LAS
League of Arab States
Background Guide
NHSMUN
National High School Model United Nations
New York City | March 04-07, 2015
IMUNA
International Model United Nations Association
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 41st Annual Conference • March 4 – March 7, 2015
November 2014
Shirley Wu
Dear Delegates,
Secretary-General
Princeton University
Lily O’Connell
Director-General
University of Pennsylvania
Brody Duncan
Conference Director
McGill University
Alec Guertin
Director of Security
University of California,
Berkeley
Jason Toney
Chief of External Relations
Bard College
Laura Beltran-Rubio
Chief of Staff
Parsons The New School for
Design
Jinny Jung
Under-Secretary General of
Administrative Affairs
University of Michigan
Helen Robertson
Under-Secretary General
University of Virginia
Joe Sherlock
Under-Secretary General
Bowdoin College
Erin Corcoran
Under-Secretary General
Harvard University
Costanza Cicero
Under-Secretary General
University of Bologna
Alyssa Greenhouse
Under-Secretary General
Duke University
Paula Kates
Under-Secretary General
Tufts University
NHSMUN is a project of the International Model
United Nations Association, Incorporated
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-profit, all
volunteer organization, is dedicated to furthering
global issues education at the secondary school level.
Welcome to NHSMUN 2015! My name is Alyssa Greenhouse and I am thrilled to be your
Under-Secretary-General for the Regional Bodies Organ. I am currently a junior at Duke
University, majoring in public policy with a pre-med track. Despite the multitude of classes
needed for my major, I was lucky enough to have to opportunity to study abroad this fall
semester in Madrid, Spain. While my focus was on language immersion, the endless tapas and
international cultures did not hurt one bit. When I am not studying or traveling, I enjoy
cooking and trying out new gluten free recipes after recently being diagnosed with Celiac
Disease, which definitely made things interesting abroad.
I cannot express how excited I am to welcome you to the first year of RBO Committees, and I
hope you are all as excited as I am to take part in these incredibly unique simulations. Each
committee will have the opportunity to explore a new dimension of its topics, with the
national and regional perspectives playing a much more pressing role in the regional bodies as
opposed to a typical UN committee. From topics discussing the energy crisis in Europe to
blood diamonds in Africa, each has been tailored to its specific regional body and the
organization’s mandate. I encourage you to embrace the important role you each will play, as
your country’s voice is crucial.
Please invest in reading through the background guide that your Director has carefully crafted
for your committee. A significant amount of time and hard work went into developing these,
and they will prove critical in allowing you to engage in debate come March. I also recommend
visiting your committee’s twitter page in order to stay updated on the current events of your
topics. I will be working alongside your Director to ensure you have a memorable and
meaningful experience at NHSMUN, especially within the very first RBO committees. If you
have any questions or concerns regarding the conference, please do not hesitate to contact me.
There are countless resources provided for you, and I am happy to offer any additional help as
well!
Good luck and I’ll see you all in March!
Best,
Alyssa Greenhouse
Under-Secretary General, Regional Bodies Organ
[email protected]
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 41st Annual Conference • March 4 – March 7, 2015
November 2014
Shirley Wu
Secretary-General
Princeton University
Lily O’Connell
Director-General
University of Pennsylvania
Brody Duncan
Conference Director
McGill University
Alec Guertin
Director of Security
University of California,
Berkeley
Jason Toney
Chief of External Relations
Bard College
Laura Beltran-Rubio
Chief of Staff
Parsons The New School for
Design
Jinny Jung
Under-Secretary General of
Administrative Affairs
University of Michigan
Helen Robertson
Under-Secretary General
University of Virginia
Joe Sherlock
Under-Secretary General
Bowdoin College
Erin Corcoran
Under-Secretary General
Harvard University
Costanza Cicero
Under-Secretary General
University of Bologna
Alyssa Greenhouse
Under-Secretary General
Duke University
Paula Kates
Under-Secretary General
Tufts University
NHSMUN is a project of the International Model
United Nations Association, Incorporated
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-profit, all
volunteer organization, is dedicated to furthering
global issues education at the secondary school level.
Dear Delegates,
My name is Max Kober, and I would like to welcome you all to the League of Arab States
(LAS) at NHSMUN 2015! To give you a little information about myself, I am a junior at Tufts
University in Boston, studying abroad in Madrid, Spain for the fall 2014 semester. I am
majoring in International Relations and Arabic. Model UN has been a part of my life for over
six years; two years ago I was the Assistant Director of the Security Council at NHSMUN
2013 and last year I was the Council’s Director. I am an active member of the Tufts Model
UN team, and I have attended sixteen conferences in all (including four NHSMUNs as a high
school delegate). This year, I am also the Director-General of the Tufts University Model
United Nations Conference (TUMUNC) to be held in April 2015. While not discussing or
studying the Arab World, my hobbies include playing the piano and watching my New York
Mets lose. Since attending Tufts I have become a bit of a language nut, and in addition to
studying Arabic I am fluent in Spanish and conversational in Portuguese.
Colloquially known as the Arab League, the LAS (and specifically its Council) is the
internationally recognized representative body for the world’s majority-Arab countries.
Located almost exclusively in the Middle East and North Africa, the Arab World is a large and
influential bloc that many claim has little representation in the United Nations itself. Because it
is technically part of Asia, the Middle East has difficulty distinguishing itself in the United
Nations, where membership often rotates by continental blocs. The League allows Arab
countries to better express economic and political goals as a single regional bloc and take
unilateral action. With that in mind, this body will seek to address the political turmoil of Syria,
where civil war has torn the region apart for years, and the ongoing economic and social crisis
of Gulf Migrant Labor, which has purportedly stripped the human rights of millions. The
region as a whole has a clear obligation to address both topics, and each has far-reaching
consequences that have affected and will affect every Arab state.
Over the course of your research, this Background Guide will serve as an important source of
knowledge. It is by no means an exhaustive analysis of the topics presented, but it provides a
comprehensive and thorough base from which to gather research. Both issues at hand will be
constantly developing, and it will be important to keep up with the news in the days and weeks
leading up to the conference. I can be reached 24/7 at [email protected] to answer
questions, address concerns, and help out. Please also follow our committee’s twitter account
at @NHSMUN_LAS to stay connected with the dais and updated on the topics. You should
feel free to contact me with anything you need, or just to introduce yourself! I am incredibly
excited to welcome you to the brand new Regional Bodies organ of NHSMUN, and its Arab
League committee, and hope the League’s unique properties encourage exciting and engaging
debate come the conference.
Don’t forget to be awesome,
Max Kober
Director, League of Arab States
@NHSMUN_LAS
[email protected]
National High School Model United Nations 2015
LAS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A Note on the NHSMUN Difference .................................................................................................... 1!
A Note on Research and Preparation ..................................................................................................... 3!
Committee History ................................................................................................................................. 4!
Members...................................................................................................................................................................... 4!
Mandate ....................................................................................................................................................................... 5!
Present Projects.......................................................................................................................................................... 5!
Simulation ............................................................................................................................................... 7!
Topic A: Reaching a Consensus on the Syrian Crisis ............................................................................ 9!
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................... 9!
History and Description of the Issue ........................................................................................................................ 10!
The Arab Spring, the Arab League, and Syria ..................................................................................................... 10!
State Fracture and International Diplomatic Efforts ......................................................................................... 12!
Major Campaigns and the Internationalization of the Conflict........................................................................ 14!
Chemical Weapons Controversy and Aftermath ................................................................................................ 16!
Current Status ............................................................................................................................................................... 17!
Refugee Crisis and Human Rights Violations ..................................................................................................... 17!
Continuing Prevalence of Extremism .................................................................................................................. 18!
Ongoing Conflict Mitigation .................................................................................................................................. 19!
Bloc Analysis ................................................................................................................................................................. 20!
The Levant ................................................................................................................................................................ 20!
The Persian Gulf ...................................................................................................................................................... 21!
North Africa ............................................................................................................................................................. 22!
Committee Mission ...................................................................................................................................................... 23!
Topic B: Defending Migrant Workers in the Persian Gulf .................................................................. 24!
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 24!
History and Description of the Issue ........................................................................................................................ 25!
Emergence of Gulf Migration through Corporate Influence ........................................................................... 25!
Migrant Labor and Failed Economic Diversification of the Gulf ................................................................... 27!
Human Rights Violations as a Product of Migrant Labor ................................................................................ 29!
Regional Migrant Labor and Internal Conflict .................................................................................................... 31!
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The Risks to Migrant Laborers and the Exporting States ................................................................................. 33!
Moral Diplomacy and the Promotion of Migrant Workers’ Rights ................................................................ 34!
Current Status ............................................................................................................................................................... 35!
Lack of Progress in Legislative Reform in the Gulf ........................................................................................... 35!
The 2022 FIFA World Cup ................................................................................................................................... 36!
Bloc Analysis ................................................................................................................................................................. 37!
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ................................................................................................................ 37!
The Levant ................................................................................................................................................................ 37!
North Africa ............................................................................................................................................................. 38!
Committee Mission ...................................................................................................................................................... 39!
Appendix A: Map of the Extent of the Islamic State in Iraq & Syria................................................... 40!
Appendix B: Map of Distribution of Factions in Syria ........................................................................ 41!
Research and Preparation Questions ................................................................................................... 42!
Topic A .......................................................................................................................................................................... 42!
Topic B .......................................................................................................................................................................... 42!
Important Documents .......................................................................................................................... 43!
Topic A .......................................................................................................................................................................... 43!
Topic B .......................................................................................................................................................................... 43!
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................... 44!
Committee History and Simulation ........................................................................................................................... 44!
Topic A .......................................................................................................................................................................... 44!
Topic B .......................................................................................................................................................................... 49!
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A NOTE ON THE NHSMUN DIFFERENCE
Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,
Hello and welcome to NHSMUN 2015! My name is Lily O’Connell, and I am this year’s DirectorGeneral. I hope you are as excited as I am to experience the conference. Our staff has been working
all year to ensure that you have an engaging, educational, and rewarding experience in committee.
NHSMUN strives to assure that the quality of our debate and in-committee interaction is
unmatched. NHSMUN focuses on the educational value of Model UN. We believe that the
experiences in our committee rooms extend skills originally developed in the classroom, and prepare
students to become future leaders. NHSMUN thrives on well-researched, realistic, and diplomatic
debate. We are thrilled with the substantive program for NHSMUN 2015 and look forward to
vibrant discussion and cooperation.
NHSMUN Practices
In order to fulfill our mission, our conference has adopted practices that are key to the continued
tradition of excellence in our committees and the NHSMUN difference.
NHSMUN prohibits the usage of personal electronics during committee in order to ensure that
delegates do not gain an unfair advantage in debate. We feel strongly that the interpersonal
connections made during debate are enhanced by face-to-face communication. Enforcing a strict no
laptops policy also helps us to ensure that all our delegates have an equal opportunity to succeed in
committee.
The Dais is permitted a laptop for the purposes of communicating with respective Under-SecretaryGenerals and other Senior Staff Members as well as attending to administrative needs. The Dais will
only be limited to using their laptops for NHSMUN purposes, and the majority of their focus will be
on the needs of the committee. In addition, we staff a dedicated team in our office to assist in typing
and formatting draft resolutions and working papers so that committee time can be focused on
discussion and compromise.
An additional difference that delegates may notice about NHSMUN is the committee pacing. While
each BG contains two topic selections, NHSMUN committees will strive to have a fruitful
discussion on and produce resolutions on a single topic; prioritizing the quality of discussion over
quantity of topics addressed. In order to respect the gravity of the issues being discussed at our
conference as well as the intellect of our delegates, NHSMUN committees will focus on addressing
one topic in-depth. BGs contain two topics in order to allow delegates to decide what problem
ought to be prioritized, a valuable discussion in and of itself, and to safeguard against the possibility
that an issue will be independently resolved before conference.
NHSMUN uses a set of the Rules of Procedure that is standardized across all IMUNA-brand
conferences. These rules provide a standardized system of operation that is easily translated across
committee or conference lines. While the general structure and flow of committee will be familiar to
any delegate who has previously participated in Model UN, there may be slight procedural
differences from other conferences. All delegates are encouraged to review the Rules of Procedure
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before attending the conference in the Delegate Preparation Guide and are welcome to direct
questions to any member of NHSMUN Staff.
While NHSMUN does distribute awards, we feel that it is crucial to de-emphasize their importance
in comparison to the educational value of Model UN as an activity. NHSMUN seeks to reward
delegations that excel in the arts of compromise and diplomacy. We always prioritize a dedication to
teamwork over solitary achievement. Directors will judge delegates on their ability and willingness to
cooperate with their peers while always maintaining an accurate representation of country policy.
At the core of the NHSMUN philosophy is an emphasis on education and compromise. As such,
we do not distribute awards to individual delegates, with the exception of committees where
students represent their own separate delegation (ICJ and UNSC, for example). Instead, awards will
be distributed to delegations that exhibit excellence across all committees. The awards system is
standardized so as to give equal weight to delegations of all sizes. Awards will also be offered for
schools that demonstrate excellence in research and preparation based on the position papers
submitted by their delegates. Detailed information on the determination of awards at NHSMUN will
be available in the Faculty Preparation Guide and online in November.
As always, I welcome any questions or concerns about the substantive program at NHSMUN 2015
and would be happy to discuss NHSMUN pedagogy with faculty or delegates. It is my sincerest
hope that your experience at NHSMUN 2015 will be challenging and thought provoking.
Best,
Lily O’Connell
Director-General, NHSMUN 2015
[email protected]
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A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION
Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United
Nations 2015 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that
will be discussed in your committee. These papers are designed to give you a description of the
topics and the committee. This Guide is not intended to represent exhaustive research on every
facet of the topics. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully explore the topics and be able to
identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues. Delegates must be prepared to intelligently utilize
their knowledge and apply it to their own country’s policy. You will find that your state has a unique
position on the topics that cannot be substituted by the opinions of another state.
The task of preparing and researching for the conference is challenging, but it can be interesting and
rewarding. We have provided each school with a copy of the Delegation Preparation Guide. The
Guide contains detailed instructions on how to write a position paper and how to effectively
participate in committee sessions. The Guide also gives a synopsis of the types of research materials
and resources available to you and where they can be found.
An essential part of representing a state in an international body is the ability to articulate that state’s
views in writing. Accordingly, it is the policy of NHSMUN to require each delegate (or doubledelegation team) to write position papers. The position papers should clearly outline the country’s
policies on the topic areas to be discussed and what factors contribute to these policies. In addition,
each paper must address the Research and Preparation questions at the end of the committee
Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper must be written from the point of view of the
country you are representing at NHSMUN 2015 and should articulate the policies you will
espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and double-spaced. The papers will be read by
the director of each committee and returned at the start of the conference with brief comments and
constructive advice.
Each delegation is responsible for sending a copy of their papers to the Director-General via email
on or before January 22, 2015. Please email the entire delegation’s papers at one time to
[email protected]. Complete instructions for online submissions may be found in the
Delegate Preparation Guide and the Faculty Preparation Guide. If delegations are unable to submit
an online version of their position papers, they should contact the Director-General
([email protected]) as soon as possible to find an alternative form of submission.
Delegations that do not submit position papers to directors or summary statements to the
Director-General will be ineligible for awards.
!
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COMMITTEE HISTORY
The League of Arab States (LAS), or Arab League, as it is more commonly known, is the modern
product of nearly seventy years of regional cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa.
Initially a diplomatic pact among several former colonies that gained their independence as a result
of post-World War II decolonization, the six original members founded the LAS on 22 March 1945.
However, the League grew over the years to encompass the entire Middle East and parts of North
Africa. The primary objective of the Arab League’s Charter, signed by each member state, notes “the
close co-operation of the member-states” as an important goal of the organization across economic,
cultural, and social fields.1 It is in this spirit that the League has worked towards the mutual benefit
of its member states. It is important to note, however, that the vast majority of legislation and
agreements issued by the LAS have not instituted legally binding agreements of political or
economic policy, but have instead largely reflected statements of opinion by the majority of the
member states without calling for specific action.
A history of the Arab League’s joint action initiatives reveals a general consensus in key political,
economic, and social areas. One of the first joint actions taken by the League’s members after its
1945 formation was the 1948 military assault on the newly formed State of Israel. The League’s
aggressive attitude towards the Jewish state continued until as late as 2002.2 The League’s Charter
identifies Palestine as a free and independent state, and although no Palestinian political organization
was represented in the LAS until 1976, it was and remains a key point of agreement among the
member states.3 This representation occurred as the next significant act of the LAS, during the
convening of a 1964 summit, out of which came the creation of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), which would come to be admitted as a full member of the League twelve years
later.4 Throughout the 1970s, eight of the League’s current members were admitted, its largest
growth since 1945, providing the size and structure of today’s LAS.5
Members
The League has undergone significant changes over time, the most notable of which is its
accumulation of additional member states in the seventy years since its formation. The six founding
states of the LAS in 1945 were Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. These
founder states were soon joined by Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, and Algeria
over the following fifteen years as the League grew in size and influence. Following the 1964
summit, the PLO was founded by those existing LAS member states, and the wave of membership
additions in the 1970s resulted in a surge in influence and population.6 Alongside Palestine, the 70s
saw the admission of Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, the UAE, Mauritania, Somalia, and Djibouti. The
League’s structure remained largely in this form, apart from a period in the 1980s during which
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League of Arab States, Charter of Arab League, 22 March 1945.
