Deforestation and Global Governance
The probability of success to reduce deforestation under REDD+
Master Thesis
Final draft
Political Science - International Relations
Wilco Heiwegen
February 2011
First reader:
Dr. R. Pistorius
Second Reader:
S. Hardus MSc
Abbreviations
AD
Avoided deforestation
CDM
Clean Development Mechanism
CfRN
Coalition of Rainforest Nations
CIFOR
Centre for International Forestry Research
CO2
Carbon dioxide
COP
Conference of Parties
CSD
Commission on Sustainable Development
FAO
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FSC
Forest Stewardship Council
IFIR
International Forest Industry Roundtable
IFF
Intergovernmental Forum on Forests
IPF
Intergovernmental Panel on Forests
ITTO
International Tropical Timber Organization
GHG
Greenhouse gas
MNC
Multinational corporation
PEFC
Pan-European Forest Certification scheme
REDD
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
SFI
Sustainable Forestry Initiative
TNC
Transnational corporation
UNCED
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNFCCC
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
UNFF
United Nations Forum on Forests
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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Table of contents
Introduction
5
1. The emergence of global attempts to address deforestation
7
Introduction
7
1.1
The complex nature of the drivers of deforestation
8
1.2
Forests as a public good
10
1.3
Historical description of global governance to address deforestation
11
1.3.1 Multilateral negotiations
11
1.3.2 Market-based approaches
13
REDD: Reducing deforestation as a tool to combat climate change
15
1.4
Conclusion
16
2. Theoretical framework
17
Introduction
17
2.1
Defining global governance
17
2.2
International relations theory on deforestation governance
18
2.3
Critique on soft law and market-based deforestation governance
22
2.3.1 Soft law as governance
22
2.3.2 Market-based approaches as governance
24
Methodology
24
2.4
Conclusion
25
3. REDD+ examined
26
Introduction
26
3.1
Core concepts
27
3.2
The debate regarding a market-based funding mechanism
28
3.3
Other points of critique on the content of REDD+
30
3.4
The implementation procedure
31
Conclusion
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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3
4. A stakeholder analysis of REDD+
34
Introduction
34
4.1
Stakeholder analysis methodology
34
4.2
Identifying and examining the stakeholders
35
4.2.1 General remarks
36
4.2.2 Brazil
37
4.2.3 India
38
4.2.4 Indonesia
39
4.2.5 ‘North’ countries
39
Analyzing the stakeholder analysis results
40
4.3
Conclusion
42
5. REDD+ as a mechanism on global deforestation governance
43
Introduction
43
5.1
5.2
REDD+ compared to existing forms of global governance to address
deforestation
43
5.1.1 Soft law
46
5.1.2 Market-based initiatives
46
Recommendations
46
Conclusion
49
Bibliography
52
Attachment: Interview questions
58
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Introduction
The question why all around our planet our natural environment and ecosystems are exploited
seemingly regardless the consequences fascinated me since a very young age. As humans can
be regarded as rational being, how can they treat their natural surroundings so irrational?
Building on this question during my years as a student I started to read more on policy
attempts to address environmental issues. Truly, politicians must know the importance of why
our natural environment cannot be disregarded and exploited. At least that is what I thought.
So I decided to write a thesis on international efforts aiming to address deforestation rates. It
puzzles me why it is so hard to adopt effective policy measures and successfully address
deforestation rates at a global level.
The outcomes of international negotiations to address worldwide deforestation rates have
resulted in the adoption of non-legally binding principles concerning sustainable forest
management. A binding forest convention has despite international never been established.
During the 90’s, private sector initiatives, such as forest certification, became increasingly
popular. Forest certification is a market-based form of governance in which corporations can
enter a certification scheme in order to demonstrate their sustainable use of forests. As statecentered approaches have failed to curb deforestation rates, market-based approaches have
thus gradually taken over. Unlike state-centered approaches, forest certification as a form of
governance is grounded not in the norm of sustainability or conservation, but in the market
and the assumptions of neoliberal economics (Humphreys, 2006:140). Despite the
international efforts to curb deforestation resulting in an abundance of soft law and forest
certification standards, individual states generally did not implement legislation based on
these international efforts.
In the battle to fight climate change, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) adopted a mechanism called ‘reducing emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation (REDD)’. In short, REDD proposes that developed countries pay
developing countries for CO2 emissions saved through avoided deforestation and degradation
(Figuieres, Leplay, Midler, Thoyer, 2008:3). Thus, the primary goal of REDD is not to curb
deforestation rates, but to reduce carbon emissions by using the forests as carbon sinks. A
number of developing countries, particularly those who own rainforests, have been active in
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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pushing for REDD in the belief that this will provide a new and desperately needed source of
funds to save their forests. Despite the difficulties these countries faced in the past, they
evidently believe that deforestation can be reduced through national level policies, provided
the financial means are made available from international sources such as REDD. When it
comes to adopting a funding mechanism within REDD+, the successor of REDD, it is still
being debated whether a market-based or non-market based funding mechanism should be
included. Market approaches generally refer to a mechanism whereby participating
developing countries are able to create and sell units of emission reduction to ‘developed’
countries. Non-market approaches generally refer to a voluntary or compulsory fund created
by ‘developed’ countries and distributed to participating developing countries to aid and
reward their efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. (Johns,
Merry, Stickler, Nepstad, Laporte & Goetz, 2008: 460).
In this thesis, I will examine whether REDD+ is likely to be a successful instrument to curb
deforestation rates in tropical countries. Although a lot has been written on REDD and
REDD+, the mechanism has very rarely been compared to existing forms of global
governance aiming to address deforestation. Therefore, the topic and scope of this thesis are
highly relevant. Furthermore, REDD+ is a very actual topic. From 29 November until 10
December 2010 the United Nations Climate Change Conference took place in Cancun,
Mexico. The negotiations and results of the conference had a great impact on the writing
process of this thesis. Keeping up to date with and assessing the news regarding Cancun was
very interesting, yet it complicated the writing process of this thesis somehow. Many already
written parts of this thesis had to be adjusted or sometimes even rewritten entirely. Although
the agreement on the content of REDD+ was presented as a major breakthrough in the
negotiation process, there are still several major uncertainties regarding the actual content
(Austin, Daviet & Stolle, 2010). In this regard the research question of this thesis can be
formulated as follows:
To what extent can REDD+ be a successful form of global governance to address
deforestation in tropical countries?
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Chapter 1 The emergence of global attempts to address deforestation
Introduction
Despite worldwide concern, deforestation of tropical rainforests is continuing at an alarming
rate. One might wonder why the issue of deforestation and forest degradation despite global
attentions remains a major problem in particularly in tropical countries. However, there are
some paradoxicalities underlying deforestation. On one hand, awareness and resistance of
both citizens and (non)governmental organization and institutions against unsustainable
logging and depletion of tropical forests have grown in the past decades. On the other hand,
due to increased population growth and consumption patterns, the demand for (tropical)
timber has grown steadily over the past decades. (Geist & Lambin 2002, 143) This is not an
attempt to oversimplify the discussion regarding the underlying causes of unsustainable
deforestation in tropical countries. In fact, it illustrates the global policy challenges regarding
deforestation in tropical countries.
The question arises what the risks are of unsustainable deforestation practices in tropical
countries. On some alleged threats of forest depletion in tropical countries there is some
controversy and debate based on the diverse and sometimes contradicting scientific research.
For example, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Centre
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) conclude in their report ‘Forests and Floods:
Drowning in Fiction or Thriving on Facts’ there is no convincing scientific evidence linking
floods in tropical countries with apparent deforestation. In the academic literature however,
many authors conclude deforestation is inherently linked with floods in tropical countries
(Laurance, 1999: 110; Ehrhardt-Martinez, 1998: 568). Furthermore, tropical areas dealing
with forest depletion and degradation have increased chances for soil erosion, loss of
biodiversity and desertification (Shandra, 2007: 6). Deforestation is not only related to
environmental degradation, it often results in certain social problems as well. Shandra (Ibid)
links deforestation to the eradication of the habitat and culture of indigenous people in
tropical countries. In this regard, many NGO’s rally against deforestation in tropical countries
on behalf of the indigenous people living in the forests. Deforestation is also linked with the
disruption of global climate. Through the depletion of tropical forests, large amounts of
carbon dioxide (CO2) are unleashed, contributing to global warming (Persson & Azar, 2007:
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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1278). In order to combat climate change, REDD aims to prevent deforestation in tropical
countries. Thus, under REDD tropical forests are seen as carbon sinks.
In this introductional chapter, the evolvement of global attempts to address deforestation and
unsustainable forestry practices will be discussed. In the first paragraph of this chapter the
complex nature and structure of deforestation will be identified. The goal is therefore to
introduce the concept of deforestation in tropical countries and give insight in its complex
nature. Furthermore, it is important to give a historical overview of the global attempts to
address unsustainable deforestation practices in order to gain a better perspective on REDD.
Such will be done in the second paragraph. This chapter will not address the causal relations
and problems underlying deforestation governance in detail. In fact, this chapter will give a
more factual description regarding complexities on deforestation and attempts to curb
deforestation rates in tropical countries in particular. After this first chapter, it will become
easier to analyze the causal relations and complexities underlying deforestation governance in
tropical countries. An overview of both multilateral attempts and market-based initiatives to
address unsustainable deforestation is essential before thoroughly examining the structure and
stakeholders in REDD and examining whether REDD will be able to successfully address
unsustainable deforestation in tropical countries.
1.1
The complex nature of the drivers of deforestation
Causal relations underlying deforestation in tropical countries are diverse and often complex.
However, there can be little discussion that due to human activities the tropical forests on our
planet are dwindling (Dimitrov, 2005: 7). These human activities include for example
commercial logging and the conversion of tropical forests into agricultural areas. In the
academic literature many different causal relations on tropical deforestation are identified,
varying between region and countries. There is also disagreement in the literature on the main
drivers of deforestation in tropical countries. Humphreys (2008: 235) and Dauvergne (1999:
24) both agree neoliberal principles and global capitalism are the main forces behind the
alarming deforestation rates in tropical countries. Forner et al. (2006: 2) conclude that due to
‘the magnitude of the social, economic, technical and political complexities underlying
deforestation’, multilateral negotiations on global deforestation governance will remain
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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difficult. In fact, it is very problematic to identify the causal relations underlying deforestation
in the first place. There are a wide diversity of situation in various tropical countries and the
nature of the causal relations underlying deforestation is in many instances indirect (Rudel,
Defries, Asner & Laurance, 2009: 1397; Forner et al., 2006: 5). As a result, attempts trying to
generalize the underlying causes of deforestation are problematic and are vulnerable for
criticism. Once attempts have been made to identify the underlying causes of tropical
deforestation through multilateral negotiations, addressing these causes of tropical
deforestation is a difficult task. Diverging interest of countries and other stakeholders
involved make it very difficult, if not elusive, to reach a consensus on how to address
deforestation.
To make matters even more complex, deforestation cannot be separated from other global
environmental issues. Global environmental issues such as climate change, land degradation
and the effects of reduced water availability are all interrelated (Durrant & Maguire, 2007).
Moreover, forests are inhabited by more than half of all living organisms on our planet
(Forner et al., 2006: 4). As a result of unsustainable deforestation practices in tropical
countries, loss of biodiversity is a major problem. This being said, successfully addressing
deforestation rates in tropical countries cannot be achieved easily. As our planet gets more
and more populated, it is likely worldwide food demand and production will keep increasing.
