MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
he political writings of James Madison—little attended to in the
T years following the Civil War, mediated through the partial and
polemical interpretations of Beard and Parrington in the first decades of this century—have become the subject of a serious and
1
extensive scholarly literature in the last twenty-five years. One consequence of this scholarly renewal is that Madison today is recognized by many as the "Father of the Constitution"—that is, the
principle theorist of the American political order. Neither too much
nor too little should be made of his present stature. On the one
hand, Madison cannot be considered a political philosopher in the
fullest sense, for his writings on politics are not comprehensive and
do not fully articulate and reflect on the first, principles of his own
position. Yet on the other hand, he cannot be dismissed as a mere
ideologist. Rather, Madison was a public man of considerable erudition and philosophic depth who, within the context of distinctively
American political premises, addressed himself to matters of enduring moment to a self–governing people. As a participant in and
observer of the precarious first decade of the American enterprise,
he engaged in a thoughtful analysis of self–government as problematic, both in its goodness and in its capacity to endure. And as
a central actor in the period of constitutional formation, he developed a constitutional model designed to remedy the vices of popular
government without violating its form or its spirit. Madison's writing on these two matters merit his present stature as a political
theorist, and will provide the focus for the following explication of
his thought.
The opening part of the paper will attempt to define and clarify
the first principles of Madison's politics, to the degree that textual
sources permit. Madison's major insights will then be explored
1
A milestone in the renewal of scholarship on Madison's political theory was
Douglass Adair's "The Tenth Federalist Revisited," William cr Mary Quarterly,
Third Series, VIII (January, 1951), pp. 48-61. Adair's article assesses the thencurrent, and deficient, state of the scholarship on Madison's most noted essay.
Among the more important treatments of Madison's politics in contemporary
scholarship are Irving Brant's six-volume biography, James Madison, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941-1961); Martin Diamond, "Democracy and The Federalist:
A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent," APSR, LIII (March, 1959), pp. 52-68;
Paul Eidelberg, The Philosophy of the American Constitution (New York: The
Free Press, 1968); and Neal Riemer, James Madison (New York: Washington
Square Press, 1968).
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within the context of his philosophic horizons. The premise of this
study is that Madison's thought is of enduring importance for understanding not only the rationale of the American political order, but
also the principles on which it is likely to operate well, and the
continuing problematic of liberal democracy, American style.
Liberty: Its Primacy, Its Dimensions, and Its Ethical Context
The concept of liberty, though subject to little philosophical
analysis in Madison's writings, may for several reasons be considered
the first principle of his politics. Liberty was Madison's central concern at the origins of his political consciousness; he continually recurred to it as fundamental, and its value and inviolability is always
presupposed in his political thought. The liberty which Madison
saw as a right of human nature has three dimensions. To begin
with, his concern was for "American liberty"—what today would be
called the right to national self–determination. Yet, unlike some contemporary advocates of "national liberation," Madison would not
consider liberty to be fulfilled through the displacement of alien
rulers by a native autocracy. In its second dimension, liberty refers
to popular sovereignty: the subordination of government to the
people. "All men are born free"; hence, no man or group of men
has the claim to rule over other men without regard to their consent. 2 The honor of human nature thus requires that the sovereignty
of the people be acknowledged.
The importance which Madison attached to popular liberty is
shown by his reasons for judging the American enterprise to have
universal significance. The unique feature of the new American
order, which makes its existence a vindication of the rights not
merely of Americans but of man, is its establishment of the principle of consent and the primacy of liberty. This belief is expressed in
the opening passage of his essay on "Charters":
In Europe, charters of liberty have been granted by power. America
has set the example . . . of charters of power granted by liberty.
This revolution in the practice of the world, may with an honest
praise, be pronounced the most triumphant epoch of its history,
and the most consoling presage of its happiness. We look back,
already, with astonishment, at the daring outrages committed by
despotism, on the reason and rights of man; we look forward with
joy, to the period, when it shall be despoiled of all its usurpations,
2
The Writings of James Madison, ed. Gaillard Hunt, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1900-1910), Vol. VI, p. 120. Hereinafter cited as Writings.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
75
and bound forever in the chains, with which it had loaded its miserable victims.3
Because Madison candidly analyzed and sought to guard against
the weaknesses of popular government, his bona fides as an advocate of popular sovereignty have often been called into question. Yet
throughout his life, Madison treated the principle of consent as
axiomatic, for example when he proposed to the First Congress:
"That there be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration, that all
power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the
people." 4 As Madison had occasion to remark after his retirement
from public life, "[I have] from the first moment of maturing a
political opinion, down to the present one, never ceased to be a
votary of the principle of self–government."5
There is a specious basis for questioning Madison's authenticity
as a "votary" of self–government, in that he affirmed certain ethical
and prudential limits to the exercise of popular sovereignty. Among
these is the third dimension of liberty itself—the liberty of the individual person. In the same speech to Congress cited above, Madison
adds the following doctrine:
That government is instituted .. . for the benefit of the people;
which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty with the right
of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.6
Individual liberty, the right to the free exercise of the various human faculties, is prior to society in that it is a right intrinsic to
human nature, rather than an extrinsic and revocable gift of society.
As Madison comments in Federalist 10, "the first object of government" is to protect the diverse faculties of men. 7 The individual's
claim to freedom of action is qualified in various respects by the
requirements of social and political existence, but any just government, including popular government, must have a due regard for
human liberty. Moreover, Madison held that liberty rather than
public control should have pride of place; it is "the great end, for
3
Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 83.
Ibid., Vol. V, p. 376.
Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), Vol. III, p. 449.
6
Writings, Vol. V, p. 376.
7
The Federalist, p. 62. All references are to the Modern Library edition, ed.
E. M. Earle.
5
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which the Union was formed." 8 Witness, too, his condemnation of
anti–republican opinion: "What a perversion of the natural order
of things! to make power the primary and central object of the social
system, and Liberty but its satellite."
An aspect of liberty on which Madison did considerable reflection is the content and priority of the rights which men may claim
freely to exercise. His conclusions on this matter are most amply
expressed in his essay, "On Property." 1 ° There Madison remarks that
property, in its particular sense, refers to the exclusive dominion
which a man exercises over external things. However, in its "larger
and juster meaning," it embraces everything in which a man has
rights. Among the things in which a man has property are the safety
and liberty of his person, as well as "the free use of his faculties and
free choice of the objects on which to employ them." What Madison
has in mind here is the world of work, of productive activity; it is
a species of property that militates against arbitrary restrictions and
monopolies which prevent men from pursuing chosen occupations,
and limit their means to acquire property in its usual sense. But the
two kinds of property which Madison first mentions relate to the
activities of thought and of religious practice.
A man has property, first, in his opinions, and in their free communication, a property which, "in the estimation of some," is more
valuable than external possessions. He has a property "of peculiar
value" in his religious opinions and practice. Indeed, conscience is
"the most sacred of all property"; unlike other property, which
depends in part on positive law, its exercise is a "natural and
unalienable right."
It is evident from Madison's public career that he was among
those who understood the peculiar value of the latter rights, particularly those of religious liberty. As early as 1774, in an impassioned letter to a fellow Princetonian, the young Madison inveighs
against the "diabolical, hell–conceived principle of persecution," and
closes by asking his friend "to pray for liberty of conscience to all."n
Subsequently, Madison was to devote much energy to securing
freedom of conscience in his native state.
At the Virginia Convention of 1776 Madison proposed an amendment to a draft statement on religious liberty, the intention of which
Writings, Vol. VI, p. 104.
Ibid., p. 122.
10
Ibid., pp. 101-103.
11 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 21.
8
9
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
77
was "to substitute for the idea expressed by the term `toleration; an
absolute and equal right in all, to the exercise of religion, according
to the dictates of conscience." 12 Again, in his "Memorial and Remonstrance" against a religious assessment in Virginia, he was to
place primary emphasis on the unalienable right of conscience.
Carrying the same theme into the new national government, he
wrote that amendments to the Constitution should provide for "the
rights of Conscience in the fullest latitude."" Final evidence of
Madison's lifelong devotion to religious liberty is found in the
autobiography which he dictated in his old age. Nearing the end of
a lifetime in which he had served as framer of the Constitution,
Congressional statesman, party leader, and President, Madison took
care, in his brief autobiographical sketch, to point with pride to the
fact that his "first political act" was to change the religious freedom
clause of the Virginia Bill of Rights from the concept of toleration
to that of "natural and absolute right."14
Liberty, then, is axiomatic to Madison's politics: national liberty,
popular liberty which implies self–government, and a personal liberty which embraces many objects, but refers especially to religious
conscience. Liberty, however, is an axiom with a context, for Madison simultaneously affirmed a world of obligation: religious and
ethical, social and political. Let us consider, first, the realm of
religion, in which citizens have the greatest claim to liberty. Though
reticent about personal religious beliefs after his youth, and in the
judgment of his most recent biographer never a fervent Christian,"
Madison consistently asserted that what is a right towards men—
religious conviction, and the profession and practice that flow from
it—is a duty towards God. Indeed, it is the primacy of a man's duty
to offer what he considers acceptable homage to his Creator that
makes religious liberty the most sacred of rights:
This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. . . . We maintain therefore that
in matters of religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution
Ibid., pp. 40-41, note.