Paul Lagasse, “Arab League,” in The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
3 League of Arab States, Charter of Arab League, 22 March 1945.
4 Johnathan Masters, “The Arab League,” Council on Foreign Relations, 26 January 2012, accessed 11 June 2014,
http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/arab-league/p25967.
5 “Member States,” League of Arab States, accessed 10 June 2014, http://www.lasportal.org.
6 Paul Lagasse, “Arab League,” in The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
1
2
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Egypt was suspended due to maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel but readmitted, and in1993,
when Comoros joined as the most recent new member state.7
Recently, Arab League membership has been somewhat tumultuous. The ability by the majority of
the League to suspend a member has been used twice in the past five years. Libya, during the course
of its popular Arab Spring uprising, was briefly suspended from the League due to a lack of cohesive
government. However, it was readmitted under its current administrative format of a ruling political
council, the National Transitional Council (NTC), in late 2011.8 Additionally, Syria is no longer a
member of the League, having been suspended in 2011 due to the ongoing Civil War, totaling the
number of member states at 21 as of June 2014, along with the three observer states of Eritrea,
Brazil, and Venezuela.9
Mandate
As previously stated, one of the primary goals of the Arab League is to promote numerous kinds of
cooperation among its member states. However, the Charter also outlines expanded goals and
missions, including the possibility of a united Arab currency, the integration of international
communications and transportations systems in the Arab world, the coordination of legal affairs
including criminal extradition, and the joint maintenance of independence and sovereignty of all
member states.10 Despite the Charter’s call for rigidly regular summit meetings twice a year, the Arab
League’s member states have thus far met in 41 official summits over 69 years: 31 diplomatic
meetings and 10 emergency military summits, with the most recent meeting a diplomatic one held in
Kuwait in March 2014.11 Beyond the responsibilities outlaid in the Charter, the mandate of the
League has begun to expand naturally to fit the changing nature of political issues in the Middle East
and North Africa today. Notably, the Arab League now maintains a flexible peacekeeping force with
troops contributed from a variety of states. This system developed at first as a response to
internationally recognized Arab crises, such as the situation in Darfur when, in 2006, the Arab
League first deployed troops to curb violence.12 Since then, peacekeeping missions have expanded to
Iraq, Somalia, and, most recently, Syria.
Present Projects
At present, the Arab League is seeking to address a number of ongoing political issues throughout
the Middle East and North Africa, in addition to working towards the economic benefit of its
member states. Some of the most pressing issues faced by the League today include the mitigation of
any political shockwaves as a result of the still continuing Arab Spring, whose legacy is still visible
throughout the Arab world; the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, separate from
Israel and with its capital at Jerusalem; and the creation of a free-trade zone for all LAS member
states in the near future. These goals and more were outlined in the most recent statement of Arab
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Johnathan Masters, “The Arab League,” Council on Foreign Relations, 26 January 2012, accessed 10 June 2014,
http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/arab-league/p25967.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 League of Arab States, Charter of Arab League, 22 March 1945.
11 League of Arab States, Arab Summits, accessed 11 June 2014, http://www.lasportal.org.
12 “Arab League Nations Offer Peacekeeping Troops for Darfur,” Associated Press, 9 October 2006, accessed 11 June
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/08/AR2006100800668.html.
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League political and economic goals, announced at the 2013 summit in Doha, Qatar.13 Ultimately,
the League of Arab States will continue to discuss and issue statements and recommendations
regarding any and all political crises, economic projects, and subjects of cooperation in the Arab
world, all while representing the voice of the world’s more than 300 million Arabs.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 “Doha Declaration of the Twenty-Fourth Arab League Summit,” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 March 2013, accessed
11 June 2014, http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/doha-declaration-twenty-fourth-arab-leaguesummit/p30339.
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SIMULATION
While the League of Arab States itself is a large organization, comprised of numerous sub-councils
and bodies, the group convened at NHSMUN will simulate the Council of the League of Arab
States, the primary decision-making body. The committee sessions as a whole shall represent a
standard summit of the League, one whose result should be a clear policy recommendation and
statement of intent to all member states.
A note on the effect of resolutions: according to the Charter of the League of Arab States, which
each member state has signed and ratified, an Arab League resolution is legally binding, that is, its
recommendations become mandatory, for each and every member state that chooses to sign the
resolution in question.14 For the purposes of this committee, a resolution requires a simple majority
(in this case, 11 or more of the 21 states convened), but will only be binding towards those states
that choose to sign it. Delegates should note the possibility for political statements or symbols of
disagreement should a member state not sign an issued resolution.
The scope of the committee over the course of the convened summit will be limited to one topic,
selected from the two researched topics by a simple majority vote of the League’s present members.
Normal committee debate will consist of a Speaker’s List moderated by the Dais of the LAS, which
is headed by the League’s Secretary-General, but at NHSMUN this will consist of the Director and
Assistant Director. Should the motion arise, delegates may also caucus for less structured debate,
either in moderated or un-moderated form.
During the course of the committee, each voting member states of the League shall be represented
by one delegation, comprising 21 voting members. The League’s three observer states will not be
present and may not vote in any case.
Diplomatically, the League is within its full rights to use unlimited scope of language, including
formatting its resolutions to “condemn,” “strongly condemn,” etc. In this sense, the scope of Arab
League resolutions have as much freedom as those of a Security Council resolution, especially
because they are legally binding to those states who choose to become signatories to them. Also
similarly to the Security Council, the Arab League does possess the power to deploy troops, but only
to states that have signed the Charter. Peacekeepers may be deployed with the consent of the state in
question or, if the state lacks a cohesive government, by a supermajority vote of the League.
The ultimate form of the resolution issued by the committee is what will primarily differentiate the
League of Arab States from bodies using similar debate procedures. Rather than issuing statements
of intent, including the desire to “encourage” or “recommend,” binding Arab League resolutions
should introduce clear frameworks for future projects, immediately making them binding
agreements for the signatories in question. States should outline timeframes and resources for each
proposed solution in detail, being prepared to implement them immediately.
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14
League of Arab States, Charter of the Arab League, 22 March 1945.
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Despite the differences in language described above, delegates should nevertheless structure their
resolutions in standard format; that is, a number of perambulatory clauses followed by a number of
operative clauses.
Member states should be consistently aware of the weight of international opinion as well as
domestic politics, realizing that the Arab League as a whole represents a massive fraction of the
global population. The League’s actions will have far-reaching consequences regardless of the topic
under discussion, by virtue of the weight represented by the League’s majority opinion. In the past,
LAS resolutions have formed governments, mitigated violent conflicts, brought forward solutions to
lasting international troubles, and proposed new systems for wealth and prosperity. All of these
types of solutions and more are possible in this style of simulation.
Ultimately, although the Arab League is an organization that speaks for the world’s Arab population,
it is invariably composed of a large number of independent states. Delegates should keep in mind
that opinions will, and should, differ wildly, and debate will be fueled by the division of opinion
among member states. While compromise is an important value of any committee, it should not be
prioritized above maintaining state policy. In the League of Arab States, any state not wishing to sign
on to a resolution has no obligation to follow it, and wide demonstrations of dissent are possible.
While the official language of the League of Arab States is Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), the
working language of the committee shall be English. Delegates and the Dais maintain the right to
address the committee in either English or MSA.
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TOPIC A: REACHING A CONSENSUS ON THE SYRIAN
CRISIS
INTRODUCTION
Of the political crises facing the Arab World today, the Syrian Civil War is the most destructive and
far-reaching. Now well into its fourth year, the conflict is in part the result of the wave of prorevolutionary demonstrations known as the Arab Spring, which has shaken the entrenched political
systems of the Middle East and North Africa since early 2011.15 Syria, which began experiencing
pro-democracy protests and calls for reformation around the same time, has since collapsed into a
failed state with no coherent national government. The conflict’s core, the military engagements
between those forces in favor of and those against the administration of President Bashar al-Assad,
does not limit the ongoing crisis to political instability. Rather, it extends economically and
diplomatically as well. The civil war affects the Arab World in its entirety, both as a catalyst for
debate and political change, and because of its very real effects that radiate today in and around
Greater Syria. Some of these include serious refugee overpopulation, economic stress resulting from
the Syrian collapse, and the prevalence of extremism in the region.
Today, the incredible momentum of the Syrian Civil War is what stands out the most. Despite
efforts from the United Nations (UN), the Arab League, special diplomatic representatives, and joint
Russo-American led multilateral peace talks, the conflict’s various sides are no closer to ceasing
military operations nor to beginning the rebuilding process. Part of this process is returning those
civilians who have been forcibly moved from their homes as a result of the conflict. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that, as of January 2014, there are
approximately 2.5 million refugees of the Syrian Crisis, with over one million of those in
neighboring Lebanon, as well as an astonishing 4.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).16
While the refugee status refers to stateless civilians fleeing across international borders, IDPs are
those contained within the country but equally without a home. Despite these differences, both
groups require extensive attention. Accompanying the refugee crisis that threatens to exhaust the
resources of surrounding Arab states, insurgency and militancy have become commonplace in Syria.
Al Qaeda-affiliated groups, especially the militant Islamist terrorist group Jabhat al-Nusra, threaten
the region’s already tenuous stability, and the newly-established Islamic State (formerly ISIS/ISIL)
has declared a 21st century Islamic Caliphate in the uncontrolled regions of Syria and Iraq.17
In addressing the multitude of subtopics and complexities surrounding the Syrian Civil War, the
League of Arab States has, in the past, issued unified statements and even attempted limited action.
Its efforts have, however, been met with failure on all fronts. It is within the responsibilities of the
Arab League to mitigate political crises throughout the territories of its member states, and Syria
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Mervat Rishmawi, “The League of Arab States in the Wake of the ‘Arab Spring,’” Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies,
September 2013, http://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Arab-Leage.pdf.
16 “UNHCR Global Appeal 2014-2015 – Syrian Arab Republic,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, last
modified 1 December 2013, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/528a0a2d15.html.
17 Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified
12 June 2014, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811.
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would certainly fall in this category. Having ejected the Assad regime from filling the Syrian seat on
the League’s Council, the LAS has an opportunity to aggressively address new and creative solutions
to the conflict. Suspension of a Council seat is one of the few immediate and direct powers afforded
to the LAS, and in this respect the League has delegitimized Assad. Only time will tell whether this
measure and others will cause lasting positive change in the region or simply bounce back, increasing
Syria’s volatile momentum.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
The Arab Spring, the Arab League, and Syria
The wave of popular demonstration and political changes known as the Arab Spring was
instrumental in bringing about the Syrian Civil War, just as it has sparked other outbreaks and
aftershocks across the Middle East and Africa. While the Arab Spring is technically ongoing, and
there is no internationally agreed-upon scope for the movement, it can be classified by its numerous
effects in Arab countries since late 2010. Beginning as peaceful protests but escalating into calls for
governmental reform, movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen ousted standing
administrations, not always to the benefit or interest of surrounding Arab states.18 One such example
of a less-than-desirable Arab Spring change was the cycle of revolution in Egypt bringing to power
the Muslim Brotherhood under Mohammed Morsi, to which many LAS administrations are
opposed. As revolts continued, the Brotherhood was overthrown by the military rule of General
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.19 In this instance and many others, the Arab Spring has proven completely
unpredictable, and following the initial wave of protests Syria was suddenly drawn into the
movement.
With the Syrian civil war representing one particular field of conflict within the larger scope of the
Arab Spring movements, it is important to understand the recent history of these pro-democracy
demonstration and what action, if any, the LAS has taken in response. When addressing each of the
Middle East and North Africa crises of the Arab Spring, we can see that the League’s member states
classified each emergency categorically. Specifically there were two categorizations: revolutions that
called for the push towards governmental transitions and revolutions that spurred controversial
responses among member states and very little action. Revolutions in a state like Libya were met
with active calls for the government’s peaceful transition because few LAS governments found an
ally in Libya’s Gadhafi. In contrast, uprisings in powerful “linchpin” states like Egypt would be met
with a less decisive stance from the League, with most LAS members calling for observation rather
than action. Whichever of the two categories a revolution might fall under, one constant throughout
the Arab Spring is the League’s absolute refusal to condone any kind of foreign military intervention
on Arab soil.20 This style of problem solving, in which national sovereignty is encouraged but the
regime in power not necessarily endorsed, does extend to Syria, and understanding how Syria fits in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Mervat Rishmawi, “The League of Arab States in the Wake of the ‘Arab Spring,’” Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies,
September 2013, http://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Arab-Leage.pdf.
19 Ibid.
20 Mervat Rishmawi, “The League of Arab States in the Wake of the ‘Arab Spring,’” Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies,
September 2013, http://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Arab-Leage.pdf.
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the puzzle pieces of the Arab Spring states is vital to interpreting the conflict as it is seen by the
LAS.
The LAS has reacted, as stated previously, in two major ways to the latest pro-democracy
demonstrations in the Middle East and North Africa. Syria fits in the category of active involvement,
as was the case with Libya, rather than in the second category of detached policy statements, as was
the case with Egypt. In 2011, when Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt became a symbol of the Arab
Spring and millions protested the Mubarak regime, the Arab League made no attempt to examine
potential human rights violations by the government, nor to ascertain to what extent protests were
being put down with violence.21 It is worth noting that Egypt stands as one of the most
economically powerful countries in the Arab World, as well as the largest, with a wealth of political
influence. Egypt prior to the Arab Spring was politically stable and a friend of the United States,
both of which are powerful tools for LAS states and are somewhat rare. By ignoring the revolutions
there, the League sent a message that long-standing reputations did not necessarily equate to
protection by the Arab bloc.
On the other hand, Libya’s major uprising of February 2011, which culminated in the capture and
execution of the government’s political leaders eight months later (including its de facto ruler,
Muammar Gadhafi), was met with immediate action from the League. Libya was swiftly suspended
as a member of the LAS; however, the League then quickly condemned the possibility of foreign
intervention to mitigate the conflict.22 In the greater scope of things, this resulted in the
endorsement of internal revolutionary movements by the LAS as the preferred means of ending the
conflict. In a further measure taken by the League, one that would provide a precedent to future
action taken against the Assad regime in relation to the Syrian conflict, the National Transitional
Council (NTC) of Libya was instituted as the country’s new Arab League representative in February
2011.23 The administration recognized by the LAS as a country’s representative must have political
clout but is at the discretion of the majority of the League Council’s members. Thus, the NTC was
granted increased legitimization and afforded a head start as a new governing body. The way in
which the LAS addressed the Libyan uprising is worth noting, as it would later influence the League
Council’s mitigations in Syria, but with less success.
International response to the Arab Spring has varied with the majority of Western countries in
support of the pro-democracy uprisings, at least towards the beginning of the conflict. As it has
become more apparent that the regime changes brought about by the Arab Spring do not necessarily
foster stable Middle Eastern democracies, Western views have shifted towards the negative. At this
time the Arab League desires more sovereignty for states experiencing Arab Spring uprisings to
allow for domestic resolution of the issues there. Concurrently, the LAS was fortunate in dealing
with a United States whose popular support for Middle Eastern intervention was hamstrung by the
end of two protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These factors have helped lead the Arab Spring
states largely to develop the results of their revolutions in a regionally contained environment.24 That
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Mervat Rishmawi, “The League of Arab States in the Wake of the ‘Arab Spring,’” Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies,
September 2013, http://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Arab-Leage.pdf.
22 Ibid.
23 League of Arab States Council Resolution 7370, Extraordinary Session, 27 August 2011.
24 “The Middle East at Crossroads,” American Foreign Policy Interests, last modified 9 August 2013, accessed 25 June 2014,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10803920.2013.819732.
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is not to say that each conflict has been without outside influence, far from it; but what influence has
permeated has largely come from nearby geographical sources. Such has also been the case in Syria,
where the trend of limited Western involvement began in the conflict’s earliest days. Today, the
United States is still hesitant to entangle itself yet again in the Middle East.25
State Fracture and International Diplomatic Efforts
The roots of Syria’s eventual degradation and fractionalization into contested zones of control began
with the Assad government’s repression of popular protests in early 2011. Following the ignition of
region-wide pro-democracy protests, similar uprisings in Syria demanded an increase in freedoms
and democratic organizations from the government. While the objective of these protests remained
largely stable and peaceful in nature, the face of the uprising changed radically when Assad-aligned
security forces began violently repressing and attacking protesters.26 A report compiled by the
United Nation Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in September 2011 found that the Assad
government was guilty of multiple human rights violations, including widespread attacks on noncombatants, stating that, “the Syrian Arab Republic has grossly violated the non-derogable right to
life.”27 The report also stated a disproportionate use of lethal versus nonlethal methods of crowd
control, and conceded that, while limited civilian violence against the military had taken place, the
numbers of pro-Assad attacks were far more prevalent and deadly.28 While the list of violations
continues, the most important factor drawn from the UNHRC report is that the government used
indiscriminant force against civilians on a number of occasions, fueling the protests that would soon
turn violent and divide Syria into factionalized zones of influence.