Thus, social and economic pressures make it eventually inevitable vast areas of tropical
forests will be depleted, making room for agricultural areas to grow crops and cattle ranching
(Blaser & Douglas, 2000 in Forner et al.: 2006: 3). The important question is how to adopt a
sustainable forestry policy on both a national and international level.
Despite the global (media) attention for tropical deforestation throughout the past two
decades, deforestation rates in tropical countries are in many countries still alarming. As has
been mentioned, drivers of deforestation vary per region and even per country. For example in
the Asia-Pacific, Dauvergne (1997: 23) concluded there are four main factors why attempts to
curb deforestation rates have failed. First, international and domestic reformers have a
relatively weak position. Second, the structures and activities of corporations, in particular
logging corporations, are blocking attempts to address deforestation. Third, international
markets and the structure of timber chains are adjusted to unsustainable governmental forest
management, in particular unsustainable logging practices. Dauvergne’s (1997: 25) final
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conclusion is many states in the Asia-Pacific are unable and unwilling to implement
sustainable forest management practices due to the high costs involved. Once again, it is
proven there is no single cause driving tropical deforestation. In the Asia-Pacific, regional
economic actors contribute greatly to deforestation through unsustainable logging (Ibid: 24).
In the Amazons however, multinational corporations are the main economic actors behind
unsustainable logging practices (Laurance, 1999: 113). As drivers and causes of tropical
deforestation vary per region or even country, it is not so hard to imagine establishing an
effective global forest governance regime to address deforestation is an arduous task. In this
regard, Dauvergne (1997: 25) notes ‘global attempts to address deforestation might
oversimplify underlying causes of deforestation, pushing attention away from salient issues
and towards general forces behind deforestation’.
1.2
Forests as a public good
Before turning to international efforts aiming to address deforestation in tropical countries, it
is important to first determine how forests are regarded in international relations. According
to the public goods theory, forests can be regarded as a public good. Kaul, Grunberg and Stern
(1999: 452) characterize public goods as non-excludable, having non-rival benefits cutting
across borders and populations. In contrast, private goods can be bought and sold and are thus
excludable and rival. Humphreys (2008: 3) adds forests are in their essence public goods, but
forests products such as timber are private goods. According to the public goods theory, as
described by both Kaul et al. and Humphreys, forests provide public goods for both proximate
and distant users. Thus, it is not possible to exclude people from this public good. Neither is it
impossible for people to escape the public bads of forest degradation resulting in soil
degradation and possible biodiversity loss. This is an interesting starting point for this thesis,
as later on it will become evident forests cannot always be regarded as non-rival and nonexcludable. For example, privatization of forests contributes to the excludability of forests.
Humphreys (2008: 5) argues there are broadly speaking three public claims on how to regard
forests in international relations. According to the first claim, forests should be regarded as a
global common or as a heritage of humankind as every person on our planet derives benefits
from forests. The second claim argues forests should be seen as a sovereign resource of the
individual state in which territory the forest is located. This claim has its foundation in
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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international environmental law and therefore has a strong legal argument. According to this
perspective, national governments can use the forests located on their territory as they please.
This perspective is also the dominant perspective on a policy level, as will be illustrated in the
next paragraph. The third claim argues local inhabitants of the forests are most qualified to be
concerned with the conservation of the forest in order to ensure its sustainability (White &
Martin, 2002: 6). Obviously, this claim is made in particular by indigenous inhabitants living
in the tropical forest involved.. According to this claim, sustainable forest management is best
served by securing land rights and legal ownership of the forests for local communities. Many
indigenous inhabitants of tropical forests have resisted and condemned state sovereignty over
forests as it does not, or insufficient, pay attention to their rights (Humpreys, 2005: 5).
1.3
Historical description of global governance to address deforestation
1.3.1 Multilateral negotiations
In 1985 the first international organization with a conservation mandate regarding forests was
established: The International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO). ITTO managed to
negotiate a non-binding agreement in 1994, aiming to promote sustainable management of
tropical forests (Forner, Blaser, Jotzo & Robledo, 2006: 5). But it was the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 that was the actual starting
point for the numerous attempts by states to establish forest governance through multilateral
negotiations during the `90’s. Although the negotiations during UNCED went far from
smooth due to different claims and views (as discussed in paragraph 1.2) on how to regard
forests on a policy level, the first pieces of soft law on forests were created: ‘The Non-Legally
Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests’. These principles are
better known as ‘the Forest Principles’. In ‘the Forest Principles’ the sovereign rights of
individual states over their national resources is reconfirmed (Dimitrov, 2005: 8). Initially the
plan for UNCED was to include negations on a binding forest convention on the agenda. This
idea was abandoned even before the UNCED negotiations started, due to sharp disagreement
between governments of countries involved on the relevance of such a convention (Dimitrov,
2005: 7). Despite the reconfirmation of state sovereignty during UNCED, after the
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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negotiations it became clear developing and developed countries were in particular divided on
how to govern the world’s tropical forests. Developed countries generally regarded the
tropical forests as a heritage of humankind, resulting in limited sovereignty of individual
states regarding the tropical forests on their territory (Humphreys, 2008: 22). They claimed
conservation and sustainable forest management are of the utmost importance because of its
implications for all human beings on this planet. In this regard many developed countries,
Canada in particular, rallied in favor of the establishment of a global forest convention, which
was intended to curb deforestation rates in countries with a tropical forest. Developed
countries argued tropical forests belonged to their territorial domain and thus emphasized the
importance of state sovereignty. Their argument presumes developing countries have every
right to use the tropical forest in line with their national development policy (Humphreys,
2005: 436). After UNCED it became already clear it would be difficult due to the diverging
interests of individual states regarding forests to establish an effective global forest
governance regime.
The next multilateral negotiations on global forest governance were in 1993 when the UN
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was established. During the 1995 session of
the CSD the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) was created as a so called open ended
body of the CSD (Humphreys, 2008: 23). As a result, other United Nations members gained
the possibility to participate in the initiative by obtaining the same rights as CSD members. In
the evolution of global forest governance, the IPF was an important new step as it provided a
platform where governments could exchange expertise and opinions on both forest politics
and forest policy (Humphreys, 2008: 46). Between 1995 and 1997, the IPF convened four
times and adopted legally non-binding principles and recommendations, adding to the quickly
increasing amount of non-binding multilateral agreements on forests (Dimitrov, 2005: 9). The
Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) was launched after the last IPF meeting in 1997
and was in fact the IPF with another name and a slightly revised mandate. The IFF convened
four times between 1997 and 2000 (Humphreys, 2008: 66). During both the IPF and IFF
negotiations, the debate on state sovereignty of countries with tropical forests versus the need
to establish a global forest convention limiting state sovereignty was fierce. In 2000 the
negotiations came to an end as a consensus could not be achieved by the participating
countries caused by the debate at hand. It was then decided by the IFF the UN Forum on
Forests (UNFF) would be established. The UNFF was different then both the IPF and IFF as
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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it was a permanent institution and had to report to the UN Economic and Social Council
(Dimitrov, 2005: 10). The UNFF also ensured permanent membership of participating states,
in contrast to the IPF and IFF. During the UNFF negotiations on how to establish an effective
global forest policy, multi-stakeholder dialogues were held involving both public and private
sector stakeholders. Like its predecessors, the UNFF failed to establish a legally binding
forest treaty after its last meeting in 2005. Once again, a consensus on the content of such a
treaty could not be reached caused by the disagreement between participating states. As a
result, the UNFF agreements can be seen as another piece of ‘soft law’. The UNFF
agreements confirm the importance of sustainable global tropical forest management, but
states do not have to commit themselves and are not required to report on their progress and
implementation (Ibid: 12). In fact, the outcomes of UNFF are merely the same as the
agreements under the IPF and IFF, illustrating its limited impact (Dimitrov, 2005: 12,
Humphreys, 2008: 115).
The global initiatives mentioned in this paragraph can be seen as the main global multilateral
attempts to address the issue of deforestation. These agreements can be regarded as soft law
as they are legally non-binding. Soft law can also be regarded as non-intrusive and nonconfrontational (Sindico, 2006: 834). The causes and diverging interests between the
stakeholders involved, preventing the agreements mentioned in this paragraph from obtaining
legally-binding status , will be further discussed in chapter two.
1.3.2 Market-based approaches
The origins of market-based approaches regarding international forest management date back
to the late `80’s. In that time, many NGO’s became disappointed with the efforts of ITTO to
boost sustainable forestry management in tropical countries (Humphreys, 2008: 116). ITTO
then introduced a labeling system to certify sustainable tropical timber. The ITTO proposal
was blocked however by most countries with tropical forests (Ibid: 117). Many NGO’s were
inspired by the idea of such a labeling system for tropical timber and as a result in 1991 the
WWF established a working group with other NGO’s to establish a forest certification scheme
(Sindico, 2006: 832). This initiative became the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). The FSC
was officially established in 1993 and in 1994 the nine-principles for well sustainable forests
were adopted primarily aiming at forests in Western countries. At this moment the FSC is
probably the best known market-based mechanism aiming to address unsustainable
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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deforestation. During the ‘90’s and after the millennium several other certification coalitions
were established. Some were regional and some were aiming at a global level. In NorthAmerica for example, in 1993 the Canadian Sustainable Forestry Certification Coalition was
established. In the same year, in the USA the US Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) was
created. In Europe, the Pan-European Forest Certification scheme (PEFC) was established in
1999 by forest owners in several European countries. The PEFC initiators were opposing the
FSC arguing the FSC is not suitable for small forest owners (Ibid: 127). Surprisingly,
certification schemes launched in countries with tropical forests remained absent. Another
market-based initiative worth mentioning is the International Forest Industry Roundtable
(IFIR). The IFIR proposed a framework with other standards then FSC. According to the FSC
these standards were less stringent then the FSC standards itself (Ibid: 132).
It does not fit into the scope of thesis to go into detail regarding the several certification
schemes that have been established throughout the past two decades. However, it is important
to identify the core ideas and practicalities underlying these market-based initiatives.
Certification schemes can be seen as market-based initiatives, whereby it does not matter
whether the certification is launched by for example NGO’s or the forestry industry itself. The
basic idea is to attach prices to environmental potentially damaging activities (Meidinger,
2002: 304). Market mechanisms can be seen as a complementary to more traditional attempts
to address deforestation through multilateral negotiations. The idea is that market forces will
make it attractive for MNC’s to join a certification scheme. Based on this idea, if timber of a
MNC is not labeled or certified, consumers will not buy it because of its unsustainable origin
(Sindico, 2006: 834). This is likely to result in economic loss for the MNC involved.
Essentially, the risk of economic loss is the main reason for MNC’s to join a certain
certification scheme.
The whole point of certification schemes is to eventually divide forestry practices of MNC’s
involved into two categories: certified or not-certified (Meidinger, 2002: 305). As a result,
MNC’s within the category ‘certified’ are labeled as if they are homogenous in their
sustainable practices. In order to obtain compliance with a certification scheme, most
certification schemes monitor the forestry practices of the MNC’s involved. Some schemes
use third party auditors, whereas other schemes conduct the monitoring on their own. Much
depends on the quality of the monitoring and auditing process as to draw up the conclusion
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whether a MNC conducts sustainable forestry practices or not. For example, the FSC is
known for its high standards which participating corporations have to comply with
(Humphreys, 2008: 139). In the second chapter, the benefits of certification schemes and its
shortcomings will be addressed regarding deforestation in countries with tropical forests.
However, FSC-certified timber origins primarily from Europe and rarely originates from
tropical forests. Thus, FSC does not provide a comprehensive solution as it comes to
sustainable forestry practices in tropical countries.
