The Future of the US-Egypt Military Relationship
In late April, 2014 the United States lifted a number of restrictions placed on
military aid to Egypt. As reported in Defense News, the US government is moving
forward with $650 million in foreign military financing (FMF) for Egypt’s
military, part of an easing of restrictions imposed after the removal of President
Morsi. Along with the funding, a delivery of 10 AH-64D Block II Longbow
helicopters held up because of the political controversy will now move forward.
These helicopters, equipped with advanced optics, maneuverability and long loiter
time are essential to the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by Egypt in the
Sinai Peninsula.
The US-Egyptian political-military relationship is encapsulated by this example.
The United States provides financial and advanced technological assistance to its
ally, Egypt. Egypt, in turn, uses that assistance to fight a common enemy. Yet, the
assistance is not without some measure of conditionality, and relations between the
two states are sometimes at odds. As Nora Bensahal from the Center for a New
America Security notes, the US continues to use military aid as a lever while trying
to maintain its close relationship with Egypt, remarking that “This is an important
tool to try to maintain some account of influence and connection with the Egyptian
Military. If these funds were completely cut off and stayed completed cut off, it
would send an isolating message to the regime.” Clearly invoking the lessons
learned from the Pressler Amendment experience of the 1980s and 1990s, where
the US lost significant amount of influence with the Pakistani military as funds
were cut off due to Pakistan’s nuclear activities, Bensahel and the US security
establishment is carefully trying to restart and recalibrate military aid to Egypt
towards a positive and amicable strategic relationship.
The Camp David Arrangements
Without going into the extensive diplomacy, history and/or negotiating processes
which led to the historic 1978 Camp David accords, the political-military
consequences of those accords led to the United States committing to several
billion dollars in Foreign Military Financing to the governments of both Israel and
Egypt, subsidies which continue to this day, given as a mixture of grants and aid
packages committed to purchasing U.S. materiel. For its part, Egypt receives
military aid of $1.3 billion annually which has helped to modernize and westernize
the Egyptian military and make it interoperable with US and other coalition
partners. It is the second largest recipient of US military aid on a continuous basis,
and accounts for over 30% of the Egyptian defense budget. It should also be noted
that the majority of this money, given as Foreign Military Financing, must be spent
on US equipment so the beneficiaries of this aid also include US defense firms.
As the United States and Egypt reflect on the Camp David arrangements and
consider whether either party should take a different direction from the path they
have been on since 1979 an obvious question is, “Have the Camp David
Arrangements been a strong basis for the US-Egyptian military relationship”?
It is hard to argue otherwise.
The US-Egypt Strategic Relationship

While the Camp David accords were primarily aimed at securing peace between
Egypt and Israel, in retrospect it is hard to imagine a better construct to support the
fundamental US-Egypt strategic relationship. The foundation of this relationship is
one of mutually beneficial interests and for the US those interests have been
articulated over the years, most recently by President Obama at the September,
2013 United Nations General Assembly. They include:

 Defending our friends
 Deterring our enemies
 Fighting Terrorism
 Preventing the spread of WMD
 Maintaining the global commons and access to strategic materials

