's response
might have been other than more and better cultural
typologies (Lyman et al. 1997a). Its basic assumptions
might have been more seriously questioned: Do cultures actually exist as real, empirical units to be discovered? More might have concluded, as apparently Ford
(1954c) and Brew (1946) had, that types-whether
of artifacts, cultures, phases, or traditions; whether
defined by the archaeologists or by the ancient artisans-were just that, classificatory constructs, conceptualizations of reality viewed from different positions
across one common ground-the continuously varying material recordo In sum, they might have concluded that the essentialist/rnaterialist paradox was
unsolvable, and abandoned their attempts to do so.
Many did of course. But many didn't. Why?
I suggest that it is not the substantive reality of
human populations or of their material records per
se that ultimately interests culture historians. 1t is culture-the classificatory, normative, sociocentric, ideographic, often irrational attempts to make sense out of
disturbing variation-that
set humans apart (Wylie
1985:90; Webster 1996b). As Lyman et al. (1997a:5)
note, "The essentialist metaphysic is manifest in human thinking." And so is the persistent interest. This is
why perhaps more culture historians were convinced
by Spaulding's essentialist argument, which promised
to get them closer to the ideas behind the artifacts,
the culture, than Ford's materialist one that promised
them only more variation, and the implication that the
whole concept of culture was an illusion.
Culture History
21
What culture historians wanted to do (and many
still do) is difficult, perhaps impossible: to link up the
etic with the emic; to match the researcher's constructs
with those of the subject (Hodder 1999:72-78). This
involves inferences about ideology, which Hawkes
(1954: 162) put at the top of his hierarchy of inference,
saying "the more specifically human are men's activities, the harder they are to infer." More recently it has
been recognized as doubly difficult-the
problem of
a double hermeneutic in which "archaeologists have
to translate between their frame of meaning and that
of the people being studied" (Preucel and Hodder
1996:13).
Neither processualism
nor neo-evolutionism
has
yet solved this issue. Both have taken easier courses:
the study of systems or artifacts. Middle-range theory
has had modest successes in linking artifacts and normative-ideographic
culture (Hodder 1982). But the
problem is being embraced most fully within recent
so-called interpretive and reflective archaeologies (see
Hodder's chapter in the Methods volume). These more
theoretically inclusive programs integrate contemporary historiography and social theory (Bourdieu 1977;
Giddens 1979) within a hermeneutic
epistemology
(Hodder 1999; see Gardner, chapter 7). There is emphasis on the significance ofhistorical specificities and
how these are perceived by purposive human agents in
creating archaeological patterning (Hodder 1992)an approach anticipated
by Childe (1949, 1956c).
Constructing chronologies has again become important, as have inductive methods for attaining a full or
deep description of the circumstances of continuity
and change (Preucel and Hodder 1996:10; Hodder
1999; Morris 2000; Webster, in press). Most important: culture-its
normative dimension-is
again being foregrounded as a central and legitimate focus of
analysis-a
cultural archaeology (Morris 2000:18-24).
This reengagement with the culture history tradition can best be seen in recent text-aided archaeological practice. The prime example is Ian Morris's
cultural history of Dark Age Greece. The program
combines ideas of the Annaliste school of historians,
like Braudel's proposal "to dissect history into various
planes ... to divide historical time into geographical time, social time, and individual time" (Braudel
1972:21, quoted in Morris 2000:4) with the idealism
of the "new cultural history" (cf. Chartier 1988) which
rejects material causality as primary and "focuses on
how people represent their worlds, the social categories they create, and the conflicts these generate"
(Morris 2000:9).
22
GARY
s.
WEBSTER
Operating within a culture unit framework of regional material cultures, Morris wishes to redirect
Greek archaeology toward a "culture history of soeiety," or-following
Samuel (1992 )-from
"fact -grubbing toward mind-reading"
(2000:13), thus retrieving
the normative view of archaeological culture so criticized by earlier processualists (Binford 1965; Flannery 1967). Morris interprets evidence from Lefkandi
toward an "event-oriented narrative" of normative
changes during the Dark Ages-a
method reminiscent of some earlier culture-historical
writings, like
Gordon Childe's Man Makes Himself At the same
time, he challenges traditional culture-historical
approaches to classic problems like the Dorian invasion,
which he acknowledges "rest on essentialist models
of ethnicity, which break down when we confront the
complexity of the evidence and the discursive, subjective construction of identities" (Morris 2000:207). But
rather than abandoning the issue as did processualists, Morris opts for viewing evidence of variation in
the material record in terms of "a series of decisions
which changed material culture"; then further interrogating these in terms of norma tive change, which in
eleventh-century
Greece he feels amounted to no less
than "syrnbolic chaos verging on anarchy" (2000:201;
see also Webster 2001b). Given more studies of this
kind, we might justifiably speak of a new culture history project.
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