After several months of protests, accusations of government crackdown, and the September report
on human rights’ violations, the Arab League decided to offer an ultimatum. In October of that
year, the LAS proposed a ceasefire between Assad and the rebels, contingent on the Syrian
government’s release of political prisoners and opening of free media.29 By November, lack of
cooperation by the Assad regime resulted in the first tangible action by the LAS in the Syrian Crisis.
League of Arab States Council Resolution 7442 instituted an array of sanctions against the Syrian
government, affecting its mobility, economic solubility, and political power, in an attempt to
hamstring the regime’s strength amid the crisis.30 The sanctions were largely seen as an effort to quell
the government’s aggression against civilians, already condemned by the majority of the international
community. In instituting these sanctions, not only did the remainder of the Arab World seek to
isolate and break down the Assad regime for its unethical attacks, it did so while implying support
for opposition parties. It is important to recognize this as part of the spark that ignited the full
revolution and would lead the initial conflict to be declared a civil war.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Ibid.
Mervat Rishmawi, “The League of Arab States in the Wake of the ‘Arab Spring,’” Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies,
September 2013, http://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Arab-Leage.pdf.
27 A/HRC/18/53, “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation on human
rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” 15 September 2011.
28 Ibid.
29 Mervat Rishmawi, “The League of Arab States in the Wake of the ‘Arab Spring,’” Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies,
September 2013, http://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Arab-Leage.pdf.
30 League of Arab States Council Resolution 7442, “Following Developments of the Situation in Syria,” 27 November
2011.
25
26
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By December 2011, just a month after the Arab League resolution instituted sanctions, the series of
protests had evolved into a full-scale revolution. With the death toll exceeding 4,000 by that time––a
conservative estimate––the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was comfortable classifying
the situation as a civil war, noting the extent to which political stability had dissolved.31 Although the
conflict at this time was a civil war that threatened the integrity of the entire country, it had not yet
evolved into the full-scale destruction that exists today. As such, there were significant efforts to
contain and mitigate the early crisis, most notably by the Arab League. In addressing the entirety of
the Syrian crisis, the League deemed it best to deploy an observer mission to Syria, similar to UN
peacekeeping forces, beginning in late December 2011 and continuing until a review of the mission
a month later, to supervise a potential ceasefire.32 The attitude expressed here by the LAS Council
was that, despite a unified call from the Arab World opposing intervention by foreign powers in
Syria, it was within the rights of the League to propose and lead an observer mission themselves.
Concurrent with the establishment of the Arab League mission in Syria, Council Resolution 7444
recognized the right of both the Syrian federal government and the opposition parties to exist and
negotiate to form a coalition government, but rejected the right of Bashar al-Assad himself to rule.33
When the “opposition parties” are mentioned, this refers to the rebel groups who by November
2011 had coalesced into political organizations. These organizations would later form the Syrian
National Coalition. After Resolution 7444, as the civil war moved into 2012, the Arab League stood
poised to supervise an organized transition from authoritarian regime to new reform. However,
circumstance would render that plan inert.
Rather than helping to curb violence growing between the government and revolutionary forces, the
presence of Arab League observers had little effect. For the most part, Syria’s opposition parties,
working to oust President Assad from office, accused the observer mission of lacking a strong
mandate, leading to an inability to enforce a ceasefire.34 The other side of the conflict did not appear
much better: while the Assad administration praised the presence of the Arab League mission, the
international consensus was that he was using the League’s presence to buy time and establish
legitimacy while working to oust the rebels.35 With this in mind, the immediate effects of the
observer mission failed to develop a lasting ceasefire or bring either party to the negotiating table.
The lack of mission success was clearly noted by Arab League member states who had donated
troops, and within days of the observer mission’s mandate renewal in January 2012, the majority of
Arab League troops had been withdrawn by their donating states, citing increased violence and lack
of progress.36 It is worth noting for future action that this lack of consensus by member states,
combined with the ineffectiveness of the “solution,” caused the mission to break apart, in effect
ending the first phase of attempted peace brokering in the Syrian Crisis.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 “Syrian crisis reaching stage of civil war, UN human rights chief says,” UN News Centre, last modified 1 December
2011, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40595#.U_Zdq1bfEds.
32 League of Arab States Council Resolution 7444, “Monitoring of developments in the situation in Syria,” 22 January
2012.
33 League of Arab States Council Resolution 7444, “Monitoring of developments in the situation in Syria,” 22 January
2012.
34 “Arab League suspends Syria mission – Nabil el-Arabi,” BBC News, last modified 28 January 2012, accessed 25 June
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16774171.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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Following the apparent lack of progress of the Arab League peace plan, major efforts were
undertaken by the UN to encourage Syria’s compliance with the League, including a resolution
adopted by the GA and approved by most every member state. Almost a month after the Arab
League’s observer mission withdrawal, the GA issued a condemnation of violence on both sides of
the conflict, urging them to negotiate towards a coalition government in talks to be facilitated by the
LAS and a United Nations Special Representative.37 The international initiative, although implicating
both parties in the perpetration of violence, identified the Syrian government as the primary party
needing to stop the hostility and was nearly unanimously passed.38 Notable dissentions included
China, Russia, and Iran, three states that, despite opposition from the international community,
continue to support the Assad regime in some regard.39 The result of this forceful UN resolution
was the initiation of the Kofi Annan peace plan for Syria, with former Secretary-General Annan
serving as the UN Special Representative in the process. As the conflict’s momentum grew and its
scope expanded into its second year, it took on qualities associated with an international political
disaster, including the involvement of foreign organizations. From mid-2012 on, the international
community became increasingly more involved, the regime more extreme, and the country itself
more factionalized.
Major Campaigns and the Internationalization of the Conflict
Once the United Nations was truly involved in the Syrian peace process by March 2012,
Representative Annan began in earnest his peace plan for the country.40 As special representative of
the United Nations to Syria, Annan hoped to institute a ceasefire that would precipitate diplomatic
talks among all factional groups and the regime facilitated by the Arab League. Annan’s UN
monitoring forces arrived to implement the ceasefire in mid-April, and the process was proceeding
as anticipated until violence broke out, the agreement was broken, and the ceasefire suspended.41 A
complete lack of progress led the UN to brand the Annan peace plan a failure by May of that year,
with the fighting between the government and its opponents only increasing. This major
international failure illustrated the dangers of attempting to implement a ceasefire in the middle of
conflict. Furthermore, it helps emphasize the current power of Syria’s growing momentum,
precipitating the need for more creative solutions.
With the lack of credibility and effectiveness of multiple peace plans in Syria as of mid-2012, and
due to the stagnant and entrenched nature of combat between the multiple sides of the conflict,
military movement began to deescalate.42 However, rather than signaling a possibility for negotiation
or cessation of hostilities, the lack of a clear victor between the two largest factions (Bashar alAssad’s government and the Syrian National Coalition) served to internationalize the civil war and
drive outside regional forces to intercede to varying degrees. One significant entity that has emerged
in Syria as a result of the chaos created in the wake of the civil war is Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), also
known as the al-Nusra Front: the Syrian branch of al Qaeda. JN became prevalent in Syria in early
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
A/RES/66/253, “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” 16 February 2012.
Ibid.
39 Voting Record for A/RES/66/253, United Nations Bibliography Information System, 16 February 2012.
40 “Syrian Civil War,” Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified 16 January 2014, accessed 25 June 2014,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1781371/Syrian-Civil-War.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
37
38
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2012 but only began military operations and gained international attention towards the end of that
year.43 As an extension of the larger terrorist network al Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra represents a security
threat birthed directly from the conflict, as it has become a major political power controlling several
Syrian municipalities and has a stated mission of international jihad.44
The UN, and especially its Western member states, began to identify Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist
organization affiliated with al Qaeda in early 2013, and the Security Council took steps to add the
group to its al Qaeda sanctions list in May of that year.45 However, because JN fundamentally
opposes the Assad regime in a similar manner to other Syrian opposition forces, they have been able
to gain limited support from factional, less extreme Syrian rebels. JN now represents only one of the
multiple groups that formed as a result of the Syrian conflict, albeit the one most directly affiliated
with organizations widely classified as terrorist in nature. The civil war itself precipitated JN’s rise,
but only with domestic support from other rebels and international support from worldwide al
Qaeda did it truly thrive. The concept that the Civil War has been destructive enough to midwife a
new branch of al Qaeda is worth noting, as it poses both a new internal concern that must be
addressed to protect Syrian security and regional security as a whole. It raises questions regarding the
extent Syria can tolerate further fracturing before it breaks entirely. Additionally, the LAS must
constantly reconsider which factions are “good” or “bad” when even more moderate ones support
the efforts of extremists like the al-Nusra Front.
In addition to those factions directly associated with al Qaeda, by late 2012 Syria saw an influx of
military aid on both sides from the surrounding region. There is widely distributed information
indicating the involvement of the Iranian government in aiding the Assad regime, especially the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Hezbollah group.46 The United States and many Western bloc
countries classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, and its involvement in aiding Assad was
troubling to a number of states that feared it would precipitate increasing militant activity and
influence in the region. The international involvement in Syria also caused a change in calculus,
especially for the United States, when considering future engagement in the conflict. Potential
military incursions against Iranian fighters in Syria would be disastrous for United States diplomacy
and political stability, and this consideration represented a shift in U.S. policy in early 2013 with
respect to Syria.47 Because Iran and Hezbollah had become involved, the United States became
increasingly reluctant to intervene. Despite the continuing internationalization of the civil war in
Syria, by mid-2013 the conflict was no closer to being resolved, either by diplomacy or by military
means. Neither the Assad regime, nor the opposition coalition, nor any insurgent group could turn
the tide, and all diplomacy had failed at bringing the sides to the table. The Assad government,
under pressure to make military progress, faced a choice that culminated on 21 August 2013 in an
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat al-Nusra: A Strategic Briefing,” Quilliam Foundation,
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jabhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf.
44 Ibid.
45 SC/11019, “Security Council al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Amends Entry of One Entity on its Sanctions List,” 30
May 2013.
46 “Syrian Civil War,” Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified 16 January 2014, accessed 25 June 2014,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1781371/Syrian-Civil-War.
47 “The Middle East at Crossroads,” American Foreign Policy Interests, last modified 9 August 2013, accessed 25 June 2014,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10803920.2013.819732.
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administration-led chemical attack that killed hundreds of unarmed civilians and set the stage for a
global controversy.48
Chemical Weapons Controversy and Aftermath
Until 21 August 2013, the warfare implemented on all sides of the Syrian conflict was conventional
in nature; that is to say, it was mainly through the use of small arms and light weapons, artillery, and
armored warfare on the ground. The Syrian government was known to have possessed some degree
of chemical weapons munitions in the past, but early international appraisals of the Syrian conflict
specifically condemned the use of such weapons. In late August, however, reports surfaced that such
weapons had indeed been used, although on what scale and by what side was contested. According
to an investigative committee of the UN, victims of the 21 August attack in the Ghouta area of
Damascus reported experiencing artillery shelling followed by uncommon symptoms, which resulted
in death or grave illness.49 These signs were consistent with a chemical weapons attack, and it was
indeed the report of the investigative mission in their September 2013 statement to the SecretaryGeneral that chemical weapons were deployed against civilians, including children, in the Ghouta
area.50 With this truth established, and other independent verifications of the incident underway, it
had become clear to the international community that the Assad administration perpetrated an
internationally condemned category of attack against its own civilians.
On 14 September 2013, one day after the UN investigative mission’s report was made public, United
States’ President Obama announced that the option of diplomacy had become open in the Syrian
Conflict.51 This was a shocking turn of events following the international outrage over the Assad
administration’s universally condemned chemical weapons use. Previously, the only U.S.
involvement discussed was limited military engagement or economic sanctions, and the President
noted that there was no other recourse because of America’s military intimidation of Syria.
However, new developments, notably the willingness of Russia and its Foreign Minister, Sergey
Lavrov, in organizing talks with the U.S. and Syria, helped encourage the Obama administration.52
While the U.S. Congress was prepared to vote on the use of military force prior to Russia’s proposal,
it was through Russia that the United States announced its willingness to attempt a diplomatic
solution instead.53 These trilateral negotiations represented a possible step forward in the solution to
the Syrian Civil War, whereby Assad might be tempted to relinquish his chemical weapons in
exchange for protection when stepping down as President.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“Syrian Civil War,” Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified 16 January 2014, accessed 25 June 2014,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1781371/Syrian-Civil-War.
49 “Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013,” United
Nations Mission to Investigate Allegation of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, last modified 13 September
2013, accessed 25 June 2014,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf.
50 Ibid.
51 Barack Obama, “Weekly Address: Pursuing a Diplomatic Solution in Syria,” Office of the Press Secretary, last modified 14
September 2013, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/14/weekly-addresspursuing-diplomatic-solution-syria.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
48
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The same day of these trilateral talks, the Assad government ratified the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
their Destruction.54 Also referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), this major
international treaty is the most recent formalization of a global anti-chemical weapons consensus
dating back to the Geneva Conventions.55 The Syrian government’s accession to the CWC
represented an additional step forward, and the progress culminated in the announcement that the
United States and Russia would jointly propose a framework for dismantling Syria’s chemical
weapons arsenal.56 Such radical steps forward were poised to ensure the total destruction of Syria’s
arsenal and open Assad to diplomatic options, a feat that was accomplished in its entirety on 18
August 2014.57 However, the breakthrough had little effect on the still ongoing civil war, and while it
represented the resolution to an international controversy it did little to encourage further
diplomacy. It should be noted that the chemical weapons controversy was, in effect, an effort by the
United States and Russia to focus the seemingly out-of-control Civil War on a single issue. While the
final agreement was a success and Syria is in the process of disarming and destroying its stockpile,
the conflict has not abated, and success in one area does not necessarily translate to success in all
areas. The LAS will have the experience of past crises on its side when legislating on Syria, and it
must recognize that solving only one issue cannot mitigate the conflict.
CURRENT STATUS
Refugee Crisis and Human Rights Violations
Among the most prevalent of the permeating subtopics within the Syrian Civil War is the expanding
number of refugees and internally displaced persons. In addition to the previously cited 2.5 million
refugees and 4.2 million IDPs, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, a
branch of the UNHRC, estimates that as of February 2014 more than 250,000 Syrians are besieged
and under attack daily.58 According to UNHCR’ figures, there are in total over nine million at-risk
civilians as a direct result of the Syrian Civil War, and while a large percentage of those are being
assisted by UNHCR, the organization is not all encompassing.59 As the situation stands, there are no
Arab League forces, observer, humanitarian, or otherwise in Syria, and current aid to IDPs is
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 “Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013,” United
Nations Mission to Investigate Allegation of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, last modified 13 September
2013, accessed 25 June 2014,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf.
55 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 3 September 1992.
56 Laura Spark-Smith and Tom Cohen, “U.S., Russia agree to framework on Syria chemical weapons,” last modified 15
September 2013, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/14/politics/us-syria/.
57 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Declared Syrian chemical weapon stockpile now completely destroyed,” The Washington Post,
last modified 18 August 2014, accessed 19 August 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/08/18/declared-syrian-chemical-weapon-stockpile-nowcompletely-destroyed/.
58 A/HRC/25/65, “Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” 12
February 2014.
59 “UNHCR Global Appeal 2014-2015 – Syrian Arab Republic,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, last
modified 1 December 2013, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/528a0a2d15.html.
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maintained by the UN exclusively.60 Any LAS member state may volunteer troops or other resources
with a majority approval of the Council, provided permission has been received from the
representative’s government. Nearly 1.6 million refugees are concentrated in nearby Lebanon, which
shares a large border with southwestern Syria and whose refugee numbers now make up nearly a
quarter of the Lebanese population.61 Most refugees feel they cannot return to their homes, and the
economic burden placed on Lebanon by the influx is crippling. UNHCR estimates that it requires an
additional USD 1 billion for the continuation of refugee operations; funding that currently is not in
the budget.62 The situation has led many in the international community to cite lack of funds and
infrastructure as serious detractors for continuing to host refugees.63 For the Arab League to find a
way to mitigate the ongoing refugee crisis, it would take immense pressure off of Lebanon while also
helping affected civilians begin to rebuild their lives.
In addition to the prevalent crisis of refugees, IDPs, and civilians under siege, as well as the lack of
resources available to aid them, there is a clear trend of human rights violations that have been
reported out of Syria to date. The February 2014 UNHRC report cites slaughter of non-combatants,
execution without due process of law, detainment without cause, torture, and gender discrimination
as only some of the practices on all sides of the conflict that should be immediately addressed.64 The
report identifies all sides as guilty of a lack of distinction between military and civilian objectives;
that is to say, military operations are carried out against combatants and non-combatants alike.65
Today, the restoration of a legitimate national Syrian government would be capable of containing
these ongoing human rights violations. Short of this strategy, it may be possible for the LAS to
intervene with action in a limited capacity such as setting up transitional courts of law or other
measures to ensure the protection of those trapped within the conflict.
Continuing Prevalence of Extremism
Today, as the conflict in Syria rages on, the factionalism that resulted from the momentum and
influence it has gathered permeates in extremist elements. Jabhat al-Nusra still operates as the
official al Qaeda-endorsed cell group of Syria, but over the past year and a half it has come in
contact and clashed with a rival organization vying for militant supremacy in the conflict zone. The
Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS or ISIL (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/the Levant), is a
transnationally operating insurgency whose stated objective is to establish a 21st century Islamic
Caliphate across Iraq and the Levant (modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and Palestine).
