Stanford Journal of International Relations
The Second Iranian Revolution:
Why Iran's modern radicalism should ease
US fears
{
By Sean Lee
}
The 1979 Islamic Revolution brought a radical, theocratic regime to power in Iran. The
government's extremist rhetoric incited fear throughout the region and even the West.
Nevertheless, Iran found itself severely isolated on the international scene and unable to
effectively pursue its goal of preeminence in the Persian Gulf. While the world was fixated
on the Gulf War in Iraq, an internal political shift within Iran led to a new foreign policy
approach, which allowed the pariah state to re-emerge as a potential regional leader. The
speed and magnitude of Iran's change qualify as nothing short of a second revolution
and suggests that a moderate Iran may be capable of more effectively opposing American
interests than a radical, attention-grabbing Iran.
Desmond Kavanagh
Though recently, more radical calls for spreading the Islamic Revolution have heightened fears in the United States, it is
perhaps the relatively moderate Iran of the Gulf War period that posed a more dangerous threat to American interests.
44 • Fall/Winter 2008
The Second Iranian Revolution
Introduction: Then and Now
A
merican perceptions of Iran are often inextricably
linked to the 1979 Revolution that led to the
overthrow of the Shah by the radical ayatollahs. As
much as this famous revolution drastically remade Iran’s
government and society around the concept of an Islamic
theocratic republic, it also utterly transformed Iran’s
foreign policy and international standing. Particularly in
the United States, the sudden and profound change in Iran’s
official attitude toward the rest of the world is the most
memorable and seemingly enduring effect of the revolution.
Iran’s fierce rhetoric, best exemplified by Supreme Leader
Ruhollah Khomeini’s call to export the Islamic Revolution,
not only caused great concern both regionally and globally,
but also highlights the stark contrast between the United
States’ current adversarial relation with Iran and its friendly
relations during the reign of the ousted Shah Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi.
Nearly thirty years later, the radical rhetoric
from this Islamic Revolution still overshadows a quieter
revolution that just as suddenly occurred while the
world was fixated on the Gulf War. During this “second
revolution” of foreign policy strategy in the very late 1980s
and early 1990s, a new Iran surprisingly emerged on the
international scene out of the severe isolation the world
had imposed on it. In what has been referred to as a
“charm offensive,”1 Iran opportunistically reached out near
and far, increasing its influence and making friends even
with previously forsaken enemies.
While the fiery old calls for spreading the Islamic
Revolution terrified the world, it is this more pragmatic
and relatively moderate Iran, which emerged during the
Gulf War period, that more realistically threatened and
successfully opposed American interests. As the rise of
wildly radical President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seems to
indicate a shift back to the old, combatively fundamentalist
mentality of the 1979 Revolution, the US should heed the
lessons of the “second revolution” and recognize that a
moderate Iran is perhaps more dangerous than a radical
one.
Sean Lee is a senior at Stanford majoring in International
Relations with a focus on nuclear affairs. He does research on
North Korea's nuclear capabilities with Dr. Siegfried Hecker
of the Freeman Spogli Institute. Sean is from Orinda, just
northeast of Stanford in the East Bay. Sean studied in Hong
Kong during the summer of 2007 and plans on studying abroad
in Prague during the summer of 2009.
Iran
Capital: Tehran
Form of Government: Theocratic Republic
Population: 65,875,224 (July 2008 est.)
GDP (PPP): $859.7 billion (2008 est.)
CIAFactbook
Pre-Second Revolution: The
Depths of Isolation
The extent of Iran’s isolation in the era before this
second revolution in foreign policy is aptly displayed by
the events of the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. While
the war domestically strengthened Khomeini’s new
government by providing a nationalistic issue to rally
public support around and diverting attention away from
internal problems, Iran’s international standing sunk to
an unprecedentedly low level.2 Despite Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein’s aggressive instigation of the war and
his unabashed objective of annexing Iranian territory,
Arab nations all over the Persian Gulf scurried to Iraq’s
side hoping Iraq would serve as a bulwark against Iranian
religious extremism. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United
Arab Emirates financed Iraq with approximately $50
billion in loans.3 While Iran and these Gulf states were
opponents even before the Iran-Iraq War, the shift from
mere verbal opposition to Iran to direct aid to Iraq plunged
these relationships to an abysmal level. As much as the war
further separated Iran from the Gulf states, it also pulled
the Gulf states together and fostered a sense of shared
security among them and against Iran. Shortly after the
war began, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and the UAE solidified their sense of shared unity against
Vol. X | No. 1 • 45
Stanford Journal of International Relations
Iran by forming an economic and security organization
called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to promote
their trade interdependence with each other and exclude
Iran.