"Memorial and Remonstrance Against a Religious Assessments," ibid., Vol.
II, pp. 183-191; Letter to George Eve, ibid., Vol. V, pp. 319-320, note.
14 Douglass Adair, "James Madison's 'Autobiography'," William and Mary
Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. II, no 2, pp. 191-229. For an account of Madison's
career as an advocate of religious liberty, see Adrienne Koch, Madison's "Advice
to My Country" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), Ch. I.
15
Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography (New York: Macmillan.
1971), pp. 46-48,55-58.
12
13
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of Civil Society, and that religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.16
Religious rights, then, have correlative duties; but the obligation
is wholly personal. This is not to say that religion is without a social
and public dimension, for the exercise of the rights of conscience
includes public profession and worship, evangelism, and conforming
one's social relationships to divine law. Moreover, Madison's position implies a civil theology, in that civil society is obliged to recognize the citizen's prior obligation to God. Madison is thus distinguished from the libertarian agnostic or atheist who would ground
religious liberty on the idiosyncratic sovereignty of self. Yet, if religion has social, public, and even political extensions, Madison consistently and emphatically held that it is to be "wholly exempt" from
government. His doctrinaire position on the separation of church
and state was based partly on a thin–edge–of–the–wedge argument:
once admit the principle that government may "intermeddle" in
religion, and the way is opened to an established church, or even
an Inquisition. 17 More fundamental than prudential considerations,
however, was Madison's individualistic view of man's relation with
God.
Since Madison's insistence that religion has no place in the political order beyond the recognition of the religious rights of citizens
may seem to place his politics in the secularized context of modern
political philosophy, it is important to note that his expectations
concerning the exercise of religious liberty were optimistic. Religion is natural to man, does not rely on the aid of law; rather than
weakening religion, disestablishment would strengthen and purify
it. ls If Madison proposed a government wholly secular in its ends,
he anticipated a religious society. Moreover, his political thought
presupposed a virtuous people, and he held with many proponents
of religious establishment that belief in God is "essential to the
moral order of the World." 19 His conviction that the religious foundation of moral and therefore political order is better served by
16 Writings, Vol. II, pp. 184-185.
Ibid., 185-186, "James Madison's 'Detached Memoranda," William and Mary
Quarterly, Third Series, III (October, 1946), pp. 554-555.
19
For a fuller treatment of this point, see my article, "Was the American
Founding a Lockean Enterprise? The Case of James Madison," The Intercollegiate Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring, 1975), pp. 101-102.
19
Writings, Vol. IX, p.'230.
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MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
79
disestablishment is illustrated by his remarks on its effects in
Virginia:
no doubt exists that there is much more religion among us now
than there ever was before the changes; and particularly in the Sect
which enjoyed the legal patronage. This proves rather more than,
that the law is not necessary to the support of religion."
...
That the exercise of liberty as distinguished from license must
embody universal moral norms as well as the dictates of religious
conscience is evident in Madison's writings, although he never
addressed himself in a systematic way to the virtues and their order.
One aspect of his teaching on this matter can be established: that
the autonomy proper to religion does not extend to morality. Certain aspects of moral law may be enforced, and government has the
general authority to promote and encourage virtue among its citizens
through a variety of means.
Enforced, principally, is justice, which is "the end of government . . . the end of civil society," and is prior even to liberty: "It
ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until
liberty be lost in the pursuit." 21 To be sure, Madison's goal was to
establish a political order both just and free, but the claims of liberty
do not transcend justice, the observance of which is simply obligatory, and may rightly be compelled. Now justice, which concerns the
other–regarding acts of men, might be construed in the Hobbesian
sense of a set of rules derivative of the proposition that individuals
are to be protected in their rights. There is evidence, however, that
Madison also understood just action to involve the moral fulfillment
of the agent; thus just laws, by their habituating effect, make men
good. Virtue is "the health of the soul," 22 and Madison often showed
concern for the moral health of the citizens, as well as their security
and prosperity. For example, he states that the end of government
is to reward the best and punish the worst. 23 Government should
support the right use of liberty directly through the administration
of justice and "laws to cherish virtue," and indirectly through various means, the chief among these being education. 21 Public education, which embraces moral education generally, should focus especially on the virtues specific to a self–governing citizenry and their
zo Ibid., p. 127.
Federalist 51, p. 340.
22 Writings, Vol. II, p. 281.
23 Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 90.
24 Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 88-89; Vol. VI.
21
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statesmen—patriotism, a just and equal spirit, and loyalty to the true
principles of liberty. Madison's assertion of a public authority to
promote morality and salutary opinion should not obscure his genuine commitment to liberty, especially liberty of thought. At the
same time, he believed that intellectual, unlike religious, liberty is
qualified by membership in civil society.25
In conclusion, though Madison envisioned liberty as the central
principle of the American regime, the theological and philosophical
context for Madison's position was not one of radical human autonomy. Men are subject to their Creator; though the acknowledgement of God's sovereignty and the manner of its recognition are
wholly personal responsibilities, Madison assumes that society will
be permeated by religion, the effects of which will be politically
salutary. Men also have the ethical responsibility to use their moral
and intellectual faculties well. The law should require justice, and
though a free government will eschew the paternal supervision of
personal morality and thought, it should promote virtue and right
opinion in the body politic.
The Ends of Political Society
Though Madison held that liberty should have primacy in the
political order, and that its successful establishment would endow
the American regime with world–historic significance, the most salient fact about government is that it governs—subjects even free
citizens to a rule of one kind or another. Accordingly, even a votary
of liberty must respond to the perennial question, What is government for? Madison formulates his understanding of the ends of government in various ways, but perhaps his most characteristic rhetoric
on this question is that of social contract theory. Man is naturally
free, but the inadequate security of rights when men may do as they
will makes it expedient for them to covenant with one another to
form a civil body politic which will secure rights, and in securing
rights also provide the basis for prosperity and civilizational development generally. The contract involves an exchange: the individual gives consent to those restraints on natural freedom required for
the establishment of justice and the maintenance of social order;
what he receives in return also defines the end of government—
fundamentally, the securing of individual rights.
25 See Madison's Letters to W. T. Barry on education ( Writings, Vol. IX, 103109) and to Thomas Jefferson on the University of Virgina law curriculum
(ibid., 218-220).
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
81
If one attended exclusively to Madison's use of social contract
rhetoric, it would appear that he shared in the political vision of
modern political theorists such as Hobbes and Locke, whose identification of the ends of political society with its primitive motivational origins was tied to a rejection of traditional political teleology. For social contract theory abstracts politics not only from
religion but also from such classical political ends as moral virtue,
public–spiritedness, and the excellence of the human being. 28 However, Madison's political vision in fact transcended the image of a
market society oriented solely to security and prosperity, for which
reason he also used a more traditional language to describe the ends
of political society. As noted earlier, he considered virtue to be an
object of government, both directly and indirectly. Moreover, the
establishment of justice is a moral object specific to political community, for a just society would not exist in the absence of government, which is "An institution to make people do their duty."27
Madison also showed his awareness of the supra–contractual character of political participation in his presupposition of and many
appeals to the patriotism of the people, a virtue corresponding to
the organic and natural analogies for political community, and having nothing to do with contracts. Furthermore, Madison's writings
are permeated by the sense that the American citizen would share in
a corporate finality which, in the very act of sustaining the realm
of private rights and activities, would be of far greater significance
than most private concerns. This corporate finality would include
national greatness, honor, dignity, associated not only with the
power and bounty which he expected to be generated by American
society, but above all with its political excellence and achievement.
To establish justice more amply than earlier societies, to secure
religious liberty and the other rights of men, to vindicate the honor
of human nature by demonstrating the possibility and worth of a
regime based on liberty—to accomplish and sustain these things
would be no mean achievement, especially for a people whose example would promote the political redemption of the world. 28 Paradoxically, the establishment of personal rights is a public accomplishment; unlike most private activities, sharing in this common
26
Madison's political teleology is so interpreted in Diamond, op. cit.
Jonathan Elliot, ed., Debates in the Several State Conventoins on the
Federal Constitution (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1896), Vol. III, p. 414.
28
For examples of these sentiments, see Writings, Vol. VI, p. 9, note, 126F;
Vol. VIII, pp. 285-385; Vol. IX, p. 102; "James Madison's 'Detached Memoranda,' "
op. cit., pp. 572f, 587.
27
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endeavor is an act of universal significance. One may question the
capacity of a free society to sustain in its emancipated citizens a
sense of duty to the "empire of liberty." Nonetheless, Madison's
understanding of the ends of political society extended beyond
security and prosperity to include justice, virtue, and the common
good appropriate to a free people.
Finally, Madison included human excellence among the ends of
the American political order, in the manner proportionate to popular and liberal rather than aristocratic and disciplined governance.