Thus far, the organization has gained swathes of territory on the Syria/Iraq border, taking advantage
of the growing instabilities of the Syrian Civil War and Iraqi insurgencies to establish a foothold that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Ibid.
“UN Humanitarian Chief calls for greater support for affected Lebanese communities and Syrian refugees in
Lebanon.” OCHA. 4 April 2014.
62 “Syria Regional Refugee Response: Funding Requirements,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 5 August
2014.
63 “UN Humanitarian Chief calls for greater support for affected Lebanese communities and Syrian refugees in
Lebanon.” OCHA. 4 April 2014.
64 “UNHCR Global Appeal 2014-2015 – Syrian Arab Republic,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, last
modified 1 December 2013, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/528a0a2d15.html.
65 Ibid.
60
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now includes major cities in both countries, including Iraq’s Mosul and Tikrit.66 While the earliest
insurgent operations that would evolve into the Islamic State were originally sponsored by al Qaeda
in U.S.-occupied Iraq, the Islamic State today has moved away from al Qaeda supported policies and
towards a unique extremism that includes the targeting of Shiite cultural sites and various Muslim
sects.67 This disagreement is what fuels the tensions between the Islamic State and al Qaedasupported Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria today.
These two major extremist groups are essentially at war, with the Islamic State having assassinated
one of JN’s primary political leaders in February 2014 and continuing its aggression that same
month. Several months later, Islamic State forces captured an oil refinery formerly belonging to JN,
absorbing additional resources and escalating the conflict.68 By June, the Islamic State had firmly
established its legitimacy by capturing the major Iraqi city of Mosul, second only to Baghdad in
size.69 The damage to innocent lives must also be taken into account when analyzing this political
turmoil. Records of the Islamic State’s brutal treatment of civilians are well documented and such
brutality may not be contained to Syria. ISIS militants began a series of assaults on a Lebanese town
in early August 2014 that ended in their withdrawal but set a frightening precedent for continuing
attacks in addition to leaving dozens dead.70 Whether or not the groups’ conflict can be used against
them by outside sources is unknown, but the destruction wrought by each group’s extremism is
absolute. Ultimately, the League must work to prioritize which organization is more threatening as
well as in what way their extremist tendencies can be combatted. In the past, LAS member states
have reaffirmed as a bloc their continuing efforts to counter terrorism in the Middle East and North
Africa, but with the Islamic State declaring itself a sovereign state with legitimate political power,
calling it a “factional group” may not apply for long. If and when the Islamic State does move
beyond the workings of a terrorist movement, the League may need to entirely readdress how it
confronts the group and its leaders.
Ongoing Conflict Mitigation
Of the past attempted peace solutions for this ongoing crisis, the only one currently enacted is the
Geneva II Peace Conference. Proposed in late 2013 and implemented in early 2014, these talks
brought together some factions of the conflict and a large number of states with a vested interest in
the conflict’s peaceful outcome. Major organizers of the conference were the United States and
Russia, with the assistance from the UN and the Arab League in bringing together the relevant
parties.71 Multiple rounds of talks are planned, with many completed in early 2014. As the talks
stand, they fail to represent the majority of Syrian opposition forces, as the very convening of
negotiations with the Assad regime caused the Syrian National Council to drop out in January
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified
12 June 2014, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811.
67 Ibid.
68 Mark Tran, “ISIS: The group too extreme for al-Qaida that is taking over Iraq,” The Guardian, last modified 11 June
2014, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
69 Ibid.
70 Fadi Tawil, “Syria militants withdraw from Lebanese border town after days of clashes,” Associated Press, last modified
7 August 2014, accessed 12 August 2014, http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2014/08/07/lebanese-free-7soldiers-held-by-syria-militants.
71 Ghassan Shabanah, “Geneva II Middle East Peace Conference,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, last modified 4 December
2013, accessed 25 June 2014, http://studies.aljazeera.net.
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2014.72 As the founding bloc and largest faction within the Syrian National Coalition, the Council’s
pulling out was a major setback, meaning the negotiations were unlikely to succeed or represent the
opinion of all groups participating in the conflict. Despite being aided by new UN Special
Representative Lakhdar Brahimi, the Geneva II talks thus far have ended in failure on all sides.
Following the end of the second round of talks in mid-February 2014, both the Assad regime and
Syrian National Coalition representatives expressed frustration at the lack of progress made as a
result of the talks.73
Should the talks stall in a similar fashion when the third round convenes, it is extremely unlikely that
the lasting solution to the crisis will be reached through the Geneva II negotiations. LAS member
states should reach an agreement on whether or not to prioritize the strengthening of Geneva II, a
conference whose previous rounds have already resulted in failure but whose infrastructure is
already in place, or move on to new efforts. Should renewed talks be attempted, the conference’s
structure must undoubtedly be reworked for any success to be had.
BLOC ANALYSIS
While the geographical distribution of the following bloc positions are based with respect to Syria, it
should be noted that exceptions and overlaps do occur in some places. The member states of the
Arab League are not confined to opinion by geographic region, nor does every state agree on every
issue with each member of its bloc. However, these blocs do offer a roughly accurate sketch of the
differences in opinion expressed by the various member states of the League. The breakdown is
approximately as such: a Levantine bloc whose population is anti-Assad but whose sects and parties
provide Assad assistance and support; a Persian Gulf bloc whose Wahhabi adherents are strongly
anti-Alawite and continue to support all efforts against the Assad regime; and a North African bloc,
whose political changes in the wake of the Arab Spring result in serious concerns about national
security and integrity.
The Levant
This bloc, consisting of the Levantine member states of Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine, and joined
in policy by Iraq, is as a whole largely in favor of ousting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and
instituting a new political regime as a solution to the crisis.74 However, it should be noted that there
exists a sizeable regional minority of Shia Muslims (a national majority in Iraq) whose opinions and
actions complicate the issue. In many regions across the Arab World, political conflict comes as a
result of fundamental differences between the two major sects of Islam, Sunni and Shia. The
combination of large Shia populations and proximity to the conflict itself means that, at least for the
Levantine bloc, the solution to Syria is not as simple as ousting Assad. For example, though the
bloc’s majority is in favor of new political institutions for Syria, more than 70% of Jordanians and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“Main bloc quits Syrian National Coalition over Geneva,” The Times of Israel, 21 January 2014,
http://www.timesofisrael.com/main-bloc-quits-syrian-national-coalition-over-geneva/.
73 George Baghdadi, “Syria peace talks in Geneva end in failure,” CBS News, last modified 14 February 2014, accessed 25
June 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-peace-talks-in-geneva-end-in-failure/.
74 “Jordanian Public Perceptions of the Syrian Crisis,” Arab Public Opinion Index, last modified September 2012, accessed
25 June 2014, http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/1af52ed1-e0ea-43af-b0a3-d55fce2e64dd.
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Lebanese believe the Arab League should not take further action against Assad.75 That is to say,
while the many Shias of the region do not necessarily support Assad, they do not believe that the
League should forcefully oust him. This leads to a difficulty in reconciling the objectives of large
Shia minorities (or, in some places, majorities) with local governments.
Within the Levantine bloc and within the Arab League as a whole, Lebanon stands as something of
an anomaly with respect to its opinion of the Assad regime. Formerly occupied by Syria under
Assad, Lebanon has a strong Shia minority, one whose support of Assad has been represented
through the actions of Lebanese political party Hezbollah.76 Hezbollah, designated by numerous
states as a terrorist organization, has provided military and economic support to the Syrian regime
throughout the duration of the civil war. The extent of the minority party’s influence, and its
combination with the economic stresses placed on Lebanon by the influx of Syrian refugees, is
somewhat uncertain, complicating its view towards the crisis.
The Persian Gulf
The Gulf States as a single bloc present the largest unified opinion in the Arab League regarding
Syria, in that its members are largely in agreement that the Alawite minority governing Syria poses a
serious threat and must be removed. Here some explanation is warranted: the Persian Gulf States,
specifically those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), are almost exclusively Sunni. These states
are comprised in large part by a branch of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism, a conservative
offshoot that stands as an ideological enemy to the Twelver Shi’ism of Syria’s governing Alawite sect
under Assad. The differences between Sunnism and Shi’ism are apparent where more extreme
Wahhabism emphasizes that non-Wahhabis (the less conservative Muslims) are sacrilegious. With
this in mind, the degree to which this bloc might clash with the rest of the League’s member states
will present interesting dilemmas in compromise and negotiation. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have each expressed a desire to see the end of the Assad administration
and a new political rule in Syria, though not necessarily one of sweeping democratic reform. It
should be noted that Wahhabis constitute large minorities in each of the Gulf States and as such
oppose the Alawite Assad government. During the conflict’s escalation in late 2012 and early 2013,
Saudi Arabia and Qatar were among the first states to fully oppose the legitimacy of the Assad
regime by funding the opposition through capital and munitions.77 The Gulf states as a bloc went
through a variety of measures designed to weaken the legitimacy of the Assad regime, adding to full
rebel support with the closing of most Gulf-state embassies in Syria and withdrawal of
ambassadors.78
A notable geographic exception to the Gulf bloc is Yemen, which stands as one of the few states to
openly support the Assad government. The country itself is absolutely split on the issue of Assad
legitimacy, with the Muslim Brotherhood adamantly pro-revolution and the large Yemeni Houthi
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Andrew Kohut, “Widespread Condemnation for Assad in Neighboring Countries,” Pew Research Center, last modified
21 June 2012, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/21/widespread-condemnation-for-assad-inneighboring-countries/.
76 William Harris, “Bashar al-Assad’s Lebanon Gamble,” Middle East Quarterly XII No. 3 (33-44), Summer 2005.
77 “Syrian Civil War,” Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified 16 January 2014, accessed 25 June 2014,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1781371/Syrian-Civil-War.
78 Ibid.
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party pro-Assad.79 The country’s government is officially pro-Assad, although the national opinion is
not unified as such, presenting Yemen with a difficult decision to make on whether to accede to the
dramatically anti-Assad majority of the Arab League.
North Africa
The North African bloc is perhaps the most divided when it comes to the Syrian Crisis, with a
variety of opinions and possible tactics among the member states of Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Libya,
Morocco, Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti. Most of these countries have directly felt the shockwaves of
the Arab Spring in one way or another, and are therefore sensitive to the issue of regime change.
The North African bloc as a whole does not stand together in its opinions of Syrian leader Bashar
al-Assad, though they share recently reformed political regimes. The North African states are
divided into two major sects: those who view Assad as another Arab Spring dictator to be
overthrown by the people, and those who believe that the Syrian rebels have no place ousting Assad.
Pro-Revolutionary North Africa
More so than other blocs, some North African states strongly advocate Arab League military
intervention to oust Assad by force, as well as an increase in punitive sanctions against the regime.80
This group is led by Libya, the first state to recognize the Syrian National Coalition rebels as the
legitimate government of Syria, and Tunisia, the first state to experience Arab Spring riots and
whose government has reportedly contributed troops to the conflict.81 The fundamental ideology of
this North African group matches that of the West in that they consider Assad an illegitimate ruler
and recognize the root of the pro-democracy Arab Spring protests as a future governmental
structure for the country.
Anti-Revolutionary North Africa
This second bloc of Arab African states, while not overtly supporting Assad on the world stage, do
not oppose his regime and have taken limited steps to reopen relations. The anti-revolutionary bloc
is in itself only united by its opposition to the Syrian rebels. This group’s leaders are Egypt – whose
military government is in Assad’s favor after a coup ousted the Muslim Brotherhood and
Mohammad Morsi – and Algeria – one of the rebels’ strongest opponents from the beginning of the
conflict. It is Algeria’s opinion that the conflict has entirely spiraled out of control and away from
the democratic ideas of its inception, and the rebel groups are no longer legitimate.82 These
combined positions stand in opposition to much of the Arab League and will provide a great deal of
controversy that will inevitably shape debate.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 Farea al-Muslimi, “Yemen divided over Syria conflict,” Al-Monitor, last modified September 2013, accessed 25 June
2014, http://www.al-monitor.com./pulse/originals/2013/09/yemen-syria-conflict-divisions.html.
80 Andrew Kohut, “Widespread Condemnation for Assad in Neighboring Countries,” Pew Research Center, last modified
21 June 2012, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/21/widespread-condemnation-for-assad-inneighboring-countries/.
81 Amira Masrour, “Syria Claims Tunisian Government Support for Fighters in Syria,” Tunisia Live News, last modified 21
June 2013, accessed 25 June 2014, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/06/21/syria-claims-tunisian-government-supportfor-fighters-in-syria/.
82 Salim Tamani, “The Syrian crisis viewed from Algeria,” Aspenia Online, last modified 10 September 2012, accessed 25
June 2014, https://www.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia-online/article/syrian-crisis-viewed-algeria.
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COMMITTEE MISSION
In addressing a solution to the Syrian Civil War, delegates should keep in mind that, in all likelihood,
a single “solution” does not exist. For an issue so widespread, so far-reaching, and so entrenched
after only four full years, no one action can resolve what has been previously explained. Rather, the
League of Arab States in its deliberations should address what is at the very core of the Syrian
question: its momentum. As violence has stirred and rebellion erupted in more ways than one,
millions have been affected and all significant efforts at mitigation have failed. Rarely does an
international crisis stand up so adamantly to all efforts of resolution as Syria has to the international
community. The civil war’s momentum has catapulted it past the scope of traditional solutions,
necessitating creative thinking alongside hybridization, compromise, and discussion among all
member states.
The Arab League, uniquely poised to deal with the topic of Syria, must understand its deeply
complicated recent history and the impact of regional political forces on the initial uprising. In
addition, the countries around Syria (most of which are part of the Arab League) continue to exert
influence on their neighbor, for good and for ill in various capacities. As a regional body, the LAS
and all its members are directly affected by the topics they address, and the international community
will turn to the League Council and its expertise for the solutions that will best fit Syria. Efforts from
the UN to the Arab League itself have attempted to grasp a Syrian solution in the past, but only now
is the full scope of the crisis emerging to be seen and addressed. With the rising tide of the Islamic
State sweeping over the uncontrolled Syrian and Iraqi lands, with millions of Syrians fleeing across
the Arab World, and with more dying every day in Syria itself, there can be no delay in applying the
regional focus of the League of Arab States to finally mitigate this crisis and bring the conflict to a
long-deserved end.
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TOPIC B: DEFENDING MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE
PERSIAN GULF
INTRODUCTION
For decades, the states of the Persian Gulf have relied heavily on a migrant workforce that
constitutes the majority of labor in the region. These countries, each a member of the League of
Arab States (LAS), have faced increasing criticism as a result of the migrant labor practices that have
come to light in recent years and suggest possible human rights violations. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman have represented a united front against
labor reform in the Middle East.83 Together, these states form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
bloc, sharing cultural, political, and economic goals and practices. Because the Persian Gulf is a
unique region of the Middle East whose countries are united by large per-capita economies as well as
religious ties, it often blocs together as the GCC. However, with the recent revelations of the 2022
World Cup in Qatar, and the lack of labor standards present there, international calls for reform in
the GCC states have grown bolder and more frequent. It is the responsibility of the Arab League,
whose charter includes working for the economic and social betterment of the region, to convene
and set a clear policy on this topic.
The issue of migrant workers’ rights is no stranger within the international community, and nowhere
does it seem more familiar than the Persian Gulf. Given the region’s wealth of natural resources,
combined with the relatively small size of most of its countries, it would stand to reason that migrant
labor be utilized to its fullest effect to combat a population dilution. Namely, in economies as
developed as those in the Gulf, the native population is educated but there is no demand for
educated labor in-country. Each country’s reliance on resource extraction, which is a labor-intensive
industry, requires some graduate-level employment, but much of the GCC workforce is manual
labor. Thus, the population dilutes when educated citizens depart seeking work and labor is
imported in an attempt to reinvigorate the economy. Today statistics show that Gulf States have
some of the highest income inequalities in the world, despite also claiming some of the globe’s
highest per-capita gross domestic product (GDP).84 With this in mind, and with the labor class in
Gulf States largely separate from the native population, it is easy to see how a constantly changing
migrant workforce has become so ingrained in the GCC bloc. Today, it is impossible to separate
these workers from an analysis of Gulf economics, and their influence reaches further beyond as it
ties into the economies of the entire region. Any hope the GCC states might have of diversifying
their economies beyond the extraction and export of oil rests with these migrant workers, at least for
now.
Those workers in the Gulf seeking manual labor fall into two general categories: married men who
travel without their families and send money back to their home countries to support themselves;
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Abbas Mehdi, “Globalization, Migration, and the Arab World,” Arab Migration in a Globalized World, Geneva:
International Organization for Migration, May 2004.
84 “Migrant Rights Research Centre,” Mideast Youth, last modified 19 February 2014, accessed 20 July 2014,
http://www.migrant-rights.org.
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and young unmarried women performing largely domestic duties in the homes of Gulf nationals.85
Concurrently, the two major issues involving migrant workers fit neatly into those categories. For
the manual laborers, there are questions of human rights abuses and labor conditions that have been
implicated in incidents of sudden death, either by exhaustion or by accident. In the case of domestic
workers, the principal problem is abuse in an environment that is largely unregulated in the Gulf
States: that of the home. In both cases, more can be done to amend the current position of migrant
workers.