scandal. However, the number of states Iran could truly
call allies and from whom it could receive significant
support was very small. Support from global powers
decisively affected the course of the war in Iraq’s favor and
highlighted the extreme extent of Iran’s isolation in the
wider international scene.7 Over half a million casualties
and billions of dollars in economic damage, from which
Iran has not fully recovered, forcefully demonstrated the
price of lacking friends.
In light of the seriousness of Iran’s isolation, as well
as the clear costs and vulnerability such isolation entailed,
it seems obvious in retrospect that Iran would begin taking
a different approach to its international relations in order
to acquire allies. Yet the ability to perceive that need for
change, to gain domestic support for its implementation,
and to successfully execute it is quite unexpected. The
extremism of Iran’s previous foreign policy makes the feat
even more incredible. Although Iran’s new foreign affairs
strategy has not been completely or always successful, the
swiftness of the change and its significant accomplishments
qualify it as nothing short of another revolution.
The Second Revolution
Rowan Castle
Mosaic depicting Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei in Esfahan, Iran
At the same time, Iran’s already poor relationship
with Western states and the superpowers further declined
as they took the easy opportunity to weaken Iran by
supporting Iraq. Clearly remembering its tremendous
humiliation by Iran during the 444-day embassy hostage
crisis and its strategic mission to contain theocratic Iran,
the United States provided Iraq with intelligence and
material support.4 The United States’ removal of Iraq from
the State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism in
1982, the resumption of diplomatic ties with Iraq in 1984,
and America’s continued support even after the realization
that Iraq was using chemical weapons on Iran, poisoned
American-Iranian relations for many decades.5 France,
Britain, West Germany, China, and the Soviet Union all
sold billions of dollars worth of military equipment to Iraq
as well.6 Admittedly, Iran was able to purchase military
supplies from some states, including China, and even
covertly from the United States during the Iran-Contra
46 • Fall/Winter 2008
Internal clashes between hard-liners and
pragmatists characterize the short period between the IranIraq War and the Gulf War. In particular, two opposing
players stood out at this time: the pragmatic President
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and the ardently ideological
Supreme Leader Khomeini. The infamous Salman Rushdie
incident in late 1988 in which Khomeini issued a fatwa
calling for the British novelist’s death is a prime example
of Khomeini’s attitude and its disastrous effect on Western
perception of Iran. However, Khomeini’s death on June
3, 1989 provided an unprecedented opportunity for
change. Soon after, Rafsanjani became president and the
Iranian Constitution was amended to give the presidency
more power. Yet Khomeini, as Supreme Leader and the
central figure of 1979 Revolution, had been so enormously
powerful and influential that even in death his ideological
approach to foreign affairs echoed for many years with the
remaining hard-liners.8
Iran’s somewhat paradoxical international behavior
at this time reflects the debate and fighting between the
two perspectives. On November 1, 1989 the Majlis,
Iran’s national legislative body, provocatively allowed
American citizens to be arrested abroad and put on trial
in Iran (the United States had passed a similar law); yet
two days later the United States and Iran worked out an
agreement to free $818 million in frozen Iranian funds.9 In
January 1990, Rafsanjani called some government officials
The Second Iranian Revolution
“narrow-minded” for opposing a plan to encourage foreign
investment in Iran, while some opposing Majlis members
referred to such foreign funds as a “poisoned gift.”10 On
the first anniversary of Khomeini’s death, his successor Ali
Khamenei reiterated the Salman Rushdie fatwa; 17 days
later Iran accepted Western and American aid in response
to a major earthquake despite calls from the hard-liners
to reject the offer.11 While the undercurrent of hard-line
opposition continued to persist, the tilt towards pragmatism
seemed to be slowly growing as Rafsanjani consolidated
power and the conservative attempt to counter him with
Khomeini’s son failed.12
While change was clearly happening at some pace,
the real breakthrough for Iran came on August 2, 1990 when
Iraq invaded and later annexed Kuwait. An international
coalition led by the United States was quickly brought into
the Gulf region. In particular, the concentration of Iraqi
troops near Saudi Arabia seemed threatening, and there
was uncertainty about how much of the Persian Gulf Iraq
truly sought to control. The takeover of oil-rich Kuwait
had the potential to simultaneously add billions of dollars
to Iraq’s income and erase billions in debt. Iran feared that
this economic boost would enable Iraq to rebuild and rearm from the Iran-Iraq War more quickly than before. The
combined oil share of Iraq and Kuwait would also make
Iraq a dominant force in the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC).13 While the economic
strengthening of Iraq was a security problem for Iran, Iraq’s
increased coastline and access to the Persian Gulf was yet
another strategic threat.