1.4
REDD: Reducing deforestation as a tool to combat climate change
Even though there is an abundance of soft law as well as market-based approaches, these have
failed to successfully address deforestation rates in tropical countries (Humphrey, 2006: 234).
REDD+ can be seen as the new mechanism aiming to curb deforestation rates in order to
achieve climate change mitigation. As such, REDD can be seen as complementary to already
existing soft law and market-based approaches related to deforestation. Nevertheless, as the
primary goal of REDD is climate change mitigation, addressing deforestation rates in tropical
countries is of the utmost importance and thus perspectives regarding sustainable global
forestry practices are hopeful.
Using forests in order to combat climate change is a fairly new concept. It is estimated
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from deforestation and forest degradation are accountable
for about twenty percent of global emissions (Mollicone, Freibauer, Schulze, Braatz, Grassi &
Federici 2007: 1). Under the Kyoto-protocol the linkage between tropical forests and climate
change, GHG in particular, was discussed for the first time. Under Kyoto participating
countries also agreed to reduce their carbon emissions below a certain level. Countries
struggling to meet their target regarding carbon emissions had the possibility to buy ‘carbon
credits’ from other countries. However, carbon credits could only be bought from countries
having no target, e.g. developing countries, or countries whose carbon emissions where below
their own target (Laurance, 2008: 286). Consequently, market-forces dominated the carbon
trading between countries whereas supply and demand determined the actual carbon trading
in practice.
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During the UNFCCC conference in Montreal in 2005, the governments of Costa Rica and
Papua New Guinea submitted a proposal regarding reducing CO2 emissions by avoiding
deforestation (Cerbu, Swallow & Thompson, 2010: 2; Humphreys, 2008: 434). This proposal
resulted in a two year research process of analysis of scientific, technical and political and
financial aspects of the proposed REDD-mechanism (Johns, Merry, Stickler, Nepstad,
Laporte & Goetz, 2008: 459). In practice, the REDD-mechanism is also known as the
‘avoided deforestation scheme’. During the UNFCCC conference in Bali it was agreed REDD
was to be included in the post-2012 climate agreement (Okereke & Dooley, 2009: 83). This
resulted in debates among participating countries and observing organizations on the content
of REDD. The main objective of REDD is to create incentives for developing countries to
curb deforestation rates and to limit forest degradation in order to reduce GHG emissions
(Karsentry, 2008: 444). Even after the recent Cancun climate change mitigation conference,
negotiations on REDD and its implementation are still taking place, although REDD-pilots
have already been launched in several countries with tropical forests. In the next chapter, the
most important aspects of REDD as well as the most urgent debates regarding the proposed
REDD+ scheme will be discussed. As REDD is very like to dominate global forest politics in
the oncoming years, it is important to assess whether REDD is likely to address the
shortcomings in existing forest governance. The next chapter will therefore examine the
proposed REDD-scheme as well as identify shortcomings and opportunities in both existing
soft law and market based approaches regarding deforestation in tropical countries.
International relations theory will assessed to explain and gain a better understanding of both
the complexities underlying REDD and existing global forest governance.
Conclusion
In this first chapter an overview of the historical context preceding REDD+ has been
provided. Both multilateral attempts and market-based approaches to address deforestation
have been explained in order to explain how REDD+ does fit in this picture. Since the early
`90’s there have been several international attempts to establish a governance structures on
deforestation and forestry issues, but these attempts have faced some major obstacles, limiting
its success. In the next chapters it will be analyzed whether REDD and its successor REDD+
will contribute to the already existing amount of global governance on deforestation.
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Chapter 2 Theoretical framework
Introduction
In this chapter a framework will be established in order to create a profound theoretical basis
to analyze REDD+. First, the notion of global governance will be addressed. This is necessary
because this concept is present throughout the entire thesis. Then, the compatibility of certain
international relations theory will be assessed in relation to subject and research question of
this thesis. It is surprising REDD+ has rarely been analyzed from a international relations
theory perspective. As such will be done in this thesis, this may provide new insights in the
complex nature of REDD+. Furthermore, in this theoretical chapter the most important
problems and shortcomings of both soft law and market-based approaches in existing global
governance on deforestation in tropical countries will be identified. By identifying both the
strong and weak points in both soft law and market-based approaches, it can be analyzed
whether REDD will be able to eventually successfully address those shortcomings. Keeping
the research question in mind, the analysis will focus whether REDD will be a successful
form of deforestation governance.
2.1
Defining global governance
In chapter 1 the concept of global governance was mentioned several times, yet not explained.
Although global governance is a widely used term in international relations, it remains a
broad and rather unclear terminology (Waters, 2009: 31). Thus, it is important to clarify the
notion of global governance in relation to global environmental issues, as the terminology will
be present throughout this thesis. Although a complete thesis can be written on the subject of
global governance alone, the notion of global governance will be limited to its relevance to
both the thesis subject and the research question.
Till the early ‘90’s, the primary actors in global governance theory were states. This statist
nature of global governance theory changed and evolved during the early ‘90’s, when the
Commission on Global Governance was established. According the Commission, global
governance should also include non-state actors such as NGO’s, TNC’s and civil society.
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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Ever since, alongside the spreading of globalization, the role of non-state actors in global
governance has become increasingly important. Authors such as Rosenau, Finkelstein and
Weiss have all contributed and further developed global governance theory to by including
non-state actors and emphasizing the importance of multi-level governance when it comes to
decision-making in international issues. In this regard, Finkelstein (1995: 369) poses a broad,
but accurate definition of global governance:
‘Global governance is governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend
national frontiers‘.
Global governance is closely related with international regimes. In fact, both institutions and
international regimes are permanent themes within global governance (Wilkinson, 2005: 4).
Consequently, regime theory will be discussed in the next paragraph as it is highly relevant
regarding international environmental issues.
2.2
International relations theory on deforestation governance
In both soft law and market-based mechanisms on deforestation international cooperation is a
crucial concept. International cooperation is one of the main pillars behind REDD+.
Consequently, sovereign states participating in REDD highlight the importance of absolute
gains to be achieved: the reduction of GHG emissions through avoiding deforestation. This
should ultimately result in slowing down climate change. When looking at this description, it
fits the liberal institutionalist stance. This is not really surprising as the liberal institutionalist
is the dominant IR theory related to global environmental issues (Baylis et al., 2008: 365).
However, international cooperation in REDD+ also faces many obstacles as the countries
involved are expected to have diverging interests.
An international relations theory closely related to international cooperation is regime theory.
Regime theory is still a dominant IR theory related to global environmental issues. Keohane et
al. (1993) describes regimes as social institutions ‘constituting persistent and connected sets
of rules and practices that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape
expectations’. As international regimes are often liberal institutionalist in its nature, it poses
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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the assumption that the main question to be addressed is how to establish global governance
in an international system of fragmented, yet sovereign states (Baylis et al, 2008: 365). As has
been identified in chapter one, multilateral attempts to curb deforestation rates have been
problematic particularly because of individual states having diverging interests. Regime
theory is derived from the liberal tradition that argues that international institutions or regimes
affect the behavior of states or other international actors. It assumes that cooperation is
possible in the anarchic international system of states, as regimes are by definition instances
of international cooperation. Liberal institutionalists and even realists share the assumption
that a regime represents the response of rational actors operating in the anarchic structure of
the international system. (Baylis et al., 2008: 302).
The definition adopted by Krasner (1983: 372) is still widely used as a common definition
regarding regimes. According to Krasner, regimes are ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in
a given area of international relations’. Four key elements can be identified in Krasners
definition: Principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedure. Environmental regimes
have been thoroughly analyzed by Young (1999). His definition of regimes is based on the
definition of Krasner, but is specifically applied to the field of environmental regimes.
According to Young (in Wilkinson, 2005: 4-5) regimes are: ‘social institutions that consist of
agreed upon principles, norms, rules decision-making procedures and programs that govern
the interactions of actors in specific issues areas’. Contrary with Krasner, who focuses on the
expectations of relevant actors, Young sees environmental regimes merely as guidelines
governing the interactions of actors. Young acknowledges states are the central actors in
international regimes, but he stresses the importance of non-state actors in environmental
regimes. Auer (2000: 158) confirms non-state actors are playing an increasingly important
role in international environmental regimes. This is contrasting with the perspective of
Krasner, who argues international regimes are solely the domain of sovereign states. The
definition of Krasner reflects the statist nature of international relations which remained
predominant until the late ´80´s. Since then, non-state actors have become increasingly
important actors in global governance. Compared to the classic definition of regime theory by
Krasner, four central elements can be identified in both the definition by Young and Krasner:
Principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. Principles and norms define the
character of a regime and these cannot be altered as doing so will lead to a transformation of
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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the nature of a regime (Krasner, 1985: 4) As REDD+ will be regarded from a regime theory
perspective in chapter three, these four rather abstract elements require further clarification.
According to Krasner (Ibid.) principles reflect the statements about how the world works.
Principles therefore presume a causal relation. For example, a neoliberal principle will be:
free trade will maximize global welfare (Baylis et al., 2008: 300). Norms in regime theory can
be perceived as the specification of general standards as well as the identification of both
rights and obligations of states. Norms are of a higher level than rules. Rules in regime theory
serve to resolve and prevent conflict which may occur between the interaction of principles
and norms. Thus, rules are more practical in its nature than norms. Finally, decision-making
procedures in regime theory identify specific prescriptions for behavior. (Krasner, 1985: 4;
Young, 1997: 30; Wilkinson, 2005: 5)
Certain elements of the dependency theories may also be useful for analyzing REDD. For
example in REDD, developed countries have to pay developing countries in order to
guarantee the usage of the tropical forests as carbon sinks. Thus, in REDD itself assumptions
are made whether a country is a developed or a developing country. Linked to dependency
theory, the REDD signals whether a country is a periphery or a wealthy (core) country.
Dependency theorists argue, in opposition to free market economists, that underdeveloped
countries needed to reduce their connectedness with the world market so that they can pursue
a path more in keeping with their own needs, less dictated by external pressures. By
participating in REDD, developing countries are becoming more dependent on wealthy
countries. In this regard it is argued that the greater the dependency on core countries, the
greater the rate of deforestation in developing countries (Ehrhardt-Martinez, 1998: 573).
Another IR theory which is most likely to be reflected in REDD is neoliberalism. According
to Humphreys (2008: 435), avoided deforestation, one of the pillars of REDD+, is inherently
linked to a neoliberal approach on environmental governance. Neoliberalism can also be
identified in the proposed market-based approach regarding the financing of REDD+.
Therefore, examining the assumptions of neoliberal theory is crucial before commencing to
analyze REDD. Neoliberalism has been and still is a dominant international relations theory
which can be identified throughout deforestation governance in the past two decades.
Neoliberal assumptions can be identified in both soft law and market-approaches as well. One
of the key characteristics of neoliberalism is its reliance on the free market doctrine. This free
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market doctrine is closely related to globalization, which neoliberals see as a positive force.
Neoliberals aim to reduce trade barriers and reduce political interference in the free market by
maximizing the role of the private sector. Essentially, neoliberalism focuses on economic and
commercial issues. (Baylist et al., 2008: 136). Bernstein (2002:3) has named his theory
liberal environmentalism which links neoliberal trade practices with environmental global
governance. Liberal environmentalism predicates international environmental protection on
the promotion and maintenance of a liberal economic order. According to the theory
liberalization in trade is consistent with, or in some occasions even necessary for,
environmental protection. (Ibid: 4) Humphreys (2008: 216) is more radical and argues
neoliberalism is in its nature inconsistent with sustainable forest management as it regards
forests a commodity and values it by its economic value. As such, this view contrast with the
view of Bernstein who argues neoliberalism does not contrast and is in fact consistent to
achieve tangible environmental protection, in this case reducing deforestation.