While the League has, in the past, legislated on the issue of migrant workers and declared their
human rights paramount, the domestic legal codes of the GCC states do not match the stated goals
of past LAS legislation. It would fall upon the LAS as a whole to rectify this discrepancy in whatever
manner possible by reaching a consensus to which the Gulf bloc would be agreeable. Without new
legislation, the migrant workforce as a whole will continue to suffer.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
Emergence of Gulf Migration through Corporate Influence
The Persian Gulf’s tumultuous relationship with imported labor dates back more than seventy-five
years to the first efforts to extract oil from the region. In the twenty years between the two world
wars, the breakup of the Ottoman Empire created five new Arab states, including several European
protectorate colonies. The seeds of foreign influence were strong in the Gulf during this time,
especially where oil was concerned, and both American and British companies sought to establish
relationships with the new governments there. At first, around 1930, oil contracts between an Arab
ruler and a Western corporation would include concessions for the region’s benefit, most often
including a “nationality clause.”86 Such clauses guaranteed that the employer make all efforts to hire
workers from the surrounding GCC states and restricted the amount of imported labor that could
be moved into the oil industry. However, the amount of manpower required to run an oil extraction
operation is significant, and restrictions on labor seriously reduced the ability of corporations to
produce efficiently. Because of this, many oil companies, especially American ones including Gulf
and Standard Oil of California (later Chevron), had serious qualms about limiting the number of
potential imported workers.87
According to the oil companies, there was a middle tier of workers, above the largely Arab
“unskilled” laborers but below the Western-staffed “administrative” level. This “semi-skilled” tier
was difficult to hire within the Gulf but absolutely essential to the corporation, and so the workers
were imported from nearby India, then under British control.88 Differing widely from the current
state of affairs, the first major labor migrations encouraged into the Persian Gulf were not of
unskilled or manual laborers, but of clerical workers in the middle tier who required some limited
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Arab Labour Migration to the GCC States,” Arab Migration in a Globalized World, Geneva:
International Organization for Migration, May 2004.
86 Gennaro Errichiello, “Foreign Workforce in the Arab Gulf States (1930-1950): Migration Patterns and Nationality
Clause,” International Migration Review Vol. 46.2 (389-413), July 2012.
87 Gennaro Errichiello, “Foreign Workforce in the Arab Gulf States (1930-1950): Migration Patterns and Nationality
Clause,” International Migration Review Vol. 46.2 (389-413), July 2012.
88 Ibid.
85
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organizational skills. Therefore, importation of labor in the past did not cause nearly the damage and
cultural dilution that it does today. As the oil business grew through the 1950s and 1960s, the
majority of Gulf-region immigration was managed through oil companies. One such example of this
practice was the American company Aramco, which imported massive amounts of foreign human
capital into Saudi Arabia to support the industry, inadvertently creating a racial hierarchy within
Saudi culture.89 The origin of this initial migration in the history of the oil industry is particularly
significant in Saudi Arabia due to its size and population compared to other Gulf States. Over the
decades, this labor integration has evolved into an attitude of discrimination towards migrant
workers, and it is important to consider its deep-rooted historical origins across the Gulf.
The Arab world as a whole, especially the Persian Gulf, underwent a period of spectacular economic
development in the 1970s and 1980s due to the increasing need for and influence of oil. As industry
boomed, so did business growth, and the Gulf’s need for large amounts of cheap labor caused
migrant labor to explode. Notably, the Gulf received large amounts of migrant workers at this time
from Arab states across the Middle East, ones whose political situations were somewhat tumultuous
after 1970.90 As the world moved through a recession in the early 1970s, the oil-producing Gulf
States were some of the few to resist the downturn, meaning emigrating from countries such as
Egypt or Yemen provided an escape from declining economic conditions as well.91 It was during this
time that the need for migrant workers, which was focused on administrative and clerical employees,
moved squarely to unskilled and manual laborers.
At this time the call for laborers in the Gulf was a win-win for workers and their employers, and the
GCC bloc constituted the world’s fastest-growing economies.92 However, oil as a growth industry
was a tenuous prospect that could not be maintained. The industry as a whole stayed afloat but
declined in affluence, and by the late 1980s, the economic situation in the Persian Gulf had begun to
emerge much as it is today. Issues of vast income inequality developed, a now persisting problem,
and poverty was endemic as laid-off foreign workers could neither find jobs nor afford travel back
to their home countries.93 During the 1990s, in much of the Arab world there appeared to be a
solution to the problem of a shrinking Arab workforce in the Middle East with the world’s highest
population growth and a high rate of marriages.94 However, the much smaller Gulf States and the
less dense Saudi Arabia were not able to reap the benefits of significant population growth.
Consequentially these states continued to rely on migrant labor as the 20th century drew to a close.
With the advent of globalization towards the end of the 20th century, the Gulf’s migrant labor
problem appeared to take on a new, uglier face. Realizing the consequences of economic downturn
in the late 1990s and the negative domestic effects of labor importation, some Gulf governments
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Hélène Thiollet, “The Ambivalence of Immigration Policy in Saudi Arabia: Public and Private Actors in Migration
Management,” Migrant Labor in the Gulf: Working Group Summary Report, Qatar: Center for International and Regional
Studies, 2011.
90 Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Arab Labour Migration to the GCC States,” Arab Migration in a Globalized World, Geneva:
International Organization for Migration, May 2004.
91 Ibid.
92 Abbas Mehdi, “Globalization, Migration, and the Arab World,” Arab Migration in a Globalized World, Geneva:
International Organization for Migration, May 2004.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
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sought to regulate the problem themselves. In particular, Saudi Arabia suffered high unemployment
rates among natives and poverty in conjunction with the decline of the oil industry, due in part to
overwhelming numbers of migrant workers.95 As a response, the Saudi government instituted
nationwide policies of “Saudization,” especially in the private sector, to reduce the number of
foreign workers employed.96 The national campaign of Saudization in some areas reduced migrant
worker employment by 5%, and barred non-citizens from holding certain positions.97 However,
these efforts and similar ones across the Gulf were often met with hostility from oil corporations
and the business sector, citing the continuing need for cheaper labor sources from abroad. This
would be yet another example in a line of clashes between the corporation and the state on the
matter of migrant workers, and would become characteristic of the conflict between the two groups.
Thus, within the Persian Gulf, a region strapped for labor, the competing interests of maintaining a
national identity and majority clashed with an exponentially rising need for labor. As the Gulf
economies have begun to diversify beyond oil extraction and exportation in more recent years, the
problem has only compounded, and the industries into which Gulf economies are expanding require
more manpower, not less.
Migrant Labor and Failed Economic Diversification of the Gulf
From an economic perspective, the technological advances afforded in the computerized revolution
of the 2000s invigorated the Persian Gulf, making the region a powerhouse once more. To
corporations, this meant their intentions would be guided more closely by the local administrations
of the GCC bloc. However, not much changed from a migrant worker’s perspective following the
turn of the 21st century. From the years between 1990 and 2005, the principal purpose of migrant
labor was to be directed by governments towards a diversification of each Gulf economy, as reliance
on a single industry has been shown to cripple economies.98 Namely, the exploitation of natural gas
reserves (as opposed to oil) caused an inundation of workers into those countries with the highest
reserves. While Saudi Arabia is known for possessing the highest oil reserves in the region, with the
focus in the early 2000s on natural gas, the resource-richest were Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE).99 Due to the increased extraction of natural gas, by 2005 the migrant populations
of Qatar and UAE made up 90% of the population of each country.100 For the next decade, the
region saw little change in those percentages, and the migrant workforce has continued to represent
an astonishing majority in most GCC states as economic production has increased.
Past 2005, realizations of the negative impact of large numbers of migrant workers shifted the
attitude of diversification in the Gulf away from natural resources entirely. Because the extraction
and sale of natural gas still tied the state to the sale of a resource that required manual labor and
imported workers, there were wide regional efforts to diversify beyond migrant work entirely,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Hélène Thiollet, “The Ambivalence of Immigration Policy in Saudi Arabia: Public and Private Actors in Migration
Management,” Migrant Labor in the Gulf: Working Group Summary Report, Qatar: Center for International and Regional
Studies, 2011.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Tarek Coury and Chetan Dave, “Oil, Labor Markets, and Economic Diversification in the GCC: An Empirical
Assessment,” Working Paper, Dubai School of Government, May 2009.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
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especially because of a lack of jobs for the native educated youth.101 It was noted in the mid-1990s
that the regional emphasis on oil production and exportation would birth a lack of industrialization.
This “Dutch disease” is characterized by rich natural resources, leading to a decrease in industry,
because the state or states in question have no need to export goods when they can simply sell their
commodities to sustain the economy.102 And when the extraction of the natural resource in question
(oil for the Gulf) is fueled by manual labor, necessitating importation, the lack of industry leads to
chaos when natural resources run low or lose value. It is important to note here that “industry”
refers to advanced production of goods, as opposed to simple resource extraction that has taken
place in the Gulf. In an effort to move away from the Dutch disease and its symptoms, most of the
GCC, excluding Kuwait and Qatar, in the first decade of the 21st century emphasized foreign
investment in new fields such as infrastructure building and education.103 Despite these efforts, oil
largely continued to drive their economies as the volume of diversification proved insufficient.
In some cases, attempts to diversify away from migrant labor have led Gulf economies to target
foreign workers from varying fields and with technological skills to build industries no longer reliant
on unskilled work. Because the foundations of the Gulf region’s oil boom was based on the
knowledge and experience of foreign corporations, there was an effort in the early 2000s to
encourage the importation of more sophisticated foreign labor and utilize international knowledge to
economic benefit.104 The Gulf States as a whole have attempted to attract investment from foreign
powers and encourage a “reverse brain-drain” to import skilled workers to new industry, including
banking, finance, and plastics manufacturing.105 However, it should be noted that despite the
positive effects of importing additional skilled labor, the strategy did nothing to amend the
unemployment crisis of the native population. In the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar in 2012, 90% of all
natives held public sector employment, demonstrating the population’s inability to gain private
sector employment and contribute directly to the economy.106 A public sector job is any employment
that is paid for and managed by the government, rather than by corporations or individuals. For the
most part, public sector jobs do not contribute to a country’s economy because they are
administrative and bureaucratic, helping run basic functions of the state. In effect, the Gulf States
had largely failed to accommodate the needs of their native populations in response to their large
migrant populations. These details represent a quantitative analysis of Gulf economics only at the
beginning of the 21st century but are adequate for noting the significant past impact of migrant labor
amid attempts to diversify. Despite some local administrations’ best efforts, the so-called “natural
resource curse” under which the GCC states have suffered continues to focus the Gulf economies
on manual imported labor.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 Martin Hvidit, “Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends,” Kuwait Programme on
Development, Governance, and Globalisation in the Gulf States, January 2013.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Michael C. Ewers, “From knowledge transfer to learning: the acquisition and assimilation of human capital in the
United Arab Emirates in the other Gulf States,” Geoforum Vol. 46 (124-137), May 2013.
105 Ibid.
106 Pascal Devaux, “Economic diversification in the GCC: dynamic drive needs to be confirmed,” BNP Paribas, JulyAugust 2013.
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Human Rights Violations as a Product of Migrant Labor
While the above corporate timeline of Gulf migrant labor is vital for understanding the workers’
histories in the region, it overlooks the human element. For as long as workers have poured into the
Gulf seeking work, there have been accusations of poor working conditions and human rights’
violations. It is only within the past quarter century that serious concern has arisen regarding the
conditions of migrant workers, especially in the GCC states. Concrete international legislation on the
rights of migrant workers is scarce, and very little of it has both been signed by the GCC states and
applied to the workers in question. Since 1990, the United Nations (UN) and the Arab League have
introduced several proposals designed to protect workers’ rights across international borders, but
none have succeeded in affording additional protections to domestic and manual workers.107
Additionally, the evolution of national attitudes towards migrant workers in each GCC state has
shaped the lack of domestic legal protection that compounds the problem of deficient international
legislation.
Introduced by labor-exporting states, the primary force of international protection for migrant
workers is the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families.108 With a stated goal of establishing international norms of
the treatment of migrant workers, the convention contains clauses for non-discrimination, human
rights, equal protection under the law, and the right to information for all international workers.109
The treaty, ratified by 47 states and entered into force in July 2003, is not recognized by the GCC
bloc or by the Western world despite its purpose as an open effort to combat human rights
violations in those very countries.110 Because the convention’s foundation originally rested on the
desire of labor-contributing economies to protect their foreign nationals, it did not attract support
from labor-importing states, and through the 2000s it was not considered influential.111 The
influence of this agreement is lacking without ratification by the countries that receive migrant
workers or those that contribute them. In an effort to establish legislation on migrant rights in a
manner acceptable to the League as a whole, the LAS council met to draft a document of its own.
The 1994 Arab Charter on Human Rights established regional standards for human rights and
served as a springboard for future policy; however, its lack of enforcement mechanisms and logistics
made it impractical, and a majority of the League Council did not ratify it.112 Nevertheless, it was not
a complete failure, giving birth to a major legislative work. Ten years after the original Charter failed,
the League Council met again in 2004 to revise and ratify a new document, and the new Arab
Charter on Human Rights was born.113
On paper, the Arab Charter on Human Rights served as a confirmation by the Arab World of other
international human rights laws previously ratified by a number of states. However, in practice, the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean,” Global Commission on International
Migration, September 2005.
108 A/RES/45/158, “International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
their Families,” 18 December 1990.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean,” Global Commission on International
Migration, September 2005.
112 “Arab Charter on Human Rights,” League of Arab States, 2004.
113 Ibid.
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agreement’s language allowed for a variety of practices not considered sanctioned by international
law. For example, the Charter as a whole emphasizes human rights and calls for equal protection
under the law for all humans, but it also praises each state’s national integrity and the power of
already existing laws.114 The apparent conflict-of-interest in these two claims meant that, even for
GCC states ratifying the Charter, if they already had laws in place not condoned by international
legislation, their rights were respected. Some objective observers have noted the ineffectiveness of
the treaty, as well as a general unwillingness of the ratifying states to follow its guidelines. The
Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), an independent commission established by
the UN in 2003, published a report shortly after the treaty’s ratification noting the lack of adherence
to its tenets.115 Two years after the Charter’s ratification, the Economic and Social Council of the
UN (ECOSOC) noted a number of issues still faced by Gulf migrant workers.116 These issues
included strong ongoing discrimination against the expatriate world population, those who had
emigrated from other countries, in the GCC states.117
Despite the existence of the Charter on Human Rights and its supposed enforcement across the
Persian Gulf, there were accusations of violations across a number of categories. Even if migrant
workers could enjoy the basic protections of human rights, there were clear domestic legislative
efforts in the GCC bloc to impede the ability of foreigners to gain status; specifically, barriers to
naturalization and lack of rights for naturalized foreigners.118 A barrier to naturalization is a law
designed specifically to prevent a group of people, or people in general, from gaining citizenship in a
country. These types of laws were desirable to GCC governments to maintain a more Arab
citizenship. In this way, the governments of the GCC bloc continued to exploit their imported labor
despite existing legislation. It will be vital for the League to address whether or not stronger
legislation should be encouraged, or whether the checks and balances in place that include barriers
to naturalization are simply appropriate domestic political responses.
In the mid to late 2000s, the international community became increasingly aware of the darker side
of the Gulf’s migrant workforce as the ineffectiveness of the Arab Charter on Human Rights came
to light. Until this point, the campaign to bring migrant workers’ rights to the Persian Gulf was
largely focused towards married men migrating from states in and around the Indian subcontinent.
However, an enormous class of exploited workers was being overlooked; domestic workers, largely,
single women working in Arab homes.119 The influx of these workers first gained widespread
attention in the early 21st century, especially with regard to the abuse of their human rights. An
independent NGO survey in 2007 found that, of Gulf domestic workers surveyed, a significant
number reported violations including physical abuse, sexual abuse, wage manipulation, excessive
work hours, and inadequate living conditions.120 The workers surveyed were largely from Sri Lanka
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Ibid.
Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean,” Global Commission on International
Migration, September 2005.
116 Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries,” United Nations, May 2006.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Jennifer Turner, “Exported and Exposed: Abuses against Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates,” Human Rights Watch Vol. 19, No. 16, November 2007, accessed 20 July 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/srilanka1107webwcover.pdf.
120 Ibid.
114
115
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and worked across the GCC states, and in almost every case the prevalence of local laws allowed for
their exploitation.121 Because of the lack of oversight and worker safety inspection in a domicile, the
problem of domestic worker abuse became serious and difficult to fully identify. The 2007 report
concluded that a quarter of all workers interviewed were not provided adequate housing, a majority
of those surveyed were paid below minimum wage, and one fifth of those surveyed had their wages
withheld entirely.122 These statistics reveal an environment of abuse found to be a result of local
attitudes.