However, Iraq was in a perilous position with its
military split between the north and south. Although
the Iran-Iraq War had been over since 1988, work on a
permanent peace deal had reached an impasse. On August
15, 1990, Saddam finally agreed to all of Iran's demands for
a peace treaty, including the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from
occupied Iranian territory and joint ownership of the Shattal-Arab River.14 Letters exchanged between the governments
on August 7th and August 14th reveal Iran's attempts to
take advantage of its new situation. Rafsanjani even went
out of his way to criticize the tone of Saddam’s letter, and
Saddam obsequiously responded with an appeal to Islamic
“brotherly relations.” Despite the peace agreement and
proclamation of neutrality in an American-Iraqi conflict,
Iran did not relent its pressure on Iraq. Iran officially and
firmly stated that it would “not accept Iraqi annexation of
Kuwait”15 and complied with all United Nations sanctions
and embargoes of Iraq. However, it should also be noted
that an oil embargo on Iraq pushed up Iranian oil prices
threefold. During the war, the unannounced retreat of the
Iraqi Air Force to Iranian territory had the potential to
strain Iran’s neutrality or taint its reputation. Again, Iran
shrewdly handled the situation by impounding the planes
as part of the Iraqi war reparations, thereby maintaining its
neutrality by recategorizing the incident within the IranIraq War.16 While the veil was thin, the only nation that
would complain was Iraq, and it had already given up much
more to pacify the Iranians in the 1990 peace agreement.
Additionally, Iran sent considerable humanitarian support
into Iraq to relieve the civilian suffering, which seemed
extraordinarily generous considering the brutality of the
Iran-Iraq War. Such actions did much to improve Iran’s
general international reputation while at the same time
only risked its neutrality by a minimal margin. Due to its
diplomatic strategy, Iran was continually able to benefit
materially from Iraq while maintaining a moral position in
the eyes of the international community.
Overall, Iran’s new approach stood in sharp
contrast to the foreign policy under Khomeini during the
Iran-Iraq War. Under his leadership, Iran obstinately and
hubristically made unrealistic demands of Iraq during the
early period where Iran was winning the war. Because no
peace agreement was signed, Iraq continued fighting and
eventually pushed back the Iranian forces. The war thus
lasted many more years, producing incredible levels of
death and destruction in Iran. The ceasefire that was finally
accepted years later in 1988 gave Iran substantially less
than it might otherwise have gotten had it presented more
reasonable demands to Iraq during the early period when
Iran was winning. Indeed, after the fighting ended, Iraq
could consider its mere survival a victory, while Khomeini
compared the ceasefire deal to drinking hemlock.17
While Iran’s friendly overtures to the Gulf states
before the 1990 Gulf crisis had only limited success,
during the crisis Iran was able to almost completely rebuild
its relationships. It would have been quite easy for Iran
to humiliate Kuwait and the other Gulf states that had
aided Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and now feared Iraqi
aggression. However, Iran resisted that temptation and
used the situation to improve ties instead. Considering the
thousands of deaths and widespread destruction that Iran
suffered in its war with Iraq, along with the fact that only
two years had passed, the speed and extent to which Iran
forgave its enemy’s supporters is remarkable. In addition,
the Gulf states’ governments had not changed during the
interim between the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf crisis;
Khomeini’s theocratic criticisms of their governments still
could be applied. Thus in many ways Iran’s new attitude
towards them was unexpected and sharply contrasted with
its attitude in the Khomeini era.