To begin with, Madison's America both presupposed and was intended to foster on a broad scale an aspect of human excellence
which earlier regimes had treated as a property of the few: namely,
liberty itself. A person who is governed in the detail of life—whether
by Tory paternalism or the impersonal management of state bureaucrats—is prevented from exercising the autonomy which is a specific
excellence of a mature human being. To be sure, liberty may be
exercised in a context of mediocrity, as indicated by the connotation
acquired by the title of the free citizen, the bourgeois. Yet the exercise of self–government, corporate and personal, is in itself a significant realization of human potential. Moreover, liberty is a precondition for high achievement in a number of activities, for though
excellence is normally nurtured within a tradition and in the context of an exterior discipline, it is also a personal accomplishment
which requires the free play of the human faculties. Thus, by
pursuing its "first object," the protection of these faculties, government would bear a positive though indirect relation to the
achievement of excellence. 29 And through its support of education,
government would directly promote what traditional political theory
identified as the specifically human excellence. "Learned Institutions," Madison remarks, which "give to the human mind its highest
i mprovements, and to every Country its truest and most durable
celebrity . . . ought to be favorite objects with every free people."
He concludes:
The American people owe it to themselves, and to the cause of free
Government, to prove by their establishments for the advancement
and diffusion of Knowledge, that their political Institutions .. .
are as favorable to the intellectual and moral improvement of Man
as they are conformable to his individual and social Rights. What
spectacle can be more edifying or more seasonable, than that of
29
Federalist 10, p. 55. For a commentary on this point, see Eidelberg, op. cit.,
pp. 150-153.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
83
Liberty and Learning, each leaning on the other for their mutual
and surest support.30
Unfortunately, Madison never gave a complete account of his
understanding of the ends of political society. Interpreting his statements on this matter is rendered difficult on at least two counts.
First, many of his remarks concern an American national government which, since it operates in a partly decentralized polity, does
not have full jurisdiction over the objects of government. Secondly,
in the free society envisioned by Madison, government at all levels
may have only limited jurisdiction over matters which are properly
of public concern. For example, Madison states that moral virtue
depends not only on good laws but also on appropriate religious
opinions—yet religious doctrine and discipline is to be wholly
exempt from governmental interference. We might also consider
the various quasi–public associations—political, educational, professional, etc.—which independently pursue ends that receive little
emphasis from government. In short, Madison may have understood
the purpose of his national association of free citizens to go substantially beyond those of the government which they establish. In
a free society, what is public may also be voluntary. Yet insofar as
the activities of individuals and voluntary associations depend upon
the peace, stability, and civil order provided by government, their
accomplishments are by extension accomplishments of government
as well. These considerations, together with the points established
earlier, may be synthesized in the following summary construction
of Madison's understanding of the objects of political society.
The moral precondition and therefore most basic end of political
association is the establishment and maintenance of political arrangements based on right principles, the principles of liberty. This
end presents itself most clearly at the founding of the polity, and at
critical moments in the life of the regime. The fundamental purpose of government is the security of the nation and its citizens, and
the protection of individual rights. Beyond these ends, political
society is properly oriented to the nobler objectives identified by
traditional political theory: the common good of a society which
embodies the right order among men and serves as an exemplum
to mankind, the promotion of moral and intellectual virtue among
citizens, and human excellence. Though Madison includes the latter objects within the jurisdiction of government, he does not em30
Writings, Vol. IX, pp. 104-108.
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phasize them. Their fruition would require the cooperative and
independent activities of a free citizenry.
Madison's conception of political order may be termed "neoclassic," in that he did not reject the ancients in favor of the moderns but, as it were, added Locke to Aristotle.'" If the marriage seems
unlikely, one should recall Madison's great attachment to the principle of liberty, which finds much greater resonance in social contract rhetoric than in Aristotle's teleological politics. At the same
time, Madison's liberty does not operate in a moral and ontological
vacuum: man's nature is oriented not merely to life or life with
comfort, but to the good life, which, religion excepted, government
should promote. Nor should Madison's wedding of ancient and
modern themes (in substance, appropriate to what Aristotle considered the best practical regime) be held in contempt, if one reflects
on the degradation which follows the transition from political liberty to moral "emancipation," or the soulless despotism practiced by
modern regimes which have claimed pre–eminent responsibility for
the fulfillment of the whole man.
The Problematic of Self–Government
An advocate of liberty and self–government, Madison was at the
same time aware of the powerful criticisms that can be made of
those principles. Madison himself held that it is not enough for a
government to be free; it must also secure the ends of government,
for the sake of those ends and for its own sake, since an incompetent
government is likely to be short–lived. Against the critics of popular
rule lie affirmed "the fundamental principle of republican Government, that the majority who rule in such governments are the safest
Guardians both of public Good and private rights." 32 Yet he also
recognized characteristic vices of popular rule which pose potential
threats to the achievement of justice and the common good, and
might if unremedied prove fatal to the American experiment in
favor of liberty. One might say that Madison saw that his task as
political theorist and statesman was to be indeed the "Publius" of
the American republic: to insure the goodness and stability of popular rule by minimizing and compensating for its characteristic vices.
This task of the new Publius was contingent, however, on his prior
31
See Ketcham, op. cit., pp. 36-44, for an account of Madison's intellectual
formation at Princeton; also, see Eidelberg, op. cit., p. 165.
32 Writings, Vol. II, p. 366.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
85
analysis of the problematic of popular government, to which he
devoted much study and thought.
A principal desideratum for any regime is the character and
motives of those who rule: "The aim of every political constitution
is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of
the society." 33 However, those who rule may be disposed to violate
their trust from motives of passion or interest. The characteristics
of misrule will vary with the type of government. For example,
Madison remarks of the regimes he rejects: "In monarchies, the
interests and happiness of all may be sacrificed to the caprice and
passions of a despot. In aristocracies, the rights and welfare of the
many may be sacrificed to the pride and cupidity of the few."31
Under the forms of popular government, power is ultimately lodged
in the majority of the people, which therefore becomes the chief
locus of potential abuses. Though the majority is a safer repository
of power than a monarchy or aristocracy, it also has potential moral
failings. If the popular majority is constituted by what Madison
calls a faction—"a number of citizens . . . who are united and
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse
to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community"—it will have the motive as well as the
opportunity to pervert and misuse the powers of government. Such
a majority is all too likely to rule tyrannically. Thus, a principal
and distinctive weakness of popular government is its propensity to
be ruled by a majority faction.35
Madison notes that there are any number of bases for factious
divisions in society—for example, differing religious and political
convictions, or attachment to contending political leaders. Such differences have "divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with
mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex
and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good."
However, the "most common and durable" basis of faction is economic: "the various and unequal distribution of property." 36 And
one might add to Madison's comments that the most durable and
dangerous of economic conflicts is that based on the unequal distribution of property—the conflict between the rich and the poor,
33
Federalist 57, p. 370.
Writings, Vol. IX, p. 361.
35 Federalist 10, pp. 53-58.
36
Ibid., pp. 55-56.
34
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the few and the many, the classical partisan division of republics.
It would be an error to reduce Madison's discussion of faction
to an analysis of economic conflict. The less common and durable
sources of faction can at a given moment be much more dangerous
than economic differences, and Madison was also concerned about
the possibilities of religious oppression and sectional conflict—a
conflict which was by no means exclusively economic, and even in
its economic dimension concerned kinds of property rather than
economic classes. Nonetheless, the distinction between the few and
the many is basic since those with little or no property always constitute a latent majority faction. If, as Madison states, "The great
desideratum of Government is such a modification of sovereignty as
will render it sufficiently neutral between the different interests and
factions, to controul one part of the society from invading the rights
of another," 37 one of his principal concerns as a republican theorist
would be to prevent government becoming excessively biased in
favor of the factious interest of the many.
Though ultimate legal authority belongs to the electoral majority, the officials responsible for the functions of government are
in a more immediate sense the "rulers" of society. Public officials
are a distinct source for the possible abuse of power because they
may invade private rights or violate the common interest, not
merely as instruments of the majority, but from private motives or
as servants of some minority faction. Furthermore, they pose the
most direct potential threat to the very existence of a popular regime since they are in the immediate position to usurp the rule of
the people. During the period of constitutional formation, the possibility of governmental tyranny did not worry Madison nearly as
much as it did many of his contemporaries. Government's dependence on the people can be relied upon as the "primary control" on
its usurping tendencies. "Auxiliary precautions" are also necessary,
especially provisions for the substantive as well as formal separation
of powers among the branches of government. 38 But as will be shown
later; separation of powers was intended to check factious majorities
as well as the abuses of public officials. It was well after the main
features of his politics had developed that Madison became especially concerned about the possibility of governmental tyranny, when
he came to see the actions of Adams' administration as an attempt
to supplant popular government in America.
37
38
Writings, Vol. V, p. 368.