When it emerged that human rights violations as a whole were continuing through 2007 and beyond
despite legislative efforts to deter them, one particular justification was the prevailing attitude of the
native Arab Gulf population towards migrant workers. It has been noted that the dichotomy of the
migrant workforce produced a frustration in the native civilians: the laborers are both entirely
necessary to sustain the economy, yet pose a threat by constituting large percentages of the
population.123 There is a general attitude, revealed through surveys and studies including the 2007
report, that Gulf citizens consider their countries to be “invaded” by foreigners, and that because
their native populations are so small this is dangerous to national identity. To that effect, the Gulf
States established a legal and physical separation between true nationals and migrants in order to
remove migrant workers from the proceedings of government and the native population.124 The
prevailing attitude became one of mistrust in addition to discrimination, resulting in the noted lack
of human rights afforded to the migrant workforce across the Gulf region. One particular example
of human rights violations as a result of the legal deprivation of rights was uncovered through
interviews with Sri Lankan domestic workers in Kuwait. The labor laws there do not cover domestic
workers under the legislation limiting the number of working hours per week (normally capped at 8
hours a day plus overtime), so they can legally be overworked for shifts of more than twenty
hours.125 When interviewing with Human Rights Watch, domestic worker Kumari Indunil described
her conditions: “Even if I went to bed at 3:30 a.m., I had to get up by 5:30 a.m…. I had continuous
work until 1 a.m., sometimes 3 a.m.”126 The same legal practices exist across the Gulf, and each GCC
state faces its share of abuse accusations. And while the Arab League should quickly and
comprehensively address the issue of human rights, it is the prevailing cultural attitudes that are the
true root of the problem.
Regional Migrant Labor and Internal Conflict
Over the past twenty-five years, the migrant labor crisis in the Persian Gulf has been characterized
not only by sweeping economic changes and accusations of human rights violations, but also by
international and regional efforts for reform. Despite the progress made by the Arab League, the
best efforts of the region have been offset by the advent of war and political strife across the Gulf,
the effects of which are clearly seen. The Middle East and North Africa have been the sites of many
recent conflicts, and such incidents have certainly had their hand in damaging local economies and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Ibid.
Ibid.
123 Mehran Kamrava, Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, London: Hurst & Company, 2012.
124 Ibid.
125 Jennifer Turner, “Exported and Exposed: Abuses against Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates,” Human Rights Watch Vol. 19, No. 16, November 2007, accessed 20 July 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/srilanka1107webwcover.pdf.
126 Ibid.
121
122
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uprooting hundreds of thousands of families. Migrant work as a whole, and therefore the economies
of the Gulf States, also has a history of turmoil as a result of regional conflict. Associating migrant
individuals with war largely conjures images of refugees and internally displaced persons; however,
in the Gulf it is the labor force that has been affected by recent conflicts.
The first of these conflicts was the Gulf War of 1990, an incident of political turmoil that saw the
invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces and the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia. By 1990
migrant labor represented a significant portion of the Kuwaiti economy; however, the war caused
hundreds of thousands of migrant workers to flee Kuwait into the surrounding area, negatively
impacting the local economy.127 Beyond the obvious effects of war on any country’s civilians,
because Kuwait depended largely on migrant labor, its workforce had no native attachment and fled
in the face of conflict.128 With Kuwait being territorially small, the loss of so much of its labor force
easily crippled the economy, and it showed how truly dependent on the migrant laborers Kuwait was
and is today. This is a consequence of labor importation-dependent economies that should be noted
when considering the possible effects of conflict on the GCC in the future.
The other GCC state directly affected by the Gulf War was Saudi Arabia, as its migrant-heavy
economy suffered in an entirely different way. Because of the hundreds of thousands of migrant
workers from surrounding Arab states present in Saudi Arabia, there existed a conflict of interest for
the country’s leadership. Migrant workers from Jordan and Yemen, who together numbered more
than a million, were citizens of states that initially supported Iraq in the conflict.129 Saudi Arabia
stood as a staunch economic ally of the West, and thus opposed the anti-American Hussein
administration that governed in Iraq. The Saudi government was forced to expel its Jordanian and
Yemeni immigrants, self-inflicting damage on the economy for political purposes.130 This act of
expulsion is one of many that proves the conflict between the region’s priorities of labor
importation and the political imperatives in the Gulf.
The danger of political influence on Gulf economies, especially those most dependent on migrant
workers, cannot be overlooked. At the end of the Gulf War, more than two million Arab foreign
nationals were returned from the Gulf to their home countries in the Levant or in North Africa,
effectively shifting the source of Gulf labor importation to the more politically friendly Indian
subcontinent.131 The prevalent status of export countries such as Sri Lanka and Nepal in the Gulf
migrant workforce is a direct result of the political consequences of the Gulf War, demonstrating the
importance of the region’s politics on its economics. The pressures of conflict on Gulf migration did
not stop with the Gulf War, as the GCC bloc was recently forced to deal with the economic effects
of the revolutionary Arab Spring movement. This ripple of revolutions beginning with pro!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Hisham Foad, “The Effects of the Gulf War on Migration and Remittances,” San Diego State University, last modified
December 2009, accessed 20 July 2014, http://wwwrohan.sdsu.edu/~hfoad/GulfMigration_v1.
pdf.
128 Ibid.
129 Hisham Foad, “The Effects of the Gulf War on Migration and Remittances,” San Diego State University, last modified
December 2009, accessed 20 July 2014, http://wwwrohan.sdsu.edu/~hfoad/GulfMigration_v1.
pdf.
130 Ibid.
131 “International Migration in the Arab Region and Suggestions for Key Actions,” UN: Third Coordination Meeting on
International Migration, last modified 28 October 2004.
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democracy demonstration in late 2010 has shaken the Arab World and ousted multiple
administrations. Rather than damaging Gulf economies, however, the Arab Spring saw a decline in
those economies surrounding the Persian Gulf as their labor force attempted to move into GCC
states regardless of the region’s hostile attitude towards migrants.132 Essentially, revolutions in places
other than the Gulf caused huge migrations into the Gulf. However, a combination of increasing
unemployment among young educated natives in GCC states and prevailing national attitudes of
discrimination towards migrants, as discussed in the above sections, stopped post-Arab Spring
migration attempts dead in their tracks.133 Concurrent to the increasing waves of political conflict
across the Arab World is a lack of desire by GCC economies to accept those attempting to join the
more politically stable and economically viable states of the Gulf. As such, the region has become
and is becoming more isolated from its neighbors and political allies.
Overall, it should be noted that the strong reliance of Gulf economies on migrant workers and the
general importation of labor is vulnerable to regional tumult. Political conflict is somewhat common
in the Arab World, though less so in the Gulf than in the Levant, and refugee populations are often
a product of these conflicts. The economic consequences of Arab political conflict are proven to be
significant, and the establishment of inter-state economic systems to safeguard a possible economic
loss due to migrant workers’ flight or expulsion is vital.
The Risks to Migrant Laborers and the Exporting States
The state of the world economy as a result of the migrant workforce present in the Persian Gulf has
two faces: that of the exporting country, and that of the importing country. Exporting states in
South Asia like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka provide an increasing number of workers to the
importing countries of the Persian Gulf. Today, movement of individuals actively affects both sides
of the exchange, for better and for worse. A case study of one movement in particular, that of
migrant workers from Bangladesh to states across the Gulf, shows just how dramatically the process
of exportation has impacted source states over the decades. Migrant labor abroad constitutes a
dramatic portion of the Bangladeshi economy, with 10% of all Bangladeshis working as
expatriates.134 This tenth of the population contributes 12% of the country’s GDP.135 Though the
position of migrant workers is often seen as a lifeline for the importing economy, it is just as
important for the exporter. Additionally, the total number of emigrants from Bangladesh has
increased each year, with more expected to leave in the near future and the economy additionally
bolstered.136 However, not every migratory venture ends in success, and thus can be economically
disastrous. The investment involved in migration is substantial: according to one study, one in ten
migrations fail, and failed migrations (those who begin the expensive process but do not eventually
migrate) cost approximately 80% of one year’s income to the average Bangladeshi.137 Combined
efforts to obtain identification documents, reserve travel by air or sea, and establish business
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich, “Migration after the Arab Spring,” Migration Policy Centre, last modified 2012,
accessed 20 July 2014, http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC%202012%20EN%2009.pdf.
133 Ibid.
134 Narayan Das et al., “Migration as a risky enterprise: A diagnostic for Bangladesh,” Foundation pour les études et recherches
sur le développement international, last modified 20 October 2013, accessed 20 July 2014,
http://www.ferdi.fr/sites/www.ferdi.fr/files/sadoulet.pdf.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
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connections are often expensive. The industry of migration also attracts scammers promising what
they cannot grant, stealing money and disappearing.138
Rather than simply indicating the inability of some individuals to succeed in the migration process,
the failure statistic reveals a far more destructive problem inherent to migration: the sale of fake
visas and prevalence of scamming. With more than half of all those still attempting to migrate citing
lack of knowledge as a primary factor, the possibility for being scammed or exploited by internal
sources is notable.139 This is both a serious issue and one that can be combated with better
institutions and clear program education, neither of which currently exist for manual worker
migrants from Bangladesh to the Gulf. On the receiving end of the migrant chain, the current status
of the Gulf economies could not be more closely intertwined with its imported workforce.
However, it is vital for the Arab League to recognize the concerns related to the exporting
economies, as both importing and exporting states are reliant on each other for success. Exporter
issues surrounding failed migration and fraud, both often overlooked, must be rectified before
migrant workers can truly be said to have universal human rights. The problem in this case is
whether to operate directly through exporting governments, with domestic programs, or to treat
migration issues as an international crisis.
Moral Diplomacy and the Promotion of Migrant Workers’ Rights
The past five years have seen a series of attempts, with varying levels of success, to combat the
exploitation of migrant workers in the Persian Gulf. Methods of response, ranging from
international agreements and the creation of legislation to the enforcement of existing laws, have not
as a whole had the desired effect of universal human rights for workers in the GCC states. Nor, for
that matter, have the efforts of local governments succeeded in moving the foci of Gulf economics
away from labor-intensive resource extraction and distribution. In recent years, emerging evidence
has highlighted the lack of human rights of domestic workers in the Gulf. Specifically, because the
systems that were and are present do not allow for workers’ rights to extend into the home,
domestic workers have been exposed as particularly vulnerable to abuse. A 2010 report estimated
the average income of a domestic worker in a GCC state at about one tenth of the same job in the
United States, while average income of skilled administrators in the Gulf was about on par with a
position in the U.S.140 So-called “moral diplomacy,” a moniker invented by scholars to refer to
campaigns that appeal to morality, began in 2010 to take precedence in an international push for
labor law revisions in the Persian Gulf.141 However, the determination of which values are
considered “moral” is not objective by definition, and bias may be pointed towards Western
opinions in this case as opposed to what would be considered “moral” to certain Arab states. The
establishment of this movement less than five years ago has instigated a global call for recognition of
the human rights violations of the Gulf, representing one of many factors pushing the League of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Narayan Das et al., “Migration as a risky enterprise: A diagnostic for Bangladesh,” Foundation pour les études et recherches
sur le développement international, last modified 20 October 2013, accessed 20 July 2014,
http://www.ferdi.fr/sites/www.ferdi.fr/files/sadoulet.pdf.
139 Ibid.
140 Mohammad A. Auwal, “Ending the Exploitation of Migrant Workers in the Gulf,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs
Vol. 34.2 (87-108), July 2010.
141 Ibid.
138
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Arab States to establish a new, clearer position for the GCC bloc to follow.142 It should be noted
that placing an emphasis on Gulf economic policies as “immoral” does not encourage reform, as it
criticizes the administrations that are the only political entities capable of effecting change.
CURRENT STATUS
Lack of Progress in Legislative Reform in the Gulf
An analysis of the actual legislation behind Gulf States’ labor policies reveals a general lack of
progress towards workers’ rights reform in recent years. In none of the GCC states does the
domestic labor law that provides basic rights to the workforce apply to migrant workers, and in most
places migrants fall under the legislative jurisdiction of the state’s Ministry of the Interior rather than
the Ministry of Labor, allowing for additional possibilities of exploitation and lack of coverage.143
The Ministry of Labor is the federal body that legislates on workers’ rights, including fair labor
practices and maintenance of human rights for workers. Concurrently, an Interior Ministry is
concerned with national security and immigration, focusing on the negative effects of migrant
workers. Proper allocation of workers into the ministry that best ensures their rights is paramount,
and it is standard worldwide for protected migrant workers to be under a Labor Ministry’s coverage,
not the Interior Ministry. To give an example of problems stemming from this issue, in the UAE
today, the Ministry of the Interior supervises domestic workers, and not the Ministry of Labor.144
Because of this, minimum wage laws do not extend to these workers, meaning they are easily
exploited.145 Normally, the ministry under which migrant workers are handled is an internal matter,
but a recommendation from the majority of the Arab League to make a legislative change would
carry strong weight into the future.
An additional issue to be addressed is the system of employment under which most migrant
workers, especially female domestic workers, operate in the Gulf. The “kafala,” or “sponsor” system
is present throughout the GCC bloc today and requires that a migrant worker register with an
employer to whom he or she is “bound” for a term of around two years.146 In almost every case, the
program sponsor will confiscate and hold on to the employee’s passport to impede travel and
discourage quitting, a practice that is the most common exploitation of the kafala system.147 One
exception is Bahrain, which has legally repealed the system but whose practice of it continues with
little enforcement from local officials. The validity of this system including whether it should legally
be in place according to international standards, and how if at all it should be reformed must be
addressed.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Attiya Ahmad, “Migration and the Gulf,” The Middle East Institute, last modified February 2010, accessed 20 July 2014,
http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Migration_and_the_Gulf.pdf.
143 Heather E. Murray, “Hope for Reform Springs Eternal: How the Sponsorship System, Domestic Laws and
Traditional Customs Fail to Protect Migrant Workers in GCC Countries,” Cornell International Law Journal 45 (461-484),
2013.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Heather E. Murray, “Hope for Reform Springs Eternal: How the Sponsorship System, Domestic Laws and
Traditional Customs Fail to Protect Migrant Workers in GCC Countries,” Cornell International Law Journal 45 (461-484),
2013.
147 Ibid.
142
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The 2022 FIFA World Cup
The best current possibility for labor reform in the Persian Gulf is the election of Qatar as host of
the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The international football event has drawn a considerable amount of
scrutiny towards Qatar, amid numerous international allegations of human rights violations and
unfair labor practices not conforming to International Labor Organization (ILO) standards. With
over 90% of Qatar’s population comprised of migrant workers, there exists a clear opportunity for
the state to reform its laws and standards with the eyes of the world scrutinizing. It should be
remembered that the Qatari government would strongly desire to save face and adhere to at least
some traditional values should any major reforms occur. Currently, the exporting state suffering
most severely from Qatari labor laws is Nepal, whose embassy in Qatar reported 44 migrant worker
deaths over the summer of 2013.148 According to current statistics, the World Cup facility
construction could leave thousands dead, through a combination of poor living conditions, long
hours, and lack of pay.149 Economically, the world cup is not poised to take a toll on Qatar in the
same way that infrastructure expenditure did for Brazil in 2014. That world cup saw the deaths of at
least eight workers in the construction of new stadiums, leading to some controversy.150 This small
number of incidents is nothing compared to the death toll already mounting in Qatar, with the
World Cup eight years away. The Cup may continue to have a real, human toll if the process
continues.
Detractors to the claim that Qatari labor practices are too deadly for the event assert that, although
the state has some improvements to make in the formation of its labor laws and human rights
protections, the World Cup offers a valuable opportunity that could be extended to the entire Gulf
and used as a model for future legislation. One of the major changes that could be brought about by
international pressure surrounding the World Cup is the extension of rights to migrant workers to
form trade unions, a vital right only afforded to Qatari citizens.151 The ability of these workers to
unite and demand protections would empower them with the rights afforded to so many others, and
would likely precipitate an end to the kafala sponsorship system also in place in Qatar. A final
potential benefit of the tournament to Qatari culture, and one that many hope will extend to the
entire Gulf, is the possibility of the migrant population to further integrate into the local society by
living and working closer to native citizens.152 For migrant workers to no longer be considered
outsiders or pests with fewer rights than full citizens in any Gulf State would be a significant step
forward and an evolution of the existing legislative reality. Whether an event like the FIFA World
Cup can precipitate such dramatic changes is yet to be seen.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Pete Pattison, “Revealed: Qatar’s World Cup ‘slaves,’” The Guardian, last modified 25 September 2013, accessed 20
July 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/revealed-qatars-world-cup-slaves.
149 Pete Pattison, “Revealed: Qatar’s World Cup ‘slaves,’” The Guardian, last modified 25 September 2013, accessed 20
July 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/revealed-qatars-world-cup-slaves.
150 Johnathan Watts, “World Cup 2014: eighth construction worker killed in Brazil,” The Guardian, last modified 9 May
2014, accessed 20 July 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/may/09/world-cup-2014-eighthconstruction-worker-killed-in-brazil.
151 Nigel G. Crocombe, “Building a New Future: the 2022 FIFA World Cup as Potential Catalyst for Labor Reform in
Qatar,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review No. 33, 2014, accessed 20 July 2014,
https://www.suffolk.edu/documents/LawJournals/TLR_V37_1_Crocombe.pdf.