Vol. X | No. 1 • 47
Stanford Journal of International Relations
Kuwait was a clear and easy target for Iran to
foster good relations with, as the country in a desperate
state at the time. The restoration of Kuwait was important
to Iranians because Kuwait’s restoration would hurt Iraq,
and thus enhance Iran’s strategic position. Iran fostered
unity with Kuwait by portraying itself as a fellow victim of
Iraq.18 According to Abdul Mohsen Jamal of the Kuwaiti
National Assembly, Iran took in over 100,000 refugees and
even provided fake Iranian passports to some Kuwaitis,
including the royal family, so that they could safely leave
their occupied country. These efforts helped build ties
between Iran and both Kuwait’s general populace and ruling
elite. In response, Kuwait’s Foreign Minister conveyed his
nation’s regret for their actions during the Iran-Iraq War,
and another National Assembly member commented how
“everything [had] changed” about their relationship.19
Iran significantly enhanced its bilateral relations with the
other five nations in the GCC as well. Iran was particularly
successful in establishing a good relationship with Oman.
Trade links, joint military exercises, and regular diplomatic
visits helped Oman and Iran establish close ties in many
different areas. Oman would become a major supporter of
Iran, and later even volunteered to mediate between Iran
and other countries. Oman acted as Iran’s main supporter
in the GCC as well. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, another
potential competitor for dominance in the Gulf region,
restored diplomatic relations with Iran. Iran even offered
to store the goods of Gulf state merchants so that they
would be safe from Iraq and the fighting.20
While Iran’s relationship with each GCC state
improved during the Gulf War, this progress did not translate
into as much change in its relationship with the GCC as
a group. Iran attempted to assume a leadership position
among the Gulf states by forming a security agreement
with the GCC and gaining entrance into its membership.
In many ways, Iran was an appropriate candidate for such a
role. Dwarfing most of the Gulf states and twice the size of
Iraq, Iran stands as the second largest nation in the region
in terms of land mass. Iran's population, too, is larger than
all of the other Arab Gulf states combined. As for trade,
Iran’s geographic position helps the Gulf connect to the Far
East and Eastern Europe.21 With the oil embargo on Iraq,
Iran was in a position to compete with Saudi Arabia for
dominance of OPEC.22 Even though its military had been
significantly damaged during its war with Iraq, Iran was
still quite formidable. After the destruction of Iraq’s war
machine by the United States during the Gulf War, Iran was
left as one of the preeminent military powers of the region.
Yet, despite these factors, a continual challenge for
Iran’s new foreign policy was the need to repair the tarnished
48 • Fall/Winter 2008
reputation it had earned during the 1980s. In the eyes of
the Gulf states and the larger international community,
Iran had gained notoriety as the major destabilizing force
in the region during the Iran-Iraq War.23 For many years
after the Revolution, the Islamic Republic had called for the
overthrow of the Gulf regimes. Although Iran had already
“decisively abandoned”24 this goal by the time of the Gulf
War, the people of the region and the wider world were
not so quick to forget. The remaining hard-line faction
further perpetuated the problem. Saif Abbas, a Kuwaiti
scholar, commented that the “problem [of trust] lies in
the rhetoric of the mullahs.”25 In an interview, Ayatollah
Musavi Ardabili referred to the Kuwaiti royal family as
“usurper[s]” and declared his hopes that they would not
be allowed to return to rule Kuwait once Iraq had left. For
domestic reasons, more moderate politicians also had to
occasionally give in to such radicalism to keep the hardliners at bay.26 In addition to these issues, the international
community worried about Iran’s continued ties to terrorist
organizations. Despite its efforts to change, Iran was never
able to fully overcome the problems of its old image.
Presidency of Iran
Iranian President Ahmadinejad meets with Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki
Nevertheless, the most powerful threat to Iranian
leadership in the Gulf was arguably the United States.