Federalist 57, p. 337.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
87
The potential abuse of power, whether by a popular majority or
by public officials acting independently of the sense of their constituents, is only one aspect of the problematic of popular government. Good will does not insure good government; those who rule
must have the "wisdom to discern" as well as the "virtue to pursue"
the common good. The classical criticism of democracy which perhaps retains the greatest cogency in modern times is that the management of public affairs requires a competence which the people at
large lack. That deficiency might be remedied today by the adepts
of Marxist–Leninist science, or in the West by Weberian experts
guided by the arcane wisdom of behavioral social science. Madison
also recognized that "there are subjects to which the capacities of
the bulk of mankind are unequal."" He had, however, enough confidence in popular capacities to rely on republican institutions to
produce political leaders with wisdom sufficient to the tasks of government: "I go on this great republican principle, that the people
will have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom." 40 It would seem that he understood elections to be properly
acts of political intelligence which select those best endowed to
pursue the common good—a "chosen body of citizens" who will
"refine and enlarge the public views." 41 He was aware that elections
might be much less. Consequently, important considerations for
Madison's reflections on republican government were to be electoral
arrangements conducive to the choice of the best, and institutional
arrangements likely to sustain and foster the exercise of justice and
prudence by public men. Yet another consideration would be the
formation of potential statesmen, men with the skills, the vision,
and the character desirable in rulers of a republic.
That the American republic be sufficiently oriented to the proper
ends of government, and competent to secure those ends, were Madison's chief concerns as a constitutional theorist. However, some of
the other vices which he saw as incident to popular government also
merit attention. In particular, popular governments are prone to
instability in legislation, and to lack of firmness and energy in executing the law. Government must be amenable to public opinion,
yet the mutability of public opinion disposes popular rule to excessive mutability of laws. At the Virginia ratifying convention, Madi39
Writings, Vol. V, p. 81.
Elliot's Debates, op. cit., p. 536.
41 Federalist 10, p. 59. Also, see Writings, Vol. VI, p. 82: "A representative
republic chooses the wisdom, of which hereditary aristocracy has the chance."
40
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son argued that "a vicissitude of laws" constitutes "the greatest
calamity to which the United States can be subject," since it gives
an advantage to "sagacious men"—we might say "sharpers." Their
profit comes at the expense of the solid but unsophisticated citizens
who normally constitute the firmest support for republican government, "the industrious farmers and tradesmen who are ignorant of
the means of taking such advantages." 42 Justice is therefore compromised, and the regime's support from such citizens would be
eroded.
If popular governments tend to lack firmness, it is from an inordinate attachment to the principle of liberty. But an unqualified
liberty is neither possible or desirable; a balance must be struck, as
Madison puts it, between liberty and power. An excess of power
raises the specter of despotism, but Madison believed despotic government would more likely arise from the excess of liberty. The
tumult and anarchy pursuant to a lack of firmness and energy in
the execution of law may, like a vicissitude of laws, lead to the
popular repudiation of popular government. As Madison remarked
in a speech on the tenure of the Senate at the Philadelphia
Convention:
He conceived it to be of greatest importance that a stable & firm
Govt. organized in the republican form should be held out to the
people. If this be not done, and the people be left to judge of this
species of Govt. by the operations of the defective systems under
which they now live, it is much to be feared that the time is not
distant when, in universal disgust, they will renounce the blessing
which they have purchased at so dear a rate, and be ready for any
change that may be proposed to them.43
The vices of unstable legislation and weak government could be
remedied, in part, by the same "modification of sovereignty" designed to check a majority faction.
Finally, an important aspect of Madison's critical analysis of self–
government in America concerned not the infirmities of popular
government, but the vices intrinsic to the confederal form of union.
Madison's critique of confederacy had its origins in his experience
as a delegate to Congress from 1780 to 1784." Throughout the war,
Congress suffered from a lack of funds and supplies, which were to
Elliot's Debates, op. cit., p. 261.
Farrand, Vol. I, p. 219.
44
For a chronicle of Madison's activities as delegate, see Brant, op. cit., Vol.
II, pp. 11-305.
42
43
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
89
be provided by requisitions on the states. The states, with problems
of their own, met the requisitions only partially and grudgingly.
Once the conclusion of the war freed the states from the immediate
threat of British arms, they proved even less willing to provide for
continuing general needs. Gradually, Madison came to see the difficulties encountered by Congress as inherent in confederal arrangements. If the Confederation had to rely on the voluntary compliance
of its members, it would fail to achieve its objectives and the Union
would dissolve. Congress must have the power to procure the means
requisite to its ends. Thus, until the end of his term in Congress,
Madison repeatedly attempted to modify the American confederation so as to supply it with sufficient "energy" in the general
government.
While seeking to strengthen the confederal Congress, Madison
also devoted himself to the study of the theory and practice of confederations, ancient and modern. His scholarly efforts, added to his
experience in Congress, led him to conclude that confederal government is indeed "imbecile" in two respects: its mode of operation,
and the source from which it derives its powers.45
A confederal government must place direct obligations on sovereign states and, insofar as its requirements impinge upon individuals, it must operate through the separate states. Both directly
and indirectly, then, a confederal government must depend for the
fulfillment of its acts on the acts of the states. Either it relies on the
voluntary compliance of its members, or it forces compliance by
resort to arms. The latter alternative is never desirable, and may
often be impracticable. Yet voluntary compliance is a "chimera."
Like individuals, but even more so, the states cannot be depended
upon to place their obligations to the whole above their particular
goods. Moreover, in their sovereign pride they may determine for
themselves their obligations under the confederal compact.
That the source of a confederal government's powers is the governments of the member states also renders it incompetent. This
follows because the general good is not identical with the particular
goods of the member states. However, the delegates to a confederal
government are not free to deliberate upon and act for the general
good, because they are mere agents of the states. Abstracting from
venal motives, the member states are likely to subordinate the gen45 Madison's extensive critique of the confederal principle may be found in
"Views of the Political System of the U. States" and "Of Ancient and Modern
Confederacies" ( Writings, Vol. II, pp. 369-390), and in Federalist 18-20.
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eral to particular goods because they lack the perspective to know
what the general good requires. Madison used this consideration to
justify his continued support for granting the confederal Congress
an impost, after Virginia had disapproved the measure:
. . . the part he took on the present occasion was the more fully
justified to this own mind, by his thorough persuasion that with the
same knowledge of public affairs which his station commanded the
Legislature of Va. would not have repealed the law in favor of the
impost and would even now rescind the repeal.46
Since confederal measures require the consent of men without
knowledge of general needs, confederation is again "imbecile."
Madison's critique of confederation pointed to a radical change
in the structure of union as the sine qua non for the success of the
American enterprise: the general government should be founded on
national rather than confederal principles. Thus, we should consider first this aspect of his proposal for remedying the vices of
popular government in America.
Madison's Constitutional Model
Of the various questions to which Madison addressed himself
during the period of constitutional formation, the most immediate
and pressing was the establishment of a "more perfect Union"; that
is, a shift of sovereignty from the states to the general government.
It is ironic, in light of Madison's later reputation as a bulwark of
states' rights, that there is so little to be found in his writings prior
to 1789 that suggests any intrinsic value in retaining a residual
sovereignty in the states. Consider his response to the fear that the
Virginia Plan would ultimately result in consolidated government:
Were it practicable for the Genl. Govt. to extend its care to every
requisite object without the cooperation of the State Go y s. the people
would not be less free as members of one great Republic than as
members of thirteen small ones. A citizen of Delaware was not more
free than a citizen of Virginia: nor would either he more free than a
citizen of America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the Genl.
Government to absorb the State Govts. no fatal consequence could
result. Taking the reverse of the supposition, that a tendency should
be left in the State Govts. towards an independence on the Genl.
Govt. and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out.47
I
n
47
Vol. I, p. 340.
Farrand, Vol. I, pp. 357-358.
Writings,
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
91
This is not to say that Madison desired a consolidated government,
or saw no advantages in state autonomy. However, the entire thrust
of his constitutional model was to strengthen the hand of the
national government.
What would be needed to give the general government sufficient
strength? First, its authority would have to be derived directly from
the people, rather than the state governments. Were a revision of the
former plan of Union to be ratified by the state governments, they
could continue to claim sovereign rights over the general government, including the right independently to judge their obligation to
federal acts. To leave grounds for such an interpretation would be
to retain the fatal flaw of the Confederation in the new fabric.
Madison in effect anticipated the nullification doctrine and attempted to remove its legal ground by insisting that the Constitution be popularly ratified. Popular ratification was crucial, he explained, in converting the form of American union from "a league
or treaty, [to] a Constitution." 48 In short, to remedy the defects of
confederation, the general government had to be converted into a
truly national government, ruling over a people united into a body
politic—even if only for certain purposes.
A general government founded on national principles could
overcome the Confederation's defective mode of operation by acting
directly on the people (perhaps most crucially, in raising revenue),
thus substituting "the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy"
for "the destructive coercion of the sword." 49 Also, it could derive
its public officials and thus its ordinary powers directly from the
people, rather than the state governments. Madison's colleagues at
Philadelphia declined to exploit the latter possibility fully, instead
applying the confederal principle of representation in the Senate.
