Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
brill.nl/thr
The centre and the frontier: Ottoman cooperation
with the North African corsairs in the
sixteenth century
Emrah Safa Gürkan*
Abstract
Sixteenth-century North Africa, the “Forgotten Frontier” between two rival empires, the
Habsburgs and the Ottomans, came into the latter’s orbit with the incorporation of the North
African corsairs into the Ottoman empire. The employment of these corsairs and the incorporation of their lands created opportunities as well as problems. This article aims to highlight the
reasons behind and the limits of the cooperation between North African corsairs and Istanbul
when the importance of the former for the latter reached its zenith, in tandem with the OttomanHabsburg rivalry in the Mediterranean. It furthermore tries to demonstrate the details of the
relationship between the imperial centre in Istanbul and the frontier provinces of North Africa
with its centrifugal elites. Thus it reveals the diversity of Ottoman administrative practices as well
as the pragmatism and flexibility of the Ottoman government. Finally, it delineates the role that
the corsairs played in the shaping of the Mediterranean strategy of the Ottoman empire.
Keywords
Corsairs, razzia, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania, derya beyi, Barbaros Hayreddin, Turgud Reis,
Uluç Ali, Ottoman navy, Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, Ottoman frontier administration, salyaneli
eyalet, Ottomans in the Mediterranean, Ottoman grand strategy
One of the neglected subjects of sixteenth-century Ottoman political history is the relations between Istanbul and North Africa after the latter was
incorporated into the Ottoman empire as a result of the cooperation between
the Ottomans and the Muslim corsairs who operated in the western
Mediterranean.
North Africa, “the forgotten frontier”1 between two rival empires, the
Habsburgs and the Ottomans, had an important place both in Mediterranean
* Department of History, Intercultural Center 600, Box 571035, 3700 O St., NW,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057-1035, USA, [email protected].
1
The term is coined by Andrew Hess. The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century
Ibero-African Frontier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010
DOI 10.1163/187754610X538609
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E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
and Ottoman history. For the student of the former, it is a battleground
between two colossal empires as well as two distinct civilizations, Christianity
and Islam.2 For the Ottomanists, it is a frontier where the basic institutions
of Ottoman administration were not established and the omnipotent
presence of the Ottoman capital was not directly felt; hence the occasional
tension between the centralizing tendencies of Istanbul and the centrifugal
reflexes of the North African elites. The diversity of Ottoman administrative practices and the pragmatism of Ottoman government in dealing with its
provinces could not have been more apparent than it was here. North Africa
also constitutes one of the terra incognita of Ottoman administrative historiography since a study that combines the Ottoman documentation with the
vast knowledge provided by European historiography and archives has still not
been undertaken by the Ottomanists.3
This study4 will first explain the basic rationale behind the cooperation
between corsairs and Istanbul, a voluntary one not imposed by conquest, by
delineating the political changes that forced both sides to cooperate. Both
sides’ expectations from each other and the extent to which these expectations
were fulfilled determined the tone of this cooperation. It had its limits which
only a thorough study of sources can explain.
The article will also try to delineate the main characteristics of the power
struggle between Istanbul and its North African provinces, one which owes
its fluctuations to the greater political events of the sixteenth-century
Mediterranean as well as the financial, logistical and strategic impediments
2
Cf. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier which defends the division of the Mare Nostrum between
two civilizations and Braudel, Fernand, La Méditerranée et le monde Méditerranéen à l’époque de
Philippe II, 2 vols. (Paris: Librarie Armand Collin, 1966), which accentuates its geographic and
socio-economic unity. For both points of view, North Africa is of central importance.
3
There are works on the North African corsairs of the sixteenth century, written by
Ottomanists, none of which, though, directly engages the relationship between North Africa and
Istanbul. Mantran, Robert, “L’évolution des relations entre la Tunisie et l’Empire Ottoman du
XVIe au XIXe siècle”, Les Cahiers de Tunisie, 26-7 (1959), pp. 319-34; Soucek, Svat, “The rise of
the Barbarossas in North Africa”, Turcica, 7 (1975), pp. 238-50; Bostan, İdris, “Garp Ocaklarının
Avrupa Ülkeleri ile Siyasi ve Ekonomik İlişkileri”, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih
Enstitüsü Dergisi, 14 (1988-94), pp. 58-86.
4
The sources for this study consist mainly of archival material from the Ottoman archives, in
particular from the Mühimme Kalemi of the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (BOA). These
Mühimme Defterleri (MD) and Mühimme Zeyli Defterleri (MZD), which registered the summaries of outgoing orders, give us an ample picture for the relationship between Istanbul and North
Africa. The often unreliable Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa, relevant chapters of Tuhfetü’l-Kibar fi
Esfari’l-Bihar and Ottoman chroniclers were also consulted, as were archival collections of less
direct relevance such as the Ru’us Defterleri. In addition to Ottoman material, the author made
use of material from the Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), and the Archivio di Stato di Venezia
(ASV), as well as published European primary sources.
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
127
that separated Ottoman North Africa from Istanbul and reinforced the former’s autonomy. After all, North Africa was western Mediterranean, while the
Ottoman empire was Levantine. Could the structural western/eastern division
of the Mare Nostrum that Braudel so well accentuated5 be overturned by the
strategies of decision-makers? Could political will prevail over geography,
logistics and technology?
The relationship between Istanbul and North Africa is also important for
the study of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the Mediterranean as the North
African provinces and the corsairs would soon become the main agents with
which the Ottomans attacked the Habsburgs in the western Mediterranean.6
Before beginning, it is necessary to define the term corsair. By this the
author means anybody who went on a corso by participating in the razzia,
regular raids that the North African sailors undertook at the expense of
Christian shores and ships, encouraged and financed at times and protected
always by a political body, be it local rulers, Ottoman governor-generals, or
Istanbul. A corsair was a privateer who operated under a universal set of laws,
rules, and customs (which regulated exchange of prisoners, safe-conducts, ransoming, passports, and so on) that had been valid since antiquity.7 In the
specific context of this article, the term corsair is used to denote the Muslim
corsairs who operated mostly, but not exclusively, in the western Mediterranean,
and excludes the Christian corsairs in Malta, Livorno and Senj or Habsburg
Naples, Mesina and Trapani.
These corsairs did not come from a homogeneous ethnic, cultural or religious background; what united them was their profession. Some of them, the
Levantine corsairs, mostly Muslim Turks or Greek converts, migrated from
the eastern Mediterranean. Some were Christians who changed their religion
(farsi turco) and became renegades or, as contemporaries would say, turco de
profesión. Most of these renegades were ironically Habsburg subjects from the
poor islands of the western Mediterranean such as Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily;
hence several Habsburg projects to bribe them back to Christianity and to
obedience to their former monarch. These men found little economic opportunity due to the rigid seigneurial order8 of these overpopulated islands which,
5
Braudel, La Méditerranée, I, pp. 123-4.
The corsairs’ role in Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and Ottoman strategy has not been given
due scholarly attention by Ottomanists, with the exception of Hess, The Forgotten Frontier.
7
Braudel, La Méditerranée, II, pp. 191-3. A corsair (Ottoman levend or gönüllü reis) was a
legal as opposed to a lawless pirate (Ottoman harami levend), a word which our documents
almost never use.
8
Sola, Emilio, Los que van y vienen: Información y fronteras en el Mediterráneo clasico del siglo
XVI (Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2005), pp. 199-200.
6
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colonized from the continent, were already facing economic difficulties
because of the imposed export agriculture.9 There was also a native element
among North African corsairs, which was further reinforced by the influx of
the Moors who chose to leave Spain after 1492, and whose knowledge of the
Spanish coasts rendered them useful.
Other groups in these North African provinces, such as the Ottoman paşas,
local janissaries, provincial garrisons, local urban elites and auxiliary Arab cavalry, even though not labelled as corsairs, were irreversibly linked with the
razzia as this was what justified their presence in the region, paid their salaries
and maintained the vitality of North African ports. After the incorporation of
Algeria into the Ottoman empire and the expansion of these corsair states into
the hinterland, these non-corsair elements gained further political relevance.
From that point on, the relationship was not only between Istanbul and corsairs, but also between Istanbul and the North African provinces, in which
corsairs were the dominant but not the only element.
Coming into orbit: the incorporation of Algeria, 1519 or 1533?
The Ottomans made it a policy to employ irregular military units on the battlefield especially in the Balkans. These akıncıs were instrumental to the early
Ottoman success in Europe and played an important role in the foundation of
the Ottoman empire as proven by the paralysing effects of their defection in
the 1440s.10 On the one hand, the Ottomans were eager to make use of their
military contribution, while on the other they gradually tried to institutionalise and therefore centralize these irregular forces in an effort to impose a more
strict control.11
One can observe a similar picture behind the cooperation between the
Levantine corsairs and Istanbul. The Ottomans had resorted to the service of
important corsairs such as Kemal Reis and Burak Reis during the hard times
of the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1499-1503. A similar confrontation facilitated the employment of another generation. With the ignition of the
Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, the cooperation between the Ottoman empire
and the Levantine corsairs, who established themselves in the western
Mediterranean, gained a special importance which deserves some scrutiny.
9
Braudel, La Méditerranée, I, pp. 139-46.
See İnalcık, Halil, Fatih Devri Üzerine Tetkikler ve Vesikalar (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu
Yayınevi, 1954).
11
See Radoushev, Evgeniy, “Ottoman border periphery (serhad) in the Nikopol vilayet, first
half of the sixteenth century”, Etudes Balkaniques, 3-4 (1995), pp. 140-60.
10
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
129
The appearance of the Barbarossa brothers, Hızır and Oruç, as well as several other less-known but equally dangerous Levantine corsairs, in the western
Mediterranean provided an opportunity for the Ottomans. What rendered
their services more important for the Ottomans was that, unlike the previous
examples of Kemal Reis and Burak Reis, they managed within a couple of
years to build themselves a power base in North Africa. After operating at first
under the aegis of local rulers, for example of Tunis and Djerba, the two brothers managed to overcome the Spanish garrisons in coastal presidios and the
Habsburgs’ inefficient local allies and conquered Djidjel, Algiers, and Cherchell
in 1516, and Tènés and Tlemcen in 1517.
The modus operandi of the corsairs was to ravage the Christian shores by
relying on their superior navigation skills, lighter and faster ships, and the
Moors’ expertise of the western Mediterranean shores. North African port cities not only provided them with suitable markets where they could sell their
goods, but also safe harbours and necessary craftsmen. There, they first operated by giving a share of the booty to the local ruler in exchange for his hospitality. When this was no longer an option, they built their own kingdom by
employing a careful strategy which took advantage of the divided nature of
local North African politics.
What were the reasons that prompted these independent-minded corsairs
to come under the aegis of the Ottoman sultan and submit their vassalage to
Istanbul? What kind of cooperation was envisaged by both sides, and to what
extent were these expectations fulfilled? Before we go into details and try to
answer these questions, let us try to determine when exactly this cooperation
actually started.
The incorporation of the province of Algeria into the Ottoman empire formally took place in 1519 when Hayreddin was appointed (albeit nominally)
the governor-general (beylerbeyi) of the province of Algeria (Cezayir-i Garb) by
the Ottoman sultan, Selim I. Only a few years later, in 1533, Hayreddin
would be appointed as the grand admiral, kapudan-ı derya, of the Ottoman
navy. The Ottoman chronicles, all of which follow the famous piece of propaganda, the Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa almost verbatim,12 do not, however, relate
12
Yıldız, Mustafa, Gazavât-ı Hayreddîn Paşa: (MS 2639 Universitätsbibliothek İstanbul) :
kommentierte Edition mit deutsche Zusammenfassung (Reihe Orientalistik, Aachen: Shaker, 1993).
This source is a propaganda piece and often unreliable. One has thus to use it with caution. The
author had to rely on it exclusively at certain times, such as here, when the chronology of diplomatic relations between the two is discussed, since he could not locate other sources save for the
Ottoman chroniclers, which themselves used the Gazavat. He furthermore consulted the
Gazavat when its propagandistic nature did not seem to interfere, that is when there is no gaza
(holy war) rhetoric.
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E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
the events between 1519 and 1533. This calls into question the assumption
that Hayreddin operated as nothing short of an Ottoman vassal and kept close
ties with the Ottoman centre during this time.
The first ambassador Oruç sent from Tunis to Istanbul was a famous corsair named Muhyiddin Reis in 1514.13 A second envoy met the Ottoman
sultan in Egypt in 1517.14 The third envoy, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa, arrived in
1519, offering the submission of the corsairs and the Algerian notables to the
sultan and receiving in return Hayreddin’s appointment to the beylerbeyilik
of the province of Algeria.15 Between 1519 and 1533, the Gazavat records
two more embassies. The famous Aydın Reis (known as Cacciadiavolo in
Italian and Cachidiablo in Spanish sources) visited Istanbul twice,16 and
enjoyed a warm welcome. According to the Gazavat, however, not much of a
cooperation seems to have taken place between Algiers and Istanbul, apart
from these two embassies. Ottoman chronicles did not record any event
related to North Africa before 1533, save for the first three envoys. They did
not mention several important events, which their European contemporaries did not miss, such as Hayreddin’s loss and then re-conquest of Algiers,
the conquest of the strategically important Spanish fortress facing Algiers, le
Peñon d’Alger (1529), and Aydın Reis’s victory over a Habsburg squadron
off the Baleares Islands (1529). If Algeria truly became an Ottoman province
and Hayreddin an Ottoman governor-general in 1519, how shall we explain
this total indifference to the fate of the capital of the Ottoman province of
13
He had an audience with the Ottoman sultan, enjoyed his favours and returned with two
new galleys that were constructed in Istanbul, Gazavât, f. 63a-66b, pp. 76-8.
14
Müslihiddin Reis Kurdoğlu and his apprentice Deli Mehmed whose destination was
Cyprus, learning that the Ottoman sultan was in Egypt, decided to pay homage and joined the
Ottoman fleet which was heading for Alexandria, Gazavât, f. 83b-85a, pp. 87-8.
15
Gazavât, f. 135a-136b, pp. 114-5. There is a letter that survived, written by the Algerian
notables to the Ottoman Sultan on behalf of Hayreddin, in 1519. Its existence partly supports
the reliability of the Gazavat in details of early correspondence between Algiers and Istanbul.
Temimi, Abdeljelil, “Lettre de la population algéroise au sultan Selim Ier en 1519”, Revue
d’Histoire Maghrebine, 5 (January, 1976), pp. 95-101.