While Iran had sought improved relations with the Gulf
states, Europe, and most of the international community,
it continued to oppose the United States. The reasoning
behind this opposition was a combination of domestic
politics, strategic interest, and ambition to replace American
leadership in the Gulf. Politically, anti-Americanism had
been a critical rallying point during and after the Revolution.
The Second Iranian Revolution
Furthermore, it was a central hard-line belief which would
be difficult and politically costly to abandon. Strategically,
increased American presence in the Gulf was a problem
because it provided an alternative to Iranian leadership.
Ironically, the hard-liners’ radical anti-American remarks
often directly strengthened the United States, since such
rhetoric frightened the Gulf states and drove them closer
to the Americans. The hard-liners’ declaration of jihad on
the American forces, coupled with a surprising number of
people supporting Iranian involvement in war against the
United States, were especially alarming.27
For its part, the United States reciprocated Iran’s
opposition to the United States' role in the Gulf War
by encouraging the Gulf states’ fear of Iran. The United
States viewed Iran as the “major challenge to stability”28
in the Gulf. The United States tried to convince the GCC
states that Iran’s ideology was inherently threatening and
destabilizing.29 Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran
had been spending billions of dollars to re-arm. While in
some respects Iran simply was upgrading its capabilities in
an attempt to close the technology gap separating it from
its neighbors, the rearmament was nonetheless alarming.30
A major characteristic of a global power is the ability to
project influence and military might beyond the immediate
region. Iran's push in the early 1990s for modern aircraft,
Soviet submarines, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons
can be seen as evidence of its desire to become a major
international player. Simultaneously, the United States
interpreted Iran's moves as an aggressive threat to the Gulf.
The United States’ approaches were particularly
successful in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Kuwaitis obviously
needed the United States’ military supremacy to free their
country from Iraq. After the Iran-Iraq War, it was clear that
Iran did not have the military power necessary to remove
Iraq from Kuwait without unacceptably high casualty
rates. Few nations in the world had both the capability
and the volition to lead the military action against Iraq,
whose military was considered quite formidable. With
this capability, the United States could trump any offer by
Iran to help Kuwait. While Saudi Arabia sought improved
relations with the United States for its own protection in the
immediate Gulf crisis, it also saw America as an alternative
and counterweight to Iran. With Iraq's imminent defeat,
Saudi Arabia realized that it would primarily compete with
Iran for dominance in the Gulf and in OPEC.
Iran attempted the difficult task of turning the Gulf
states against American intervention throughout the crisis.
The amount of regional and international approval for
the Coalition made this problematic. In essentially every
government statement on the Gulf crisis, Iran reiterated its
neutrality, but more strongly emphasized its disapproval of
foreign troops in the Gulf. Nevertheless, Iran could do little
besides ask fellow Gulf states to refuse foreign intervention.
More aggressive demands would leave neighbors feeling
bullied or violated. Drawing from an appeal to religion,
Iran declared that the region needed an “Islamic Solution,”
but few states bought into Iran’s argument.
Despite its worthy efforts, Iran could not offer any
viable alternatives to American-led intervention. Thus
Iran complied with international sanctions on Iraq, while
simultaneously pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the
crisis that would undercut the American initiatives. Iran
offered to mediate in the crisis, but Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia preferred to go through other intermediaries.
Rafsanjani then tried to bring the Soviet Union into the
situation and also traveled to France, Germany, and Italy
to promote his regional peace initiative. Foreign Minister
Ali Akbar Velayati tried to convince Saddam to meet the
United Nation’s demand for withdrawal by the January 15,
1991 deadline and also traveled to many nations to gain
support for a regional answer to the problem. Many local
and distant states were receptive of Iran’s campaigning, but
in the end the countries that had the most at stake--Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia--chose to go with American-led foreign
intervention. America simply had the military ability
to neutralize Iraq, and Iran did not. Furthermore, Iran’s
diplomatic efforts were not guaranteed to work. While
many Gulf states may have wanted to pursue both courses
of action, the mutual animosity between the United States
and Iran made this untenable.31
The incredible progress Iran had made with its
Gulf neighbors encountered a further setback in the latter
stages of the Gulf War and in 1992. Iran failed to prevent
American intervention once the Desert Storm operation
began on January 16, 1991. Afterwards, Iran stressed that
the foreign forces promptly leave after the resolution of the
crisis. However, in September 1991, the United States and
Kuwait concluded a defense cooperation deal that ensured
an American military presence in the Gulf for the next ten
years.32 Saudi Arabia allowed several thousand American
troops to remain on its territory, and purchased tens of
billions of dollars of American military equipment. In
the few years after the Gulf War, most of the GCC states
had signed security agreements with the United States.