While those US vital national interests extend worldwide, they are certainly
applicable to shared interests with Egypt. Within the Middle East and Egypt, they
can be further clarified by mutual threats that directly affect Egypt and indirectly
affect the United States, to include the challenges posed by:
 A developing Iranian nuclear program
 Syria-based terrorists and extremists
 Threats along the Sinai border
 Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb
 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, small arms and MANPADs
 Key strategic commons such as the Suez Canal
Additionally, while not within the context of the military relationship, other key
issues such as the Middle East Peace Process, Libyan border security, Economic
assistance, and Ethiopian interference with the free flow of the Nile- all critical
towards a strong relationship between the US and Egypt- are handled by other
agencies of the US government.
In light of current events, it is reasonable to ask if the US is still willing to stand by
these interests. Watching the Mubarak transition, events in Syria and Ukraine, the
pivot to Asia and the withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, many in Egypt and
the region are questioning whether the US will maintain its longstanding presence
and a willingness to employ the necessary means to defend those interests. While it
is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the future intentions and actions of the
current US administration, it remains the policy of the US government to stand by
those commitments.
Going Forward
The Camp David Accords provide a remarkably effective means to achieve mutual
benefits for Egypt and the United States, and it is likely that the US will continue
to depend upon these arrangements in the future. While some may criticize the
large sums of money contributed by the US taxpayers, one only has to point to Iraq
and Afghanistan to demonstrate that Camp David peace, at roughly $5 billion per
year, is far cheaper than war in Iraq or Afghanistan at almost $20 billion per
month.
That said, there are areas for enhancement, even where the arrangements are going
well. Some thoughts to consider include:
 Focusing on proximate threats. There is little danger of conventional war
along the borders of Egypt. Large tank battles are unlikely any time in the
near future and tanks, although impressive, are expensive to operate and
maintain. By contrast, there is a clear danger- to both Egypt and the
United States- from insurgent and terror groups. Programs such as the
BTADs tunnel detection program along the Sinai border, the Proliferation
Security Initiative, provisioning of counterterrorism capability and
intelligence are a far more cost-effective and relevant use of limited
FMF funding.
 Exclude conditionality on FMF. Although the money is US taxpayer
provided, FMF is still an investment in Egyptian capacity and Egyptian
willingness to employ that capacity. Granting FMF but imposing
conditions and “strings” on the financing may appear logical, but is an
affront to the sovereignty and independence of the Egyptian Military.
 Increase bilateral International Military Education and Training. One of
the most cost-effective methods of enhancing understanding and
developing long-term relationships, exchanging students in military
programs has validated its worth over the years. While the Egyptian
military does have an active program for sending its officers to US
military programs, the number of US officers attending Egyptian schools
is proportionally far lower. As a demonstration of the US commitment to
the bilateral relationship, the US should increase the number of US
officers attending Egyptian civilian and military educations institutions.
 Increase intelligence sharing. Counterterrorism activities require
intelligence-driven operations, and the longstanding reluctance of both
sides to provide full intelligence cooperation should be reviewed. While
there are reasonable concerns about how far the intelligence sharing
extends, and which nations receive collateral intelligence reports from
intelligence sharing, those concerns should be directly confronted. No
military operation should be deprived of available intelligence simply
because of unwillingness towards bilateral cooperation.
For longtime observers of the US-Egypt relationship there are few new ideas here,
but returning to the pre-2009 status quo, with enhancements, would be the
strongest signal that both the US and Egypt seek to reestablish the strong military
ties which have been so consequential to the relationship since 1978. Conversely,
there are many in both countries that see a return to the status quo as ratifying the
significant, and often, controversial decisions which have been taken since 2009.
This debate will play itself out over the coming months, although the US seems to
be willing to renew those ties somewhat more than its Egyptian counterparts. One
hopes both sides can reach an amicable solution.
On a final note, the absence of Israel from this discussion is not intentional. Some
would suggest that the US-Egypt relationship is a consequence of, and secondary
to, the US-Israel relationship. While the original Camp David Accords were
primarily a means for the United States to promote security for Israel, those
accords could never have taken place had President Sadat not ended the Egyptian
relationship with the Soviet Union, allowing the opportunity for the US to step in
as an honest broker between Egypt and Israel. It is unlikely that Camp David and
the ensuing strong relations between Egypt and the US could have occurred had
Egypt remained in the Soviet orbit. President Sadat’s act of courage should never
be forgotten.
As such, the US-Egypt relationship is sui generis. Unique in its characteristics. Of
its own kind. On a financial basis alone, it’s been a lifeline for the Egyptian
military, and a bargain for the US. While the benefits of ensuring peace and
stability with Israel were once the primary basis for the relationship, the bilateral
benefits of the relationship and the mutual threats to Egypt and the US have
expanded far beyond the original Camp David vision. It is a credit to the original
framers of the Accords that they have proven, over the years, to be durable and
flexible and remain a solid basis to restore and expand the relationship for the
decades to come.