152 Ibid.
148
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BLOC ANALYSIS
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
As a bloc, the GCC states, all member states of the League of Arab States, strongly value the
continuing growth of their own economies. This bloc is composed of the Gulf Cooperation Council
states; namely Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Despite its position in
the Gulf, Yemen does not bloc with the GCC, and is not a significant receiver of migrant labor as
the Gulf states are. For decades, the GCC bloc has defended its policies with respect to migrant
workers. This has especially extended to the kafala system, the sponsorship of workers required in
most Gulf States that has been shown to entrap workers in harsh conditions. The system is widely
enforced, and the bloc as a whole largely still adheres to the concept called by some to be, “modern
slavery.”153 In June 2014, which saw the addition of a 21st-century protocol to the 1930 Forced
Labor Convention, representatives from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia opposed specific reforms
towards migrant workers’ rights by the ILO while Qatar abstained from the vote.154 Should this
attitude continue, it is unlikely that any single international agreement will convince the GCC bloc
states that a change is necessary in the near future. However, in the past the GCC along with the rest
of the Arab League has adhered closely to the organization’s widely agreed-upon proclamations.
Should the League as a whole agree on a course of action, the GCC states are more likely to follow.
Delegates of the GCC should remember with respect to the topic of migrant workers that their
opinions are not isolated in the League of Arab States. The other blocs of the League do not
necessarily oppose the kafala system, despite calls from the international community for its
reformation, and the prevalence of migrant labor is no new concept to the rest of the Arab World,
especially the Levantine bloc. Ultimately, while this bloc’s goals are not necessarily maintenance of
the status quo in the Gulf, the economies of the states in question should be maintained at all cost
and the stability of each GCC country must not be jeopardized.
The Levant
Similar to the situation in the GCC states, the Levant has been the recipient of a large number of
migrant workers supporting their local infrastructure and industry; however, it is not to the same
extent as in the Gulf. This bloc includes Jordan and Lebanon, two major migrant worker importers,
as well as Palestine, Iraq, and the suspended Syria. One notable difference between the Gulf
countries and those of the Levant is the domestic attitude, and the feeling of the government versus
that of the local population. Two excellent examples of the way in which the government’s opinions
differ from those of the people of the Levantine bloc are Jordan and Lebanon. In Jordan, an NGO
investigation in 2012 by the Jordan Commission for Democratic Culture (JCDC) discovered a focus
by the local media on the negative effects of migrant workers, especially the pressure they place on
local native populations, rather than reporting on the ample number of stories of human rights
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153 “Bahrain: Migrant Workers Denied Pay, Right to Travel,” Human Rights Watch, last modified 4 November 2009,
accessed 20 July 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/11/04/bahrain-migrant-workers-denied-pay-right-travel.
154 Aakash Jayaprakash, “Qatar abstains in ILO Protocol to Forced Labour Convention vote; Saudi, Bahrain vote
against,” JH News Qatar, last modified 12 June 2014, accessed 20 July 2014, http://www.justhere.qa/2014/06/qatarabstains-landmark-ilo-forced-labour-convention-vote-saudi-bahrain-vote/.
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violations.155 However, the Jordanian people as a whole are opposed to the media’s actions and want
to hear about the troubles of migrant workers, while government-controlled media is somewhat
more focused on how to paint migrant workers as problematic.156
The second example of popular differences with respect to migrant workers comes in Lebanon, and
is related to the apparent poor treatment of domestic workers therein. Mass protests of Lebanese
citizens in solidarity with migrant workers have opposed the government’s legal actions regarding
the domestic workers in the country. Namely, because Lebanon hosts such a large number of
migrant workers who work domestically (living in personal homes), they are not protected by local
labor laws, as is the case in the GCC states, and are more prone to abuse.157 The Levantine bloc as a
whole will have to reconcile its people’s wishes with the official stances of their governments. It is in
this bloc that the best chances for measured reform in the Gulf lie, because the Levant does not
desire a full overhaul of their policies but may be open to limited reforms to serve as a model to the
GCC.
North Africa
Many of the North African Arab states are opposed to exploitation of migrant workers and agree
that additional rights should be afforded to those in the Gulf. This is demonstrated in the fact that
North Africa as a whole is a significant contributor of the migrant workforce worldwide, including
to the Persian Gulf, and has a clear vested interest in the continuing safety of its citizens abroad as
well as their continuing human rights.158 A large portion of the North African bloc, namely
Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt, have signed and ratified the 1990 International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, and would like
to see the Gulf States do the same were it not for that region’s persisting unwillingness to sign on to
international treaties protecting the rights of migrant workers.159 As a bloc, North Africa is the least
unified of the Arab League’s segmentations with respect to the topic of migrant workers. The other
bloc groups represent a relatively clear position, but the African group often disagrees despite the
states’ similarities. Paradoxes of policy are also common, for example, Sudan contributes a massive
amount of migrant workers to Saudi Arabia, or did before the Gulf War, but has not ratified
international conventions or protections covering migrant workers.160
As such, countries within this bloc must use the factors that unite it, rather than those that divide it,
to find a clearer voice. Most North African Arab countries are contributors of migrant labor, and
while not all have made conscious efforts to promote their expatriate laborers’ human rights in the
past, now may be the time to speak up. In a debate that has been historically confined to countries
that import labor, rather than those from whom the labor is imported, the North African bloc can
stand as a more vocal proponent of bringing human rights to the Gulf.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 Hani Hazaimeh, “Media coverage of migrant workers flawed,” Jordan Times, 8 July 2014, accessed 20 July 2014,
http://jordantimes.com/media-coverage-of-migrant-workers-flawed----report.
156 Ibid.
157 “Lebanon: Stop Abuse of Domestic Workers,” Human Rights Watch, 23 March 2012, accessed 20 July 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/23/lebanon-stop-abuse-domestic-workers.
158 A/RES/45/158, “International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
their Families,” 18 December 1990.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
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COMMITTEE MISSION
Principally, it should be the objective of the League of Arab States to do what it has been unable to
do for fifteen years: take action to help the vulnerable migrant workers in the Gulf. While legislation
has been issued and the topic debated, in no case have the GCC states acceded to or enforced a
universal labor rights policy. The LAS has the chance to set such a policy, in a way that would
necessitate the reform of domestic laws in the Gulf for the better. While it is true that not every
member of the League agrees that sweeping changes and abolition of extant legal systems are
necessary, there is a general consensus that the issue bears addressing and some change will be good.
In addition to reaching an agreement, the League should seek to issue a universal policy
recommendation complying at some level with international migrant labor standards, keeping in
mind the ultimate economic effects on both host and donor states. Aware of past attempts to
institute international labor legislation in the Gulf, any new policies should be tailored to facilitate
future enforcement. In addition to the necessary legal reforms, the key to permanently improving
the condition of migrant workers is to evolve the social norms and attitudes of the Gulf States.
While migrant labor has been controversial in the past, and international demands for reform are
numerous, the sheer workforce in the Gulf has the potential to evolve the region as a whole into the
Middle East’s economic powerhouse for the next fifty years. Should the proper rights be afforded to
the region’s workforce, the economy could be allowed to grow and the culture allowed to integrate
in a way conforming to international standards. The ideal situation is one that encourages economic
growth, ensures future rights for both manual and domestic migrant workers and the enforcement
of those rights, and establishes a trans-regional policy prescription to be implemented by the entirety
of the GCC states.
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APPENDIX A: MAP OF THE EXTENT OF THE ISLAMIC
STATE IN IRAQ & SYRIA
161
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161
“Extent of the Islamic State in Iraq & Syria,” Economist, June 2014.
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APPENDIX B: MAP OF DISTRIBUTION OF FACTIONS IN
SYRIA
162
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
162
“Distribution of Factions in Syria,” Political Geography Now, 18 August 2014.
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RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS
As mentioned in the Note on Research and Preparation, delegates must answer each of these questions in their position papers.
TOPIC A
1. What policies has your country’s government expressed with respect to Syria?
2. Is your government recent; i.e., a result of the Arab Spring uprisings? If so, analyze
whether or not the new government sympathizes with other Arab Spring states. If not,
examine what kinds of policies your country has emphasized towards those states.
3. Does your country have a history of contributing troops or resources to international
conflicts? How might the answer to that question affect your country’s policy?
4. What is the prevailing attitude of Islam in your country? Be sure to examine both the
government’s policies and the majority demographics, i.e. whether the majority religion
differs from the religion of the government.
5. With which other members of the League of Arab States has your country agreed in
policy with respect to the Syrian Civil War? With which has it disagreed?
6. Does your country provide funding or resources towards the accommodation of
refugees, or does it contribute refugees to other countries? How might these factors
affect the question of the Syrian Civil War?
7. How has your country’s government responded to international agreements based on
humanitarian norms (i.e. human rights treaties and/or chemical weapons treaties)?
TOPIC B
1. Has your country signed, acceded to, and/or ratified the 1990 United Nations
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and their
Families? If not, to what extent does your country’s government offer legal protection to
resident non-citizen workers?
2. Is your country a donor state for migrant workers, receiver state of migrant workers, or a
major trafficking center for migrants? If not, consider your government’s past policy
towards refugees.
3. Does your country have a dedicated federal department to address the rights of migrant
workers? To what extent have legal protections been extended to expatriates?
4. To what extent does your country rely on manual labor, and how does this affect
national policies?
5. Is there a history of emphasizing national sovereignty and Arab identity in your country?
How might this affect your country’s opinion of the Gulf attitude towards migrant
workers?
6. Is your country strongly linked economically to the Gulf States, either through extensive
trade or reliance on imports including oil? How might the level of economic
interdependence affect your government’s opinion on the issue at hand?
7. With which Arab League states does your country share similar opinions on the topic of
migrant workers? With which does it disagree?
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IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS
TOPIC A
A/HRC/25/65. “Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic.” 12 February 2014.
This report represents the most recent international consensus on the ongoing allegations of human rights violations in
Syria. It details a variety of attacks and horrors on both sides of the conflict.
Arab League Council Resolution 7370, Extraordinary Session, 27 August 2011.
This resolution called in extraordinary session helped establish precedent for expelling Syria under Assad from the
Arab League and alter recognizing an entity as the representative of the Syrian people, when the same was done for
Libya.
“UNHCR Global Appeal 2014-2015 – Syrian Arab Republic.” United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. Last modified 1 December 2013. Accessed 25 June 2014.
http://www.unhcr.org/528a0a2d15.html.
This report is a general overview of the humanitarian crises currently facing Syria, including a large influx of refugees
into nearby Lebanon and over four million internally displaced persons in Syria.
TOPIC B
A/RES/45/158. “International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families.” 18 December 1990.
This international agreement was largely formed as an interest bloc of contributing countries exporting labor to states
with less strict human rights laws. It was not ratified by any of the Gulf States, but stands as an international
standard for Migrant Workers’ rights.
“Arab Charter on Human Rights.” League of Arab States. 2004.
This regional agreement is one of the only Arab League consensuses on human rights; however, it often places the
importance of state autonomy and already existing laws above the prevalence of internationally agreed-upon standards.
“Arab Declaration on International Migration.” Population Policies and Migration Development: League of
Arab States. 17 July 2006.
This resolution represents the major consensus by the Arab League on migrant labor of the past half century. Though
it is somewhat dated, at almost ten years old, it does provide an excellent portrait of member states’ intentions and the
status of workers’ rights at the time.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
COMMITTEE HISTORY AND SIMULATION
“Arab League Nations Offer Peacekeeping Troops for Darfur.” Associated Press. 9 October 2006.
Accessed 11 June 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/10/08/AR2006100800668.html.
An article discussing the peacekeeping troops of the LAS and the organization’s present projects.
“Doha Declaration of the Twenty-Fourth Arab League Summit.” Council on Foreign Relations. 27
March 2013. Accessed 11 June 2014. http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-northafrica/doha-declaration-twenty-fourth-arab-league-summit/p30339.
A discussion of the economic and political goals outlined in the Arab League’s recent summit in Qatar.
Johnathan Masters. “The Arab League.” Council on Foreign Relations. 26 January 2012. Accessed 11
June 2014. http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/arab-league/p25967.
An in depth discussion of the history of the LAS and its views and policies on the state of Palestine.
League of Arab States. Arab Summits. Accessed 11 June 2014. http://www.lasportal.org.
Provides a history of the League of Arab States via the organizations official website.
League of Arab States. Charter of Arab League. 22 March 1945.
Official charter of the Arab League.
“Member States.” League of Arab States. Accessed 10 June 2014. http://www.lasportal.org.
A listing of the current and former members of the League of Arab States according to the organization’s official
website.
Paul Lagasse. “Arab League” in The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. New York: Columbia University
Press. 2000.
A description and history of the Arab League as well as its part in international affairs.
TOPIC A
LAS and UN Sources
A/HRC/18/53. “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
situation on human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic.” 15 September 2011.
This provides one of the earliest available assessments of the possible oppressions by the Assad regime against the
Syrian people, compiled by the Human Rights Council.
A/HRC/25/65. “Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic.” 12 February 2014.
This report represents the most recent international consensus on the ongoing allegations of human rights violations in
Syria. It details a variety of attacks and horrors on both sides of the conflict.
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A/RES/66/253. “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic.” 16 February 2012.
This is an early report on the possible human rights violations going on in the first days of the Syrian conflict.
Arab League Council Resolution 7370, Extraordinary Session, 27 August 2011.
This resolution called in extraordinary session helped establish precedent for expelling Syria under Assad from the
Arab League and alter recognizing an entity as the representative of the Syrian people, when the same was done for
Libya.
Arab League Council Resolution 7442. “Following Developments of the Situation in Syria.” 27
November 2011.
This LAS resolution details one of the first committed actions against the Assad Regime by an international
organization: the levying of sanctions, including freezing Syrian assets abroad. This resolution set the tone for the
following intervention by the Arab League later that year.
Arab League Council Resolution 7444. “Monitoring of developments in the situation in Syria.” 22
January 2012.
This resolution, passed by the League of Arab States in early 2012 shortly before the withdrawal of its monitoring
mission in Syria, calls for an end to all hostility. Notably, it recognized the right of both sides of the conflict to meet
diplomatically in attempts to form a coalition government.
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction.” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 3
September 1992.
This international accord was the product of more than a decade of negotiations and formalized for the 21st century an
international ban on chemical weapons. Signed by almost every UN member state, the CWC is an evolution of the
Geneva Protocol, itself designed to prevent the chemical warfare of World War I.
“Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August
2013.” United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegation of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian
Arab Republic. Last modified 13 September 2013. Accessed 25 June 2014.
http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_I
nvestigation.pdf.
This detailed report analyzes possible chemical weapons use against civilians in late 2013 by the Assad regime or by
the Syrian rebels.
SC/11019. “Security Council al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Amends Entry of One Entity on its
Sanctions List.” 30 May 2013.
This Security Council resolution summary notes the status of Syrian opposition groups Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist
organization affiliated with al Qaeda, and levies sanctions against the same group. This source helps establish the
factionalism of rebel groups in Syria.
“Syria Regional Refugee Response: Funding Requirements.” United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. 5 August 2014.
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This is an analysis of the funds contributed to and those necessary for the continuation of refugee housing and care in
Lebanon. With over 1 million Syrians having crossed the border into Lebanon, the UNHCR estimates it needs
almost USD1 billion to continue operations.
“Syrian crisis reaching stage of civil war, UN human rights chief says.” UN News Centre. Last
modified 1 December 2011. Accessed 25 June 2014.
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40595#.U_Zdq1bfEds.
This article from the UN marks an important point in the history of the Syrian conflict, the point in time at which the
UN began classifying it as a civil war in its own right.
“UN Humanitarian Chief calls for greater support for affected Lebanese communities and Syrian
refugees in Lebanon.” OCHA. 4 April 2014.
In this report, the head of UN humanitarian operations notes the growing difficulties in Lebanon of housing the more
than one million Syrian refugees fleeing from the Civil War. Without a solution, and soon, resources will be stretched
beyond their limit.
“UNHCR Global Appeal 2014-2015 – Syrian Arab Republic.” United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. Last modified 1 December 2013. Accessed 25 June 2014.
http://www.unhcr.org/528a0a2d15.html.
This report is a general overview of the humanitarian crises currently facing Syria, including a large influx of refugees
into nearby Lebanon and over four million internally displaced persons in Syria.
Voting Record for A/RES/66/253, United Nations Bibliography Information System, 16 February 2012.
This list shows which member state in the General Assembly voted for, against, abstaining, or no vote on the issue of
Syria in February 2012.
Other Sources
Al-Muslimi, Farea. “Yemen divided over Syria conflict.” Al-Monitor. Last modified September 2013.
Accessed 25 June 2014. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/yemen-syriaconflict-divisions.html.
This part-statistical part-opinion article details the idealistic divisions of Yemen when addressing loyalty to the Assad
regime in Syria.
“Arab League suspends Syria mission – Nabil el-Arabi.” BBC News. Last modified 28 January 2012.
Accessed 25 June 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16774171.
This report on a statement by the Secretary-General of the Arab League details its intentions to withdraw from its
assistance mission in Syria. This was a notable step in that it opened up the floor to UN intervention and the peace
plan of Special Representative Kofi Annan in mid-2012.
Baghdadi, George. “Syria peace talks in Geneva end in failure.” CBS News. Last modified 14
February 2014. Accessed 25 June 2014. http://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-peace-talksin-geneva-end-in-failure/.