In addition, a disagreement between Iran and the UAE
about the status of the Abu Musa Islands led to some
deterioration in relations. Despite these setbacks and the
decision of many Gulf states to choose the United States
over Iran, Iran did not return to its old days of isolation.
In particular, Oman continued to support the inclusion of
Vol. X | No. 1 • 49
Stanford Journal of International Relations
Iran in various Gulf matters. The Kuwaiti Defense Minister
declared that “Iran could not be ignored in any regional
security arrangement.”33 Although Iran had not achieved
all of its goals for regional leadership, it successfully reentered the diplomatic scene, gained recognition, found
allies, and elevated its international standing far beyond its
prior state of ostracism.
Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991 provided Iran with a whole new realm for diplomatic
interaction. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Iran
was among the first nations to recognize the newly created
Central Asian states. While in transition from a communist
system, these countries provided significant new economic
opportunities, particularly in oil and natural gas resources.
While Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other nations sought to
develop relations with these countries as well, Iran had
the advantage of its geographic proximity and hundreds
of kilometers in shared borders.34 Parts of these areas were
formerly part of the greater Persian Empire, so at least some
degree of shared history and cultural ties also existed. Iran
increased its presence and showed leadership in the region
by mediating in conflicts in Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and
Armenia. Moreover, having been dominated by the Soviet
Union, the Central Asian states were wary of superpowers.
Iran took advantage of their fears in its bid to build ties
with them. Iran joined the Economic Cooperation
Organization, which is made up of Central Asian states.
Iran has helped some states, such as Azerbaijan in 1994,
develop their oil fields.35 Iran's location, furthermore,
allows these landlocked states access to the sea. Thus Iran
has connected itself to the Central Asian countries through
such transportation links as the Bafgh-Bandar Abbas,
the Mashhad-Sarakhs-Tejen, and the Bafgh-Mashhad
railways.36 These economic ties have helped Iran grow
economically, and has led to the formation of partnerships
that may strengthen diplomatic ties.
Iran has not limited itself to the local region in its
attempt to increase influence and international standing.
For example, Iran is making considerable efforts in North
Africa. Although many North African nations are poor,
lack of state capacity, and have little international influence,
Iran continues to work with the Islamic Salvation Front
in Algeria, the government in Tunisia, and the National
Islamic Front in Sudan.37 In North Africa, Iran often deals
with factions or political organizations instead of the
local governments; nevertheless, Iran’s support of these
groups sometimes translates into indirect influence over
entire nations. Iran’s attempts to gain influence and build
ties to distant or seemingly weak nations should not be
dismissed. Iran has cultivated political and economic ties
50 • Fall/Winter 2008
with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a equally vocal
critic of the United States.
Although its dismal human rights record and
terrorist links continue to concern many countries, Iran
made significant progress in the wider international
scene and, particularly, in Europe. Several Western
observers praised Iranian efforts to solve the Gulf War
crisis peacefully.38 Britain resumed diplomatic ties with
Iran on September 27, 1990 and offered to help rebuild the
damaged Iranian embassy in London.
By encouraging foreign investment, Iran built solid
relationships with many major powers and simultaneously
rebuilt its economy. Since Iranian oil production capabilities
were still recovering from the Iran-Iraq War, the French firm
Totale was awarded a large oil deal. Russia was contracted
to build nuclear reactors in Iran. In fact, Britain, China,
France, and Russia all have significant financial stakes in
Iran in a variety of areas. In a 2001 study concluded that the
European Union was Iran’s largest trading partner. Around
40 percent of Iran’s imports and exports are exchanged
with the European Union, and they have been working for
even greater economic cooperation.39 Accordingly, Europe
has been notably vocal in its objection to sanctions on Iran
throughout the 1990s. Europe thwarted American plans
of wider international sanctions several times, including
the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 and the IranLibya Sanctions Act of 1996. In the future, disagreement
over Iran's handling of its nuclear program could even be
decided by Iran’s improved relations with Europe. Such aid
would have been unthinkable under the Khomeini regime's
foreign policy. While terrorist ties, such as those with
Hezbollah, continue to limit the extent of Iran’s progress,
in terms of foreign policy, Iran has successfully engaged
the West economically and diplomatically far better than
before the revolution.