Whereas neoliberalism relies on the free market doctrine, liberal institutionalist theory focuses
more on global governance through international cooperation. According to liberal
institutionalism states are the most import actors. States are rational and always seek to
maximize their gains and interests. As states try to maximize their interests, there always is a
competitive environment. Therefore, international cooperation is required if states want to
achieve the maximization of their interests. Liberal institutionalists argue international
cooperation can be troublesome, but state will transfer sovereignty to institutions. Institutions
will thus be created for states to secure their own interests as well as to prevent noncompliance in the international cooperation process by other states. Institutions are regarded
as a mediator and a tool to establish successful international cooperation resulting in the
maximization of interests of the individual state. However, liberal institutionalists stress the
importance of the presence of mutual interests by states involved in the cooperation process.
When states have little mutual or shared interests, successful cooperation will be difficult to
achieve. (Baylis et al., 2008: 133). As liberal institutionalist theory is a dominant theory
regarding global environmental governance, in this the governance on reducing deforestation
rates, this theory will be used to analyze REDD+.
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2.3
Critique on soft law and market-based deforestation governance
2.3.1 Soft law as governance
Since UNCED in 1992 multilateral negotiations on deforestation were aiming at establishing
a legally binding global forest convention. While there are certain elements of both soft law
and market-based incentives as tools for private forest governance operated by non-state
actors, a forest policy regime based on hard international law is unlikely to be established in
the near future. (Dimitrov, 2005: 1) The plan to include negotiations on a forest convention on
the agenda for the 1992 UNCED was abandoned at the preparatory stage due to sharp
disagreements among governments on the need for such a treaty. While the US, Canada and
most European countries emphasized the principle of global responsibility in preserving
forests, developing countries stressed the importance of their sovereign rights to utilize natural
resources. They regarded proposed international regulations on deforestation as methods of
raising trade barriers by developed countries. A binding treaty would put limitations on their
timber exports and oblige them to engage in sustainable forest management resulting in more
expensive harvesting (Dimitrov, 2005: 7).
Dimitrov (Ibid.) criticizes the institutions, particularly the UNFF, which have been established
in the past decades regarding multilateral negotiations on deforestation. Humphreys (2008:
115) concludes the UNFF has very limited capabilities and argues international institutions
related to deforestation are purposefully stripped of policymaking capacities (Humphreys,
2008: 115). Dimitrov (2005: 3) thus describes the state of global deforestation governance as
follows: ‘… state deliberations on forestry have become notorious in diplomatic circles for
their apparent futility. Virtually no progress was made over fifteen years of debates, the
differences appear irreconcilable, and key players offer no indication they may change their
positions in the foreseeable future.’
The failure to establish a global forest treaty is also related to financial matters. Developing
countries were reluctant to commit to a binding convention as developed countries were
unwilling to compensate the developing countries for the implementation of such a treaty. For
example, at the fourth session of the IFF, African countries such as Zambia and Nigeria
indicated that they would consider joining a treaty if a global forest fund was created
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(Dimitrov, 2005: 9). Further frustrating the adoption of a binding forest treaty was the
reluctancy of most NGO’s to support such a treaty. NGO’s were highly skeptical about the
content and effect of such a forest convention. They were supported by Canada, Malaysia and
Finland. The argument was a weak treaty would diminish environmental criticism while
logging corporations were legitimized to lower their environmental standards (Sindico, 2006:
835). As a result, because of the presumed ‘weak’ content of the treaty the exploitation of
tropical forests would be very likely to continue (Humphreys, 2008: 215; Dimitrov, 2005: 9).
Furthermore, in the literature explanations are abundant illustrating the complexities
underlying deforestation in tropical countries. The adoption of soft law in the past two
decades failed to successfully address these complexities (Sindico, 2006: 835; Humphreys,
2008: 114-115; Dimitrov, 2005: 12). These obstacles include the large number of actors
involved, the distribution of power across negotiating coalitions, concerns with relative gains,
material interests in commercial logging and agriculture, the policy impact on economic
sectors, and the distribution of costs and benefits among domestic actors (Dimitrov, 2005:
12). Domestic politics within participating states made the multilateral negotiations difficult
as well. In the Russian Federation for example, the treaty was seen as a means of wresting
forest policies away from regional governors of its provinces (Ibid). Consequently,
multilateral attempts failed to tackle these issues. According to Dauvergne (1997: 24) the
influence of the deeply entrenched corporate interests in logging in tropical forests frustrates
multilateral negotiations on deforestation to a greater extent. Another obstacle frustrating
multilateral negotiations is the absence of reliable scientific information on the transnational
consequences of deforestation (Dimitrov, 2005: 12). Humphreys (2008: 216) argues the most
important reasons why soft law has failed to curb deforestation in tropical countries is the
domination of neoliberal principles, in particular the free trade doctrine. Humphreys (Ibid)
stresses multilateral negotiations to address deforestation in tropical countries will remain
difficult as neoliberal principles are routinely embedded in most countries general
environmental policies. All these issues and obstacles mentioned here are making multilateral
negotiations resulting in reduced deforestation rates in tropical countries difficult. (his has
resulted in vast amount of soft law available on addressing deforestation rates.
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2.3.2 Market-based approaches as governance
Market-based approaches have gradually been established in the past two decades. Examples
are the FSC, the Rainforest Action Network, the Rainforest Alliance as tradable pollution
permits (Lipschutz, 1997: 165). According to Humphreys (2008: 220) two main reasons
explaining the rise of market based approaches can be identified. First, market-based
initiatives are consistent with neoliberalism. As neoliberalism and economic globalization
have become widespread, market based initiatives are a logical consequence as privatization
is promoted. As a result private sector initiatives are more likely to be established. Second,
the failure of multilateral negotiations to address global deforestation rates through
institutions, such as the IPF and UNFF, have resulted in alternative approaches. The question
arises whether market-based approaches have been able to successfully address deforestation
in tropical countries. Humphreys (ibid) is positive on the effects of market-based approaches,
such as the FSC, in developed countries but is highly pessimistic on the effectiveness of such
approaches in less developed countries with tropical forests. Dauvergne (1997: 24) confirms
Humphreys conclusion regarding deforestation in tropical countries. Logging corporations
active in tropical countries have proven to be reluctant to participate in market-based
initiatives. Both Humphreys and Dauvergne argue this is due to a simple cost and benefit
analysis as performed by logging corporations operating in countries with tropical forests.
Participating in for example the FSC involves high costs, but more importantly, logging
corporations would have to alter their logging practices in the tropical country involved,
resulting in fewer profits. Meidinger (2002: 318) adds market-based approaches have not
altered the practices of MNC’s and have therefore been unsuccessful to address successfully
curb deforestation rates in tropical countries. Lipschutz (1997: 173) acknowledges market
based approaches may increase the efficiency of the financial resources of parties involved,
but ‘it is also driven by the ability of the rich to purchase rights to pollute from the poor,
which could result in a transfer of financial resources from the former to the latter, thereby
allowing the poor to pay the costs of environmental improvement’.
2.4
Methodology
In this thesis, the focus will be on deforestation in tropical countries. This scope is justified as
REDD primarily focuses on reducing GHG emissions by avoiding deforestation in countries
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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with economies in transition. Furthermore, estimates using data from 78 tropical developing
countries indicate that the highest average deforestation between 1990 and 2005 occurred in
Tropical South America, followed by Africa and tropical Asia and the Pacific (Dimitrov,
2005: 4). When speaking of REDD in this thesis, I refer to REDD+ unless otherwise stated.
REDD and REDD+ will thus be used as synonyms throughout this thesis, unless specifically
mentioned otherwise. Confusion that otherwise may have occured from this terminology can
now be avoided.
Due to the limited time and length available for this thesis, the primary source of information
will be academic literature. Additional and recent information about the REDD+ negotiations
will be obtained through assessing newsarticles, journals and (NGO) reports. Unfortunately, it
is therefore not possible to travel to countries where REDD pilot projects have been launched.
Besides literature research, interviews where possible will be held with experts having indepth knowledge on REDD and global environmental governance. Interviews will be
conducted in line with the standards for interviews that have been set forth in Gilbert
(2008:193-196). Furthermore, in chapter four a stakeholder analysis will be applied in order to
better analyze the different actors and interests involved related to REDD. The theory of
Grimble, Chan, Aglionby & Quan (1995:4) will be used to provide a theoretical framework
for the stakeholder analysis. This will be further explained in chapter 4 itself.
Conclusion
In this chapter a framework has been established to further analyze both existing forms of
global governance on deforestation and REDD+. The main problems of both existing soft law
and market based initiatives have been identified. From a IR perspective, liberal
institutionalism is likely to be the most helpful in order to analyze REDD+. Certain elements
of both regime and dependency theory may be useful to provide insight in the complex nature
of REDD+ and will thus be taken into account throughout this thesis where applicable. Based
on the theoretical framework as provided in this chapter it is expected that
as the result of the inclusion of a market-based approach in REDD+ deforestation rates in
tropical countries will not successfully be reduced.
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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Chapter 3 REDD+ examined
Introduction
In the last five UN climate talks and negotiations (Nairobi in 2006, Bali, Poznan in 2008,
Kopenhagen in 2009, Cancun in 2010). much time as been devoted to discussions on the
content of REDD+. REDD+ has an extended scope compared to the initial REDD
mechanism. In short, REDD+ is the ‘improved’ version of REDD and was adopted in the Bali
Action Plan. In contrast with the initial REDD-programme, REDD+ also includes principles
on conservation, sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon
stocks in developing countries (Chutz, 2010: 14). REDD+ is not just about reducing
emissions but is also about slowing down and even reversing forest loss and degradation
(Austin, Daviet & Stolle, 2010). A consensus on the content of the REDD+ mechanism has
not been achieved regarding certain issues, whereas a debate regarding the funding
mechanism in particular proves persistent. This being said, in Copenhagen and very recently
in Cancun further steps have been taken to achieve the establishment of a post-2012 climate
mitigation program, in which forests in developing countries play a crucial role. The
proposed, yet still contested, REDD mechanism is quite complex and technical in its nature.
Therefore, it is important to first identify and summarize the core ideas and concepts
underlying REDD+. This will be done in the first paragraph of this chapter, before
commencing with the analysis of the central debates within REDD+. This chapter will be
limited to the main policy debates within REDD+, rather than focusing on technical aspects of
the proposed REDD+ mechanism
Thus, in this chapter the REDD mechanism will be discussed in order to assess whether
REDD will be successful to curb deforestation rates in developing countries. As such, the
main debates ongoing in the REDD negotiations will be identified and analyzed. Keeping the
research question of this thesis in mind, the focus will not be on REDD in relation to climate
change, but rather on REDD as a successful tool to curb deforestation rates in tropical
countries. In order to be able to answer the research question it is essential to assess whether
REDD will be able to successfully address some of the shortcomings of both soft law and
market-based approaches on deforestation. Thus, in chapter five REDD+ will be linked and
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
26
compared to existing deforestation governance, both soft law and market-based approaches.
The different stakeholders and parties involved will be discussed in the next chapter.