16
According to the Gazavât f. 267b-271a, pp. 181-2, the first visit occurred at a time when
Süleyman I had recently ascended to the throne and was preparing for a Hungarian expedition,
which suggests the date 1521. However, the fact that Aydın Reis joined Hayreddin in 1523
(Galotta, A., “Khayr al-Dîn (Khıdır Pasha), Barbarossa”, in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd. edn.,
H.A.R. Gibb et al. (ed.) (Leiden: Brill, 1960-2006) [hereafter EI2], vol. IV, p. 1155) rules it out.
Possibilities other than 1526 are 1529 and 1532. The latter is more likely, since Gazavat mentions this embassy after Aydın Reis’s other embassy, which should be sometime between 1529
and 1531. Gazavat records the second one sometime between Aydın’s victory over the Habsburg
admiral Portundo (1529) and Andrea Doria’s attack on Cherchell (1531). It should be born in
mind, however, that Gazavat’s chronology may not be reliable.
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
131
Algeria? The fact that the Ottoman chroniclers neglected to record even the
loss of a capital of an Ottoman province demonstrates to us the triviality of
North African politics for the Ottoman decision-making and ‘grand strategy’17
before 1533. It suggests that the incorporation of Algeria and the appointment of Hayreddin were only symbolic until he was summoned to Istanbul.
Ottoman chronicles probably mentioned these three embassies prior to 1519
only because Hayreddin later became an influential figure whose origins they
could not overlook.
It was probably both sides’ intention to cooperate in the first place in 1519,
but this proved impossible because of a series of events, prompted by the
quickly changing nature of North African politics. Hayreddin had already
found himself in trouble when Oruç Reis died in Tlemcen while fighting
against the Spaniards (1518). Although storms had saved the corsairs from
two ill-planned Habsburg naval expeditions,18 he still faced serious local
opposition with the breakdown of a fragile system of alliances that his brother
had built with great effort. This local opposition forced Hayreddin to leave
Algiers in 1520 and settle in Djidjel, in no way comparable to Algiers, either
as a harbour or political centre. Even though he consolidated his power further by conquering a number of places including Collo, Constantine and
Bone in 1521-22 and recruiting other corsairs, such as Aydın Reis and Sinan
Reis “the Jew”19 who joined him in 1523, still the overall political importance of the Levantine corsairs and Hayreddin declined rapidly in the 1520s.
This is also evident from the silence of the Habsburgs over the corsair threat.
With the death of Oruç Reis in Tlemcen, and the withdrawal of Hayreddin
17
By this the author means a well-formulated set of priorities in Ottoman decision-making
after a careful review of several diplomatic, logistical, technological and financial factors. The
Ottoman ‘grand strategy’, once formulated, only changed very slowly. It is not a coincidence that
the Ottomans attacked the same targets consistently. Cf. the siege of Rhodes (1480), another one
planned in 1519, its final conquest (1521); the conquest of Otranto (1480) and the Corfu expedition (1538); the triple-conquest of Tunis (1535, 1569, 1574) and attempts to conquer Malta
(1551, 1565); and several plans on Cyprus before 1571. For a detailed study of the Ottoman
‘grand strategy’ in the Mediterranean, see my, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekabeti Çerçevesi’nde
Osmanlıların Akdeniz Siyaseti (1516-1580)”, in Akdeniz’de Savaş ve Barış, Haydar Çoruh et al.
(ed.) (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2010), forthcoming.
18
One in 1516, led by Diego de Vera and Juan del Rio, and another in 1519 led by Hugo de
Moncada.
19
He was not named so because he was Jewish. According to Gomara, the reason was that he
once ran from an encounter with Christian ships. See de Gomara, Francisco Lopez, Crónica de
los Barbarrojas, in Memorial histórico español: Collección de documentos, opúsculos y antigüedades
(Madrid: la Real Academia de la Historia, 1853), pp. 388-9. The editor of the book suggests, on
the other hand, that his interest in astrology earned him this nickname, Ibid., p. 389, fn.1.
132
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from Algiers, the Habsburgs had already achieved all the political objectives
that they intended to reach with the naval expeditions of 1516 and 1519, and
the reconquest of Tlemcen in 1518. The very threat that the corsairs posed to
the Habsburgs’ “occupation restreinte”20 faded when there were no longer corsairs in Tlemcen who upset the channels of provisioning from the hinterland
to the most important Spanish presidio in North Africa, Oran (Ottoman
Vahran). Hayreddin was no longer in Algiers, threatening the Spanish garrison
located on an islet facing the city, le Peñon, nor in Tunis, dangerously close to
Habsburg Sicily, which he had had to leave after a disagreement with the
Hafsid ruler.
Hence, corsairs could offer little to the Ottomans, whose ‘grand strategy’
hardly covered the western Mediterranean in the 1520s. Ottoman objectives
in the 1520s were to secure the communications between Istanbul and the
newly conquered provinces of Syria and Egypt, and to consolidate its position
in Hungary, the main theatre of the Ottoman-Habsburg confrontation. The
corsairs, who could not help in any of these objectives, were of no interest to
the Ottomans, especially with the former’s diminishing influence in a distant
geography of secondary strategic importance. The lack of an Ottoman interest, hand in hand with the corsairs’ decreasing political relevance for the
Habsburgs in the 1520s, doomed the prospects of a functioning alliance.
A series of events between 1529 and 1533 eliminated these impeding factors. First of all, the corsairs managed to re-consolidate their position in the
region. Hayreddin returned to Algiers in 1525 after pacifying the local opposition, and furthermore conquered the Spanish fortress of le Peñon d’Alger in
1529.21 The same year, Aydın Reis inflicted a noteworthy defeat on the captain-general of the Spanish fleet, Rodrigo de Portundo who was returning
from Genoa where he had disembarked Charles V. These developments
prompted the Habsburgs to acknowledge the threat which, they presumed,
had ended and forced them to react; hence, Andrea Doria’s failed expedition
to Cherchell (1531). Secondly, Ottoman priorities had also changed. The
stalemate reached in central Europe became more obvious for the Ottomans
after the campaigns of 1529 and 1532. Furthermore, the Habsburg navy, reinforced by the volte-face of Andrea Doria from the French to the imperial camp
in 1528, became a primary concern for the Ottomans. In 1532, Doria attacked
20
Ricard, R., “Le Probleme de l’occupation restreinte dans l’Afrique du Nord (XVe-XVIIIe
Siècles)”, Annales d’Histoire Economique et Sociale, 8 (1936), pp. 426-37.
21
Hayreddin had the fortress demolished and built a breakwater linking the islet to the shore
in order to build a safe harbour for his fleet, Haëdo, Diego de, Histoire des rois d’Alger, De
Grammont, H. D. (trans. and ed.) (Alger: Adolphe Jordan, 1881), pp. 41-4.
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
133
the Ottoman coasts and conquered Coron and Patras, while the Ottoman
army was in Hungary, and the Ottoman navy could offer no relief.22
The Ottomans realized both the threat and the opportunity. A Spanish
garrison in a strategically important place like Coron could result in the bouleversement of the Ottoman control over a region populated by a rebellious Christian population. Hence, the Ottomans considered the cooperation
with the corsairs an opportunity which could provide them not only with a
chance to improve the quality of their navy, no match for that of the Habsburgs
under the command of Andrea Doria, as proven in 1532, but also a new theatre of war where they could challenge the Habsburgs at no additional
cost: the western Mediterranean. Taking these factors in consideration, the
Ottomans invited Hayreddin to Istanbul in 1533, the date for the real incorporation of Algiers and the corsairs into the Ottoman system as well as the
commencement of a half-a-century long cooperation with important political
repercussions.
Ottomans’ expectations from the corsairs
To challenge the Habsburgs in the western Mediterranean, the Ottomans
needed bases that only the corsair establishment in North Africa could provide. The immediate outcome of the cooperation, the siege of Tunis (1534),
and later operations of the imperial navy could only be made possible by
the sine qua non condition that the Ottoman fleet had secure fortified ports
nearby from where it could get its provisions. The military technology of
sixteenth-century Mediterranean naval warfare allowed galleys a rather limited
radius of operation because of their large crews, and little hull space as a result
of which they had to go to shore often.23 If the Ottomans wanted to penetrate
to the western Mediterranean, they could only rely on corsair ports in North
Africa before the French opened theirs to the Ottomans in 1543.
22
According to Admiral Gravière, if Ahmed Paşa had arrived on time with his 24 galleys, he
would have been able to break the siege, de la Gravière, Jurien, Doria et Barberousse (Paris:
Librairie Plon, 1886), pp. 203-5. The ineptitude of the Ottoman admiral is also criticized by
Lütfi Paşa who labels him as “stupid” and “a frequenter of taverns and a drinker of wine” (“Lakin
baş ve buğ olan kimesne harabat ehli ve şaribü’l-hamr olub gemilerin tedarikin idemeyüb
hamakatından gemileri bozub kendü İslambola dönmüş idi. Ana binaen kafir dahi meydanı hali
bulub bu hadiseleri itdi”, Lütfi Paşa, Tevârih-i ‘Âlî ‘Osmân (İstanbul, 1341), p. 343.
23
Guilmartin, Francis Jr., Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean
Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 96-7.
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E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
Furthermore, having operated in these waters for years, and relying on the
exiled Moors’ knowledge of the Iberian coasts, the corsairs’ expertise of the
western Mediterranean was crucial for the Ottomans. The Gazavat itself
records that the reason why the Ottomans called Hayreddin was because they
were in need of “experts in naval affairs who knew the Spanish lands.”24 A
good example of such an expert is the famous corsair Turgud Reis’s contribution
to the conduct of the imperial fleet that sailed in the Tyrrhenian Sea in 1552
under the command of the enderun (palace school) educated Sinan Paşa who
owed his title of kapudan-ı derya not to his naval skills, but to his brother
sadrazam Rüstem Paşa. Turgud advised Sinan to anchor near the island of
Ponza and Palmerola. The 40-mile wide canal between the Neapolitan coast
and a group of rocky islands was the route generally used by the ships sailing
between Genoa and Naples. When Andrea Doria chose to use this route rather
than to sail close to the land, Turgud’s intervention proved critical and the
Ottomans ambushed the Habsburg fleet off the Neapolitan coast.25
The information that the North African provinces provided the Ottomans
with was invaluable. Istanbul repeatedly ordered their governor-generals to
develop a reliable information-gathering network.26 The threatening tone of
the Ottoman documents when Istanbul did not receive information proves
that the Ottomans highly appreciated the news that arrived from North
Africa.27 Apart from the irregular information gathering, thanks to the advantages of geographical proximity to and close trade relations with western
Europe, these governor-generals took the initiative by sending corsair ships
to spy on the enemy,28 and interrogating the slaves that arrived after each
year’s razzia.29 This regular flow of information kept Istanbul up-to-date about
24
“İspanya semtlerin bilür derya umurında sahib-i tedbir bir adamumuz olaydı didükde…”,
Gazavât, f. 291a, p. 192.
25
de la Gravière, Jurien, Les corsaires barbaresques et la marine de Soliman le Grand (Paris:
Librairie Plon, 1887), pp. 228-33.
26
For orders sent to the governor-general of Algeria, see Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [hereafter BOA], Mühimme Defteri [hereafter MD], VI, nos. 561 (29 Cemaziyelevvel 972/ 2 January
1565), 904 (22 Şaban 972/25 March 1565); XLIV, no. 287 (c. 23 Muharrem 991/16 February
1583), to the governor-general of Tripolitania; VII, nos. 653 (6 Receb 975/6 June 1568), 1060
(c.14-16 Ramazan 975/13-15 March 1568), 1472 (25 Zilkade 975/22 May 1568).
27
See, for instance, the order sent to the governor-general of Algeria, BOA, MD, XLIV,
no. 297 (c. 28 Muharrem 991/21 February 1583).
28
Gazavât, f. 280b-281a, p. 187; 296b, p. 195.
29
According to the Gazavat, Hayreddin made a habit of interrogating the leading captives
as soon as they arrived in Algiers. “Bellü başlu söz anlar kafir var ise huzurına getürüb kafir
yakası havadislerinden dahi ne var ise su’al idüp her şeyden haberdar olurdı”, Gazavât,
f. 233b-235a, p. 164; also see f. 238b, p. 166. The Habsburg viceorys did the same. Legajos in
Nápoles and Sicilia sections of Archivo General de Simancas [herafter AGS] are filled with reports
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
135
current political events in Europe, and thus possible threats. Dispatches sent
by the governor-generals were not the only channel of information. Individual
corsair captains who were sailing off the enemy coasts, were also richly rewarded
when they brought valuable information.30 Some of them sent spies to Sicily
and Naples; the renegades among the corsairs were perfect candidates for such
a task.31 Corsair captains not only operated independently as gönüllü reis,
bringing information they gathered during the razzia;32 but also operated
from an Ottoman port either employed locally by the governor, 33 or appointed
from the centre as an imperial captain, hassa reisi,34 and even as a middle-rank
Ottoman officer such as Avlonya (Valona) azab ağası ve kapudanı.35 The corsairs
provided a variety of information concerning European politics,36 Habsburg
defences,37 and preparations, movements and destination of the Habsburg
of interrogations of the crews of merchant ships, run-away or ransomed captives, returning pilgrims and captured soldiers.
30
For terakki given to Yusuf, who went to the küffar vilayetleri from Navarin and brought
information, see BOA, MD, LXV, no. 96 (24 Şevval 997/5 September 1589). See also MD XXV,
no. 2804 (10 Receb 982/25 October 1574).
31
A Spanish document (AGS, Papeles de Estado [hereafter E] 1127, f. 103-4) records a renegade spy sent by Turgud, Constantino de Candia, with the Turkish name Muhammed. Having
been interrogated, he gave the names of other spies sent by other corsairs, such as a Greek named
Juan employed by Memi Reis and a Genoese employed by Ali Reis. See also AGS, E 1070, f. 77.
32
See BOA, MD, VII, no. 526 (18 Cemaziyelahir 975/20 December 1567). For news brought
by captains coming from the western Mediterranean, see, MD, XIX, nos. 629 (18 Rebiülevvel
980/27 August 1572), 631 (9 Rebiülevvel 980/18 August 1572).
33
According to BOA, MD, XIX, no. 87 (28 Safer 980/9 July 1572), the governor of İlbasan
sent Şaban and Memi to gather information. See also MD, XIV, no. 517 24 (Rebiülevvel 978/26
August 1570).