They did so, however, over the Virginian's opposition, as exemplified by his declamation against the Connecticut Compromise: "By
the vote already taken, will not the temper of the state legislatures
transfuse itself into the senate? Do we create a free government?"50
But even with regard to the Senate, Madison's objectives were largely
secured. Paid from the national treasury, and with a long term of
office, Senators would have substantial latitude to attend to the
48
Farrand, Vol. II, p. 92. Emphasis in original.
as Federalist 20, p. 124. Emphasis in original.
o Farrand, Vol. I, p. 416.
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general good, rather than act merely as ambassadors of provincial
interests.
Securing the independent authority and power of the general
government would not wholly rationalize the structure of Union, in
that the states would remain as powerful corporations which might
come into mutual conflict, impede common purposes, and obstruct
national operations. Madison's constitutional model included a truly
radical prescription for maintaining order and harmony—the requirement that before becoming legally valid, all state legislation
must be reviewed by the national Congress, which would be empowered to exercise the veto. Madison considered this provision "the
mildest measure that could be devised" to prevent the "mischiefs"
of state autonomy. 51 The Constitution was to provide a much milder
control, to be imposed by the judiciary under the supremacy clause.
Madison believed that judicial control would be too slow and uncertain, especially when the cooperation of the state courts would
be required. Also, it could be applied only after improper legislation had been put into effect and caused perhaps irreparable harm.52
It was the omission of a prior veto in the national legislature that
gave Madison his greatest doubts concerning the efficacy of the Constitution. In the light of subsequent events, one might not fault his
judgment.
Though the Constitution which Madison was to defend in the
Federalist did not provide the general government with as much
energy as he thought necessary, it did go far in the national direction. In so doing, it promised not only relief from the vices of confederation, but also new possibilities for the success of self–government. For Madison held that majority faction, the principal vice of
popular rule, would be much less likely in the large republic of the
United States than in the thirteen small republics of the old Confederation. He thus reversed the prevalent opinion that small republics are best suited for popular rule. The rationale for his novel
thesis is presented in Federalist 10.
Having remarked that the great object of his inquiry is to secure
the public good and private rights against the danger of majority
faction, without violating the spirit or form of popular government,
Madison notes two means of obtaining his object: either prevent a
majority actuated by the same passion or interest from arising, or
51
Ibid., pp. 164-165. See also Vol. I, pp. 162, 168-71, 318-319; Vol. II, pp. 27,
390, 440, 589.
52
Farrand Vol. II, pp. 27-28; Writings, Vol. V, pp. 26-27.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
93
render such a majority, "by their number and local situation," incapable of common action. "Pure democracy," in which the people
administer the government in person—"pure," presumably, since the
principle of popular sovereignty is wholly unmodified—is from this
standpoint ineligible: "A common passion or interest will, in almost
every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and
concern result from the form of government itself." A "republic,"
distinguished from democracy in that popular rule is mediated
through representatives, offers better prospects. First, representatives
need not and perhaps cannot be neutral instruments for translating
public views into legislation. The significance of this point will be
developed presently. Secondly, republics can encompass a greater
territory and population than can be accommodated by a democracy. Madison considers this the principal circumstance which makes
faction less dangerous in republics than in democracies:
smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and
interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same
party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a
majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed,
the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole
will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens;
or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison
with each other.53
The
The advantages of a small republic apply even more forcefully in
large republics: parties and interests are further multiplied, as are
the impediments to the mobilization of an existing majority faction.
Madison probably considered the latter point to be of limited importance, since he anticipated that the new Union would facilitate
improvements in transport and communication. The "local situation" of a majority faction, its territorial diffusion, would in time
prove less of a barrier to its organization. The principal advantage
of a large republic, then, is its capacity to embrace a great diversity
of parties and interests.
One can readily see how the extent of the republic could control
the effects of certain kinds of faction. Family feuds, for example,
could not polarize the United States as they could the Verona of the
53
Citations from Federalist 10, pp. 57-61.
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Montagues and Capulets. Likewise, passions tied to feelings of locality would not generate majority factions in a large country, nor
would religious passions in a nation encompassing a multiplicity of
sects. However, the effect of size in controlling economic factions is
not so apparent. As noted earlier, Madison refers to "the various
and unequal distribution of property" as "the most common and
durable source of factions." The United States would indeed have
more varieties of property than any individual state, but factions
based on the inequality of wealth would not be more numerous.
Stated simply: while a large territory can add a thousand proud
family names to the Montagues and Capulets, it cannot add a single
category to the division between the rich and the poor.
The classical answer to this ancient problem of republics is a
large middle—class which can provide stability by mediating between
the propertyless and the rich. Madison was aware of the benefits of
having a large number of citizens with an interest in property, a
condition existing at the time with the broad diffusion of small land
holdings. He anticipated, however, a limited tenure for America's
agrarian economy. Furthermore, even small landowners could engage in factious conflict, as demonstrated by Shay's Rebellion. The
classical answer, then, was inadequate. Yet Madison believed that
the large republic could serve as a remedy for "class struggle," over
and above the remedies previously devised. First, there is the factor
of size: a leveling impulse could be less likely to pervade the entire
Union than any of its parts. But as Martin Diamond has pointed
out, more important to Madison's thinking was the number and
diversity of interests in a large republic.54
Diamond notes that because the many poor and the few rich will
exist in the large as well as the small republic, a majority faction of
the poor is always latent. In terms of their specific economic activities, though, the many and the few are united into numerous groupings of shared interest. Hence, the pursuit of economic interest can
cut across class lines and create intra—class divisions. Using a contemporary example, Diamond remarks that railroad magnates and
trucking mgnates may conflict, while railroad owners and workers
may close ranks against competitors in the transportation industry.
54 Diamond develops his interpretation in "Democracy and The Federalist: A
Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent," op. cit.; "The Federalist," History of
Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss and Josephy Cropsey (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1963), pp. 573-593; The Democratic Republic (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1970), pp. 91-98.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
95
Such associations for particular rather than class interests, Diamond
suggests, were Madison's expedient for avoiding class conflict. This
expedient would be inefficacious in a small society, "where the many
are divided into only a few trades and callings: these divisions are
insufficient to prevent them from conceiving their lot in common
and uniting for oppression." But in a large republic, especially if it
is commercial, particular interests will be so numerous and powerful
that the desired result will follow:
The mass will not unite as mass to make extreme demands upon the
few, the struggle over which will destroy society; the mass will fragment into relatively small groups, seeking immediate advantages
for their narrow and particular interests.55
In this second way, then, a large republic may avert the political
mobilization of the factious majority of the poor.
Diamond's interpretation finds confirmation in a letter in which
Madison presents to Jefferson the rationale for the large republic.
"Divide et impera," he remarks, "the reprobated axiom of tyranny,
is under certain qualifications, the only policy, by which a republic
can be administered on just principles." By the division of the
people into many parties and interests "a common sentiment is less
likely to be felt . . . by a majority of the whole"; rule is likely to
be by a fluid coalition majority, rather than a permanent majority
based on class interest. But it should be noted (here I depart from
Diamond) that Madison's thinking implies a certain modification of
popular sovereignty. As he explains to Jefferson: "The great desideratum in Government is, so to modify the sovereignty as that
it may be sufficiently neutral between the different parts of the
Society to controul one part from invading the rights of another."56
The sovereignty must be modified because under the forms of popular government the many may rule in their class interest. But the
rule of a part—even the most numerous part—in its self–interest is
unjust, and also dangerous: the few, whose resources may compensate for their numerical disadvantage, may cherish sweet treason
against the regime, while the many may become dupes of demagogues aspiring to despotic power. The extended republic would
modify the sovereignty not simply by its tendency to fragment the
55
"Democracy and the Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent,"
ibid., p. 66.
"Writings, Vol. II, pp. 31-32. The last citation continues: "and at the same
time sufficiently controlled itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of
the entire society."
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interests of the many, but because the resulting multitude of particular interests would be so many alliances of the few and the many:
in class terms, each faction (or most) would be mixed. If the politically relevant factions represent the few as well as the many, the
sovereignty would then be so modified as to make it "sufficiently
neutral between the different parts of Society."57
I have suggested that Madison's remedy to the vice of majority
faction was to establish a setting for popular government in which
the ruling majority is likely to represent a mixture of social classes.
Such a remedy is proportioned to his diagnosis of the moral and
intellectual deficiencies of men which make just government problematic: we tend to subordinate conscience to passion or interest;
we tend, moreover, to be biased in our moral opinions. It would
therefore be imprudent to expect justice from a government which
represents a part of society on a policy question affecting the interest
of that part; much better that the ruling majority be distributed,
and represent those who hold and those who are without property.
Indeed, Madison's discussion of democracy and the extended republic recalls Aristotle's distinction between democracy and his favored
mixed regime, the polity: in democracy, the majority is likely to rule
for its own interest, in the large republic, for the common good.58
The notion of a large republic is of course not Aristotelian; rather,
the insight that extended republics are better suited than small republics to the formation of distributed majorities was Madison's
contribution to the science of politics. However, Madison did not
ignore the relevance of electoral and institutional arrangements,
which are so important to Aristotle's discussion of the polity. Republics differ from pure democracies not simply because they can
be larger, but because they substitute for direct popular rule the
principle of representation. In Madison's constitutional model the
principle of representation, combined with appropriate institutional
arrangements, would serve both as an impediment to factious rule
and a means to secure competent government.