Iran’s sudden and drastic improvement in
international standing can be partly attributed to the
fortuitously close timing of three critical events: the death
of Khomeini, the Gulf War, and the collapse of the Soviet
Union; however, the crucial impetus for change came
from within Iran. It is conceivable that Iran could have
squandered these opportunities had hard-line politicians
had their way.
Now, however, the ascension of the radical
Ahmadinejad to the presidency seems to be threatening all
the progress Iran has made since the Gulf War. While the
United States may fear Iran's return to ideological foreign
policy, it should not forget that the more pragmatic Iran
of the 1990s was, in some ways, more problematic for
American interests and leadership in the Gulf. §
The Second Iranian Revolution
Endnotes
1 Ahrari, M E., and James H. Noyes. The Persian Gulf After the Cold War.
London: Praeger, 1993, 181.
2 Graz, Liesl. The Turbulent Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1990, 71.
3 "Iraq Debt." Global Security. 27 Nov. 2006 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/
wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/ch2_anxd_img06.jpg>.
4 Battle, Joyce, comp. National Security Archive. 23 Feb. 2003. George
Washington University. 1 Dec. 2006 <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/>.
5 The revelation in 1992 by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs that the United States actually provided Iraq with some
material for chemical and biological weapons would have another large
impact on the relationship between the United States and Iran. Other
countries, such as France and Germany also provided Iraq with equipment
for making chemical weapons.
6 Reynolds, Paul. "How Saddam Could Embarrass the West." BBC News 16
Dec. 2003. 24 Nov. 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3324053.
stm>.
7 Ahrari, M E., and James H. Noyes 181.
8 Graz, 81-82.
9 Mostyn, Trevor. Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian
Peninsula 1945-1990. Oxford: Facts on File, 1991, 251.
10 Ibid., 253.
11 Ibid., 260.
12 Graz, 83.
13 Ahrari, M E., and James H. Noyes 115.
14 Ibid., 116.
15 Ibid., 115.
16 Marschall, Christin. Iran's Persian Gulf Policy. London: Routledge Curzon,
2003, 112.
17 Graz, 143.
18 Tarock, Adam. Iran's Foreign Policy Since 1990. New York: Nova Science
Inc, 1999, 22.
19 Ibid.
20 Marschall, 114-6.
21 Maleki, Abbas. Iran and Central Asia. 5 April 2006. John Hopkins. 30
Maria Golovnina
November 2006, 27.
22 Ahrari, M E., and James H. Noyes 114.
It remains to be seen whether the religious extremists will
23 Tarrock, 22.
continue to isolate Iran from the international community.
24 Ahrari, M E., and James H. Noyes 191.
25 Marschall, 118.
26 Graz, 80.
27 Marschall, 114.
28 Ahrari, M E., and James H. Noyes 118.
29 Tarrock, 188.
30 Ahrari, M E., and James H. Noyes 191.
31 Marschall, 110-114.
32 United States. Country Studies. Library of Congress. Kuwait, Post-Persian
Gulf War Foreign Policy. Jan. 1993. 23 Nov. 2006.
33 Marschall, 117-8, 164-5.
34 Iran and Central Asia. Ed. Abbas Maleki. 5 April 2006. John Hopkins. 30
November 2006 32-34.
35 Barham, John, and Daneshkhu, Scheherazade. "Iran Gains in Scramble for
Central Asia." The Financial Times 13 Dec. 1994: 6.
36 Ibid., 38-41.
37 Ahrari, M E., and James H. Noyes 94-7.
38 Tarrock 113.
39 European Union. European Commission. External Relations. Dec. 2005. 5
Dec. 2006.
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