34
BOA, MD, XIV, no. 16 (9 Muharrem 979/2 June 1571).
35
BOA, MD, VII, nos. 554 (20 Cemaziyelahir 975/12 December 1567), 1078 (c.14-16
Ramazan 975/13-15 March 1568); XXIII, no. 550 (7 Şevval 981/30 January 1574).
36
For information Murad Reis extracted from the Christians he captured in Sicilian waters
(Cicilye canibi) and sent to Algiers, to be transmitted to Istanbul, regarding the naval struggle
between Spanish, English and Lutheran (i.e. Calvinist, the Dutch rebels) ships, see BOA, MD,
XXIII, no. 645 (22 Zilhicce 980/25 August 1573).
37
Corsairs were very well informed about Habsburg coastal defences and this was decisive
during naval campaigns. For instance, according to del Moral, Hayreddin’s success in 1534 (his
successful raids of the Neapolitan shores, the burning of six Christian galleys, the capture of Julia
Gonzaga, his attack on the undefended shores of Calabria instead of fortified places such as
Gaeta and Pozzuoli) is a sign of how well- informed the corsair was. Habsburg intelligence suggested that Hayreddin would attack either Otranto or the Apulian coast, while Hayreddin,
informed of Habsburgs preparations, changed course and attacked the Tyrrhenian coasts which
were unguarded, save for Naples and a couple of well fortified places. See del Moral, Jose Maria,
El Virrey de Napoles Don Pedro de Toledo y la guerra contra el Turco (Madrid: Consejo Superior de
Investigaciónes Cientificas, 1966), p. 170. The viceroy of Naples, Don Pedro de Toledo frequently complained about Hayreddin’s spies in the kingdom of Naples who were sending information about defense preparations, Ibid. p. 201, fn 42. Hayreddin and his corsairs could shape
136
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
navy.38 They also helped Ottoman counter-information by capturing enemy
ships that tried to gather information or provoke rebellion, especially those
sent by Don Juan to sail in the Adriatic Sea between 1570 and 1572.39
The employment of corsairs and the incorporation of Algeria transformed
the dimensions of Ottoman strategy, not only by creating new responsibilities
and opening new theatres of war, but also for its diplomatic role. For both
Ottoman-French and Ottoman-Moroccan relations, corsairs played an exceptional role.
The Habsburg-Valois confrontation created a rapprochement between the
French and the Ottomans that ended in an alliance which the corsairs profited
from and contributed to. Close relations between Algiers and Paris had already
started during Hayreddin’s time, in 1533.40 Turgud Reis was also on good
Ottoman naval strategy based on reliable information thanks to this intelligence network. For
instance, according to the testimony of Francisco de Alderete in 1536, Hayreddin asked Sinan
“the Jew”, the famous corsair and his second in command, whether he should attack the castle
or immediately launch an assault on Crotone itself. Sinan provided detailed information about
the Spanish defenses in Crotone which proved vital in the conquest of the badly defended castle,
AGS, E, 1025, f. 105, “declaración que presta en la Cárcel de Nápoles Francisco de Alderete”,
cited by Ibid., pp. 82-5.
38
A good example that demonstrates corsair skills in information-gathering for the Ottomans
is that of Kara Bıyık, the captain of the corsairs of Santa Maura. He was assigned to gather information, a la caza de avisos, about the enemy navy en aguas de Calabria y Sicilia, and to capture
informants, AGS, E 1124, f. 110 (1558). Needless to say, this type of information was extremely
valuable during the 1570-73 Ottoman Venetian war. See BOA, MD, XIV, no. 517 (24 Rebiülevvel
978/26 August 1570); MD, XVI, no. 640 (23 Cemaziyelevvel 979/13 October 1571); MD,
XIX, nos. 255 (3 Rebiülevvel 980/13 July 1572), 629 (18 Rebiülevvel 980/27 August 1572),
631 (9 Rebiülevvel 980/18 August 1572), 688 (16 Receb 980/22 November 1572). See also
MD, III, no. 139 (15 Şevval 966/21 July 1559); MD, LV, no. 283 (22 Safer 993/22 February
1585); AGS, E, 1413, f. 127 (1580). Another good example is the following: in 1570, while the
Ottoman navy was in Cyprus, a small squadron led by Uluç Ali and Kara Hoca entered the
Adriatic to learn whereabouts of the Christian navy. They encountered a Venetian galley which
took refuge in Ragusa. When Ragusans refused to give back the ship, Uluç convinced them to
provide important information about the preparation of the Christian navy. Uluç Ali then sent
Kara Hoca to Sicily where the latter managed to approach the navy, anchored in Messina, at
night, counted 130 to 140 ships, and proved the importance of corsair mobility. He then disembarked with some of his men on the Calabrian shores and learned from a Calabrese, a relative of
Uluç Ali that the Christian navy was about to set sail to meet the Ottoman navy, Valente,
Gustavo, Vita di Occhialì (Milano: Casa Editrice Ceschina,1960), pp. 121-5.
39
BOA, MD, XXV, no. 2686 (26 Cemaziyelahir 982/12 October 1574).
40
Hayreddin sent an envoy to François in 1533 and received the French ambassador Rinçon
the next year on his way to Istanbul. In 1534, he sent a diplomatic mission of 12 people who
gave Süleyman’s letter to the French king in Châtellerault and travelled to Paris with him.
François responded to this by sending La Forêt who went to Tunis to meet Hayreddin before
he set sail for Istanbul. In 1536, another French envoy, Jean Montluc, paid a diplomatic visit
to Hayreddin, to which he responded the next year. For early diplomatic exchanges between
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
137
terms with the French. The admiral of the French fleet, Leone Strozzi, the
Knight of St. John and Prior of Capua, sought help from him in an ingenious
plan to capture Philip II who was sailing from Spain to Genoa in 1547.41 In
1552, the French ambassador Gabriel d’Aramon wrote to his king, praising
the goodwill and willingness of the newly appointed governor-general of
Algeria, Salih Reis, to be of service to the French, unlike his predecessor Hasan
Paşa,42 who chose to follow his own ambitions against Morocco instead of
consenting to French plans to attack either Oran or the Spanish shores and
whose dismissal d’Aramon had secured a year before.43 In 1563, a French fleet
of 32 galleys was present at the siege of Mers el-Kébir.44 The Algerians, desperately fearful of an attack from Don Juan’s navy in 1572, even requested the
over-lordship and protection of the French king who accepted the offer
gladly, albeit risking the displeasure of Istanbul.45 The French established a
separate embassy in Algiers in 1580,46 allowed under the capitulations of
1569.47 Marseille had a special importance for the corsairs, as this was the
French port which corsair ships frequented to get victuals48 and critical information49 as well as from where Algeria bought raw materials and munitions.50
In 1595, the Ottomans ordered the governor-general of Algeria to send a delegation to Marseille to convince the town to accept the authority of their new
king Henry IV, an Ottoman ally, and authorized him to attack the city in case
of refusal. The same year, the governor-general also received an order to help
Süleyman, Hayreddin and François, see Soysal, İsmail, “Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetlerinin
İlk Devresi”, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi, 3 (1951-1952), pp. 63-94.
41
Charrière, Ernest, Négociations de la France dans le Levant (Paris: Impr. Nationale: 184860), vol. II, pp. 72-6.
42
Charrière, Négociations, II, pp. 181-2.
43
It is possible that the French ambassador was influential also in Hasan’s third dismissal
in 1567. See İlter, Aziz Samih, Şimali Afrika’da Türkler (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1936), vol. I,
pp. 127-8, 143.
44
Panetta, Rinaldo, Pirati e corsari turchi barbareschi nel Mare Nostrum: XVI secolo (Milano,
Mursia, 1981), p. 186.
45
Charrière, Négociations, III, p. 291-2. The French king intended to place garrisons in
Algiers, Tunis and Bone in case of a Spanish attack, AGS, E 1403, f. 1 (24 January 1572).
46
Galibert, Léon, Storia di Algeri dal primo stabilimento de’ cartaginesi (Firenze: Giuseppe
Celli, 1847), vol. I, p. 346.
47
Baron de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane (Paris: Amyot, 1864), vol. I, p. 95,
art. 10. There were French consulates also in Tunis and Tripolis, according to a document dated
Gurre-i Ramazan 1001/1 June 1593, see Bostan, “Garp Ocaklarının”, p. 71, doc. II.
48
AGS, E 1530, f. 38 (9 August 1584).
49
AGS, E 1413, f. 127 (18 March 1580).
50
AGS, E 1398, f. 45, 212 (1569); AGS, E 1413, f. 127 (18 March 1580).
138
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
French war efforts against the Spanish with a fleet that consisted of Algerian
and Tunisian ships.51
There were times when the relations between Algiers and France cooled
due to issues of compensation for damage to French ships;52 nevertheless, in
general Algiers entertained a privileged position between Paris and Istanbul
until the waning of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the Mediterranean
through the 1580s. The French and the corsairs were natural allies as both had
a vested interest in convincing the Ottomans to challenge the Habsburgs in
the western Mediterranean. In this cooperation, the corsairs’ role was to operate as a middleman between the French and the Ottomans and encourage
mutual cooperation by providing both sides with information, facilitating
their diplomatic exchange and rendering channels of communication.53
The Ottomans formulated their Moroccan policy entirely based on the
information and plans provided from Algiers.54 The main contender for
Algerian hegemony in North Africa, especially after the relative decline of the
Habsburg threat after 1541, was the Sa’adi dynasty in Morocco. The Algerian
government developed their own strategy independently from Istanbul for
the Ottomans were unwilling and unreliable as an ally who sent their navy
against the Moroccans and the Spaniards, only if there were no other imminent threats and opportunities. In affairs concerning Morocco, Istanbul generally delegated the decisions to the governor-generals of Algeria.55 These
governors, on one hand, undertook expeditions with provincial forces, while
on the other, constantly lobbied in Istanbul to secure the assistance of the
51
Bostan, “Garp Ocaklarının”, pp. 75-7, docs. X, XI.
In July 1562, for instance, a French ambassador arrived in Algiers, demanding compensation for the damage caused by the corsairs, Braudel, La Méditerranée, vol. II, p. 303.
53
For instance, the Ottomans would write directly to the governor-general of Algeria
to ensure the liberation of Muslim slaves in France, who, after having run away and entered
France, were put to the galleys again, BOA, MD, XXXVI, no. 205 (17 Zilhicce 986/13 February
1579).
54
For instance, the governor-general of Algeria, Hasan Veneziano, sent the news that the
French supplied about the military preparations of Portugal, Spain and Rome, against the
Ottoman candidate on the Moroccan throne in 1578, BOA, MD, XXXV, no. 475 (2 Receb
986/4 July 1578). The Ottomans also asked Hasan’s predecessor, Ramazan, about the situation
in Fez and Marakesh, MD, XXX, nos. 348 (18 Safer 985/7 May 1577) and 424 (5 Rebiülevvel
985/23 May 1577).
55
For how the Ottomans delegated Moroccan affairs to the governor-generals of Algeria, see
BOA, MD, VI, nos. 971, 972 (Ramazan 972/April 1565); XIV, nos. 1571, 1068 (26 Muharrem
979/19 June 1571); XVIII, nos. 24 (27 Ramazan 979/20 June 1571), 25 (27 Ramazan 979/20
June 1571); XLII, no. 344 (Gurre-i Receb 989/1 August 1581).
52
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
139
imperial fleet.56 Still, most of the expeditions against Morocco were undertaken by Algerian forces, without the participation of the Ottoman fleet. The
Ottomans attempted to send their navy to help them twice, in 1556 and
1581; none the less, in both cases, they eventually recalled the fleet before it
reached its destination.57
One other contribution of the corsairs was the pool of experienced sailors
for the Ottoman navy. The Venetians’ wise decision to kill, rather than ransom, the captured Ottoman sailors after the Battle of Lepanto (1571) and the
consequences of the defeat of Djerba for the Habsburg navy show us how
valuable a commodity a trained sailor was in the sixteenth-century Europe.58
The Ottomans repeatedly recruited these corsairs; nevertheless the most pressing need for skilled sailors was after the defeat at the Battle of Lepanto.59
Apart from experienced sailors, the naval prowess of corsair captains
contributed to the quality of the Ottoman navy until the death of Uluç Ali
in 1587. Their expertise provided something that the enderun education
of Istanbul that concentrated on land warfare could not have provided,
even though there were fine admirals such as Piyale Paşa among its graduates.
The disparity between the outcomes of the choices made by corsair and the
enderun graduate grand admirals proves our point. Hayreddin’s successful tactics in Prevesa (1538) present a stark contrast with Piyale and Mustafa’s
decisions in Malta (1565), contrary to Turgud’s advice, and Müezzinzade’s
choice to accept the battle at Lepanto (1571) in spite of Uluç Ali’s warnings.60
56
For Uluç’s efforts to inform the Ottomans about Moroccan politics and to convince the
sultan to undertake a Moroccan expedition, see, for instance, BOA, MD, XVIII, nos. 24, 25 (27
Ramazan 979/12 February 1572).
57
According to Haëdo, the death of Salih Reis during the plague sealed the fate of the expedition in 1556. Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, pp. 96-7. For the 1581 expedition, see, BOA, MD,
XLII, nos. 344, 345, 347, 352 (Gurre-i Receb 989/August 1581). Haëdo claims that the navy
was recalled because the janissaries of Algiers refused to embark on Uluç Ali’s ships and asked for
a direct order from the sultan, Ibid., pp. 186-8.
58
Hayreddin did the same to the Spanish who were captured in 1519. Having been refused
a fetva by the ulema to ransom, he killed them, Gazavât, f. 124b-126a, pp. 108-9. One should
read this with caution though, as this could be a fabrication since slaves constituted the most
important economic aspect of Mediterranean corsairing. On December 21, 1571, the pope also
issued a bull forbidding the sale or ransom of the Ottoman prisoners-of-war, Rosi, M., “Alcuni
documenti relativi alla liberazione dei principali prigionieri turchi presi a Lepanto”, Archivio
della R. Società Romana, XXI (1898), p. 154, fn.1.
59
For a list of reises who entered Ottoman service after 1571 see, BOA, Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi,
Ru’us Defterleri, 225 pp. 46-7, 79, 95, 112, 288-9, 330.