57
Simple fragmentation of the interests of the many would not be enough,
in that the clashing interests regulated by legislation would involve not only
differences in kind of property (landed, manufacturing, mercantile, etc.), but also
differences in amount.
58
On the likeness between Madison's republic and Aristotle's mixed regime,
the polity, see. Paul Eidelberg's The Philosophy of the American Constitution,
op. cit., passim; as well as his A Discourse on Statesmanship (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1974), Ch. I–VI. The following analysis of Madison's constitutional model is at many points indebted to Eidelberg's insights.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
97
We should first note Madison's claim that the Constitution established a "wholly popular" government—an "unmixed" republic."
The republic is unmixed because all offices are derived, directly or
indirectly, from the great body of the people, neither the electors nor
the eligible candidates for any office being restricted to a given social
class. Though numerous restrictions in fact existed, Madison's claim
was defensible, in that the exclusions were established by state laws
rather than the Constitution. However, he had for a time considered
the idea of establishing a property qualification for suffrage in the
Constitution itself." His reasoning on this matter is revealed in
some remarks concerning Virginia's Constitution:
[The] question arising here is how far property ought to be made
a qualification. There is a middle way to be taken which corresponds
at once with the Theory of free Government and the lessons of
experience. A freehold or equivalent of a certain value may be
annexed to the right of voting for Senators, and the right left more
at large in the election of the other House. . . . This middle mode
reconciles and secures the two cardinal objects of Government; the
rights of persons, and the rights of property. The former will be
sufficiently guarded by one branch, the latter more particularly by
the other. Give all power to property, and the indigent will be oppressed. Give it to the latter and the effect may be transposed.
Give a defensive share to each and each will be secure.6I
Though the national Constitution would be unmixed in the
formal sense indicated above, Madison anticipated that the principle of representation would give property a share in sovereignty
sufficient to its defense. This follows because representatives would
likely be chosen from among men of property and reputation, and
because political institutions were designed to give public officials
substantial latitude to follow their own judgment. Both the oligarchic principle of wealth (related to the defense of property) and
the aristocratic principle of merit (related especially to competent
and just government) could therefore have a share in the sovereignty
Federalist 14, p. 81.
When the question , arose in Philadelphia he remarked: "Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the safest
depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the people
will not only be without landed, but any other sort of property. These will
either combine under the influence of their common situation; in which case,
the rights of property and the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands:
or which is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence & ambition,
in which case their will be equal danger on the other side." (Farrand, Vol. II,
pp. 203-204.)
61
Writings, Vol. V, pp. 286-287.
59
60
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disproportionate to their numerical weight in society. But let us
turn to textual sources.
In his public defense of the Constitution, Madison emphasizes
the relation of representation to the principle of merit. Thus, he
notes in Federalist 10 that representation may "refine and enlarge
the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens," who may be characterized by "wisdom . . .
patriotism and love of justice." Elsewhere, he remarks that the representative principle is "an auxiliary desideratum for the Republican form," which serves its purpose by extracting "from the mass of
society the purest and noblest characters which it contains." 62 Now,
Madison did not have sanguine illusions concerning the probable
motives of representatives; interest and ambition are all too likely
to weigh more heavily than devotion to the public good. Nonetheless, he considered it important to have men of character and intelligence in the legislature, and gave several reasons why his constitutional model would favor the operation of legislative virtue.
First, the very size of electoral districts in the extended republic
would favor the choice of suitable representatives. More men of
merit would he available in large distritcs, and the voters' choice
"will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters."63
Secondly, the representative's term of office—which Madison had
proposed should be three years—would support his capacity to act
well. His tenure would allow sufficient time to become acquainted
with the public business, and would also serve to remedy the excessive parochialism likely to typify representatives drawn from local
constituencies. Lastly, his tenure would be sufficient to give him a
degree of independence from his constituents, and therefore the
capacity to resist temporary factious pressures.
Yet why would a representative act contrary to the popular sense,
and risk being removed from office? He might be a man of character, unwilling to cooperate in unjust schemes, more concerned with
honor than with the mere possession of public office. But there is
an added reason, which Madison does not elaborate in the Federalist. Consider the question: what would be the material circumstances of the men most likely to be elected to office from a large
district? What men would have "most most diffusive and established
62
63
Federalist 10, p. 59; Writings, Vol. II, p. 369.
Federalist 10, p. 60.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
99
characters" in a district encompassing probably one and possibly several counties? Would they not be men of property? Madison himself
elaborated on this consideration many years after the Federal
Convention:
Large districts are manifestly favorable to the election of persons
of general respectability, and of probable attachment to the rights of
property, over competitors depending on the personal solicitations
practicable on a contracted theatre.
The representatives would likely be "patricians" of sorts. Madison
considered it improbable that they would be patrician demagogues:
And altho' an ambitious candidate, of personal distinction, might
occasionally recommend himself to popular choice by espousing a
popular though unjust object it might rarely happen to many districts at the same time.64
The effectiveness of the principle of representation in magnifying the influence of property and merit would vary with such factors as the size of the electoral district, the mode of election (direct
or indirect), and the term of office. Also important would be the
size of the representative body. Madison judged the disposition of
small assemblies to be "aristocratic," while large assemblies would
be disposed to a democratic character. 65 On all of these counts, the
House of Representatives would be the "democratic" branch of the
national government: more "sober and respectable" than a random
gathering of citizens, more attached to the rights of property, yet
popular in character and properly so, since it would be the special
function of the House to represent the rights, the interests, and the
perspective of the many. Madison repeatedly emphasized and sought
to promote the latter role for the House. For example, at Philadelphia he argued for the popular election of one legislative branch as
"essential to every plan of free government," lest the necessary sympathy between the people and their rulers be too little felt, and the
people "be lost sight of altogether." 66 The same focus on the House
as the "people's branch" of government pervades the relevant numbers of the Federalist, as well as Madison's subsequent comments on
the Constitution's intention. Consider his explanation, to his colFarrand, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 428.
Although too large a body would tend to be dominated by a few members.
See Federalist 58, p. 382.
66 Farrand, Vol. I, pp. 49-50.
64
65
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
100
leagues in the first Congress, of why the House was given the exclusive power to originate money bills.
The principal reason why the Constitution had made this distinction was, because they were chosen by the people, and supposed to
be best acquainted with their interests and ability. In order to make
them more particularly acquainted with these objects, the democratic
branch of the Legislature consisted of a greater number, and were
chosen for a shorter period, so that they might revert more frequently to the mass of the people.67
It should be noted that the House would be "the democratic
branch" relative to the other branches: its large electoral districts
and intermediate term of office would make it more removed from
an immediate impulse of passion or interest in the popular majority than the lower house of a state legislature, or the assembly of
citizens in a pure democracy. Still, the House would be that branch
of government in which the character, interests, and perspective of
the many would predominate. Although itself a potential threat to
minor parties, the House would most fully embody and defend the
principle of democratic liberty: popular liberty against the despotic
tendencies of the few and the liberty of the individual against the
power of the government. But what holds for the House need not
hold for the other branches of government. Here we should consider the role of separation of powers and bicameralism in Madison's
constitutional model.
The first purpose of separation of powers is to guard against
governmental tyranny—a possibility which is not wholly eliminated
by the establishment of popular controls on government. Madison
did not develop the argument for this widely recognized principle,
but instead stated its rationale as an axiom:
The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and
judiciary
in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny.68
Madison's discussion of the separation of powers in the Federalist is
primarily an explanation of why the Constitution does not rigidly
divide the functions of government among the several branches. The
principle of separation is maintained, he argues, as long as no one
department wholly controls the functions of another. Furthermore,
67
68
Writings, Vol. V, p. 368.
Federalist 47, p. 313.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
101
some sharing of functions may be necessary to give each branch the
capacity to resist encroachments by the others. Since the legislature
is the most powerful branch, the Constitution's blending of powers
was intended to strengthen the other departments—for example,
through the executive's veto power. In addition, a division of power
is established within the legislature itself. Bicameralism is a necessary extension of the same principle that requires the separation of
powers:
. . . it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of
self—defense. In republican government, the legislative authority
necessarily predominates. The remedy for the inconveniency is to
divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them,
by different modes of election and different principles of action, as
little connected with each other as the nature of their common
functions and their common dependence on society will permit.69
Bicameralism, then, together with the separation of powers would
serve as a security against governmental tyranny. Why? Clearly, the
fact that the House and Senate are separately organized would act
as a mechanical barrier to their cooperation in schemes of oppression. But as evidenced in the above citation, Madison's expectations
were based on the belief that they would be not only separate but
different bodies, with different principles of action. The same point
is made in the Federalist when he argues for "the improbability of
such a mercenary and perfidious combination of several members of
government, standing on as different foundations as republican principles will well admit." 7 ° The heterogeneity of the two branches
would be established by a series of constitutional provisions that
makes the Senate, relative to the House, the "aristocratic" branch of
the legislature. The differing interests and ambitions characteristic
of the two branches would provide the motives for their operating
as mutual checks, thus forestalling the accumulation of all power in
the same hands, whether of "a few, or many." At the same time,
Madison expected the Senate to be the legislative branch most
disposed to protect the interests of the few from the many, and
best constituted to provide firmness, stability, and competence in
government.