This is an article from very recently, detailing the UN’s opinion that, for the most part, the Geneva II talks were not a
success.
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Benotman, Noman and Roisin Blake. “Jabhat al-Nusra: A Strategic Briefing.” Quilliam Foundation.
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jabhat-alnusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf.
This report is a summary of the history and operations of the branch of al Qaeda known as Jabhat al-Nusra, or the
al-Nusra Front, in revolutionary Syria. JN is only growing today and demonstrates the war’s failures.
“Distribution of Factions in Syria.” Political Geography Now. 18 August 2014.
Map showing the distribution of different factions in Syria.
“Extent of the Islamic State in Iraq & Syria.” Economist. June 2014.
Map showing the extent of the Islamic State in Iraq & Syria.
Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. “Declared Syrian chemical weapon stockpile now completely destroyed.”
The Washington Post. Last modified 18 August 2014. Accessed 19 August 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/08/18/declared-syrianchemical-weapon-stockpile-now-completely-destroyed/.
This very recent news article details the complete disposal of the Assad regime’s stockpile of chemical weapons,
representing a huge step forward in what was previously the most important issue of the Syrian Civil War.
Harris, William. “Bashar al-Assad’s Lebanon Gamble.” Middle East Quarterly XII No. 3 (33-44),
Summer 2005.
This journal article, though somewhat dated, is vital in understanding the entangled relationship of Syria and its
neighbor Lebanon, especially now that Lebanon is playing so vital a role in the Syrian Civil War.
“Jordanian Public Perceptions of the Syrian Crisis.” Arab Public Opinion Index. Last modified
September 2012. Accessed 25 June 2014. http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/1af52ed1e0ea-43af-b0a3-d55fce2e64dd.
This poll conducted in Jordan and throughout the Levant details public opinion of Bashar al-Assad, as well as
opinions on what kinds of solutions should be implemented to effect change in Syria.
Kohut, Andrew. “Widespread Condemnation for Assad in Neighboring Countries.” Pew Research
Center. Last modified 21 June 2012. Accessed 25 June 2014.
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/21/widespread-condemnation-for-assad-inneighboring-countries/.
This poll conducted by the Pew Research Center shows the lack of support across the Middle East and North Africa
for Assad, as well as a combined indecisiveness on whether to take more aggressive action against the Syrian regime.
Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. “Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria.” Council on Foreign
Relations. Last modified 12 June 2014. Accessed 25 June 2014.
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811.
This profile of the organization now known as the Islamic State (formerly ISIS/ISIL) provides a detailed history,
objective, and composition of the militants.
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“Main bloc quits Syrian National Coalition over Geneva.” The Times of Israel. 21 January 2014.
Accessed 25 June 2014. http://www.timesofisrael.com/main-bloc-quits-syrian-nationalcoalition-over-geneva/.
This news article details the manner in which the Geneva II peace talks began to fall apart, when the main rebel
coalition pulled out due to objections over negotiating with the Assad government, seen as illegitimate by many
factionalists.
Masrour, Amira. “Syria Claims Tunisian Government Support for Fighters in Syria.” Tunisia Live
News. Last modified 21 June 2013. Accessed 25 June 2014. http://www.tunisialive.net/2013/06/21/syria-claims-tunisian-government-support-for-fighters-in-syria/.
This article examines the accusation by the Assad regime that Tunisia provided rebel fighters for the Syrian conflict. It
is an important barometer for Tunisia’s opinions of Syria, as Tunisia leads one bloc of countries most recently having
experienced Arab Spring regime changes.
Obama, Barack. “Weekly Address: Pursuing a Diplomatic Solution in Syria.” Office of the Press
Secretary. Last modified 14 September 2013. Accessed 25 June 2014.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/14/weekly-address-pursuingdiplomatic-solution-syria.
This public statement reaffirms the willingness of the United States towards negotiations to disarm Syria’s chemical
weapons.
Rishmawi, Mervat. “The League of Arab States in the Wake of the ‘Arab Spring.’” Cairo Institute for
Human Rights Studies. September 2013. Accessed 25 June 2014. http://www.cihrs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/Arab-Leage.pdf.
This scholarly journal article describes the limited amounts of reformation undergone by the LAS in the wake of the
Arab Spring revolutionary movements, as well as the response of the body to the various crises.
Shabaneh, Ghassan. “Geneva II Middle East Peace Conference.” Al Jazeera Center for Studies. Last
modified 4 December 2013. Accessed 25 June 2014.
http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013/12/4/20131249212
3299580Geneva%20II%20Middle%20East%20Peace.pdf.
This is a brief analysis of the Geneva II peace conference on Syria, the most recent effort to reconcile the difference of the
Assad and revolutionary forces, facilitated by Lakhdar Brahimi.
Spark-Smith, Laura and Tom Cohen. “U.S., Russia agree to framework on Syria chemical weapons.”
Last modified 15 September 2013. Accessed 25 June 2014.
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/14/politics/us-syria/.
This article formalizes the official agreement reached in late 2013 among the United States, Russia, and Syria to
disarm Syria’s chemical weapons.
“Syrian Civil War.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Last modified 16 January 2014. Accessed 25 June 2014.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1781371/Syrian-Civil-War.
This encyclopedia entry is a brief, accurate timeline of the Syrian conflict, accompanying details of major military,
diplomatic, and political developments of the past three years.
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Tamani, Salim. “The Syrian crisis viewed from Algeria.” Aspenia Online. Last modified 10 September
2012. Accessed 25 June 2014. https://www.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia-online/article/syriancrisis-viewed-algeria.
This news article is an analysis of Algeria’s radical position on the Syrian Civil War. Standing somewhat apart from
the other Arab League member states, Algeria’s recently elected government is opposed to the rebel groups sponsored by
the West, believing them to have strayed from their original democratic ideals.
Tawil, Fadi. “Syria militants withdraw from Lebanese border town after days of clashes.” Associated
Press. Last modified 7 August 2014. Accessed 8 August 2014.
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2014/08/07/lebanese-free-7-soldiers-heldby-syria-militants.
This AP article marks the end of a days-long siege by forces of the Islamic State (formerly ISIS) on the Lebanese town
of Arsal. It is a significant recent development in the Syrian militant issue.
“The Middle East at Crossroads.” American Foreign Policy Interests. Last modified 9 August 2013.
Accessed 25 June 2014.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10803920.2013.819732.
This article, although from 2013, analyzes the entirety of the Arab Spring dating back several years, and summarizes
the lessons that should be learned on the part of the United States, the West, and the Middle East.
Tran, Mark. “ISIS: The group too extreme for al-Qaida that is taking over Iraq.” The Guardian. Last
modified 11 June 2014. Accessed 25 June 2014. http://www.guardian.co.uk.
This article profiles ISIS, now known as the Islamic State, and its complicated historic relationship with al Qaeda as
well as Jabhat al-Nusra, the al Qaeda affiliate in Syria.
TOPIC B
LAS and UN Sources
A/RES/45/158. “International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families.” 18 December 1990.
This international agreement was largely formed as an interest bloc of contributing countries exporting labor to states
with less strict human rights laws. It was not ratified by any of the Gulf States, but stands as an international
standard for Migrant Workers’ rights.
“Arab Charter on Human Rights.” League of Arab States. 2004.
This regional agreement is one of the only Arab League consensuses on human rights; however, it often places the
importance of state autonomy and already existing laws above the prevalence of internationally agreed-upon standards.
“Arab Declaration on International Migration.” Population Policies and Migration Development: League of
Arab States. 17 July 2006.
This resolution represents the major consensus by the Arab League on migrant labor of the past half century. Though
it is somewhat dated, at almost ten years old, it does provide an excellent portrait of member states’ intentions and the
status of workers’ rights at the time.
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“International Migration in the Arab Region and Suggestions for Key Actions.” UN: Third
Coordination Meeting on International Migration. Last modified 28 October 2004. Accessed 20
July 2014. http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf/3/P15_ArabLeague.pdf.
This paper published through a UN conference details international advice offered to the Arab League on the question
of migrants, and summarizes the powers and scope available to the League today.
Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries.” United Nations.
May 2006.
This report from a United Nations committee meeting details the situation of migrant workers in the Gulf, specifically
comparing migrants from different points of origin and their differing situations.
Other Sources
Ahmad, Attiya. “Migration and the Gulf.” The Middle East Institute. Last modified February 2010.
Accessed 20 July 2014.
http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Migration_and_the_Gulf.pdf.
This report details the situation of domestic migrant workers, mostly women, and the troubles they experience in the
Gulf States. The statistics included herein were invaluable in determining the extent of the lack of legislation protecting
domestic workers throughout the Gulf.
Auwal, Mohammad A. “Ending the Exploitation of Migrant Workers in the Gulf.” The Fletcher Forum
of World Affairs Vol. 34.2 (87-108). July 2010.
This article, while inherently biased, does provide a series of objective statistics to accompany its insistence that new
legislation be implemented in the Gulf States to better accommodate the majority of migrant workers.
“Bahrain: Migrant Workers Denied Pay, Right to Travel.” Human Rights Watch. Last modified 4
November 2009. Accessed 20 July 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/11/04/bahrainmigrant-workers-denied-pay-right-travel.
The essential point of this article is that Bahrain has officially banned the practice of the sponsorship system (kafala)
deemed immoral by much of the world, but that the ban is in fact not widely enforced.
Baldwin-Edwards, Martin. “Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean.” Global Commission on
International Migration. September 2005.
This general history of migration across the Middle East region also includes a specific analysis of the GCC migration
patterns, which constitute the majority.
Coury, Tarek and Chetan Dave. “Oil, Labor Markets, and Economic Diversification in the GCC: An
Empirical Assessment.” Working Paper, Dubai School of Government. May 2009.
This is an economic assessment of possible ways to diversify Gulf economies, independent of the existing reliance on
migrant labor as well as on natural resources.
Crocombe, Nigel G. “Building a New Future: the 2022 FIFA World Cup as a Potential Catalyst for
Labor Reform in Qatar.” Suffolk Transnational Law Review No. 33. 2014. Accessed 20 July
2014. https://www.suffolk.edu/documents/LawJournals/TLR_V37_1_Crocombe.pdf.
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This journal article offers a perspective on Qatar’s 2022 World Cup bid as ultimately positive, with the opportunity to
reform at least one GCC labor code, with the alternative to spread around the Gulf.
Das, Narayan, Alain de Janvry, Sakib Mahmood, and Elisabeth Sadoulet. “Migration as a risky
enterprise: A diagnostic for Bangladesh.” Foundation pour les études et recherches sur le
développement international. Last modified 20 October 2013. Accessed 20 July 2014.
http://www.ferdi.fr/sites/www.ferdi.fr/files/evenements/presentations/de_janvry.pdf.
Through a case study of Bangladeshi migration to the Persian Gulf, this report analyzes the current economic effects of
importing the majority of a country’s work force, both on the importing country and the exporting country.
Devaux, Pascal. “Economic diversification in the GCC: dynamic drive needs to be confirmed.” BNP
Paribas. July-August 2013.
This is an economic assessment of possible ways to diversify Gulf economies, independent of the existing reliance on
migrant labor as well as on natural resources.
Errichiello, Gennaro. “Foreign Workforce in the Arab Gulf States (1930-1950): Migration Patterns
and Nationality Clause.” International Migration Review Vol. 46.2 (389-413). July 2012.
This journal article details the mid-20th century history of migrant labor in the Persian Gulf, especially in those Gulf
States whose economies relied and continue to rely heavily on oil exports.
Ewers, Michael C. “From knowledge transfer to learning: the acquisition and assimilation of human
capital in the United Arab Emirates and the other Gulf States.” Geoforum Vol. 46 (124-137).
May 2013.
This article examines the diversification of the Gulf States’ economies, nominally based on oil exports, through the
importation of foreign labor. It both praises the positive diversification brought on by migration and warns of potential
dangers should new legislation not emerge.
Fargues, Philippe and Christine Fandrich. “Migration after the Arab Spring.” Migration Policy Centre.
Last modified 2012. Accessed 20 July 2014.
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC%202012%20EN%2009.pdf.
This recent analytical piece analyzes the effects of the Arab Spring uprisings on migration, including the effect on
migrant labor. The series of revolutions is still ongoing, and has affected every aspect of Arab life.
Foad, Hisham. “The Effects of the Gulf War on Migration and Remittances.” San Diego State
University. Last modified December 2009. Accessed 20 July 2014. http://wwwrohan.sdsu.edu/~hfoad/GulfMigration_v1.pdf.
This is a summary of how political conflict, including the Gulf War in 1990, can affect migration, including how
refugees from the Gulf conflict fled to GCC states to contribute to the migrant worker population.
Hazaimeh, Hani. “Media coverage of migrant workers flawed.” Jordan Times. Last modified 8 July
2014. Accessed 20 July 2014. http://jordantimes.com/media-coverage-of-migrant-workersflawed----report.
This article notes that Jordanian media coverage when discussing human rights violations of migrant workers fails to
involve the workers themselves, choosing instead to focus on potential unrest caused by the presence of so many foreign
laborers.
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Hvidit, Martin. “Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends.”
Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance, and Globalisation in the Gulf States. January 2013.
This is an economic assessment of possible ways to diversify Gulf economies, independent of the existing reliance on
migrant labor as well as on natural resources.
Jayaprakash, Aakash. “Qatar abstains in ILO Protocol to Forced Labour Convention vote; Saudi,
Bahrain vote against.” JH News Qatar. Last modified 12 June 2014. Accessed 20 July 2014.
http://www.justhere.qa/2014/06/qatar-abstains-landmark-ilo-forced-labour-conventionvote-saudi-bahrain-vote/.
This article reports on a voting record in which the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states abstained or outright
opposed a vote offering increased protection for manual laborers of all kinds, migrant and otherwise.
Kamrava, Mehran. Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf. London: Hurst & Company, 2012.
This book is an overview of the history of migrant labor in the Gulf, how it has affected the local economy and the
condition of human rights of expatriates through 2012.
Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Labour Migration to the GCC States.” In Arab Migration in a Globalized
World. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. May 2004.
This statistics-heavy article provided facts and figures backing up its assertions that the rights of workers in the Middle
East, and in the Persian Gulf in particular, were not adequately represented in the 21st century. Numerous tables and
charts detail the lack of protection for these workers, and the challenges they face.
“Lebanon: Stop Abuse of Domestic Workers.” Human Rights Watch. Last modified 23 March 2012.
Accessed 20 July 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/23/lebanon-stop-abusedomestic-workers.
This report on popular Lebanese uprisings shows that, internationally and domestically, there is a vocal group
expressing opinions contrary to those of the Lebanese government where migrant workers are involved.
Mehdi, Abbas. “Globalization, Migration and the Arab World.” In Arab Migration in a Globalized
World. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. May 2004.
This introduction to a comprehensive report on Arab migration outlines the troubles the Arab World has faced
following the advent of globalization. It cites the benefits, drawbacks, and changes as a result of increased migration to
Arab states.
“Migrant Rights Research Centre.” Mideast Youth. Last modified 19 February 2014. Accessed 20 July
2014. http://www.migrant-rights.org.
This database offers an array of statistics gathered from Arabic-language news sites, and compiles them into userfriendly data on Arab migration.
Murray, Heather E. “Hope for Reform Springs Eternal: How the Sponsorship System, Domestic
Laws and Traditional Customs Fail to Protect Migrant Workers in GCC Countries.” Cornell
International Law Journal 45 (461-484). 2013.
This analysis credits local systems of law and governance in the Gulf for the failure to protect the human rights of
migrant workers in that region. It suggests a wide variety of legislative reforms for GCC administrations.
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Pattison, Pete. “Revealed: Qatar’s World Cup ‘slaves.’” The Guardian. Last modified 25 September
2013. Accessed 20 July 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/revealedqatars-world-cup-slaves.
This news article details an analysis run by the Guardian newspaper into the suspicious deaths of large numbers of
Nepalese laborers in Qatar building the infrastructure for the upcoming 2022 World Cup.
Thiollet, Hélène. “The Ambivalence of Immigration Policy in Saudi Arabia: Public and Private
Actors in Migration Management.” In Migrant Labor in the Gulf: Working Group Summary
Report. Qatar: Center for International and Regional Studies. 2011.
This is a criticism of the lack of government structures designed to protect migrant workers in Saud Arabia, leading to
a series of human rights violations across the country over the past several decades.
Turner, Jennifer. “Exported and Exposed: Abuses against Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates.” Human Rights Watch Vol. 19, No.
16. Last modified November 2007, Accessed 20 July 2014.
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/srilanka1107webwcover.pdf.
This report from a reputable NGO offers a summary of potential violations of human rights committed against
migrant workers in the Persian Gulf. The report is from a number of years ago, but its data and conclusion could not
be more relevant to the topic today.
Watts, Johnathan. “World Cup 2014: eighth construction workers killed in Brazil.” The Guardian.
Last modified 9 May 2014. Accessed 20 July 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/may/09/world-cup-2014-eighth-constructionworker-killed-in-brazil.
This article provides some precedent with respect to number of accidents and deaths in the construction of stadiums for
the World Cup. Where in Brazil eight had died by the start of the Cup, dozens have already died in Qatar with the
event eight years away.
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