60
For Hayreddin’s wise strategy of wait-and-see against Andrea Doria in 1538, see Guilmartin,
Gunpowder and Galleys, pp. 42-56. In 1565, Turgud Reis did not approve the crucial mistake of
140
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
Having realized their mistakes after Lepanto, the Ottomans would return
the office of kapudan-ı derya to a corsair, Uluç Ali, giving him free rein in
naval operations and relying on his expertise while forming policy,61 in contrast to earlier interventions from the centre which proved disastrous such as
Müezzinzade’s decision to enter battle at Lepanto.
The physical contribution of the corsairs to the Ottoman fleet was also
important. By the time the Ottomans called Hayreddin, not only had
the Ottoman navy failed to prevent Doria’s attack on Coron in 1532, but the
capacity of the Arsenal was so insufficient that İbrahim Paşa had to ask
the bailo Pietro Zen whether Venice would sell the Ottomans 30 galleys.62
The incorporation of corsair ships increased the number of ships in the
Ottoman navy and the addition of a different type of galley facilitated its
operation. The light and fast corsair fuste and brigantines improved the mobility of the Ottoman navy and the effectiveness of reconnaissance missions. It
also changed the modus operandi of the Ottoman navy which was given to the
command of a corsair. With the addition of corsair ships, one of the primary
concerns of the Ottoman navy became, to the detriment of the fulfilment of
the long-term objectives of Istanbul, to satisfy these corsair ships with plunder.
This was one of the factors that crippled the joint Ottoman-French operations
against Corsica in the early 1550s, when the Ottoman fleet repeatedly fell
short of French expectations and chose to resort to the ‘Little War’ and pillage
the Italian coasts, rather than help the French in lengthy military operations
in Corsica, such as the siege of Calvi and Bastia (1555).63 This insistence on
plunder was most obvious in Turgud’s threat to return when he was refused,
by the French admiral and the Neapolitan exiles accompanying the Ottoman
the Ottomans of laying siege to Forte Sant’Elmo rather than Forte Sant’Angelo. Nevertheless, by
the time he arrived, the siege was already underway and there was little to do, Katip Çelebi,
Tuhfetü’l-Kibar fi Esfari’l-Bihar, Orhan Şaik Gökyay (ed.) (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi,
1973), p. 118. Further, at Lepanto Uluç Ali advised Müezzinzade not to confront the fresh and
well-supplied enemy with ships worn out after six months of campaigning and a tired crew, some
of whom had been given leave. However, the high Ottoman command decided otherwise,
Ibid., pp. 137-8.
61
BOA, MD, XIX, nos. 265 (26 Safer 980/8 July 1572), 275 (5 Safer 980/17 June 1572) and
623 (Rebiülahir 980/18 August 1572); see also no. 668 (c. Rebiülevvel-Rebiülahir 980/12 July
1572-8 September 1572): “Donanma-yı Hümayunum’un takdir-i ilahi ile cümle umurı senün
rey-i rezin üzre isabet karinüne tefviz olunmışdur, din ü devlete enfa’ olan ne ise münasib
gördüğün üzre ‘amel eyleyesin”.
62
Marino Sanudo, I diarii di Marino Sanuto (MCCCCXCVI-MDXXXIII) dall’ autografo
Marciano ital. cl. VII codd. CDXIX-CDLXXVII (Venezia: F. Visentini, 1879), vol. LV, col. 615,
date 28 February 1532.
63
Panetta, Pirati e corsari turchi, p. 186.
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
141
navy, an opportunity to sack Roccella Jonica that belonged to the Prince
of Salerno, a French ally.64 The Ottomans did not intervene as long as these
operations funded themselves and provided booty as well as slaves.65
The economic contribution of the North African provinces is harder to evaluate. The Ottomans created a separate financial arrangement for distant provinces such as Egypt, Damascus and Aleppo. Instead of direct taxation, they
preferred the system of remittances (irsaliye) sent from the provincial revenues
after the expenditures were met (salyaneli or müstesna eyalet). The three North
African provinces theoretically fell into this category. However, there is no
indication in the budget of 954-55/1547-48 of a payment made by Algeria
nor in the budget of 974-75/1567-68 of a payment made by Algeria and
Tripolitania.66 This could be because the amount was not significant as most of
the income would have been spent on the military expenditures of these frontier provinces as was the case in the Kefe and Akkerman sancaks on the Black
Sea frontier. Further, these budgets only imperfectly covered the Ottoman
vilayets without separately calculating their revenues.67 Still, the fact that there
was no separate calculation for these provinces, unlike other salyaneli eyalets of
Mısır, Şam, Haleb and Kıbrıs that were included in a separate section in the
sixteenth century budgets, shows the fragility of the Ottoman presence which
was only a few decades old in a deprived frontier zone. This did not last long,
however. A Spanish spy reports the arrival of 13 galleys from Algiers with the
tribute in 1569,68 and according to a mühimme register in 1580, these provinces were supposed to send 25,000 flori to the centre every year.69 In 1609,
64
Manfroni, Camillo, Storia della marina italiana (Roma: Forzani E C. Tipografi Del Senato,
1917), vol. III, p. 386.
65
Thanks to these operations, the financial burden of the Ottoman navy on the treasury
decreased relatively. For instance, the Ottomans spent 1,200,000 ducats on naval expenses
for 1543-44 operations, while the monthly expenditure of the Habsburg fleet was 200,000
ducats. Raffa, Angelo, “L’ultima impresa di hayreddin (Barbarossa). La guerra marittima turcofranco-spagnola del 1543-4”, in P. Alberini (ed.), Aspetti ed attualità del potere marittimo in
Mediterraneo nei secoli XII-XVI, (Rome, 1999), p. 406.
66
Barkan, Ömer Lütfi, “H., 954-955 (M. 1547-1548) Mali Yılına Ait Bir Osmanlı Bütçesi”,
İ.Ü. İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 25/1-4 (October 1957-July 1958), pp. 219-276; idem, “H. 974-5
(M. 1567-1568) Malî Yılına âit Bir Osmanlı Bütçesi”, İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, 19/14 (October
1957-July 1958), pp. 277-332.
67
Barkan, “H. 974-5 (M. 1567-1568)”, p. 282-3.
68
No amount is mentioned, AGS E 487, Nuevas de Constantinopla de 23 de Julio 1569.
69
An order sent to the governor-general of Tunisia (with copies sent to the governor-general
and the defterdar of Tripolitania as well as the Mağrib defterdarı, i.e. that of Algeria) complained
that the yearly payment of 25,000 flori was not dispatched for over a year, BOA, MD, XLIII,
no. 292 (19 Cemaziyelahir 988/31 July 1580).
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E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
the three provinces appeared among the nine salyaneli eyalets mentioned in
Ayn Ali’s Kavanin-i Ali Osman.
In addition, the governor-generals, be they of corsair or enderun origin, had
to pay the sultan and the vezirs to secure their appointment to the post. Once
appointed, they also had to send presents and slaves regularly after every razzia
to secure their positions.70 In short, Istanbul had a de facto share in the profits
of each year’s razzia which was commanded by the governor-general,71 who
himself took a penc-i yek, a one-fifth share in Algiers.72 A further contribution
was that of the slaves provided for the insatiable markets of Istanbul. The
Ottoman navy never hesitated to troll for booty and slaves even when there
was a demanding operation on hand, such as the conquest of Tunis in 1534.
In addition to the slaves that were sent as presents and those who were captured during naval campaigns, the Ottomans at times directly demanded
the dispatch of slaves from these provinces.73 The Ottoman appetite for
slaves becomes even more palpable when it comes to those of higher birth
whose ransom would be higher.74 The corsairs generally preferred to sell the
captives in situ instead of taking them to North Africa as doing so made much
more sense economically. For instance, Turgud, after sacking Pozzuoli and
70
The amount of these presents could make a difference in appointments. There are several
instances in the Gazavat whereby Hayreddin secured his position by sending presents and slaves
to the sultan and frustrating the efforts of his opponents who criticized him in his absence.
When Hayreddin arrived in Istanbul, he gave the following presents to the sultan: 21 male slaves,
two tavaşis, silver artefacts such as decanters and mugs, dyed clothes, a crown of coral, two
clocks, and velvet, satin, woollen, and brocade clothes (12 Cemaziyelahir 940/29 November
1533). BOA, Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi, 1863, p. 68, cited by İdris Bostan, “The province of Cezayir-i
Bahr-ı Sefid”, in The Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain, Elizabeth Zachariadou (ed.)
(Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 2002), p. 244. The sultan decided to appoint Turgud as the
governor-general of Algeria after he had sent many him presents. However, this appointment was
blocked by Rüstem Paşa. Turgud did not give up and appealed to the sultan who in 1556
appointed him governor-general of Tripolitania instead.
71
BOA, MD, LXX, no. 416 (19 Cemaziyelahir 1001/23 March 1593).
72
BOA, MD, XLVIII, no. 386 (25 Ramazan 990/22 October 1582). According to Haëdo,
the governor-generals received at times one-fifth and at times one-seventh of the total
booty. Governor-generals also benefitted economically from the razzie by investing in these
corsair ships. They provided them with biscuits, oil, olive, honey, butter, rice and slaves. They
also rented leather, wax and fat (sebo). See Haëdo, Diego de, Topografía e Historia General de
Argel (Madrid: La Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles, 1927), vol. I, pp. 209-10.
73
BOA, MD, III, no. 922 (6 Receb 967/2 April 1560) ordered that the slaves in Algiers destined for Istanbul be put in ten ships.
74
BOA, MD, LXVII, nos. 218 (28 Rebiülahir 999/23 February 1591), 362 (7 Ramazan
999/29 June 1591).
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
143
Castellammare in 1548, came to the small island of Procita which immediately became a market for transactions between Christians and Muslims. He
allowed the Christians to ransom their women, children and other kin and
thus made a handsome profit.75 The Ottomans, however, prohibited the corsairs to sell the captives in situ less expensively (ucuz baha ile), in an effort to
further their claim especially on important individuals (namdar beyler) who
had to be brought to Algiers instead, and handed over to the governor-general
who, in turn, would send them to Istanbul.76
Corsairs’ expectations from the Ottomans
The opportunities the Ottomans could have offered the corsairs were even
greater. First of all, the corsairs received the right to recruit young boys from
Anatolia thanks to the agreement between Hayreddin and Selim I. This
Levantine manpower, as well as the janissaries who were dispatched to Algiers
by the Ottoman sultan, gave Hayreddin a military corps alien to the local
population and loyal to him, not a small advantage given the unreliability of
his local allies.77 Two thousand janissaries were sent from Istanbul in 1519, to
whom another 4,000 volunteers were added. Unlike the Ottoman janissaries,
these were not devşirme of Christian origin, but rather young Anatolians
whom the corsair agents in Istanbul, İzmir and Antalya had recruited.78 The
North African provinces regularly depended on these recruits. For instance, in
1541, Kara Hasan, the Algerian envoy sent to Istanbul to announce the failed
Habsburg expedition against Algiers, sent five fuste to the Ottoman shores in
order to recruit young boys. His ship would join them at Boğazhisar on the
Dardanelles on the way back to Algiers.79 In 1564, the governor-general of
75
Gravière, Les Corsaires, p. 155.
BOA, MD, LXX, nos. 414, 415 (14 Cemaziyelahir 1001/18 March 1593). A good example
is the son of the duke of Escalona, Diego de Pachecho, who was sent from Algiers to Istanbul,
AGS, E 1886, f. 203 (26 May 1609). There is a myriad of documents on him in E 1167, 1168,
1886, 1888, 1889, 1892.
77
Hayreddin and Oruç as well as the Habsburgs suffered from several volte-face of their local
allies in North Africa. The Gazavat is especially critical of these unreliable local rulers: “Bu ‘Arab
kısmına kadimü’z-zemandan berü i’timad itmek yokdur…amma Arabun şanındandur ekseriya
“her kim eşek biz semer” fehvasın kullanurlar”, Gazavât, f. 98b-99a, p. 95.
78
İlter, Şimali Afrika’da Türkler, I, p. 107.
79
Gazavât, f. 83b-75a, pp. 87-8.
76
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Algeria asked for 1,500 men,80 and in 1571, 1,000 volunteers (gönüllü) whom
the Ottomans sent with two ships.81
The legitimacy that the title of beylerbeyi brought Hayreddin was also crucial. He could not aspire to be more than a usurper in the eyes of the local
population and in his struggle with local rulers, all of whom were proud of
their royal descent. The disadvantages brought by his outsider ‘Turkish’ status82 could only be compensated for by the prestige provided by his new title,
given him by the most prominent Muslim ruler of the time for whom the two
traditional symbols of sovereignty were reserved after 1519. The Friday sermon (hutbe) was given and coin was minted in his name.
The North African provinces procured from the Ottoman empire certain
raw materials, necessary for shipbuilding, which North Africa could not provide,83 as well as munitions and weapons which the meagre weapons industry
in North Africa could not produce.84 The essential contribution of the reises to
the imperial navy also convinced the Ottomans to allow the former to build
their ships on the Anatolian coast and buy raw and war materials, the export
of which was forbidden (merces prohibitae).85
80
AGS, E 1053, f. 52.
BOA, MD, XVI, no. 632(5 Cemaziyelevvel 979/25 Sept. 1571).
82
The way İbn-i Kazı tries to persuade the locals to revolt against Hayreddin clearly shows the
disdain for the latter and other Levantines. “Şimdi İbn-i Kazı didükleri müfsid gayrı başladı
sırran Cezayir’de olan şeyhlere dahi esamesi bellü olan ehl-i beled ekabirlerine mektub yazub
“Niçe bir Cezayir’de kapanub oturursunuz, sizde ar u gayret yok mıdur ki Türk yirinden bir Türk
gelüb zarb-ı destiyle beledinüzi zabt idüp hükm ü hükümet eyleye?...Bu Cezayir aslında Arab
vilayetidür”, Gazavât, f. 173a, p. 133.
83
Bono, Salvatore, I corsari barbareschi (Torino: ERI-Edizion RAI Radiotelevisione Italiana,
1964), p. 85.
84
For instance, in 1564, the governor of Algeria asked for gunpowder and cannonballs
(pelota), for which he had to pay 100,000 ducats, as well as a reinforcement of 40 galleys for the
coming year, AGS, E 1053, f. 52. Another seller was the French and particularly Marseille. See
fn. 50.