The Senate, of course, would not be an aristocratic body in the
formal sense. Its material basis would be wholly popular: the regime
so Federalist 51, p. 338.
70
Federalist 55, p. 369.
102
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
would not give legal sanction to a social aristocracy or recognize any
hereditary claim to office, nor would its Constitution restrict Senators or their electors to propertied men. Moreover, Madison expected the character of the Senate to be substantially conditioned
by its popular derivation; subject to ultimate popular control, it
could be less "high–toned" than a traditional patrician council.
Nonetheless, Madison expected the Senate to have, relative to the
democratic House, the characteristics and functions of an aristocratic (or aristocratic–oligarchic) body: to be at its best the legislative embodiment of justice, reason, and practical wisdom; in its less
lofty and perhaps more usual operation (given those deficiencies of
human nature which make government necessary and the rule of
enlightened statesmen contingent), an agent of stability, reasonability, and the interested defense of the rights of the few. Consider
a few of Madison's comments on the Senate. The mode of electing
Senators would favor "a select appointment"; such a body would
have the capacity to check a majority guided by some irregular
passion, illicit advantage, or artful misrepresentation "until reason,
justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind."
In arguing at Philadelphia that the Senate should have a seven–year
term, he feared that "the popular branch would still be too great
an overmatch for it"; according to Yates' notes, he considered this
branch "a check on the democracy." The Senate exists to protect
minorities, especially to protect a propertied minority against "a
leveling spirit"; it has "for one of its primary objects the guardianship of property." The Senate is a body "possessing that proportion
of aristocratic power which the Constitution no doubt thought wise
to be established in the system." 71 Finally, Madison concludes his
defense of the Senate in Federalist 63 by citing the example of the
ancient republics: only those with an institution like the Senate were
long–lived. His exemplars are Sparta, Carthage, and Rome. He reassures his readers: "the federal Senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body." 72 His protestations were no doubt sincere, for the Senate would be a dependent body, derived from the people. Yet it is
equally clear that the Senate was to perform the functions of an
aristocratic body, and represent in a special way (although not exclusively) the character, purposes, and interests of the few. The
71
Federalist 62, p. 401; Federalist 63, pp. 409-410; Farrand, Vol. I, pp. 218, 222;
422-423; 562; Writings, Vol. V, p. 402.
72
Federalist 63, p. 416.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
103
derivation of a quasi—aristocratic body from the great body of the
people would be accomplished through institutional means: the
mode of election, the tenure of office, and the number of Senators.
As noted earlier, the principle of representation may provide a
legislative assembly with greater wisdom, virtue, and/or attachment
to property than possessed by the people themselves. In the election
of Senators, the principle would be employed twice; the- resulting
"refinement" and "filtration" of popular opinion would especially
favor a select appointment." Also, the system of staggered elections
would insure that no short—lived majority faction could control the
Senate. Similarly, the Senate's long term of office would give its
members the independence to resist a factious or foolish popular
majority too powerful for a body like the House to resist.
The latter points emphasize the Senate's negative role, as a check
against the vices of popular government. Yet Madison also saw these
Constitutional features in positive terms, as enabling it to contribute
to good government. The lengthy tenure of Senators would enhance
their capacity to improve the character of legislation by acquiring
a deep knowledge of national affairs, and by considering distant
objects of legislation which require continuous attention over a
period of years. The Senate's long—range view, its term of office, and
its staggered elections would also make it an agent of stability, "the
great anchor of Government." Also, Senators would have the time
to acquire a national perspective. This characteristic is particularly
important for the proper discharge of its exclusive legislative powers
in foreign policy. In Federalist 63, Madison emphasizes the need for
"a sense of national character" in dealings with foreign powers. The
Senate, the "select and stable member of the government," is best
fitted to endow the conduct of foreign policy with honor, consistency, and integrity, because its members have an adequate tenure,
and the body exists forever.
The Senate's national perspective would also enable it to elevate
the character of domestic legislation. The House, though better constituted than the state -legislatures, might degenerate into a brokerage assembly for particular interests, or even become the agent of
some factious majority. Madison wanted a Senate capable of remedying such defects in the House by its national perspective and sense
of national character, and by its relative independence from particular interests and momentary popular passions. The Father of the
73
73
Farrand, Vol. III, p. 123.
104
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
Constitution is often interpreted as a group–interest theorist—an
interpretation which finds support in passages dealing with the
House. His vision of the Senate, however, shows that he understood "justice and the common good" to mean more than the
moment–to–moment result of interest–group brokerage. Consider
his response to Elsworth's proposal that Senators be paid by their
respective states: "The motion would make the Senate like Congress,
the more Agents & Advocates of State interests 8c views, instead of
being the impartial umpires & Guardians of justice and the general
Good."74
The final institutional device for securing wisdom and virtue in
the Senate—the restriction of that body's size—requires some elaboration. That the moral and intellectual capacities of the Senate
should be related to the number of Senators may seem peculiar, yet
Madison posited that relationship on the basis of carefully considered psychological judgments. The Senate was to be the locus of
reason in the legislature, and the rule of reason requires a cool and
deliberate approach. But characteristically, a large body is readily
swayed to hasty and ill–considered action: as an assembly approaches
a mob in size, it tends to acquire the mob spirit. The Senate must
therefore be kept small:
use of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more
coolness, with more system, & with more wisdom than the popular
branch. Enlarge their number and you communicate to them the
vices which they are meant to correct.75
The
Number also relates to virtue: in a small Senate, the personal
motives of members could be employed to compensate for defects in
their character. The motives for seeking public office, Madison
teaches, are ambition, personal interest, and the public good: "unhappily, the two first are proved by experience to be most preva1ent." 76 Yet under proper circumstances, a certain kind of ambition
can have good effects: the ambition for honor, for the reputation of
virtue. This high ambition may especially characterize the "select
body" of the Senate.
To channel such ambition toward the public good requires that
the Senate be small; for if the actions of a given Senator are to effect
his personal reputation they must be visible—which they would not
Farrand, Vol. I, p. 428.
Ibid., p. 151.
76 Writings, Vol. II, p. 366.
74
75
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
105
be in a large assembly. Madison explains how the size of the Senate,
together with its continuity, conspire to make ambition a motive for
right action:
. . . however requisite a sense of national character may be it is
evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous
and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small,
that a sensible degree of praise and blame of public measures may
be the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community."
Madison speaks with a certain contempt of the personal motives
which his constitutional model accommodates and uses; the pitting
of ambition against ambition, he remarks in Federalist 51, is "a reflection on human nature." But such deprecating remarks reflect the
nobility of his standards, rather than the ignobility of the motives
he employs. The ambition for honor is a motive intermediary between the truly base and the most noble. It implies recognition that
virtue is intrinsically worthy, and therefore points the person towards virtue in the fullest sense. And if the institutional arrangements of the Senate lead men of high ambition to just and public–
spirited actions, they may also habituate those men to the truly
noble virtue that Madison hoped for from the Senate at its best.
Madison's reflections on appropriate institutional arrangements
for the American republic centered principally on the legislature,
the most powerful branch. However, his constitutional model included a role for the other departments, similar to that of the Senate. The part to be played by the executive and judiciary is seen
most clearly in his plan for a Council of Revision. This Council,
to be composed of the President and a portion of the Supreme
Court, was to have a qualified veto over legislative acts. The purposes of the veto were to deter legislative encroachments on the
other departments, as well as to check tyrannical majorities, and
promote stability and wisdom in republican legislation. As Madison
explained, "a revisionary power is meant as a check to precipitate,
to unjust, and to tyrannical laws."78
77
78
Federalist 63, p. 408.
Writings, Vol. V, p. 293. A Council of Revision was part of the Virginia
Plan. (Farrand, Vol. I, p. 21) When the matter was considered by the Convention,
the executive veto was substituted on the motion of Gerry. On three subsequent
occasions, Madison initiated or supported moves to reinstate the Council (Farrand, Vol. I, p. 136; Vol. II, pp. 74, 298).
106
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
Why would the Council function as intended? Its members
would, of course, have personal motives—motives of ambition—for
protecting the prerogatives of their offices against legislative usurpations. And its disposition to veto factious or foolish legislation
would be supported by institutional provisions similar to those
operating in the case of the Senate. For example, Madison believed
that the selection of the President through the electoral college
would, through its "filtration" of popular opinion, favor the choice
of meritorious men. The President's tenure would support executive firmness and the pursuit of long–range objectives, and he would
be even more likely than the Senate to have or acquire a national
perspective. 79 And in light of what Madison had to say concerning
the significance of number, the importance of having a single executive with full responsibility for the actions of his department is
apparent. In the Presidency especially the ambition of the man is
tied to the duty of the office.