3.1
Core concepts
The general idea underlying the REDD mechanism is the concept of avoided deforestation
(AD). The idea to include the concept of avoided deforestation in the climate convention was
adopted in 2005 in Montreal at the Conference of Parties (COP) when the Coalition of
Rainforest Nations (CfRN), specifically Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica submitted a
proposal. This proposal suggested countries succeeding in lowering their deforestation rates
should be financially rewarded.
Under the Kyoto-protocol no mechanism was included to reward countries for efforts to
reduce or avoid deforestation in countries not signatory to the Kyoto-protocol (Okereke &
Dooley, 2010: 83). The main reason why such a mechanism was not included was that
countries e.g. parties involved could not reach a consensus regarding such a mechanism. The
concept of avoided deforestation was mentioned in the Kyoto-protocol, but was only put in
practice till a limited extent.
Regime theory may be helpful to provide a better understanding of REDD+. Building on the
definitions by both Krasner and Young as given forth in the theoretical framework of this
thesis, REDD+ will now be regarded from the four central elements as present in regime
theory: Principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. The most obvious principle
of REDD+ is the assumption ‘using forests as carbon sinks will lead to climate change
mitigation’. This is the key REDD+ principle and consists of a causal relation. On a lower
level, a principle is avoiding deforestation leads to increased GHG emissions storage in
forests (Angelsen & Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008: 14). This principle or assumption underlying
REDD+ is supported by scientific evidence provided by the UNPCCC (Cerbu, Swallow &
Thompson, 2010: 2). Avoiding deforestation should lead to reduced deforestation rates in
countries with tropical forests and should therefore be is an important norm of REDD+. A
rule in REDD+ for example is the priority developing countries with high deforestation over
other countries with lower deforestation rates. The degree of deforestation decides whether
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
27
the country involved will receive payments to reduce their deforestation rates or not. Such a
rule has the effect to reconcile conflict between countries over which country will be
beneficiary to payments. This is in line with the goal of Krasner (1985:4) has set forth in its
definition of regime theory. The decision-making process in REDD takes place on both the
local, national and international level. As this thesis focuses on the global governance of
deforestation and REDD+ the international level is of relevance. Based on consensus on the
content of REDD+, all participating countries except Bolivia signed the REDD+ agreement at
Cancun at the Conference of Parties.
3.2
The debate regarding a market-based funding mechanism
A debate that has been ongoing during the REDD negotiations is the debate whether to
include a market-based funding mechanism in REDD+. REDD+ is likely to reflect a
commitment to market-based approaches to tropical forest governance. However, some
participating countries in REDD+ including Brazil and Bolivia, are opposing the inclusion of
a market-based finance mechanism in REDD+. The debate on whether to or not include
market-based approaches in REDD+ is still ongoing and after the COP at Cancun no
consensus has been reached on the latter.
Criticism on the inclusion of market-based approaches in REDD+ is abundant. Okereke &
Dooley (2010: 82) for example argue the inclusion of a market-based approach serves the
interests of powerful players, in particular TNCs and western countries. Chutz (2010, 43) adds
a market-based mechanism might be cost efficient for developed countries, but it does not
guarantee the realization of actual CO2 emissions reductions. Another argument against the
inclusion a market-based approach in REDD+ is that it may have perverse effects in terms of
achieving forest preservation, the protection rights and livelihood of indigenous people as
well as sustainable community development. Forests and trees will be regarded as replaceable
commodities, disregarding and neglecting the needs and wishes of indigenous people
inhabiting the forests. (Okereke & Dooley, 2010: 82). Another critique on a market-based
funding mechanism is the concept known as additionality. This means the emission reductions
would not have been achieved without policy intervention, fixing the carbon credits market
(Ookereke & Dooley, 2010: 90; Fry, 2008: 177). Brown, Seymour & Peskett (2010: 110)
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
28
refer to the CDM as an example where a market-based funding mechanism has not succeeded.
They argue the funding mechanism unevenly distributed finance between developed and
developing countries. Investors turned out to be unwilling to invest in emerging economies
with poor governance structures. (Brown, Seymour & Peskett, 2010: 110).
The implementation of a market-based approach in REDD+ is consistent with neoliberal
theory. It is compatible with neoliberal elements as the free market, driven by supply and
demand, will provide for the financing of REDD+. REDD+ does not however seek to
decentralize nor privatize, two other fundamental characteristics of neoliberal doctrine (Chutz,
2010:52). Humphreys (2006: 226) argues neoliberal theory and policy is in its nature
conflicting with the protection of the environment, in particular reducing deforestation. In
contrast with Humphreys, Bernstein (2002: 14) argues effective environmental governance is
possible within the current global economic order. As will be discussed in the next chapter,
some countries participating in REDD argue a market-mechanism regarding carbon trading
should not be included, whereas other countries aim to include such a mechanism. To a
greater extent, this debate in REDD can be seen as a debate related to the neoliberal doctrine.
This debate focuses on the financing of REDD. The Copenhagen Accord, like the Bali Action
Plan, states that there should be positive financial incentives for countries that take action to
reduce deforestation and degradation How REDD+ will be financed is still uncertain, even
after the Cancun COP meeting. Financing REDD could made possible through a carbon
market, a dedicated fund or something else (Daviet, 2010). In the REDD+ Cancun agreement,
this question is still left unanswered. Favouring the inclusion of a market-based mechanism is
Gribling (personal communication, 20-01-2011, 2010). He argues a market-based mechanism
will generate more money through carbon credits than a controlled fund will. Also, he argues
a market-based funding mechanism is most cost-efficient for developed countries. Verchot &
Petkova (2009: 10) argue a market-based funding mechanism better ensures the long-term
financing of REDD+ compared to a non-market based funding mechanism, in particular
because of the large-scale financing REDD+ requires.
On the other side, there are also some strong arguments against the inclusion of a non-market
based fund. Gribling (personal communication, 20-01-2011, 2011) argues such a fund will
generate less money compared to a market-based funding mechanism. Supply and demand
determine the prices of carbon credits, ensuring the optimal prices for donors willing to invest
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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in REDD+ and offset their carbon emissions through the purchase of credit credits. A nonmarket based funding mechanism may not sufficient incentives for donors to invest in such a
fund (Gribling, personal communication, 20-01-2011, Butler, 2009; Fry, 2008: 179).
Furthermore, there are concerns on both the accountability and governance of a non-market
based funding mechanism. Besides individual countries, non-state actors such as banks are
likely to execute and distribute the funding, whereas some of these banks and states are
notorious for their interest in financial gains rather than environmental protection. (Butler,
2009).
3.3
Other points of critique on the content of REDD+
Okereke & Dooley (2010: 83) argue REDD focuses too much on CO2 reduction as the main
causes and drivers of deforestation are not linked to carbon emissions. As a result, the main
drivers of deforestation are not dealt with sufficiently in REDD+. Ookereke & Dooley (Ibid.)
conclude focusing on CO2 emissions is in fact a limited technical solution whereas the
broader causes of deforestation in tropical countries are not addressed. Thus, the regime focus
is on reducing CO2 emissions, but Okereke & Dooley (2010: 84) argue it is essential to attend
to socio-cultural, moral and political issues and implications as well in order to establish an
effective REDD+-regime. From a International relations regime theory perspective, the focus
on reducing CO2 emissions by avoiding deforestation is understandable. The main principle
of REDD+ when applying the regime theory definition by Krasner and Young is ‘using
forests as carbon sinks will lead to climate change mitigation’. This principle, one of the key
elements of the regime theory definition, implies a causal relation between using forests as
carbon sinks and climate change mitigation. As this principle and the norm ‘avoiding
deforestation should lead to reduced deforestation rates in countries with tropical forests’
form the essential character of REDD+, the causes of deforestation rates in countries with
tropical forests are not addressed.
Smouts (2008: 431) criticizes regime theory as it regards regimes individually and separated
from other international regimes. Smouts argues international environmental regimes can
never be solely regarded, as international regimes are always linked to other international
environmental regimes. Regime theory identifies the relatively narrow scope of REDD+ as it
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
30
focuses primarily on climate change mitigation by using forests as carbon sinks. Because of
this narrow scope, the main drivers of deforestation, for example unstructured timber chains
in countries with tropical forests remain unaddressed (Dauvergne, 1997:25). Thus, the
argument as posed by Okereke & Dooley (2010: 84) to include socio-cultural, moral and
political issues into REDD is consistent with Smouts critique on IR regime theory, in
particular the REDD-regime.
Another controversial issue in REDD+ is the issue of ‘leakage’. Leakage in REDD+ is likely
to occur when developing countries receive payments for reducing their deforestation rates.
As a result, it is foreseeable deforestation and forest depletion will increase in other countries
having large quantities of forests but not beneficiary to payments in REDD+ (Mann & Surya,
2009: 43). Leakage is mainly caused by the growing demand for timber, a trend that is likely
to continue in the next decades due to increased global consumption and population growth
(Fry, 2008: 173; Huettner, Vilamor, Huberman, Ebeling, Lehmann & Mannigel, 2008: 1).
Although deforestation rates might drop in areas belonging to a developing country receiving
REDD+ payments, because of leakage it is likely the unsustainable forest practices will move
to different forests of which the state is not assigned as REDD+ beneficiary. Chutz (2010: 62)
argues the issue of leakage is unavoidable as neoliberal polices have become widespread
throughout the globe. It is therefore highly profitable for TNCs to move to areas where there
is no regulation prohibiting the exploitation of the forests. Humphreys (2006: 216)
emphasizes the role of increased consumption demands and the removal of trade barriers
consistent with neoliberalism as why it is not difficult for TNCs to move to different countries
to deplete forests. What is particularly making the threat of leakage very real, is that the issue
of leakage is largely overlooked and seldom discussed during multilateral REDD negotiations
(Fry, 2008: 173).
3.4
The implementation procedure
When assessing existing deforestation governance, the implementation of soft law into
national policies as well as the implementation of market-based approaches into national
policies has proven to be an arduous task. Thus, the question arises whether individual states
will be able to successfully implement REDD and live up to its obligations. An unresolved
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
31
issue in REDD+ is at what geographic scale REDD+ activities have to be carried out. After
Copenhagen, more emphasis has been placed on the national policy level as to ensure that
significant drivers of deforestation are being addressed and that efforts can be tracked in till
the bottom (Daviet, 2010). Currently, three implementation levels can be identified: the
international, national and subnational level (Angelsen & Wertz-Kannounnikoff, 2010: 12).
On the sub-national level the idea is forest conservation efforts in an individual country will
be eligible for funding under the REDD+ mechanism at project level (Chutz, 2010: 41).
However, it is still rather unclear how the subnational level will function in practice. Thus,
REDD+ consists of a hybrid form of environmental governance as the REDD+ has to be
implemented on different levels (Igoe & Brockington, 2007: 433; Corbera & Schroeder, 2010:
2; Angelsen & Wertz-Kannounnikoff, 2010:13). Corbera & Schroeder (2010: 9) stress the
importance to establish agreements on how to implement REDD+ policies, as this is issue is
still largely unresolved even after Cancun.
Implementing REDD will also be problematic for another reason. REDD+ focuses solely on
countries with high rates of tropical deforestation as potential players in a REDD+. In this
regard, concern has increased related to regions and/or countries where forest cover is vast yet
deforestation pressures are low. Examples of such countries are Guyana, Belize and Gabon.
The nations fitting these criteria have an unclear position in the REDD+ mechanism. The
issue of leakage is therefore foreseeable regarding these countries. As Guyana, Belize Gabon
are no beneficiaries of payments under the current REDD+ regime, this may provide an
incentive for them to start depleting their forests at a higher rate in order to qualify for
REDD+ as to to receive payments. (Chutz, 2010: 42). Furthermore, it seems also a matter of
before TNCs will move to these countries to use its natural resources.