85
Timber according to mühimme zeyli defterleri (hereafter MZD), V, no. 178; “demirli tekerlek, kundak ve dingil” according to BOA, MD, XXXVI, no. 195; grain, derk (leather shield) and
seren (sail) according to BOA, MD, XIX, no. 483. In 972/1564-5 Turgud Reis alone bought
timber, galley oars and 200 müd of grain which was shipped to Tripolis, BOA, MD, VI, nos. 587
(4 Cemaziyelevvel 972/8 December 1564), 1035 (12 Ramazan 972/13 Aprıl 1565), 1290 (19
Zilkade 972/18 June 1565), 1419 (18 Zilhicce 972/17 July 1565). Several orders were issued
to local officers which urged them to allow and even encourage the corsairs to build their ships,
especially during times of difficulty, such as in 1572. For general orders that allowed the use of
local resources and harbours: BOA, MD, X, no. 417 (18 Receb 979/6 December 1571) (with the
stipulation that they would not build ships with less than 17-20 banks), XII, no. 375 (16 Zilkade
978/11 April 1571), XIV, no. 1368 (3 Zilkade 978/29 March 1571), XVI, no. 285
81
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
145
Finally, the Ottomans provided economic opportunities for these corsairs.
It is hard to evaluate the overall economic contribution of sailing with the
Ottoman fleet. It is true that to sail with a large fleet was more secure for corsairs. None the less, it is equally true, no matter the extent to which the
Ottomans tried to provide them with opportunities of plunder, that occasionally they had to endure the hardships of long military expeditions and sieges
with the Ottoman navy.
The opportunities of employment, promotion (terakki) and rewards for
these corsairs, however, were more tempting. There were several levels of
employment. At the highest level, the most prominent corsairs, such as
Hayreddin (1534-46), Uluç Ali (1571-87) and Hasan Veneziano achieved the
rank of the grand admiral with the province of the Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid
appended to the revenues of the office. Further, the beylerbeyiliks of the three
North African provinces were granted almost exclusively to the corsairs until
1587, the year when the Ottomans started to send triennial enderun-educated
paşas from the centre. Several famous corsairs, such as Turgud Reis, Uluç Ali,
Arnavud Memi and Salih Reis became governor-generals of one or more of
these provinces at one point in their careers.86 Many others were also given the
office of the sancak beyi which they either held as the kaid of one of the sancaks
in North Africa under one of these three beylerbeyiliks, or as a “sea lord”, derya
beyi, the governor of one of the coastal sub-provinces (sancak) which were
attached to the province of the Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid and thus under the
domain of the grand admiral.87 They could also find employment (gediks) in
(12 Zilkade 979/27 March 1572) (with the stipulation that they would not build ships with less
than 16 banks), XL, no. 31 (20 Zilhicce 986/17 February 1579). For orders to local officers to
encourage this activity: BOA, MD, X, no. 417 (18 Receb 979/6 December 1571) (ordering a
declaration in the marketplace), and XXIV, nos. 198 and 222 (13 Zilhicce 981/5 April 1574). In
1564, six mahonas went to the Black Sea coasts to build galleys, and three karamürsels loaded
timber, two for Tripoli, one for Algeria, AGS, E 1053, f. 52.
86
Some of them became governor-generals of more than one province: Uluç Ali, of
Tripolitania (1565-68) and Algeria (1568-72); Ramazan, of Tunisia (1570-73) as the kaimmakam of Uluç Ali (BOA, MD, XII, nos. 1034 (27 Şevval 979/15 March 1572) and 1074, and
1577-1579), Algeria (1574-77), Tlemcen (1579-80), which he governed not as a sancak beyi but
as the paşa of a separate province (see Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, p. 164) and Tripolitania
(Bostan, İdris, Adriyatik’te Korsanlık: Osmanlılar, Uskoklar, Venedikliler, 1575-1620 (İstanbul:
Timaş Yayınları, 2009), p. 85), Hasan Veneziano, of Algeria (1577-80, 1582-83) and Tripolitania
(Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, p. 195).
87
The most famous derya beyi was Turgud Reis who was unable to receive the province of
Tripolitania in 1551 and was appointed to the sancak of Karlıili instead (1551-56). Kurdoğlu
Müslihiddin, who commanded the Ottoman navy in the siege of Rhodes in 1522, became
the first sancak beyi of the island. Salih Reis was also the sancak beyi of Rhodes before being
146
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
the Ottoman Arsenal in Istanbul as the Ottomans seemed to have relied quite
often on their expertise. There were also other related offices such as the azab
ağalığı, gönüllü levend reisleri kapudanlığı,88 Kavala kapudanlığı,89 İskenderiye
kapudanlığı, and several ad-hoc appointments with different responsibilities
such as fighting against the pirates (harami levend),90 accompanying treasury
ships between Alexandria and Istanbul, and escorting Ottoman dignitaries to
their destination.91 Finally, some of these corsairs were also employed in the
Red Sea, as Hind kapudanı, such as Murad Reis, Seydi Reis, Piri Reis and
Kurtoğlu Hızır Reis.
A corsair needed a good reference from either the grand admiral or one of
the North African beylerbeyis to receive an office. This resulted in a complex
network of patron-client relationship between first the kapudan-ı derya who
was instrumental in the appointment of the governor-generals, arsenal officers, and derya beyis, then the governor-generals whose recommendations
were crucial not only in the appointment of the local kaids, but also in granting other offices, promotions and rewards, and finally the corsairs who
were looking for better opportunities provided by high office.92 This system
appointed to the beylerbeyilik of Algeria in 1552. The other famous corsairs who were the sancak
beyi of Rhodes were Ali Portuc (AGS, E 1124, f. 162, 1559) and Arab Ahmet (AGS E 487, lo
que se entiende de Constantinopla por cartas de VIII y XIX de Março 1573). Arnavud Memi
was given the sancaks of Mizistre and Naxos (Bostan, “Garp Ocaklarının”, p. 80, doc. XV).
Gavur Ali was the sancak beyi of Modon (AGS E 487, lo que se entiende de Constantinopla por
cartas de VIII y XIX de Março 1573). It was common for a kaid to be appointed to a sancak in
the Levant or vice-versa. For instance, Parmaksız Mustafa, the kaid of Tlemcen, was appointed
to the sancak of Karlıili and given the task of protecting the Levantine coasts (derya muhafazası),
see BOA, MD, XII, nos. 1048, 1049(29 Şevval 979/14 March 1572).
88
Kemal Reis was the azab ağası of Euboea. Another famous corsair, Kara Hoca, was
appointed Avlonya azab ağası with a daily income of 100 akçe, while he was also the captain of
the corsairs, gönüllü levend reisleri kapudanı. His responsibility was to lead corsair ships in the
Adriatic Sea, defend Ottoman shores against Venetian ships and gather information for the
Ottomans, BOA, MD, XII, no. 787 (18 Ramazan 978/13 February 1571). He seems to have
been succeeded by a certain Hasan in both offices, BOA, MD, XXIII, no. 550 (7 Şevval 981/30
January 1574); XXIV, no. 76 (21 Zilkade 981/15 March 1574); XXV, no. 2804 (10 Receb
982/25 October 1574).
89
BOA, MD, L, no. 15 (20 Rebiülahir 991/13 May 1583). See also BOA, MD, II, no. 1299
(10 Şevval 963/17 August 1556); XVI, no. 75 (979/ 26 May 1571-13 May 1572); Kamil Kepeci
Tasnifi 212, Ru’us Defterleri 5 a. p. 54, cited by Colin Imber, “The navy of Süleyman the
Magnificent”, Archivum Ottomanicum, 6 (1980), pp. 255-6.
90
Memi Reis was appointed as the mübaşir to fight against pirates in the Marmara Sea, BOA,
MD, LI, no. 84 (16 Şaban 991/4 September 1583).
91
For instance, it was Piri Reis who accompanied İbrahim Paşa to Egypt in 1524.
92
See the requests by all three governor-generals asking for a sancak for Arnavud Memi
(BOA, MD, XXV, no. 1160 (13 Zilhicce 981/5 April 1574), by the governor-general of Tunisia
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
147
of clientalism was one of the main features that cemented the relationship
between Istanbul and North Africa.
Cooperation: to what extent?
One should not assume that the inclusion of corsairs in the Ottoman high
command was not resented by certain cliques in the capital. The Ottoman
high officials were either graduates of the palace school, enderun, or members
of the Ottoman bureaucratic and judicial cadres, and therefore received proper
education and developed a sense of an elite consciousness which made them
feel that high offices should be exclusively theirs. The best example of their
resentment towards the outsiders is the rebellion of the Hain Ahmed Paşa in
Egypt in 1524, frustrated by the appointment of İbrahim, the favourite of
Süleyman I, to the grand vezirate in his place, contrary to usual practice. In
1534, too, the idea that a self-made man with no proper education, Hayreddin,
would be appointed as the Grand Admiral created resentment among the
Ottoman grandees.93
In the beginning, Hayreddin faced serious opposition in Istanbul.94 The
Gazavat records several instances in which the Ottoman grandees opposed his
for Kaid Ferhad (BOA, MD, XXV, no. 3035 (15 Şaban 982/30 November 1574) and the
kapudan-ı derya himself for Kaid Rıdvan (BOA, MD, XXV, no. 3020 (15 Şaban 982/30
November 1574) and for the Avlonya azapları ağası ve kapudanı Mustafa (BOA, MD, L, no. 6
(10 Rebiülahir 991/3 May 1583). The governor-generals also recommended several corsairs for
positions in the imperial arsenal; for recommendations of the governor-general of Algeria, Hasan
Paşa, see BOA, MD, IV, nos. 897, 1546, 1567; and for those of Turgud Reis, see BOA, MD, IV,
nos. 1854, 2113, 2213. For their recommendations for tımar appointments, see BOA, MD,
XXVII, passim.; L, no. 1155 (991-993/25 January 1583-22 December 1585), LXV, no. 636 (5
Rebiülahir 998/11 February 1590). For their recommendations for promotions, terakki, see
BOA, MD, IV, nos. 873, 874, 875, 876 and 1290-1310 (967-968/3 October 1559-10 September
1561); for the promotions after the victory of Djerba (1560), BOA, MD, IV, nos. 1430-1444
(967-968/3 October 1559-10 September 1561). There is also a list of 86 people in BOA, MD,
IV, no. 1733. See also BOA, MD, L, nos. 554 (24 Receb 993/22 July 1585), 1168-1170 (991993/25 January 1583-22 December 1585). For a special reward, see BOA, MD, XVIII, no. 292
(20 Şevval 979/6 March 1572), 293 (20 Şevval 979/6 March 1572): Parmaksız Mustafa was
ordered to come to Istanbul because of his military deeds (küffarın def ’inde külli yoldaşlık ve
dilaverlik itdüğü).
93
For instance Uluç Ali, enslaved by the corsairs when he was a boy, did not know how to
read and write. See, Relazione of Giovanni Morosini (1585), in Le Relazioni degli ambasciatori
veneti al senato durante il secolo decimosesto, Eugenio Albèri (ed.) (Firenze: Società Editrice
Firoentina, 1839-1863), Serie III, vol. III, p. 296.
94
According to Gomara, when Hayreddin first arrived in Istanbul in 1533, he was not
warmly welcomed. His sponsor, İbrahim Paşa, who himself was an outsider to the Ottoman
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appointment.95 During his tenure, there were several instances of rivalry and
disagreements between him and the Ottoman grandees. According to a
Spanish document, Lütfi Paşa, the brother-in-law of the sultan, tried to insult
Hayreddin by treating him as a mere captain, rather than the grand admiral.96
Hayreddin also infuriated Hüsrev and Mustafa Paşas when he refused to land
his troops during a campaign against the Albanian rebels in 1537.97 He had
further disagreements with Ayas Paşa during the siege of Corfu the same year,
which were the main reason why the siege had failed, at least according to the
opinions of the Venetians,98 as well as in 1538, when he was unwilling to follow the retreating Habsburg navy, aware of the risks involved in a pursuit in
foggy weather.99
Hayreddin’s successful career allowed him to retain his office until his death
in 1546. He was not, however, succeeded by a prominent corsair such as
Turgud or Salih Reis or his son and successor Hasan,100 as would be expected.
All the grand admirals between 1546 and 1571 were of enderun origin. Only
the heroic escape of Uluç Ali from the disastrous battle of Lepanto convinced
the Ottomans to return the office to a corsair.
elites like Hayreddin, was with the army in the East and in his absence he did not receive an
official ceremony. After having to wait in his galley for three days, he went to a friend’s house
where he spent the winter. “…no fué tan bien recibido… como él pensaba….ni se hiço en la
çiudad caso ni estima dél”, Gomara, Crónica de los Barbarrojas, pp. 409-410. This story, however,
is presumably a fabrication since an Ottoman document, dated 12 Cemaziyelevvel 940/29
November 1533, proves that Hayreddin was granted an audience with, and given 20,000 akçe
and a robe of honour (hilat) by the sultan, before the former traveled East to meet İbrahim Paşa,
BOA, Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi, 1863, p. 68, cited by Bostan, “The province of Cezayir-i Bahr-ı
Sefid”, p. 244. However, the fact that such a fabricated story existed suggests that relations
between the self-made corsairs and the Ottoman elites in Istanbul were cool.
95
Some of them, according to the Gazavat, told the sultan that he would take the navy to
Algiers and not return, Gazavât, f. 313b-314a, p. 204. When he did not return, having lost Tunis
to Charles V in 1535, there were some who speculated, in order to infuriate Süleyman I, that he
was afraid of the sultan, Ibid., f. 240b, p. 217. See also beyt verses in Ibid., f. 350b, pp. 222-3.
The Gazavat continuously accentuates the jealousy of the Ottoman grandees, caused by the
sultan’s favours to the corsairs, Ibid., f. 391a-391b, p. 244.
96
Cited by Capasso, C., “Barbarossa e Carlo V”, Rivista Storica Italiana, 49 (1932), pp. 1889. However, this could be a strategy of misinformation to trick the Habsburgs into believing
that Hayreddin, discontent with such treatment, had a motive to negotiate with the Habsburgs.
See also AGS E 1313, f. 5.
97
According to the Gazavat, he refused because it was not his duty to get involved in land
operations, Gazavât, f. 345b, p. 220.
98
Charrière, Négociations, I, p. 340.
99
Manfroni, Storia della marina italiana, III, p. 337, considers this a sign of a secret understanding between Hayreddin and Andrea Doria.
100
Later paşa and governor-general of Algeria (1544-51, 1557-61, 1562-67).