In every respect but number, the provisions for the judiciary are
even more "high–toned" than those for the executive. The selection
of judges would carry the principle of refining popular opinion to
its highest pitch, in that both agents in judicial appointments would
be indirectly elected. The judges' tenure is for life, and their office
national. At the greatest remove from popular control, they would
have the fullest capacity to resist factious majorities, or even brokeraged majorities that are insensitive to the requirements of justice
and the general welfare. Finally, as Madison pointed out to the
Federal Convention, the Court could make a unique contribution
to improving the character of republican legislation, if given a place
on a Council of Revision:
It would be useful to the Legislature by the valuable assistance it
would give in preserving a consistency, conciseness, perspicuity 8c
technical propriety in the laws, qualities peculiarly necessary; & yet
shamefully wanting in our republican Codes.80
To summarize the main features of Madison's political thought
during the founding period: the most immediate requirement was
to rationalize the structure of Union, to overcome the "imbecility"
of confederation. Though the logic of Madison's critique of confederation pointed to the centralization of sovereignty, he was not
79
According to King's notes on the Federal Convention, Madison supported
a seven—year term for the l'resident (Farrand, Vol. I, p. 71).
so Farrand, Vol. II, p. 78.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
107
a doctrinaire "consolidationist"; rather, his object was to secure
sufficient authority, independence, and power in the general government, and to rein in the potentially anarchic autonomy of the states.
The instrument approved at Philadelphia did not strengthen the
national government as much as he thought necessary, though subsequent experience was to alter his judgment of the relative dangers of
state and national power. His second object was to establish a
government at once popular, just, and competent. That America was
to be self–governing was for Madison both a commitment and a presupposition; consequently, his attention was directed principally to
remedying the typical deficiencies of popular government. The potential vices of popular government are located above all in the
sovereign, the majority: if the majority is a faction, it is likely to
rule unjustly. Although the sources of faction are several, the indigent many are particularly important because they form an ever–
latent majority faction. Madison's theoretical response to the problem of majority faction was both social and institutional. On the
one hand, he looked to the large, diversified society of the extended
republic to fragment the interests of the many into a multiplicity
of particular interests, thus tending to obscure class differences and
to make the locus of factious activity so many alliances of the few
and the many. On the other hand, he sought to establish political
institutions which would secure a share in power for the few despite
their numerical disadvantage. "The few" refers first to those "pure
and noble characters" with the wisdom to perceive and the virtue
to pursue justice and the common good; secondly, to men of high
ambition whose intermediate motives might be directed to the public good in an appropriate institutional setting; thirdly, to men with
a substantial personal attachment to the rights of property.
No single organ of government would be identified with the few:
all would be derived from the people, and each would in various
degrees share power between the few and the many. Nonetheless,
the House could be identified as the "democratic branch," while the
design of the Senate and the other departments removed them from
the immediate influence of popular majorities, and was intended to
foster the selection of men of merit and/or property. The House
would be the guarantor of popular liberty and the attachment of
government to the people. The other departments were expected to
defend the rights of minorities, especially the permanent minority
of the propertied, and to supply qualities such as stability, energy,
108
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
and wisdom, in which popular assemblies tend to be deficient. Also,
these departments could be expected to support the nobler ends of
government, insofar as those ends might be pursued by a government of limited jurisdiction operating in a free society. Finally, the
differing character of the various organs of government would provide substantial grounds for expecting the separation of powers to
prevent the governmental tyranny consequent to the accumulation
of all power in the same hands.
As an architect of the American Constitution, Madison sought
to provide a social context and institutional devices which would
favor good popular government. Yet his political theory was more
comprehensive than the above discussion might imply, for he did
not fancy that the political good can be achieved by a people of
indifferent character. A recurrent theme in his political writings is
that public virtue is prerequisite to the success of self–government.
As he proclaimed at the Virginia Convention:
I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have
virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there
no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation.
No theoretical checks, no form of government, can render us secure.
To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.
And again, in the Federalist: "As there is a degree of depravity in
mankind . .. so there are other qualities in human nature which
justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher
degree than any other form."81
Evidently, Madison considered simple reliance on human virtue
to be utopian folly: men are not angels, and virtue must be supported and supplemented by institutions which foster the elevation
of the best to public office, and furthermore pit interest against
interest and ambition against ambition in such fashion that base
motives may provide some security for private rights and the public
good. Yet simple reliance on such devices would also be folly. Madison believed that a sustained popular majority would ultimately
have its way; if so, the institutional devices which may impede its
access to the statute books would merely allow an appeal from Peter
drunk to Peter sober. Sober public opinion, then, would have to be
informed by a sense of justice and regard for the public good. Nor
81
Elliot's Debates, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 536-537; Federalist 55, p. 365.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
109
would Madison be justified in his confidence that "a coalition of a
majority" in a pluralistic society "could seldom take place on any
other principles than those of justice and the general good," if those
principles were not of sufficient importance to the people and their
representatives.82
In conclusion, Madison's political theory, intended as a remedy
to the characteristic vices of popular government, included three
elements: first, the presupposition that certain specifically human
qualities—"virtue and intelligence" in the people, "virtue and wisdom" in their representatives and rulers—would be sufficiently present to make the enterprise of self–government feasible; secondly, the
fragmentation of and diversification of factions in the extended republic of the United States; thirdly, the appropriate arrangement of
political institutions. Madison was not under the illusion that his
constitutional model could conquer the contingency to which every
human enterprise is subject, nor, for that matter, was his thinking
fully incorporated into the Constitution. But in the spirit of venture,
Madison had confidence that the new American republic could succeed in vindicating the honor of popular government, and recommending it "to the esteem and adoption of mankind."83
Madison's Politics and Contemporary America:
Some Critical Reflections
A prima facie criticism of Madison's political theory is that if his
constitutional model presupposes virtue, he says too little about how
it would be nurtured and sustained. Now, there are necessary limits
to the governmental support of virtue in a polity dedicated to liberty, especially if one speaks of a federal government with partial
sovereignty. Madison's political order, if it operated as he anticipated, would foster the habits of justice and moderation. Moreover,
he supported public education in the states, and a national university, with a view to the moral training of citizens and potential
statesman. But such provisions would not in themselves suffice. If
the promise of the American experiment were to be realized, much
would depend on the capacity of a free society to bring about virtue
in its members. From what Madison had to say on this matter, it
would appear that he anticipated and relied upon a pervasive
82
83
Federalist 51, p. 341.
Federalist 10, p. 58.
110
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
religious ethic to supply the requisite moral leaven for American
society.
A lugubrious observer of the contemporary scene might wonder
whether more direct and specific public support for character formation is not necessary and proper. But it should again be pointed out
that Madison did not pretend to have conquered historical contingencies (in this case, secularization). At the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829, when the question of a property qualification for suffrage once more arose, Madison reflected on the
variety of relevant changes which might be expected in a society
decreasingly agrarian, increasingly commercial and industrial. As an
elder statesman addressing a new generation of political leaders, he
concluded: "To the effect of these changes, intellectual, moral, and
social, the institutions and laws of the Country must be adapted,
and it will require for the task all the wisdom of the wisest patriots." 84 He did not expect America to flourish, and overcome crises
in her national life, if his were the last generation with political
vision and devotion to the public good.
Given the regnant ideology, a more likely criticism of Madison's
politics is that it is undemocratic. It is true that much of his thought
was directed to tempering the power of the many. But his reasoning
was based on the premise that the people would indeed have final
authority: it is because the majority is sovereign that it needs to be
checked. After the new republic was established, Madison revised
his estimate of the relative power of the few and the many. In
Hamilton's program and influence, he saw a danger that the national government might become dominated by a well–connected
oligarchic junto centered in the executive. It was then that he developed the thesis that states' rights are vital to a plan for free government. Maintaining the bulk of administration in the states would
prevent the aggrandizement of the national executive at the expense
of the legislature, while autonomous state leaders could challenge a
national establishment adrift from its popular moorings. Thus, he
responded to the unanticipated power of the few by entering a
constitutional polemic in support of the many.
Since Madison's republic, though of the many, would include a
role for the few, periods of oligarchic ascendancy are inherently
possible. If contemporary corporate power—public as well as private—makes it appear that the people are "lost sight of altogether,"
84 Writings,
Vol. IX, p. 360n.
MADISON'S POLITICAL THEORY
111
democratic reforms would be called for by Madison's politics. But
if his insights are correct, some defensive power should be preserved
for the few. Moreover, a people neither blinded by flattery nor corrupted by prejudice will recognize the folly of governance by the
Gallup some devices are required to magnify the public role
of wisdom. Given the transformation of America in the last two
centuries many of Madison's specific proposals are archaic. Yet we
may profit from the principles of his theory, for his was a worthy
attempt to deal with a perennial concern of free government: the
reconciliation of reason, justice, and consent. .
ALEXANDER LANDI
Spring Hill College
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