Further complicating the implementation process of REDD+ is the fact tropical forests are not
inhabited. These indigenous peoples and forest inhabitants are usually either economically
poor or are not attached to global financial and market structures (Okereke & Dooley, 2010:
93). It is foreseeable REDD+ will have a big impact on their lives but to date they have not
been given a voice in the REDD+ negotiations either directly or indirectly through domestic
participatory processes (Schroeder, 2010: 318).
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Conclusion
In this chapter the core concepts underlying REDD+ have been explained. The main points of
critique related to REDD+ have also been addressed. What has become clear regarding the
debate whether to include a market-based funding mechanism, is that the inclusion of the
latter yields certain benefits, such as financial incentives, compared to a non-market based
funding mechanism. However, there are some strong arguments opposing the inclusion of
such a funding mechanism. Taking a stand in the debate is therefore not an easy task as many
arguments have to be taken into account.
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Chapter 4
A stakeholder analysis of REDD+
Introduction
While there have been several rounds of REDD negotiations in the past few years, it is
puzzling why even after the Cancun climate negotiations still no consensus has been reached
on the content of the REDD mechanism. After all, all countries participating in the REDD
negotiations expressed the wish to mitigate climate change by using tropical forests as carbon
sinks. As has been cynically noted by Lang (2010), the only agreement made at Cancun is
that there will be another round of REDD+ negotiations next year in Durban, South-Africa.
Although such a comment might be a bit too cynical, it is puzzling why it turns out to be so
difficult to reach consensus on the content of the REDD mechanism. This being said, a
stakeholder analysis in this thesis can be a useful tool to obtain a better insight in the
complexities underlying the REDD negotiations. Moreover, in order to conclude whether
REDD can be successful to curb deforestation rates in tropical countries, a stakeholder
analysis is most likely to be helpful. A stakeholder analysis will thus be useful in order to
answer the research question.
4.1
Stakeholder analysis methodology
The stakeholder analysis will primarily focus on the role and influence of stakeholders in the
REDD+ negotiations. The question arises why a stakeholder analysis will be useful regarding
the answering of the research question in this thesis. The answer is twofold. First, by
addressing the influence and motivations of different actors involved in the REDD
negotiations, a better insight is likely to be obtained. Whether REDD will eventually turn out
to be a successful tool to curb deforestation rates in developing countries. Second, by
assessing the different actors directly or indirectly involved in the REDD negotiations, a
better understanding of the magnitude of complexities regarding the multilateral REDD
negotiations is likely to be perceived. Although a multi-stakeholder analysis is commonly
used in the field of corporate and business studies, it is not so widely used in the field of
international relations. This does not however lower the importance of a stakeholder analysis
in the field of international relations. In this thesis, a stakeholder analysis in relation to the
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
34
research question is expected to be particularly helpful in order to gain a better insight in the
diverging interests of the countries involved in REDD+. In this regard the definition of a
multi-stakeholder analysis as has been set forth by Grimble, Chan, Aglionby & Quan (1995:4)
will be used. Grimble et al. (Ibid.) define a stakeholder analysis related to the field of
international relations ‘as an approach for understanding a system by identifying the key
actors or stakeholders in the system, and assessing their respective interest in that system’.
Adding to this definition, Ramirez (1998: 103) states stakeholders need to be assessed on the
basis of their attributes, interrelationships, and interests related to a specific topic or issue, in
this regard the REDD negotiations.
The stakeholder analysis will be conducted as follows. Stakeholders will be analyzed through
assessing academic literature, (NGO) reports, journals and news articles. Where possible, data
obtained from interviews with experts in the field will also be used to map the various
stakeholders and their alleged interests in the REDD negotiations. Grimble et al. (1995: 7)
have also set forth a list a general set of comprehensive steps which will be used in order to
conduct the multi-stakeholder analysis in this thesis:
1.
Identify the main purpose of the analysis;
2.
Develop an understanding of the system and decision-makers in the system;
3.
Identify principal stakeholders;
4.
Investigate stakeholder interests and characteristics, as well as circumstances;
5.
Investigate stakeholder interactions where possible.
The first step, the identification of the main purpose of the analysis, has already been
performed in this chapter. By the analyzing of REDD+ in chapter three, the second step of
the multi-stakeholder analysis has been conducted. Therefore the next step to be addressed is
the identification of principal stakeholders.
4.2
Identifying and examining the stakeholders
In REDD+, many stakeholders on different levels can be identified. On a horizontal
international level for example, the different governments of countries involved in the
multilateral REDD policy negotiations can be identified as principal stakeholders. On a
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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vertical level, stakeholders within individual states can be identified. Stakeholders on a
national level can be logging companies, (inter)national NGO’s and indigenous people
inhabiting the tropical forests. The primary focus of this stakeholder analysis will be on the
multilateral REDD+ negotiations because this thesis focuses primarily on multilateral
negotiations to address deforestation. Furthermore, the limited length and time available for
writing this thesis does not allow for more into depth research into stakeholders on a national
level, in particular non-state actors. This is further justified as NGO’s, scientists and
individuals are all observers to the REDD negotiations but have no formal voice in the actual
decision making process on the content of REDD (Skutch & van Laake, 2008: 835). That is
why this stakeholder analysis will primarily focus on the participants involved in the REDD+
negotiations, e.g. governments of countries. Three South countries will be analyzed in this
chapter: Brazil, India and Indonesia. The choice for these countries is justified as all three
have a different position on whether a market-based funding mechanism should be included in
REDD+. As such, these countries represent a different view on the proposed content of
REDD+, in particular regarding the debate whether to include a market or non-market based
funding mechanism. Due to the limited length and amount of time available for the writing of
this thesis, it is not possible to analyze more than three countries in detail.
4.2.1
General remarks
In REDD+ countries are divided in North (annex I) and South (non-annex I) countries. Skutch
& van Laake (2008: 831) mention that ´on several issues there is more difference in interest
between different South countries than between South and North.´ This argument will be
analyzed by taking a closer look at the interests and preferences of three so called South
countries: Brazil, India and Indonesia. Although financial compensation will primarily flow
from North countries to South countries to implement policy measures to curb their
deforestation rates, these will not be solely government to government deals. Non-state actors,
such as TNC´s, will be involved as well in the REDD+ mechanism on a national level (Ibid).
The involvement of non-state actors is consistent with liberal institutionalist theory.
International cooperation through multilateral negations, which is the main pillar of liberal
institutionalism, as well as the inclusion of non-state actors in REDD, has not resulted in
tangible REDD+ content yet. Although the non-state actors merely have an advisory role in
the REDD negotiations, they are in fact pressing their own interest and have therefore
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
36
influence on the negotiations (Chagas, 2010: 18). Furthermore, TNC’s from developed
countries will have the opportunity to buy carbon credits when a market-based funding
mechanism will be implemented in the REDD-mechanism. Thus, carbon credits can also by
purchased by private actors.
4.2.2 Brazil
Brazil’s territory contains huge amounts of tropical forests making it interesting to assess
Brazil’s interests and position in the REDD+ negotiations. Albeit deforestation rates in Brazil
have dropped significantly in the past decade, deforestation remains a major problem
(Regalado, 2010). According to Ookereke & Dooley (2010: 89) Brazil´s main concern in
REDD+ is to keep sovereignty over its own tropical forests. As Brazils territory contains huge
amounts of rainforests, Brazil is a key player in the REDD+ negotiations and is likely to be a
major beneficiary of REDD+ payments. Brazil is aiming for REDD+ policies which will
eventually reward reduced rates of deforestation in the oncoming years. It is logical Brazil
stresses rewarding reduced rates of deforestation as Brazil is facing high deforestation rates
itself, making it likely for Brazil to yield maximum financial compensation as a REDD+
beneficiary. In this regard Brazil argues reducing deforestation is socially and politically
costly and needs early funding to launch reforms, compensate the potential ‘losers’ and
maintain efforts over time (Skutch & van Laake: 2008: 835). One way of putting pressure on
‘North’ countries as used by Brazil is pointing out the historical responsibilities of the North.
Bolivia for example is another country which stresses the importance of historical
responsibilities of the North. The argument regarding historical responsibilities is constructed
as follows: The North has contributed to a greater extent to the carbon emissions in the past
150 years. Consequently, North countries must pay more to compensate for their historical
emissions as they can be held responsible to a greater extent for the climate change. The
argument for North countries to pay more is also based on the fact TNC’s from the North
have contributed to unsustainable logging practices in the Amazon in the past decades.
(Ookereke & Dooley, 2010: 89; Butler, 2009). As Brazil’s main concern is to keep
sovereignty over its own tropical forests, Brazil is strongly opposing the inclusion of a
market-based mechanism as it comes to the funding of REDD+. Instead, Brazil calls for a
fund financed by donations from North countries. With the inclusion of a fund North
countries are likely to pay more compared with the inclusion of a market-based funding
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
37
mechanism. According to Brazil this will do justice to the historical responsibilities of the
industrialized countries. (Butler, 2009). Another argument why Brazil is resisting the
inclusion of a market-based funding mechanism in REDD+ is this might have negative effects
on Brazil’s economy. By issuing carbon credits Brazil cannot do as it pleases with its own
forest as the owners of the carbon credits will gain influence on a certain part of Brazil’s
tropical forests. According to Butler (2009) carbon credits may thus have negative effects on
Brazil’s economy, which contributes to Brazil’s reluctancy to support the inclusion of a
market-based mechanism in REDD+.
4.2.3 India
Another country worthwhile analyzing in the REDD+ negotiations is India because of its
contradictory position compared with Brazil, in terms of deforestation rates the country faces
as well as their position on the inclusion of a market-based financing mechanism. Even
though India is likely to be a REDD+ beneficiary it takes a different stance than Brazil on
several points in the negotiations. The threat of high deforestation rates and thus forest
depletion is not a problem in India as the deforestation rates of the tropical forests in the
country are stable. The stable and low deforestation rates in India are not related to the
country its battle to mitigate climate change (Fry, 2008: 180). As it comes to the content of
REDD+ India is aiming for financial compensation for keeping their deforestation rates
stable. The claim India has made is labeled as ‘compensated conservation’. Compensated
conservation means countries that preserve their forests or even afforest should be financially
rewarded under the REDD+ mechanism (Ookereke & Dooley, 2010: 89). There is however
disagreement on whether compensated conservation should actually be included in the
REDD+ mechanism as it does not directly contribute to carbon savings (Mann & Surya, 2009:
52; Skutch & van Laake, 2008: 835). Fry (2008: 180) argues compensated conservation is
likely to create perverse effects when a country receives money while it does not face high
deforestation rates of its tropical forests. According to Fry this will provide an incentive for
the country involved to increase its imports of tropical timber. Although at first sight this
argument might seem a bit farfetched, India is already a major importer of tropical timber
even though it has stable deforestation rates (Fry, 2008: 180). As such, compensated
conservation might provide an incentive for countries to extent their deforestation footprint to
other countries with tropical forests. In Cancun the decision whether to include compensated
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
38
conservation in REDD+ has been postponed to the next COP in Durban, South Africa in
December 2011.
As it comes to the question whether to include a market-based funding mechanism in REDD+
India is favoring a mixed approach. As such, India supports a carbon credits trading scheme
but also wants to a fund to correct the market when for example stock prices are too high or
too low (Government of India, 2009: 19-20; Ookereke & Dooley, 2010: 89).