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
149
With the death of Hayreddin, the relationship between Turgud and Istanbul
cooled until Turgud felt the need for Ottoman protection against the increasing Habsburg threat. He had conquered Mahdiyya and Manastır and secured
himself a power base in the Gulf of Gabes. When the Habsburgs, aware of the
threat of a corsair base so close to their ally in Tunis and therefore Sicily, sent
Andrea Doria against him in 1550, Turgud had to ask for Ottoman help. The
Ottomans sent a navy under Sinan Paşa who preferred to conquer Tripolis
instead of recovering Turgud’s Mahdiyya and to appoint as its governor another
corsair, Hadım Murad, the governor of Tajura since 1539.101 Turgud had to be
content with the sancak of Karlıili in the Levant. The Ottoman grand vezir
Rüstem Paşa and his brother, the grand admiral Sinan Paşa, did not want to
reward the naval prowess of Turgud with a beylerbeyilik. Furthermore, when
the Sultan appointed Turgud as the governor-general of Algeria in 1551,
Rüstem Paşa managed to reverse this decision. A furious Turgud would come
to Edirne and succeed in receiving the less prosperous beylerbeyilik of
Tripolitania from the sultan.102 Rüstem Paşa also disliked Hayreddin’s heir and
successor in Algeria, Hasan Paşa. The latter had to leave his post in September
1551 and go to Istanbul to appease Rüstem’s anger over his refusal to surrender to him the income of a hamam built by his father. Rüstem, unforgiving,
replaced him with his favourite Salih Reis.103 Furthermore, the corsairs had to
endure a double standard in terms of reward and punishment. The favouritism towards the enderun graduates is evident in the disparity between the
career of the corsair Piri Reis who was executed in 1553 because of his failed
expedition before Hürmüz and that of enderun graduate Hadım Süleyman
Paşa, who, despite a similar failure before Diu in 1538, faced no punishment
and later managed to become the grand vezir.104
A penchant for independence: corsair autonomy
The incorporation of the province of Algeria and the corsairs into the Ottoman
system did not mean that both sides shared identical interests all the time.
Even during times of intense cooperation when the Ottoman grand admiral
101
Abu’n-Nasr, Jamil, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), p. 190.
102
Katip Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-Kibar, p. 100 ff.
103
Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, pp. 81-2.
104
Soucek, Svat, “Pîrî Re’îs b. Hâdjıdjî Mehmed”, EI 2, vol. VIII, p. 308.
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was one of them, the corsairs had a different agenda from that of the Ottomans.
We have already described how the incorporation of corsairs changed the
modus operandi of the Ottoman navy and how the resulting emphasis on the
“Little War” during naval operations created a conflict between the policies
that were designed and the operations that were undertaken.
High offices enjoyed by Hayreddin, Uluç Ali and Hasan Veneziano as
well as the reputation of Turgud and Salih Reis also affected Ottoman policymaking. These corsairs openly advocated an active policy in the western
Mediterranean and succeeded at times in convincing Istanbul to mobilize
its resources to this end. When frustrated, however, the corsair grand admirals did not hesitate to use the Ottoman navy to reach their own objectives
in the western Mediterranean. The best example of this is the conquest of
Tunis in 1534. According to del Moral, the complete silence of Marquis de la
Tripalda’s intelligence network about an Ottoman attack on Tunis suggests
that Hayreddin decided to attack Tunis after he realized the infeasibility of an
attack on the kingdom of Naples itself.105 The fact that he left the pretender to
the Tunisian throne Reşid in Istanbul and that he had to lie to the Tunisians
to make them believe that he was with him, as well as the report of a Spanish
agent in Istanbul, which related that the Ottoman grandees were not content
with Hayreddin’s independent measures,106 indicate that he took the initiative
in attacking Tunis. It is possible that Hayreddin, whose instructions were to
divert the enemy while the Ottomans were in a truce with Ferdinand and at
war with Safavid Persia, followed his own interests by attacking Tunis. It is safe
to assume that, as long as he could bring enough booty and slaves to Istanbul,
he could formulate his own policy within the lines vaguely demarcated by
Istanbul. The decision between attacking either Habsburg Naples or its ally,
the Hafsid Tunis, which was dangerously close to the Habsburg Sicily,
remained within these lines. The fact that Hayreddin sent back the imperial
ships in the winter while he stayed in Tunis to prepare its defences also suggests that the attack on Tunis was not planned in Istanbul. Stéphane Yerasimos
has also raised the question of whether corsairs were acting as agents of
Ottoman geo-politics or whether the Ottomans were following their lead.107
Moreover, relations were not so harmonious all the time. Prominent corsairs
105
del Moral, El Virrey de Napoles, pp. 168-9.
AGS, E, 1021, f. 106, cited by del Moral, El Virrey, p. 186.
107
Yerasimos, Stéphane, “Les relations franco-ottomanes et la prise de Tripoli en 1551”,
in Soliman Le Magnifique et son Temps: Actes du Colloque de Paris Galeries Nationales du Grand
Palais, 7-10 Mars 1990, Gilles Veinstein (ed.) (Paris: La Documentation, Française, 1992),
p. 544.
106
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151
such as Hayreddin, Hasan Ağa, Uluç Ali and Hasan Veneziano did not
hesitate to negotiate with the Habsburgs and offer a volte-face in exchange
for Habsburg-controlled places like Tunis.108 The reason why the Ottomans
called off the attack on the sultanate of Morocco at the last minute in 1581
was because they did not want to eliminate the only check on the power
of the corsairs who, the Ottomans suspected, dreamed of an independent
kingdom.
Corsairs and international law
Such a penchant for independence became more discernible when it created
problems for the Ottomans in the international arena. The corsairs were not
only attacking Habsburg lands and ships belonging to Habsburg subjects. In
several instances, the Ottomans received complaints from France, England
and Venice. Their subjects were guaranteed safe-conduct while trading and
travelling in Ottoman lands, under the status of a müstemin, according to the
ahdname granted by the Ottoman sultan. The corsairs’ repeated violation of
the rights that were bestowed by these ahdnames caused trouble for and undermined the prestige of the Ottomans in the international arena.
Did the Ottomans intend to stop these corsairs and satisfy these complaints?
If they did, to what extent could they have done it? European historians who
relied on solely western sources underestimated the Ottomans’ willingness to
restrain corsairs’ infringement of the ahdnames. With reservations one should
accept arguments such as that of Alberto Tenenti who states that Istanbul
dragged its feet when it came to punishing these corsairs for the basic reason
108
In 1537, Hayreddin asked for both Tunis and Bone and three years later, a Habsburg
agent, Juan de Aragon contacted him in Istanbul. There is an enormous amount of documents
in the Spanish archives concerning negotiations with corsairs. For negotiations between
Hayreddin and Charles V, see AGS, E 1027, f. 13; E 1031 f. 26, 58, 98, 99; E 1033, f. 160; E
1372, f. 57, 60, 64, 66, 73, 84, (1539); E 1373 f. 15, 18, 19, 20, 28, 30, 41, 42, 85, 88, 117,
118, 119, 151, 156, 160, 165, 176, 178, 181, 187, 226, (1540); E 1376, f. 34 in 1543-4. See
also E 1027, 1031, E 1033, passim. For a good summary of these, see Capasso, “Barbarossa e
Carlo V”, pp. 169-209. According to Capasso, p. 193, the Habsburgs did not take negotiations
with Barbarossa seriously and used them to gain time for their preparations. For negotiations
between Hasan Ağa and Charles V, see AGS, E 1374, f. 171 (1541). For those between Uluç Ali
and Philip II, see E 1061, passim (1573), E 1400, no. 34 (1570), E 1061; Serrano, D. Luciano,
Correspondencia diplomatica entre España y la Santa Sede durante el pontificado de s. Pio V (Madrid:
Imprenta del Instituto Pio X, 1914), vol. IV, pp. 516-7. For those between Hasan Veneziano and
Philip II, see AGS E 1417, f. 41, 62, 109 (1583).
152
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
that the latter were conducting a Holy War against Christians109 Firstly, the
religious nature of the so-called gaza should not be overestimated. There were
numerous renegades among the corsairs some of whom attained the highest
rank and the works of propaganda like the Gazavat should not conceal the
entrepreneurial character and the economic aspect of the razzia. A close reading of the Ottoman sources also demonstrates that the Ottomans lacked the
means, rather than the intention, to punish these corsairs. They respected the
principle of pacta sunt servanda and took the obligations imposed upon them
by international law seriously.110 However, despite several orders issued to the
governor-generals of North African provinces, the Ottomans could not contain these breaches of international law by their own vassals, who was unwilling to deprive themselves of handsome profits. This inability is best exemplified
by the fact that one of the Ottoman officials, who was sent to Algiers in order
to investigate a corsair attack on French ships, was arrested on the orders of the
governor-general who was probably trying to cover the fact that he himself
was involved in the attacks.111 In a similar incident a year before, a corsair
galiot attacked an English ship, which by chance was carrying a Mehmed
Çavuş whose mission ironically was to assure Elizabeth I that corsairs would
no longer attack her ships. He managed to reach Algeria, where the governorgeneral told him that he would not, even under the threat of losing his post,
refrain from attacking Christian ships. Cavuş related this and another incident
in which corsair ships captured an English ship and sold the merchandise in
Oran instead of Algeria. The Ottomans quickly ordered the release of the
prisoners and the compensation of the damages, yet to no avail as the governor-general of Algeria defied the order.112
Even the French, the long time ally of both Istanbul and Algiers, were not
immune from corsair attacks. Thanks to his easy access to the Ottoman government, the French ambassador could have Istanbul intervene on behalf
of French ships.113 The Ottomans repeatedly ordered the release of French
109
Tenenti, Alberto,“I corsari nel mediterraneo agli inizi del cinquecento”, Rivista Storica
Italiana, 72/2 (1960), pp. 237-8.
110
Faroqhi, Suraiya, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (New York and London:
I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 122.
111
BOA, MD, LXII, no. 43 (14 Rebiülevvel 995/22 February 1587).
112
BOA, MD, LX, nos. 472 (2 Safer 994/22 January 1586), 599 (20 Cemaziyelevvel 994/9
May 1586); LXI, no. 85 (14 Receb 994/1 July 1586).
113
BOA, MD, VII, no. 355 (22 Rebiülahir 975/26 October 1567); XLIII, nos. 208 (20
Cemaziyelevvel 988/3 July 1580), 214 (27 Cemaziyelevvel 988/10 July 1580), 289 (19
Cemaziyelahir 988/1 August 1580).
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
153
prisoners114 and the restitution of French ships and goods.115 They also forced
the Algerians to accept a French consul in the city116 and the dispatch of delinquent corsairs to Istanbul to be tried.117 Another Ottoman ally, England, also
suffered from corsair attacks. The English ambassador William Harborne,
despite the presence of an English consul in the city, had to send one of his
men to Algiers in 1584 and 1585.118 A year later, the Ottomans sent orders to
North Africa for compensation of English losses.119
It is true that the Ottomans showed a greater determination to compensate
French and English damages than Venetian ones since the former two were
instrumental to the anti-Habsburg policy of the Ottomans. Yet, the Ottomans
still tried to contain and punish the corsairs120 and the Venetians were compensated by the Ottoman authorities for corsair attacks, excluding those
114
According to a record dated 20 Cemaziyelevvel 973/13 December 1565, the Ottomans
sent a copy of the defter which the French gave them and included the names of French slaves in
Algiers. They ordered that these should be delivered to the agents of the French king in the city,
BOA, MD, V, no. 656 (20 Cemaziyelevvel 973/13 December 1565). See also MD, XXVIII, no.
663 (22 Receb 984/15 October 1576).
115
BOA, MD, V, nos. 93 (18 Muharrem 973/15 August 1566), 215 (12 Safer 973/8
September 1565); XII, no. 1102 (9 Zilkade 979/ 24 March 1572).
116
The Algerians at first resisted the idea of a French consulate in Algiers which would complain incessantly about corsair attacks. They refused entrance to the French consul in 1564. Only
when the Ottomans intervened, could the French appoint a consul, İlter, Şimali Afrika’da Türkler,
I, p. 113.
117
BOA, MD, XLVII, no. 105 (Rebiülevvel 990/3 April 1582) ordered the governor-general
of Algeria to send them to Istanbul, BOA, MD, VI, no. 1359 (9 Zilhicce 972/7 July 1565) reassured the French king that orders would be sent for the punishment of corsairs, who, with three
galiots, sacked a French merchant ship near Djerba, heading from Marseille to Alexandria, as
well as for the compensation of the merchants. See also nos. 1361 (9 Zilhicce 972/8 July 1565),
1362 (9 Zilhicce 972/8 July 1565).
118
Burian, Orhan, “Türk-İngiliz Münasebetlerinin İlk Yılları”, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve
Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, 9 (1951), p. 14. See BOA, MD, LX, nos. 472 (2 Rebiülahir
994/23 March 1586), 599 (20 Cemaziyelevvel 994/9 May 1586); LXI, no. 85 (14 Receb 994/1
July 1586).
119
See fn. 112.
120
According to an Ottoman document from the Venetian archives, the Ottomans assured
the Venetian Signoria that Hayredin was ordered to refrain from attacking Venetian ships,
Archivio di Stato di Venezia [hereafter ASV], Documenti Turchi, busta 3, no. 315 (11-20
Receb/25 January 1534-4 February 1534). An imperial hatt-ı hümayun was sent to Hayreddin
in which he was ordered to investigate the validity of a Venetian complaint, punish the violators
and compensate the Venetians, ASV, Documenti Turchi, busta 3, no. 330 (11-20 Muharrem
941/23 July-1August 1534). For an Italian translation, see no. 331, reprinted in Gökbilgin,
M. Tayyib, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar Külliyatında Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devri
Belgeleri”, Belgeler: Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, 1 (1964), p. 188.
154
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
during wartime.121 Even the Spaniards were given a guarantee by the Ottomans,
at least during the peace negotiations, that the Ottoman corsairs would not
attack Habsburg ships as long as Habsburg corsairs (i.e. the knights of St. John
in Malta) did not attack Ottoman ships.122 Finally, there are also records of
orders that protected Moroccan ships,123 and individual safe conducts for
Christian merchants who were ordered to buy commodities for the palace.124
In short, the Ottomans tried to suppress the economic incentives that nourished local interests since these damaged their reputation in the international
arena, and were in conflict with their long term diplomatic strategies. However,
these orders, in conflict with local interests, were often disregarded by the
corsairs and local officers, another proof of the fragile Ottoman control over
the area.
The profits of razzia were such that even Ottoman officials in the Aegean
and the Adriatic coasts were complicit. Local officials such as governors and
fortress commanders (dizdars) of the coastal sancaks cooperated with these
corsairs and provided them with a safe harbour to anchor and repair their
ships as well as markets to sell their slaves and plunder, in exchange for a share.
Three important ports that linked Istanbul to North African shores, Valona,
Lepanto and Modon, were major centres for corsairs, who, even though operating independently from each other, at times gathered in their meeting point,
Valona.125 Nova, Drazzo, Santa Maura, Prevesa, and Coron were other important ports that corsairs frequented.
Yet, the Adriatic Sea had a special significance. Apart from the local officials,
Istanbul, too, supported the corsairs in the Adriatic for the very basic reason
that Ottoman naval power there had always been fragile. These shores were
strategically important for the Ottomans because of their proximity to Venice
and Habsburg Naples. However, the geographical distance between Istanbul
and the Adriatic Sea, penetrations by the Habsburg navy and the attacks that
121
BOA, MD, XXXVII, no. 1911 (28 Safer 987/26 April 1579) ordered the Kavala kapudanı
Memi Reis to hand over the Venetians who had been captured during the time of peace (zaman-ı
sulhde aldıkları zahir olmağın) to the Venetian bailo. BOA, MD, LX, no. 540 (28 Rebiülahir
994/18 April 1586) ordered the punishment of levends who were enslaving Venetians and the
return of Venetian slaves in Ottoman lands unless they converted to Islam.
122
BOA, MD, XLIII, no. 322 (Cemaziyelahir 988/June 1580).
123
BOA, MD, XXX, no. 427 (5 Rebiülevvel 985/23 May 1577).
124
BOA, MD, LVIII, nos. 661 (13 Ramazan 993/7 September 1585), 663 (13 Ramazan
993/7 September 1585).
125
Tenenti, “I corsari”, pp. 251, 282. A Spanish document gives information about the
Ottoman plans to place levends in Valona and make it a second Algiers, AGS, E 1124, f. 191
(Febrero 1559).
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
155
Muslim ships suffered from Venetian officers and (later in the century) the
Uskoks of Senj forced the Ottomans to use these corsairs in order to increase
their influence in the region. Several orders were dispatched to local officers
from the centre that these corsair levends be allowed to build galleys and buy
necessary raw materials and grain as long as they protected Ottoman shores
without molesting Ottoman subjects, the reaya.126 In an effort to control these
corsairs better, the Ottomans chose one of their captains to command them
and appointed him as the gönüllü levend reisleri kapudanı and at times Avlonya
azab ağası.127 During difficult times such as the Ottoman-Venetian war of
1570-1573, these corsairs proved their worth, especially as spies.128 The
Ottomans also used them against the Christian corsairs in the Adriatic who
captured Ottoman ships and attacked coastal areas. The failure of the Venetians
to provide protection to Ottoman ships or to contain Uskok piracy further
increased the importance of these corsairs in the Adriatic.129
126
The Ottomans forbade the governor of Karlıili to provide corsairs with grain unless they
helped with the protection of the coast under their commander Kara Hoca or spied on the
enemy, BOA, MD, VII, no. 526 (18 Cemaziyelahir 975/20 December 1567).
127
The most famous of these gönüllü levend reisleri kapudanı was Kara Hoca, see fn. 88.
128
For their intelligence activity during the war, see BOA, MD, XII, nos. 403 (16 Zilkade
978/11 April 1571), 532 (Gurre-i Safer 979/25 June 1572); XXIV, no. 76 (21 Zilkade 981/9
March 1574). See also fn. 38.
129
Based on the theory of mare clausum, the Venetians considered the Adriatic Sea their own.
All ships that sailed in this Golfo di Venezia had to obey Venetian laws. No foreign armed ship
was allowed while the merchant ships sailed with a passport and followed an established course
from and to their original destination. This claim brought Venice the responsibility of protecting
merchant vessels. The Ottomans themselves accepted these Venetian claims and expected, in
return, the protection of Venetian officials from corsair attacks, including those of the Uskoks,
Pedani, Maria Pia, “Ottoman merchants in the Adriatic. Trade and smuggling”, Acta Historiae,
16/1-2 (2008), pp. 156-60. Such responsibilities were also put in the Ottoman-Venetian ahdnames starting from 1518, Bostan, Adriyatik’te Korsanlık, p. 79. There are several recorded
Ottoman complaints about corsair attacks and demands for compensation and the restitution of
the captives in both the Ottoman (BOA, MD, V, no. 1194 (21 Zilkade 981/9 March 1574), VII,
no. 116 (19 Safer 975/25 August 1567), XXIV, nos. 45 (16 Zilkade 981/4 March 1571), 136
(29 Zilkade 981/17 March 1574); XXXIII, no. 686 (17 Zilhicce 985/25 February 1578),
XXXVI, nos. 428 (2 Safer 987/31 March 1579) and 442 (2 Safer 987/31 March 1579); XLVIII,
nos. 628 (9 Zilhicce 990/4 January 1583), 646 (18 Zilhicce 990/13 January 1583); LI, no. 93
(18 Şaban 991/6 September 1583), LII, no. 212 (8 Şevval 991/25 October 1583) and the
Venetian archives (ASV, Documenti Turchi, busta 5, nos. 623 (11-20 Safer 954/2-11 April 1554,
reprinted in I Libri Commemoriali della Republica di Venezia. Regesti, R. Predelli (ed.) (Venice,
1876-1914), 8 vols, libro XXII, no. 132), 701 (16 Ramazan 959/5 September 1552, reprinted
in Gökbilgin, M. Tayyib,“Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Kolleksiyonu ve Bizimle
İlgili Diğer Belgeler”, Belgeler: Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, 5-8 (1968-71), doc. 172); busta 7,
nos. 880 (11-20 Zilhicce/19-28 February 1578), 881 (28 September 1577), 882 (30 November
1577); busta 8, nos. 984 (1-10 Rebiülevvel 997/18-27 January 1589), 1016 (19 Marzo 1591).
156
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
The limits of Ottoman influence in North Africa
The Ottomans could not exercise a strict control over their North African
provinces. They constantly had to negotiate with different power groups such
as corsairs, janissaries, urban ulema and local tribes. Even during the climax of
Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the western Mediterranean, the Ottomans were
extremely reluctant to try to consolidate their power further in the region at
the expense of alienating these cliques. The distance surely hindered Ottoman
control over these provinces, and geographical barriers separated the province
from the centre. The sea itself, with its hostile winters and strong winds, was a
challenge to communications, while the desert which lay between Tripolis and
Egypt, itself a challenge to the Ottoman centralization efforts, did not serve to
link North Africa to the core Ottoman provinces. This resulted in the difficulty of concerted action and rendered Ottoman control too fragile. The problems of logistics worsened with the strategic stasis created by the changing
naval technology in the second half of the sixteenth century that rendered the
maintenance of a fleet too costly and operations in the western Mediterranean
less feasible.130 Due to such difficulties, the Ottomans were not interested in
more than a pragmatic policy where they were content with minimal direct
influence in the region as long as the corsairs sacked the Habsburg shores,
captured their ships, molested presidios, attacked Spanish allies in North
Africa, the Ottoman treasury received the annual tribute, the markets of
The complaint in ASV, Documenti Turchi, busta 6, no. 786 (1-10 Zilkade 971/11-20 June 1564,
reprinted in Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler”, I, doc. 11) is especially
interesting since the alleged victims were three Ottoman corsairs, Süleyman Reis, Parmaksız
Mustafa and Arab Hasan, whose ships were attacked by the Venetians and on whose behalf the
Ottoman authorities demanded compensation. The corsairs received 45,000 ducats. For summaries of these documents, see, Pedani Fabris, Maria Pia (ed.) I “Documenti Turchi” dell’Archivio
di Stato di Venezia, (Venezia: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali Ufficio Centrale per i
Beni Archivistici, 1994).
130
For these changes which limited the operational radius and therefore paralyzed the offensive capabilities of the galley, the main war vessel in the Mediterranean, see Guilmartin,
Gunpowder and Galleys, pp. 221-9. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the construction
of larger galleys that carried more men increased combat power, but reduced the space of storage
per man. With the added effect of the Price Revolution, the costs of operating a galley increased.
The increase in the number of oarsmen needed (from 144 to 160, and even 200 at Lepanto)
reduced the galley speed which created a stasis. Galleys with less hull space had to come to land
more frequently and it became harder for the Ottomans to operate away from their bases in the
western Mediterranean. Further, the increase in the amount of available artillery resulted in an
increased defensive firepower in the fortresses and curbed the offensive power of the galley. The
bow of a ship could carry a limited number of artillery, while this was not the case for the newly
designed coastal fortresses.
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
157
Istanbul enjoyed the influx of slaves and the coffers of the Ottoman elite were
filled with bribes and presents.
At the same time, Istanbul had an important function as the setting for final
appeal in several disputes and as the overseer of the balance between the three
provinces and between different cliques in the region. It chose to implement
its power on a number of occasions.
First, the Ottomans supervised the cooperation between the three provinces
and sent orders to coordinate unified action. One should not forget that the
North African provinces did not represent a unified political front. Corsairs,
appointed governors and local interest groups in each province had their own
political agenda which did not necessarily coincide. Neither was there a hierarchy between these provinces, although Algeria seemed to be the most important. The task of unifying and harmonizing, then, was Istanbul’s. In 1582, the
governor-general of Tripolitania received an order to help the bey of Gafsa in
subduing a local revolt.131 In 1586, the governor-general of Tunisia was
entrusted with the task of selling grain at a fixed price (narh-ı cari) to
Tripolitania where there was a famine.132 In the same year, the Ottomans
warned the corsairs about a possible Habsburg attack against Tunis, in communication with dissidents in the city (Tunus müfsidleri), and ordered cooperation between the governor-generals, governors and soldiers of the three
provinces.133 In 1593, this time the governor-general of Tunisia was to help
that of Tripolitania in suppressing a local rebellion.134
Second, the Ottomans sent several hükms that regulated justice in these
provinces and ordered investigations of abuses committed by the governorgenerals, provincial kaids, local janissaries and corsairs. In an order addressed
to the governor-general of Tripolitania and the judges of Tripolis and Djerba,
the Ottomans ordered an investigation of abuses committed by the former
governor-general Cafer as well as some local kaids, who seized the property of
local notables unlawfully while Cafer had appointed janissary commanders
from outside the janissary regiments, contrary to practice.135 A similar investigation was entrusted to diyar-ı garb defterdarı Mustafa, concerning the embezzlement of the property belonging to the Treasury (mal-ı miri ) by the former
governor-general of Tunisia Haydar and his accomplice Mehmed who was
131
BOA, MD, XLVII, no. 439 (16 Cemaziyelahir 990/7 July 1582).
BOA, MD, LX, no. 498 (28 Safer 994/17 February 1586).
133
BOA, MD, LXI, no. 34 (3 Receb 994/20 June 1586).
134
BOA, MD, LXIX, nos. 32 (3 Cemaziyelahir 1001/7 March 1593), 311 (Rebiülevvel
1001/6 December 1592/4 January 1593).
135
BOA, MD, XII, no. 306 (23 Şevval 979/23 February 1572).
132
158
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
originally given the task of compiling a tax register (tahrir) of Tunisia after its
conquest in 1574.136 One of Haydar’s successors suffered a similar fate in
1585. Local complaints about Mustafa Paşa who seized soldiers’ pay (kul
mevacibi ), embezzled miri property,137 as well as the property of the local people,138 confiscated grain to give it to his own hoca,139 violated the narh prices
by buying cheap and selling expensive,140 and forced local people to work
without pay,141 convinced the Ottomans that his abuses were to be investigated and the damages to be compensated. In another instance in 1581, the
grand admiral Uluç Ali was ordered to investigate the local complaints about
the abuses that his protégé Hasan Veneziano had committed in Algiers.142 In
1595, an arz, sent to Istanbul by the locals, complained about the governorgeneral of Tripolitania who monopolized the camel and sheep trade and made
a five-fold profit by selling them at inflated prices.143 In two instances, the
locals had a lawsuit against their governor-generals, the first in 1577 against
the former governor-general of Algeria, Ramazan Paşa,144 and the second in
1595 against the former governor-general of Tunisia whose departure was prevented by the plaintiffs.145 Istanbul, however, was not willing to leave its paşas
at the mercy of local discretion. In both instances, it ordered the departure of
the governor-generals and the transfer of the lawsuit to the capital. There were
complaints about the provincial administration as well. In 1587, the sancakbeyis of Tunisia were reported to be demanding more taxes than their share
from the people.146 An order addressed to the governor-general of Tripolitania
as well as the local kaids, strictly forbade over-taxation in 1595.147
The Ottomans also tried to prevent abuses by the local janissaries. These
abuses included punishing and executing the locals arbitrarily without the
approval of the judge,148 intervening in appointments and promotions (gedik
136
BOA, MD, XXXIX, nos. 432, 433 (12 Muharrem 988/27 February 1580).
BOA, MD, LVIII, nos. 557, 577 (17 Şaban 993/13 August 1585).
138
BOA, MD, LVIII, nos. 494 (25 Cemaziyelahir 993/ 24 June 1585), 558 (17 Şaban 993/13
August 1585).
139
BOA, MD, LVIII, no. 560 (17 Şaban 993/13 August 1585).
140
BOA, MD, LVIII, no. 496 (25 Cemaziyelahir 993/24 June 1585).
141
BOA, MD, LVIII, no. 565 (17 Şaban 993/13 August 1585).
142
BOA, MD, XLIV, no. 390 (7 Safer 991/2 March 1583).
143
BOA, MD, LXXIII, no. 1079 (20 Zilhicce 1003/26 August 1595).
144
BOA, MD, XXX, no. 469 (5 Rebiülevvel 985/23 May 1577).
145
BOA, MD, LXXIII, no. 228 (27 Şevval 993/5 July 1595).
146
BOA, MD, XLIV, no. 303 (996/2 December 1587-19 November 1588).
147
BOA, MD, LXXIII, no. 95 (Gurre-i Zilhicce 1003/7 August 1595).
148
BOA, MD, XXX, no. 532 (13 Rebiülevvel 985/31 May 1577).