4.2.4 Indonesia
Another likely beneficiary in REDD+ is Indonesia. Indonesia has exploited and depleted vast
amounts of its forests in the past decades and is still facing staggering deforestation rates
mainly caused by ongoing unsustainable logging practices (Harris, Petrova, Stolle & Brown,
2008: 2; van Noordwijk, Purnomo, Peskett & Setiono, 2008: 11; Butler, 2010). Indonesia has
large stocks of tropical forests and supports REDD policies which are rewarding the total
amount of forests in a specific country, rather than changes in deforestation rates over a
specific period of time (Mann & Surya, 2009: 8-9). The Indonesian authorities have done
little to curb deforestation rates in the past and merely see its quantities of tropical forests in
terms of commerce and profits it yields (Lang, 2010). This fits with their claim to reward
countries for the amounts of forests on their territory rather than reward their efforts to curb
deforestation rates or preserve their forests. Meijaard (2010, in Lang, 2010) points out
corruption in at both the local and national level Indonesia is a persistent problem in Indonesia
and the government has done little to curb deforestation rates. Indonesia has a strong interest
in exporting timber and it is unlikely the Indonesian authorities are willing to address the
unsustainable logging practices of their forests, both legal and illegal (Mann & Surya, 2009:
23) Thus, the implementation of REDD+ in Indonesia is likely to face obstacles as its
government seems reluctant to take an active stance to implement the REDD+ policy
measures.
4.2.5
‘North’ countries
Developed countries are particularly favoring a market based carbon credits trading scheme in
REDD+ in order to provide financial resources for beneficiaries, e.g. South countries with
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
39
tropical forests (Brown, Seymour & Peskett, 2010: 110; Mann & Surya, 2009: 52). The main
reason why North countries are favoring the inclusion of a market based approach in REDD+
is its cost effectiveness. Supply and demand of carbon credits will balance the market,
creating the possibility for North countries to offset their emissions through the purchase of
carbon credits. According to Mann & Surya (2009: 52) there is another important reason why
North countries generally favor the inclusion of a market based approach regarding the
financing of REDD+.
They argue North countries are able to avoid responsibility for
reducing emissions in their own countries by buying carbon credits. Although developing
countries are financially compensated when carbon credits are bought by developed countries,
by buying carbon credits North countries are likely to have increased carbon emissions on
their own territory (Mann & Surya, 2009: 52). According to Gribling (personal
communication, 20-01-2011, 2011) the official position of the Netherlands is to support the
inclusion of a market-based funding mechanism in REDD+. Gribling argues it is favorable the
private sector will eventually take over the financing of REDD+ based on a carbon credits
trading scheme. This is favorable as donors, e.g. governments and TNc’s, are willing to invest
in carbon credits. According to Gribling the willingness of donors to invest in REDD+ is a
strong indicator for future success of the REDD+ mechanism.
4.3
Analyzing the stakeholder analysis results
It is important to note all participating countries in REDD+ have expressed they are in favor
of the mechanism ultimately aiming to achieve climate change mitigation. However, there is
disagreement on the content of the mechanism frustrating its effective establishment. (Skutch
& van Laake, 2008: 835). Karsentry (2008: 450) argues the REDD+ negotiations are too
deeply founded in the assumption governments of participants are acting neutrally and in
favor of the common interest of their own country, or even in the common interest of
humanity as a whole. According to Karsentry (Ibid) most stakeholders involved in the REDD
negotiations are likely to pursue hidden agendas and are thus aiming to maximize their own
gains. The assumption that there is disagreement between so called ‘South’ or developing
countries on the content of REDD+ is further supported by the wishes several developing
countries have expressed related to the content of the REDD+ mechanism, in particular when
it comes to what should and what should not be credited. These conclusions by both Skutch
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
40
& van Laake (2008) and Karsentry (2008) are confirmed by the interests and preferences of
Brazil, India and Indonesia. Although due to the limited length and time available for this
thesis only these three countries have been examined, it has become clear there is
disagreement between the South countries whether to include a market based mechanism in
REDD+. The conclusion by Karsentry (2008: 450) stakeholders in REDD+ are primarily
pursuing their own agenda’s instead of primarily aiming to mitigate climate change is also
supported. The main driver of Brazil, India and Indonesia to participate in the REDD+
negotiations is self-interest which is not negative per se. This is consistent with liberal
institutionalist theory, which sees states as rational actors aiming to maximize absolute gains
through international cooperation (Baylis et al., 2008: 132). However, after examining the
cases of these three countries, they are primarily concerned with their national interests and
economical gains. This puts pressure on REDD+ as to achieve its main goal; climate
mitigation through avoiding deforestation.
According to liberal institutionalist theory non-compliance or cheating by states in the process
of international cooperation is the main concern whether successful cooperation is likely to be
established (Baylis et al., 2008: 132). The Indonesian authorities so far have done little to
guarantee the successful implementation of REDD+ on its territory, providing a possible
danger for the future success of REDD+ (Mann & Surya, 2009: 52). As corruption remains
widespread in Indonesia and the government is reluctant to address illegal logging practices,
this can be regarded as non-compliance or cheating in the process of international
cooperation. As has been once again illustrated by the negotiations on REDD in Cancun,
South countries have diverging interests on what should and what should not be credited in
the REDD-mechanism and are primarily pursuing their own interest. This makes it difficult to
reach a consensus on the content of REDD+, be it lowered deforestation rates, compensated
conservation or rewards related to the amount of tropical forests within a country (Mann &
Surya, 2009: 52; Skutch & van Laake, 2008: 835). Brazil, India and Indonesia are persistent
regarding their position on the funding of REDD+ and are not likely to shift their positions
easily, making it a difficult task to reach an agreement on the content of REDD+. North
countries have neither been willing to give in to the argument they have to contribute to
REDD+ in accordance with their historical responsibilities during the Cancun negotiations,
further complicating the future negotiation process (Dooley, 2011: 2).
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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Conclusion
In this chapter a stakeholder analysis has been conducted in order to gain better insight in the
different perspectives and interest of countries involved in the multilateral REDD+
negotiations. Brazil, India, Indonesia as well as North countries in general have been analyzed
and their interests regarding the content of REDD+ are varied. The stakeholder analysis has
contributed to the understanding of why it proves to be so difficult to establish the actual
content of REDD+ through multilateral negotiations, most recently in Cancun
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Chapter 5
REDD+ as a mechanism on global deforestation governance
Introduction
Now that REDD+ and its stakeholders have been analyzed, it is time to compare the results to
the existing forms of deforestation governance, both multilateral agreements and marketbased approaches. These existing forms of deforestation governance have been identified and
discussed in chapter two of this thesis. Thus, in this chapter the important question will be
answered whether REDD+ in practice is and will be fundamentally different from the wide
array of soft law and institutions that have adopted in the past two decades stemming from
multilateral negotiations.
It is easy to oversimplify the causes of the limited success of attempts through soft law and
market-based approaches to address global deforestation rates in the past two decades as the
drivers of deforestation have proven to be various and complex to identify. Nevertheless, the
main causes as identified in academic literature will be put forth. These causes will then be
compared to the analysis of REDD+ in chapter 3 as well as the multi-stakeholder analysis in
chapter 4. Based on this comparison, a conclusion will be drawn on whether REDD+ is likely
to successfully address deforestation rates in tropical countries. Finally, recommendations will
be provided based on the results of this thesis.
5.1
REDD+ compared with existing forms of global governance to
address deforestation
5.1.1 Soft law
Financial matters played a key role in the limited success of multilateral negotiations on how
to address deforestation in tropical countries in the past two decades (Humphreys, 2008: 115;
Dimitrov, 2005: 3.). The multilateral negotiations in the ‘90’s were originally aiming to
establish a binding forest treaty, but a consensus could not be reached on the latter.
Consequently, the multilateral negotiations have all resulted in the adoption of non-binding
principles. Developing countries were reluctant to commit to a binding convention as
developed countries were unwilling to compensate the developing countries for the
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
43
implementation of such a treaty. This issue of limited financial resources is likely to be less of
an issue in REDD+ due to the willingness of donors to invest (Phelps, Webb & Agrawal,
2010: 312). According to Gribling (personal communication, 20-01-2011) countries,
corporations and even individuals are willing to invest in REDD+ by purchasing carbon
credits. Because of the willingness of donors to invest in REDD+ Gribling strongly favors the
inclusion of a market-based financing mechanism, e.g. a carbon credits trading scheme, in
REDD+. If REDD+ is to be solely based on a fund, it is less likely private donors will invest
in REDD+ as it is unlikely carbon credits can be purchased by donors. Instead, countries will
be paid from a fund.
However, the debate whether to include a market-based funding
mechanism in REDD+ remains undecided even after Cancun (Austin, Daviet & Stolle, 2010).
Whatever the outcome of this debate, REDD+ has more financial incentives and prospects
compared to the multilateral negotiations during the `90’s. The recognition of the importance
to mitigate climate change certainly sets REDD+ apart from previous international attempts to
address deforestation.
Another critique is the wide array of soft law and institutions have diminished environmental
criticism while as a result logging corporations were legitimized to lower their environmental
standards (Sindico, 2006: 835). Dimitrov (2005: 3) describes the results of multilateral
agreements preceding REDD+ on deforestation governance as follows: ‘… state deliberations
on forestry have become notorious in diplomatic circles for their apparent futility. Virtually
no progress was made over fifteen years of debates, the differences appear irreconcilable,
and key players offer no indication they may change their positions in the foreseeable future.
The soft law that has been adopted as a result of multilateral negotiations is enforced by
institutions, such as the UNFF. According to Humphreys (2008: 115) and Dimitrov (2005: 3)
these institutions have limited capabilities and are purposefully stripped of policymaking
capacity. Soft law is non-binding and thus compliance with these non-binding principles
could not be ensured. This remains a problem in REDD+ as well. States participating in the
REDD+ negotiations have not been able to agree on how to monitor compliance (Gribling,
personal communication, 20-01-2011 2011). Consequently, after Cancun, it is still unclear
how to monitor the implementation of REDD+ in developing countries (Natividad, 2011).
Ensuring compliance of the developing countries through the implementation of REDD+
policies can thus not be guaranteed (Gribling, personal communication, 20-01-2011). From a
liberal institutionalist perspective, the lack of an effective monitoring process can be regarded
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
44
as problematic because non-compliance or cheating by states is the foremost threat to
successful international cooperation (Baylis et al., 2008: 132). A comparison can also be
drawn to the stakeholder analysis related to Indonesia. A lack of transparency and corruption
in the various layers of the Indonesian authorities threaten the successful implementation of
REDD+ policies (van Noordwijk et al., 2008: 18). The Indonesian authorities turn a blind eye
to issues regarding deforestation, resulting in persistent illegal logging activities performed by
both Indonesian and transnational corporations (Mann & Surya, 2009: 52). If REDD+ policies
are to be successfully implemented in Indonesia pressure has to be enforced on the authorities.
Otherwise, illegal logging practices in Indonesia will remain unaddressed, further threatening
the successful implementation of REDD+ policies. It is unclear whether REDD+ payments to
Indonesia might prove to be an incentive for the authorities to address the illegal logging
practices, but Gribling (personal communication, 20-01-2011, 2011) is skeptical authorities of
developing countries, in this case Indonesia, will address illegal logging practices.
A consensus on the content of such a binding forest treaty could not be reached during the
multilateral negotiations in the `90’s due to disagreement on its content as well as diverging
interests of the states involved. As a result, only non-binding principles were created. For
example, the UNFF agreements confirm the importance of sustainable global tropical forest
management, but states do not have to commit themselves and are not required to report on
their progress and implementation (Humphreys, 2008:115). A comparison can be drawn to the
REDD+ negotiations. A consensus on the content of REDD+ has not been reached on certain
key areas, such as the financing of REDD+, even after several rounds of negotiations. Even
though states have been willing to cooperate in order to mitigate climate change, individual
interests and domestic politics prove to be a major obstacle in order to establish a
comprehensive REDD+ agreement. Taking into account Finkelsteins (1995: 369) definition:
‘Global governance is governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend
national frontiers‘, the absence of a sovereign authority requires states to be willing to reach a
consensus. In many instances, states are unwilling to even slightly change their position
during multilateral negotiations, even if then an agreement could be reached. Liberal
institutionalist theory correctly regards states as rational actors, although this complicates the
actual decision-making process as states act in accordance with their own self-interest. Taking
into account the latter, Forner et al. (2006: 2) have correctly noted that due to ‘the magnitude
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
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of the social, economic, technical and political complexities underlying deforestation’,
multilateral negotiations on global deforestation governance will remain difficult.
5.1.2
Market-based initiatives
A critique on market-based deforestation governance is that it has not altered the practices of
MNC’s and has therefore been unsuccessful to address deforestation in tropical countries
(Meidinger, 2002; Humphreys, 2006: 140). According to Humphreys (Ibid.) this is because
‘forest certification as a form of governance is grounded not in the norms of sustainability of
conservation, but in the market and the assumptions of neoclassical economics’. The idea is
that market forces will make it attractive for MNC’s to join a certification scheme because
such a scheme is cost-efficient (Sindico, 2006: 834). Essentially, not ethical concerns but the
risk of economic loss is the main reason for MNC’s to join a certain certification scheme. So
the question arises whether REDD+ will alter the logging practices of MNC’s. Market-based
approaches, such as the forest certification, have proven effective in developed countries, but
have proven to be less effective in developing countries with tropical forests. Logging
corporations active in tropical countries were reluctant to participate in market-based
initiatives. (Humphreys, 2008: 220; Dauvergne, 1997: 24). TNC’s have the freedom to or not
to join a market-based initiative. The example of TNC’s to join market-based initiatives in
tropical countries illustrates the limited efficiency of such approaches. It remains to be seen if
TNC’s are willing to invest in REDD+ by purchasing carbon credits. Gribling (personal
communication, 20-01-2011) is in this regard positive and argues TNC’s are to a greater
extent willing to invest in REDD+ in contrast to previous market-based governance on
deforestation.
5.2
Recommendations
It has become clear throughout this thesis the complexities underlying REDD+ are not easy to
be dealt with, resulting in slow progress as has been illustrated during the climate conference
in Cancun last November and December. Providing recommendations is therefore not an easy
task, as the complexities underlying REDD+ cannot addressed by straightforward answered. I
will nevertheless try to provide recommendations on how to increase the probability of
success for REDD+.
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
46
In the previous paragraph REDD+ has been compared with existing forms of deforestation
governance, both soft law and market-based initiatives. Taking into account the expectations
of this thesis, first the question whether to include a market or non-market based funding
mechanism has to be addressed. In short, I reject the inclusion of a market-based funding
mechanism in REDD+. Under market-based approach forest are seen as a commodity and are
thus expendable and valued by their economic value. Donors, be it states, NGO’s or TNC’s,
are able to offset their emissions by purchasing carbon credits. This results in the greatest
polluters purchasing the carbon credits for the most cost-efficient price. Furthermore, it
remains unsure whether a market-based funding mechanism will provide sufficient financial
resources to execute REDD+ policies. Supply and demand of carbon credits will determine
the fate of REDD+, which is too much of a risk for such a big issue as climate change
mitigation. It would be favorable to adopt a non-market based funding mechanism as this
better guarantees the future success of REDD+. As donors have proven to be willing to invest
in REDD+, a non-market based funding mechanism is likely to provide sufficient resources
while not valuing tropical forest by their economical value and placing them in the free
market.
Securing and taking into account the rights of indigenous people has been one of the positive
sides of the extended REDD+ mechanism compared to the initial REDD mechanism (Verchot
& Petkova, 2009: 20) However, the massive demonstrations by inhabitants of tropical forests
during the COP at Cancun illustrated this issue is still far from resolved. Indigenous people
fear the tropical forests they inhabit will be sold under a carbon credits trading scheme,
resulting in limited rights of the indigenous people over their forests. Although indigenous
rights of indigenous people have been more protected under REDD+ than under its
predecessor REDD, ensuring the rights of indigenous people should be a high priority. Not
just only from a human point of view, but if the rights of indigenous people are not
sufficiently protected this may result in a loss of credibility of REDD+. Protestors against
REDD+ have actively harassed the climate conference in Cancun and threaten to take it to the
next level if their rights are not sufficiently ensured (Menon, 2010).
The criticism on not sufficiently ensuring the rights on indigenous people does not stand on
itself. Although REDD has been extended to REDD+ in order to provide for a more
comprehensive solution to mitigate climate change, the extended elements in REDD+ are not
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
47
sufficiently implemented in the REDD+ negotiations. After the climate conference at Bali,
REDD+ was to include principles of forest conservation and sustainable forest conservation.
However, in practice little of this new scope is to be identified. The narrow scope of REDD+,
climate change mitigation through avoided deforestation, is threatening the future success of
REDD+ although this perspective is understandable by IR regime theory. Because of this
narrow scope, the main drivers of deforestation, for example unstructured timber chains in
countries with tropical forests remain unaddressed. Ookereke & Dooley (2010: 84) stress the
importance to put more emphasis on the inclusion and implementation of sociological, moral
and political issues in REDD+. Conclusively, to increase the probability of REDD+ to be
successful a comprehensive solution related to forestry issues has to be established. By doing
so, the REDD+ regime will become connected to other environmental regimes and does not
stand on itself anymore. This is further supported by Smouts (2008:431) as he argues regimes
achieve limited effect when regimes are not interrelated with other regimes. Tropical forests
cannot thus be solely regarded as a tool to mitigate climate change. In fact, by the
enhancement of the scope of REDD+, forestry issues will be successfully dealt with until a
greater extent. This will eventually contribute to the initial goal of REDD; achieving climate
change mitigation. It remains to be seen whether in 2011 REDD will truly earn the + behind
its name as it intended to do when established in 2009.
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
48
Conclusion
In this thesis it has been studied to what extent REDD+ can be a successful form of global
governance to address deforestation in tropical countries. REDD+ has placed the issue of
tropical deforestation and preservation back in the centre of global attention. Avoiding
deforestation is the of the highest priority in REDD+ as this will ensure the storage of CO2
emissions as forests are used as carbon sinks. Although even after the REDD+ negotiations at
Cancun several elements of the content in REDD+ have not been resolved, it is has become
evident curbing deforestation rates of tropical forests is crucial in REDD+. The REDD+
negotiations at Cancun have focused more on reaching any form of an agreement, rather than
on the actual content of the agreement. Thus, important issues like the problem of leakage
remain largely unaddressed during the COP at Cancun resulting in an increasing threat of
undermining the success of REDD+ in the future as deforestation will shift to areas now not
prone to it.
If there is one thing that has become clear during this thesis, it is the sheer magnitude of
complexities underlying REDD+. First, making decisions through multilateral negotiations on
the content of REDD+ has proven difficult because it is largely unsure which policies will in
practice mitigate climate change by using forest as carbon sinks. Seconds, the different
countries participating in the REDD+ negotiations used different claims and perspectives
regarding which efforts should be compensated in order to support their own positions and
interests. For example Brazil argues countries should be financially rewarded which reduce
their deforestation rates. In contrary, India argues countries should be financially rewarded
when they conserve their forests and keep their deforestation rates stable. Finally, Indonesia
argues countries should be financially rewarded under REDD+ in accordance with the amount
of tropical forests on their territory. Not surprising, the claims of these countries fit their own
position and interest the best. As such, the countries involved have diverging interests making
it difficult to establish REDD+ policies. As has been illustrated in this thesis, once REDD+
policies have been established the implementation thereof faces many obstacles, for example
weak government structures.
Addressing the drivers of deforestation has proven to be a very difficult task during previous
multilateral negotiations on deforestation, resulting in the adoption of soft law. Forner et al.
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
49
(2006: 2) have in this regard correctly concluded that due to ‘the magnitude of the social,
economic, technical and political complexities underlying deforestation’, multilateral
negotiations on global deforestation governance will remain difficult. REDD+ aims to address
the drivers of deforestation in order to achieve its goal, but based on the content the current
REDD+ mechanism fails to do so. First, if REDD+ policies are to be successfully
implemented on a national level, cooperation by the national authorities of the beneficiary
states is required. In this thesis Indonesia for example has been analyzed and weak
governance structures and widespread corruption are strong indicators the implementation of
REDD+ in Indonesia are bound to face severe obstacles. Second, the issue of how to monitor
the actual implementation of REDD+ policies is left largely unresolved, even after the climate
conference at Cancun. Under the current REDD+ mechanism it is thus unclear how to achieve
compliance by individual states.
From an IR liberal institutionalist perspective, the risk of non-compliance or even cheating by
states is the foremost threat to successful cooperation. As international cooperation can be
regarded as the actual foundation of REDD+, it is important the risk of non-compliance and
cheating is reduced to a minimum. Under the current mechanism, the threat of noncompliance or cheating is very real and needs to be addressed as soon as possible if REDD+
is going to succeed in the future. Despite this, there are certainly some promising aspects of
REDD+ when compared to soft law and market-based approaches. REDD+ is likely to have
more financial resources available in both the short and long term as donors, both states and
non-state actors, are more willing to invest in REDD+. This is major advantage when
comparing REDD+ to existing forms of governance on deforestation. These previous attempts
became incomprehensive solutions partly caused by the lack of sufficient financial resources.
There are some other unresolved issues in REDD+ threatening the future success of REDD+.
Most important is to make a decision on what kind of funding mechanism is going to account
for the resources in REDD+. Although the majority of the countries participating in REDD+
are in favor of a market-based funding mechanism, some countries, in particular Brazil and
Bolivia, are frustrating inclusion of the latter. The issue of leakage also needs to be resolved
in the near future, as it threatens the future success of REDD+. If these issues are to be
successfully addressed during the next climate conference in December 2011 in Durban,
South-Africa, the likeliness of REDD+ to be a successful tool to address global deforestation
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
50
rates has become very real. However, it will not be easy to establish such agreements as no
sovereign authority governs these negotiations. As such, REDD+ as a form of global
governance faces some severe obstacles. When the multilateral negotiations in Durban fail to
address these issues and again a REDD+ agreement with limited content is agreed upon,
REDD+ seems to go the same direction as multilateral negotiations in the ‘90’s: Endless
negotiations resulting in non-binding principles not committing individual states to take
action. Much is at stake.
Wilco Heiwegen, February 2011
51
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Attachment
Interview questions
The following questions were used during a telephone interview with Fons Gribling (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands) on 20 Januari 2011:
1. What is your opinion on the extent of comprehensiveness regarding the current state of
global governance, for example soft law and market-based initiatives, related to
addressing deforestation?
2. What is your opinion on the result regarding REDD+ as has been achieved at the
climate conference at Cancun, Mexico?
3. What do you see as the major unresolved issues in the REDD+ negotiations?
4. What is your opinion on the inclusion of a market-based funding mechanism in
REDD+?
5. What is your point of view on the probability of success of REDD+ as a successful
instrument to address deforestation rates in countries with tropical forests?
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