137
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
159
ve terakki),149 and disobeying their commanders150 which they changed frequently without approval from the governor-general.151 They also developed a
habit of demanding a raise every time a new governor-general was appointed,
against which the Ottomans sent several prohibitive orders.152 The financial
burden of these raises could not be matched by the provincial income.153 This
left the Ottomans with a hard choice between risking a janissary revolt and
increasing the tax burden on the local population.154
Istanbul tried to take preventive measures to stop both the decay of
their control over the provinces and the janissary abuses. In 1582, they ordered
the expulsion of the troublesome janissaries in Algeria.155 In 1587, another
order was dispatched to Tunis that forbade the intervention of the janissaries
in local affairs which hurt the population.156 The same year, the janissaries
of Tripolis were involved in a series of illegal acts. They taxed the local people, seized their property and grain, prevented them from addressing their
complaints to the governor-general, asked for additional money from the
governor-general before going out to the provinces with him to collect annual
tributes from the local tribes (mahalleye çıkmak), and changed their officers
arbitrarily every two or three months.157 Local şeyhs complained to Istanbul158
that sent prohibitive orders.159 It was not only the local people who suffered.
In 1595, the governor-general of Tripolitania was entrusted with the task of
149
BOA, MD, LXIV, no. 289 (996/1 December 1587-20 November 1588); LXXIII, no. 998
(11 Şevval 1003/19 June 1595).
150
BOA, MD, XL, no. 232 (12 Şaban 987/3 October 1579).
151
BOA, MD, LXII, no. 372 (11 Safer 996/10 January 1588) for Tripolis; LXIV, no. 301
(996/1 December 1587-20 November 1588) for Tunis.
152
BOA, MD, XXX, no. 518 (13 Rebiülevvel 985/ 31 May 1577); XLVIII, no. 136 (Gurre-i
Şaban 990/20 August 1582); LXIV, no. 288 (996/1 December 1587-20 November 1588), LXX,
no. 413 (19 Cemaziyelahir 1001/23 March 1593).
153
The alienation of lands and income in the provinces that belonged to the treasury further
complicated the issue for the hard pressed provincial finances. For orders trying to prevent such
alienation in Algeria see BOA, MD, LXXIII, nos. 1253, 1254 (18 Şevval 1003/26 June 1595),
and in Tripolitania, see BOA, MD, LV, no. 64 (992-3/14 January 1584-22 December 1585). For
problems of paying the soldiers’ wages, see for Tunisia, BOA, MD, LVIII, no. 491 (25
Cemaziyelahir 993/24 June 1585); and for Tripolitania, BOA, MD, XXI, no. 163 (20 Safer
981/20 June 1573).
154
BOA, MD, LXIV, no. 288 (996/1 December 1587-20 November 1588).
155
BOA, MD, XLVIII, no. 127 (27 Receb 990/16 August 1582).
156
BOA, MD, LXIV, 289 (Şevval 995/September 1587).
157
BOA, MD, LXII, no. 309 (Gurre-i Muharrem 996/2 December 1587); LXIV, no. 231
(996/2 December 1587-19 November 1588).
158
BOA, MD, LXIV, no. 308 (996/2 December 1587-19 November 1588).
159
BOA, MD, LXIV, no. 309 (996/2 December 1587-19 November 1588).
160
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
preventing the janissaries from looting the property of his predecessor on
the way from the castle to the ship which would take the latter to Istanbul.160
The same year, the janissaries of Tunis tried to seize the slave rowers (forsa
kafir) in the baştarde of the former governor-general.161
Third, the Ottomans regulated disputes between the three beylerbeyiliks.
The most frequent of these disputes were the ones concerning the borders. In
1571, the Ottomans acquiesced in the demands of the Tunisian notables and
reattached the villages (nevahi) around Keyrevan to the jurisdiction of Tunis,
then newly conquered and still a sancak under Algeria.162 In 1579, a series of
orders were issued that regulated a major border dispute between Tripolitania
and Tunisia, concerning the ownership of large settlements such as Keyrevan,
Manastır, Gafsa and Sousa.163 When the Ottomans wanted to give these provinces back to Tripolitania, which held them before the final conquest of Tunisia
(1574), the governor-general and the janissaries of Tunisia did not want to
give them back. Another border dispute between these two provinces would
follow in 1588.164 Even a border dispute between Morocco and Algiers in
1584 was to be resolved with the intervention of Istanbul as the Moroccans
claimed that the contested territory had been granted them in the past by the
Ottomans.165
There were other less relevant issues that required the Ottomans’ attention
such as the dispute of protocol between the janissaries and the azabs that
would determine which one of these regiments would be placed on the right
flank of the army166 and the lawsuit between the governor-general of Tunisia
and the former governor-general of Tripolitania.167
The resistance to the centralization efforts of and the intervention from
Istanbul is more explicit in the frequent refusal of the Algerian janissaries to
accept the centrally appointed governor-general. There the Ottomans profited
from the rivalry between the corsairs and the janissaries in Algiers. The main
160
BOA, MD, LXXIII, no. 686 (13 Zilhicce 999/19 August 1595).
BOA, MD, LXXIII, no. 229 (17 Şevval 1003/25 June 1595).
162
BOA, MD, XVII, nos. 6, 8 (4 Muharrem 979/29 May 1571).
163
BOA, MD, XXXVI, nos. 230 (17 Zilhicce 986/13 February 1579), 457 (9 Safer 987/6
April 1579), 621 (6 Rebiülevvel 987/2 May 1579), 743 (27 Rebiülevvel 987/23 May 1579), 786
(6 Ramazan 987/1 June 1579); XLVI, no. 364 (10 Şevval 989/7 November 1581).
164
BOA, MD, LXII, no. 371 (11 Safer 996/10 January 1588), LXIV, nos. 225 (996/2
December 1587-19 November 1588), 226, (996/2 December 1587-19 November 1588), 314
(996/2 December 1587-19 November 1588).
165
BOA, MD, LII, no. 592 (13 Muharrem 992/26 January 1584).
166
BOA, MD, VII, no. 2399 (10 Cemaziyelahir 976/31 October 1568).
167
BOA, MD, LXII, no. 280 (Şevval 995/September 1587).
161
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
161
issue of contention was economic. The janissaries wanted to participate in
corsair raids and thus get a share from the booty and asked the corsairs to
assume their share of burden by going out to the provinces and collecting
tributes.168 Even though Hasan Paşa tried to solve this problem by allowing
the janissaries on corsair ships in 1567,169 the rivalry did not end. An order, in
1593, tells us that corsairs were not paying their dues (penc-i yek ve bazı avaid)
to help the janissary payments even though they manned their ships with
them.170 In the end, the rivalry between these two corps, coupled with the
corsairs’ dependence upon the resources and the protection of the Ottomans,
convinced the corsairs to take sides with the centre at times when the janissaries proved themselves centrifugal.
The first janissary opposition took place in 1556, when they did not want
to allow the newly appointed governor-general Mehmed Paşa to Algeria and
sent orders to the kaids of Bougie and Bone to that effect. The paşa, having
been refused entrance by these local kaids, anchored in front of the city of
Algiers instead and could only enter the city with the help of the corsairs who
tricked the janissaries. He then punished the janissaries and executed his contender Hasan Corso. He could not, however, establish his rule as another
rebellion took his life. The kaid of Tlemcen, Yusuf, in order to avenge Hasan’s
execution, took arms, defeated and executed the paşa.171 In 1561, suspicious
of the alliance that Hasan Paşa contracted with the sultan of Kouko by marrying his daughter, and irritated by his appointing the ineligible kuloğlu172 to
important positions, the janissaries arrested Hasan Paşa with his allies in the
city, Uluç Ali and Kaid Hasan, and sent them in chains to Istanbul.173 In 1562,
Istanbul sent Ahmed Paşa, but upon his death reinstated Hasan Paşa the same
year. When the same Uluç Ali, who was put in chains by the janissaries
in 1561, became the governor-general in 1568, his relations with the janissaries became even worse,174 because he paid their wages irregularly.175 In 1569,
168
Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, p. 101; BOA, MD, VII, no. 655 (6 Receb 975/6 January
1568).
169
Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, pp. 133-4.
170
BOA, MD, LXX, no. 417 (19 Cemaziyelahir 1001/23 March 1593).
171
Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, p. 100-10.
172
The kuloğlus, the children of the governing Ottoman elites by local women, were not
allowed to take part in the army in North African provinces.
173
Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, pp. 121-3; İlter, Şimali Afrika’da Türkler, I, p. 140.
174
They sent a delegate to Istanbul to complain, AGS E 487, Relación de dos cartas de Juan
Baptista Ferraro de Constantinopla a 25 de Junio 1569, E 487, al Conde de Benavente, 30 de
Enero 1569.
175
Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, pp. 145-6.
162
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
the revolt in Tripolis cost the governor-general his life.176 In 1579, the Algerian
janissaries sent a complaint to the sultan that included the signatures of important local figures, accusing and asking for the removal of the governor-general
Hasan Veneziano. Istanbul sent Cafer Paşa to replace him and investigate the
issue. He arrived in January 1580, sent Hasan back to Istanbul and imprisoned his accomplices.177 Later, some discontented janissaries and local kaids,
whom he had punished, devised a plot against Cafer Paşa; but the plot was
revealed and they were all executed.178 The next year, the janissaries took a
further step in disobedience and flatly refused the orders of the grand admiral
Uluç Ali to embark on his ships for a campaign against Morocco and asked for
explicit orders from the sultan to whom they sent envoys. Istanbul aborted the
expedition which Uluç Ali had tried for years to persuade the sultan to undertake.179 In 1592, when Haydar Paşa was called back to Istanbul, the janissaries
of Algiers sent a delegation of bölükbaşıs to the capital to complain about the
cruelties and injustices of the former governor-general. Istanbul took no
action, but instead appointed him back to Algiers in 1595.180
Ottoman control over the North African provinces loosened even further
with the end of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the western Mediterranean
and the declining interest of the Ottomans in the region.181 After the recall of
176
According to a Venetian document cited by Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de
l’Empire Ottoman depuis son origine jusqu’à nos jours, J.J. Hellert (trans.) (Istanbul: Les editions
Isis, 1996), vol. VI, p. 169, fn. 2.
177
Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, pp. 179-81.
178
Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, pp. 185-6.
179
Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, pp. 186-8.
180
Haëdo, Histoire des rois d’Alger, p. 214.
181
Preliminary peace talks started in 1577. A suspension of arms was agreed to in 1578
which became a three-year truce in 1581. Braudel covered these negotiations extensively, see.
Braudel, La Méditerranée, II, Chapter V, pp. 431-68. For a more detailed study, Rodríguez
Salgado, M. J., Felipe II, el “Paladín de la Cristiandad y la paz con el Turco” (Valladolid: Universidad
de Valladolid, 2004). There is extensive documentation in AGS, E 488, 489, 490, 491. There
is also a number of documents in the Ottoman archives, such as salvocondotti and orders concerning the voyages and the safety of Spanish envoys. For Martin d’Acuña, see BOA, MD, XXX,
nos. 76 (28 Muharrem 985/17 April 1577), 78 (28 Muharrem 985/17 April 1577); for Santa
Croce, see XXXI, no. 49 (28 Rebiülahir 985/15 July 1577), for Juan Stefano, see XXXIII, nos.
559 (27 Zilkade 985/5 February 1578), 560 (27 Zilkade 985/5 February 1578), 561 (27 Zilkade
985/5 February 1578), 637 (18 Zilhicce 985/26 February 1578), XLII, nos. 611 (18 Muharrem
989/22 February 1581), 612 (18 Muharrem 989/22 February 1581), 672 (4 Safer 989/10
March 1581), XLIII, no. 542 (11 Ramazan 988/20 October 1580). I could not find data for the
envoy who arrived in 1584. For Spanish envoys who came to renew the truce in 1587, see BOA,
MD, LXII, nos. 111 and 113 (16 Cemaziyelevvel 995/24 April 1587); for those who came in
1591, LXVII, no. 602 (2 Rebiülevvel 1000/2 December 1591). See also, XXXV, no. 42 (19
Rebiülahir 986/25 June 1578); XXXVI, nos. 107, 108 (19 Zilkade 986/17 January 1579);
E.S. Gürkan / Turkish Historical Review 1 (2010) 125–163
163
the navy from Algiers in 1581, and the abandonment of the campaign against
Morocco, the Ottomans did not take action in the western Mediterranean.
In 1583, they rejected Hasan Veneziano’s proposal of a campaign against
Oran.182 They left the navy unattended, a situation which Venetian observers
vividly related.183 Despite several attempts to revive the Ottoman presence
in the western Mediterranean by a coalition of grand admiral Uluç Ali and
the ambassadors of France, England and Dom António, the pretender to the
Portuguese throne, as well as an interest in 1590-92 in helping Henri de
Navarre and the Huguenots against Philip II and the Catholic League,184 the
Ottomans refrained from action and chose to fight land wars against Austria
and Persia. The economic hardships of the Price Revolution, hand in hand
with the changing naval technology forced the Ottomans to abandon their
Mediterranean policy until 1645 when Ottoman naval forces began their
assault on Crete.
XL, nos. 276-7 (20 Cemaziyelevvel 987/15 July 1579); XLVIII, no. 1085 (991/25 January
1583-14 January 1584).
182
BOA, MD, LVIII, no. 230 (17 Cemaziyelevvel 993/17 May 1585).
183
Relazione di Giacomo Soranzo (1584), in Costantinopoli, relazioni inedite (1512-1789),
Maria Pia Pedani (ed.), in Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al Senato tratte dalle migliori edizioni
disponibili e ordinate cronologicamente, Luigi Firpo (ed.) (Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1996), vol.
XIV, p. 277; Relazione di Giovanni Moro (1590), in Albèri, Relazioni, Serie III, vol. III, pp. 349,
355; Relazione di Lorenzo Bernardo (1592), in Albèri, Relazioni, Serie III, vol. II, pp. 340-4.
Matteo Zane could not suppress his joy when he saw the miserable situation of the Ottoman
navy: “…si possa desiderar maggiore per servizio della cristianità”, Relazione di Matteo Zane
(1594), in Albèri, Relazioni, Serie III, vol. III, p. 403.
184
Fodor, Pál, “Between two continental wars: the Ottoman naval preparations in 15901592”, in Fodor, Pál, In Quest of the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics, and Military
Administration in the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul, Isis, 2000), p. 186.
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